JOINT FORCE QUAR TERLY JFQ - National Defense …ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-35.pdf · JOINT FORCE QUAR TERLY A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL JFQ ... Air Wing/Tony

J O I N T F O R C E Q U A R T E R L Y

A P R O F E S S I O N A L M I L I T A R Y J O U R N A L

JFQCenter ofGravity

HomelandSecurity

ConsequenceManagement

Command andControl

Effects-BasedOperations

35I s s u e

Signal Corps officers like to remind usthat “although Congress can make ageneral, it takes communications tomake him a commander.”

—Omar N. Bradley

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JFQJ O I N T F O R C E Q U A R T E R L Y

Published for theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

by the Institute for National Strategic StudiesNational Defense University

Washington, D.C.

J O I N T F O R C E Q U A R T E R L Y

A P R O F E S S I O N A L M I L I T A R Y J O U R N A L

JFQCenter ofGravity

HomelandSecurity

ConsequenceManagement

Command andControl

Effects-BasedOperations

35I s s u e

coming next . . .

the future of Reserve Forcesplus

psychological operations,component commands,

asymmetric warfare,

and more in issue thirty-six of JFQ

1 A Word from the Chairmanby Richard B. Myers

8 From the Field and Fleet: Letters to the Editor

J F Q F O R U M

9 Clausewitz and War

10 Center of Gravity:Recommendations forJoint Doctrineby Antulio J. Echevarria II

18 Interpreting the Legacy of Clausewitzby Christopher Bassford

20 Center of Gravity: WhatClausewitz Really Meantby Joseph L. Strange and Richard Iron

28 U.S. Strategic Command—Meeting Global Challengesby James O. Ellis, Jr.

34 The DOD Role in HomelandSecurityby Adrian A. Erckenbrack and Aaron Scholer

42 Disengaging fromConsequence Managementby Joel D. Cusker, Charles H. Hash,Mary E. Landry, and Dallas D. Owens

50 Charting New Seas: Navy-Coast Guard Cooperationby Charles S. Hamilton II and Patrick M. Stillman

58 Linking Conventional andSpecial Operations Forcesby Ronald S. Mangum

64 The Evolution of SpecialOperations Joint Firesby Eric Braganca

M I L I T A R Y T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

69 Transforming JointWarfighting Capabilitiesby Scott E. Jasper

77 Stepping Outside the RealityBoxby Mark R. Lewis and John C.F. Tillson

83 Information Operations andMillennium Challengeby Mark W. Maiers and Timothy L. Rahn

88 Ground Radar Surveillanceand Targetingby Price T. Bingham

95 Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution inthe Era of Forward Reachby Mark G. Davis

100 Operational Command and Control in theInformation Ageby Milan N. Vego

■ C O N T E N T S

2 JFQ / issue thirty-five

The cover shows marines firing 155mm howitzer, IraqiFreedom (U.S. Marine Corps/Andreas A. Plaza). The frontinside cover features soldiers in Bradley fighting vehicle,Iraqi Freedom (982d Combat Camera/Lee Davis); USNSSpica alongside USS Harry S. Truman, Enduring Freedom(Navy Visual News Service/John L. Beeman); Marine am-phibious vehicles on Splash Beach, Okinawa (1st MarineAir Wing/Tony Vega); and F–16s over Mediterranean (U.S.Air Force/Mark Bucher). The table of contents depicts ac-cident response exercise (20th Communications Squadron/Josef Cole). The back inside captures C–17 dispersing

countermeasure flares (U.S. Air Force). The back cover highlights activities of theReserve Forces: rehearsing crowd control (Fort McCoy/Lou Ann Mittelstaedt); re-fueling F–15s (83d Fighter Squadron/Michael Ammons); conducting weaponstraining (Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific/Brandon A. Teeples); and flying tolive fire exercise (16th Special Operation Wing/Greg L. Davis).

P H O T O C R E D I T S

JFQ

129 Trends in Future Warfareby Christopher J. Bowie, Robert P. Haffa, Jr., and Robert E. Mullins

134 The Other Gulf War: BritishIntervention in Iraq, 1941by Douglas Porch

O F C H I E F S A N D C H A I R M E N

141 Wallace Martin Greene, Jr.

O F F T H E S H E L F

143 Bombing Serbia intoSubmission: A Review Essayby Conrad C. Crane

144 Statecraft and MaritimePower: A Book Reviewby Thomas G. Mahnken

145 Chinese Naval Power: A Book Review by Larry M. Wortzel

146 Wars and Rumors of Wars: A Book Reviewby James Jay Carafano

108 Revisiting the Korean Tree-Trimming Incidentby Richard A. Mobley

116 The Origins of Effects-BasedOperationsby Phillip S. Meilinger

123 Systems Integration and theNew American Way of Warby Paul Bracken

Joint Force Quarterly

I S S U E T H I R T Y - F I V E

issue thirty-five / JFQ 3

JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffby the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De-fense University, to promote understanding of the integratedemployment of land, sea, air, space, and special operationsforces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare,contingency planning, combat operations conducted by theunified commands, and joint force development.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex-pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defenseor any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted

portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extractedwithout permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg-ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate-rial is quoted from or based on its contents.

This publication has been approved by the Secretary of De-fense. All previous issues have been published electronicallyand are available over the Internet at the address indicatedbelow. Paid subscriptions to JFQ are offered through the U.S.Government Printing Office.

The editors invite articles and other contributions on jointwarfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and

topics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 148for details). Please direct all editorial communications to:

Editor, Joint Force QuarterlyATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62)Fort Lesley J. McNairWashington, D.C. 20319–5066

Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219e-mail: [email protected]://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm

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Stephen J. FlanaganDirector

Institute for National Strategic StudiesEditor-in-Chief

William A. RawleyArt Director

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Institute for National Strategic StudiesEditor

Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hays, USAFExecutive Editor

Calvin B. KelleyCopy Editor

ISSN 1070–0692 Published in October 2004


O ne of my three agenda items as Chair-man is military transformation, an im-perative that is obviously gainingacceptance across the defense commu-

nity. It is difficult to find an argument for stand-ing still rather than developing new capabilities.Yet there are many unresolved issues becauseclarity on the future environment is lacking.

Despite such uncertainties, there are manycapabilities that must be transformed in order toget to the fight more quickly, achieve better infor-mation sharing and command and control, increase interoperability, and improve interagencycoordination. And while progress on transforma-tion in the 1990s was not insignificant, 9/11

raised the stakes. Terrorists, who want to under-mine the very principles on which America isfounded, threaten our security at home andabroad.

The Armed Forces have many advantagesover potential enemies: command and control,logistics, precision weaponry, and professional-ism. But terrorists pose an unconventional threatthat is highly adaptable and shrewd. For example,while many al Qaeda leaders have been killed orcaptured, their command and control networkhas adjusted. It is necessary to transform in orderto be more agile, responsive, and capable to de-feat global terrorism.

JFQAWord fromthe

Chairman

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Paratroopers boardingC–130 in Iraq.

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ExperimentationTransformation has three aspects: technolog-

ical, intellectual, and cultural. New technologyand weapons systems are important, but oldproblems also must be approached in new ways—the intellectual piece. And the ways in which or-ganizations interact—components, services, agen-cies, and allies—must change. That is the culturalaspect, which is probably the greatest challenge.

There are real benefits in understanding re-sistance to change. As part of the CJCS lecture se-ries, I recently invited Hugh O’Neill of the Uni-versity of North Carolina to address the subject oftransformation. He has written and lecturedwidely to business and government audiences onthe dynamics that make organizations resistant tochange. The key influences that work againstchange are size, age, and success. Although these

factors strike close to home for many of us in uni-form, O’Neill identified some methods to over-come them. He recommended encouraging inno-vation and risk-taking by breaking out smallergroups that can function separately from the day-to-day tasks of the organization. These groupswould go outside normal processes to come upwith innovative ideas. There is a growing com-munity hard at work doing just that. We callthem experimenters.

Experimenting is not new, especially inwartime. During the Civil War, the Navy built andemployed USS Monitor, a ship that was really afloating set of experiments; it had ironclad armor,an innovative hull design, and a moveable gunturret. Aviation was in its infancy in World War Iwhen the Army Air Corps experimented with ob-servation, aerial gunnery, and bombing. In theKorean War, the Army experimented with combatmedical care, aeromedical evacuation by heli-copter, and MASH field hospitals, all of which dra-matically reduced combat casualties.

What defines experimentation—whether ittakes place in isolation or as part of an exercise,wargame, or demonstration—is applying scientificmethod to evaluate a concept. Experiments testideas by hypothesizing, testing the hypothesis,collecting data, and analyzing results to determinetheir validity. By contrast, traditional exercisesprovide training for commanders, staffs, and unitsto practice existing doctrine and capabilities.

■ A W O R D F R O M T H E C H A I R M A N


Joint Force Quarterly

Gen Richard B. Myers, USAFPublisher

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Lt Gen Michael M. Dunn, USAF ■ National Defense UniversityChairman

BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman

Maj Gen John J. Catton, Jr., USAF ■ The Joint Staff

A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College

RADM Patrick W. Dunne, USN ■ Naval Postgraduate School

Maj Gen Robert J. Elder, Jr., USAF ■ Air War College

Col George E. Flemming, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College

MG David H. Huntoon, USA ■ U.S. Army War College

RADM Richard D. Jaskot, USN ■ National War College

VADM Timothy J. Keating, USN ■ The Joint Staff

Col Walter L. Niblock, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College

MG Kenneth J. Quinlan, Jr., USA ■ Joint Forces Staff College

RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN ■ Naval War College

BG Volney J. Warner, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

MajGen Frances C. Wilson, USMC ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces

EDITORIAL BOARD

Stephen J. Flanagan ■ National Defense UniversityChairman

Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University

Col John M. Calvert, USAF ■ Joint Forces Staff College

Stephen D. Chiabotti ■ School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

Eliot A. Cohen ■ The Johns Hopkins University

COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy

Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University

Alan L. Gropman ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces

CAPT Chester E. Helms, USN ■ Naval War College

Mark H. Jacobsen ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Daniel T. Kuehl ■ Information Resources Management College

Kathleen Mahoney-Norris ■ Air Command and Staff College

Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation

William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College

John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago

LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute

Col Thomas C. Skillman, USAF ■ Air War College

COL Robert E. Smith, USA ■ U.S. Army War College

LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University

Col Gary West, USAF ■ National War College

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

(continued from page 1)

what defines experimentation is applying scientific method toevaluate a concept

The real key to experimentation is risk-tak-ing. Although the acquisition process attempts tomitigate risk by a structured approach and rigor-ous accountability, experimenters accept a certaindegree of risk. Outcomes are not predetermined;failure is an option. That amounts to a culturalchange for most. For example, in a recent experi-ment, an off-the-shelf networking program wasused to link planners. It did not work, so U.S.Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), working withthe Defense Information Systems Agency, wentback to the drawing board to find a better tool.

Even as a formal process to support transfor-mation, experimentation has been taking placethroughout the Department of Defense for sometime. The services have been making progress forabout a decade, and their battle labs have beenexperimenting and developing concepts for years.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, estab-lished in 1995, has developed and fielded a rangeof projects. For example, it designed and testedthe chemical and biological incident response

force, which became operational at Camp Lejeune. The Army, Navy, and Air Force have 27labs in all, but until recently no one was responsi-ble for coordinating them. Today the joint com-munity is making great strides in linking experi-ments to lessons learned and required jointcapabilities as well as coordinating experimentsamong the services and combatant commands.

Steering the CourseLast year, JFCOM assumed the lead role in

military transformation. One of its functions is issuing the joint concept development and exper-imentation campaign plan, which lays out criteriaand priorities for all joint experiments. The com-mand coordinates experiments with all services,combatant commands, and other Governmentagencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investiga-tion, Central Intelligence Agency, and Justice Department, as well as allied nations.

One task that JFCOM must tackle, alongwith other players, is balancing readiness againstmid- and long-term transformation. ProfessorO’Neill suggested ways to have highly indepen-dent groups begin transformation experiments,

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Patrolling in Al Fallujah,Iraqi Freedom.

increase efforts within existing organizations fo-cusing on mid-term modernization, and encour-age critical thinking to come up with innovativesolutions for the long term. The JFCOM vision ofexperimentation is strikingly similar, encouragingefforts along two separate paths. The first isaimed at the near term—fielding prototypesquickly to solve existing problems. The second isaimed at developing innovative concepts and ca-pabilities for the future. Both are critical. In fight-ing the global war on terrorism we must trans-form in midstride, balancing short-term needswith longer-range vision to ensure that we are asprepared as possible to meet future threats.

The Olympic event of experimentation todate was Millennium Challenge in summer 2002,which involved more than 13,500 people and an

enormous simulation network. The experimentscovered everything from headquarters commandand control to individual weapon systems. Oneconcept tested was standing joint force headquar-ters (SJFHQ), conceived as a means to provide thecombatant commander with a core command andcontrol team, along with collaborative networkingcapabilities, for joint task force headquarters. Thegoal is eliminating the spin-up time for ad hoc,service-centric headquarters to respond to contin-gencies as combined and joint headquarters.

Initially, XVIII Airborne Corps had the leadfor the SJFHQ experiment, but it could not partic-ipate in Millennium Challenge because it was de-ployed to Afghanistan; III Corps responded injust three weeks. This late change in the gameplan actually proved beneficial. Despite short no-tice, III Corps validated the headquarters conceptby becoming operational in only five days.

Information sharing was another focus ofMillennium Challenge. At one point, 800 peoplewere networked in a collaborative information en-vironment that furnished situation awareness onopposing forces, Web portal to access databases,and a collaborative tool. The prototype systemthat resulted is about to be fielded in Korea, thePacific region, and various non-DOD agencies.

The air component conducted several experi-ments within Millennium Challenge, including aprogram for generating air tasking orders and animproved process for time-sensitive targeting.These capabilities were employed in Iraqi Free-dom, with over 800 time-sensitive targets struck.

Experiments went beyond headquarters in-formation systems and strategic and operationalprocesses to tactical aspects of joint warfighting.For example, the Army Stryker Brigade proved itsintratheater ability to deploy, flying aboardC–130s to the National Training Center. Thebrigade is now serving in Iraq. In another exam-ple, the Marine Corps experimented with DragonEye—a five-pound, $70,000 UAV designed to pro-vide surveillance and reconnaissance out to sixmiles. This vehicle was also employed duringIraqi Freedom.

Enhanced JointnessThe experimentation community is func-

tioning in high gear. The JFCOM charter ensuresthat it will not lose sight of its primary objective:enhanced joint warfighting. As Chairman, I havestressed the need to look beyond the ArmedForces in planning and executing operations tobring every instrument of national power to bearin a coherent way. Experimentation is fertileground for exercising interagency processes.

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Millennium Challenge investigated a conceptknown as the joint interagency coordinationgroup that provides civilian perspectives and con-tacts to joint task forces. It is being expandedfrom an initial focus on counterterrorism to therange of military operations. The day may not betoo far off when we will include the private sectorin the integration process.

Multinational cooperation is important infighting the global war on terrorism, and JFCOMexperimentation is breaking new ground by test-ing allied participation in collaborative networks.

In the last event, the ArmedForces linked with four nationalmilitaries and performed a com-bined operational net assess-ment. This comprehensiveanalysis of enemy capabilitiesevaluated not only instruments

of power such as military forces, but networksand alliances, intellectual and financial resources,and other national assets. The next multinationalexperiment will involve six nations and focus oncombined effects-based planning.

Experiments are vital in creating momentumand cutting across barriers. However, they are notthe answer to every transformation challenge.

First, like all new processes and systems, it isnecessary to think jointly from the outset. Thejoint direct attack munition (JDAM) is a successin part because it was born joint. In Desert Storm,less than 10 percent of air-to-ground bombs werelaser guided and only 5 percent of air-to-groundfighters could even guide them. After the PersianGulf War, JDAM kits were developed to provide

global positioning to all weapons delivered byNavy, Marine, and Air Force platforms. In IraqiFreedom, nearly every air-to-ground fighter andbomber employed JDAM or other precision muni-tions day or night in any weather.

Second, experimenters must share informa-tion and stay connected to lessons learned fromongoing operations. Together with the MarineCorps, JFCOM recently hosted Emerald Express.Returning warfighters from five services and sev-eral coalition nations met with concept develop-ers to discuss lessons from Iraqi Freedom and gen-erate ideas for future experiments. This is exactlythe right approach.

Third, experimentation must balance costsand risks against potential benefits. MillenniumChallenge cost on the order of $250 million, but itwas a needed, innovative set of experiments.Smaller events, whether conducted independentlyor as part of larger exercises, also play a major roleand may provide substantial benefits.

Many past experiments were born of neces-sity. When Americans are engaged in combat,their willingness to take risks at home increases.But in times of peace, innovation tends to followa more cautious path. Should a pause occur in theglobal war on terrorism—which may take sometime—experimentation can play an importantrole in transformation by providing an environ-ment for continued risk-taking.

Innovation is measured by its impact on theenvironment. In other words, we are looking forgood ideas with practical applications to solvereal-world problems or create new capabilities.Above all, experimentation is a means to an end:improved joint warfighting.

Military transformation has come a longway, but the Armed Forces are still organized forthe 20th century. Though it is necessary to be pre-pared to defeat conventional threats, terrorism isdifferent and requires being ready for the un-known. Change implies taking risks to provideevery possible advantage when going into harm’sway. Warfare will always be part art and part sci-ence. Experimentation is one project in whichscientific methods and creative ideas combine togenerate dramatic results for joint warfighters.

RICHARD B. MYERSChairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

experiments are vital increating momentum andcutting across barriers

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K now thy enemy. That adage has beenrepeated since armies first clashed onthe field of battle. Understandingenemy intentions, tactics, and vulner-

abilities is an essential part of warfare. But it isalso necessary to know your friends. Making ene-mies is easy, but it is harder to make friends. Thewrong approach to allied or occupied countriescan quickly create enemies.

The United States has not been an occupyingpower since immediately after World War II. In

Korea and Vietnam,where the goal was fight-ing and leaving, sensitiv-ity to local culture wasimportant, although itwas not a long-term con-cern. In Iraq, however, acultural divide brought

to the fore issues that three generations of sol-diers have considered only peripherally.

Operating in a foreign land can be a mine-field. Few members of the Armed Forces will befamiliar with cultural traditions of the countriesin which they operate. Yet violation of localnorms and beliefs can turn a welcoming popula-tion into a hostile mob.

Iraqis arrested by U.S. troops have had theirheads forced to the ground, a position forbiddenby Islam except during prayers. This action of-fends detainees as well as bystanders. In Bosnia,American soldiers angered Serbs by greeting them

with the two-fingered peace sign, a gesture com-monly used by their Croat enemies. And the cir-cled-finger “A–OK” signal was a gross insult to So-malis. The military has enough to worry aboutwithout alienating the local population.

Afghanistan and IraqThough it may be premature to draw defini-

tive lessons from Afghanistan or Iraq, it is clearthat the Armed Forces lack sophisticated knowl-edge of foreign countries. That does not dishonortheir performance; cultural awareness is not amission-essential task—but it should be.

Winning a conflict means more than subdu-ing an enemy. While the U.S. military ran intotrouble in the past, it was not because it lackedcombat skills, personal courage, or the necessaryresources. As operations in Afghanistan and Iraqhave demonstrated, the process of restructuringthe political order, economy, and social well-being of an entire country is as critical as defeat-ing organized resistance. But it is cultural aware-ness that helps determine whether a hostpopulation supports long-term American militarypresence—and may determine the outcome ofthe mission.

It is uncertain whether the majority of theIraqi people will support the multinational ef-forts, which many see as responsible for the un-rest. Rebuilding Iraq may hinge on drawing ap-propriate inferences from ethnic and religiousaspects of its culture—including tribal dynam-ics—and then properly responding to them.Commanders in Iraq have stressed the impor-tance of being aware of these elements of the se-curity landscape.

You’re Not fromAround Here, Are You?By I K E S K E L T O N and J I M C O O P E R

The Honorable Ike Skelton and the Honorable Jim Cooper are membersof the House Armed Services Committee.

rebuilding Iraq may hinge ondrawing appropriate inferencesfrom ethnic and religiousaspects of its culture

S k e l t o n a n d C o o p e r

The House Armed Services Committee held ahearing in late 2003 to examine the lessons ofIraqi Freedom at which Major General RobertScales, Jr., USA (Ret.), highlighted the requirementfor cultural awareness among both civilian andmilitary personnel. His testimony emphasizedthat had American planners better understoodIraqi culture, efforts to win the peace would havebeen more sound. Senior officials and command-ers might have reached a different conclusion onthe willingness of Iraqis to welcome the U.S. mili-tary for an extended period of reconstruction.

Events during Uphold Democracy furtheremphasized cultural differences:

The Army in general had little appreciation ofHaitian history and culture. Few planners knew any-thing about Haiti other than its basic geography. In acombat operation, where overwhelming firepowerachieves objectives, sensitivity for the local popula-tion’s culture and traditions clearly is not a top prior-ity. In a peace operation such as Uphold Democracy,however, knowledge of how a people think and act,and how they might react to military intervention, ar-guably becomes paramount. The U.S. military culturein general focuses on training warriors to use fire andmaneuver and tends to resist the notion of cultureawareness.1

The need for cultural awareness is notunique to the American military. Russian soldiersin Chechnya made cultural blunders in dealing

with local civilians who, once insulted or mis-treated, either supported active resistance fightersor joined them. Moreover, Russian leaders real-ized that they had underestimated the influenceof religion in the region.

Cultural AwarenessUnderstanding the culture and social factors

peculiar to the countries in which Americans aremost likely to be deployed will make the environ-ment work to U.S. advantage. On the lowestlevel, awareness means knowing enough aboutlocal culture to permit military personnel to oper-ate effectively. Along with linguistic capability,cultural awareness can highlight political, social,and other characteristics of the operational area.It can explain why local people may see thingsdifferently from Americans. It can enable troopson the ground to understand how their attitudesand actions directly influence mission outcome.

The Armed Forces often operate as part ofcoalitions and alliances. Nations cannot work to-gether without recognizing their cultural differ-ences—where the other guy is coming from. Thatawareness becomes even more important overtime. It is not a touchy-feely or nice-to-have so-cial grace; it is basic intelligence on attitudes andpotential actions of host nations and coalitionpartners. Only such insights can enable the mili-tary to understand other cultures.

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The 1940 Marine Corps manual on insur-gency noted that:

The motive in small wars is not material de-struction. It is usually a project dealing with social,economic, and political development of the people. Itis of primary importance that the fullest benefit be de-rived from the psychological aspects of the situation.That implies a serious study of the people, theirracial, political, religious, and mental development.By analysis and study the reasons for the existingemergency may be deduced; the most practicalmethod of solving the problem is to understand thepossible approaches thereto and the repercussion to beexpected from any actions which may be contem-plated. By this study and ability to apply correct psy-chological doctrine, many pitfalls may be avoided andthe success of the undertaking assured.2

Stability operations and postconflict recon-struction are among the major challenges facingthe military in the post-Cold War world. This was

clear even beforeAfghanistan and Iraq—two battlefronts in theglobal war on terrorism.

The Army and Ma-rine Corps have a his-tory of conducting suchoperations under the

rubric of low intensity conflict and military opera-tions other than war. Operations in the Philippinesfrom 1899 to 1903 and in Haiti from 1994 to1995 also offer examples of partial success in suchefforts. Other than foreign area officers, defenseattachés, and Special Forces, there is insufficientcultural awareness and linguistic skill amongcommissioned and noncommissioned officers.

A combat brigade would not be deployedinto hostile territory without maps. The beliefs ofa culture are as critical as terrain features. Theunit should have those coordinates as well.

Defining the NeedPredeployment preparations must include

cultural awareness training. Just as personnel aretrained in specific tactics, they should be providedan understanding of the environment where theywill operate. The ability of deployed personnel todraw inferences from experience or study couldcontribute decisively to the national strategy.

General Scales describes the operational en-vironment and importance of cultural awareness:

The image of sergeants and captains actingalone in the Afghanistan wilderness and the sands ofIraq, innovating on the fly with instruments of strate-gic killing power, reaffirms the truth that today’s lead-ers must acquire the skills and wisdom to lead indi-rectly at a much lower level. Today‘s tactical leadersmust be able to act alone in ambiguous and uncertaincircumstances, lead soldiers they cannot touch, thinkso as to anticipate the enemy’s actions—they must betactically proactive rather than reactive.3

The need for cultural awareness extends be-yond the foxhole. Senior officers must create anappropriate command climate. Civilian officialsneed to be culturally aware in developing policyand strategy. They must know that imposingAmerican values on unwilling people in a foreigncountry may have undesired strategic and opera-tional consequences. Deployed personnel musthave sufficient awareness in theaters where am-biguous and contradictory situations are thenorm. And because of the reliance on the Reservecomponents, they must have similar training.

At a minimum, training on cultural aware-ness should occur on two levels. The first wouldbe focused on planners. As an interim measure,programs for flag and field grade officers wouldbe appropriate, along with greater emphasis oncultural awareness in curricula at both the staffand war college levels. As soon as practical, thattraining should be extended to all officers.

One report on the experiences of general of-ficers who served in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haitinoted the need for additional training.

Greater emphasis must be placed on geopoliticaland cultural training for the Army‘s officer corps.Such training must begin at the officer basic courseand continue at all levels of professional military edu-cation. Officers at all grades will benefit from suchtraining because of the likelihood that they will be in-volved in peace operations on multiple occasionsthroughout their careers.4

personnel must have awarenessin theaters where ambiguousand contradictory situations arethe norm

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Training should be comprehensive and of-fered to both the active and Reserve components.The ideal program would reward continued learn-ing and require that officers get an early start onbecoming indirect leaders. Unit leaders wouldmentor their performance while undergoing in-struction. Both the classroom and distance learn-ing would stretch across career assignments. Thecurriculum would be historically based and thor-oughly joint.

The second tier involves language and areastudies. Commissioned and noncommissionedleaders must possess some language skills and un-derstanding of nations to which they are de-ployed. This sort of training results in streetsense—knowing how to gather intelligence fromlocal people. That can only happen with culturalawareness. It is the level on which simple linguis-tic skills are essential: Halt, lay down your weapon.But it is better to warn of the likely consequencesof such interactions with locals.

Compared to education, training involvesimparting specific skills. It can be prepackagedand offered throughout a career. It is part of thedaily military routine. As one officer described hisexperience in Bosnia:

Specialists are assigned to ensure the command-ers are politically astute, historically aware, and cul-turally sensitized. Unfortunately, this information has

no real conduit down to company and platoon levels,and perhaps most important, to the individual soldier.In most organizations of the conventional infantryforce, there is no foreign area officer or civil affairs of-ficer who specializes in these matters to fill the gap.Although it is vital for senior leaders to be well in-formed in these facets of operations, it is often thecompany commander, platoon leader, or squad leaderwho finds himself . . . dealing with the civilian popu-lace day by day.5

A Matter of TimingCultural awareness must be taught on the

primary level. And knowing your enemy shouldbe accompanied by knowing your friends. More-over, educational and training programs shouldfocus on those regions likely to pose threats tonational security and cultures vital to long-termstrategic relationships.

Mandating cultural awareness training is eas-ier than implementing it. First, identifying whichcultures to study and what level of proficiency toattain is demanding. There is no one-size-fits-allanswer to cultural awareness. Nonspecific theorieson cultural contexts can be detrimental, and gen-eralizing cultural characteristics can be deceptive.

Americans are often direct in their conversations,expecting the truth with no hint of deception. At the

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same time, Americans also tend to be uncomfortablewith silent moments. People in some other countries,though, may prefer not to be direct and may shifttheir eyes away from the American...a person who isreluctant to maintain eye contact is called shifty-eyedand arouses suspicion. But in some countries an at-tempt to maintain eye contact may be perceived as asign of aggression. Accordingly, in Japan, SouthKorea, Taiwan, and other Asian countries, maintain-ing eye contact is not an acceptable behavior. On theother hand, in Saudi Arabia, eye contact and gesturesof openness are important and could facilitate com-munications.6

Predeployment training focuses on the cur-rent military situation for all the obvious reasons.But cultural awareness training must be accom-plished on a regular basis and well in advance.Thus that knowledge must already be in place be-fore it is time to go.

The national security strategy envisions amore assertively expeditionary military. Over thelast two decades, extended coalition operationshave become the norm. This requires operationalplanning that recognizes the importance of cul-tural awareness. If implemented, integrated train-ing to develop such awareness will have lasting,positive effects for plans, actionable intelligence,and the credibility of U.S. objectives. Experience

teaches that cultural awareness is a force multi-plier. It is the time to be serious about enhancingour knowledge of today’s world. The ArmedForces are busier than ever before, but they arenot too busy to be culturally aware. JFQ

N O T E S

1 Walter B. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, John T.Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion: A Concise History of the U.S. Army Operation Uphold Democracy (FortLeavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command and GeneralStaff College, 1998), p. 188.

2 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washing-ton: Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 18.

3 Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA (Ret.), letter to the Honorable Ike Skelton, June 12, 2003.

4 U.S. Institute for Peace, Alternative National MilitaryStrategies for the United States (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.:Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,2000), p. 6.

5 Joel B. Krauss, “Cultural Awareness in Stability andSupport Operations,” Infantry, vol. 89, no. 1 (January/April 1999), p. 15.

6 Gary Bonvillian and William A. Nowlin, “CulturalAwareness: An Essential Element of Doing BusinessAbroad,” Business Horizons, vol. 37, no. 6 (November/December 1994), p. 45.

This article is also published as chapter 12 in Ike Skelton,Whispers of Warriors: Essays on the New Joint Era(Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004),pp. 131–37.

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A dvanced by Carl vonClausewitz, the concept ofcenter of gravity is a pop-ular strategic theory. Mili-

tary transformation assigns a domi-nant role in doctrine to this conceptdespite its roots in the industrial age.

Yet after more than two decades ofcontroversy, the meaning of center ofgravity remains unsettled. Fortunately,some of the confusion can be elimi-nated by returning to its originalsense. Both the concept and its ana-logue in the mechanical sciences havecommon properties: neither is asource of strength, but rather a pointat which physical and psychologicalforces meet. As a result, doctrineshould be revised—in particular, JointPub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations,


Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA, is director of national securityaffairs in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College and theauthor of After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War.

Center of GravityRecommendations forJoint DoctrineBy A N T U L I O J. E C H E V A R R I A I I

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or national strategy. On the opera-tional and tactical levels, they wouldgenerally consist of principal sources

of combat powersuch as modern, mo-bile, or armoredforces that can assureor prevent mission

accomplishment. In other words, JointPub 3-0 strove for consensus by draw-ing together service predilections. Indoing so, however, it defined centersbroadly and offered no method for de-termining them.

Joint Pub 5-00.1, which appearedin January 2002, builds on Joint Pub 3-0 and provides a general method fordetermining centers of gravity. It de-fines the concept like Joint Pub 3-0, ex-cept that locations is replaced by sourcesof strength. In addition, it states thatcenters consist of “those aspects of theadversary’s overall capability that, theo-retically, if attacked and neutralized ordestroyed will lead either to the adver-sary’s inevitable defeat or force oppo-nents to abandon aims or change be-havior.” Thus it is a capabilities-baseddefinition that is derived from the sumof enemy capabilities despite termssuch as characteristics and sources ofpower. Moreover, Joint Pub 5-00.1stresses the importance of linking cen-ters to critical vulnerabilities, enablingan attack through weak points in theoverall system. Similar to the approachadopted by the Marine Corps, centersof gravity and critical vulnerabilities

and Joint Pub 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine forCampaign Planning, to establish a clearunderstanding of the meaning of cen-ter of gravity.

Joint Doctrine Each service has applied the con-

cept of center of gravity differently. TheArmy and Navy typically thought interms of a single center of gravity,which resided at the core of landpoweror seapower and provided the source ofphysical and psychological capacity tofight. The Air Force, on the other hand,envisioned multiple centers, each tar-geted from the air to paralyze anenemy. The Marine Corps, which con-ducts forcible entry operations, haslong regarded center of gravity as a crit-ical vulnerability. Thus the concept hasassumed many guises over the years.

In the mid-1990s the military at-tempted to consolidate individual serv-ice perspectives into a single definitionthat asserts that the essence of the op-erational art resides in massing effectsagainst enemy sources of power—cen-ters of gravity—to gain a decisive ad-vantage. Joint Pub 3-0 defined centersas “characteristics, capabilities, or loca-tions from which a military force de-rives its freedom of action, physicalstrength, or will to fight.” It also im-plied that centers exist for every leveland type of war. Presumably, defeating

tactical centers facilitates tactical ob-jectives that contribute to the defeat ofoperational centers and assist in

achieving operational objectives andso on until national security objectivesare reached. On the strategic level, cen-ters might include military forces, al-lies, national will, critical capabilities,


Joint Pub 5-00.1 stresses the importanceof linking centers to critical vulnerabilities

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are regarded as different but comple-mentary ideas. Identifying the latterwill focus efforts on something thatcan achieve decisive results. Criticalvulnerabilities will provide knowledgeon attacking centers of gravity, but asone military analyst explained, usingthis concept in planning “leads you tosee very quickly that some vulnerabili-ties are interesting but a waste of re-sources because they do not lead any-where useful in the end.”1

The process described in Joint Pub5-00.1 does not lead to center of grav-ity, but rather to a set of critical capa-bilities. It seems to rely on an ap-proach developed by Joseph Strange,who concluded that service definitionslacked precision and tended to equatecenters of gravity with physical vulner-abilities or strengths without enoughattention to psychological centers ofpower.2 To redress that notion, Strangeredefined centers as “dynamic agentsof action or influence,” as specific“moral, political, and physical entitiesthat possess certain characteristics andcapabilities, or benefit from a given lo-cation/terrain.” Moreover, he defined

centers of gravity in relationship to ca-pabilities, requirements, and vulnera-bilities. Key combat forces, for exam-ple, may be centers if they possesscritical capabilities. Those capabili-ties—to shoot, move, and communi-cate—have critical requirements suchas open lines of communication thatenable them to continue operating. Arequirement that is inadequately pro-tected—such as enemy lines of com-munication near Inchon during theKorean War—constitutes a critical vul-nerability. Neutralizing critical vulner-abilities would contribute to defeatingthe enemy center of gravity.

Strange links centers of gravity tocritical vulnerabilities in a way thatwar planners can put into practice.However, since any number of “dy-namic agents of action or influence”can exist in a given battlespace, his ap-proach does not focus resources on el-ements that will prove decisive. Hismethodology lacks criteria for deter-mining what makes one dynamicagent more important than another.Moreover, since he does not build onthe Clausewitzian definition, in whichcenter of gravity serves as a focalpoint, his interpretation is capabili-ties-based and tautological. In fact,

centers for Strange are important be-cause of their critical capabilities. Al-though this approach can link criticalstrengths or capabilities to critical vul-nerabilities, it will bring planners toan actual enemy center of gravity asopposed to a center of critical capabil-ity only by coincidence.

The definition in Joint Pub 5-00.1and its approach to determining cen-ters of gravity thus begs the question:Why not just call centers of critical ca-pabilities what they are?—critical cen-ters or critical points. Although identi-fying enemy centers of criticalcapabilities can be useful, as will beseen in the definition by Clausewitz,an enemy might not have a center—atleast not one that can be attacked. Inthose cases one should focus on de-stroying critical capabilities. It standsto reason that neutralizing them willeventually lead to accomplishing ob-jectives.

The Clausewitzian ConceptThe Prussian philosopher of war

apparently derived his concept of cen-ter of gravity in part from Paul Erman,


Recommendations for Joint Doctrine■ To align the definition of center of gravity with the Clausewitzian concept and bring it back under control, doctrine in gen-

eral and Joint Pubs 3-0 and 5-00.1 in particular should redefine it as focal point—the element with centripetal force to hold every-thing together and provide raw power, purpose, and direction.

■ Planners should refrain from applying the concept to every kind of war or operation to reduce competition with political-mili-tary objectives. We must ask whether the total military collapse of an enemy is commensurate with our political objectives and end-state.

■ If total collapse is desired, planners should identify the connections and gaps in an entire enemy structure or system beforedeciding whether a center of gravity exists. The concept does not apply where the enemy is not connected enough to act with unity.Also, given the anticipated proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive weapons, there could betimes when it is dangerous to assume that individual enemy segments can be defeated by a single knockout blow. If several al Qaeda cells were armed with such weapons, for instance, striking one could trigger massive retaliation. Continued proliferationand information technologies could make the concept of center of gravity academic in the future.

■ Employing the concept means learning to think more about the desired effects and less about capabilities to be destroyed, allwithout denigrating the importance of those capabilities.

■ Centers of gravity can change during a conflict if, for example, allies enter or leave the fight, or other changes occur withinthe combatants’ power structures. We must therefore reassess any previous determination of a center. We should reevaluatewhether we need to attack centers that are so transitory they can quickly be replaced. Perhaps we have only found a center of criti-cal capability.

■ Resist dissecting an enemy into tactical, operational, and strategic centers of gravity. Efforts and intermediate objectivesshould largely be focused on destroying the center. Creating subunits is artificial unless an enemy is too dispersed or decentralizedto have a dominant center of gravity. Then it may be possible to trace individual centers to a central one. JFQ

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latter. Directing a blow with enoughforce against the center of gravity of aninfantryman could lay him low regard-less of his strengths and weaknessesbecause this center is connected to hisphysical characteristics.

Most definitions of the concept ofcenter of gravity are based on the

translation of On War by MichaelHoward and Peter Paret, especiallybook six (Defense) and book eight(War Plans). It is “always found wherethe mass is concentrated mostdensely,” serves as “the hub of allpower and movement, on whicheverything depends,” and emergesfrom the “dominant characteristics ofboth belligerents.”3 Unfortunately, thisversion creates a false impression thatcenters of gravity are akin to sources ofstrength:

The first principle is that the ultimatesubstance of enemy strength must betraced back to the fewest possible sources,and ideally to one alone. The attack onthese sources must be compressed into thefewest possible actions—again, ideally,into one. . . . The task of reducing thesources of enemy strength to a single cen-ter of gravity will depend on: 1) the distri-bution of the enemy’s political power . . .2) the situation in the theater of warwhere the various armies are operating.4

A closer look at the German origi-nal reveals that Clausewitz never usedsource (Quelle). Instead he advised trac-ing the full weight (Gewicht) of anenemy force (Macht) to as few centersof gravity as possible. Like the exampleof physics, center of gravity connectsvarious strengths of the soldier with-out being a strength itself. A more lit-eral translation is:

. . . to trace the full weight [Gewicht] ofthe enemy’s force [Macht] to as few cen-ters of gravity as possible, when feasible,to one; and, at the same time, to reducethe blow against these centers of gravity toas few major actions as possible, whenfeasible, to one. . . .

a physicist who taught at the Univer-sity of Berlin and Allgemeine Kriegs-schule (war college). Clausewitz was di-rector of the latter institution from1818 to 1830 and exchanged ideas onthe mechanical sciences with Erman.

For Clausewitz and his contempo-raries, center of gravity represented thepoint where the forces of gravity con-verge within an object in the contextof modern elementary physics. Strikingan object with enough force will usu-ally cause it to lose its equilibrium and

fall. Center of gravity is therefore not asource of strength but a factor of bal-ance. The strength of an infantryman,for example, can be attributed to hismuscles, brains, or weapons in anycombination, but it relates to center ofgravity only so far as he needs to bebalanced to use them. Conversely, asoldier might be physically frail, intel-lectually challenged, or lack forweaponry, but these conditions havelittle effect on his equilibrium. Strictlyspeaking, a center is neither a strengthnor a weakness, though striking it cancompromise the former or exploit the


center of gravity connects variousstrengths of the soldier withoutbeing a strength itself

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Reducing the enemy’s force to onecenter of gravity depends, first, upon the[enemy’s] political connectivity [or unity]itself . . . and, second, upon the situationin the theater of war itself, and which ofthe various enemy armies appear there.5

Enemy CohesionReferences to center of gravity in

the text indicate that the concept re-mains valid only when an enemy hassufficient unity or interdependence(Zusammenhang) to act as a single body.

Just as the center of gravity is alwaysfound where the mass is most concen-trated, and just as every blow directedagainst the body’s center of gravity yieldsthe greatest effect, and—more to thepoint—the strongest blow is the one deliv-ered by the center of gravity, the same istrue in war. The armed forces of everycombatant, whether an individual state oran alliance of states, have a certain unityand thus a certain interdependence [orconnectivity—Zusammenhang]; andwhere such interdependence exists, one

can apply the concept. Accordingly, thereexist within these forces certain centers ofgravity which, by their movement and di-rection, exert a decisive influence over allother points; and they exist where theforces are most concentrated. However,just as in the world of inanimate bodieswhere the effect on a center of gravity hasits proportions and limits determined bythe interdependence of the parts, the sameis true in war.6

In other words, before applyingthe concept to war planning, one mustdetermine whether an enemy will act

as a single entity. Ifso, we should lookfor connectionsamong its parts todiscover what holdsthem together. In1809, for example,Napoleon had tofight on two fronts:against Anglo-Span-

ish forces in Spain and the Austrians inCentral Europe. Although they had acommon enemy, the Anglo-Spanishand Austrians did little to coordinatetheir efforts. Hence it would have beencorrect for Napoleon to look for twocenters of gravity, one on each front.As Clausewitz stated, the degree ofunity formed by forces and the geo-graphical spaces in which they have tofight can create more than one center.He advocated tracing multiple centersof gravity back to a single one. Yet heallowed that a lone center of gravitymight not exist. The key question,


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not strictly a source of power. Rather, itis a focal point for drawing power fromvarious sources: population (recruits),industry (weapons and matériel), andagriculture (food). The same holds truefor the personalities of leaders, capital,or alliance networks, which draw rawpower and then refine and redirect it.

Cause and EffectCenter of gravity focuses on

achieving a specific effect: collapse ofan enemy. Hence it is an effects-basedrather than capabilities-based ap-proach. These approaches are linked.Attacking specific capabilities producescertain effects. Achieving them oftenrequires attacking specific capabilities.Indeed, one could say that these ap-proaches represent two sides of thesame coin. In the capabilities-based ap-proach, the first step is identifying keyenemy strength that could prevent onefrom achieving his objective. In the ef-fects-based approach, the first step isidentifying the desired effect and deter-mining what actions are needed. Fre-quently such actions might go beyondneutralizing or destroying specific capa-bilities. The capabilities-based approachseeks a negative aim, destroying a capa-bility. The effects-based approach pur-sues a positive aim, creating a certaineffect. The Armed Forces have gotteninto the habit of narrowly focusing onthe former but could benefit from thebroader approach of the latter.

In one sense, the Clausewitzianeffects-based center of gravity resem-bles an emerging concept known as ef-fects-based operations more than thecurrent capabilities-based notion, withthe exception that only one particulareffect is sought—total collapse of anenemy. For Clausewitz, the effect andthe objective—total collapse—were al-ways the same. Effects-based opera-tions have the benefit of forcing politi-cal and military leaders to focus on thespecific effects they want military andnonmilitary action to achieve.

Like effects-based operations, cen-ter of gravity requires the ability to rea-sonably predict how to achieve at leastfirst- and second-order effects and pos-sibly more. Yet the Prussian consideredthe calculation of a center of gravity amatter of “strategic judgment” on the

then, is whether enemy forces are con-nected sufficiently so actions againstthem in one area will have a decisiveeffect in other areas.

Second, center of gravity refers toan element that holds enemy forces to-gether or, in other words, serves as afocal point. Indeed, this becomes clearin a popular passage from book eightwhich actually described center ofgravity as it applies to war plans:

What theory can admit to thus far is thefollowing: Everything depends upon keep-ing the dominant characteristics of bothstates in mind. From these emerge a cer-tain center of gravity, a focal point [Zen-trum] of force and movement, uponwhich the larger whole depends; and, itis against the enemy’s center of gravitythat the collective blow of all power mustbe directed.7

To find a center in any particularsituation, one must look for whateverprovides an enemy with a certain cen-tripetal (center-seeking) force as op-posed to centrifugal force, which isoutward-seeking. Clausewitz pointedout that in the campaign againstFrance in 1814, the allied center ofgravity lay more with the Prussiansunder Field Marshal Blücher than theAustrians under Prince Schwarzenberg.Blücher, “although weaker than

Schwarzenberg [100,000 versus140,000], was nonetheless the moreimportant adversary due to his enter-prising spirit; hence, the center ofgravity lay more with him and itpulled the others in his direction.”8 Inthe actual campaign, Napoleon (with75,000 men) defeated the Prussians,then turned on the Austrians anddrove them back. Nonetheless, Blücherand Schwarzenberg recovered andbested Bonaparte a month later.Clausewitz argued that Napoleonshould have pursued and crushedBlücher—the allied center. Such a vic-tory would have induced the Austriansto withdraw. Like mechanical sciences,military centers have a centripetalquality; they represent a focal pointwhere forces come together.

Clausewitz provided several exam-ples of focal points. The centers ofgravity of Alexander the Great, Gus-tavus Adolphus, Charles XII of Swe-den, and Frederick the Great restedwith their armies. Under different cir-cumstances, the personalities of lead-ers, capital, or network of allies andtheir community of interests might fillthat function. What these elementsshare in common is not that they aresources of power; rather they perform acentripetal function that holds systemsof power together and in some casesprovides direction. But military force is


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highest levels. Given his distaste forprescriptive formulae, it is doubtful hewould have approved of current effortsto make such calculations by means ofinformation technology and software.On the other hand, he would certainlyhave supported educating leaders todevelop their strategic judgment inorder to make such determinations.That theme runs throughout On War.

Moreover, Clausewitz did not dis-tinguish between tactical, operational,or strategic centers of gravity. Center is

defined in terms of the entire systemor structure of an enemy, not by a levelof war. A soldier can have only one at atime. Accordingly, a local commandermight determine a center for enemyforces directly opposing him, provid-ing that the forces are sufficiently re-moved from their comrades. However,this separate center would only belocal rather than either tactical or op-erational. To isolate such a center, lev-els of war would have to exist inde-pendently. Using the concept of center

of gravity should have a unifying effecton tactical, operational, and strategicefforts. Dividing centers of gravity intotactical, operational, and strategic ele-ments only leads to centers of criticalcapability.

Clausewitz emphasized that cen-ters of gravity should only be soughtin wars designed to defeat an enemycompletely. Only vast energy and re-sources aimed at decisive victory causesuch centers and their areas of influ-ence to emerge. In such wars, military

and political objectives—the totalpolitical and military defeat of anenemy—essentially complementeach other. To achieve the totalcollapse of an enemy, one shouldstrike at its center. In limited wars,

on the other hand, centers competewith the typically more restricted po-litical objectives. For example, theground component planning staff ofU.S. Central Command spent more ef-fort in trying to identify the Iraqi cen-ter of gravity during the Persian GulfWar than planning its defeat. Ironi-cally, under the Clausewitz concept,that determination would have beenunnecessary since Desert Storm wasnot a war of annihilation. Simply

translating strategic objectives—the ex-pulsion of Iraq from Kuwait and reduc-tion of enemy offensive capabilities—into operational and tactical objectivesshould have given Coalition forces allthe necessary operational guidance.This is not to say that the concept onlyapplies in wars of annihilation; but itis neither appropriate nor necessary inall cases.

Determining CentersDefining center of gravity is only

half of the battle. Planners must find apractical way to determine the centerfor specific enemies. The methodshould be simple, in keeping with theClausewitzian dictum that in war eventhe simplest thing is difficult; yet itshould use the best intelligence avail-able and accommodate revision as theresult of rigorous analysis.

Determine whether identifying andattacking a center of gravity is appropriatefor the war being waged. The campaignagainst al Qaeda, though part of thelarger global war on terrorism, is essen-tially a conflict that cannot end with-out neutralizing or destroying thatgroup; hence the identification andpursuit of center of gravity serves aconstructive purpose.

Determine whether the enemy struc-ture or system is sufficiently connected tobe treated as a single body. Al Qaeda hasnumerous cells globally, and most donot know the others exist. Some ofthese cells or individuals within themappear to have been linked to groupleadership by networked electroniccommunications. Messages and com-mands were thus passed via the Inter-net, cellular phones, and other elec-tronic devices. It is also possible thatsome cells have orders and will at-tempt to execute them at a certaintime and place if they receive no guid-ance to the contrary. Thus the physicallinks are intermittent at best. Success-ful operations against cells in Europewill not likely cause those in Singaporeto collapse. The group’s psychologicallinks appear strong. If cells are not welllinked physically, they have strong ide-ological ties. Perhaps we should seekan ideological center of gravity.

Determine what element has cen-tripetal force to hold the system together.


center is defined in terms of theentire system or structure of an enemy, not by a level of war

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N O T E S

1 Huba Wass de Czege, “Clausewitz: His-torical Theories Remain Sound CompassReferences: The Catch Is Staying onCourse,” Army, vol. 38, no. 9 (September1988), p. 42.

2 Joe [Joseph L.] Strange, Centers of Grav-ity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on theClausewitzian Foundation So That We Can AllSpeak the Same Language, Perspectives onWarfighting Series, no. 4, 2d ed. (Quantico,Va.: Marine Corps Association, 1996).

3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, editedand translated by Michael Howard andPeter Paret (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1989), pp. 485–86, 595–96.

4 Clausewitz, On War, p. 617. In fairnessto Howard and Paret, their translation ismore interpretive than literal by their ownadmission. They could not have foreseenthe extent to which the U.S. military wouldtake their interpretation of center of gravityliterally.

5 See Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege,19th ed. (Regensburg, Germany: Pustet,1991), pp. 1009–10.

6 Ibid., pp. 810–11.7 Ibid., pp. 595–96. 8 Ibid., p. 324.

One ideological element appears tohave sufficient centrifugal force to bindal Qaeda: avowed hatred of apostasy. Itis probably that loathing, rooted in aradical Islam, that serves as center ofgravity rather than Osama bin Laden.While he admittedly laid much of thegroundwork to establish al Qaeda, itdoes not appear that his removal willbring collapse. Most intelligence ana-lysts claim that even if bin Laden wascaptured or killed, someone would re-place him. He can only be more or lesseffective. Thus leadership reallyamounts to a center of critical capabil-ity; it is an element that should be neu-tralized, but its absence will not endthe war in itself.

Instead, the hatred of apostasydraws raw power—recruits, money,and support of other states—and moti-vates members to wage a particularstyle of asymmetric warfare. Thus deci-sive defeat will require neutralizingthat center. However, accomplishing

that defeat will mean employing thediplomatic and informational ele-ments of national power as deliber-ately as the military one. It will also re-quire the support of moderate Islam.

The Armed Forces have reached acritical point. On the one hand, theconcept of center of gravity could bereplaced by center of criticality to moreaccurately represent its original mean-ing. Then center of gravity can bedeleted from the military lexicon. Onthe other hand, if the concept is re-tained to focus on an element thatcompels an enemy to collapse, centerof gravity should be redefined to meanfocal point. By choosing the latterpath, planners would be better posi-tioned to incorporate ideas such as ef-fects-based operations. But the conceptmust be applied judiciously. At a timewhen an enemy can operate in a de-centralized manner globally, certainsituations may arise in which the ideadoes not apply and pursuing it will notbenefit warfighters. JFQ


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W hen Clausewitz wrotehis famous opus, OnWar, little did he real-ize that a new industry

had been born. Interpreting, reinter-preting, and artfully refining—not tomention plagiarizing—his ideas on warhas been a minor but profitable cot-tage industry ever since.

Clausewitz knew the limits on in-tellectualizing about war; his conceptof friction applies not only to the prac-tical conduct of war, but also to thedifficulty of thinking clearly about it.Because war involves many variables,

including chance, individual and orga-nizational mindsets are quickly over-whelmed and events tend to escapecontrol. Consequently, he sought toidentify key variables and explore theircomplex relationships, for “in warmore than in any other subject . . . thepart and the whole must always bethought of together.” It is easy as wellas dangerous to be mesmerized by dis-crete, equivocal Clausewitzian terms,such as real war, culminating point, criti-cal analysis, or center of gravity, and losetrack of their connectivity. Like dispu-tations among theologians over mat-ters of faith, some analysts become lostin theoretical hair-splitting and an at-tempt to overdefine principles that, bytheir very nature, are mutable and de-pendent on the context.


Interpreting theLegacy of ClausewitzBy C H R I S T O P H E R B A S S F O R D

Christopher Bassford teaches at the National War College and is the author ofClausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America,1815–1945.

B a s s f o r d

There is nothing wrong with suchan intellectual evolution, for one mustalways adapt to the task at hand.Nonetheless, it is always necessary tobe mindful of the context and inten-tions of a theoretician. The latest chap-ter in the what-Clausewitz-really-meant debate can be revealing, asillustrated by the two accompanyingarticles in this issue of Joint Force Quar-terly. But it can also inflict elaborateunspoken assumptions and producerigid tools exquisitely overadapted fora global security environment that has vanished. JFQ

Clausewitz was interested in fun-damental truths on war. He sought todevelop concepts of universal applica-bility to the past and an unpredictablefuture, while most analysts are con-cerned with the political-military is-sues of the day, tending to narrow andredefine concepts in specialized ways.A classic case is the adaptation of theconcept of trinity by Harry Summers inthe aftermath of the Vietnam War.Clausewitz argued that the course ofwar is driven by complex and inher-ently unpredictable interactions thatoccur as conflicting human intentions,driven by rational calculation (policy)and violent, irrational emotion, hit theproverbial fan of reality. Addressingthe crisis in the 1970s, Summers recastthat dynamic trinity as a fixed, trian-gular relationship among “people,army, and government.” Recognizing

that these elements had become fatallydisconnected during the Vietnam con-flict was helpful in provoking reformin the military. But the simplifiedmodel of people, army, and govern-ment offers little guidance for actionin the world today.

Similar accounts can be found ofother isolated concepts in On War,helping to explain how this Prussianmilitary philosopher, long since dead,managed to evolve from being theapostle of total war during the 1920sto the preeminent strategist of limitedwar by the 1970s.


But it is inevitable that all the terminology and technical expressions of a given[theoretical] system will lose what meaning they have, if any, once they are tornfrom their context and used as general axioms or nuggets of truth that are sup-posed to be more potent than a simple statement.

—Carl von Clausewitz

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T he Armed Forces have comea long way in understand-ing centers of gravity andcritical vulnerabilities. The

former are equated to strength; the lat-ter to weakness. As stated in The Joint

Staff Officer’s Guide, multiple centers ofgravity may exist on a given level ofwarfare and change during a campaign,sometimes unexpectedly when anenemy shifts “the weight of its attack,thus uncovering or relying on a previ-ously unforeseen center of gravity.”

Nevertheless, ambiguities abound.That same publication contains the fol-lowing statement: “Centers of gravityare the characteristics, capabilities, orlocations from which a military force


Center of GravityWhat Clausewitz Really MeantBy J O S E P H L. S T R A N G E and R I C H A R D I R O N

Joseph L. Strange is professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps War Collegeand has taught at the Air War College; Colonel Richard Iron, British Army, headsthe doctrine branch in the Directorate of Land Warfare at the Joint Service Com-mand and Staff College and has commanded an armored infantry battalion.

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Misunderstanding Book EightIn book six (Defense), Clausewitz

offers a clear discussion of opposingarmies as centers of gravity. But in bookeight (War Plans), he applies the termto the broader realm of national andcoalition (or grand) strategy, as op-posed to the operational and tacticallevels. On the strategic level, the armymay be just one among several centersof gravity: “In countries subject to do-mestic strife, the center of gravity isgenerally the capital. In small countriesthat rely on large ones, it is usually thearmy of their protector. Among al-liances, it lies in the community of in-terest, and in popular uprisings it is thepersonalities of the leaders and publicopinion.” Moreover, chapter 4 (“CloserDefinition of the Military Objective:The Defeat of the Enemy”) of bookeight contains perhaps the mostquoted passage regarding centers ofgravity: “One must keep the dominantcharacteristics of both belligerents inmind. Out of these characteristics a cer-tain center of gravity develops, the hub

derives its freedom of action, physicalstrength, or will to fight. On the strate-gic level, centers of gravity might in-clude a military force, an alliance, a setof critical capabilities or functions, ornational strategy itself.” According tothis definition a military force cannotbe a center of gravity, yet it is cited asan example. It also presents a choiceamong characteristic, capability, or lo-cation, when in reality all three exist si-multaneously in mutual dependency. Aforce operating in a given location isineffective without essential character-istics and capabilities. Moreover, theuse of terms such as foundation of capa-bility, hub of all power and movement,and dominant characteristics is ambigu-ous enough. And worse, they are in-variably accompanied by an expansivelist of examples that include alliances,communities of interest, public opin-ion, and “national strategy itself.”

A Collision of CentersTo understand centers of gravity,

one must be grounded in the originalcontext of On War. Book one defineswarfare as “an act of force to compel

our enemy to do our will,” which en-tails a “collision of two living forces.”1

Much of the work is focused on war asa clash between armed forces and theuse of physical force to “throw an op-ponent” to break his will to resist.Chapter 27 in book six develops “thenature and effect of a center of grav-ity” in the context of “several theatersof operation” in which “division offorces then becomes inevitable. . . . Acenter of gravity is always found wherethe mass is concentrated most densely.It presents the most effective target fora blow; furthermore, the heaviest blowis that struck by the center of gravity.”Clausewitz drove to the heart of thematter in chapter 28: “A major battlein a theater of operations is a collisionbetween two centers of gravity; themore forces that can be concentratedin a center of gravity, the more certainand massive the effect. Consequently,any partial use of force not directed to-ward an objective that either cannotbe attained by the victory itself or thatdoes not bring about the victoryshould be condemned.”


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of all power and movement, on whicheverything depends. That is the pointagainst which all our energies shouldbe directed.”

The discussion of centers of grav-ity in book eight is much less preciseand is the source of misunderstanding

for two reasons. First, the Howard andParet translation of On War, the mostcommonly used English edition, mayhave confused some aspects of the orig-inal text. Moreover, some interpreta-tions have taken the original out ofcontext. Notwithstanding possible mis-translations, Howard and Paret are usu-ally clear and consistent—provided thetext is interpreted within the context ofthe relevant passages elsewhere.

Even in Howard and Paret, bookeight supports the notion of armies ortheir components functioning as phys-ical centers of gravity on the strategiclevel. For example: “For Alexander,Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, andFrederick the Great, the center of grav-ity was their army. If the army hadbeen destroyed, they would all havegone down in history as failures.”

Secondly, commonly overlookedor ignored is the very large paragraphin On War that precedes the “domi-nant characteristics” and “the hub ofall power and movement” passagesquoted earlier. There Clausewitz ex-plained the relationship between acapital city and a defending army inseveral different scenarios.

If Paris had been taken in 1792 the waragainst the Revolution would almost cer-tainly for the time being have beenbrought to an end. . . . In 1814, on theother hand, even the capture of Pariswould not have ended matters if Bona-parte had still had a sizeable army behindhim. . . . Again, if in 1812 Bonaparte hadmanaged, before or after taking Moscow,to smash the Russian army . . . the factthat he held the capital would probablyhave meant that he could make peace in

spite of the enormous area still unoccu-pied. In 1805 Austerlitz was decisive. Thepossession of Vienna and two-thirds of theAustrian territory had not sufficed to bringabout a peace. On the other hand, afterAusterlitz the fact that Hungary was stillintact did nothing to prevent peace being

made. The final blow requiredwas to defeat the Russianarmy. . . . Had the Russianarmy been with the Austrianson the Danube in 1805 andshared in their defeat [refer-

ring to Ulm], it would hardly have beennecessary to take Vienna; peace couldhave been imposed at Linz.2

Third, “the hub of all power andmovement” must be understood in thebroader context of the remarks foundin chapter 27 of book six. The follow-ing passage appears immediately afterthe sentence “A center of gravity is al-ways found where the mass is concen-trated most densely.”

The fighting forces of each belligerent—whether a single state or an alliance ofstates—have a certain unity and thereforesome cohesion. Where there is cohesion,the analogy of the center of gravity can beapplied. Thus these forces will possess cer-tain centers of gravity, which, by theirmovement and direction, govern the rest;and those centers of gravity will be foundwherever the forces are most concentrated.

Here the phrase “hub of all powerand movement” refers unequivocallyto the main bodies of the opposingforces. This point is supported by a pas-sage on the same page: “It is therefore amajor act of strategic judgment to dis-tinguish these centers of gravity in theenemy’s forces [that is, concentrations intheir total force] and to identify theirspheres of effectiveness [and influence].One will constantly be called upon toestimate the effect that an advance or aretreat by part of the forces on eitherside will have upon the rest.”

The phrase “where there is cohe-sion” causes confusion. One commen-tator contends that where should beread as if. But based on the previoussentence it can be inferred that Clause-witz meant that although the degree ofunity and cohesion is small, the con-cept still applies. Nor should concept

be based only on cohesion, that is, in-terdependence or connectivity (Zusam-menhang).3 Consider the next to thelast sentence in chapter 27: “Our posi-tion, then, is that a theater of war, be itlarge or small, and the forces stationedthere, no matter what their size, repre-sent the sort of unity in which a singlecenter of gravity can be identified. Thatis the place where the decision shouldbe reached.” Finally, it is difficult toconceive of a mass of an armed forceacting as a physical center of gravitythat does not also function as a “hub ofall movement and power” and as a gluethat holds everything together.

Fourth, even the term dominantcharacteristics has often been applieddevoid of the context. The next sen-tence in the Howard and Paret versionreads: “Out of these [dominant] char-acteristics a certain center of gravitydevelops, the hub of all power andmovement.” Note the use of the termsout of and develops; the sentence doesnot read “One of these characteristicswill emerge as a center of gravity.”Moreover, Clausewitz elaborates onone such characteristic—cohesion.

There is a decided difference between thecohesion of a single army, led into battleunder the personal command of a singlegeneral, and that of an allied force extend-ing over 250 or 500 miles, or even operat-ing against different fronts. In the one, co-hesion is at its strongest and unity


the discussion of centers of gravityis much less precise and is the sourceof misunderstanding

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be seen in the proper light as the cen-ter of power or mass of a force, not asecondary element or characteristicfrom which power emanates oraround which it revolves. Moreover,this interpretation is reinforced by thefirst reason for misinterpreting theconcept of center of gravity.

Alternative TranslationsThe description of center of grav-

ity as “the hub of all power and move-ment” has appeared several times inthis analysis. Actually, these words be-long to Howard and Paret, not Clause-witz. He meant something rather dif-ferent in the phrase ein Zentrum derKraft und Bewegung, which is translatedas “a center of power and movement.”The actual difference is small but sig-nificant. The analogy of a center ofgravity as a hub of a wheel came fromthe translation, and the current con-cept has been shaped by its words.

While one should not adheredogmatically to 180-year-old defini-tions, the original concept of center of

[another characteristic] at its closest. Inthe other, unity is remote, frequentlyfound only in mutual political interests[another characteristic], and even thenrather precarious and imperfect; cohesionbetween the parts will usually be veryloose, and often completely fictitious.4

In this context, cohesion, unity,and political interests are clearly notviewed as candidate centers of gravity.

They are variables thatdetermine which armiesor their componentsfunction as centers.Moreover, Clausewitzdescribed these threecharacteristics in starkterms: unity of effort isremote because precari-ous and imperfect coali-tion political interestscause weak or fictitiouscohesion—so much sothat, like Napoleon,more often than not

they would be weaknesses akin to theconcept of critical vulnerabilities today,not powerful centers of gravity.

Fifth, at the end of the chapter,Clausewitz indicates that “[book eight]will describe how this idea of a centerof gravity in the enemy’s force oper-ates throughout the plan of war.” Notethat it is not contributing to thestrength of an enemy nor associated in-directly with an enemy. Even in theHoward and Paret translation, the“hub of all power and movement” can


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gravity was simpler than those foundtoday in references such as the NATOGlossary of Terms and Definitions :“Those characteristics, capabilities, orlocalities from which a nation, an al-liance, a military force, or other group-ing derives its freedom of action,

physical strength or will to fight.” Stu-dents of history may consider panzergroups and the Army of Northern Vir-ginia or Winston Churchill and Abra-ham Lincoln as centers. It takes con-siderable imagination to regard any ofthose military formations or leaders as“characteristics, capabilities, or locali-ties,” while they are undoubtedly cen-ters of gravity.

This confusing definition is theroot of disagreement on centers ofgravity. It is so open to interpretationthat analysts can view the same situa-tion in a variety of ways. Hours arewasted in fruitless argument that couldbe better spent on planning.

The concept is much simpler.There is no doubt that Clausewitzmeant center of gravity as the mainstrength of an enemy. The mechanicsanalogy as rendered by Howard andParet states: “A center of gravity is al-ways found where the mass is concen-

trated most densely. It presentsthe most effective target for ablow; furthermore, the heaviestblow is struck by the center ofgravity.” According to a transla-tion by J.J. Graham published in

1874: “As a centre of gravity is alwayssituated where the greatest mass ofmatter is collected, and as a shockagainst the centre of gravity of a bodyalways produces the greatest effect,and further, as the most effective blowis struck with the centre of gravity ofthe power used, so it is also in war.”5

The Graham translation is moreliteral, conveying a slightly differentand clearer meaning. Note that Clause-witz was talking about the center ofgravity having an effect on an enemy,and the blow it strikes is the most ef-fective—not necessarily the heaviest.But both translations leave no doubtthat reference is made to somethingphysical that can strike blows. There is

no indication of alliance cohesion,lines of communication, or seaports.

According to one analyst, theoriginal German text is more specificthan Howard and Paret or Graham in“that a center of gravity is a center ofstrength.” The term Schwerpunkt (cen-ter of gravity) appears 51 times in sup-port of this reading. Moreover, Macht[power] appears eight times in con-junction with Schwerpunkt. Chapter 9of book eight in the Howard and Paretversion “leaves out Macht quite a bit,and so leaves the door open for misin-terpretation.”6

The Adversarial ElementAccording to the Howard and

Paret edition, “One must keep thedominant characteristics of both bel-ligerents in mind. Out of these charac-teristics a certain center of gravity de-velops.” But there is another meaningin the original text: Es kommt daraufan, die vorherrschenden Verhältnisse bei-der Staaten im Auge zu haben. Aus ihnenwird sich ein gewisser Schwerpunkt . . .bilden.7 Graham rendered this passageas “the great point is to keep the over-ruling relations of both parties in view.Out of them a center of gravity . . . willform itself.”

That translation includes an es-sential ingredient that is missing inHoward and Paret: what is important isthe adversarial nature of centers ofgravity. Clausewitz described centersemerging from the “overruling rela-tions (Verhältnisse) of both parties”;that is, a center of gravity is relevantonly in relation to an enemy. It is notan isolated concept. In the Civil War,the Army of Northern Virginia was acenter of gravity because of the threatit posed to Washington and its abilityto block the march of the Army of thePotomac on the Confederate capital ofRichmond.

The Republican Guard consti-tuted a center of gravity in 1991 notonly because it was well trained andequipped, but because it was a threatto VII Corps. It was again identified asa center in 2003 because it was vital tothe defense of Baghdad. However,


there is no doubt that Clausewitzmeant center of gravity as themain strength of an enemy

Bombing NorthVietnam.

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Paret. Instead the term dominant char-acteristics was introduced. This is theorigin of the NATO definition—a mis-translation of the original. It impliesthat center of gravity could exist in itsown right and is a function of “nation,alliance, military force, or other group-ing” taken in isolation. This assump-tion is obviously wrong. Nothing inwar is vital except in the context of thebalance between combatants. Andusing the English term characteristicpermits inclusion of virtually anythingas a center of gravity: logistics, roadnetworks, unit cohesion, or radar sys-tems. This confuses planners. The offi-cial definition is a long way from astrength that strikes “the most effec-tive blow,” although many examplesquoted in doctrine are precisely thoseClausewitz would recognize, contraryto the formal definition.

Clausewitz would recognize theevolving concept of effects-based oper-ations. A center of gravity exists be-cause of its effect on an enemy or situa-tion (for instance, striking a heavyblow), not because of its inherent ca-pabilities. A center needs certain capa-bilities as well as characteristics and lo-cations to achieve the effect, but that

effect is the startingpoint, not the capability.

Moral Centers ofGravity

It is possible to de-feat an enemy, destroyits industry, and occupyits land. But if the spiritof resistance burns inthe hearts of its people,one cannot claim vic-tory. It might be possibleto subjugate an enemyin the short term, butwho can doubt thattrouble will arise in thelong run? It is difficult

to envisage, for instance, that the Is-raeli Defense Force can achieve lastingpeace in the Occupied Territories whilethe Palestinians believe they are beingwronged. That is a powerful exampleof a strong-willed people who lackconventional military power but aredetermined to fight indefinitely fortheir cause.

with the gift of hindsight, the Feday-een were briefly more worrisome be-cause of their grip on cities along sup-ply lines from Kuwait. While theKurdish peshmerga may have relishedfighting the Fedayeen, the RepublicanGuard with its superior firepower, mo-bility, and protection were a more po-tent center of gravity. Thus centers ofgravity are formed out of the relation-ships between two forces. Althoughthe Iraqi operational center of gravitymay have been the Republican Guardagainst the Kurds, it was more likelythe asymmetric Fedayeen forces againstthe Coalition.

Clausewitz maintained that oncean enemy decides to engage in a con-test of physical and moral strength,centers of gravity are “active agents”

until it ends. Physical centers functionas active agents that endeavor to de-stroy enemy capabilities and the willto resist, and moral centers function asactive agents to influence or controlphysical centers.

Nevertheless, the adversarial ele-ment in the concept of centers of grav-ity is largely missing in Howard and


German soldier,World War II.

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Clausewitz understood the phe-nomenon of popular will. Accordingto Howard and Paret, “The moral ele-ments are the most important in war.They constitute the spirit that perme-ates war as a whole, and at an earlystage they establish a close affinitywith the will that moves and leads thewhole mass of force. . . . History pro-vides the strongest proof of the impor-tance of moral factors and their oftenincredible effect.” Throughout history,many would-be conquerors havefailed to succeed largely because theydid not fully appreciate moral centersof gravity.

In chapter 4 of book eight,Clausewitz cites specific moral centers:“In countries subject to domestic strife,the center of gravity is generally thecapital. . . . Among alliances, it lies in

the community of interest, and in pop-ular uprisings it is the personalities ofthe leaders and public opinion.” Butdoes he mean “the center of gravity isgenerally the capital” or what is in thecapital? He concludes that capturingthe capital would be “important forthe defeat of the enemy . . . if it is notonly the center of administration butalso that of social, professional, andpolitical activity.” Who is governing

and conducting political and eco-nomic activities? Moreover, the Gra-ham edition reads, “this centre gener-ally lies in the capital.” Lies in is quitedifferent than is the. Is it actually “thecommunity of interest?” Both the Gra-ham and the Howard and Paret trans-lations render “lies” in the communityof interest. But who determines thatinterest over the duration of a conflict?On popular uprisings, the Grahamtranslation states that center of gravityresides “in the person of the chiefleader, and in public opinion.” What ifthe public is apathetic? Is it still a cen-ter of gravity? A strong-willed popula-tion is a source of moral strength and,conversely, a weak-willed one is a criti-cal vulnerability.

To reach a lasting settlement—self-sustaining peace—one must under-

mine enemy strategic, and espe-cially moral, centers of gravity.There must be clear linkage be-tween campaign objectives onthe operational level and under-mining moral centers of gravity

(or resistance) on the strategic. Thattakes more than the military instru-ment; the total strategy should em-brace every instrument of nationalpower—military and nonmilitary. Ifoperations stand alone, it is unlikelythat defeating an operational center ofgravity will undermine strategic moralcenters of gravity.

The outcome of the Persian GulfWar was a resounding victory thatachieved the limited objective of theCoalition, liberating Kuwait, by defeat-ing the Iraqi operational center of

gravity, the Republican Guard. But Sad-dam Hussein, a strategic moral center,remained undefeated. In OperationIraqi Freedom, Saddam was effectivelyneutralized early in the war, and theinformation operation underminedpopular will (another potential strate-gic center) to fight on his behalf. Thusthe moral centers of gravity were neu-tralized simultaneously with defeatingoperational centers of gravity, the Re-publican Guard and the Fedayeen. TheCoalition achieved operational objec-tives, seizing Baghdad and topplingthe regime. However, neutralizing astrategic center of gravity is not thesame as defeating it, which is necessaryfor the wider strategic objective of last-ing peace. The evolving nature of theconflict in Iraq demonstrates that con-tinuing effort is required to win overthe will of the Iraqi people to acceptCoalition strategic postwar objectives.

How does one identify moral cen-ters of gravity? The process begins andends with people, for only they can cre-ate and sustain moral resistance. Peoplefall into the following categories.

Leaders have the will to develop,execute, and sustain a policy of opposi-tion to an enemy as well as the abilityto exert that will through the militaryand people (examples include SaddamHussein in 1990–91, Winston Churchillin 1940–41, and Joseph Stalin in WorldWar II).

Ruling elites are closed groups inwhich real power resides in their mem-bers, who are loosely described as king-makers, and who direct policy andwield control over the military andpeople (examples are the Soviet Polit-buro in the 1970s and clerics in the1979 Iranian revolution).

Strong-willed populations are largegroups with common beliefs thatcompel them to engage in conflict (ex-amples include the Palestinians and Israelis in their dispute over the Occupied Territories and Americans inthe wake of the Japanese attack onPearl Harbor).

Two central elements common tothese moral centers of gravity are thewill to fight and the ability to com-mand the necessary resources.


it is unlikely that defeating anoperational center of gravity willundermine strategic moral centers

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N O T E S

1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, editedand translated by Michael Howard andPeter Paret (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1976), pp. 75, 77.

2 Ibid., p. 595.3 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz’s

Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfight-ing Doctrine—Again!” (Carlisle Barracks,Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyWar College, September 2002). See espe-cially p. 10.

4 Howard and Paret, On War, p. 486.5 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans-

lated by J.J. Graham (London: Kegan Paul,Trench, Trübner, 1908), volume I, book six, p. 354.

6 Joe [Joseph L.] Strange, Centers of Grav-ity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on theClausewitzian Foundation So That We Can AllSpeak the Same Language, Perspectives onWarfighting Series, no. 4, 2d ed. (Quantico,Va.: Marine Corps University, 1996).

7 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, editedby Werner Hahlweg (Bonn: Ferd. Dümmler,1980), p. 976. He uses the standard meaningof Schwerpunkt, which was center of gravity.The military definition as a point of maineffort was accepted by the Prussian army.Since Clausewitz appeals to both, accuratetranslations must depend on the context.

According to Clausewitz, “Thefirst, the supreme, the most far-reach-ing act of judgment that the statesmanand commander have to make is to es-tablish . . . the kind of war on whichthey are embarking. . . . This is the firstof all strategic questions and the mostcomprehensive.” They must thereforefirst appraise the moral and physicalcharacter of an enemy to include itsmoral and physical centers of gravity.There is no alternative, short cut, oranalytical model to make up for inac-curate assessment of the enemy whendeciding on centers of gravity.

Defeating a leader differs fromundermining popular will. In Afghani-stan, for instance, planners could haveconsidered several moral centers ofgravity: Mullah Omar, the Talibanelite, or large segments of the Pashtunpopulation. The right choice assumedin-depth knowledge of the Talibanand the local situation, and a wrongone would likely have led to a misdi-rected campaign.

By appealing to the original con-cept of centers of gravity, one can deter-mine that they are dynamic, positive,

active agents (people in formations andgroups or individuals), obvious (morefor physical than moral centers, de-pending on the quality of intelligencegathered on an enemy), and powerfuland strike effective blows. Physical cen-ters of gravity can be visualized moreeasily as armies or units, those thingsthat resist an enemy. By contrast, moralcenters of gravity are less obvious. Yet itis essential to understand them sincethey are likely to be more important onthe strategic level.

Clausewitzian centers of gravityare not characteristics, capabilities, orlocations. They are dynamic and pow-erful physical and moral agents of ac-tion or influence with certain qualitiesand capabilities that derive their bene-fit from a given location or terrain. Fur-ther analysis is required to clearly de-fine the relationship between centers ofgravity and critical vulnerabilities, thusenabling planners to better focussources of power on developing suc-cessful strategies and campaigns. Thisprocess will indicate where characteris-tics, capabilities, and locations properlybelong in the overall scheme of thingswhen thinking about warfighting. JFQ


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T he Nation has faced unprecedentedthreats over its history that called for abold strategy. Consider the followingstatement in the inaugural address of

Harry Truman: “Events have brought our Ameri-can democracy to new influence and new respon-sibilities. They will test our courage, our devotionto duty, and our concept of liberty.” Those words

reflect the major challenges faced by a com-mander in chief who worked with Congress to re-organize the Armed Forces and establish new mis-sions demanded by national security. Todaycivilian leaders are again taking bold steps to in-troduce changes in military organization becauseof national security imperatives.

Established in October 2002 to replace Strate-gic Air Command and U.S. Space Command, U.S.Strategic Command capitalizes on synergy gener-ated by combining command and control of nu-clear forces and space-based operations. Subse-quently, it received four previously unassigned

Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., USN (Ret.),s served as the first commander ofU.S. Strategic Command and also was commander, U.S. Naval ForcesEurope and commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe.

U.S. StrategicCommandMeeting Global ChallengesBy J A M E S O. E L L I S, J R.

B–2 on ramp, Nellis AirForce Base.

509th Communications Squadron (Michael R. Nixon)

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missions: global strike planning and execution; in-tegrating information operations; integratingglobal ballistic missile defenses; and command,control, communications, computers, intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).

Each new mission is strategic in both scopeand effect. Full operational capability for this dy-namic package will provide a unified resource forbetter understanding threats as well as a means torespond quickly. Legacy missions impose the rig-orous discipline of nuclear responsibilities and cre-ative drive of experience in space. Effective evolu-tionary strategy runs through these missions asthe command gathers and translates real-timedata to produce actionable intelligence to enabledecisions on a timely basis for joint warfighters.

Global StrikeThe first new mission requires rapidly pro-

jecting military power against terrorists, hostilestates, or any other threat. It depends on syn-ergy achieved by identifying target sets andmanaging space-based assets for weather and in-telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mis-sion planning support, global positioning forprecision execution and timing, and compre-hensive communication systems under the sea,in the air, and in space.

To reclaim the original meaning of the termstrategic as more than a synonym for nuclear, thecapabilities must include conventional weapons

as well as kinetic andnonkinetic alternativesthat can be employedto meet various threatsin time-critical situa-tions. The promise and

challenge of global strike is producing capabilitiesthat reach across mission areas. Global strike is re-aligning and repositioning the military to protectthe Nation and its allies. The structure and em-ployment of the Armed Forces are changing.Agility is an attribute requiring smaller, more rap-idly deployable units. U.S. Strategic Commandmust be able to support them with a responsivestrike capability, which can reach globally inhours or even minutes.

The command is also preserving six decadesof nuclear weapons stewardship and its focus onstrategic nuclear forces. The triad of bombers, bal-listic missile submarines, and intercontinentalballistic missiles is key. The President is commit-ted to reducing operationally deployed warheadsto between 1,700 and 2,200 within a decade, andthe command is responsible for this task whilemaintaining national security. Toward this end, itwill periodically assess the strategic environmentand reductions to ensure that forces are alignedfor the future. The command will draw down the

number of Peacekeepers in exchange for the war-heads on the older Minuteman III missiles in fis-cal year 2006. It is also extending the life of Min-uteman III missiles by upgrading both propulsionand guidance systems while exploring future in-tercontinental ballistic missile concepts.

Information OperationsAnalysts often equate information opera-

tions with computer networks, but that view doesnot reflect actual missions. Commanders operatein a multidimensional battlespace that calls forgoing beyond day-to-day military requirements.In this environment, information operationshave an incredible impact through electronicwarfare, psychological operations, operations se-curity, and military deception. U.S. StrategicCommand seeks to ensure use and trust offriendly information systems while denying someor all of that use and trust to an enemy. Under-standing the vital role of information in everysegment of society highlights the importance andscope of this mission.

Information operations are rarely definedbroadly enough. They can include all instrumentsof national power and the interagency process.They will not be effective unless integrated acrossthe national security community. Furthermore,information operations are not new. Almost everyorganization has its own program. The difficultycomes when commanders find themselves in themidst of crises and organize information teamsfrom disparate sources. The command vision hasresolved this issue by providing a single inte-grated source of assets for every commander.

Global Missile DefenseThere is a wider range of threats today than

during the Cold War. The distinction between na-tional missile defense and theater missile defenseno longer exists. The Missile Defense Agency isspecifically tasked to develop missile protectionfor the homeland and allies. The mission of U.S.Strategic Command is turning the focus ofwarfighters to missile defense and also makingthe system operational. Initially, the commandwill integrate disparate missile defense systems inone system and link it to other offensive capabili-ties. In addition, it must examine technological,organizational, and operational capabilities to in-tegrate and develop a multilayered system to pro-tect the United States and its allies.

Multilayered missile defense involves morethan directing missile-on-missile engagements.The emerging defense network will integrate

the distinction between nationalmissile defense and theatermissile defense no longer exists

■ U . S . S T R A T E G I C C O M M A N D


command and control, attack operations, intelli-gence, interceptors, and the full spectrum ofsensors able to feed information on the terres-trial and space environment to battle manage-ment centers that direct interceptors to targets.But there is no system capable of stopping everythreat. The solution lies in multiple layers of de-fense with a number of systems. The initialground-based missile defense interceptors willbe fielded at Fort Greely and Vandenberg AirForce Base. The command is also consideringother systems such as Patriot and theater highaltitude air defense. In the future, the global

missile defense system is likely to include sea-based interceptors, the airborne laser, and othercutting-edge technology.

Global C4ISRThe fourth mission, global command, con-

trol, communications, computers, intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance, is best under-stood in terms of its constituent parts. Each ele-ment is distinct and raises specific issues. The firstgoal is developing a command and control struc-ture that provides knowledge superiority, infor-mation assurance, timely decisionmaking capabil-ities, and prioritized resource tasking on a global

USS Lake Eriefiring SM–3 missile.

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scale. This will allow integrating strategic, opera-tional, and tactical levels of command from thePresident to warfighters. In addition to obvioustechnical challenges, establishing governance,standards, and policy to ensure the transition to amultilevel, secure, network-centric enterprise re-mains a primary objective.

U.S. Strategic Command is integrating com-mand and control systems across mission areasand engaging other organizations to identify re-quirements for consolidated support of warfight-ers. One example is its collaboration with U.S.Joint Forces Command and the Office of the As-sistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and In-formation Integration to delineate the responsi-bilities of warfighter command and control. In aparallel effort, the command is working to con-solidate and centralize command and controlgovernance, a key to attaining a truly globalDOD enterprise.

Lessons from Enduring Freedom and IraqiFreedom identified requirements for commercialsatellite communications, network security, andbandwidth expansion. The command is workingwith public and private sources to improve theuse and protection of these assets. It will remainfocused, apply lessons, and address challengeswhile ensuring that it does not create stovepiped

systems. The ultimate goal will involve culturalchange as the command introduces a 24/7 cross-functional information sharing system.

U.S. Central Command had seven timesmore bandwidth available in Iraqi Freedom thanDesert Storm, and four-fifths of that expansioncame from commercial systems. Modern systemsrequire increased capabilities. For example,Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles can re-ceive commands and transmit high resolutionstreaming video with up to 1.2 gigabytes of band-width per second. By contrast, older manned U–2aircraft need only 2 megabytes per second. War-ships that fire Tomahawk cruise missiles can alsobe heavy users of satellite communications, espe-cially when relying on space-based systems to ob-tain targeting information. Bandwidth demandswill only increase as more unmanned aerial vehi-cles are fielded and new weapons are deployedthat can be reprogrammed in flight, such as theTactical Tomahawk.

U.S. Strategic Command is assuming someintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanceduties from the Joint Staff. These capabilities areseen as a weapons system to enable operationswith a deterrent value of their own. As com-manders rely on more sophisticated and inte-grated ISR support, the command must supplyunprecedented situational awareness for battle-field dominance.

The command is building on the legacy ofU.S. Space Command. Land forces will depend onthe next generation of space systems with space-based radar, transformational communications,and space-based infrared and global positioningsystems. When integrated, space forces will offerdecisionmakers and commanders unprecedentedsituational awareness, communications, and nav-igation and timing.

Coordinated application of these capabilitiesis essential to give the Armed Forces battlefielddominance and enable concepts such as globalstrike and missile defense. This will require a sin-gle source for space-based capabilities that cutsacross the military and national space boundary.Strategic Command is uniquely positioned to helpplan and support an effort to combine militaryand national security space operations in supportof both peacetime and wartime operations.

Military CultureA global focus and unique combination of

missions require cultural changes. To achieve thevision of the President and the Secretary, U.S.Strategic Command must synchronize its assetstoward a single purpose. Its missions are dynamicand must evolve cohesively. Strategic thinking re-quires breaking down boundaries and surmount-ing ownership issues. The Nation can no longer

Tomahawk missile testat Point Mugu.

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afford bifurcated operations. Old divisions—civil-ian and military, joint and service—must giveway to a strategic, coordinated, unified approachto serve everyone concerned.

U.S. Strategic Command has Army and Ma-rine Corps components that work closely withtheir Navy and Air Force counterparts. Joint taskforce-global network operations and informationoperations center personnel interact with part-ners from the National Security Agency and De-fense Information Systems Agency. Moreover, for-eign colleagues are being added. Britain is on

board, and other allies will join the endeavor inOmaha to work together in unprecedented waysto ensure the security of the free world.

The command must continue to engage a fu-ture that not only links across military and na-tional security operations but builds a truly com-bined system where observing, orienting, andacting are one process, not three.

Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom re-vealed the potential of cutting across organiza-tional boundaries in space as orbiting capabilitiesbecame critical warfighting components. Now thecommand must change the way it interacts in allmission areas to ensure that warfighters have the

USS Ohio undergoingconversion.

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support to access data and conduct effective oper-ations during any conflict. Timely and accurateinformation has become a decisive advantage inthe shadowy global war on terrorism, especiallyfor Special Operations Forces. While these profes-sionals do not ask for accolades, they demand themost up-to-date information.

The Armed Forces are challenged to discover,observe, and target more elusive enemies in the

72-hour air tasking ordercycle and even the 45-minute response time seenin Iraq. While that is a re-markably short kill-chaincycle, it was ten minutes latefor one well-publicizedstrike. The command is

uniquely positioned to help plan and support thedynamic evolution required to further compressthis timeline to better hold enemies at risk.

The command will not realize its potentialuntil processes linking it to the common pursuitof national security are addressed. New organiza-tions with old processes are not an answer. It isclear that chains of command must be stream-lined and duplication avoided. And it is not anissue of ownership or self-aggrandizing authori-ties. Rather it is about doing what is right andbest for the security needs of the Nation.

Partnerships with civilian agencies, industry,and academe are also vital to all mission areasand to achieving the integrated teamwork essen-tial to success. The command is fortunate in hav-ing strong relations with these players, and as itmoves forward in each new mission area it willneed even stronger ties with all its partners, oldand new.

Tradition and InnovationAs it becomes fully operational, U.S. Strategic

Command will provide a unified resource to bet-ter understand threats and rapidly respond tothem. However, achieving such capabilities willrequire charting a course over the horizon. Thiseffort involves developing a new paradigm that isnot understood at present. Consider designers ofvideo games. It can take from 18 to 30 months tomake a quality game for personal computers.Work can begin on games before the computeron which they will be played becomes available.And all that effort is for developing games.

The stakes involved in developing and coordinating systems for national security aremuch higher and need an advanced level of fore-sight. America has reached a pivotal point in its history. The security environment is changingdramatically.

U.S. Strategic Command is literally new. Itsmissions confirm that strategic should not beequated with nuclear but rather defines the rangeof options available to protect national security.Meanwhile, potential enemies will seek to exploitvulnerabilities on land, at sea, and in the air aswell as in information networks and space systems.

The command can build on traditionalstrengths while shaping its broader and deeperrole. To accomplish this goal, its service compo-nents must reach outside their own traditions tointegrate tasks in new organizational constructsand draw on expertise from across the defensecommunity. At the same time the command re-lies on the services to provide unique perspectivesand distinct contributions. This mix of traditionand innovation has resulted in excellent progress.

There are unprecedented opportunities toshape capabilities to meet the needs of the Na-tion. Unfortunately they will remain nothingmore than opportunities without the courage toseize them, which means consolidation. U.S.Strategic Command must integrate operationalconcepts as well as streamline chains of com-mand, not just draft memoranda of understand-ing or organize senior steering groups. Bold inno-vation must drive efforts to support the newmissions assigned. Global threats are too radicalfor old ideas. The bottom line is not compli-cated: U.S. Strategic Command must think andact in new ways. JFQ

U.S. Strategic Command willprovide a unified resource tobetter understand threatsand rapidly respond to them


M any experts warned prior to Sep-tember 11, 2001, that the prolifera-tion of weapons of mass destruc-tion (WMD) would exploit

weaknesses in the defense of America. A report bythe Commission on National Security/21st Cen-tury sounded one such alarm: “The United Stateswill become increasingly vulnerable to hostile at-tack on the American homeland. . . . military su-periority will not entirely protect us.” The subse-quent terrorist attacks validated the commissionreport and the need to reexamine protecting thehomeland. Moreover, they resulted in a reap-praisal of the role of the Department of Defensein support of civil authorities. Among Federalagencies, it has the most experience in combat-ting terrorism.

One year after 9/11, the commissioncochairs, Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, cau-tioned: “America remains dangerously unpre-pared to prevent and respond to a catastrophicterrorist attack on U.S. soil.” And, as the Nationprepares for such attacks, so will terrorists.Though America maintains a superiority inweaponry, personnel, and other resources, terror-ist groups can convert their disadvantage in num-bers into an advantage. Networked terrorists cancoordinate strategy and plans, execute schemesquickly, and outpace the cumbersome U.S. deci-sionmaking cycle.

The DOD RoleThe establishment of U.S. Northern Com-

mand (NORTHCOM) strengthened the capabili-ties of the Nation to respond to terrorism. Thecommand solidifies the DOD role in homelanddefense and provides information to Federal,state, and local authorities. And it could do moreby leveraging WMD expertise through planning,

Lieutenant Colonel Adrian A. Erckenbrack, USA, is special assistant for legislative affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense andAaron Scholer is deputy military legislative assistant for Senator Joseph Lieberman.

The DOD Role inHomeland SecurityBy A D R I A N A. E R C K E N B R A C K and A A R O N S C H O L E R

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training, exercises, and consequence manage-ment to support the homeland defense mission.This is a break with the traditional practice bythe defense community of getting involved indomestic consequence management only afterevents overcome the capacity of civil authoritiesto respond.

The defense establishment should not bethe first responder or lead agency in preventingor detecting terrorism but should assist organiza-tions tasked to respond. It alone has the capacityto both improve homeland security on the Fed-

eral, state, and locallevels and respond tochemical, biological,radiological, nuclear,or large explosiveevents. For the Na-tion to become more

secure as a result of NORTHCOM activities, theconventional homeland defense paradigm of re-sponse must give way to a new model that in-cludes both prevention and preparedness.

To date the Secretary of Defense has specifi-cally referred to DOD involvement as homelanddefense rather than homeland security—signifyingmore than a semantic difference. Defense impliesdeterrence and/or response whereas security ismore comprehensive; defense is part of securitybut not the only part. This distinction avoidshaving the Pentagon become embroiled in an ill-defined mission as capstone agency for Federal,state, and local police and first response agencies.The Department of Defense is not prepared, will-ing, or in some cases constitutionally permittedto play that role. Yet because agencies that mustrespond to the consequences of an attack usingweapons of mass destruction need resources nowinstead of after another terrorist attack, the DODmission must be expanded from just defendingthe homeland to supporting homeland security,especially since a future attack could inflict morecasualties than were suffered on 9/11.

Support PlanningA strategic support plan should be developed

to meet the challenges of homeland defense andsecurity. While emphasizing defense, it shouldalso be focused on security objectives to supportstate and local authorities, in some cases with ex-tant defense organizations, resources, and poli-cies. The plan should provide a strategic visionand endstate, be coordinated with both Mexicoand Canada, focus NORTHCOM activities by pro-viding clear goals, be linked to the Department ofHomeland Security (DHS), and work in partner-ship with other Federal and state agencies.

Existing procedures must be enhanced andother mechanisms developed to coordinate DODinvolvement with first responders. These stepsmay include:

■ making homeland security the primary missionof part of the National Guard

■ developing a NORTHCOM civil support struc-ture to parallel the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA) regions and National Guard state areacommands (STARCs)

■ broadening current policy in DOD Instruction2000.12 and DOD Directive 2000.16 to require militaryinstallations and defense agencies to incorporate firstresponse and consequence management organizationsin terrorism planning, exercise, and evaluation activities

■ working with the Department of Homeland Se-curity to develop a telecommunications infrastructureto connect selected homeland security agencies

■ expanding defense participation on both theFederal and state levels, developing more comprehen-sive interagency curricula at professional military edu-cation institutions, fielding regional chemical biologicalincident response teams (CBIRTs), and organizing con-sequence management centers of excellence.

The result must be improved prevention,preparedness, and consequence management onthe state and local levels, enhanced interoper-ability among agencies, common communica-tion and equipment standards among all agen-cies, and coordinated and synchronous responsemechanisms. Such actions do not suggest thatthe Department of Defense should assume thoseresponsibilities alone or be the lead Federalagency but that it should coordinate with theDepartment of Homeland Security and support-ing organizations.

Strategic PlanningIt is essential to develop a plan to defend

and secure the homeland. By definition it shouldinclude the objectives of the Secretary of Defensefor operations needed to meet the requirementsof homeland defense and security. Such a planwould guide development of supporting opera-tional and tactical planning and facilitate coordi-nation of strategic priorities and resource alloca-tion on the national level. It must seek to linkhomeland defense and security goals to NORTH-COM and DHS planning. Absent an overarchingplan, the unified commands and services shouldrely on policies, regulations, and other issuancesfrom organizations with disparate responsibilitiesand perspectives to safeguard their personnel andfacilities as well as assist the civil authorities.

To address the threat of domestic andtransnational terrorism, this plan must be na-tional and international in scope. It should inte-grate homeland defense and security planningwith state and local authorities at home as well as

existing procedures must beenhanced to coordinate DODinvolvement with first responders

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in Mexico and Canada. This approach will ad-dress existing shortcomings and provide compre-hensive responses to threats such as smallpox,which can spread rapidly beyond boundaries.

The plan must be accompanied by a conceptdevelopment and experimentation process thatwill allocate forces and resources and developboth joint and service mission essential task lists.This process will be valuable for the Army and AirNational Guard, which are expected to assume re-sponsibilities for homeland defense and support-ing security.

Reserve ComponentsWith the decline of the homeland protection

role in the last century, the military became in-creasingly expeditionary, applying its powerabroad to deter foreign threats to national inter-ests. Turning back to homeland defense, it is criti-cal for the Armed Forces to maintain their expedi-tionary character. But securing the Nation is afundamental mission that the Reserve compo-nents must be reorganized, trained, and equippedto accomplish.

The Army and Air National Guard are bestsuited for a homeland defense and security role.These two Reserve components have deep roots intheir local communities. Furthermore, becausemost state adjutants general also serve as bothemergency manager and homeland security direc-tor, they are engaged in intragovernmental issuesas well as Federal and interagency matters. Operat-ing outside existing arrangements or establishingnew organizations that replicate those effortswould add bureaucracy, increase turf battles, anddecrease efficiency on the state level.

Homeland defense is not a new mission forthe National Guard, but it must be expanded to

include appropriate organizational structures andadded resources. In addition, it must plan, train,and conduct exercises with agencies that respondto chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, orlarge explosive events. NORTHCOM, workingwith state adjutants general, should develop aplan to address concept development and valida-tion of homeland defense roles and missions. Theplan must also move assets from geographic sup-port to assist in homeland defense and security.While reorienting a portion of the NationalGuard is a departure from current thinking andoperations, it reflects the changing national secu-rity environment.

The Quadrennial Defense Review issued in2001 concluded that defending America was theprimary DOD mission and that policy wouldevolve accordingly. NORTHCOM was designatedto provide unity of command for this mission,but there are significant problems because capa-bilities intended to defend the homeland andsupport civil authorities were developed for fight-ing overseas. Thus the command must first beconfigured to better leverage existing organiza-tional structures.

Command Restructuring Central to the success of U.S. Northern Com-

mand in providing timely, appropriate support tocivil authorities is the development of a com-mand and control structure that reaches down tostate level while reaching out to other Federalagencies. The purpose of this structure is not toexercise command and control as lead agency butto facilitate coordination. NORTHCOM can lever-age several organizations. One is the FederalEmergency Management Agency, which dealswith consequence management through ten re-gional offices covering most of the NORTHCOMarea of responsibility. Within those regions,STARCs can be tasked and organized to help over-see training regimes and standardize require-ments, develop common terminology, and syn-chronize the efforts of state and local firstresponders—a million firefighters, half a millionlocal police, and 150,000 emergency medicalworkers. In addition, there are numerous activeduty service installations in each of these FEMAregions and STARCs that currently conduct anti-terrorism planning, training, exercises, and evalu-ations. It is imperative that the National Guardand first responders take part in all critical plan-ning, training, and evaluation in their locales.This would often incur no extra funding, but itwould require thinking differently. By looking be-yond the perimeter of the installation and the

Antiterrorist exercise.



military as a whole and by incorporating the ef-forts and resources of many agencies into plans,exercises, and evaluations, the Department of De-fense can significantly improve first responder ca-pabilities. This will decrease the likelihood thatthe department will have to provide first responseto a local incident.

Policy and DirectivesDOD Directive 2000.12 establishes responsi-

bilities for antiterrorism/force protection whileDOD Instruction 2000.16 sets antiterrorism stan-dards. Both issuances apply to physical securityfor activities overseas and at home, but their scopemust be expanded to include Federal, state, andlocal agencies in antiterrorism planning, training,and exercises. Extending these authorities acrossthe Department of Defense will be a major step inimproving interoperability and capabilities.

Moreover, many commanders are unawareof their responsibilities to respond to civilian re-quests for emergency assistance based on DODDirective 3025.15, “Military Assistance to CivilAuthorities.” The Secretary of Defense retains ap-proval authority for support to civil authoritiesinvolving the use of commander-assigned forces,which would include any personnel or assets thatmight be used in a chemical, biological, radiologi-cal, nuclear, or large explosive event in theUnited States. This issuance gives commanders

immediate emergency response authority to savelives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate prop-erty damage under imminently serious condi-tions. Commanders who receive verbal requestsfrom civil authorities during an exigent emer-gency may initiate informal planning and imme-diately respond under the directive. This informa-tion should be incorporated in professionalmilitary education, starting with courses for jun-ior officers, and also disseminated to civil author-ities on all levels.

Once NORTHCOM has broadened its antiter-rorism policy to include functional preventionand preparedness activities that are paired with anorganizational structure designed to best supportcivil authorities, it must communicate its changedregulations and standing directives to all Federal,state, and local homeland security agencies.

Connecting the DotsWhile first responders must be integral to

network-centric warfare, the current state of playsuggests that is not the case. One way to rectifythis situation is the better use of the defense mes-sage system, a telecommunications capabilitybased on off-the-shelf commercial products.

The system can provide secure, accountable,reliable writer-to-reader electronic messaging for

USCGC Bainbridge inNew York harbor.

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both institutional and individual users. It re-placed AUTODIN as well as other disparate e-mailsystems within the Department of Defense. Theuser-friendly X.400-based messaging system,which resembles a common e-mail application,handles classified information with high-assur-ance message security and delivery capability. Thedefense message system also provides globalX.500 directory services and supports transmis-sion of digital files containing graphics, photoimagery, and video. The system has been de-signed to use interoperable commercial hardwareand software.

Another option is supporting the effort bythe National Guard Bureau to optimize GuardNetfor homeland defense and security. Although not

as capable as the defensemessage system, it wasuseful for limited long-distance communica-tions on 9/11 whenphone lines became un-available. Regardless ofwhich system is selected,

it must enable numerous Federal, state, and localagencies to exchange information, and it mustserve as an alternate secure means of communica-tion during a crisis. NORTHCOM must also helpopen interagency communication pipelines anddevelop manning for liaison elements within se-lected Federal and state agencies.

Expanding the MissionThe Department of Defense lacks domestic

WMD prevention or consequence managementinteroperability to deal with a real asymmetricthreat. Accordingly, it must expand its intera-gency role through education, exercises, andtraining. To foster interoperability, cooperation,and jointness, the defense presence in the intera-gency process could be increased by assigningmore personnel to liaison offices in FEMA re-gions. Emergency preparedness liaison offices as-sist in planning and coordination with state au-thorities, local jurisdictions, and integratedtraining and exercises. Coordination should notbe limited to consequence management butshould include prevention and preparedness ac-tivities with Federal, state, and local agencies.Members of both the active and Reserve compo-nents should staff these liaison elements. To ex-pand the number and type of National Guardpersonnel in full-time positions may require achange in the authority for Federally financed,state-controlled National Guard activities.

Another way to foster interagency coordina-tion involves providing the same type of DOD li-aison to the Federal Bureau of Investigation,which is responsible for antiterrorist crisis man-agement. Finally, liaison officers could be as-signed to state emergency operations centers.Terrorists are most likely to target infrastructureto overwhelm preemption and consequencemanagement capacities. Such an attack may bedesigned to provoke Federal, state, and local re-sponses simultaneously. The Department of De-fense must be prepared on every level (its first re-sponders will be on the installation level) toparticipate in a joint interagency task force madeup of multiple Federal, state, and local agencies.Training for such events can occur in both mili-tary schools and installations across the countryor at National Guard training centers—existingassets that can be economically expanded to sup-port realistic interagency planning, training, andexercising with first responders, law enforcementagencies, active duty personnel, and all levels ofgovernment. Optimally, the Department of De-fense must develop this capability until it be-comes second nature to both the installationforce protection officer and the joint staff officerin any organization. A special focus of any ex-pansion of the defense role in the interagencyprocess must be the knowledge of actions to betaken in a chemical or biological environment.

A natural adjunct to DOD efforts would be atraining academy under the Department ofHomeland Security for first responders and con-tinuing education of officials in appropriate agen-cies and organizations.

A Chemical/Biological InitiativeOne key assumption about a catastrophic ter-

rorist attack is that defense and response begin onthe local level and that sufficient Federal and stateassistance will not arrive for hours or days. Givencurrent assets, state and local law enforcement,emergency response, and medical services maycollapse quickly. The Department of Defense candecrease the time required to identify, react, andcontain a chemical or biological attack, provide amultilayed national crisis response capability, anddecrease the scope and length of any commit-ment. Any such initiative must:

■ develop and integrate disease diagnosis and re-porting with the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-vention (CDC)

■ create CBIRTs to improve the national chemicaland biological response capability and create conse-quence management centers of excellence

■ broaden participation of Federal, state, and localprevention, preparedness, and consequence manage-ment under the revised emergency management stan-dard of the Joint Commission on Accreditation ofHealthcare Organizations

NORTHCOM must also help openinteragency communicationpipelines and develop manningfor liaison elements



■ help implement a laboratory response networkfor bioterrorism

■ review and recommend changes to Federal,state, and local contingency plans to integrate installa-tions, facilities, and personnel in the movement, secu-rity, and distribution of national pharmaceutical stock-pile packages.

Detection and WarningFor the Department of Defense to help civil

authorities identify and contain the spread of anycontagion, it must improve its disease surveil-lance detection systems and the way it communi-cates indication and warning of pending attack,confirmation of an attack in progress, and detailsof a past attack to partners. Currently, sources ofdata for both defense and public health surveil-lance are as varied as the diseases and conditionsthemselves. Because there are multiple datasources, information requirements, distinct users,and private and governmental partners withwhom the Department of Defense may collabo-rate in obtaining data for specific program areas,there is no single syndromic surveillance systemthat captures information required to monitorthe health of DOD personnel and share it withthe Centers for Disease Control.

To meet this need, the defense communitymust be integrated into the national electronicdisease surveillance system or something like thehealth alert network or a parallel system. Whencompleted, the system will electronically link a

variety of syndromic surveillance activities andfacilitate more accurate and timely reporting ofdisease information to the Centers for DiseaseControl. It will include data standards, an Inter-net-based communications infrastructure built onindustry standards, and agreements on data ac-cess and sharing, burden reduction, and confi-dentiality. This type of system would provide in-formation crucial to monitoring the health ofDOD personnel, identify their health problemsand priorities, help the department take actionsto prevent further illness, assist in evaluating theactions, and serve as a collaborative means ofmonitoring syndromic trends in other parts ofthe country.

Consequence ManagementThe concept for chemical biological incident

response teams grew out of the chemical biologi-cal incident response force (CBIRF), formed in1996 in response to Presidential Decision Direc-tive 39. The Marine Corps organized this self-con-tained unit of 375 marines and sailors that cancounter chemical/biological terrorist threats.

When directed, this force can rapidly re-spond to chemical or biological threats. Once de-ployed, it coordinates initial relief efforts, secu-rity, detection, identification, expert medical

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F–16 patrollingAmerican skies,Noble Eagle.



advice, and limited decontamination of person-nel and equipment. Although this unit can per-form its primary missions, the scale of a potentialbiological terrorist attack has expanded the scopeof the required response.

The level of response being considered mustbe able to deal with a threat similar in size andscope to that portrayed in the biological terrorismexercise, Dark Winter. In that scenario, the effectsof a terrorist attack using smallpox encompassed

a multistate region andrapidly overwhelmed theFederal, state, and localconsequence managementresponse. Under this sce-nario, CBIRF would re-spond with critical re-sources as needed, but its

capabilities in security, detection, identification,expert medical advice, and limited decontamina-tion would be quickly overwhelmed. Indeed,even multiple units would be insufficient to man-age a terrorist attack like the one in the exercise.

Part of the solution is lending DOD expertiseto planning, training, exercises, detection, andmedical operations in a contaminated environ-ment and providing WMD response and manage-ment capabilities alongside Federal, state, and

local agencies with first response missions and re-quirements. In effect, although no single organi-zation would be responsible for responding to anevent on the scale of Dark Winter, contributingsuch expertise will improve the capability to pre-vent an incident from reaching a supercriticalmagnitude, while decreasing the probability thatthe Department of Defense will be required to re-spond in the first instance.

To achieve this objective, the best optionwould be embedding a more capable prevention,detection, and consequence management capac-ity in the National Guard. It must develop chemi-cal biological incident response teams, determinetheir appropriate size and equipment, and pro-vide transport for five or six strategically locatedregional teams, each within four hours flyingtime of any point in its area of responsibility.That would enhance the capability to respond tobioterrorism incidents that overwhelm first re-sponders. Moreover, developing and pre-position-ing teams in selected locales would offer a layeredresponse (no mid-sized WMD consequence man-agement assets exist between state and local HAZMAT units and strategic CBIRF assets). Thiswould also reduce the distance over which re-sponse forces must travel in an emergency.

the best option would beembedding a more capableconsequence managementcapacity in the National Guard

USNS Comfortin New York harbor,September 18, 2001.

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The response force would provide regionalconsequence management centers of excellence.On a day-to-day basis teams would form centersto provide consequence management planning,training, evaluation, and exercises. They wouldalso serve as catalysts by developing standards forequipment, communications, and doctrineamong first responders. This phenomenon is oc-curring already, albeit on a lower level andsmaller scale, wherever WMD civil support teamsare present. While not originally envisioned as aDOD mission, a collateral benefit of civil supporthas been offering a credible and neutral catalystin an environment that is often turf oriented. Ona larger scale, while CBIRTs have not previouslyexisted, there is precedent for providing such as-sistance to Federal, state, and local agencies.

The National Defense Authorization Act of1997 required the development of a program totest and improve responses to emergencies in-volving biological and chemical weapons. To en-able this program, Federal funding must supportNational Guard CBIRTs, including planning,training, evaluation, and exercise oversight tostate and local organizations.

Medical SupportTo respond to the threat of bioterrorism,

plans should be developed to increase the capac-ity of the Laboratory Response Network. The De-partment of Defense could contribute by enlarg-ing the number of level-four labs and connectingthem with Federal information systems to im-prove rapid diagnostics and report attacks. Suchcapabilities are located at the U.S. Army MedicalResearch Institute of Infectious Disease at Fort Dietrich, Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta,Southwest Foundation in San Antonio, and Na-tional Institutes of Health in Bethesda. To de-crease the time required for a sample from a sus-pected terrorist attack to be positively identified,the Department of Defense and Centers for Dis-ease Control must improve existing facilities onthe west coast such as the Madigan Army MedicalFacility at Fort Lewis and in the midwest or de-velop new capabilities. If population density is afactor, then the demographics of California,Texas, and Oregon demand that level-four labora-tories be located in these regions as well.

By locating more facilities in key areas, theDepartments of Defense and Health and HumanServices will bolster the number of qualified epi-demiological experts, reduce the lag time betweendiscovering and identifying an agent, enhancecommunicating diagnostic information, and im-prove the probability of containing a biologicalattack before it becomes pandemic.

To ameliorate the consequences of nerveagents, biological pathogens, or chemical agents,

the CDC national strategic stockpile ensures theavailability of vital pharmaceuticals, antidotes,and other medical supplies and equipment. Theprogram can rapidly deploy resources to any do-mestic location in the event of an attack involvingbiological or chemical agents. As part of its re-sponse, the Centers for Disease Control wouldtransfer stockpile resources to state or local au-thorities who, in turn, would repackage medicinesand other commodities. This stockpile programwas exercised in response to 9/11 when officials inNew York requested large amounts of medical ma-terial and logistic support. With the support ofstate and local public health and emergency re-sponse agencies, the operation was performed suc-cessfully according to contingency plans.

The deployment of the stockpile package inresponse to 9/11 occurred in a relatively benignenvironment that facilitated its rapid and effi-cient transfer to the New York metropolitan area.Had the attack been coordinated with the releaseof chemical or biological agents—which canspread rapidly and contaminate or infect largenumbers of people—and had terrorists interdictedor destroyed the package to increase mortality,the outcome might have been different.

With the arrival of a stockpile package, fewlaw enforcement agencies would be capable ofmaintaining public order long enough to distrib-ute vaccines under chaotic conditions. Ultimately,the Departments of Defense and Homeland Secu-rity must jointly recommend appropriate changesin contingency planning to integrate military as-sets into the distribution of stockpile packages.

The Department of Defense is not yet pre-pared to address the consequences of events thatemploy weapons of mass destruction or asymmet-ric attacks with conventional means. Detectionand containment capabilities are limited in thisarea. Integrated planning, training, exercises, andevaluation have been discussed but not fully im-plemented. Most importantly, there is no com-mon understanding of the relationship amongprevention, preparation, and response. To over-come the ambiguities in its mission, the defensecommunity must be able to immediately respondin support of Federal, state, and local authorities.It should expand its policy on antiterrorism byleveraging expertise in WMD to prevent any fu-ture act of terrorism. By so doing, it can protectthe Nation and manage the consequences of anasymmetric terrorist attack. JFQ


A lmost twenty years ago, Caspar Wein-berger defined the uses of militarypower in remarks made before aluncheon meeting at the National

Press Club. The Secretary of Defense outlined sixconditions to be met before committing troopsoverseas. They required that any decision thatput the Armed Forces in harm’s way must bebased on vital national interests, a clear determi-nation to win, well-defined political and military

objectives, a continuing reassessment of the rela-tionship between force structure and objectives, areasonable assurance of popular support, and theappeal to the use of force only as a last resort.

One does not have to be a fan of the so-calledWeinberger doctrine to appreciate the benefit ofending military operations in a timely and deci-sive manner. Leaders value planning that enablesdisengaging from one operation and deploying toanother. And the same capability is valued in do-mestic assistance. Indeed, it is notable that thecurrent Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld,has registered his reluctance to commit militaryassets to aid civilian authorities without a clearexit strategy. Although planning is a scarce com-modity during the early stages of such operations,part of the process should be dedicated to exitplanning as well as engagement planning.

Colonel Joel D. Cusker, ARNG, is a recipient of the U.S. Army MacArthurLeadership Award; Colonel Charles H. Hash, USA, is a strategic plannerin the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve; Captain Mary E. Landry,USCGR, is commanding officer, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office;and Colonel Dallas D. Owens, USAR, is an analyst with the StrategicStudies Institute at the U.S. Army War College.

Disengaging fromConsequenceManagementBy J O E L D. C U S K E R, C H A R L E S H. H A S H, M A R Y E. L A N D R Y, and

D A L L A S D. O W E N S

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Like disengaging from overseas commitments,exiting domestic missions is not exclusively a mili-tary decision. But while the Armed Forces are sup-porting partners, they need not be passive. Activeinteragency partnerships are essential in creatingan effective disengagement strategy.

Exit StrategiesIn a high-end assistance requirement such as

consequence management involving weapons ofmass destruction, responding is the first priority.

However, exit strategiesare also essential in threeways: ensuring that mili-tary support is availablefor other domestic orforeign emergencies, en-

hancing return to normalcy in the disaster area,and maintaining civil-military relations.

First, active or Reserve assets responding toevents involving weapons of mass destructionwill likely come from a variety of units, somededicated to consequence management, somewith expertise in responding to weapons of massdestruction as a primary mission, and many withdual or no explicit missions in this area. If unitsinvolved in such a mission are required else-where, it will take time to disengage, reconstitute,

and move on. Accordingly, operations are wellserved by plans that enable quick partial or totaldisengagement for redeployment.

Next, the goal of Federal agencies in the re-sponse plan is assisting overwhelmed state andlocal governments. Ideally, military support endsas a community returns to normal, perhaps withstate help, and is able to perform emergency serv-ices needed to save lives, protect property, andtransition to recovery operations. If the militarystays longer than required it violates the spirit ofthe Federal response plan, the letter of agreementamong participating agencies, and assumptionsthat justify assistance to state and local govern-ments. It can also hamper the return to normalcy,thereby doing a disservice to the people targetedfor assistance.

Finally, effective civil-military efforts de-pend on forthright relationships among civilianand military agencies. State and local authoritiesmust understand what the U.S. Government cando, including the limits on military assistance.Exit planning can deflect false expectationsamong state and local officials and the generalpopulation on the quality, magnitude, and dura-tion of assistance. No one, especially citizens insupported areas, should be surprised when themilitary decreases and then ends support. Atimely exit avoids competition between businessand government agencies. In addition, particu-larly for the military, staying too long can risk

if the military stays longer thanrequired it violates the spirit ofthe Federal response plan

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resentment, constitutional issues, and violationsof civil liberties.

Contributions and ownership must beshared by all parties for an exit plan to be effec-tive. In consequence management, the militaryplan must be integral to the overall Federal en-gagement and disengagement strategy, which inturn is linked to the request for assistance by stateand local governments. The engagement strategyis embodied in the Federal response plan. The De-partment of Defense has clearly defined responsi-bilities. In large and complex operations, its roleis more critical as a supporter of other agencies.The primary and support responsibilities dictatedual exit strategies, each with peculiar inter-agency relationships.

Federal ResponseThe process and structure for delivering assis-

tance to address major disasters are contained inthe Federal response plan, which designates pri-mary and support responsibilities of emergencyagencies and functions. The Department of De-fense serves as the primary agency for public

works and engineering (function 3) and as sup-port agency for other functions. The plan ad-dresses only those disengaging Federal agenciesresponsible for managing assistance to state andlocal agencies. Disengagement naturally focuseson completing emergency support requirementsand releasing agencies with primary responsibil-ity for coordination of that function.

The plan designates a lead organization,normally the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA), and a Federal coordinating offi-cer, the senior official in charge of support. Thisofficer, normally selected from a pool of desig-nated, trained, and experienced officials, has re-sponsibility for disengaging the Federal agenciescalled on to support an event. Now part of theDepartment of Homeland Security, FEMA islikely to remain responsible for providing Federalcoordinating officers to execute consequencemanagement.

The life cycle of a consequence managementevent is largely responsible for the dual role ofthe Department of Defense. Early in an incident,a fast and massive response is necessary acrossseveral emergency support functions. Primaryagencies may exhaust their organic assets or morelikely cannot mobilize or contract for resources torespond quickly and thus will call on the militaryto meet some or all of the requirements. Concur-rently, the military must provide its own support.Logically, a disengagement strategy should returnresponsibility for emergency support functions tothe primary Federal agency or complete the re-quirement, whichever occurs first. This transitionbecomes complex when eleven functions are sup-ported, each at different stages of completion ortransition to a primary agency.

Determining the status of a function requirescoordination among at least three parties: the Fed-eral coordinating officer, primary agency, and de-fense coordinating officer. Large operations mayrequire establishing a joint task force, but the de-fense coordinator would remain the point of con-tact for the Federal coordinating officer. It is rea-sonable to expect, depending on the magnitude ofthe event and local capabilities, that this initialsupporting effort for the eleven emergency sup-port functions will be a sizable requirement thatthe Department of Defense is anxious to end. Yetit is during this phase that the military contribu-tion is unique, because no other agency can mobi-lize the requisite assets as quickly or efficiently.

The follow-on disengagement is obviouslysecondary to providing immediate emergencyservices. Assistance for public works and engineer-ing (function 3) comes from the Army Corps ofEngineers as lead agency. In support of other func-tions, the Department of Defense relies on unitswith specialized or general support equipment.

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Sometimes unskilled personnel are needed, but atother occasions a few technicians are adequate. Inall cases, the defense coordinator remains the sin-gle DOD point of contact and requests appropriatemilitary personnel and equipment.

In recent years the disaster life cycle has be-come fairly predictable for types and magnitudesof events. According to an experienced coordinat-ing officer, and confirmed by recent consequence

management efforts, theemergency response stagewith heaviest defensecommitments should lastno more than 90 days.Disasters could be greaterin magnitude and lesspredictable than events in

the past. But after three months other Federalagencies generally have time to organize, contract,and begin recovery rather than simply managingconsequences. Defense contributions in recoveryoperations are few and are rejected as a conse-quence management mission. Function 3 activi-ties are likely to last longer, but their level is gen-erally low and routine for the Corps of Engineers.

State and local agencies may have plans, orat least expectations, on how and when Federalagencies disengage. But after submitting requests

for Federal assistance, the plans do not directly af-fect disengagement; rather requests become partof the initial input to the Federal disengagementplan. Authorities give input to the Federal coordi-nating officer in many forms, including amendedrequests. All input is an important source of in-formation for disengagement criteria and plans.

Current StrategiesThe Federal response plan is not intended to

provide details of disengagement for agencies andcomponents of the U.S. Government. Because theDepartment of Defense is one of several supportagencies, its disengagement is only partially self-determined and depends largely on state andlocal requests and taskings by the lead agency,under the direction of the Federal coordinator, di-rectly or through another agency. It has devel-oped a number of documents that provide guid-ance for affecting how that support should beprovided and ended.

At the highest levels, there is concern overdisengagement because it is situation-dependent.The Pentagon does not publish a plan for disen-gaging from the consequence management ofevents involving weapons of mass destruction,but related issues are addressed in DOD Directive3025.1, which provides the response structure,agency relationships, transition strategies, andleadership responsibilities. This directive clarifies

the Federal response plan isnot intended to provide detailsof disengagement for agenciesof the U.S. Government

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disengagement planning and gives the Federal co-ordinator overall responsibility for operationalphases, including disengagement. Similarly, theOffice of the Secretary of Defense or its executiveagent—with the Joint Staff, U.S. Northern Com-mand, and Directorate of Military Support on theArmy Staff (a function that is being transferred tothe Joint Staff)—will appoint a defense coordina-tor as part of the requirement for defense assis-tance. Under the Federal coordinator, this officerwill orchestrate disengagement based on originaland amended requests for assistance.

If the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF–CS)has command responsibility, the defense coordina-tor may be under its operational control, but thisstill implements disengagement. Recent initiatives,such as the appointment of the Assistant Secretaryof Defense for Homeland Defense and establish-ment of U.S. Northern Command, may lead to adramatic reorganization, though one theme seemsimmune from change: the Federal coordinatormust continue to be provided with a single DODpoint of contact. It does not matter to whichagency the coordinating officer belongs as long ashe represents the Pentagon with one voice.

Joint Publication 3-07.7, Doctrine for CivilSupport, has been a work in progress for severalyears, but the recent structural and conceptual

changes have outpaced the publication cycle. Themost recent draft contains a single paragraph ontermination under planning considerations andnotes that “termination of military support . . . isa sensitive phase that requires detailed planning”and that the agreed endstate defines when forceswill be disengaged. The endstate is unlikely to bedetermined until the danger recedes and criticalservices are restored. It will be evident when localauthorities are able to assume responsibility forthe operation and, together with FEMA, considerthe incident under control. This publication con-tends that disengagement criteria have an objec-tive (capabilities) basis while recognizing thevalue of political consensus (subjective) basis.

The implementation plan reiterates that suc-cessful disengagement and the transition to civilauthority are key to the JTF–CS mission and re-quires detailed planning and execution. It alsostates that the task force will not remain to con-duct recovery operations, defined as long-termcleanup and relief efforts that are the responsibil-ity of local and state authorities. The plan also rec-ognizes the importance of identifying the endstatecriteria for disengagement. The endstate should bebased on agreements between the lead agency andcombatant command before assigning forces. Allparties must agree that local authorities can as-sume operational responsibility before Joint TaskForce-Consequence Management will redeploy.

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The first JTF commander stated that disen-gagement is important but likely to be difficult.He also outlined a disengagement policy: begindeveloping a strategy as soon as the joint taskforce gets a tasking for civil support. In general,the criteria will call for creating a stabilized envi-ronment—moving from crisis to routine re-sponses to requests for assistance. This processinvolves determining that civilian agencies canperform their functions. More specific criteriawill be established to fit the event. He noted that“We will look to FEMA to be our advocate for dis-engagement.”1

The Domestic Operational Law Handbook of-fers pragmatic rather than legal advice.2 Likeother sources, it recommends establishing end-states to mark the completion of disaster assis-tance missions and understand community ob-jectives. Elaborating on endstates the handbookindicates that they must be attainable, developedfrom the national to the lowest level, and offer aroad map to follow. Perhaps as important, itstates that “the affected population must knowwhen military operations will cease and local sup-port organizations are to continue the mission.”

The handbook also recommends that termi-nation standards quickly be set that are objective,measurable, and understood by all players. They

may be “expressed in terms of percentage of pre-disaster capability by specific function; for exam-ple, 70 percent of electrical power restored.” Thestandard should represent the threshold by whichthe community agrees to have services restored toan acceptable level that can be sustained withoutFederal assistance.

Response ContextThe Federal coordinating officer ultimately

makes decisions on disengagement. The issue isensuring that he has the understanding, motiva-tion, and means to plan the effort. Understand-ing has been discussed, and FEMA has the mis-sion to meet this requirement. Motivation priorto the event is found in the Federal responseplan, which serves as the mission statement forcoordinating officers, the urgency of being pre-pared to perform on short notice, and the respon-sibility derived from being the steward of scarcelifesaving emergency response assets. After theevent, it is found in the specific requests for assis-tance, the mandate to return the communities tonormalcy, and the need to manage the demandsfrom local and state agencies and services pro-vided by a mix of public and private agencies.

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The means for planning exist in the numerousteams, groups, and officials that assist the coordi-nating officer.

■ The catastrophic disaster response group is com-posed of representatives from all Federal agencies andoperates on the national level to provide guidance andpolicy direction on response coordination and opera-tional issues arising from Federal coordinating officerand emergency support functions response activities. Itis normally located at FEMA headquarters.

■ The disaster field office is the primary venue inaffected states for coordinating response and for coor-dinating officers to collocate, along with Federalagency regional representatives and state and local liai-son officers.

■ The emergency response team is the principalinteragency group supporting the Federal coordinatingofficer in the overall operation, located at the disasterfield office.

■ The Federal coordinating officer informationand planning section collects, processes, analyzes, anddisseminates information to support planning and de-cisionmaking on both the field and headquarters lev-els. It has a large section from the emergency responseteam and a smaller one from the emergency supportteam at the FEMA emergency information and coordi-nation center.

All four assets are vital for Federal coordina-tion, with information and planning being thelogical lead agent for the exit strategy. This sec-tion is located on the national and local levelsand has contact with interagency representatives,including the local defense coordinating officer.

They also have access tostate and local respondersand sources of informationabout recovery needs andactivities, are collocated inthe operations section of

the Federal coordinating office, and normally arein continual contact with the defense operationssection. The information and planning sectionneeds training to maximize its value for disen-gagement planning.

Effective StrategyGenerally leaders understand the impor-

tance of disengagement and developing a strat-egy. Doctrinal documents on each level note thesignificance and sensitivity of disengagement.Doctrine treats it on the functional level, as ifthe department was the lead in performing emer-gency support functions rather than providingsupport. That approach neglects the duality ofresponsibility and results in disengagement crite-ria focused on only fulfilling functions; it over-sees disengagement by handing off to otheragencies. Fulfilling these functions is a worst caseapproach and has merit if functions are per-formed before lead agencies prepare to handoff.

But planning for only the worst case may over-look an opportunity to disengage quickly, at leastpartially. Handoff also enables other agencies tofulfill their responsibilities and supports the in-tent of the Federal response plan.

Both Federal and defense coordinating offi-cers are essential in maximizing disengagementstrategies. If they recognize the duality of defenseconsequence management missions, they canplan to disengage by handoff or functional com-pletion. That recognition will make handoff morelikely by highlighting the responsibilities of otheragencies and supporting a characterization of theDOD role as a notional ready reserve but not asthe force provider of first resort.3

Coordinators are more likely to recognize thedual DOD mission when it is emphasized in doc-trinal and training publications. The key docu-ments need to be revised to increase emphasis ondisengagement and expand strategies to includedisengagement by handoff.

Revising documents is only the first step;training is equally important. But formal trainingfor defense coordinating officers consists of atwo-week overview supplemented by the conti-nental army where they command the trainingsupport brigade. Exercises reinforce training. Bothtypes of disengagement strategy should ideally bepart of this process. They provide the opportunityfor interagency players to understand the com-plexity of negotiating disengagement.

Most importantly, FEMA, with support fromother agencies and its parent organization, theDepartment of Homeland Security, should definedisengagement criteria under the response plan.Provisions should be made to ensure that the leadagency establishes a disengagement planning cellwith governmental and nongovernmental agen-cies that have stakes in consequence manage-ment. Without the emphasis of the lead Federalagency and coordinating officer, subordinateagencies can do little for a successful transition.Planning cell guidance should establish measura-ble standards for disengagement, monitor andmeasure progress toward meeting the standards,adjust standards based on changes to requests forassistance, and inform all parties of the standardsand timetable for decreasing and ending support.

The Department of Defense should follow thelead of the response plan by ensuring that it canfully support the disengagement cell. Joint TaskForce-Consequence Management should take thedoctrinal lead by expanding its implementationplan and ensuring that the final Joint Pub 3-07.7 has an expanded disengagement strategy.

leaders understand theimportance of disengagementand developing a strategy



The establishment of the Department ofHomeland Security provides an additional forumfor policy level interaction among Federal agen-cies and other parties. The Department of De-fense has representation on all levels of home-land security committee work. It is imperativethat this new structure address policy issues butrecognize that current relationships for executingconsequence management are working well, espe-cially between Federal and defense coordinators.Care should be taken to strengthen this corner-stone of effective interagency cooperation.

It is important to exercise disengagement.Without practice, state and local leaders are notlikely to trust the process or be prepared to sup-port disengagement planning. And without trustin the process, they are less apt to establish disen-gagement criteria or reach consensus on sched-ules. If local leaders are confident that the publicand private sectors can resume support functions,they will be more inclined to accept the departure

of Federal agencies. Exercising disengagement ful-fills consequence management and demonstratesthat a community can both respond to a disasterand then return to functioning normally. JFQ

This article is based on a paper written by the authorswhile attending the Kennedy School of Government atHarvard University.

N O T E S

1 Interview with Brigadier General Bruce Lawlor, Feb-ruary 8, 2000, Washington.

2 Peter Menk and Marsha Mills, Domestic OperationsLaw Handbook (Charlottesville, Va.: Center for Law andMilitary Operations, U.S. Army Office of the Judge Ad-vocate General, 1999).

3 Bradley Graham and Bill Miller, “Pentagon DebatesHomeland Defense Roles,” The Washington Post (Febru-ary 11, 2002), p. 6.

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T he Navy and Coast Guard have a tradi-tion of collaboration that goes backmore than two centuries to their ori-gins as sea services. Faced with an un-

precedented threat after 9/11, they have mademajor strides in force recapitalization and trans-formation. This relationship was forged in theNational Fleet Policy Statement in 1998. The Chiefof Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark, andthe Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral

Thomas Collins, have updated this policy to syn-chronize multimission platforms, infrastructure,and personnel to gain the highest level of navaland maritime capability.

The Coast Guard postponed decommission-ing 13 coastal patrol ships and offered them withcrews for homeland security missions in ports,harbors, and coastal areas. The two services alsomet to align homeland security, defense roles,and other responsibilities. This collaboration hasimproved global intelligence by the establish-ment of an all-force maritime tracking operation.For example, working with the Coast Guard, theNavy is developing a global intelligence picture totrack ship movements at sea, which Clark be-lieves shows profound results.

Rear Admiral Charles S. Hamilton II, USN, serves as deputy programexecutive officer for ships and formerly commanded USS O’Brien; Rear Admiral Patrick M. Stillman, USCG, is program executive officer ofthe integrated deepwater system acquisition and formerly commandedthe barque Eagle.

Charting New SeasNavy-Coast GuardCooperationBy C H A R L E S S. H A M I L T O N I I and P A T R I C K M. S T I L L M A N

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Beyond operational cooperation, both serv-ices are seeking greater overall collaboration inthe future. They signed a memorandum of under-standing in 2002 and established a working groupto identify common elements in developing thenational security cutter, offshore patrol cutter,and other platforms for the integrated deepwatersystem (IDS) and the littoral combat ship (LCS).

The Navy contribution to this effort is envi-sioned as a small, fast, agile, and networked war-ship optimized for a variety of littoral missions. Itis key to next-generation surface combatants thatinclude the multimission destroyer and guided-missile cruiser. The focused-mission littoral com-bat ship will use a reconfigurable platform or seaframe to deploy modules and warfighting capabil-ities to meet littoral operational requirements.

The 20-year deepwater program is a $17 bil-lion (in FY98 dollars) integrated effort by theCoast Guard to upgrade surface and air assetswhile developing more capable platforms, includ-

ing improved systems forcommand, control, com-munications, computers,intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance(C4ISR) and advanced lo-gistic capabilities. Whenfully implemented, the

total integrated deepwater system will consist ofthree classes of cutters and associated small boats,upgraded fixed-wing aircraft, new and upgradedhelicopters, and cutter- and land-based un-manned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Separate but related ship acquisitions arecharting new seas to recapitalize maritime forcesand transform their operational capabilities in re-sponse to 21st century requirements. The defenseacquisition process is also being transformed.This cooperative venture is critical to realizing atotally interoperable fleet.

The New Way of WarMilitary transformation is proceeding apace.

The Navy and Coast Guard—indeed all the serv-ices—have no alternative but to transform as theyrecapitalize by adopting bold new concepts andaccelerating the rate of affordable change in away that ensures continued high levels of opera-tional excellence. One definition of transforma-tion holds that it is the productive integration oftechnological change. The Chairman argues thattransformation involves more than technology; itis a process and mindset entailing intellectual,cultural, and technological dimensions.

In endeavoring to transform the maritimeforces, it is useful to consider recent operations.The steady transformation since the Persian GulfWar was apparent during Enduring Freedom and

Iraqi Freedom. Both manifested improvements injoint warfighting doctrine, including large-scalespecial operations, tactical agility, and interser-vice cooperation; more accurate, lethal, andabundant all-weather precision-guided munitionsto enable effects-based targeting; and the devel-opment of a netted force with the C4ISR systemsto enable responsive decisionmaking and effec-tive force employment. Transformational devel-opments generate a significant force multiplierfor naval and other forces even when legacy plat-forms are employed—compounding fightingpower, flexibility, and speed of response in thebattlespace. The Chairman maintains that thistrend is redefining the American way of war—ashift from the strategy of annihilation thatguided operations during the Civil War andWorld War II to a new model described as “wag-ing precise and focused war.”

Coalition forces in Iraq demonstrated theirflexibility by adapting a war plan quickly whenconfronted with rapidly changing circumstances.This flexibility characterized nearly every aspectof operations—from the insertion of Special Op-erations Forces inside Iraq to the seaborne de-ployment and support of ground forces, use oflarge numbers of precision-guided munitions andlong-range cruise missiles delivered by aircraftand launched from surface ships and submarines,and deployment of soldiers and marines fightingdangerous three-block wars during a 350-miledash from the Kuwaiti coast to Baghdad. Fortu-nately, network-centric C4ISR systems linkedCoalition forces and provided land, sea, and aircommanders with the situational awareness tomove quickly inside the decision loop of isolatedand fragmented Iraqi commanders, making it im-possible for them to keep up with the tempo.

The Coast Guard participated in the opera-tion, deploying two high-endurance cutters, eightpatrol boats, a buoy tender, four port-securityunits, strike-team personnel, and two mainte-nance support units to the Arabian Gulf andMediterranean. The presence of white, black, andgray hulls is another reminder of joint warfaretoday. Speaking to the Navy League, Clark praisedthe Coast Guard for its role in global port securitysince 9/11.

Military contingencies over the past decadehave demonstrated that the littorals—especiallyin the Mediterranean, northern Arabian Sea, andwestern Pacific—loom large in the convergence ofnational economic and security interests. Thelikelihood of regional conflict, heightened sensi-tivity over sovereign rights of other nations, andtransnational threats to security suggest that sea-basing capabilities will become increasingly vital.

the Navy and Coast Guard haveno alternative but to transformin a way that ensuresoperational excellence

■ C H A R T I N G N E W S E A S


Transformation Planning Guidance■ Transforming how we fight—developing joint warfighting concepts that include the full range of supporting military capabil-

ity areas■ Transforming how we do business—planning and business practices such as adaptive planning, a more entrepreneurial, fu-

ture-oriented capabilities-based resource-allocation planning process, accelerated acquisition cycles built on spiral development, out-put-based management, and a reformed analytic support agenda

■ Transforming how we work with others—integrating military power with other instruments of national power; working withother departments to share information on transformation programs to help guarantee compatibility and encourage other agenciesto follow suit as appropriate—including arrangements for international military cooperation to ensure that rapidly transforming U.S.capabilities can be applied effectively with allied and coalition capabilities. JFQ

[The full text of this planning guidance is found at http://www.oft.osd.mil/.]

This outlook underscores the importance oftransforming naval forces to ensure continuedand uninterrupted access to the littorals. A na-tional fleet with new cutters, littoral combat ships,and other deepwater assets designed for seamlessinteroperability will be a force multiplier across arange of missions, including force protection,power projection, and maritime intercept. Littoralcombat ships are relevant to future Navy require-ments while the Coast Guard seeks to leveragethem as part of deepwater recapitalization.

The Transformation Imperative According to the director of the Office of

Force Transformation, Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, USN (Ret.), the United States mustnot only sustain the current pace of transforma-tion to retain its advantage in future combat op-erations, but also outpace current and potentialenemies: “We must recognize power is moving toa system level while violence migrates downwardto the level of individuals.” He has emphasizedthe steps which the Armed Forces must take as:

■ creating the future by coevolving technology,organizations, and processes

■ reevaluating warfighting attributes based ontheir ability to access and contribute to larger informa-tion networks, shared situational awareness, and speedof command

■ networking, including partnerships■ deterring forward—developing high rates of

change that an enemy cannot outpace and that requireforces oriented around speed of deployment, organiza-tion, employment, and sustainment.

“The entry fee for a deter-forward force,” as Cebrowski wrote, “is a network-centric structure,organizations, and understanding of the theoryof war for the information age.”

As Iraqi Freedom was demonstrating combatadvantages of the Armed Forces to the world, theSecretary of Defense issued Transformational Plan-ning Guidance. In offering a clear vision, he notedthat the military must “think differently and de-velop the kinds of forces and capabilities that canadapt quickly to new challenges and to unex-pected circumstances. . . . We must promote anentrepreneurial approach . . . one that encouragespeople to be proactive, not reactive, and antici-pates threats before they emerge.”

The littoral combat ship and deepwater sys-tem-of-systems force structure will provide the ca-pabilities to ensure that the national fleet is adeter-forward force. Each program is advancing ina way that conforms with defense policy andplanning guidance for transformation.

The objectives of the transformationalroadmap underpin Navy-Coast Guard collabora-tion to achieve fully interoperable, compatible,and complementary forces that share the respon-sibility to meet national maritime security anddefense needs in a highly cost-effective way.

A Common EffortAccording to the President, transformation

will yield a force “defined less by size and moreby mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to de-ploy and sustain, [and also] one that relies moreheavily on stealth, precision weaponry, and infor-mation technologies.” This process is viewed in

USCGC James Renkinpatrolling BaltimoreHarbor.

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the transformational planning guidance as shap-ing “the changing nature of military competitionand cooperation through new combinations of

concepts, capabilities, peo-ple, and organizations . . . tosustain our strategic posi-tion.” This planning guid-ance offers a concise ap-proach for transforming byidentifying critical elements,assigning roles and responsi-

bilities, describing new organizational structures,and depicting desired outcomes. This effort in-cludes three areas that are directly correlated withNavy and Coast Guard recapitalization programs.

The national fleet policy provides specificgoals for linking the integrated deepwater systemto the littoral combat ship program. Implementa-tion of this guidance will transform collaborationbetween the two services by stipulating:

■ commitment to shared purpose and commoneffort focused on tailored operational integration ofservice multimission platforms, infrastructure, and per-sonnel

■ full cooperation and integration of nonredun-dant and complementary capabilities to ensure thehighest level of maritime readiness for the Nation

■ processes to synchronize research and develop-ment, planning, fiscal accountability, procurement,doctrine, training, and execution of operations for thenational fleet

■ ensuring ships, boats, aircraft, and commandand control ashore nodes of the national fleet will beinteroperable to provide force depth for peacetime mis-sions, homeland security, crisis response, and wartimetasks.

The Coast Guard contribution to the nationalfleet includes its statutory authorities (includinglaw enforcement), multimission cutters, boats,aircraft, and C4ISR systems designed for the fullrange of Coast Guard missions.

In general, LCS design will be optimized toassure access and the ability to exploit littoral wa-ters as maneuver space for naval, joint, and com-bined expeditionary forces. Each ship will also beconfigured to focus on countering one of threeproliferating, asymmetric threats—mines, dieselsubmarines, and small, fast surface craft—and willbe capable of performing other assignments suchas intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR),homeland defense, special operations, or logisticsupport. The primary mission capabilities will beaddressed with a mix of manned and unmannedsystems (vehicles or sensors) deployed on, above,or under the sea. The littoral combat ship will beunlike previous surface combatants; it will besmall, displacing 1,000–4,000 tons; fast, withspeeds up to 50 knots; and optimized for shallowwater with a maximum draft of 20 feet.

Spiral development and evolutionary up-grades will be achieved by exchanging modularmission payloads or packages that are pluggedinto an open-systems architecture designed foraccessibility and interoperability with other shipand system components. Readily transportablepackages will provide sensors and combat systemsin each littoral combat ship based on a desig-nated mission as determined by the assignednaval or joint force commander.

Modular, open architecture is a sea change indesigning surface combatants, operationally em-ployed, and technologically upgraded. Platformswill act as seaframes (the naval equivalent of air-frames) to deliver specific payloads and tailoredcapabilities for users. Mission packages will be de-vised independently of the seaframe and accom-panied by operations and maintenance personneltrained to accomplish the assigned warfightingmission task and ensure continued performanceof mission modules.

The reconfigurable LCS design will allowmodules to be removed and replaced withoutputting ships into dry dock, cutting holes, modi-fying codes, or running cables and pipingthrough the hull and superstructure. Each mis-sion payload will be engineered for incrementalupgrades of pre-installed systems and completechange-out in theater. This modular mission ap-proach to sea combat capability also mitigatesrisk in adapting to emerging technologies by pro-viding a path for future technology insertion. De-veloped, tested, and evaluated in a process sepa-rate and distinct from the actual LCS hull, the

the littoral combat ship willbe small, fast, and optimizedfor shallow water with amaximum draft of 20 feet

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availability and affordability of the ship will notbe determined by the success or failure of a singledevelopmental item or capability.

To enhance survivability and operationalagility, littoral combat ships will incorporate low-observable technologies and use evasive speed tomaneuver quickly in and exploit littoral areas ofinterest without being detected. By leveraging ad-vances from the next-generation multimissiondestroyer program, the ships will be designedwith integral acoustic quieting, noise monitoring,and controlled magnetic, anti-mine signatures.

Operational FlexibilityAnother transformational aspect of the lit-

toral combat ship is its operational flexibilitywhen a new mission capability is required in the-ater. Conceptually, a new modular mission pack-age and its personnel detachment could be air-lifted, transported, or prepositioned for deliveryto a deployed ship and exchanged for old person-nel and equipment within days.

With the capabilities of unmanned vehiclesto both provide real-time intelligence and deliverordnance on target, littoral combat ships will haveflight decks and support facilities for both thesevehicles and helicopters. Off-board vehicles willcontribute to network-centric and combat supportoperations, including rapid launch and recoveryof small boats or special operations craft. Like thehost ships, manned and unmanned vehicles alikewill feature integral modular-mission capabilitiesthrough interchangeable vehicle payloads.

Littoral combat ships will be manned withmost personnel assigned to module detachmentsand crew size determined by the modular mis-sion. The optimal manning concept will permitships to remain on station for extended periods

with crew rotations in theater. These ships willpossess the speed and endurance to transit andoperate with either carrier strike or expeditionarystrike groups. For sustained operations, they willhave both conventional underway and verticalreplenishment capability and exploit automatedand modular technologies for all at-sea and in-port material handling.

The fully netted disposition of multimissionships is important in the operational constructfor littoral combat ships. Additional combat sup-port may be required from platforms with differ-ent modular mission packages, ground or sea-based tactical air, or multimission cruisers ordestroyers in adjacent waters. Operating inde-pendently in LCS squadrons or with other plat-forms will extend capabilities to counter chal-lenging anti-access littoral threats while enablinglarger naval, joint, or coalition task forces to fightand win across the full range of conflict scenarios.

System of SystemsFor the Coast Guard, the integrated deepwa-

ter system will lead to important changes in oper-ational capabilities and the acquisition process.The award of the contract to Integrated CoastGuard Systems (ICGS) in June 2002, a joint ven-ture between Northrop Grumman and LockheedMartin, marked a major milestone.

Unlike similar programs of the past, deepwa-ter represents a system-of-systems approach torecapitalization by the Coast Guard that breaksnew ground by implementing a performance-based acquisition model of extraordinary scopeand complexity. ICGS serves as a full-industrypartner for the service. In the years ahead, legacyhelicopters, aircraft, and patrol craft will be up-graded as more capable deepwater cutters, air-craft, and UAVs are introduced.

As the lead agency for maritime homelandsecurity, the Coast Guard plays a critical role inproviding a layered defense to project U.S. bor-ders out to sea from ports, waterways, and coastalareas. Improving operational capabilities for thissecurity mission is an important element of CoastGuard strategy, and the deepwater programstands at center stage.

The program will provide operational capa-bilities, capacity, platforms, and systems that canprevent attacks. Emerging requirements, especiallythose associated with maritime homeland secu-rity, are being evaluated for inclusion in the pro-gram. In addition, its more capable platforms willalso benefit traditional Coast Guard missions, in-cluding maritime safety, protection of natural re-sources, maritime mobility, and national defense.

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An interoperable deepwater C4ISR systemwill be a critical enabler for the Coast Guard indeveloping maritime domain awareness—com-prehensive information, intelligence, and knowl-edge of relevant entities in the maritime domainthat can affect the security, economy, and envi-ronment of the Nation. This awareness will con-tribute to improved risk management, more pro-ductive use of operational assets, and a commonoperational picture. More capable platforms andC4ISR will expand surveillance and detection ef-forts with assets that could also assist other agen-cies as new joint competencies are forged.

The integrated logistics system will form asolid basis for transformation, driving platformdesign that will result in higher operational readi-ness, improved safety, and lower operating costs.This process demands an acquisition strategy ofcomparable vision and innovation. The deepwatermission calls for interoperable platforms and sup-porting systems to meet performance-based re-quirements by maximizing operational effective-ness while minimizing total ownership costs. Itsneeds statement outlines a systems solution to re-capitalization: “The goal of this effort is not to re-place ships, aircraft, and sensors with more ships,aircraft, and sensors, but to provide the CoastGuard with the functional capabilities required toachieve mission success safely.”

The emphasis is placed on the industrial sec-tor to assess the deepwater system and integrateplanning for asset comparability and interoper-ability while providing operational effectivenessand affordability. Cost is regarded as an independ-ent variable in the acquisition program, which isessential for the Coast Guard to remain within theplanned annual expenditure of $500 million (inFY98 dollars) over the life of the program.

ICGS partners in industry were provided theperformance specifications needed to achieve sys-tem-wide capabilities. This allows industry to bothleverage state-of-the-market technology and bringinnovation and industrial capacity to bear mosteffectively. Commercial items will be basic build-ing blocks for deepwater assets and components.

The performance measurement plan, devel-oped with Integrated Coast Guard Systems, willmeasure and track performance against the basicrequirement to maximize operational effective-ness while minimizing total ownership costs. Acomprehensive mitigation strategy is in place toaddress risks associated with the program’s cost,schedule, and performance.

Enduring partnerships and joint competen-cies are another important factor in structuringthe deepwater program. This interaction is under-scored on all levels—from integrated productteams to relations between the Departments ofDefense and Homeland Security as well as otherplayers, including allies and friends around the

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world. The Navy-Coast Guard partnership associ-ated with the transformational development andacquisition of the selected deepwater assets andthe littoral combat ship will be a work in progressfor many years.

Transformation IntersectionsAs the Navy transforms forces, technologies,

and operating concepts within the framework ofSea Power 21, the Coast Guard integrated deepwa-ter system recapitalization strategy offers a num-

ber of transformationintersections where theoperational require-ments of each serviceoverlap.

With regard to thenational fleet, the foun-dation of Sea Power 21

rests with the network-centric capability thatFORCEnet and systems such as cooperative en-gagement capability offer commanders—an evo-lutionary but dramatic transition to a force thatcan share digital tactical information and sensordata seamlessly among ground, surface, sub-merged, air, and space platforms that are broadlydispersed across an operational theater.

FORCEnet, an operational construct and ar-chitectural framework for naval warfare, will inte-grate sensors, weapons, networks, and platformsto give commanders more accurate battlespaceawareness and information dominance. It willprovide the means and context for projecting areal-time, common operational picture to all bat-tle force assets aimed at achieving advantages intactical engagement speed, accuracy, and range.

A similar vision guides the development ofthe deepwater plans to upgrade and modernizesurface and air platforms and support the C4ISRsystem for the multiple Coast Guard missions.The latter will be a critical enabler for attainingmaritime domain awareness—an essential ingre-dient of maritime homeland security.

The deepwater C4ISR system will convey dataamong integrated deepwater system assets andother Federal, state, and local agencies. Just asFORCEnet will transform Navy operational capa-bilities by enabling decisionmaking and massedwarfighting effects, deepwater transformation willresult in platforms serving as nodes for shared in-formation with command centers ashore, a po-tent force multiplier that will contribute directlyto maritime domain awareness and a commonoperational picture.

This network-centric vision translates into aconsideration of working together to conducthomeland security and defense missions. Terroristthreats make the coastal region of the maritimedomain a geographic zone of immense impor-tance. The transition from a homeland securityincident to a homeland defense emergency in lit-toral waters could take place in minutes, nothours. That said, all responsible Federal agenciesand military services must possess seamless inter-operability and connectivity. Our services are onthe road toward this end.

The agreement the Navy and Coast Guardsigned in 2002 established a working group tospecify common technologies, systems, andprocesses critical to the design and developmentof the deepwater national security cutter, offshorepatrol cutter, and patrol boats as well as the lit-toral combat ship. This group holds regular ex-changes on multiple levels to ensure that theservices derive mutual benefits through a cooper-ative technical approach.

The characteristics of the littoral combatship could lead to a capable deepwater offshorepatrol cutter—a hull with double the speed nowcontemplated. Adding 25 Coast Guard bottomsbased on this design would complement Navyshipbuilding. LCS modular mission packages, ondeepwater hulls as dictated by operational re-quirements, would amplify the national fleetmultiplier effect. Logistic commonality wouldallow both services to leverage maintenance andsupport programs to achieve mutual efficiencies.

One possible outcome is that littoral combatships could become white-hulled with a CoastGuard stripe; another is that they could bepainted gray with platforms configured for spe-cialized systems and modular force packages.

the partnership associated withdeepwater assets and thelittoral combat ship will be awork in progress for many years

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Moreover, allies could define their own require-ments, thus making littoral combat ships interna-tional assets. This synergy would support na-tional fleet policy with common technologies,systems, and processes for a network-centric, in-teroperable force.

Interservice cooperation in replacing obso-lete medium- and high-endurance cutters couldbe extended to future mission systems. In Febru-ary 2003, Bell Helicopter was awarded a contractto begin concept and preliminary design on thevertical takeoff and landing unmanned aerial ve-hicle. Eagle Eye will be deployed on board newdeepwater offshore patrol and national securitycutters as well as Famous class medium-endurancelegacy cutters. Their projected completion in2006 will coincide with delivery of the first na-tional security cutter. Up to four vehicles can bedeployed on each cutter, or two may deployjointly when a helicopter is embarked.

Eagle Eye will be able to accept modular mis-sion payloads. With a planned endurance of 6.2 hours and dash airspeed of 220 knots, it willimprove detection, surveillance, and monitoringcapacity across the fleet. Extending shipboard ca-pabilities will enhance the process of classifying

and identifying targets of interest, enabling im-portant contributions to maritime domain aware-ness. This air asset could be deployed aboard lit-toral combat ships or other vessels.

In the evolution of naval forces, there hasrarely been an opportunity to design future fleets.Acquisition strategies usually consist of progres-sive system upgrades and class-by-class platformrecapitalization. This approach has changed in re-cent years with the chance to transform in waysthat were difficult to envision a generation ago.Advances in materials, technologies, and systemsoffer unparalleled openings to infuse innovativecapabilities in networked and distributed forces.The Navy and Coast Guard are committed notonly to a partnership in creating a national fleet,but in reforming the acquisition process. JFQ

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USCGC Midgett along-side USS Constellation


By R O N A L D S. M A N G U M

T he Armed Forces have consistentlydemonstrated their skill in conductingjoint operations. However, their capa-bility exists almost exclusively on the

operational level. To cope with nonstate enemiesin the global war on terrorism, jointness must ex-tend down to the tactical level. Small and agilejoint units, self-sustaining or with reachback lo-gistics, executing missions independently but

based on national source real-time intelligence,are the wave of the future.

The interface between special operations andconventional forces on the division and corpslevel is a critical seam in joint doctrine. Likewise,the Special Operations Forces (SOF) communitymust examine its doctrinal interface at the seambetween joint and combined operations. Exam-ples from the Korean peninsula are useful becausejoint and combined forces operate there everyday in a standing theater of war. But the sameconcepts are relevant for future conflicts in which

Brigadier General Ronald S. Mangum, USAR, is commander of SpecialOperations Command Korea and formerly served as commander, 1st Brigade, 85th Division (Training Support).

LinkingConventionaland SpecialOperations Forces

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special operations and conventional forces willwork together.

Doctrinal SynchronizationSpecial Operations Forces typically function

on the operational and strategic levels but in real-ity are tactical assets with a strategic impact. Assuch they interface with conventional forces onseveral levels. A joint special operations compo-nent command (JFSOCC) is a headquarters thatprovides liaison with other components. It hasplanners, operators, and intelligence personnel atmultiple points within a theater. Coordinationand synchronization between special operationsand conventional forces is key, not only to multi-ply the effects of friendly engagement but to pre-vent fratricide among friendly units. Both tasksare more difficult in combined warfare.

One doctrinal connection in the area of re-sponsibility of a corps ordivision on the opera-tional and tactical levelsis the special operationscommand and controlelement (SOCCE). As anArmy element, Special

Forces have traditionally been concerned onlywith other Army SOF units. In joint and com-bined warfare, however, it must coordinate allSOF–Army, Navy, Air Force, and allied forces oper-ating within the area of responsibility of its sup-ported unit.

Within a corps or division area, Special Oper-ations Forces come under SOF command and con-trol, although in some situations they may beplaced under the operational control of supportedcommanders. Field Manual 3-05.2 stipulates thatwhile Special Operations Forces are not usually in-tegrated into conventional forces, it is necessaryfor the “simultaneous or sequenced execution ofseparate actions in time and space to achieve asynergistic effect.” A special operations commandand control element is the doctrinal synchroniza-tion organization with operational or tactical con-trol of Special Operations Forces in the area of re-sponsibility of supported units and is alsoequipped to provide communications with eitherJFSOCC or Special Forces group headquarters.

Special operations command and control ele-ments are formed around an existing table of or-ganization and equipment, such as a SpecialForces company headquarters. In some situationsthey may be organized around battalion head-quarters. The element arrives at the supportedheadquarters with personnel and equipment for aminimum of 30 days. Traditionally this missionprovides connectivity only with Special Forces intheir role as “the primary and often the only di-rect link from the conventional forces to the SOF

command and control structure.” In the jointwarfighting environment, however, it can operatewith allied corps or division headquarters and becomposed of both U.S. and allied forces. Currentdoctrine recognizes that augmentation may beneeded, but it does not flesh out such augmenta-tion well, nor are there routine opportunities totrain as a joint and combined force operating in ajoint and combined environment.

For example, each field army in Korea is aug-mented by a special operations command andcontrol element organized around a SpecialForces operational detachment in its headquar-ters. The reality is that each field army is on thecoast, so ROK and U.S. Army Special Forces andNavy SEALs, as well as Air Force aircrews and spe-cial tactical squadron personnel, can be expectedto operate in the area in front of the field army.Currently a special operations command andcontrol element is composed exclusively of Armypersonnel and has little visibility outside its ownarea of responsibility. In Korea, Special Opera-tions Command Korea combines with ROK Spe-cial Warfare Command to form the combined un-conventional warfare task force during wartime.

A special operations command and controlelement may be augmented by Korean personnelto provide language capability because the taskforce has a combined forward operating base withthe field army headquarters, which has a Koreanelement that commands operational detachmentswithin the area of responsibility. Duplicating con-trol mechanisms does not provide redundancybecause the command and control element andoperating base do not coordinate their efforts.Thus only Army personnel synchronize the ef-fects of Army-only teams (sometimes with Koreanforces) within the area of responsibility of thefield army. Not only is the expertise of SOCCEpersonnel limited to Army functions, but thecommunications package that accompanies thiselement is set up to meet only the needs of theArmy mission. Doctrine, training, and equippingneed to emphasize the joint special operationspart of the SOCCE title, so the element is staffedand trained to control all Special OperationsForces in the field army area of responsibility.

In addition to staffing and equipping a com-mand and control element to accomplish the fullrange of SOF control, a fully manned elementmust train routinely as a unit to perform its mis-sion. A one-time deployment to Korea for an ex-ercise, anticipating that an element will garnerthe requisite knowledge, is unrealistic. And to ex-pect it to grasp the complexities of the Koreantheater of operations during wartime courts disas-ter. The joint mission essential task list for eachSpecial Forces operational headquarters needs to

SOCCE is staffed to control allSpecial Operations Forces in thefield army area of responsibility

■ S P E C I A L O P E R A T I O N S F O R C E S


contain specific tasks for operating as a jointcommand and control element in a coalition en-vironment, and these headquarters need the op-portunity to train in that environment.

Although a special operations command andcontrol element may be rotated to the NationalTraining Center, it is not situated at corps head-quarters, which has units in the training box,since the corps is a player control element in thecontrol center. And collocating a command andcontrol element turns it into a white cell element,making it part of the exercise control center andprivy to all aspects of the exercise, both friendlyand enemy, which eliminates any gain from par-ticipating as a player unit. This is a typical exer-cise problem when the main units are conven-tional brigades or divisions. For an element toparticipate in its full mission profile, the exercisemust have player units from the tactical to strate-gic level—for example, from battalion to theaterarmy. Since that is costly, the SOF portion of theexercise often gets short shrift.

The Task at HandPerhaps the most critical task for a command

and control element in synchronizing special op-erations and conventional forces is preventingfratricide among SOF units from close air support

and artillery. Without closely monitoring the firesupport coordination line as it moves forward,fratricide is likely. The element needs access tothe tactical operations center of the supportedunit as well as real-time vision of the commonoperating picture. While there is no establishedanswer to locating an element, it may be advis-able to place it with the supported unit center.This provides access to a supported unit com-mand structure. Separation from the special oper-ations coordination detachment, which is a staffelement at corps level or other supported unit,may be advisable. The detachment performs stafffunctions, not command and control, and collo-cation will confuse roles and may deflect criticalcommand issues. Moreover, the element mustprovide intelligence up and down the chain. Op-erational detachments in front of the corps orarmy have eyes-on-target and can provide rele-vant intelligence to supported units. On the otherhand, a special operations command and controlelement must ensure that intelligence reaches thedetachments to assure their survival and missionsuccess. Intelligence may simply be intelligence,but critical intelligence requirements are differentat various locations on the battlefield.

What conventional force commanders mustunderstand to fight a counterfire battle is not thesame as what operational detachment command-ers need to know to survive in the deep battlearea. A special operations command and control

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element must be able to access not only conven-tional force intelligence, but also JFSOCC intelli-gence products to ensure that feeds to deployedSpecial Operations Forces are relevant. Naval Spe-cial Warfare Command maintains a mission sup-port center in San Diego to provide real-time in-telligence to SEAL teams worldwide. The centerdoes not eliminate the need for teams to get in-telligence feeds from the theater joint intelligencecenter through JFSOCC, but it is another sourceof specific intelligence. Command and control el-ements, however, must be able to access everysource that provides intelligence to its compo-nents to ensure that both levels have the samepicture of the battlefield. Thus these elements, orat least JFSOCC, must be connected to national,theater, and center intelligence feeds.

A special operations command and controlelement must also provide guidance to deployedforces as the situation changes. It must transmit

fragmentary orders to de-tachments to re-mission ormodify missions. As con-ventional forces approachSOF team locations, the el-ement must plan to imple-ment the linkup. This isperhaps the most danger-

ous phase of the SOF mission as well as the phasethat receives the least training and rehearsal.When the deployed forces include elements ofSpecial Forces units as well as SEALs, implement-ing the linkup is delicate and critical. Hence theneed for routine joint and combined augmenta-tion and training.

Finally, according to Field Manual 3-05.2,while a special operations command and controlelement is not responsible for planning or execut-ing civil affairs (CA) or psychological operations(PSYOP) activities except as incidental to its mis-sion, both are performed by Special OperationsForces and may be integral to the mission. Oftenoverlooked as a force multiplier, PSYOP provedvaluable in Desert Storm by encouraging Iraqi sol-diers to surrender and in Afghanistan by gainingthe support of the civilian population. As soon asa semipermissive environment is established, CAunits can assist in restoring governmental controlby helping rebuild infrastructure. Deployed Spe-cial Forces teams are usually the first units in hos-tile areas and, if augmented by CA or PSYOP per-sonnel, can assess the needs for civil affairssupport and determine the impact of psychologi-cal operations on enemy forces as well as civilianpopulations. Consequently, augmenting an ele-ment with CA and PSYOP personnel assists in ef-fectively using a range of SOF capabilities.

RequirementsIn a coalition environment, a special opera-

tions command and control element needs rou-tine joint augmentation. Foremost is a packagethat can establish secure communication withthe theater special operations command, alliedforces, and theater command system, includingconnectivity for the SEAL mission support centerand other intelligence feeds, either directly orthrough JFSOCC. Communications with theaterincludes the ability to obtain the common rele-vant operating picture. In Korea this means con-nectivity to the Global Command and ControlSystem-Korea.

A special operations command and controlelement must have qualified linguists in a coali-tion environment. Interpretation must not be leftsimply to contract or military personnel who arenative speakers. Not every bilingual person canthink in two languages. In addition, knowledgeof military terminology in both languages is criti-cal. Doctrine may be difficult to translate withoutdetailed explanation.

Elements that will be expected to operate asspecial operations command and control re-sources in wartime need a habitual training andworking relationship. Expecting an element to de-ploy to a theater as complicated as Korea andfunction effectively on arrival is unrealistic. Koreaoperates under three major command structures—the combined ROK/U.S. Forces Command, UnitedNations Command, and U.S. Forces Korea. Evenafter fifty years the two militaries are continuallyrefining these multiple command and controlstructures. Where will ammunition, intelligence,and air support come from? Such questionsshould not wait until combat is under way. Conse-quently, besides defining a basic joint SOCCEstructure, we must assure that the structure rou-tinely operates in its host nation environment.Even if only some members have had that oppor-tunity, there may be enough situational awarenessand personal relationships with the host militaryto overcome cultural differences.

PersonnelTo conduct joint and combined warfare, a

special operations command and control ele-ment must be configured for success. Personnelwill be chosen based on the mission and circum-stances but would include—and each operationaldetachment should train with—certain commonelements. Augmentation by Army and Air ForceSOF aviation facilitates coordinated infiltration,exfiltration, and resupply missions by fixed androtary wing air assets, with the joint special oper-ations liaison element collocated with the aircomponent command. If a command and con-trol element has SEALs operating within its area

in a coalition environment, a special operations commandand control element needsroutine joint augmentation

■ S P E C I A L O P E R A T I O N S F O R C E S


of responsibility, it should have SEAL augmenta-tion as connectivity with the naval special war-fare command mission support center and thenaval special operations liaison element collo-cated with the naval component commandheadquarters. This latter element would be partof a communications package for secure commu-nications with higher and lower headquarters aswell as with theater and allied headquarters.

Within a coalition, a special operations com-mand and control element should be augmentedwith appropriate counterpart organizations fromallied militaries as well as host nations. This willrequire interpreters from every contributing na-tion. In order to pass intelligence to allied forces,the element must have a trained foreign disclo-sure officer. Allies cannot access critical intelli-gence without this augmentation.

Moreover, a command and control elementis not doctrinally responsible for either planningor conducting CA or PSYOP activities. That ex-pertise will be required as the battle unfolds, andthe activities must be planned in advance. Afterthe victory over the Taliban, coalition forceslooked to civil affairs units to provide humanitar-ian relief before winter and rebuild the infrastruc-ture before the population soured on the nationalgovernment and created conditions for a Talibanresurgence. When the U.S. military succeeds incrushing enemy forces, PSYOP and CA assets areneeded to consolidate the victory and avoid slip-ping back into hostile conditions.

The Way AheadCurrent doctrine must be reviewed in light

of the demand for special operations commandand control elements in a joint and combined en-vironment. Tasks must be developed and mis-sions anticipated so forces are prepared to assume

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this responsibility. Beyond simply identifying themission and tasks in doctrinal publications, forcesmust train to appropriate mission standards to ac-complish their assignments. This consideration,along with habitual training relationships, is im-portant to the transition to warfare in areas inwhich Special Operations Forces deploy.

One way to increase the abilities of a specialoperations command and control element is in-cluding basics such as the Special Forces qualifica-tion course exercise to enable students to learn

joint planning challenges first hand. The JointSpecial Operations University should develop aprogram of instruction and exercise on jointmanning. Joint Readiness Training Center andNational Training Center rotations should in-clude a joint special operations command andcontrol element, but the exercise must be scriptedto portray group interaction on the division,corps, and theater levels.

Simulation exercises are a cost-effective wayof training headquarters and staffs without theexpense of deploying troops to the field, but theydo not portray Special Operations Forces well.They concentrate on the main battle area, whichis usually focused in time and terrain. BecauseSpecial Operations Forces normally operate deepin the battlespace, it becomes difficult to modelthe large terrain areas necessary to accommodatespecial operations and conventional forces in thesame exercise. Without combining these twowarfighting elements, however, realistic trainingfor special operations command and control ele-ments is lost. Consequently, the best full missionprofile training is probably in conjunction withmajor joint exercises such as Ulchi Focus Lens.Yet because Korean units are practicing defendingtheir territory while Special Operations Forcestrain to deploy in enemy territory, there is an arti-ficiality that must be bridged by careful scripting.

Getting the interface right between specialoperations and conventional forces on the tacti-cal level is critical to the conduct of joint andcombined warfare. Although Special OperationsForces are working jointly on the operational andstrategic levels, they must be able to extend joint-ness to the tactical level by effectively staffingand training special operations command andcontrol elements. JFQ

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A familiar complaint about Special Op-erations Forces (SOF) is that they arenot integrated with conventionalforces. Moreover, they are suspected

of regarding themselves as strategic assets. How-ever, SOF leaders recognize that they supportother forces—land, sea, air, and space—just asthose forces support special operations and oneanother. This reality has led to the improvementof special operations joint fires in Iraq, which islargely based on experiences in Afghanistan.

Special Operations Forces made greatprogress in integrating joint fires by borrowingideas from three distinct battlespaces during Iraqi

Freedom. The use of joint fires and air coordina-tion elements assured these successes and shouldprovide a model for the future.

Prior to Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan,Special Operations Forces understood the need tointegrate joint fires. Doctrine indicates that SOFheadquarters should include joint fires expertisein mission planning and execution. But evenafter 9/11, those headquarters were reluctant toseek the support of outside joint fires in order tokeep operations small and light, and they did notfully understand what was missing. Initially, theyresisted this assistance on the tactical and opera-tional levels, deploying teams without either ter-minal attack controllers or qualified operationalplanners and executers on their staffs.

However, based on a battlefield assessment,Special Operations Forces realized their errors and

Major Eric Braganca, USAF, is an MH–53 pilot who is currently assigned as a trainer for joint fires and personnel security with SpecialOperations Command at U.S. Joint Forces Command.

The Evolution of SpecialOperations Joint FiresBy E R I C B R A G A N C A

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Aaron Allmon)

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took corrective action. With the air component,they organized a small but effective team to inte-grate operations. This cooperation became themodel for Iraqi Freedom. But that operation wasmuch more complicated because SOF assets oper-ated in three environments, each with unique in-tegration issues. These varied supported and sup-porting relationships required unique solutions tojoint integration, and each serves as a model forfuture joint fires integration.

The next challenge is institutionalizing suc-cess. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq werefought with the same land, sea, air, and specialoperations components. While other theatershave witnessed this success, they require detailson SOF advances to adapt their lessons for thefuture. Special Operations Forces also play an im-portant role in the global war on terrorism thattranscends conventional boundaries and thatwill require increased personnel, some of whomshould reinforce joint fires. One aspect of this ca-pability is the link between special operationsand conventional forces. U.S. Special OperationsCommand (SOCOM) and the Air Force shouldinstitutionalize the relationships among theirsubordinate commands to better respond to thenext crisis.

Planning and CoordinatingFor years joint doctrine did not list the duties

or responsibilities for the fire support element of ajoint special operations task force (JSOTF). SpecialOperations Forces eventually integrated joint firesin the theater air-ground system through JointPublication 3-09, Joint Fire Support. The Army has

an extensive approach to linking organic fires (ar-tillery, missiles, and helicopters) with Air Forceclose air support and interdiction using tactical aircontrol parties attached to units down to battal-ion level. The Marine Corps has a similar arrange-ment connecting its air and ground fires. TheNavy links strike aviation and missiles with theother services. Each path goes through a joint airoperations center to ensure that campaigns aresynchronized. Special Operations Forces only areconnected to each other, reinforcing a perceptionthat they are fighting their own war. Between1998 and 2001, this started to change.

Prior to the war in Afghanistan, some head-quarters realized the shortfall in operational firesexpertise through joint exercises and began to ad-dress it. However, the effort proved insufficient.Joint Publication 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task ForceOperations, was being revised as the conflict inAfghanistan began and included details on thefire support element, including coordinatingboundaries, representing special operations toagencies such as the joint targeting and coordina-tion board, and preventing fratricide. This vol-ume also recommended a fire support annex tothe task force operation order and standard oper-ating procedures. However, none of these were inplace when operations began in Afghanistan,thus lessons were learned through experience.

Task Force Dagger, the initial joint specialoperations task force for Afghanistan, was builtaround a Special Forces group headquarters andfaced problems using joint fires on the tacticaland operational levels. Teams deployed withoutterminal attack controllers—Air Force troopstrained and were certified to control close air sup-port. Unsuccessful close air support in the firstfew days of combat indicated the need for expert-ise, which led the task force commander to de-ploy trained ground controllers. They had an im-mediate positive effect on the campaign.

Within days the Special Forces team hadqualified terminal attack controllers. This posedproblems when air-savvy ground controllers sentair support requests to the task force. No one inthe headquarters could handle integration—in-corporating joint fires in campaign planning, col-lating or submitting subordinate fires requests,and deconflicting operations. Though there was aspecial operations liaison element at air compo-nent level, the task force almost exclusively reliedon liaison for deconfliction and integration. Thisresulted in limited success but was not the com-plete answer because the liaison cell was locatedwith the air component in Saudi Arabia, leavingthe task force with no resident expertise to incor-porate fires in the campaign.

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Fortunately, the air component commanderdeployed a small element of the same type usedto support conventional Army maneuver. Likecontrollers on the battlefield, this dramatic ini-tiative enhanced coordination and integrationwith the air component. Teams on the ground

experienced this im-provement when closeair support becamereadily available. ThisAir Force element,known as the joint air

component element, provided what Special Op-erations Forces lacked—the ability to plan andcoordinate joint air fires.

Iraqi FreedomAs operations continued in Afghanistan, U.S.

Central Command focused on planning for Iraq.Its land, air, and special operations components—Third Army, Ninth Air Force, and Special Opera-tions Command Central (SOCCENT)—created ajoint fires architecture. SOF units fought in thenorth, west, and south. They stopped the enemyin the north, which had fortified the unofficialboundary with the Kurds, from reinforcing Bagh-dad. To the west they assisted the air componentto prevent the launch of SCUDs and other theaterballistic missiles. And they supported the landcomponent in the south to take Baghdad andeliminate elite forces such as the RepublicanGuard. Because these three fronts required uniqueapproaches to joint fires integration, Third Army,Ninth Air Force, and SOCCENT developed tai-lored packages for each one.

In the north, where the SOF commander wassupported, the air component deployed a joint aircomponent element to JSOTF (subordinate to

SOCCENT), which developed its own joint fires el-ement. While these organizations worked togetherclosely, they had separate identities because thejoint air component element was directed exclu-sively on air operations as the joint fires elementfocused on lethal and non-lethal effects. In thewest, where Special Operations Forces supportedthe air component in the counter-SCUD mission,joint air component and fires elements were fusedinto a homogeneous body. This worked becauseoperations in the west focused on one missionand there was no need to distinguish betweenthem. In the south, it used a different structure tointegrate with the land component.

Integration in the land battle presentedunique challenges. First, the two units subordinateto Third Army were organized differently for fires.1st Marine Expeditionary Force and V Corps haddistinct processes for deep operations where Spe-cial Operations Forces would be supporting them.Rather than a one-size-fits-all solution, SOCCENTand its subordinate commands organized a flexi-ble system of command and control as well as liai-son elements to ensure SOF capabilities supportedboth Third Army and its subordinate commands.

SOCCENT and Third Army exchanged liai-son officers, ensuring conduits for information.By mutual agreement, SOF elements were sent toV Corps and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force.These special operations command and controlelements (SOCCEs) took tactical control of teamsoperating with ground forces to ensure that SOFoperations were fully integrated. The element atV Corps also recognized the need for presence atsubordinate divisions to keep commanders, whowere directly supported, informed by deployingliaison elements. This integration was effective asSOF assets supported Third Army in front of andbehind a nonlinear operation. With this scheme,Special Operations Forces reconnoitered lines ofcommunication in advance of 3d Infantry Divi-sion en route to Baghdad and supported 1st Ma-rine Expeditionary Force with AC–130 gunshipsin rear areas, eliminating the fedayeen fighters,

Special Operations Forces solved integrationchallenges through innovation. The methods di-verged but were tailor-made for battlespaces withdisparate missions. Though for many Iraq was aunified effort, it was not for SOF units. Theynominated over 5,200 targets while fighting onthree fronts. They captured the northern oilfields, which contain one-third of Iraqi reserves,helped prevent theater ballistic missile launches,and took the southern oil distribution point inpreparation for conventional forces. Such successwas largely the result of agile thinking by archi-tects of joint fires from Third Army, Ninth AirForce, and SOCCENT.

the joint air component elementprovided the ability to plan andcoordinate joint air fires

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The FutureSOCCENT learned painful but beneficial les-

sons in Afghanistan and Iraq. The challenge is in-stitutionalizing them. By improving joint fires ex-pertise in SOF headquarters, formalizing the linkwith the Air Force, and updating doctrine, thoselessons will endure. They should be folded into

training so that successivegenerations of warriors un-derstand joint fires.

No theater special oper-ations commands havestanding joint fires elementsto better prepare them tomake this leap in ability.

Theater headquarters are small and lightly staffedwith little fires expertise. Moreover, that is true ofthe SOF headquarters that formed many of the re-cent JSOTFs. By organizing standing special oper-ations joint fires elements in each theater, therewill be resident expertise during deliberate plan-ning as well as exercise development. This assetwill ensure that each theater special operationscommand establishes and maintains links to sis-ter components and rehearses processes duringoperational battlestaff and field training exercises.Standing joint fires elements need not be as large

as those deployed in Iraq with up to 21 personnelin one command. With expertise in four areas(Army fire support, Navy and Air Force close airsupport/interdiction, and Marine Corps artillery),each SOF command could develop standard oper-ating procedures, incorporate joint fires into de-liberate operational and concept plans, and in-clude these concepts in routine exercises.

SOCOM is preparing to absorb a large num-ber of new positions to fight the global war onterrorism. Moving some assets to theater specialoperations commands as joint fires elements willachieve both tasks since improved joint fires inte-gration will significantly help combat terrorism.And the Marine Corps is working with SOCOM tointegrate some of its forces, which provides anopportunity to lend their joint fires expertise toSOF headquarters. With a three-legged joint fireseffort, Special Operations Forces can ensure thelong-term survival of the process which broughtsuccess in Iraq without the lengthy learningprocess which preceded it.

The other half of this success story was theAir Force tactical air control party—particularlyjoint air component elements. For years, Special

no theater special operationscommands have standingjoint fires elements to betterprepare them

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Operations Forces have been augmented by AirForce enlisted terminal attack controllers, includ-ing some who have been permanently attached asSpecial Forces trainers. But direct support relation-ship by these elements to JSOTF headquarters wasnew. SOCOM and the Air Force should formalizethis arrangement for tactical and operationaltraining purposes as well as contingencies. Link-ing specific headquarters with tactical air control,perhaps geographically, would create a standingrelationship with common tactics, techniques,and procedures before contingencies erupt. With-out a formal agreement, recent successes will fadeand need to be revived with the same risks experi-enced by U.S. Central Command.

Lessons learned must also be incorporatedinto doctrine as proven methods for integration.Joint special operations doctrine is being revisedwith joint fire support scheduled to be included.These are the first areas in which these new meth-ods should be addressed. Related joint doctrinemust eventually be revised as service doctrine ismodified in this collaborative effort.

Progress should be institutionalized by ex-tending joint fires expertise to SOF headquarters,formalizing the links between U.S. Special Opera-tions Command and the Air Force and updatingjoint doctrine for the next conflict.

Special Operations Forces made dramaticprogress in joint integration by the end of com-bat operations in Iraq. No longer seen as fighting

their own war, they were fully integrated withother forces as both supported and supporting as-sets during the campaign. A major part of thissuccess was joint fires, which began before theAfghanistan conflict and culminated in Iraq.

SOCCENT learned valuable lessons inAfghanistan and, through a collaborative effortwith other components, established a network ofjoint fires, air coordination, and command andcontrol elements on multiple levels. Special Oper-ations Forces applied different joint fires solutionson three fronts in Iraq, tailored to specific circum-stances. They were supported in the north withjoint fires linked to air component elements em-ploying traditional Army side-by-side integration.They supported the air component in the west,merging joint fires with joint air component ele-ments. Their complex support to the land compo-nent in the south required a more detailed infra-structure of command and control elements andliaison, ensuring the appropriate expertise.

Special Operations Forces learned valuablelessons in both Afghanistan and Iraq that must beinstitutionalized. Capabilities cannot be devel-oped after a crisis occurs. JFQ

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deterring and defeating enemies thatrely on surprise, deception, and asym-metric warfare.

Military transformation is theprocess of rendering previous methodsof warfare obsolete by changes in oper-ational concepts, organizational struc-tures, and technologies. U.S. JointForces Command (JFCOM) and theJoint Staff are working under guidancefrom the Office of Force Transforma-tion and the Chairman to improvejoint warfighting capabilities throughinitiatives such as joint force commandand control, dominant maneuver, andrapid decisive operations; standingjoint force headquarters; and joint ex-perimentation with emerging tech-nologies in events such as Millennium

T he global war on terrorismhas validated the need foraccelerating military trans-formation. The national se-

curity strategy directed the process toexamine how enemies may fight,rather than where and when, reaffirm-ing a shift from threat-based to capa-bilities-based planning. Moreover, theSecretary of Defense instructed theArmed Forces to first “pursue theglobal war on terrorism” and second“strengthen joint warfighting capabili-ties.” Those capabilities are critical in

TransformingJoint WarfightingCapabilitiesBy S C O T T E. J A S P E R

Captain Scott E. Jasper, USN, is associate dean of the School of InternationalGraduate Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School and formerly served as deputyfor joint experimentation at U.S. Pacific Command.

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Challenge. Transformation documenta-tion has identified various capabilitiesrequired to dominate across militaryoperations, including standing, deploy-able command and control systems,rapidly deployable and sustainable mis-sion-oriented and tailored joint forces,pervasive targeting, shared situationalawareness, precision effects, strategicmobility, and layered force protection.

The challenge is systematicallyprioritizing, testing, and fielding broadcapabilities while avoiding theoreticaland bureaucratic pitfalls in conceptand architecture developments. In ad-dition, getting these capabilities towarfighters in a timely fashion is criti-cal, particularly in the information agewith its rapid and compressed changes.Service transformation roadmaps indi-cate that future development of robustplatforms and potential capabilities in-clude unmanned, stealthy, long-rangesensor, and deep-strike systems tocounter enemy strategies as well asother innovative technologies. How-ever, only by solving joint system in-teroperability problems will the awe-some power of joint synergy beachieved across the battlespace withthese platforms and capabilities.Among lessons from Afghanistan is arealization that joint system interoper-ability is key to operational success.

The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)joint mission force (JMF) developmen-tal experience can assist in identifyingrevolutionary breakthroughs thatyield measurable shifts in joint war-fare. The command approach is mov-ing from visionary concepts towardsimple, practical, implemental solu-tions to current interoperability prob-lems. Spiral development with re-gional operational forces in jointexercises validates results among thosecharged with executing the intent of acommander and speeds the fielding ofsolutions to the hard spots that pre-vent seamless joint operations.

Joint Mission ForceCommander, Pacific Command,

called for a seamless joint-combinedresponse force with sufficient flexibil-ity to meet national objectives in 1999.That force would be capable of accom-plishing missions across a range of op-erations, from complex contingenciesto humanitarian assistance. It couldserve as the leading edge in a conflict.The intention was eliminating servicebarriers and segmented components. Italso sought advances in speed of reac-tion, command, and decisionmaking,which commanders were expected toimplement by fiscal year 2003.

Bimonthly seminars and a table-top game with warfighters and experts

in experimentation developed the JMFconcept, defined as a package of20,000 personnel from designatedcomponent ready forces. It is aug-mented by supporting commands,coalition partners, and a center of ex-cellence coordinated group of interna-tional, nongovernmental, and privatesector organizations from which ajoint task force commander can tailortask forces for a range of missions. Thekey realization of the joint missionforce was that interoperability linkagesare at the heart of increased JTF effec-tiveness, specifically data-sharing andcommand and control challenges.Thus strategies to improve operationsmust strengthen links between taskforce and component headquarters.

Leveraging transformation on theoperational level to achieve interoper-ability is consistent with the Americanway of war and crisis resolution out-lined in An Evolving Joint Perspective, re-cently approved by the Joint Require-ments Oversight Council. Thearchitects of the JMF concept realizedthat relationships on joint and serviceheadquarters staff levels foster trustand confidence in joint warfighting.PACOM established standing com-mand and control relationships for cri-sis response by designating primary JTFheadquarters, service or functionalcomponent commanders, and require-ments for force structure and reactiontimes. The application of strategies tocombine technological advances andorganizational augmentation, doctri-nal standardization, and mission-ori-ented training evaluations can providenear-term improvements that seriouslychange the conduct of joint warfare.

Compelling questions includewhich areas to focus on first, the bestforums for testing experimentationstrategies, and how to measure im-provement. The immediate focusshould be on fixing deficiencies injoint interoperability, then on capabil-ities to execute joint mission essentialand service training tasks under futurethreat scenarios. Exercise and trainingvenues sponsored by the Joint Staffcan test capability initiatives with aregional audience. Assuring full inter-operability across DOD requires


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for an effective multinational, multia-gency approach to complement a ro-bust and versatile joint force tool kitready to be employed at a moment’snotice. Humanitarian emergencies cre-ated by typhoons, earthquakes, or vol-canoes may explode into a cata-strophic stage in days, leaving littletime for the international communityto assemble a coherent response. A rap-idly tailored, jointly trained, multia-gency, multinational force will not justhappen; it must be thoroughly devel-oped, preferably before the crisis.

The Defense Planning Guidancefor fiscal year 2004 directs regionalcommanders to create standing jointforce headquarters by fiscal year 2005in accordance with the lessons of Mil-lennium Challenge. JFCOM envisionsa flag officer-led, 55-member standingjoint force command and control ele-ment (SJC2E) at each command, whichwould serve as a full-time core of func-tionally organized and skilled jointplanners. The element would use stan-dard operating procedures and com-mand and control systems in a collab-orative environment to performcontingency planning. The employ-ment concept models the deployableJTF augmentation cell, which rapidlyturns a JMF-type service headquartersinto a joint team. However, the stand-ing joint force command and controlelement would empower decision su-periority for effects based operationsthrough development of an opera-tional net assessment based on a politi-cal, military, economic, social, infra-structure, and information analysis ofthe enemy.

PACOM planners considered es-tablishing a standing joint force head-quarters from theater assets but de-cided against it because of manpowerconstraints. They selected a hybridconcept of developing the joint com-mand and control capabilities of desig-nated single-service headquarters aug-mented by battle-rostered augmenteesfrom other services. Planners focusedon the fact that combined doctrine,command and control mechanisms,and shared training and experienceswere lacking for rapidly assembling a

expanded venues such as distributedglobal command and control exercisesand national training programs linkedto regional commands. Recent propos-als for a joint national training capa-bility support this need. Success canbe gauged by measures of effectivenessrelated to tempo, responsiveness, flexi-bility, and cost. The Joint Staff per-spective offers clearly definable attrib-utes. Future warfare and crisisresolution must be integrated, self-synchronized, continuous, simultane-ous, distributed, effects focused,knowledge based, network centric,and nonlinear. By assigning metrics tothese categories, an assessment ofshifts in the conduct and character ofwar could be provided.

Defeating Enemy StrategiesKnowing how the other side

might fight yields insights into thejoint capabilities required to maintaina competitive advantage. Potential en-emies could comprehend joint doc-trine and refuse to fight on our terms.Their strategies could seek to dissuade,delay, or disrupt military interventionby the United States while raising thepolitical, economic, and military costs.An enemy could use terrorism, commitatrocities, and leverage weapons of

mass destruction asymmetries at homeand abroad while seeking surprisethrough delivery systems such as scubadivers, crop dusters, and containerships. They will attempt to counterasymmetrical U.S. strengths in powerprojection, space, stealth, precision, in-formation operations, and strategic lift.

The principal enemy focus islikely to be countering access to the re-gion of conflict. In the littoral, multi-layered coastal defenses consisting ofsubmarines, small boats, anti-ship mis-siles, and mines could deny force de-ployment and concentration. Ballisticand cruise missiles could threatenbases, stocks, and ports. Over land, en-emies could counter airpower superior-ity by integrated air defense systems,

global positioning, and surface-to-airmissiles and anti-air artillery. Theycould deny precision targeting by con-cealment and deception and deny at-tack by hardening underground facili-ties, dispersing ground forces, andcollocating with civilians.

Enemy strategies could includemeans to undermine national will athome and among allies. Misinforma-tion campaigns that take advantage ofthe Internet and human exploitationmethods that use hostages or refugeesas human shields could manipulatepublic opinion. Likewise, insurgent,paramilitary, or guerrilla tactics such assystematic ambushes, hit and run at-tacks, and killing zones could protractconflict and erode public support. At-tacks on infrastructure by computernetwork or biological agents that dis-rupt or destroy information, trans-portation, energy, economic, or othernodes could paralyze the Nation with-out channeling animosity against avisible enemy.

Understanding the depth of op-posing capabilities provides rigor incrafting an examination. Falling barri-ers in cost and global marketing prac-tices will grant enemies access to com-mercial off-the-shelf technologies suchas wideband communications and

high-resolution imagery. Theywill outsource, buy, or stealcapabilities to fight in spaceand cyberspace, domains tra-ditionally dominated by theUnited States. Joint warfight-

ing capabilities need to be testedagainst this highly capable threatunder possible conditions across therange of military operations. Achieve-ment and sustainment of joint preem-inence will not only ensure decisiveresponse but also dissuade enemiesfrom embarking on the road to con-flict.

Interoperability ShortfallsThe joint mission force concept

recognizes that an enemy may put apremium on continual assessment ofdeveloping crises and the ability tocommit an effective, properly tailored,and fully integrated JTF in days, notweeks. Complex multinational militaryoperations such as those in Somalia,Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor, and

insurgent, paramilitary, or guerrillatactics could protract conflict anderode public support


military coalition. The joint missionforce objective was crafted to enhanceJTF speed of action, precision, and mis-sion effectiveness. Achieving this ob-jective began with identification of thetop challenges to rapid, seamless jointand combined operations.

Input from theater staffs togetherwith operational lessons and readinessreports produced an initial list. Thechallenges are JTF headquarters activa-tion and augmentation; commonstanding operating procedures andcollaborative tools; multilevel securityprocedures; a common operating pic-ture; standard command, control,communications, computers, and in-telligence (C4I); adequate training forcomplex interoperability issues; inte-grated force protection and rules ofengagement; underdeveloped infor-mation operations; strategic lift fore-casting; contingency contracting; andhost nation support. The challengeswere refined and prioritized in a sec-ond theater flag officer-led JMFwargame in May 2000. Conferencemembers concluded that significantjoint interoperability improvementscome from routine interactions ofcommanders and staffs.

Implementing the ConceptFour primary strategies were cre-

ated to improve on the challenges andimplement the JMF concept: developcommon procedures; develop effectiveC4I architecture through command

and control exercises; refine, develop,and package joint mission essentialtasks; and modify PACOM training toinclude integrating experimentation.These strategies are outlined belowwith examples of how they can em-power DOD-wide standing joint forceheadquarters implementation.

Develop common procedures. Thefirst implementation strategy producedJTF procedures. They were establishedusing diverse standard operating proce-dures and developed in functionally or-ganized workshops. They were testedwith joint task force and service com-ponent headquarters in a third JMFwargame and validated in Cobra Goldand Tandem Thrust. Totally joint stan-dard operating procedures design startswith the intent of the commander, de-scribes how the task force fights inboards and cells, details standardizedinternal staff procedures, and transmitsinformation management techniques.This unique standard operating proce-dure is a compact disc linked withchecklists, templates, and references foraccess to over 1,300 pages of data. Web

accessible links provide external accessto both unclassified and classified sites,depending on the Internet securitylevel, while keeping the procedures eas-ily distributable to all official parties.

In late 2001, PACOM approvedthe standard operating procedures formandatory use in all JTF exercises andoperations. Besides standardizing pro-cedures for complex interoperability-dependent tasks, it identifies activationand augmentation requirements, in-cluding the deployable augmentationcell that immediately provides keyjoint planners to service-based JTF andbattle staff rosters that source criticalpersonnel by service and specific skills.This cell has been in existence for yearsat PACOM, but it has now been refinedand implemented with common proce-dures and collaborative tools. It is a po-tential precursor to the standing jointforce command and control element.

Common headquarters procedures.The PACOM model has been selectedas the prototype for developing com-mon standard operating proceduresfor JTF headquarters, the basis ofSJC2E. JFCOM has drafted proceduresfor review by unified commands that

could serve as an integratingfactor across service andcommand bounds. The capa-bility for internal linkageusing a compact disc pro-vides unlimited capacity to

identify region-specific parameterssuch as command relations or com-munication activation templates whilemandating procedures for complextasks such as joint fires and missile de-fense. Applying joint doctrine andjoint tactics, techniques, and proce-dures can solve interoperability chal-lenges. As JFCOM continues todemonstrate the merits of experimen-tal concepts in information manage-ment, fires coordination, net assess-ment, and effects planning, provenprocedures must be spirally integratedfor a common JTF headquarters. Ac-ceptance of these new procedures bywarfighters on the operational andtactical levels can be realized in work-shops and exercises to facilitate imple-mentation of standing joint forceheadquarters within two years.

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applying joint doctrine and jointtactics, techniques, and procedurescan solve interoperability challenges

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a multinational force headquarters forcrisis action situations.

The team engages in concept de-velopment conferences on multina-tional force procedures in concert withsemiannual workshops. Singaporehosted a recent exercise, Tempest Ex-press Four, and acted as lead nation forcombined task force headquarters withparticipation from 30 nations of themultinational planning and augmenta-tion team. The focus was headquartersactivation and crisis action planningprocedures for a peacekeeping scenariothat included combating terrorism. TheSingaporean general who acted asevent commander thought that Tem-pest Express was the best training he re-ceived prior to serving as combinedtask force commander in East Timor. Byimplementing multinational standardoperating procedures across regionalcommands, planners can develop rela-tionships and become adept at formingmultinational, operational-level head-quarters under common doctrine.

management procedures is the Website. Service sites lack consistency,prove difficult for training distributedand rotational users, and fall short inoptimizing data access. The JMF site of-fers a simple intuitive layout and stan-dard appearance for concise displayand information in three clicks. Webcentric information pull is sustained bylinks to supporting sites and pages. Thesite provides for the routine, timely,and remote manipulation of informa-tion content by subject matter experts.Realizing that the site architecture doesnot satisfy service-directed specifica-tions, PACOM has promulgated de-tailed and required certification criteria.Certification guidance covers Internetor Web compatibility and the layout toinclude window size, color, typography,and graphic format. Further require-ments specify site identification, globalnavigation structure using tabs, localnavigation structure using scrollinglists, event awareness indicators forclassification, current conditions andtime zones, and functional enhance-ments such as search aids and self-serv-ice updating. Adapting these criteria to

the SJC2E Web site can generate infor-mation management standardizationacross the defense establishment.

Headquarters linkages. PACOM di-rected the development of separatemultinational force procedures that arebased on the JTF model but focus onmultinational operations on the coali-tion or combined task force level.These procedures are more generic andinclude broad operational considera-tions that partners can readily imple-ment. Overarching operational startpoints (common frames of reference)that include a lead nation concept,common command or control-coordi-nation relationships, standardizedcombined task force headquarters or-ganization, common planning and de-cisionmaking processes, and clarity ofterminology set the foundation forunity of effort within the task force.The centrifuge for multinational forcestandard operating procedures devel-opment has been the PACOM multina-tional planning and augmentationteam program, which focuses on devel-oping a cadre of military plannersfrom nations with Asia-Pacific interestswho are capable of rapidly augmenting

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Effective C4I ArchitectureThe second implementation strat-

egy established a series of commandand control exercises (C2Xs) to developC4I architecture. The program validatesthe command and control prepared-ness and proficiency of primary JTFand component commander staffs byexecuting basic procedures usingfielded and experimental tactical sys-tems and applications, documentingsubsequent shortfalls and work-arounds, and identifying solutions andassociated timelines. The exercises areshort, vignette-driven drills conductedoriginally as stand alone events andnow in concert with major joint exer-cises. Focus and objectives alternatebetween communications networksand systems architectures, decisiontools, and processes.

Initial exercises have progressivelyrefined procedures and interoperabil-ity. For example, C2X One revealedthat JMF-designated division head-quarters need the standard C4I equip-ment normally apportioned on thecorps level to act as force commander.Funding was identified for deployableglobal command and control systemterminals and classified Internet rout-ing network backbones. C2X Fourtested the joint air operations centercapability to create a common operat-ing picture, use deployable video tele-conferencing systems, and issue airtasking orders via a split Internet pro-tocol configuration on the globalbroadcast system. Planning for C2XSeven was conducted with same-timeInternet protocol-based voice and chatcollaborative tools. This exercise willcontinue experiments with activebandwidth monitoring and controltechnology in support of Web centricinformation dissemination and knowl-edge management. These exercisescontinue to demonstrate the value ofroutinely testing, ensuring, and en-hancing individual JTF unit capabilityto actually conduct command andcontrol in expected crisis scenarios.

The barriers to connectivity be-tween the JFCOM-designed and imple-mented standing joint force commandand control element in regional com-mands on one side, and theater JTF

service or functional component com-manders on the other, can be elimi-nated by a worldwide C2X program.Deployable joint command and con-trol is the solution for this elementand is expected to provide standard-ized hardware and software for JTF-level command and control functionsand support. Testing compatibilitywith permanent, transiting, or rota-tional component commands is imper-ative for interoperability. Draft require-ments for deployable command and

control delineate a strategy for fieldingtechnology. A global exercise programcan facilitate technology induction aswell as the coupling of command andcontrol procedures in regional scenariovignettes.

The obvious winners of Millen-nium Challenge include the joint enroute mission planning and rehearsalsystem near term as well as the joint


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mand and control or fires, with corre-sponding criterion-derived metrics toevaluate initiative performance in the-ater-specific scenarios. Building on thePACOM approach, the Joint Staff isworking on a set of joint capability de-scriptions for approval by the Joint Re-quirements Oversight Council. By ana-lyzing military operations acrosscommands and identifying an array ofJMETL-based metrics, standards can beprovided for the council to comparerecommendations for change in doc-trine, organization, and technology.Creating universal metrics for jointforce development could furnish quan-titative measures for Joint Vision 2020concepts and architectures. In addition,future warfare and crisis resolution at-tributes formerly identified could beboth linked to tasks and assigned met-rics to measure improvement.

Implementation will link jointcommand and staff planning and exe-cution and address joint training. De-liberations on improving interoperabil-ity examined mandatory alignment ofjoint and service rotational readinessperiods and multiple service trainingevents but found them too difficult be-

cause of tempo, funding, andsimulation limitations. New net-worked architectures could bringtogether forward JTF headquar-ters (such as Seventh Fleet) withdistributed components at major

training centers to perform high inten-sity, combat-related tasks such as firesupport or battlespace maneuver. Sim-ulation can augment live force short-falls while exploring conceptual revo-lutionary platforms, such as cruisemissile submarines, future combat sys-tem platforms, or advanced theatertransport aircraft.

Integrating ExperimentationThe fourth strategy modified

PACOM training by integrating experi-mentation into exercises for evolution-ary gains in warfighting. Mature near-term technology insertions could beevaluated for accelerated fielding at for-ward deployed headquarters. Experi-menting while exercising leads to spiraltechnology enhancements that can aidseamless JTF operations. For example,

fires initiative. The former affords col-laborative operating environmentfunctions over international maritimesatellite radio in airborne deploymentoperations. The latter has an integratedsuite of situational awareness andknowledge-enabled tools to managetime sensitive targets. Inclusion ofcoalition partners in the global C2Xprogram would facilitate multinationalinteroperability to include testing ofPACOM-type combined operationswide area and Asia Pacific area networksystems. The first encourages separate,simultaneous views of communities ofinterest while the second provides fire-wall-protected, multilevel access por-tals for posting and sharing informa-tion in a collaborative Web network.

Refine, Develop, PackageThe third strategy led to the joint

mission essential task list (JMETL), aunique document that delineates pack-aged, mission-oriented training stan-dards common for JTF headquarters.Early JMF workshops postulated theaterthreat scenarios for 2003–2015 andidentified the core missions that wouldconstitute over 90 percent of the opera-tions expected within the area of re-sponsibility. Based on core competen-cies, specific missions were assigned to

three primary designated JTF headquar-ters: I Corps, Seventh Fleet, and III Ma-rine Expeditionary Force.

Mission essential tasks with con-solidated standards were derived fromsample scenarios by the JTF staffs forforcible entry or foreign consequence

management. The joint mission essen-tial task list was approved for immedi-ate and mandatory use in all PACOMexercises and operations in 2001. It of-fers a basis for developing training ob-jectives and articulating operational re-quirements. Command determinationof specific criteria (the actual level ofperformance such as hours, days, orpercentage) for standards, based onmission analysis, provides a bench-mark for measuring unit performance.In the end, a performance matrixgrades JTF headquarters readiness.

Mission-oriented tasks with crite-ria could be translated into measures ofperformance for evaluating the JFCOMstanding joint force command andcontrol element-related experimenta-tion. Specific technological, organiza-tional, or procedural initiatives would

creating universal metrics couldfurnish quantitative measures forJoint Vision 2020 concepts

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during Cobra Gold ’02 in Thailand,conducted with III Marine Expedi-tionary Force as deputy combined taskforce headquarters, a number of tech-nologies were exposed to operationalscrutiny, with use of new procedures forJTF headquarters and JMETL standards(26 specific tasks).

To meet the challenge of C4

equipment and procedures in CobraGold, installation of the bandwidthmonitoring and control system meas-ured the volume of combined opera-tions-wide area network applicationsand demonstrated utility to poten-tially control targeted applications,while the theater automated profilingsystem visually represented civil-mili-tary and information operations ob-jectives through relevant vectors thatprovided progressive views of key bat-tlespace metrics.

Against the challenges posed by acommon operating picture, joint fires,and intelligence, surveillance, and re-connaissance, the installation of auto-mated deep operations coordinationsystem terminals enabled situationalawareness and report visualization forSpecial Operations Forces. For the diffi-culties of common collaborative tools,the introduction of defense collabora-tive tool suite servers enabled NetMeet-ing chat, voice, and video collaborativesessions, with server etiquette and pro-tocol. Exercise lessons revealed the

need for a formal process of assessingexperimentation. Joint training and ex-perimentation specialists assigned toeach regional combatant commandcould assist in grading technology in-sertion capacity to achieve JMETL crite-ria, eventually enhancing implementa-tion of the standing joint forcecommand and control element con-cept, which is heavily dependent onemerging technology.

Operational ExperimentationThese implementation strategies

have achieved tangible advances in JTFspeed, precision, and effectiveness pri-marily because they were developedand executed by warfighters who de-pend on JMF-related policies, proce-dures, and technology. Developing theSJC2E concept in exercises with realforces will assure headquarters activa-tion and planning. Focusing on inter-operability in complex tasks under dif-ficult conditions will guarantee decisiveaction joint force execution. For exam-ple, the joint mission essential task listadded responsibilities for examiningdoctrine linked to technology to inte-grate and synchronize fires and maneu-ver. Experimentation on proceduresand technologies is needed to facilitatecoordination of fire control measures

and gain better battlespace situationalawareness in rugged terrain, urban jun-gles, and rural camouflage.

The PACOM approach to findingsimple and practical solutions to inter-operability problems and integratingthem into exercises will better prepareoperational forces. New technologiesand processes must be balanced withservice training requirements. How-ever, warfighter endorsement of proto-type joint experimentation will accel-erate technology acquisition andprocedural adaptation, paramount toensuring joint preeminence. The spiraltesting and fielding of initiatives injoint and multinational exercises, toinclude live fire events, will facilitatetransparency and confidence amongthe joint and combined forces respon-sible for responding to a crisis.

Implementation strategies for thejoint mission force highlight provenways to prioritize, test, and field newcapabilities. Efforts by U.S. PacificCommand to develop the prototypefor the joint mission force headquar-ters confirm the value of the JFCOMstanding joint force command andcontrol element for interoperability.Future application of this elementshould facilitate rapid implementationacross regional commands. Subsequentidentification and correction of barri-ers to interoperability of the elementthrough expanded national and globaltraining and experimentation venueswill assure the vital transformation ofjoint warfighting capabilities. JFQ


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make the chain stronger. It is futile tostrengthen links that are stronger thanthe weakest link. Regardless of thenumber of aircraft and ships in thesystem, if the ports cannot deal witharriving troops and equipment,throughput will be limited.

Most DOD missions are per-formed by a system of systems inwhich each subsystem is an interlock-ing and interdependent process operat-ing in concert with other systems andsubsystems within their parent sys-tems. They all come together to ac-complish a task. Each subsystem playsa role in the overarching system, butnone can complete the mission on itsown strength alone.

A system resembles a chainin that it is only as strongas its weakest link. Con-sider the example of de-

fense transportation. Regardless of thecapacity of aircraft and ships to carrymilitary forces, system throughputwill be limited if ports cannot handlewhat is debarked. A chain is strength-ened by reinforcing the weak link; al-ternatively one could disassemble thechain, replace the weak link, and thus

SteppingOutsidethe Reality BoxBy M A R K R. L E W I S and J O H N C. F. T I L L S O N

Mark R. Lewis is a member of the strategy, forces, and resources division at theInstitute for Defense Analyses; John C.F. Tillson is also a member of the researchstaff at the Institute for Defense Analyses and has served in the Office of theSecretary of Defense.

Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic (Michael Sandberg)

Transformation GoalsPlanning guidance released in

April 2003 called for U.S. Joint ForcesCommand (JFCOM) and the services toaddress six goals (and joint operatingconcepts) in an annual endeavor toproduce transformation roadmaps. TheSecretary of Defense established criticaloperational goals in the Report of theQuadrennial Defense Review, usingroadmaps to focus on developing serv-ice-unique capabilities to:

■ protect critical bases of operations■ project and sustain forces in distant

anti-access/area denial environments anddefeat anti-access and area denial threats

■ deny sanctuary through persistentsurveillance, tracking, and rapid engage-ment by high-volume precision strike

■ assure information systems to con-duct effective information operations in anattack

■ enhance capabilities and survivabil-ity of space systems and supporting infra-structure

■ leverage information technologyand innovative concepts to develop inter-operable joint command, control, commu-nications, computers, intelligence, surveil-lance, and reconnaissance architecture andcapability to include a tailorable joint oper-ational picture.

To meet those goals, a service oragency can assume that each goalstatement is a mission—a set of tasksand subtasks that must be accom-plished in a structured way.

For instance, the essential task ofthe third goal is denying sanctuary toan enemy. Several tasks and impliedsystems are cited in the goal statement.Surveillance, tracking, and engagementsystems are subtasks of the overall mis-sion. Furthermore, there are impliedtasks in each specified system that mayuse the output of other systems andsubsystems or contribute to them.

Surveillance requires multiple sys-tems of various components, both serv-ices and agencies, to provide continu-ous and near-complete information. Tocover potential sanctuaries and furnishuseful, timely information, this taskwill likely require multiple, comple-mentary ground, sea, air, and space ca-pabilities, which in turn call for sepa-rate commands and agencies to execute

discrete tasks in common. Every organ-ization and the overall system musthave both a tasking mechanism and afeedback loop to enable accurate assess-ment and responsive reengagement.

Similarly, acquiring targets is onlyone major task under the Quadrennial

Defense Review. Intelligence systemsmust process information from surveil-lance systems, tracking systems mustretain targets, engagement systemsmust be able to deliver the desired ef-fect, and maneuver systems must beappropriately positioned in the battle-space. In addition, both combat sup-port and combat service support sys-tems must sustain operations. Denyingsanctuary also requires complex inter-action by these various systems.

The Weak LinkOnce the six transformational

goals are understood as missions exe-cuted through a system of systems, thenext step is determining where tofocus the effort to transform the largersystem. Where is the weak link? Arethere components that can be lever-aged to increase the capacity of the

system? Can a component be bypassedor its output improved in other ways?

The concept that the six goals aremissions performed by a system of sys-tems that are only as adept as its weak-est component exposes a flaw in thecall to “develop service-unique capa-

bilities necessary tomeet the six criticaloperational goals.”How can a serviceknow where to

focus until it knows how its systemscontribute to the overall mission?Moreover, how will DOD know howto allocate resources to reinforce theweak links?

System of SystemsDescribing the mission in terms of

a system of systems identifies causeand effect relations between entities inthe system and allows commanders onall levels to monitor contributions todesired outputs. The areas ripe forbreakthrough or transformational solu-tions are best found once these com-plex missions are presented as systemsof systems. Then detailed analysis canfind the weak links—or the hidden po-tential in the system.

The challenge of diagrammingcomplex missions is not limited to


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describing the mission in terms of a systemof systems identifies cause and effect

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Each conventional solution-seekingprocess entails mission analysis thatdescribes assumptions, limitations, andproblems or constraints that boundthe range of solutions.

Because such methods include op-erational risk assessments, they areconservative and take identified lim-iters as a given. Although some atten-tion is paid to replacing assumptionswith facts, the primary aim is identify-ing limiters to planning with completesituational understanding. Thus theprocesses are not designed to producetransformational solutions, but insteadpoint to the most effective course ofaction while minimizing risk. That isreasonable in the context of opera-tional planning, and it almost alwaysgenerates a conventional solution.

In identifying facts, limitations,constraints, and assumptions, currentprocesses define the reality box inwhich a solution might take shape.The effort is focused on defining thedimensions. If one conceives of the so-lution as a sphere and the reality boxas a cube, the task becomes stuffingthe largest possible sphere into thecube. The result is either the largestpossible reality box (which is desirablebecause the bigger the box, the biggerthe sphere that fits inside) or fitting asolution into a constrained reality box(which means effectively using allavailable resources). The existence ofsuch a box, however, is rarely ques-tioned or even recognized.

The reality box concept is relatedto outside-the-box thinking but is notidentical. The term outside the box hascome to mean unconventional ap-proaches to solving problems. Suppos-edly its origin is a parlor game thatpresents players with nine dotsarranged in a 3 by 3 square. The objectis connecting nine dots with fourstraight lines without lifting the pencilfrom the paper. The only solution isdrawing lines outside the box. Todaythe phrase is used as a hortative: thinkoutside the box. But it rarely offers direc-tion—it simply means considering al-ternatives. Such thinking can be un-guided and result in plans that drift inwhite space. Any breakthroughs wouldbe serendipitous. Hence the need forthe reality box concept to direct effortstoward transformational solutions.

identifying the system of systems. Theweb of relationships linking tasks andsystems must be perceived in enoughdetail to enable understanding that achange in one dimension may res-onate throughout the system. Onlywhen processes, subsystems, and rela-tionships among them are identifiedcan the overarching process be tracedto find constraints inhibiting missionperformance. Problems can be associ-ated with hardware, resources, organi-zations, policy, or doctrine. Choke-points that impede the system canindicate problems that cannot be re-solved normally and call for transfor-mational solutions.

Sometimes commanders do nothave needed technology or resources.For example, night vision devices rep-resented a breakthrough that deniessanctuary in darkness. Suddenly anenemy could be seen at night, boost-ing capability and effectiveness.

At other times the problem is or-ganizational. The Goldwater-NicholsAct sought to change the way that thedefense establishment does business.By strengthening the operationalchain of command and eliminatingstovepipes to enhance jointness, thislaw overcame friction between unifiedcommanders and the services.

Operational concepts also poseproblems. France invested significantresources in the Maginot Line duringthe interwar years without resolvingthe fact that defensive barriers can bebreached or avoided. It was faced bythe demands of a fortified force versusa mobile reserve. Failure to resolve thistension, rather than technology, whichwas at least on a par with that of Ger-many, led to defeat.

Problems can exist in many di-mensions—technology, organizations,and policy as well as operational con-cepts and doctrine. Once the systemof systems is understood, the effortshifts to finding problems that restrictthe potential or opportunities to en-hance capability by restructuring it. Itsproblems are identified. The challengeis eliminating those things that in-hibit the performance of the overarch-ing system, clearing the way for trans-formation.

The Reality BoxWith mission statements dia-

grammed, the primary issue is findingproblems in the system. Surveying de-cisionmaking processes is the point ofdeparture in creating a methodology toidentify breakthroughs. The processesare ways to think about solving prob-lems presented by a mission statementand discovered in mission analysis.


The image of a solution stuffed in-side a reality box enables the visualiza-tion of concepts of potential and fric-tion in the context of developingbreakthroughs. The space between thesolution sphere and the box representspotential; the sphere has room to growbefore it contacts the limiting boxwalls. The task of conventional plan-ners is fitting a solution sphere intothat space defined by the box. Expand-ing the sphere as far as possible repre-sents a qualitative refinement of thesolution within the limits discoveredthrough mission analysis.

Similarly, points where the solu-tion sphere makes contact with the in-side of the box can be understood asproblems that hamper system perform-ance; the solution sphere wants to ex-pand but is constrained. Those pointsof friction are generally regarded as anunmovable part of the box and effortsusually turn to expanding the sphereinto empty spaces. When every optionfor developing a solution to fit inside

the reality box is exhausted, some lim-iters must be relaxed enough to allowexpansion for the solution to fit. Thatmight mean requesting added re-sources to use in mission accomplish-ment, redefining the mission objec-tive, or rethinking the level of riskacceptable. The result is that the realitybox is stretched to enable the solution

to fit inside the box. This effort willnot cause breakthroughs because itdoes not fundamentally alter the waysolutions are shaped.

A distinction can be made be-tween conventional problem solvingand a method that might produce abreakthrough. Instead of accepting thelimitation, transformational solutionseekers look at points of contact to de-termine the nature of the constraint. Isthe sphere rubbing against an actuallimiter or merely the fabric of assump-tions covering holes between facts? Isthe point of friction vulnerable to

puncture? Are the facts really facts, orare they assumptions? By definition,transformational solutions fall outsidethe reality box. This is the nature of abreakthrough; it penetrates limitersthat box in solution sets.

Even though processes like thejoint operation planning and execu-tion system or the Army decisionmak-

ing process may not lead totransformational solutions,they may be a reasonablestart in building the realitybox. This step is critical be-

cause it offers an exquisite definitionof reality. Ultimately what one doeswith the completed box is what distin-guishes transformational solutionseeking from conventional decision-making processes.

Identifying AssumptionsCare is taken to identify assump-

tions on the situation and environ-ment in mission analysis. An assump-tion is a statement or conditionaccepted as valid without any substan-tiation or proof. It is a supposition


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by definition, transformationalsolutions fall outside the reality box

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tions pass down the chain. Soon theybecome facts. Similarly, policy con-straints take on a life of their own.Sometimes unbreakable rules arise forlack of focus on the overall system,which reinforces the need for a sys-tems diagram that enables planners totrace undesirable effects in the systemto an original conflict and to judge thevalidity of the assumption.

Windows of OpportunityTransformational solution seekers,

unlike planners, think that holes inthe box are windows of opportunity.Covered only by assumptions, theseare points where the box becomes vul-nerable to breakthroughs. When as-sumptions are identified, addressingthem is a straightforward process. Ifthe source of conflict is clear and thechoice deliberate, organizations canweigh options, make informed deci-sions, then adopt ways to mitigate theconsequences.

Transformational solution seekerslook specifically for assumptions thatcan be broken with transformationalsolutions. The box represents reality,but conditions that define reality—po-litical, social, economic, military, andother factors—are complex adaptivesystems that change human and envi-ronmental interaction. Indeed, tech-nology develops and scientific under-standing evolves. Thus the bases ofassumptions constantly change. Ac-cording to one analyst, “Assumptionsthat were valid yesterday can becomeinvalid and, indeed, totally misleadingin no time at all.” Thus, while the nextphase is beginning to generate solu-tions that fit in the reality box, thetransformational solution begins byidentifying assumptions.

If assumptions are identified, thechallenge is straightforward. Unfortu-nately, it is not easy to identify as-sumptions that point to transforma-tional solutions. Planners need adifferent way to locate assumptions tobreak. First, they must understand thesystem of systems so the web of tasks,organizations, and relationships thatinteract to accomplish the mission be-comes clear. Today this web of interac-tion takes place within the reality box,

about current or future situations heldto be true that replaces the unavailablefacts. Identifying assumptions is vitalin planning and pivotal in militarytransformation.

Valid assumptions combine withfacts to become the framework thatshapes the reality box. The structuralintegrity of the box is relevant to plan-ners. From their perspective, holes arewindows of vulnerability throughwhich an unforeseen event could com-promise the solution. Thus as the box

takes shape, planners naturally seek toidentify holes and plug them. At firstthey use assumptions, replacing themwhen they acquire facts.

In dealing with recognized as-sumptions, facts must be scrutinized.Often they are deeply held convictionswhose basis is not understood. Hiddenassumptions are insidious because theytake considerable effort to expose.Constraints may be based on assump-tions that are seemingly unbreakablerules. Commanders are advised in JointPub 5.00-1, Joint Doctrine for Planning,to consider “assumptions handeddown from higher echelons as facts.”

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and problems that limit the ability ofthe system can be seen as points wherethe system meets the box. Problemscan arise from conflicts over choicesregarding policy, organization, doc-trine, technology, or resources. Thusthe next step for transformational so-lution seekers is using the reality boxto identify problems in the system andthen focusing analysis on them.

Analytical ToolsMost management concepts deal

with transforming corporations, butthey offer little insight into theprocess. Among them is the theory ofconstraints, which began as a tech-nique based on scientific method thatcould be applied to industrial produc-tion. It developed into an approach foranalyzing organizations to address

problems that hinder attaining organi-zational goals. Simply put, this theoryprovides analytical tools to answerthree questions:

■ what to transform—causes of prob-lems faced by organizations and systems,conflicts that prevent eliminating problems,and explicit and implicit assumptions un-derlying conflicts

■ what to transform to—changes thatresolve problems and facts that can replaceor modify faulty assumptions

■ how to achieve transformation—obsta-cles to change, finding means to overcomethem, and taking the necessary steps.

The first step is identifying prob-lems that affect organization. Onceidentified, the theory of constraints fa-cilitates the recognition of assump-tions, policies, practices, and measuresthat cause them. To remain abreast ofevolving reality, one must identifywhat to change. Then, in deciding

what to transform to, the theory offersa technique for deciding changes inpolicies, practices, and measures. Fi-nally, it provides a way of decidinghow to transform.

Military transformation calls forbreakthroughs in problems con-fronting the Armed Forces. Opera-tional goals should be regarded as mis-sion statements that describe a systemof systems. The services bring uniquecapabilities to these goals, but they in-teract within the context of a largersystem. Thus the system must be dia-gramed in a manner that illustrates itsconstraints across the defense commu-nity. Developing transformational ca-pabilities without such an understand-ing runs the risk of suboptimizing orsquandering resources. JFQ


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was focused on operational net assess-ment, identifying critical nodes, therange of options, second- and third-order effects, and unintended conse-quences. The services mounted live ac-tions with combat assessments andemployed effects-based operations topursue experimentation goals.

From the outset of the exercise itwas apparent that information opera-tions could produce decisive effects inthe fight. These efforts integrate mili-tary deception, psychological opera-tions, electronic warfare, operationalsecurity, and computer network opera-tions. They affect the enemy informa-tion environment while not affecting

M illennium Challenge, ajoint exercise hosted byU.S. Joint Forces Com-mand (JFCOM) in sum-

mer 2002, examined how far theArmed Forces could go in implement-ing Joint Vision 2020 and executingrapid decisive operations within thisdecade. One goal was to develop rec-ommendations on doctrine, organiza-tion, training, manpower, logistics, per-sonnel, and facilities. Exercise live play


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InformationOperationsand Millennium ChallengeBy M A R K W. M A I E R S and T I M O T H Y L. R A H N

Lieutenant Colonel Mark W. Maiers, USA (Ret.), was the information operationssupervisor and Major Timothy L. Rahn, USAR, served in the combatant commandinformation operations cell during Millennium Challenge.

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friendly audiences. Ultimately, theseoperations seek to influence enemy de-cisions and opinions in ways favorableto national objectives.

Another goal of the exercise wasintegrating information operations inrapid-decisive and effects-based opera-tions constructs to gain and maintaininformation superiority. The conceptof operations was the initial step in theexperiment and adhered to currentdoctrine. It involved testing the stand-ing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ),which provided combatant command-ers with a trained, equipped, and per-manently constituted joint organiza-tion. This headquarters was intendedto reduce lag time for setting up a JTFheadquarters to conduct operations.Once the exercise began, the staff wasaugmented to form a cross-functional

body composed of five groups: opera-tions, plans, information superiority,information/knowledge management,and a command element, whichworked without formal or informalbarriers.

Thus information operations sup-ported the joint task force in an envir-onment heavily reliant on informa-tion and information systems. Bothwere meant to increase knowledge ofan enemy and to protect commandand control and situational aware-ness. Information superiority isachieved by negating enemy capabili-ties until the Armed Forces dominatethe information domain without ef-fective opposition.

Most information operations staffmembers were part of the informationsuperiority group. Primary dutiesunder the original concept were syn-chronizing information operations,maintaining the operational net as-sessment, developing the effects task-ing order, integrating information ef-fects into the overall mission,assessing the effects of informationoperations, and identifying intendedand unintended enemy reactions. The

staff worked with organizations exter-nal to the joint task force to accom-plish these tasks.

Growing pains appeared as theexercise progressed. It became clearthat the information portion was notvigorous enough to gain and sustaininformation superiority. As such, oper-ations directly reflected the situationin the defense establishment. Capabil-ities are not well understood by allplanners and leaders. There are dis-parate service centric information op-erations capabilities, with little agree-ment on how they should be usedtogether in support of joint opera-tions. During the exercise, Joint Pub 3-13, Information Operations, was inthe process of rewrite, with over 200critical comments on the first review.DOD Directive 3600.1, though not yet

published, was in its seventhrevision. The services and U.S.Special Operations Commandwere responsible for tactics anddoctrine, JFCOM for testingand experimentation, and U.S.

Space Command for computer net-work defense and attack. The informa-tion operations study that DefensePlanning Guidance directed was notyet complete.

Setting the StageAs exercise planning commenced,

there was a lack of overarching nationalpolicy, with no national doctrine, strat-egy, or process promoting integrated in-formation operations. The interagencycoordination and approval process wasgeared to separately established Presi-dential directives concerning functionssuch as contingency operations andcritical infrastructure protection. SJFHQand the component commands did nothave enough trained and experiencedpersonnel to conduct full spectrum in-formation operations. Inadequate re-sources existed for producing effectiveperception management results such asintegration of cultural intelligence, psy-chological operations (PSYOP), publicaffairs, and civil affairs. There was insuf-ficient intelligence support for technicaloptions in conducting a computer net-work attack and for integrating andconducting operations with coalitionand allied information operations play-ers. In addition, there was a need to

ease and streamline the restrictive secu-rity accesses for existing capabilities.

The need to fix information oper-ations is understood on the nationallevel. Requirements and instructionsfor military information capabilitiesare clearly and consistently outlined inrecent defense guidance as follows:

■ Operations will be synchronizedwith multinational and interagency part-ners as required.

■ Information operations may evolveinto a separate mission area requiring theservices to maintain appropriately designedorganizations and trained specialists.

■ The ability to conduct informationoperations has become a core DOD compe-tency.

■ It is imperative to maintain an un-surpassed capability to conduct informationoperations.

The ChallengesMillennium Challenge provided a

test for finding solutions to the chal-lenges of information operations.Given a near-peer competitor and therequirement to conduct rapid decisiveoperations in the future, how can ac-tions be measured to determine wheninformation operations are effective?Many believe information superiority,like air superiority, can be gained onlyfor limited periods, so a reliable way ofmeasuring success is needed. Compar-ing measures of performance and effec-tiveness offers a way of identifyingwhen windows of information superi-ority exist.

It became obvious during the ex-ercise that the organization was inade-quate for information operations.Functional aspects were dispersed withno one commander coordinating activ-ities, and information operations wereonly partially represented by the jointpsychological operations task force,which is equally important to plansand information superiority. Early inthe exercise the JTF commander recog-nized information operations as a cap-stone element of combat power bothin the lethal and nonlethal sense.

Information operations cell. The or-ganization combined enabling effects,guidance/intent, and the critical infor-mation requirements list in the infor-mation operations part of the effects


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there was no national doctrine,strategy, or process promotingintegrated information operations

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nodes, and outside influences on thejoint task force.

Cyberwolf. Computer network at-tack activity in blue force systems andsubsystems was measured using Cyber-wolf. The software had the desired ef-fect by getting organizations to changeinformation conditions in the theater.It identified network scans and poten-tial intrusion, but it was not the onlyindicator. It was adequate only whencombined with information external tothe serviced network. Cyberwolf was aqualified success. Injects were limited tothe first phase of operations prior to Hhour. They sensitized the JTF staff to adependence on digitized informationhandling and highlighted the fact thata change in information conditions im-pacts, but is not understood by, midand upper levels of leadership. Everycomponent has the authority to changethe conditions, normally in concertwith joint task force computer networkoperations, which maintains a commonoperating picture. In Millennium Chal-lenge, components changed conditionswithout consulting outside organiza-tions or considering the global ramifica-tions in a stressed environment.

The relevance of informationconditions in this exercise, where in-formation workspace was the primarymeans of JTF command and control,reveals that the entire process shouldbe reviewed and synchronized. Duringthe exercise, workspace used the secret

Internet protocol routernetwork (SIPRNET) with-out a redundant system.Disconnecting systems, asrequired under informa-

tion condition Charlie, is not an op-tion. Commanders will face this sameproblem in the future should anenemy find the means to degradefriendly databases, nodes, and trans-mission capabilities.

Space and InformationOperations

U.S. Space Command provided aspace and information operations ele-ment on the level of the combatantcommander during Millennium Chal-lenge to give enhanced support torapid-decisive operations, effects-basedoperations, and operational net assess-ment. It contributed personnel and

tasking order. It was not envisioned asan annex or stand-alone plan, but asan integration of operations across thepriority effects list that componentsuse in developing plans in support ofthe order. The assessment processwould be critical and should be drivenby the objectives of JTF commandersand not exclusively by a list of effects.

Network analysis. Future cells mustbe furnished with suitable analyticalproducts. A full network map of thecommunications architecture andcomplete analysis of the regional infra-structure should be primary tools inunderstanding enemy targets. Addi-tionally, strategic influence analysismodeling of political and economicnetworks is needed. Only partial ver-sions of these products were availableas separate networks in the exercise,with no initial analysis on how theywere interconnected. Subsequent tar-geting analysis by the joint force aircomponent commander, combined airoperation center, and JTF joint intelli-gence support center were not syn-chronized. The combined air operationcenter used the Telescope system,while the joint intelligence supportcenter relied on the Adversary softwaretool. The latter performed marginally,

resulting in attrition as opposed to tar-geting the systems that had the mostbang for the buck.

Defense information operations. Theexercise focused almost exclusively onthe attack and exploitation capabilitiesof offensive information operations;little defense was played. There wasminimal cyber event reporting andnone in the joint operational area.

Similarly, red forces made only a slighteffort to dazzle and jam space assets.Future JTFs must consider the reality ofthe threat to networks, nodes, andtransmission centers. During the exer-cise, asymmetric attack on friendly op-erations was unrealistic compared withthe scope of the simulation.

While few defensive informationoperations were built into the exercisedesign, the cell did work on defensiveissues. It tracked trends in analyses offriendly networks, communication


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few defensive information operationswere built into the exercise design

Launching Dragon Eye,Millennium Challenge.

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supported the information operationscell, which must be available in everyJTF operation. In the near term, infor-mation expertise should be provided tocombatant commanders from the rela-tively small pool of expertise in DOD.However, expertise will eventually needto become resident in the commander’sstaff to provide full integration intoboth deliberate and crisis planning.

External organization support. Cen-ters of excellence were mentioned fre-quently during the exercise, but theircapabilities were not drawn upon.Agencies could reasonably be ex-pected to be available over SIPRNET,but private sector resources such aseducational institutions would not ina classified scenario. Furthermore,posing specific questions would vio-late operational security. Connectivitywith agencies such as Joint WarfareAnalysis Center, Joint InformationOperations Center, joint task forcecomputer network operations, 1st In-formation Operations Command,Fleet Information Warfare Center,Central Intelligence Agency, and De-fense Intelligence Agency would have

proven invaluable and should be partof future JTF operations.

Analysis tool development. Currentinformation operations doctrine andmost of the tools that supported plan-ning involve a mechanical, stovepipedapproach based on the joint operationplanning execution system. Informa-tion operations do not fit that mold.Analysis of the problem of isolatingunfriendly command and controlyielded various methods by which anenemy obtains information and makesdecisions. The information operationsstaff evaluated physical contacts, theelectromagnetic spectrum, hard copymedia, and intelligence apparatus. Theassociated nodes were identified,which eventually linked to the targetsnecessary to focus on a specific enemycapability. The team avoided stovepip-ing in its approach to the problem, re-sulting in integrated and synchronizedsolutions. The development of this for-mal approach to analysis of the infor-mation environment will be critical tofuture JTF operations.

Spectrum analysis and deconfliction.A requirement for a joint restrictivefrequency list or spectrum managerwas identified early in the exercise. Ajoint force air component commander

had nominal responsibility as part ofthe real-world live fire portion. How-ever, an analysis of the total radio fre-quency spectrum was needed to iden-tify the part the enemy was using andthe part JTF was using. The informa-tion operations cell conducted an ini-tial analysis but could not gain suffi-cient intelligence to create a viable toolfor attacking or exploiting enemy useof the radio spectrum. The ability tounderstand, exploit, deny, and protectacross the full range of frequenciesmust be considered in future exercises,experiments, and real world events.

Technical Skill SetsManning information operations

cells is a challenge. During the exercisethe cell had electronic warfare special-ists from the Navy and Air Force, aPSYOP officer, two computer networkoperations planners (a marine and anairman), but no dedicated planners fordeception or operational security. Inaddition, there were no dedicated tar-geteers or intelligence support person-nel. All operators were specialists in in-formation and service-specificcapabilities, but few had significantbackgrounds, and all had difficulty un-derstanding the larger concept. Thisproblem will persist until the servicesfurther develop career patterns forplanners. Key personnel and skill setsare required for SJFHQ and informa-tion operations components:

■ information operations specialistswho have expertise in areas such as elec-tronic warfare and computer network oper-ations and a general understanding of infor-mation capabilities and centers ofexcellence that can provide in-depth analy-sis for planning

■ planners able to use informationoperations in support of the overall JTFplan, understand their capabilities and ap-plication on the national level, and developmeasures of performance and execution

■ special technical operations plan-ners who understand technical operationscapabilities and how they can support in-formation operations

■ intelligence analysts who specializein intelligence but grasp the requirementsfor planning, executing, and assessing in-formation operations

■ system of systems analysts who areexperts on the operational net assessmentdatabase and have sufficient knowledge of


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operations as a key element of combatpower. The information operations su-pervisor was a primary staff positionwith functional responsibilities thatincluded:

■ furnishing CJTF with informationoperations optimized to furnish planning,coordination, integration, and synchroniza-tion across the spectrum of conflict

■ spanning the CJTF joint operationalarea with a process harmonized across agen-cies and services, capable of providing sup-port to other agencies in their missions

■ providing a focus for informationoperations in every medium (land, sea, air,space, and information)

■ focusing the command on translat-ing information operations from an enablerinto a fully integrated capability

■ providing CJTF and componentcommanders with capabilities, limitations,and employment considerations (second-and third-level effects) to employ informa-tion operations.

Millennium Challenge high-lighted challenges and areas for futureexperiments and games. According tothe JTF commander, information oper-ations are a “capstone element ofcombat power . . . both lethal and non-lethal. . . . We must condition theworld to accept [information opera-tions] as an essential element.” Any-one with responsibility for conductingsuch operations must have the requi-site authority and assets. Because theoperations form a component of jointwarfighting that remains in a grayarea, there is a gap in its effective em-ployment. The challenge is bridgingthat gap and bringing the full poten-tial of those capabilities to bearagainst enemies. JFQ

information operations to support planningand analysis activities

■ effects assessors who can evaluatethe effectiveness of information operationsboth generally and in relation to the over-all plan.

There are five core capabilities ofinformation operations divided intotwo camps. On one side are technolo-gists, who provide electronic warfareand computer network attack/defenseto affect the electromagnetic spectrumand information systems. On the otherare humanists, who conduct PSYOP,military deception, and operations se-curity to influence foreign decision-makers and protect friendly decision-makers. Unifying both groups into asingle core of specialists is key to un-derstanding the capabilities that mustbe integrated on all levels of warfare.

A Joint Task ForceOne important observation in Mil-

lennium Challenge was the require-ment on the part of the blue force for acentral coordinator on the JTF level.Only PSYOP was addressed formally onthe command level by the joint psycho-

logical operations task force. During theexercise, information operationsachieved component-level status withrespect to responsibility but lacked theresources and authority to be genuinelyeffective. Functional aspects were dis-persed. Because information operationswere part of the information superiorityfunction, they had no direct representa-tion at the table and were not com-pletely integrated into the overarchingJTF plans, and thus were not fully lever-aged for expertise and use. The after ac-tion report noted that senior exercisementors, the joint task force com-mander, and the combatant com-mander all agreed that information op-erations needed a centralizedcommander to coordinate activities on

the JTF level. A joint information opera-tions task force (JIOTF) would fill thisneed.

Two concepts are essential in con-sidering information operations on theJTF level. First, combatant command-ers must have a strategy in place, clar-ify the JTF role in achieving the strat-egy, and accept the strategy as criticalto objectives. Second, the role of infor-mation operations cannot be simplyan afterthought addressed immediatelybefore a conflict. Shaping and influ-encing activities must occur continu-ously throughout peace, crisis, andcombat. It is almost impossible tochange a popular negative view of JTFefforts once shots are fired.

OrganizationThe need for JIOTF as part of a JTF

staff is critical to establish and main-tain the knowledge superiority neededto execute rapid decisive operations.Lessons from Allied Force and Endur-ing Freedom together with observa-tions from Millennium Challenge un-derscore the need to solve thischallenge. Lingering Cold War mental-

ities still generate operation plansfocused on brief, single-dimen-sion combat in which deception,diversion, and feint opportunitiesare lost. JIOTF should be based onplans and operations. The focus

must be on enabling the lethal andnonlethal capabilities of informationoperations for joint warfighters.

Future experiments should ad-dress the need to organize a joint in-formation operations task force tofocus on information operations as anelement of combat power. The taskforce would be constituted by mem-bers of combatant command staffs,augmented by information operationsassets from U.S. Strategic Command asrequired. The responsibilities of theJIOTF commander would include as-sisting CJTF planning for informationoperations, monitoring execution ofspecific actions, and assessing meas-ures of performance and execution.

Millennium Challenge revealedthe important functions that JIOTFbrings to the table because the JTFcommander recognized information


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information operations were notcompletely integrated into theoverarching JTF plans

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ground forces. Although manythought those operations would re-quire a large number of heavily armedtroops in close combat, logistic diffi-culties and the concern over casualtiesmade such operations unsuitable inthree of the four conflicts. Those reali-ties will likely have an even greater im-pact in the future because of the threatof anti-access capabilities and weaponsof mass destruction.

D eveloping the capability toquickly defeat an enemy onland, with fewer and moreagile forces, is a significant

challenge for the military. DesertStorm, Allied Force, Enduring Free-dom, and Iraqi Freedom involved se-verely punishing or defeating enemy

Ground RadarSurveillance and TargetingBy P R I C E T. B I N G H A M

Lieutenant Colonel Price T. Bingham, USAF (Ret.), is the former chief of the currentdoctrine division in the Airpower Research Institute at the College of AerospaceDoctrine, Research, and Education.

Manpack terminal,Enduring Freedom.

55th Signal Company (Jeremy Colvin)

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Military transformation is feasiblein part because of wide-area, high-per-formance ground moving target indi-cator (GMTI) radar capabilities. Todaythe E–8 joint surveillance target attackradar system (JSTARS) of 116th AirControl Wing is their principal source.Various systems will offer such capa-bilities in the future including GlobalHawk unmanned aerial vehicles, B–2bombers, F–35 joint strike fighters,F/A–18E/F and F/A–22 aircraft, aerialcommon sensors, multi-sensor com-mand and control aircraft, and spacebased radars.

Ground radar disrupts and dislo-cates enemy forces through the inte-gration of maneuver and standoff at-tacks. Using these means rather thanmass and attrition can transform warby making it possible to defeat landforces quickly and decisively withfewer and lighter forces while reducingrisks to military and civilian personnel.Despite this potential, use of E–8ground radar systems in recent con-flicts reveals obstacles that will requirea transformation in training.

Enabling TransformationGround radar can enable military

transformation because almost everyarmy, even primitive forces such as theTaliban, relies on vehicular movementfor offensive and defensive operations.Before the massive and heavily mecha-nized Easter offensive by the NorthVietnamese in 1972, their operational

effectiveness depended largely on lo-gistic support along the Ho Chi Minhtrail. Commanders have used move-ment to gain advantages in force ra-tios, position, and surprise, but duringthe 20th century most armies came torely on motorized vehicles. Today thatdependence is greater than ever. Vehi-cles furnish not only mobility butheavy firepower, armored protection,and logistic and engineering support.And with the capability of the ArmedForces to precisely attack fixed targets,vehicles such as missile transporter

erector launchers are being used in-creasingly to improve survivability.

JSTARS is unique in its ability toturn reliance on vehicular movementinto an information advantage in bothpeace and war. With ground radar, thesystem can reliably detect, accurately lo-cate, and precisely track vehicles from asignificant standoff distance within alarge coverage area even in darknessand bad weather. It can identify vehi-cles being tracked. Data on movementcan be used to cue unmanned aerial ve-hicles with high-resolution but limitedfields-of-view electro-optical/infraredsensors. This information, especiallywhen collected over days or weeks andused as the context for integrating otherforms of data, can provide unprece-dented situational awareness of threatsand opportunities.

If a vehicle being tracked byground radar is identified as hostile,the E–8 crew and capable communica-tions make it possible to exploit thisreal-time information by supportingair and missile attacks before the vehi-cle can threaten friendly forces. In adevelopment with major implicationsfor such targeting, tests in the afford-able moving surface target engagementprogram have shown that groundradar information can be used in guid-ing seekerless weapons in standoff, all-weather attacks against moving vehi-cles. This capability, applicable to the

joint direct attack munitionand missile systems, couldreduce civilian casualties,collateral damage, and air-craft losses. Moreover, pre-cise strikes on vehicles in all

weather from standoff ranges mightinhibit an enemy from risking militar-ily significant movements.

Perhaps the transformational im-portance of radar ground surveillanceand targeting such as the affordablemoving surface target engagement pro-gram can be appreciated by recogniz-ing the limitations that faced theArmed Forces before those capabilitiesexisted. Available sensors in the formof human sight and cameras could lo-cate moving vehicles but only at shortranges and in daylight and fairweather. Commanders were thus de-nied situational awareness on the loca-tion, movement, and strength of

JSTARS is unique in its ability to turnreliance on vehicular movement intoan information advantage

Scud missile bunkers,Desert Storm.

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tions Center were reportedly unfamil-iar with the system.

The Gulf WarBecause JSTARS was intended to

counter the Warsaw Pact, many be-lieved that it was no longer neededwith the end of the Cold War. How-ever, the employment of two prototypeE–8A aircraft during the Gulf Warquickly proved otherwise. During theirattack on Al-Khafji only two weeksafter the system reached the theater,the Iraqis learned that they could nolonger assume that moving at nightprotected them from detection and at-tack. E–8A ground radar made it possi-ble to locate enemy units and targetthem with devastating air strikes beforethey could close with Coalition forces.In addition to enhancing the efficiencyand effectiveness of air attacks, manydeep within Kuwait, the system helpedCoalition leaders understand that theAl-Khafji attack was not a feint de-signed to mask a larger offensive.

During an offensive in some ofthe worst weather of the war, E–8Aground radar quickly revealed enemyefforts to reposition their forces, pro-viding advancing Coalition land forceswith information to defeat the Iraqimaneuver before it became a seriousthreat. When the Iraqis began pullingout of Kuwait, GMTI radar surveillanceindicated that a large-scale withdrawal

enemy forces. Fighter bombers onarmed reconnaissance sorties providedthe only means for detecting and tar-geting individual vehicles before theycould engage in close combat.

Unfortunately, armed reconnais-sance has proven inefficient and oftenineffective in finding and attackingmobile forces. The limited fields ofview of a fighter-bomber pilot was onereason armed reconnaissance fellshort. Limited vision made it necessaryto fly many sorties to search a largearea for vehicles. It also made it neces-sary to search at low altitudes where anaircraft was exposed to short-range airdefenses. Even when many sortiescould be flown and the losses from airdefenses were acceptable, operations inWorld War II, Korea, and Vietnamdemonstrated that armed reconnais-sance failed to locate and attack suit-able targets. Camouflage, concealment,and deception often caused fighter-bombers to miss suitable targets or at-tack invalid ones like decoys or previ-ously destroyed vehicles. Moreimportantly, enemy land forces wereable to reduce the risk of detection andattack by moving during darkness orbad weather.

The inability of the Air Force tofind and target vehicles before theyapproached friendly land forces helpsexplain why it was necessary until re-cently to find opposing land forcesthrough contact with friendly landforces, why until then victory de-pended on close combat, and howthat created its own problems. Prevail-ing in close combat usually called forheavy land forces, which led to con-cerns over casualties. Deploying thoseforces also required significant timeand resources. However, radar groundcapabilities provide effective and effi-cient alternatives to relying on bothclose combat and visual armed recon-naissance.

With the development of the af-fordable moving surface target engage-ment program, high-performanceground radar surveillance and target-ing systems are transforming opera-tions against armies much as radar did

against air forces. Radar made it possi-ble to detect, locate, and track aircraftflying in a large airspace even whenlight and weather were poor. As earlyas the Battle of Britain, where radarprovided unprecedented wide-area sit-uational awareness, the use of maneu-ver by the Royal Air Force to engage oravoid enemy aircraft was enhancedand the danger of surprise was re-duced. When radar was applied toweapons, it became possible to pre-cisely target aircraft from a significantstandoff distance in both darkness andbad weather.

Today ground moving target indi-cator radar offers similar capabilitiesagainst vehicles that move over a largearea. In contrast to air warfare, how-ever, only U.S. and allied forces (sev-eral European nations and NATOmembers) have these high-perform-ance systems. Moreover, even if anenemy obtained such technology, itwould not gain an advantage becausethe effective operation of the systems,unlike radar against air forces, requiresan air- or space-borne platform, andthe Pentagon can deny the ability tooperate such a platform. Yet despitethe immense potential of ground radarfor transforming operations, a reviewof recent conflicts reveals that realizingit has been slow. Iraqi Freedom is notaddressed here, but early reports indi-cated that fully utilizing radar surveil-lance and targeting capabilities re-mains a problem. Some personnel

Desert Storm

T he United Nations called on Iraq to withdraw its invasion forces fromKuwait in August 1990. Then, in response to requests by Saudi Ara-bia, the United States formed a coalition and sent troops to the re-

gion. The United Nations authorized the use of force if Iraq did not with-draw by mid-January 1991. Coalition forces of some 700,000 were fielded byJanuary 1991, including 540,000 Americans. Desert Storm commenced onJanuary 17 with airpower focused on enemy air defenses before turning toinfrastructure, oil refineries, and military targets. The ground offensivebegan on February 24. Kuwait City was liberated in three days and the oper-ation ended after only 100 hours. Although no official statistics exist, the es-timated level of Iraqi forces in theater ranged from 180,000 to 630,000 with8,000 to 100,000 casualties. In contrast, the Coalition lost only about 300troops. A Security Council resolution in April required Iraq to destroy or ren-der harmless its chemical and biological weapons, halt its nuclear weaponsdevelopment, and eliminate its ballistic missiles with a range greater than150 kilometers. JFQ

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to support air attacks along the so-called Highway of Death. Despite thedescription of attacks on that escaperoute, relatively few Iraqis were killedthere; throughout the war they rarelystayed in place once their vehicleswere targeted. Moreover, had theground offensive not been suspendedafter only 100 hours, surveillance andtargeting support might have played amajor role in preventing RepublicanGuard divisions from escaping intact.

Ground radar surveillance and tar-geting contributed to Desert Storm bydefeating enemy land forces despitemajor handicaps. One was that onlytwo prototype systems were available,and they did not reach the theateruntil just before the air offensive. How-ever, thanks to heroic efforts by the

JSTARS team, composed of militaryand contractor personnel, one of thetwo systems flew every night of thewar. But with only one system airborneand only at night, it was impossible toprovide continuous ground radar cov-erage. Consistency was further reducedbecause commanders had urgent re-quirements across the theater for itsunprecedented system capabilities.E–8As were often tasked during a sin-gle mission to conduct surveillancefrom the far west of Iraq (to look forScuds) to the border between Kuwaitand Saudi Arabia (where the Al-Khafjiattack took place).

Since the system was still in devel-opment during the invasion of Kuwait,another handicap was widespread un-familiarity with JSTARS. As the jointforce air component commandernoted, “We who were responsible forplanning and orchestrating air opera-tions had little appreciation of the sys-tem’s capabilities and limitations.”1

Lack of familiarity extended to crews,which had to be trained while the sys-tems were en route to the theater.

Even the concept of operation hadnot been fully developed. But thanks tothe ability of the JSTARS team to refine

the system during combat and explainits capabilities, the Coalition quicklyexploited advantages in ground surveil-lance and targeting.

KosovoIn the case of radar ground surveil-

lance and targeting, Allied Force didnot begin where Desert Storm left off;JSTARS was not used to its full potentialto help target mobile Serbian landforces. To some extent the failure to ex-ploit the system from the outset of hos-tilities can be explained by major dif-ferences between the conflicts.

Unlike the terrain in Kuwait andsouthwestern Iraq, which is relativelyflat desert, Kosovo is mountainouswith heavy foliage that increasedscreening and made it more difficultfor E–8A ground surveillance to detect,

locate, and track mo-bile forces, especiallyfrom the orbit assignedto the system. Anotherdifference was that Ser-

bian forces faced little immediate dan-ger from a land force. Thus they hadscant need to move to develop advan-tages in mass, position, and surprise.By remaining dispersed they couldavoid providing the large number oflucrative moving targets JSTARS de-tected in the Gulf War.

The lack of enemy land forcescontributed to the failure of NATO toperform intelligence preparation ofthe battlespace until it was too late.Currently, only land componentsmake such preparations. Task ForceHawk, the deployment of two battal-ions of Apache and other helicopterstogether with infantry, tanks, artillery,engineer, and headquarters assets, pro-vided NATO airmen with expertise in

developing the ground order of battle,which significantly aided the employ-ment of airpower.

Civilians the Serbs used for pro-tection were another factor. Their pres-ence led NATO to require positive vi-sual identification before attackingtargets to reduce harm to noncombat-ants. Operations revealed that groundradar surveillance could play a valu-able role in target identification byproviding cues to airborne forward aircontrollers and operators of unmannedaerial vehicles on locations wheremovement was occurring. JSTARS,Rivet Joint, forward air controllers,C–130 command and control aircraft,U–2s, and Predator unmanned vehicleswere all linked. These cues made for-ward air control and unmanned aerialvehicles more efficient since targeteersdid not have to conduct the initialsearch for movers using limited fields-of-view sensors.

Another difference was the impactof basing on JSTARS employment. Swissand Austrian refusal to allow over-flights required E–8s to fly a long dis-tance to reach an orbit from their basein Germany, which reduced on-stationtime and increased air refueling.

Similarities to the Gulf War alsolimited the initial contribution of thesystem. Even though JSTARS was nolonger a prototype, the fleet consistedof only four operational systems; thusfor most of Allied Force only two sys-tems were deployed in theater. But, asin Desert Storm, the team excelled ingenerating sorties between February22 and June 28, 1999, flying 83 sortiesfor a total of 730.7 on-station hours.Yet even with this level of effort, the

JSTARS was not used to its full potentialto help target mobile Serbian land forces

Allied Force

A fter the failure of negotiations at Rambouillet in March 1999, NATOlaunched an air campaign designed to compel President SlobodanMilosevic of Yugoslavia to end abuses against ethnic Albanians by

Serbian forces in Kosovo. Air strikes continued for 78 days and were halted inearly June when Milosevic acceded to NATO demands to withdraw from theprovince. The Alliance generated over 38,000 combat sorties without anycombat losses in the largest operation in its history. Allied Force was the thirdlargest strategic application of U.S. airpower since World War II at the time,exceeded only by the Vietnam War and Desert Storm. JFQ



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dilemma. If they maneuvered in re-sponse to the offensive, they were visi-ble to ground radar; but if they did notmove for fear of being detected, theyhandicapped their ability to achievethe force ratios and position needed todefeat the light Kosovar forces withminimum casualties. As the JSTARSsquadron commander put it, “TheSerbs got smart—they realized thatwhen they moved, they died; they at-tempted to move in smaller numbers—that didn’t work either. JSTARS wasable to see what was going on, sharethe information, bring iron on target,and help bring an end to theconflict.”2 According to the NATO aircomponent commander, LieutenantGeneral Mike Short, Serb forces “gotspanked from JSTARS and [unmannedaerial vehicle] cross cues.”3

The dilemma that faced the Ser-bians may have been key to their deci-sion to withdraw from Kosovo. Afterthe conflict, the Supreme Allied Com-mander Europe reaffirmed the value ofthe system, testifying that “JSTARS wasa big winner for us here. It is also all-weather; it really helped us understandwhat was going on both in the earlystages and in the late stages.”4

limited number of aircraft and the dis-tances involved prevented JSTARSfrom providing 24-hour coverage,which allowed Serbian forces to movewithout the risk of being detected, lo-cated, or tracked by radar.

A further similarity to the GulfWar was the lack of familiarity withsystem capabilities and limitations onthe part of those responsible for air op-erations. That may explain why JSTARSwas not deployed early in the crisiswhen vehicular information couldhave revealed the magnitude of the Ser-bian deployment. Once deployed, un-familiarity also contributed to delays inincluding the system in the air taskingorder and to placing the system in aless than ideal orbit. Choosing orbitsfor surveillance of rough terrain re-quires special software to ensure thatthe screening of key areas such as roadsegments will be minimized. Lack of fa-miliarity caused the system to be usedinitially for only surveillance and nottargeting. Because the small number ofoperational aircraft constrained train-ing, some crewmembers were unfamil-iar with targeting capabilities used in

Desert Storm. Nor were crews initiallyprepared to help forward air controllerswith information on movement.

Like Desert Storm, operational ex-perience gave NATO commanders,staffs, and aircrews the opportunity tolearn more about system capabilitiesand an appreciation of its contributionto air operations. Fighter pilots recog-nized that the capability of JSTARS todetect, locate, and track vehicularmovement eliminated the need for in-efficient visual search and reduced de-ception by decoys and camouflage.During the conflict, the system beganto cue both forward air controllers andunmanned aerial vehicles on the loca-tions of vehicular traffic, allowing formore effective and efficient targetingof Serbian forces.

Another similarity was weather inthe initial phases, which resembledwhat the ground offensive experiencedin the Gulf War. When conditions im-proved, the so-called Kosovo Libera-tion Army began an offensive thatforced the Serbs to move and mass.Even though the offensive was notpowerful, it enabled E–8 surveillanceand targeting capabilities to presentSerb forces with an operational

JSTARS landing,Iraqi Freedom.

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One difference in Afghanistan wasthe delay in deploying JSTARS, whichdid not arrive in theater until after sev-eral weeks of combat. Although theCommander, U.S. Central Command,reported to President George Bush thathe needed the system operating in theenvironment, much of the Taliban andal Qaeda vehicle movement had ceasedby the time it was available.

The President recognized the rele-vance of movement, according to a re-porter: “Our strategy is to . . . get thebad guys moving. We get ’em moving,we can see them, we can hit them.”5

The Chairman also perceived the needto attack mobile rather than fixed tar-gets but realized, “We’ve got a militarythat does great against fixed targets.We don’t do so well against mobile tar-gets. You’re not going to topple aregime with this [fixed] target list.”

Despite the delay, JSTARS opera-tions were similar to previous conflicts.For example, the system was not de-ployed in numbers sufficient for per-sistent coverage. And like the final daysof Allied Force, ground radar data cuedthe employment of other sensors, suchas high-resolution but soda-strawfields-of-view sensors. Another encour-aging similarity was system reliability.From November 7, 2001, to April 27,2002, E–8s flew 249 missions (100 per-cent of those scheduled) and 245 (98.4percent) were effective. Of the final 189missions, 188 (99.5 percent) were effec-tive. Yet like Kosovo, the distance theaircraft had to fly to reach an orbit re-duced on-station time and increased airrefueling requirements.

Like the Gulf War and the finaldays of Allied Force when the Kosovaroffensive occurred, the presence offriendly land forces greatly enhancedthe air operations JSTARS supported.

The threat the Northern Alliance pre-sented was sufficient to cause Talibanand al Qaeda forces to move and con-centrate and to rely on vehicles forfirepower and armor, making it easierto detect, locate, track, and targetthem. Enhancing the contribution ofground radar information to targetingwas the fact that almost no one exceptthe Taliban or al Qaeda had vehicles.6

Nevertheless, fear of hitting civil-ians influenced the rules of engage-ment and exploitation of groundradar targeting. Reportedly, positive

identification was required to selectcivilian vehicles for air attack, oftenby land forces that actually saw thetargets. Such rules not only handi-capped an asymmetrical advantage,but also put military and civilian per-sonnel at greater risk. Deploying eyeson the ground in proximity to anenemy is dangerous. Moreover, whenvehicles are allowed to escape, theirpotential remains intact. And whenthe enemy in question is al Qaeda,Americans around the world are fur-ther endangered.

The terrain in Afghanistan alsomade screening a challenge, as it didin Kosovo. But it was not a majorproblem initially, given the relativelyflat areas where Northern Allianceforces fought Taliban and al Qaedaforces. Moreover, even the ability toscreen radar surveillance and targetingcould be offset because it also con-strained vehicle movement. Thus ter-rain can actually enhance radar sur-veillance and targeting when orbits

are well planned and capabilities suchas unmanned aerial vehicles, U–2s,and Special Operations Forces comple-ment radar surveillance.

The Way AheadGMTI radar is essential to an inte-

grated network that provides situationalawareness and the ability to attackacross a large area before enemy unitscan close with friendly land forces. Atthe same time, experience shows thatthe learning curve for exploitation ofsuch capabilities has not been steep,

with many of the same problemsarising in each conflict. To someextent the learning problems canbe traced to the unprecedentednature of ground radar and thelimited numbers of systems avail-

able for training. But a greater reason isthe profound difference between peace-time training and combat.

The value of wide-area groundradar is more apparent on the opera-tional than tactical level of war. Thepreponderance of training involvingsuch surveillance and targeting capa-bilities is neither joint nor focused onthe operational level; service trainingcenters are geared toward combat by asingle service, though forces fromother services occasionally participate.And with a focus on combat, the im-portance of pre-hostility ground radarsurveillance is neglected. Moreover,much combat training is devoted tothe tactical level, ignoring the role ofthe operational level in determiningwhen, where, or whether engagementsmust be fought. For example, the Na-tional Training Center is focused onthe training brigade or lower echelonsto fight regimental-size opposingforces in close combat.

Although this center provides oneof the few opportunities for the AirForce to train against a realistic oppos-ing land force, it is usually confined toclose air support. Moreover, accordingto the Chief of Staff of the Air Force,“The results [of close air support in ex-ercises] are never fully appreciated. Ifwe attrited the red force with air, thenthey’d never get engaged on theground. When you think about what’sthe lesson taught to generations of

GMTI radar is essential to anintegrated network that providessituational awareness

Enduring Freedom

W hen the Taliban in Afghanistan failed to deliver terrorist leadersand close their training camps in the wake of 9/11, the UnitedStates initiated air strikes in early October 2001 to support resist-

ance by the Northern Alliance. The Taliban regime fell from power by Decem-ber and the operation was subsequently focused on stabilization and recon-struction. Periodic efforts to kill or capture al Qaeda and Taliban memberscontinued, however, such as Operation Anaconda in March 2002. JFQ



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to fully exploit ground radar surveil-lance and targeting.

Training is an essential prerequi-site for the military transformation inmeeting the strategic implications ofenemy land forces. Commanders mustuse joint training to integrate land andair forces by using maneuver andstandoff air attack to create an in-tractable operational dilemma for anenemy while maneuvering to avoidclose combat, except when over-whelming advantages and close com-bat make contributing to campaign ob-jectives worth the risks.

A commander attempting to cre-ate such a dilemma will soon find thatenemy vehicular movement provides amore reliable means for assessmentthan attrition. For example, when theobjective is stopping movement,ground moving target indicator radarwill quickly reveal whether the attackwas successful. And thanks to this sur-veillance, it is possible to make this as-sessment in real time, even in darknessand bad weather. With the realisticjoint training the transformation intraining is designed to achieve, com-manders should become confidentthat it is feasible to quickly defeat op-posing land forces using fewer andlighter land forces. JFQ

N O T E S

1 Charles A. Horner, “An Information Su-periority Lesson,” ISR Journal, vol. 1, no. 1(January/February 2002), p. 17.

2 Tony Capaccio, “Northrop GrummanJoint Stars Led Most Lethal Attacks onSerbs,” Bloomberg News (June 29, 1999).

3 Briefing, 93d Air Control Wing, RobinsAir Force Base, May 31, 1999.

4 Wesley K. Clark, testimony before theSenate Armed Services Committee, July 1,1999.

5 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 153,174.

6 “Targeting Improving; No Problemswith Coordination, Rumsfeld Says,” Aero-space Daily (November 20, 2001), p. 4.

7 “CAS Role Damaged by Staffing, Train-ing Structure, Jumper Says,” Aerospace Daily(February 27, 2003), p. 4.

8 “Joint National Training Capability:The Next Wave in Transformation,” Insidethe Pentagon (February 20, 2003), p. 1.

young soldiers, [it’s] ‘Y’all got these air-planes but they’re no help to me.’”7

Such training clearly does not supportthe operational level, in which target-ing combat units and, often more im-portantly, logistic support can elimi-nate the need for close combat. Giventhe single service, tactical, and closecombat orientation for most peacetimetraining, it is not surprising that learn-ing to fully exploit radar ground sur-veillance and targeting capabilities hasbeen largely confined to on-the-jobtraining during conflicts.

The Pentagon is reportedly con-sidering a project known as T2. TheSecretary of Defense noted that “we

need to train like we fight and fightlike we train, and too often we don’t.”8

The strategic plan for transformingtraining makes establishing a joint na-tional training capability a top priority.This would provide tools to train regu-larly with forces from multiple servicesusing live-fire and training simulators.It also includes augmentation by com-puter-generated synthetic forces,which would provide the realistic oper-ational-level environment needed toput the tactical level into perspective.Clearly, a joint national training capa-bility would provide commanders an

Iraqi Freedom

T he U.N. Security Council found in November 2002 that Iraq remainedin material breach of resolutions banning weapons of mass destruc-tion. Later in the month inspectors returned to verify the disarma-

ment efforts. But members of the Security Council were divided over whetherBaghdad was cooperating with the inspections. In March 2003 the UnitedStates, which had begun to deploy forces to the region, suspended negotia-tions and demanded that Saddam Hussein leave Iraq within 48 hours or facewar. When he refused to comply, U.S. and allied forces launched combat op-erations. Organized enemy resistance ended by mid-April. Approximately467,000 Americans and 43,000 coalition troops were deployed during thecombat phase of the operation. JFQ

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T he phenomenon of political and mili-tary leaders reaching forward into therealm of tactical operations has existedsince Thucydides. It differs today be-

cause of technology, doctrine, and the current op-erational environment. Enduring Freedom

demonstrated that technology can provide com-manders on all levels with immediate situationalawareness and that joint publications can offerdoctrine on every aspect of operations. Moreover,warfare is no longer controlled under the samemodel that prevailed throughout most of the 20th

century. Commanders can anticipate conductingoperations in an environment in which politicalgoals are vague; domestic and international sup-port is tentative; and casualties are dutifullyavoided. To redress this dilemma, DOD has spent


Major Mark G. Davis, USA, is a student at the School of Advanced Airand Space Studies who has previously served in a variety of specialoperations assignments.

Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution in the Era of Forward ReachBy M A R K G. D A V I S

U.S

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■ C E N T R A L I Z E D C O N T R O L / D E C E N T R A L I Z E D E X E C U T I O N

billions on command, control, communications,computers, intelligence, surveillance, and recon-naissance (C4ISR) systems. As a result, centralizedcontrol and decentralized execution pursued bythe Air Force is not valid in view of joint doctrineand the emergence of effects-based operations.

Takeoff to LandingThe first doctrinal issue is the inconsistency

between centralized control and decentralizedexecution and the joint precept of centralizedplanning and direction. As a reaction to the

bombing of Vietnam during Rolling Thunder in1971, the Air Force altered the concept of cen-tralized control to include decentralized execu-tion. Since then, centralized control and decen-tralized execution has been accepted by theservice as the best way to employ airpower. Bycontrast, Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of theArmed Forces of the United States, establishes thatcentralized planning and direction is “essentialfor controlling and coordinating the efforts of allforces available.” What is more, Air Force Doc-trine Document (AFDD 1), “Air Force Basic Doc-trine,” states that “centralized control is the bestway to employ air power,” which would be op-posed by the Army and Marine Corps, which uti-

lize centralized planning anddirection and mission-typeorders to employ forces.

Because senior officersof the Air Force are routinelyselected as joint force aircomponent commanders(JFACCs), it is essential thatits doctrine and executionmethodologies mirror thoseprescribed in joint doctrine.Its tenet of centralized con-trol is not a recognized termin joint doctrine and is caus-ing confusion not only

within the Air Force but throughout the jointcommunity. The following statement is an exam-ple of the dichotomy between Air Force and jointdoctrine. Joint Pub 1 states, “Unity of effort, cen-tralized planning and direction, and decentral-ized execution are key considerations in joint op-erations.” Where conflict arises between serviceand joint doctrine, joint doctrine takes prece-dence, according to Joint Publication 0-2, Unified

Action Armed Forces. It is therefore imperative thatthe Air Force core tenet of centralized control anddecentralized execution be modified to reflect theprinciples outlined in joint doctrine. Centralizedplanning and direction is consistent throughoutjoint doctrine and clearly shows that this tenet iscontradictory to the basic command and controltenet outlined.

From a joint perspective, centralized controland decentralized execution is illogical and can-not exist together because control is about execu-tion and is inherent in command, as explained in

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine forJoint Operations . An aircraft isunder centralized direction virtu-ally from takeoff to landingthrough a series of control func-tions: Joint force commanders and

JFACC maintain operational or tactical control ofeach aircraft on the air tasking order; the airmanis required to execute only those missions derivedfrom the air tasking order or in the case of timesensitive targets when directed by joint com-manders; the airman must adhere to the instruc-tions as outlined in the airspace control order andspecial instructions; to receive direction and guid-ance the airman must communicate over the the-ater air-to-ground system, which exists to expe-dite the ability of joint commanders to control airoperations; and finally, if the aircraft is conduct-ing close air support, it must receive clearancefrom an air or ground controller before releasingits ordnance. The only decentralized aspect inthis mission scenario is the tactics involved instriking the target, and even then rules of engage-ment could be a controlling factor.

Another clear discrepancy between joint andservice doctrine involves control of airpower.AFDD 1 is unequivocal in insisting that “Air andspace power must be controlled by an airman.” Bycomparison, Joint Publication 3-56.1, Commandand Control for Joint Air Operations, states that ajoint force commander will assign responsibilitiesfor air operations to a commander with the pre-ponderance of air assets and skill to control jointair operations.” Moreover , when “a JFACC is notdesignated, the JFC may plan, direct, and controljoint air operations.” Joint doctrine makes it quiteclear that centralized planning and direction ofjoint air operations can be assigned not only toairmen, as Air Force doctrine would seem toimply, but to senior officers from the Army, Navy,and Marine Corps with control over substantialair resources and requisite qualifications.

Centrifugal Force?Command relationships are another doctri-

nal issue that generates concern. Joint Pub 3-0outlines four relationships: combatant command,


from a joint perspective, centralized control anddecentralized execution is illogical and cannotexist together

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operational control, tactical control, and support.Centralized control is missing from that menuand its ambiguous definition in AFDD 1 mightleave some airmen guessing. Does the Air Forcetenet of centralized control bestow command au-thority over assets once aircraft are aloft or doesexecution authority and responsibility continueto reside with joint commanders? As noted, whentaken as a whole, this tenet confuses the issue ofcontrol, which according to Joint Pub 3-0 is in-herent in command. Joint doctrine satisfactorilyaddresses the level of control of forces delegatedto joint commanders by establishing relation-ships for particular missions or operations, andcentralized control is not among them.

The third issue deals with decentralized exe-cution and the realities of modern air operations.Air Force doctrine defines decentralized executionas delegating “execution authority to responsibleand capable lower level commanders . . . toachieve span of control and to foster initiative, sit-uational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.”Does this statement accurately reflect the realitiesof air operations since Deliberate Force, Allied

Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom?Have the joint air operations planning process, airtasking order cycle, theater air-to-ground system,and C4ISR fusion capabilities within the airweapons operation center subsumed all responsi-bility from subordinate air commanders on thewing and squadron level and made joint com-manders the focal point for every aspect of air op-erations? As Joint Pub 3-56.1 states, “The JFACCdirects . . . the air operations plan [centralizedplanning] and a responsive and integrated controlsystem [decentralized execution].” Again, jointdoctrine refers to centralized planning, not cen-tralized control, and additionally describes thetheater air-to-ground system as the method forutilizing decentralized control. That system en-ables joint commanders to exercise control overthe air and space environment, control air mis-sions to achieve assigned air operations objectives,and finally produce command, control, communi-cations, and computers systems that enable thecontrol of assets. It would be difficult to describethe theater air-to-ground system as anything but atool for joint commanders to extend control overthe execution of air operations.

The military reluctantly turned to decentral-ized execution in the past because technology did


Desert Storm.

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■ C E N T R A L I Z E D C O N T R O L / D E C E N T R A L I Z E D E X E C U T I O N

not exist to provide an integrated network tocontrol operations. Today, unity of effort isachieved not by decentralized execution butthrough an elaborate system of systems that en-ables centralized planning and direction on thehighest levels. The spirit of decentralized execu-tion resides in senior commanders issuing mis-sion-type orders to subordinates and allowingthem to develop plans and execute missionsbased on the mission and intent of higher com-mand, as outlined in Joint Pub 3-0. The joint airoperations planning process, air tasking ordercycle, and theater air-to-ground system haveusurped this precept of joint operations. Decen-tralized execution is established joint doctrine,but it would appear that the Air Force tenet ofcentralized control is inconsistent with its spiritand the realities of modern joint air operationsthat require centralized planning and direction.

The fourth issue that invalidates the tenet ofcentralized control and decentralized execution isthat doctrine allows joint commanders to reachforward. This is best illustrated in Joint Pub 3-0:“JFCs have full authority to assign missions, redi-rect efforts, and direct coordination among subor-dinate commanders . . . in addition the commandauthority [combatant command] provides theJFCs unlimited authority to direct every aspect ofthe operation.” Until doctrinal changes are imple-mented, joint force commanders will continue to

have the authority to play JFACC, wing com-mander, and tactical fighter pilot.

A fifth issue is focused on the principles ofwar, specifically unity of command. In Joint Pub3-0, unity of command means that “all forces op-erate under a single commander with requisite au-thority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of acommon purpose.” In comparing this tenet withunity of command it might be concluded that it ismerely a duplication of a principle of war, readilyacknowledged as the enduring bedrock of doc-trine. Centralized control and decentralized exe-cution is not necessary when such principles arealready inherent in joint operations.

The final doctrinal issue deals specificallywith the emergence of effects-based operationsand its impact on centralized control and decen-tralized execution. These operations are con-ceived and planned in a systems framework thatconsiders the full range of direct, indirect, andcascading effects by the application of military,diplomatic, psychological, and economic instru-ments. They embrace the notion that political,economic, and diplomatic considerations aremore important than military conquest. Theyrepresent a top-down process rather than usualbottom-up operations.

Because of casual linkages among target setsand the danger of objective fratricide, effects-based operations must be orchestrated by a cen-tralized planning and execution authority thathas situational understanding of every aspect of


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the diplomatic, informational, economic, andmilitary campaign. Such operations will add myr-iad players to the targeting process to includeeconomists, nongovernmental officials, bankers,lawyers, and politicians. It will require microman-agement of air operations and demand enhancedC4ISR systems to control all aspects of ground,sea, and air maneuvers. It would be impossible for

centralized control and decentralized executionto coexist with a true effects-based campaignstrategy construct.

The areas highlighted above have empha-sized the tactical and operational friction pointsthat arise when contrasting centralized controland decentralized execution with the conceptscodified in joint doctrine. The most significantdanger facing the joint community is not the im-pact that this tenet will make on tactical andoperational warfighting methods, but how it willaffect the strategic thinking by senior politicaland military leaders. Centralized control and de-centralized execution, and specifically centralized

control, could lead to tactical and operationalconsiderations that define strategy, sometimescalled tacticization of strategy.

Traditionally, the levels of war are depictedas a pyramid with the strategic level on top andthe operational and tactical levels in subordinatepositions. Today, the lines separating these levelsare difficult to discern. Codifying centralized con-trol in doctrine will further confound an alreadycomplicated situation. On the strategic level, cen-tralized control influences decisionmaking inthree ways. First, the operational level will be lesscritical because sensors and shooters are becom-ing strategic. Secondly, centralized control andthe emphasis on the capability to destroy targetswith precision-guided munitions will result instrategic success without first identifying politicalgoals. Finally, centralized control increases thelikelihood of intervention by political and mili-tary leaders removed from the fight. The dangerof centralized control is subverting long-rangestrategy that looks beyond the capabilities ofweapons platforms and destruction of targets.

Centralized control and decentralized execu-tion is not possible in an environment in whichpolitical factors nullify military efficiency andemerging joint doctrine enables commanders toreach forward and direct air operations. In theevent, neither technology nor the environmentinvalidate centralized control and decentralizedexecution in military operations; rather it will bejoint doctrine and the emerging strategy of ef-fects-based warfare that will decide its fate. JFQ


it would be impossible for centralized control anddecentralized execution to coexist with a trueeffects-based campaign

Ramstein air base,Allied Force.

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A major tenet of command and controlis centralized direction and decentral-ized execution. But there has beensteady movement in the last decade

toward increased centralization on all levels. Thistrend should be arrested and the German-styletask-oriented command and control from top tobottom adopted. Otherwise the Armed Forces

could find themselves resembling the former So-viet military and paying a heavy price in thequest for absolute certainty and control.

CentralizationAuthority is concentrated in a single com-

mander and headquarters under centralized(order-oriented) command and control. Oneactor determines objectives and directs their ac-complishment. Centralization ensures unity ofeffort through unity of command, facilitates de-cisionmaking, offers effective use of forces andassets, eliminates uncertainty, and maximizes

Milan N. Vego teaches in the Joint Military Operations Department atthe Naval War College and is the author of Naval Strategy andOperations in Narrow Seas.

OperationalCommand and Controlin the Information AgeBy M I L A N N. V E G O

DOD (Dean Wagner)

V e g o


control. But subordinate commanders do nothave much latitude in decisions and suffer fromlow morale and motivation. Under centralizedcommand and control, detailed orders can per-suade tactical leaders against taking advantage ofchanging circumstances.

The Soviets used centralized command andcontrol during World War II by issuing bindingorders to field commanders. The result was com-

manders who would notconsolidate and exploitcombat success becausethey could not act with-out orders. Moreover,American and Britishforces relied extensivelyon directive orders in

1944, which explains their almost six-month ad-vance from Normandy to the German border, de-spite superiority in men and matériel.

The more political the objective, the greaterthe need for centralized command and control.The lack of common operational concepts anddoctrine requires more centralization on all lev-els. Additionally, poorly educated and trainedsubordinates can be controlled only by detailedorders. Centralization is also essential when lead-ers will not accept errors by their subordinates,especially in crises that might lead to hostilities.During the Cold War, national command authori-ties on both sides controlled the actions of theircommanders. Centralization is suitable when sit-uations such as fixed defense evolve slowly. It isalso suited to the unique limitations of peace op-erations which, in turn, can severely influencefreedom of action on the ground.

The TrendThe most serious current problem in the

Armed Forces is the trend toward overcentralizeddecisionmaking on the operational and strategiclevels. Centralized command and control maynot preclude the defeat of a capable enemy, but itextorts a price. For example, in the initial phaseof the German invasion of Russia in 1941, JosephStalin and his military advisors tried to run thewar by themselves with catastrophic conse-quences. The Soviet high command made all thestrategic decisions. Subordinates were not allowedto exercise their initiative. Stalin personally or-dered ill-conceived counteroffensives and forbadewithdrawals, resulting in the encirclement ofhundreds of thousands of men who were de-stroyed by fast-advancing enemy armor. Yet de-spite monopolizing decisionmaking, the highcommand had little effect on the outcome.

The German army demonstrated the applica-tion of task-oriented command and control andthe impact of being abandoned by its strategicleadership. Its successes in 1939–41 resulted fromthe freedom of action that Adolph Hitler and thesupreme command gave operational commanders.Army commanders were issued instructions andnot detailed orders. Moreover, the Fuehrer did notunduly interfere in operations during the Polishcampaign. These practices eventually gave way tomore intrusive orders after the start of the inva-sion of Russia. In the first major German defeat atthe gates of Moscow, Hitler took command, turn-ing the army general staff into a de facto personalstaff as he had the supreme command.

Hitler centralized policy and strategy andalso made operational decisions. He increasinglybypassed the supreme command and army groupcommands. Task-oriented command and controlwas abandoned and he issued detailed ordersdown to mid-level echelons, which allowed forno interpretation. Hitler directed group com-manders that a certain city must be held or thata corps or division must hold its occupied posi-tion. His experiences as a soldier during WorldWar I formed the basis of his decisions. LikeStalin, he rarely allowed a withdrawal from un-tenable positions, leading to large losses on theeastern front in 1942–45.

Today operational commanders often bypassimmediate subordinate commanders and issue di-rect orders to tactical commanders in the field, asAllied Force and Enduring Force illustrated. Thiscircumstance prevailed because of the inability orunwillingness of operational commanders to del-egate authority. In general, leaders bypass subor-dinates because they distrust their competence. Anarrow tactical perspective is another reason formicromanagement despite lessons of the past,which indicate that such practices are invariablydetrimental to an organization in combat.

Overcentralized command and control un-dermines morale and encourages an unwilling-ness or inability on the part of subordinates toact independently and take responsibility fortheir actions. Among other concerns, eliminatingindependent action leaves no reliable way togauge promotion potential of junior and mid-level leaders.

Advances in communications allow seniorleaders to observe events in near real time fromthousands of miles away. This promotes a falseimpression that remote headquarters can perceivethe situation better than tactical commanders onthe scene. Consequently, not only must tacticalcommanders report to operational commanders,but the latter often issue orders to the tacticallevel. Intermediate commanders are bypassed andrelegated to being information administrators as

overcentralized command andcontrol undermines morale andencourages an unwillingnessto act independently

■ C O M M A N D A N D C O N T R O L


more senior leaders immerse themselves in de-tails. Networking supposedly promises decentral-ization, affording greater initiative to subordi-nates. Evidence suggests the opposite: theatercommanders increasingly use information tech-nology to make decisions that would normally bethe province of tactical commanders.

Real-Time KnowledgeDuring Enduring Freedom, senior leaders in

the United States not only observed but also sec-ond-guessed subordinate commanders. Comman-der, Central Command, reportedly exercised di-rect command in real time over forces inAfghanistan from headquarters in Florida. Hecould also monitor images of the battlefield fromunmanned aerial vehicles that were retransmitted

by orbiting satellites. His headquarters was net-worked via satellite with headquarters in Kuwaitand Uzbekistan.

Experience proves that theater commandershave less need for real-time knowledge than sub-ordinate commanders. Also, at theater level, thevolume of the real-time information availablemakes it more difficult to focus on operational in-stead of tactical aspects of the situation. DuringMillennium Challenge, tactical units received or-ders from senior levels, sometimes without theknowledge of intermediate commanders. Com-puter networks can apparently turn the tradi-tional chain of command into a web of command

Intelligence briefing,Iraqi Freedom.

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that is deemed highly desirable. Yet it is an illu-sion to think that senior leaders can grasp tacticalintricacies better than their subordinates. Nor canthey take advantage of their fleeting opportuni-ties on the ground.

During World War II, Admiral ChesterNimitz, the theater commander in the Pacific,and Admiral Raymond Spruance, the fleet com-mander, realized their commanders on the scenewere best suited to make tactical decisions.Nimitz reportedly left commanders alone becauselooking over their shoulders inhibited them. Aslong as commanders had the responsibility, theyhad the freedom to do what they thought best. Atthe same time, both leaders made recommenda-tions by radio if local commanders were over-looking opportunities. Nimitz and AdmiralJoseph King, the Chief of Naval Operations, al-lowed freedom of action but were not slow to in-tervene or relieve a commander.

Technology is a two-edged sword, especiallywhen developments lend themselves to evergreater centralization and, in extreme cases, tobattlefield micromanagement. Some 130 yearsago, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke warnedthat the most unfortunate senior commander isone who suffers under close supervision and mustcontinually give an account of his plans and in-tent. This supervision may be exercised through adelegate of the highest authority at his headquar-ters or by a telegraph wire attached to his back. Insuch cases, all independence, rapid decisions, andaudacious risk—without which no war can bewon—cease.

Delegating AuthorityOperational commanders who specify every-

thing for subordinates will get lost in myriad de-tails and lose their perspective. They will also risklosing the trust of their subordinates and under-mine the basis of their decisions. Senior army

commanders in Vietnam used helicopters as air-borne command posts to direct commanders onthe ground. Technology enabled senior leaders tomake purely tactical decisions. During the Kosovoconflict, General Wesley Clark, USA, the SupremeAllied Commander Europe (SACEUR), interferedwith the responsibilities of the joint force air com-ponent commander at Allied Force South. Thepersonal relationship between these leaders wasaccordingly troubled. Clark reportedly selectedfixed targets, stipulated the means to attack them,and aborted attacks on targets in progress.

Regional commanders seem unwilling to del-egate authority through intermediate levels ofcommand. In the Persian Gulf War, Commander,Central Command (CENTCOM), was also thecommander of the Kuwaiti theater of operationsas well as de facto land component commander,with his forward headquarters at Riyadh. In theconflict against Serbia in 1999, SACEUR ran day-to-day operations rather than delegating responsi-bility to his subordinate, the commander of Al-lied Forces Southern Europe. He also got boggeddown in making tactical decisions instead of de-voting himself to strategy and policy as the seniorNATO military officer.

In Enduring Freedom, Allied Forces CentralCommand ran the war from some 8,000 milesaway. The distance between headquarters andsubordinates on the ground still matters even inthe information age. Greater distance means lessability to make timely decisions. Distance also af-fects the performance of respective staffs, largelybecause of different battle rhythms caused by dif-ferent time zones.

The human dimension of leadership islargely ignored by apostles of information war-fare. Senior commanders should be close to battlewhere subordinates can see them. This can en-hance morale and build trust. Hence theater-strategic commanders could establish a subordi-nate theater of operations command or combinedjoint task force prior to hostilities. This commandwould be directly accountable to the theater-strategic commanders and responsible for day-to-day planning and execution of joint and com-bined operations or campaigns. Such a solutionin Kosovo and the combat phase of EnduringFreedom would have relieved the theater-strategiccommander of direct involvement in tacticalmatters. At the same time, intermediate com-manders could improve their control over forcesby their proximity to the fight. Moreover, theater-strategic commanders could devote time and en-ergy to strategic and operational affairs in theirareas of responsibility.

Press conference onOperation Anaconda.

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TargeteeringAnother result of the increased centralized

command and control is that the planning andexecution focus is almost exclusively on targets tobe degraded, neutralized, or destroyed, not the

objectives and tasks to be ac-complished. Targets are oftenselected first, then the searchstarts for objectives. This vio-lates the foundation on whichthe regressive planning process

rests. The ultimate operational or strategic objec-tive is determined first for a major operation orcampaign. Afterward, intermediate major tacticalor operational objectives must be resolved as well.

The main reason for the excessive focus onthe targeting process among U.S. planners is theuncritical acceptance of the flawed five-ring the-ory. The most serious error is belief that each ringconsists of a single or many centers of gravity. Inpractical terms, these centers are targets to be at-tacked. It is wrong to suppose these centers arevulnerabilities. With this belief, the logic of whatconstitutes a center of gravity is turned on itshead. It is directly related to one’s objective. In an-alyzing enemy critical factors, a center of gravity isinvariably found among its tangible and intangi-ble strengths whose serious degradation, neutral-ization, or destruction would prevent it from ac-complishing its objective, not critical weaknesses

or vulnerabilities. Today, many parties from theJoint Staff in Washington to tactical commandersand agencies in the field are involved in target de-velopment, selection, and approval.

Allied Force and Enduring Freedom are thelatest examples of the targeteering approach towarfare. In the former operation, SACEUR pres-sured planners to produce a list of 5,000 targets.After being informed there were not that many inSerbia, he reduced the number to 2,000. Many tar-gets eventually attacked were unrelated to militarycapabilities. The targeting process involved nu-merous planners at the Pentagon and elsewhere inthe United States as well as Great Britain, SupremeHeadquarters Allied Powers Europe, U.S. EuropeanCommand, and the combined air operations cen-ter in Italy. And worse, selection and approvalwere time-consuming, politicized, and random,which resulted in ad hoc targeting.

Each strike in Enduring Freedom was ap-proved by CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa.Military lawyers vetted targets on all echelonsfrom the Pentagon and unified command level tothe combined air operations center in Saudi Ara-bia and carrier battle groups and ground forces inAfghanistan. The Joint Staff selected targets whileNavy and Air Force planners abroad, chiefly in

targets are often selectedfirst, then the search startsfor objectives

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Saudi Arabia, determined how strikes would becarried out, prepared daily air tasking orders, andestablished aircraft packages for given missions.However, in contrast to prevalent practices, targetselection—creating a joint prioritized list for bothground and air targets—was made by CENTCOMfor four months until Anaconda in March 2002.Often intelligence and advances in shorteningthe time to carry out strikes were degraded by de-lays in obtaining approval from senior command-ers. In addition, many attacks on time-sensitivetargets failed because controllers from the CentralIntelligence Agency or Special Forces had to getapproval from Tampa.

One solution is putting target selection at theend of the planning process, not the front. Objec-tives and tasks should dominate planning. Target-ing should be decentralized with higher levels ofcommand less involved in tactical and technicaldetails. Control on the operational and strategiclevels should be exercised through appropriateguidance and rules of engagement. The resultwould be faster decisions on target selection andattack. Specifically, the process should reside withservice or functional component and joint taskforce commanders. In issuing strategic guidance,the national, alliance, or coalition authoritiesshould specify desired strategic endstates, objec-tives, and limitations on which categories and in-dividual targets can be attacked. Afterward, the-ater commanders should specify detailed targetinglimitations in their operational guidance.

Estimates of the situation, when conductedby commanders and their staffs, would ensurethat the focus is firmly on objectives and tasks,not targets. Hence objectives and correspondingcenters of gravity should be determined first.Then the main tasks and component (partial)tasks can be determined for each objective. Subse-quently, a target list can be developed and targets

selected for component tasks. The focus must beon targets whose destruction or neutralizationwould cause a ripple effect and lead to accom-plishing the assigned task.

Focusing on targeting makes it harder to de-termine whether and when an objective has beenreached. It also wastes time and resources. AsKosovo demonstrated, emphasizing targets in-stead of objectives and tasks can lead to attritionwarfare on the operational and strategic levels.This outcome may not be critical in operationslike Enduring Freedom, where victory is assured,but could have serious consequences when anenemy is stronger. Moreover, targeteering directsalmost all the attention of the operational com-manders and their staffs to the tactics of weaponsand platforms instead of the operational andstrategic situation.

Task OrientationThe Armed Forces could meet the challenges

of information technology by reinforcing thetenets of centralized control and decentralized ex-ecution found in joint doctrine. Decentralizationis often regarded as synonymous with Auftragstak-tik, the concept of task-oriented command andcontrol. Its prerequisites are understanding thenature of war, a common operational and tacticaloutlook, common doctrine and vocabulary, ahigh degree of professional education and train-ing, and the highest degree of leadership by sen-ior commanders and their subordinates.

Decentralization of large formations duringthe Wars of German Unification (1864–71) re-sulted from the increased range and lethality ofweapons, railroads, and telegraphs. The effect wasa larger theater in which armies were deployedand maneuvered. Commanders were unable tofully observe or control their forces. Another ef-fect was the intensity of combat and need to dis-perse forces over the theater. Moltke recognizedthat the flow of information would never be fastenough to allow control by commanders at head-quarters in the rear, even with the telegraph. Hethus fostered independence of thought, believingthat officers must act on their own at times. Theyshould not wait for orders when no orders can begiven. Their efforts are most productive when fol-lowing the intent of the senior commander.

Task-oriented command and control is basedon the conviction that subordinate levels of com-mand act more quickly than higher levels inchanging situations because of their proximity.On the level of execution, knowledge of the vari-ous aspects of the situation are far greater than onsenior levels. Hence the assumption is that deci-sions are generally sounder on the tactical levelthan tactical decisions made on the operational orhigher echelons. Independence of action also can

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motivate subordinates. The Germans believed a fa-vorable situation could not be exploited if com-manders waited for orders. Senior level command-ers and low ranking soldiers recognized that

omission and inactivitywere worse than resortingto the incorrect expedi-ent. Commanders on alllevels had latitude for ini-tiative and prompt ac-tion, on their own au-thority if necessary.

Inaction was considered criminal, but deeds wereto be performed in consonance with objectives setby senior commanders, who were obliged to inter-vene when subordinates endangered the mission.

The application of task orientation for com-mand and control is particularly suitable whenobjectives are predominantly military, combat isintensive, and changes of situation are rapid andoften drastic. It is less applicable in scenarios re-quiring immediate action or where an error canlead to severe political or strategic consequences.The scope of the subordinate’s independent ac-tion must be reduced when the senior commandauthority must coordinate the actions of adjacentor friendly forces.

Among other things, the limitations of task-oriented command and control are found in per-sonal rivalries, unhealthy self-esteem, character

weakness, insecurity, and mistrust between seniorand subordinate leaders. These factors lead to sus-picion or disobedience. Both the incompetence ofsubordinates and the interference of senior com-manders in purely tactical matters can signifi-cantly reduce the scope of task-oriented com-mand and control.

Rapid technological advances are pulling theconduct of war in contradictory directions. Seniorcommanders can observe events in near real timeand almost instantaneously control them fromtheir headquarters, as seen in Allied Force and En-during Freedom. Yet this does not justify unnec-essarily usurping authority on the tactical level.Today commanders can intervene faster butshould do so only when subordinates endangerthe mission.

Despite technological advances, terrain anddistances matter, as witnessed in Afghanistan andIraq. The nature of war today is essentially thesame as it was for Clausewitz and Moltke. Propo-nents of information warfare ignore the wisdomof Clausewitz by trying to limit warfare to fixedvalues and physical quantities. Wars will continueto be characterized by friction, uncertainty, andchaos. It is a mistake to believe that advances incommunications will make it otherwise.

the limitations of task-orientedcommand and control arefound in mistrust betweensenior and subordinate leaders

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Perhaps the chief argument for German-style, task-oriented command and control is thatfriction and the fog of war are best mastered by ahigh degree of independence. Detailed tacticalpicture technology should be used to monitor un-folding events by senior officers who interveneonly when necessary. Morale and motivation re-main enormously valuable. Psychological factorscannot be dismissed, as some proponents of in-formation warfare may believe. Vietnam revealedthe folly of overestimating technology and equat-ing leadership with management. Measurable orquantifiable methodologies have replaced humananalysis, individual initiative, and independenceof execution. Yet the focus of command and con-trol on any level should be the human element,not technology that supports it. Mastering tech-nology does not make leaders successful.

Out of FocusThe true nature of war is often misunder-

stood or ignored. The aphorisms of Sun Tzu aretaken literally while the dicta of Clausewitz areconsidered irrelevant in the information age. Theimportance of technological innovations is recog-nized, while human and psychological factors ofcommand and control are neglected. Senior lead-ers are apparently unwilling to delegate authorityand establish intermediate levels of command oruse existing echelons. In addition to interferingin the purely tactical decisions and actions ofsubordinate commanders, there is a growingtrend to bypass tactical commanders and dealwith subordinates or individual soldiers on theground. Recent successes over weak, technologi-cally backward, and largely passive enemies seemto have convinced many observers that informa-tion technology reinforces the need to centralize

functions on the operational and strategic levelsof command. Yet success in war demands soundbalance between centralized and decentralizedcommand and control. Experience has shownthat when fighting highly capable and resource-ful enemies, excessive centralization has neverbeen an answer if the victory must be won deci-sively with the fewest friendly losses.

While proponents of information warfareclaim that their goal is furthering decentralizeddecisionmaking on all levels, the trend is in theopposite direction. Tactical commanders shouldnot be passive observers and mere transmitters oforders. As freedom of action is diminished, theycannot exercise initiative to achieve the intent ofsenior leaders. In addition, officers who are unac-customed to acting independently may fail totake prudent risks as senior commanders.

The emphasis on information technologyand targeteering is troubling for several reasons.Targeteers reduce the art of war to a process ofcollecting information on specific categories andindividual targets that are attacked with little re-gard to their relationship to objectives and tasks.Selection is unwieldy, time-consuming, and inef-fective. Excessive focus on targeting means thatthe perspective of operational commanders andtheir staffs is becoming tactical. A targeteering ap-proach carried to its logical conclusion can onlyresult in a war of attrition on the operational andstrategic levels when fighting against a relativelystronger and more competent enemy.

The problems of centralized command andcontrol could be solved by adopting the tenets oftask-oriented command and control. This meansaccepting that war is not a science but an art.Friction and the fog of war are inherent in com-bat. Advanced information technologies can re-duce uncertainty but not eliminate it. The morecomplex the technological innovation, thehigher the friction. Technology is only a meansto an end, not an end in itself. Hence operationalcommand and control must focus on those ele-ments of combat power, leadership in particular,that will enhance the ability to fight and win de-cisively with the fewest losses. Education andtraining are critical to applying task-orientedcommand and control on all levels of war. JFQ

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By R I C H A R D A. M O B L E Y

I n August 1976, two Americans were killedwhile supervising a work party at Pan-munjom. The incident involved a detach-ment of U.S. soldiers who were trimming a

poplar tree in the joint security area to improvevisibility between checkpoints when North Ko-rean troops attacked them. In response, theUnited States raised the defense readiness condi-tion, reinforced the peninsula, and chopped

down the tree. The incident represents a casestudy in crisis planning and joint operations priorto passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The attack is worth studying because theUnited States extracted an apology, albeit weak,from the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, whocharacterized the incident as regrettable. But theofficial records, which began to be declassified in1994, shed new light on the incident. They revealprofound uncertainty about the intent of Py-ongyang but an equally deep American desire toretaliate. Indeed, simply chopping down the treewas the mildest action considered by the NationalSecurity Council. Washington wanted to keep

Commander Richard A. Mobley, USN (Ret.), served as chief of indica-tions and warning at U.S. Forces, Korea, and is the author of Flash PointNorth Korea: The Pueblo and EC–121 Crises.

Revisiting the KoreanTree-Trimming Incident

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close tabs on the operational commander; its de-sire to send the right signal had not wavered sinceVietnam. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs and GeneralRichard Stilwell, USA, Commander in Chief,United Nations Command (UNC), were con-cerned about rapid escalation and protecting theforce chopping down the poplar. Evidence alsosuggests the desire to deter through exceptionalmeasures taken for weeks after the tree was felled.1

The Korean ContextThe so-called second Korean War ended by

1976. Hundreds of provocations along the demili-tarized zone (DMZ) and in the South subsided.

Pyongyang did not re-peat earlier acts such asthe attempted assassina-tion of President ParkChung Hee, seizure ofUSS Pueblo, or shootdownof a Navy EC–121 aircraftwith 31 crewmen on

board. Indeed, the situation calmed enough by1970 for President Richard Nixon to order thewithdrawal of 7th Infantry Division.

Although the Central Intelligence Agencydid not believe Pyongyang intended to invade, itwarned “We are not at all sanguine that [intelli-gence sources] could provide a clear and timelywarning of a North Korean attack.” At that time,over half of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) wascombat ready and within 50 miles of the demili-tarized zone. The intelligence community held“that Pyongyang could mount a sizable attackwith little or no warning.”2

The communist propaganda intensified inMarch 1976 with Kim proclaiming his intention

to “stir up world opinion more vigorously” bypublicizing “U.S. criminal barbarities.” He soughtto “make the Korean question the focal point ofattention both in Asian and world affairs.” Indaily broadcasts, Pyongyang accused America ofcreating a grave situation. Shortly after an ex-change of fire along the demilitarized zone on Au-gust 5, North Korea claimed that the United Statesand South Korea had “completed war prepara-tions,” the first such statement since 1969.3

An assessment by the Central IntelligenceAgency concluded that there were two proximatecauses for increasing tension in the joint securityarea. Pyongyang wanted to support its claim thatthe United States was the major danger on thepeninsula. The Nonaligned Movement summit inColombo, Sri Lanka, which was meeting whenthe incident occurred, would provide the venuefor the assertion. In addition, Pyongyang mighthave been attempting to influence Americanopinion during the 1976 election.

August 18North Korea revealed its sensitivity in mid-

August. A few days before the incident, UnitedNations Command sent unarmed Korean mainte-nance workers to determine how to remove thetree. Communist guards warned them to leave italone. As a compromise, the command plannedto trim rather than chop down the tree. Thatwould allow UNC checkpoints 3 and 5 to seeeach other at the least. The command accord-ingly dispatched a 15-man tree-trimming team(three officers, five laborers, and seven securitytroops) into the joint security area at 1030 hourson August 18.

The report on the incident relates a dramaticseries of occurrences over a six-minute period.Two KPA officers and nine guards appeared.When informed by the Americans that the treewas only being trimmed, a communist officervoiced his approval and the guards began to offeradvice. But at 1050 hours the North Koreans or-dered the work to halt and threatened the UNCpersonnel. Thirty guards appeared and attackedCaptain Arthur Bonifas, the detachment com-mander. Witnesses saw them bludgeon Bonifaswith the blunt end of an ax as he lay on theground. The communists also attacked First Lieu-tenant Mark Barrett and other soldiers with axehandles and clubs. Photos reveal two instanceswhere seven and nine KPA guards clusteredaround soldiers and struck them with ax handlesand clubs as well as their feet and fists. Bonifasand Barrett died at the scene and several otherAmericans were injured.

the Central Intelligence Agencyconcluded that Pyongyangmight have been attempting toinfluence the 1976 election

Trimming tree in DMZ.

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A response to the attack was approved withintwo days and ready for execution in three. Be-cause of the 13-hour time difference, activity intheater occurred as Washington slept. During theday, the command sent back operational reportsand forwarded photos of the event. Moreover, var-ious responses to the incident were considered, in-cluding chopping down the tree. In addition, Stil-well proposed issuing a strongly worded protest toKim Il Sung in his notional role as supreme com-mander of the Korean People’s Army.

On August 18, the Secretary of State, HenryKissinger, telephoned President Gerald Ford inKansas City, where he was attending the Republi-can convention. Other members of the cabinet,including the National Security Advisor, BrentScowcroft, were located in the capital, though theSecretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was athome in Michigan recovering from surgery. Forddecided not to return to Washington but directedthe cabinet to formulate a strong response. Withthis tasking, Kissinger chaired a meeting of theWashington Special Action Group (WSAG) late inthe afternoon.

The Central Intelligence Agency decided thatthe attack was premeditated. Although Pyong-yang did not want war, it was looking for anexcuse that Kim Chong Il could use at the Non-alignment Movement summit to denounce theUnited States in an attempt to weaken its resolveover Korea. Moreover, the intelligence briefingindicated that North Korea could engage in fur-ther controlled acts of violence, depending onthe response to the tree-trimming incident.

Kissinger guided the Washington Special Ac-tion Group through various courses of action thatwould “be a good lesson for them. . . . The impor-tant thing is that they beat two Americans todeath and must pay the price.” He added, “It willbe useful for us to generate enough activity sothat the North Koreans begin to wonder whatthose crazy [Americans] are doing or are capableof doing this election year.” With this mindset,he endorsed some options, deferred others, andignored a third set.4

The Secretary of State proposed resurrectingan exercise involving unarmed B–52s flying overKorea. The Department of State had earlier op-posed such a move to avoid provoking China.Kissinger urged alerting the bombers, and Admi-ral James Holloway, the acting Chairman of theJoint Chiefs, agreed. The exercise could be con-ducted within three days. The Secretary also rec-ommended raising the defense readiness condi-tion, which was striking because it would havebeen the first time it was changed in response toactivity in North Korea. After Holloway explainedthe impact of going to DEFCON 3, he urged thatit be raised that night.

After reviewing other options, the Washing-ton Special Action Group decided to augmentUnited Nations Command with F–4 aircraft fromJapan, including Wild Weasels armed with anti-radiation missiles. Other actions would be consid-ered, such as deploying F–111s from the UnitedStates, but they would have to await their nextmeeting, scheduled for the following morning.Finally, the group agreed that the tree must be cutdown. It also concluded that Stilwell should

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communicate directly with Kim Il Sung; it deniedhis proposal to protest.

With these decisions, a flurry of messageswas released overnight to unified and specifiedcommanders. DEFCON 3 was set for Korea andF–4s were ordered to Osan, B–52s on Guam and

F–111s at MountainHome Air Force Basewere alerted, and theUSS Midway carriertask group in Yokosuka

was readied for deployment. Meanwhile, bothStilwell and the chargé d’affaires of the U.S. Mis-sion were scheduled to brief President Park on thefollowing day.

August 19American forces went to DEFCON 3 early on

August 19. The balance of the day was spentreaching this level. Major General John Singlaub,USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces Korea, noted thatother steps to enhance readiness quickly followed:

Nuclear and conventional artillery and missiles ofvarious calibers were carried forward by road and hel-icopter to prepared concrete bunkers. Listening postsjust south of the DMZ were activated and reconnais-sance patrols were mounted. . . . A quick scan of tacti-cal radio net produced a multi-band cacophony of Ko-rean and American voices. This was obviously not atraining exercise.5

Pyongyang sent conflicting signals but itsmedia remained defiant, faulting Washington forprovoking the incident as a pretext for war. Com-ments before the Military Armistice Commissionon August 19 presented a similar view, includinga claim supported by photographic evidence thatits soldiers had also been injured.

Despite its bravado in public, the commu-nists reacted defensively to the increased defensereadiness condition. Kim Il Sung put the army,Worker-Peasant Militia, and Red Guard Youth on awar footing. Pyongyang conducted civilian airraid drills on August 20. While divisions along thedemilitarized zone were immobile, naval and airforce units went on alert. A total standdown intactical air activity began on August 18 and con-tinued until August 23, perhaps because of the in-clement weather in the North. These actions werecharacterized by Stilwell as “reactive, urgent, anddefensive,” indicating “genuine apprehensionover possible UNC retaliatory military actions.”

Meanwhile, Stilwell met with Park, who con-curred with American actions. Deliberate andcalm throughout the meeting, Park wanted toteach the North a lesson “without use ofweapons.” Referring to the posturing by Washing-ton after the seizure of USS Pueblo, he warned thata show of force by itself would not persuade. Hewarned that United Nations Command must befully prepared should North Korea attempt to pre-vent the tree from being cut down. To guaranteethat outcome, Park offered to integrate 50 specialforces who had multiple black belts into theranks. When Stilwell suggested that the operationmight occur too quickly for the North to respond,Park opined that it would be better to conduct anoperation that punished the KPA guards withoutusing firearms. Stilwell agreed to consider theoffer, and ultimately these special forces person-nel were integrated into the operation as regularliaison soldiers.

A preliminary plan emphasizing speed andsurprise was completed that night. An engineerforce with 50 to 60 unarmed ROK soldiers wouldconduct the operation on or after August 21.Backup would include the authorized 35-man se-curity force, an infantry company from 2d In-fantry Division stationed near the joint securityarea, a Korean infantry company, a Korean orAmerican rifle company in UH–1 helicopters overthe southern approach to the demilitarized zone,and a task force of one mechanized infantry andtwo tank companies located south of the ImjinRiver. The operation would take 45 minutes andcommence between 0720 and 0730 hours.

Stilwell also addressed the risk of escalation, aconcern that was raised in Washington on August19. If the communists threatened to defeat theSouth Korean special forces unit, Stilwell wouldintroduce the American rifle company with clubsto allow ROK troops to withdraw. If the North re-sorted to pistols, United Nations Command“could respond with mortar and artillery fire onknown or suspected North Korean installations

Park wanted to teach the North alesson “without use of weapons”

North Koreans takingaxes from work crews.

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just outside the joint security area to allow theUNC troops to withdraw from the fight.” How-ever, if the North actually attempted to overrunthe joint security area in a concerted ground at-tack, Stilwell warned it would be “ill advised” totry to stop the onslaught in this particular area.He recommended using the backup forces to facil-itate withdrawal of U.N. forces from the joint se-curity area while delivering heavy artillery fires onKPA targets outside the area: “If the other sidestarts shooting, the mission becomes one of rapidextraction of our forces from close contact, relyingprimarily on artillery covering fires.”6

The WSAG meeting on August 19 beganwith a contentious discussion of possible actions.Kissinger had heard radio reports on a Pentagonstatement that military action was inconceivable.Determined to signal U.S. anger, he warned that“the President will hit the ceiling when he hearsthat, because I told him we would be discussingpossible military actions and that is what thePresident wants.” On that note, the Secretary re-peatedly steered the meeting to military re-sponses with admonitions on failing to act: “If wedo nothing they will think of us as the papertigers of Saigon. . . . If we do nothing there maybe another incident and then another.”7

The Washington Special Action Group re-viewed the proposed B–52 missions. Holloway ex-plained that the aircraft would fly from Guam towithin 43 miles of the demilitarized zone anddrop their radar bombs before returning. To en-sure that North Korea discovered the bombers, theJoint Chiefs would have them fly high enough tobe detected on radar. Kissinger agreed to clear theproposal with the President. Meanwhile, F–111sand the USS Midway task group deployed.

Holloway then went through a list of othermeasures to be implemented coincident with orindependent of efforts to chop down the tree, in-cluding firing an Honest John surface-to-surfacemissile or artillery barrage. Both suggestions haddisadvantages: the former was inaccurate and thelatter invited counterfire. Nevertheless, Kissingerasked the Joint Chiefs to consider artillery fireagainst the communist barracks just outside thejoint security area.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, WilliamClements, offered another option as the meetingcontinued: a SEAL operation against an unspeci-fied target along the west coast of North Korea.“They would be wondering what happened andwho did it.” Holloway balked. He believed thatthis option posed a danger: “If we pick a targetwhich is significant in their view we would havea 50 percent chance of doing it without gettingsome people killed. The North Koreans are in ahigh state of alert . . . we might have difficultygetting the guys out.” Kissinger remained focusedon the artillery barrage.8

This last WSAG meeting ended with a deci-sion to continue contingency planning and movethe F–111 aircraft and USS Midway. The groupsensed the need to do something quickly andhave precise guidance for Stilwell in case the situ-ation escalated. But an exchange between the Sec-retary and one member revealed the concern thatevents could get out of control. Kissinger opined,“One always assumes the unlimited willingness ofopponents to take risks. . . . We are 200 millionpeople and they are 16 million.” In response theDeputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for EastAsia and Pacific Affairs, Morton Abramowitz, said,“They could overawe us locally.”9

The Deputy National Security Advisor,William Hyland, observed that strong differencesexisted in Washington over the plan developedby Stilwell. He reported that the Joint Chiefs sup-ported the plan:

out of loyalty to the field commander and in recogni-tion that we must make a strong show of manhood inan area we were driven out of two days ago. TheChiefs, however, recognize that there are severe risksand there could be casualties. Bill Clements does notsupport the Stilwell plan; he feels it will lead to amajor fight and that the Koreans are in effect baitingan attack. . . . The third option would be to ignore thetree and [later] attack the North Korean barracks withartillery fire. A further option unanimously opposed byClements, the Chiefs, and I think Habib would be toconduct an artillery attack at the same time we werechopping down the tree. . . . A final option would be toconduct the Stilwell tree chopping plan and, if it runsinto trouble, to withdraw and then attack the NorthKorean barracks with artillery.10

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The proposal to shell the barracks was re-viewed by the Joint Chiefs, who cautionedagainst it in a starkly-worded memorandum.

While there was suffi-cient artillery for themission (batteries alongthe demilitarized zonecould destroy the targetwith a hundred rounds),resorting to artillery dur-ing the operation would

leave the force vulnerable to retaliatory fire.Moreover, the barracks would probably be vacant.More critical, the communists enjoyed a 4 to 1ratio in artillery tubes in the immediate area.

Implementing the PlanDespite these differences, Washington

adopted the plan on August 19. The Joint Chiefsapproved the proposal from Stilwell with guid-ance that it be conducted “quickly and aggres-sively” starting at 0700 hours (local time) on Au-gust 21. They also agreed that two KPA dropbarriers should be eliminated unless it delayedthe cutting operation or increased risks. The samemessage directed Strategic Air Command to initi-ate B–52D training sorties along the demilitarizedzone at 0630 hours on August 21. The first cell ofthree bombers would fly at medium to high alti-tudes to facilitate radar detection. The flightswould continue through August 25 with a dailyvisit by a cell. U.S. Pacific Command would pro-tect the bombers using fighter combat air patrols.

United Nations Command likely received theflash precedence approval message from the Joint

Chiefs at midmorning on August 20. That after-noon, five groups of four F–111s would start arriv-ing in Osan from Idaho. The F–4 squadron had ar-rived the previous day. The carrier task groupwould be underway for the Tsushima Straitswithin the next few hours, comprising USS Mid-way and its air wing, four frigates, and a cruiser.

Stilwell completed the planning and move-ment of forces in country. Under the final plan,according to Singlaub, disparate units had tomove simultaneously:

Altogether, a force of 813 men would be involved.. . . Task Force Vierra . . . would conduct the actualtree cutting . . . three batteries of American 105mmhowitzers were to be moved across the Freedom Bridgenorth of the Imjin River. Another three batteries ofROK heavy artillery would be positioned just south ofthe river in clear view of North Korean positions. Thegunners, Stilwell said, would have “rounds in the tubeand hands on the lanyards.”11

And a lot of events would be occurring simultane-ously in the air. Singlaub continued:

[A] reinforced composite rifle company . . . would beorbiting aboard twenty Huey helicopters a few hun-dred meters south of the DMZ, supported by twelveAH–1G Cobra gunships. Tank-busting F–4 Phantomswould be prowling at a slightly higher orbit. F–111medium strategic bombers would orbit still higher,and be clearly visible to Korea radar. . . . At the pre-cise moment of the tree chopping . . . B–52 bombersfrom Guam would be moving ominously north up theYellow Sea on a vector directly to . . . Pyongyang. Inthe Sea of Japan . . . [USS] Midway would launchforty aircraft that would vector north above interna-tional waters.12

Stilwell and Singlaub shared the concernover escalation. As the latter subsequently noted,“It was my estimate, shared by many of the staff,that the operation stood a fifty-fifty chance ofstarting a war.” If the communists attacked andtried to overwhelm the tree-chopping forces, Stil-well planned for rapid extraction of the teamunder artillery covering fire.

On the evening of August 20, key membersof the UNC staff manned the command center inpreparation for the next morning. To precludeWashington micromanagement, they cut poten-tial communications links between the Presidentand subordinate commands.

For Washington, the balance of the daypassed uneventfully now that the key decisionswere made. However, two F–4Es equipped withGBU–15 laser guided bombs were ordered to flyto Osan. The Joint Staff considered destroying thepoplar tree or a North Korean target with theguided bombs, and the aircraft may have beensent with that in mind.

Stilwell and Singlaub sharedthe concern “that the operationstood a fifty-fifty chance ofstarting a war”

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Enter Paul BunyanThe tree chopping was planned to start at

0700 hours, August 21 (1800 hours, August 20,Washington time). The North Korean guards ap-peared surprised and did not interfere. Althoughat one point 50 KPA soldiers gathered just outsidethe joint security area, they did not enter it.

Pyongyang immediately demonstrated amore conciliatory attitude, requesting a meetingof the Military Armistice Commission only hoursafter the tree was chopped down. In the 15-minute conference, the senior KPA officer deliv-ered a high-level message to Stilwell flagged fromKim Il Sung as supreme commander. It admittedthat “It is regrettable than an incident occurred.”It proposed that “an effort must be made so thatsuch incidents may not recur. . . . ” In a secondnote, the KPA representative added that the treetrimming was a serious provocation. The embassycommented that the meeting was “calm andquiet.” The national-level review also commentedthat the letter from Kim Il Sung was “exception-ally mild, almost conciliatory in tone.”

North Korean media also avoided escalation.The authoritative Nodong Simmun stressed keep-ing the peace and coverage of the incident be-came somewhat more restrained. Nevertheless,United Nations Command pushed for punish-ment of those guards responsible for the murdersand guarantees that the incident would not be re-peated. Pyongyang counterproposed that person-nel on both sides be physically separated alongthe demarcation dividing North and South.Guards would henceforth be located only in theirrespective zones of responsibility. North Koreawould remove guard posts and barrier gates fromthe UNC portion of the joint security area but

would need its own access road. On September 6,1976, the sides agreed to the basic division.

Pyongyang remained on a heightened stateof alert as negotiations continued in part becauseU.S. Forces remained at DEFCON 3. Yet withindays of chopping down the tree, Commander inChief, Pacific Command, and the Joint Chiefsbegan thinking about an end to the crisis. Train-ing sorties by B–52s over Korea dropped fromdaily to weekly. Only two or three bomberswould fly in each cell, and F–4 aircraft equippedwith GBU–15 bombs departed in early September.

The Joint Chiefs evidently tried to releaseother assets to DEFCON 4. The Kadena-based F–4contingent would soon depart but leave its WildWeasels behind. Along with 14 of the 20 F–111s,these aircraft would depart in mid-September. Thesix remaining F–111s would deploy to Australiafor an exercise in October. The USS Midway carriertask group would remain on station in the south-ern approaches to the Tsushima Strait.

Singlaub ordered U.S. Forces Korea to re-main at DEFCON 3 until September 8, when theNorth agreed to a set of new security proceduresfor the joint security area. With the lowered de-fense readiness condition, USS Midway returnedto Japan.

Lessons LearnedA formal apology on the part of North Korea

is rare. How did the United States manage to getone? While at the time many decisionmakers be-lieved the incident was deliberate, some saw theAmerican deaths as an accidental rather than will-ful act. And still others thought that the event wasa provocation that got out of control. Since Kim IlSung had not planned for the situation to result inthe loss of life, he could admit that it was regret-table. He did not have a vested interest in oppos-ing or retaliating for cutting down the tree.

The operation succeeded because the stan-dard of success was low. The United States did notexpect a reaction by the communists other thanpassivity as the tree was felled. No reparations orreturn of crewmen had to be negotiated.

Ironically, one of the last crises Kissingerfaced involved the same country as the first. AsNational Security Advisor, he had helped formu-late the response to the downing of an EC–121 re-connaissance aircraft in April 1969. To be credi-ble, he said the United States must react toprovocations quickly, even when the desiredforces are not available. Accordingly, he originallypushed to chop down the tree on August 20 andwas determined to avoid the impression of pos-turing like earlier responses in similar crises.

The Secretary of State knew what he wantedout of the WSAG meetings. While endorsing thechopping down of the tree, he proposed other

Engineers cuttingdown disputed tree.

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measures, such as increasing defense readinessand B–52 training missions. Kissinger simply ig-nored more extreme courses of action profferedby the Joint Chiefs. Both the relatively small na-ture of the provocation and the desire to avoid es-calation were partly responsible for limiting thescope of potential reactions.

Planning for responses to the incidents in-volving USS Pueblo and the EC–121 aircraft wascomplex because the options ranged from shoot-ing down fighters to attacking every North Ko-rean fighter base. A simple plan was selected tochop down the tree. The hardest part, movingground forces into position, was firmly controlledby the land component commander. OrganizingB–52s, F–4s, and F–111s did not appear that diffi-cult. But if the Joint Chiefs had intended to directthe capabilities in the theater, doctrine and plan-ning would have been severely tested. However,since artillery was the weapon of choice in theevent of escalation, contingency planning by oneservice was much easier to execute.

Recalling the micromanagement by officialsin Washington who had reacted to the seizure ofMayaguez the previous year, Stilwell took steps tohead off the tendency to skip echelons in the com-mand and control system with high-level queries.

The response to the tree-trimming incidentsucceeded because it was well planned, simple,and executed to achieve surprise. The operationgenerated sufficient forces and a state of readiness

to deter escalation. Moreover, President Ford re-strained the communists by taking the unusualstep of increasing the level of defense readiness.And for a leader whose center of gravity was hisarmy, Kim Il Sung was far more threatened bythis development than by naval and air opera-tions following the capture of USS Pueblo and lossof the EC–121 aircraft. The Nation had learnedfrom its earlier encounters with Pyongyang. JFQ

N O T E S

1 These events are recounted in John K. Singlaub,Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Cen-tury (New York: Summit Books, 1991).

2 Central Intelligence Agency, “DMZ Incident,” Au-gust 18, 1976, Presidential Country Files for East Asiaand Pacific (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ford Presidential Li-brary), box 10.

3 Ibid.4 Minutes of Washington Special Action Group,

“Korea-North Korea Tree Incident 8/18/76 (2),” August19, 1976, Presidential Country Files for East Asia andPacific (Ann Arbor: Ford Presidential Library), box 10.

5 Singlaub, Hazardous Duty, pp. 371–72.6 Message from Richard G. Stilwell, “Joint Security

Area Incident,” August 19, 1976, Presidential CountryFiles for East Asia and Pacific (Ann Arbor, Mich.: FordPresidential Library), box 10.

7 Minutes of Washington Special Action Group,August 19, 1976.

8 Ibid.9 Ibid.

10 Memorandum from William Hyland to BrentScowcroft, “Korea-North Korea Tree Incident 8/18/76(2),” August 19, 1976, Presidential Country Files for EastAsia and Pacific (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ford Presidential Library), box 10.

11 Singlaub, Hazardous Duty, p. 373.12 Ibid., p. 373.

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E ffects-based operations are defined byU.S. Joint Forces Command as “a set ofactions planned, executed, and assessedwith a systems perspective that considers

the effects needed to achieve policy aims via theintegrated application of various instruments ofpower.” The success of any military action is cal-culated in terms of furthering political objectives.

Airmen have always aspired to conduct ef-fects-based operations, although they did not usethat term. During most of World War II, the ana-lytical, cognitive, and intelligence tools needed todetermine the effectiveness of air operations werelacking on the strategic level. As a consequence,airmen began doing what they could by resolvinga torrent of tactical and technical problems. Theycounted things, substituting quantification forevaluation. In addition, they assumed that ene-mies were a mirror image of themselves. Todaythere are more efficient ways of evaluating ef-fects-based operations, yet there is still a searchfor a methodology to apply them.

Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF (Ret.), is deputy director of the aero-space center at Science Applications International Corporation and theeditor of The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory.

The Originsof Effects-BasedOperationsBy P H I L L I P S. M E I L I N G E R

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Lieutenant ColonelEdgar Gorrell of the ArmyAir Service wrote the firstAmerican concept paper re-garding strategic bombingwhile serving in France dur-ing World War I. It was strik-ingly similar to the work ofair theorists during WorldWar II. More importantly,Gorrell touched on the pre-cepts of effects-based opera-tions. He noted the stale-mate on the Western Frontand the toll inflicted on theAllies by German artillery.But the millions of enemyshells that rained down weremade at only a few factories.If they were eliminated, pro-duction would cease. Inother words, if the desiredeffect was silencing enemyguns, attacking German am-munition plants would have

the same effect as destroying artillery tubes. Thesame was true of other critical war industries.

Gorrell argued that there were a few indis-pensable German economic targets withoutwhich the war could not be fought. Thoughvague about targets, he identified four industrialregions.1 Those who followed him in the nexttwo decades did little better. Billy Mitchell wrotesimply that air forces could strike “manufacturingand food centers, railways, bridges, canals, andharbors.”2

A Metaphor of Air WarThe doctrine with which the United States

went into World War II largely offered lists ofstandard targets. Army Field Manual 1-5, Employ-ment of Aviation of the Army, stated “important ob-jectives may be found in the vital centers in the

enemy’s line of commu-nication and importantestablishments in theeconomic system of the

hostile country.” Besides focusing on enemyforces, this publication suggested targets such asrail lines, bridges, tunnels, power plants, oil re-fineries, and similar objectives. But more imagi-native ideas were germinating elsewhere.

Two events occurred at the Air Corps TacticalSchool, one minor and out of proportion and theother more significant. The instructors-cum-pilotsat the school found their planes grounded.

Springs in the propeller assembly had failed andreplacements were back ordered. The parts weremade in Pittsburgh, but the factory was closed be-cause of floods. This seemed significant. If onewanted to achieve air superiority, perhaps it wasonly necessary to destroy one factory rather thanevery enemy airfield or aircraft.

Although this scenario may appear too sim-plistic as a basis for military doctrine, there wasmore to it. America and much of the world expe-rienced the Great Depression during the 1930s.Businesses and financial institutions failed. Majorpowers were brought to their knees without ashot being fired. Economies are delicate systems.If the desired effect is rendering an enemy inca-pable of waging war, strategic bombardment maydevastate its economy. Victory may follow. Butinfrastructures are huge and one might not beable to attack every factory, power station, railline, bridge, and steel plant. What targets are themost important or vulnerable? The example ofpropeller springs provides a clue because it im-plies there are key nodes within an economic sys-tem on which it depends. All targets are not cre-ated equal. The springs became a metaphor for away of looking at air warfare—the search for thestrategic bottleneck.

Prior to World War II it was difficult for air-men to obtain information on the economies ofpotential enemies. There were no resources forsuch intelligence, and American isolationismmade such an endeavor inappropriate. Instead,the officers at the Air Corps Tactical Schoollooked at the industrial northeast and gathereddata on power grids, steel mills, oil refineries, andtransportation systems. Even more significantly,they tried to discover how systems worked. Inshort, air leaders had an inherent belief in the im-portance of effects-based operations and a rudi-mentary understanding of how systems should bemeasured and evaluated. They did not, however,have the analytical tools to conduct that meas-urement and evaluation.

When Europe went to war in September1939, an air war plans division was established inthe War Department to devise target sets in theevent the United States entered the war. The ini-tial effort was small and hesitant, but business-men, engineers, and other members of the privatesector were soon contacted. In some cases theystudied factories in Europe that American bankshelped finance or construction companies helpedbuild. In others, experts simply explained howU.S. systems operated, assuming that those in Ger-many were similar. This was largely a hit-or-missapproach, often depending on businessmen.There was an obvious risk of what can be calledthe blueprint availability syndrome, in which thetype of intelligence gathered shapes one’s view of

all targets are not created equal

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a system. If planners had ample data on the Ger-man ball bearing industry, they might put toomuch emphasis on its contribution to the war ef-fort while missing other target systems.

Other bodies were formed to study the Ger-man economy. One was a group of Americanbusiness executives, lawyers, and economists whowere known as the Committee of Operations An-alysts and another was the Enemy ObjectivesUnit in London, which advised Allied air leadersfor the balance of the war.

These groups studied the German economyto determine the most lucrative targets for air at-tack. Unfortunately, they lacked the data to makereasoned judgments. As the official history ofArmy Air Forces put it:

. . . there existed in almost every instance a seriousshortage of reliable information, and the resulting la-cunae had to be bridged by intelligent guesswork and

the clever use of analogies. In dealing with this massof inexactitudes and approximations the social scien-tist finds himself in a position of no special advan-tage over the military strategist or any intelligent lay-man; and an elaborate methodology may even, byvirtue of a considerable but unavoidably misdirectedmomentum, lead the investigator far afield.3

To overcome these limitations, analysts initiallylooked for information in enemy newspapers andperiodicals as well as from business and industrialexperts as noted above. Such poor sources led tothe misconception that the German economywas hard pressed and thus was susceptible to at-tack with devastating results. For most of the warGermany actually had remarkable slack. BecauseAllied economies had been put on a wartimefooting, it was assumed that the enemy had aswell. But in fact, it had not. For example, auto-mobile manufacturing, the largest industrial sec-tor of the German economy in 1930s, barely ranat half capacity.

“A Bridge Too Far.”

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Measures of MeritEconomic analysts became increasingly capa-

ble of understanding effects-based operations.This was due partly to their criteria and method-ologies for gathering information on the Germaneconomy, accessing it, and then looking at tar-gets. They examined factors such as total produc-tion of a given commodity, minimum operationalrequirements, surplus capacity, ability to substi-tute other materials, time needed to repair facili-ties, damage sustained, and the ratio betweenpool and production. The last factor identified

commodities that could bestockpiled for an apprecia-ble time. Thus oil was ini-tially considered a largepool, so its destruction

would have little immediate effect. Similarly, U-boat production was slow, with most submarineson active service or in port. Thus hitting the fac-tories that manufactured them would not be deci-sive. On the other hand, aircraft were expendedquickly in combat and there was no pool onwhich to draw. Destroying the plants that builtthem would have a rapid effect.

Once planners determined key nodes, indus-tries, and commodities, they had to answer twoquestions. Were air strikes destroying the targets?If they did, were they having the predicted rippleeffect throughout the war machine?

Estimating if bombers were actually de-stroying their targets was difficult. Data on accu-racy was hard to obtain, and the extent of de-struction when bombs hit was not obvious. Liketoday, assessing bomb damage was as much artas science. Post-strike aerial photography, for ex-ample, indicated that attacks on ball bearing fac-tories in Schweinfurt in 1943 caused extensivedamage. After the war, however, it was learnedthat many bombs detonated on top of buildings,collapsing the roofs. The results looked impres-sive from the air, but only 5 percent of the ma-chines on the floor were damaged and mostwere quickly repaired.

Beyond this level of analysis, intelligence andplanning agencies had to confront the subject ofindirect effects, which required measures of merit.Although the term was popularized earlier by thetotal quality movement, the concept was under-stood in World War II. Essentially, measures ofmerit linked objectives to targets. But the specifictype of evidence analysts should examine to deter-mine if targeting strategies were achieving theirpolitical goals remained a thorny issue.

The Tedder PlanAt Casablanca in January 1943, Franklin

Roosevelt and Winston Churchill agreed that theobjective of the combined bomber offensive was“the progressive destruction and dislocation ofthe German military, industrial, and economicsystem, and the undermining of the morale ofthe German people to a point where their capac-ity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.”4

This was a highly and perhaps deliberatelyambiguous directive that allowed readers to takeaway from it what they wished. Air Chief MarshalArthur Harris of Bomber Command saw the orderto undermine enemy morale as a vindication ofnight area-bombing. To Lieutenant General CarlSpaatz, senior American air commander in Eu-rope, the operative phrase was “the progressivedestruction” of economic and industrial infra-structure—the mission of daylight precisionbombing. General Dwight Eisenhower, who be-came Supreme Allied Commander for Overlord,was focused on the need to invade. In his view,the main function of bombers was supporting theassault on the French coast to ensure that “armedresistance was fatally weakened.”

By early 1944, planning for the invasion wasin full swing, and the question of a combinedbomber offensive to complement landings arose.American analysts revised estimates of Germanoil supplies and decided reserves were not as largeas originally thought. If true, refineries should be-come the top priority for Allied bombers. If thelifeblood of the economy stopped pumping, theentire war machine would collapse—one of thestated goals at the Casablanca conference.

Other air planners focused on the Germanrail network. Troops, supplies, equipment, andraw materials moved primarily by train. If railwaylines were cut, the German war machine wouldcome to a halt together with the entire economy.The debate tended to break along national lines,with Americans backing the oil plan and mostBritish, notably Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder,deputy supreme Allied commander, advocatingthe rail plan.

The argument ended in March 1944 whenEisenhower opted for the rail plan. The decidingfactor was time. For Ike, measures of merit re-quired air superiority to isolate the beachheadarea from enemy reinforcements. He wanted thatcapability for the invasion and not at some pointin the following weeks. Although he agreed withSpaatz that the collapse of the oil supply wouldbe catastrophic for the German war machine,that could not be expected until the autumn, toolate for Normandy. The rail plan won the day be-cause it promised a solution to immediate prob-lems—the effects desired by Eisenhower.

essentially, measures of meritlinked objectives to targets



Yet there was evendisagreement on the railplan. If the desired effectwas halting traffic, whatparts of that systemshould be targeted? Possi-

bilities included rail cars, locomotives, repair fa-cilities, round houses, marshalling yards, and rail-way bridges.

Solly Zuckerman, a primatologist in the Uni-versity of Oxford before the war, worked for Ted-der in the Mediterranean theater. He studied rail-road bridges versus marshalling yards in Sicily andon the Italian mainland in 1943 and concludedthat the latter were more desirable targets simplybecause they were larger. Given the inaccuracy ofAllied bombers, bridges were small and took dis-proportionate tonnages to knock out. Because themarshalling yards were expansive, bombers weremore likely to hit something of value, thus bomb-ing these yards was more efficient.5 Tedder agreedand directed his planners accordingly.

When Tedder and Zuckerman left the the-ater, Lieutenant General Ira Eaker, USA, the newcommander, reviewed the decision. He concluded

that Zuckerman was mistaken. By using moredata on air operations in his sample, Eaker dis-covered that bridges were not as difficult to hit aspreviously thought, especially with mediumrather than heavy bombers operating at high alti-tudes. In addition, marshalling yards could oftenbe repaired within days while it generally tookseveral weeks to repair a bridge.

These findings became important as plannersgrappled with preparations for Overlord. If the de-sired effect was isolating the beachhead by pre-venting German reinforcements from reachingthe area—Eisenhower’s goal—how best could air-power achieve it? Tedder and Zuckerman, now inLondon, dusted off their earlier analysis and againpushed for marshalling yards. Spaatz and his plan-ners, led by Charles Kindleberger and Walt Rostowof the Enemy Objectives Unit, disagreed. Usingextensive analysis from the Mediterranean, theyargued for a bridge campaign.

Like the broader question of oil versus rail,the more specific issue of railways generated bit-ter debate for the next four decades. In the event,air leaders resolved the dilemma in their usualmanner by bombing both marshalling yards andbridges. There was enough Allied airpower bymid-1944 to follow several targeting strategies. By

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D-Day, Ninth Air Force alone, with more than4,000 aircraft, was larger than the entire combatstrength of the Luftwaffe.

It would be unwise, however, to pass overthis question too quickly. Determining whetherZuckerman or the Enemy Objectives Unit wascorrect had more than academic interest. Plan-ners will not always have infinite air assets attheir disposal. As seen over the past decade, thoseassets may be limited by political considerationsand not a lack of airframes. In such cases, airplanners should know how to achieve the great-est effect to fulfill policy objectives.

Picking the Right ObjectiveZuckerman and Rostow published memoirs

after the war, attacking each other with gusto.Their supporters and detractors entered the fray,but one of the more insightful accounts came

from Henry Lytton, aneconomist on the WarProduction Board andthe Economic WarfareBoard. It is not just his

conclusions on the relative importance of bridgesversus marshalling yards that are of interest, buthis insights into the methodology and assump-tions of the respective protagonists.6

Lytton considered what were being used asmeasures of merit. Zuckerman was interested inthe density of bomb patterns within designatedtarget areas. Marshalling yards were large; thus amuch higher percentage of bombs fell in thatarea than when the target was a small rail bridge.Kindleberger and Rostow were more concernedwith effects. If only one bomb out of a thousandhit a bridge and dropped it, that was preferableto having all the bombs landing within the con-fines of a marshalling yard and leaving even onerail line intact. The enemy assessment was thesame. The German officer in charge of the Italiantransport system stated that strikes on mar-shalling yards destroyed goods and rolling stockbut not tracks, which in any event could bequickly repaired.

In short, the objective was stopping trains,not putting a certain percentage of bombs withina grid. Choosing the wrong measures of merit willdefeat effects-based operations. In early 1945,Tedder received unexpected support. The Allieshad broken the Enigma codes and produced whatwas called Ultra intelligence. However, the Ger-man rail system, which had been using teletypeor telephone to transmit reports, began usingEnigma in January 1945. Signals intelligence per-sonnel largely ignored messages on rail traffic,

but when Enigma was adopted, they paid moreattention. By February, a study of the traffic re-vealed the role coal played in the economy, virtu-ally powering all industries and providing 90 per-cent of energy supplies. Coal moved almostexclusively by train once the rivers and canalswere mined by Bomber Command. When the railplan took effect, coal movement slowed down.The implication was clear: to deliver a death blowto German industrial production and military ca-pabilities, the Allies had to stop the flow of coal.That meant stopping the trains.

In essence Tedder had been right all along,only for the wrong reasons. Neither he nor hisplanners identified coal as the commodity thatmade the enemy function. His plea for a cam-paign against German railways (as opposed tothose in France, which had been the centerpieceof pre-invasion bombing) emphasized disruptionof the flow of reinforcements and supplies. Thegoal of an expanded rail campaign was to “rapidlyproduce a state of chaos which would vitally affectnot only the immediate battle on the West Wall,but also the whole German war effort.”7 Since coalwas never mentioned, Tedder was not interestedin studying intelligence related to its shipment.

But when examined almost by accident inFebruary 1945, the significance of coal quicklybecame apparent. The evidence had been thereall along; it merely required someone to establishcoal as the crucial link and identify the desiredeffect with an appropriate measure of merit—halting its movement by rail. Once this key rela-tionship, desired effect, and metric were articu-lated, the bombing campaign could be focusedon achievement.

A further consideration highlights the some-times serendipitous nature of war. The railwaysystem did not adopt the Enigma code to secureits reports at such a high level of classification,but because bombing had knocked out the tele-type network as well as most telephone lines andeven the postal service. Otherwise Enigma proba-bly would not have been used, and the Allieswould never have been curious enough to lookinto the movement of coal by train.

Technological WarAlthough targeting was a key factor in ef-

fects-based operations in World War II, questionsremain. Was there a particular node the heavybombers should have concentrated on? Con-tenders for this magic bullet were oil, coal, raillines, electricity, and ball bearings. Were these tar-gets really key or panacea targets, the derisive termof Arthur Harris? In his view, the German econ-omy was so large, complex, and redundant thatonly its wholesale destruction would bring thecountry to its knees.

the wrong measures of merit willdefeat effects-based operations



The German perspective on the Allied air of-fensive is instructive. Albert Speer, Minister of Ar-maments and War Production, later wrote:

I shall never forget the date May 12 [1944]. . . . Onthat day the technological war was decided. Untilthen we had managed to produce approximately asmany weapons as the armed forces needed in spite oftheir considerable losses. But with the attack of ninehundred and thirty-five daylight bombers of theAmerican Eighth Air Force upon several fuel plants incentral and eastern Germany a new era in air warbegan. It meant the end of German armaments pro-duction.8

On the other hand, Speer later wrote Hitler aboutthe bombing of rail lines on the Ruhr:

We are on the verge of the most serious coal produc-tion crisis since the beginning of the war. . . . For morethan six weeks now, in the matter of transport theRuhr has become more and more cut off from theareas it supplies. . . . It is clear from Germany’s overalleconomic structure that in the long run the loss of theindustrial area of Rhineland-Westphalia would be amortal blow to the German economy and to the con-duct of the war.9

Further confusing matters, when Speer wasinterrogated following the war, he stated that thecrucial targets that should have been attackedmore vigorously were chemicals, ball bearings,and electrical power, implying that they weremore important than oil or coal. It would seemthat not only were the Allies uncertain about the

economy of Germany, but the head of its arma-ments production was confused.

While effects-based operations were at theroot of what airpower was intended to achieve,planners went to war without precedent for deter-mining objectives, targets, and measures of meritfor strategic bombing. At the same time they hadalmost no experience in gathering intelligence forsuch campaigns. These processes, both requiringsubstantial resources and skill, had to be createdanew. Although mistakes were made, one mustnot underestimate the task of collecting eco-nomic intelligence and then planning and con-ducting an economic warfare air campaign.

Analytical tools have improved dramatically.Unfortunately, questions over effects-based opera-tions persist: the adequacy of intelligence, thelack of cultural sensitivity, the risk of studying in-puts rather than outputs, and the need for mod-els to account for cognitive, cultural, political,and social factors. These are serious questions,and their solutions are not obvious.

Airmen have always desired to conduct suc-cessful effects-based operations. For much of thefirst century of airpower that aspiration was outof reach because of technological limitations onaircraft and weapons as well as inadequate intelli-gence and analytical tools. Now those tools andtechnology are beginning to catch up. JFQ

N O T E S

1 Maurer Maurer, The U.S. Air Service in World War I,volume 2 (Washington: Office of Air Force History,1978), pp. 141–57, reprints the Gorrell memorandum.

2 William L. Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Develop-ment and Possibilities of Modern Air Power, Economic andMilitary (New York: Putnam’s, 1925), pp. 126–27.

3 Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The ArmyAir Forces in World War II, volume 2 (Chicago: Univer-sity of Chicago Press, 1948–58), p. 369.

4 Ibid., p. 305.5 Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords (New York:

Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 209–10, 220–23.6 Henry D. Lytton, “Bombing Policy in the Rome

and Pre-Normandy Invasion Aerial Campaigns of WorldWar II: Bridge-Bombing Strategy Vindicated—and Rail-yard Bombing Strategy Invalidated,” Military Affairs,vol. 47, no. 2 (April 1983), pp. 53–58. Lytton’s titlepretty much says it all.

7 Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The StrategicAir Offensive Against Germany, 1939–1945, volume 4(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), pp.290–92, contains Tedder’s “Note on Air Policy to beAdapted with a View to Rapid Defeat of Germany,”dated October 25, 1944.

8 Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York:Macmillan, 1970), p. 346.

9 Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive,pp. 349–56, contains a letter from Speer to Hitler datedNovember 11, 1944.

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T here is a new American way of war. Asseen in Afghanistan and Iraq it in-volves winning with smaller, moreagile forces, where jointness and net-

working combine to produce large-scale gains inwarfighting. Using this experience to transformthe defense and intelligence communities for net-worked operations is one of the biggest manage-rial challenges ever undertaken.

Many plans focus on building blocks likedoctrine, organization, and technology. That is

necessary, but it leaves out one critical element—how the blocks are put together. In a networkedforce it is more important than ever to ensureproper coordination and timely integration of as-sets. This is what gives the big payoffs.

Transformation involves various buildingblocks and different ways of combining them,here designated as systems integration. But orga-nizational skills and capabilities for systems inte-gration have not kept pace with the requirementsof the new way of war. Current frameworks andtools reflect the industrial era when most of themwere created. That world no longer exists; newapproaches are needed.

Instead of focusing on systems integration,transformation is too often regarded as a choice


Paul Bracken is professor of management and political science at YaleUniversity and the author of Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian MilitaryPower and the Second Nuclear Age.

Systems Integrationand the New AmericanWay of WarBy P A U L B R A C K E N

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between incremental and revolutionary ap-proaches to change. Stated in these terms, the in-cremental approach often wins out because it ap-pears to be less risky and radical.

But these choices—incremental versus revo-lutionary change—offer an inadequate concept oftransformation. Overlooking the interdependenceof the building blocks ignores one key aspect ofnetworked operations. The sharply increased de-gree to which military tasks are carried out by dif-

ferent organizationalunits amplifies the im-portance of coordina-tion. Without it, eachunit will go it alone,thereby losing the

tremendous benefit of networking. The incre-mental-revolutionary model all but guarantees alopsided organization whose performance is lim-ited by its least effective parts. Systems integra-tion tools must be sharpened and a systems inte-gration framework should replace the choicebetween incremental and revolutionary ap-proaches to transformation.

Alternative PathsThe incremental-revolutionary model misses

a key feature of networked operations: change inone part of the organization affects other parts.This is true in combat operations, acquisition,and intelligence. An incremental or evolutionaryapproach tackles problems serially through small-scale improvements in existing processes andtechnologies. The focus is on local expertise, andthe changes are small enough that outside organi-zational units are not usually involved.

By contrast, the revolutionary or radical ap-proach involves strategic leaps to overhaul an or-ganization across the board, which may meanchanging doctrine, organization, and technologysimultaneously. This approach requires extensivefinancial and intellectual capital: sizable budgetsbecause projects are expensive and intellectualcapital because risks are high. Consultants, tech-nical experts, strategic planners, and others arenecessary to advise leaders about the risks.

AT&T in the 1990s offers an example of revo-lutionary transformation. It undertook radicalchange in its core technology, moving to digitalfiber optics from copper analog circuits. A newCEO revolutionized the personnel system, termi-nated 60,000 employees, and made it obvious thatloyalty to workers was a thing of the past. The cor-poration entered a new business area, cable televi-sion, taking on massive debt in the process.

The result was indeed a revolutionary trans-formation of AT&T. But despite hiring the best

and the brightest investment bankers, strategicplanners, and technical experts, the transforma-tion nearly destroyed the firm. In five years it be-came a pale image of its former self and wasforced to auction off key divisions at fire saleprices to avoid bankruptcy.

Organizations can only manage so muchchange at a time. Most leaders understand this,and that is why, practically speaking, an incre-mental approach nearly always prevails.

Incremental change has been the historicalapproach to military transformation. For exam-ple, the tank was first introduced without chang-ing the organization or tactics for land warfare. Ittook nearly two decades after developing the tankfor organization and tactics to catch up. Evenwhen they did change during World War II, theGerman army looked much as it did duringWorld War I, with masses of infantry and horse-drawn supply trains supporting tanks. Similarly,the airplane transformed combat at sea only afteryears of incremental experimentation. In theUnited States and Japan fleet battle tactics did notdevelop until the 1930s.

There are two major problems with an incre-mental approach. First, military transformationnow rests on smaller force structures than thecase studies of the tank and airplane. This re-moves the cushion that reduces risk. The UnitedStates developed innovative technologies in virtu-ally every war from the Civil War to Vietnam. Butmore than technological innovation, Americaused mass—measured in men and dollars—to bat-ter an enemy into submission. If technology didnot do the job, as in Vietnam, mass would, or soit was thought. Large force structures provided ahuge redundancy against technological failure.That reduced risk and made the incremental ap-proach safe. Because technological failure was off-set by massive force structures, mission successdid not depend on the complete success of inno-vation, whether tanks, laser guided munitions, orarmed helicopters.

A second problem is that the Armed Forcesare far more tightly coupled than ever before. Abreakdown or performance lag in one part of theforce could check the performance of the wholeorganization because of increased interdepend-ency. Networking interconnects the forces andlinks them to supporting systems, such as logisticsand intelligence. That increases performance andthe chances of mission success, but it also intro-duces a risk that was not present in earlier episodesof innovation and transformation-network risk,the chance that some part of the organization willnot keep up with the others.

Relatively simple incremental transforma-tion strategies worked in the past because variouselements of the military were not tightly coupled.


incremental change has been thehistorical approach to militarytransformation

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Such approaches are not likely to be as effectiveagain, which is important to understand. Histori-cal studies of innovation offer insight into aworld that no longer exists, an era of loosely cou-pled mass forces where change was slow. Bureau-cratic resistance was a big obstacle in this worldbecause change threatened established routines.

Although bureaucratic reluctance still exists,it is not the problem it was. The defense and in-telligence communities recognize the need forchange. They want to do their best, but they arenot sure how. The issue is less one of bureaucraticresistance than of factoring a complex probleminto digestible bites. These are tasks carried out bylinked organizational units. All relevant partsmust work together. For example, suppressingenemy air defenses may involve a combination ofair, space, and special operations forces. Decidingwho does what, when, and how is a factoringproblem, meaning it requires breaking down a bigproblem into manageable parts. Coordination isneeded to make the assignment, monitor execu-tion, and synchronize the actions of many sub-units. In such situations incremental approachesto transformation can be dangerous.

Transformation in JapanOne drawback with incremental approaches

to transformation is that they nearly always focusattention on assets at hand rather than how theyare put together with other building blocks. Be-cause changes are small, they usually do not get a

review by those not immediately involved withthem—or if they do, the reviews tend to be cur-sory rather than disciplined. The focus is honingthe asset one knows and optimizing it to perfec-tion. But what happens when tightly coupledunits or activities use this approach?

The Japanese electronics industry is a partic-ularly good case since it sparked the fascinationof the American business community with incre-mental approaches to transformation in the1980s. Japanese electronics companies dominatedthe world. They came out of nowhere to seize thehigh ground of innovation in low cost, high qual-ity production.

When the DRAM chip was invented in theUnited States in 1969, Japan took the idea andput it through incremental product improve-ments. The five electronics giants—NEC, Toshiba,Hitachi, Fujitsu, and Mitsubishi—copied the ap-proach other Japanese companies used in the1970s in automobiles, steel, and ships. “Get agood design from anywhere and improve it con-tinuously” was the doctrine. Japan used an incre-mental approach to pummel its rivals in Americaand Europe. Its global market share of chip pro-duction rose from 26 percent in 1980 to 49 per-cent in 1990.

But during the 1990s the competitive envi-ronment changed. The cheap capital that fi-nanced R&D and plant expansion in Japan van-ished as its banks nearly went bankrupt from


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overlending to government-targeted industries.Employment at the big five grew while the econ-omy did not. It became politically impossible tolay off workers.

The American electronics industry staged acomeback in the 1990s by beating the Japanese atsystems integration. In U.S. firms, unlike those inJapan, different organizational units—R&D, pro-duction, or marketing—were tightly coupled sothe interactions among the parts were managedto sharpen competitive advantage.

Japanese companies covered the R&D water-front. American rivals focused only on those seg-

ments in which demandwas growing and produc-tion advantages existed.Firms guaranteed lifetimeemployment in Japan.Companies in the United

States targeted hiring in specialty skills for thechip business. Japanese firms did everythingthemselves. American firms competed in keylinks of the value chain and outsourced the rest.

Incremental change rewards those who un-derstand existing processes. If the environmentdoes not change, and if structures hold stable,that works well. It favors a stable workforce, longproduction runs, and long-term suppliers. U.S.companies understood both the economic andcultural differences in the American economy: itsdynamic labor markets, flexible contracting, andtradition of risk taking. But they did not just rec-ognize them as building blocks. They integratedthem into a tightly coupled business model.

Integration ToolsChoosing between incremental or revolu-

tionary approaches is not the right framework formanaging transformation. Systems integration,linking separate parts of an organization soweaker ones do not limit improving ones, is key.Since the Armed Forces are moving to more net-worked operations, this approach can be appliedthroughout the defense and intelligence commu-nities from the highest levels to the lowest.

Three areas for improvement can be identi-fied. On one level they might be considered asmundane parts of nuts-and-bolts activities likeoutsourcing and software, which usually do notget high-level attention. But downplaying them isa mistake. Poor integration in general, and cer-tainly in outsourcing and software, wastes capitalbetter deployed elsewhere. Moreover, innovationscan disproportionaly improve the benefits of net-working because they crosscut nearly every aspectof military transformation.

The industrial era was built on optimization,not innovation. Competitive advantage cameabout by grouping production factors in an opti-mal way, such as steel and labor. Tools of systemsintegration reflected the loose coupling of assets.The defense budget was restructured using onesuch tool in the planning, programming, andbudgeting system in 1961. Strategic nuclearforces, conventional forces, and logistics weretreated as separate factors, the steel and man-power of war. This approach assumed that, likethe industrial corporation on which it was mod-eled in 1947, DOD was a machine whose assetscould be separately improved and combined toachieve a seamless whole. What happened in theAir Force, for example, did not much affect theNavy under that kind of integration.

The difficulty was that as complexity andspecialization increased, innovation becomemore important than top-down optimization. Butold tools of systems integration, such as optimiza-tion and the planning, programming, and budg-eting system, had no way to incorporate the pay-off from innovations or networked forces. As aresult it became harder to allocate resources in away that encouraged military transformation.

The planning, programming, and budgetingsystem largely ignores synergies from network ef-fects and understates their payoffs. Its replace-ment is not a new accounting system, but betterhorizontal integration to enable innovation.Mechanisms to do that have sprung up in recentyears in response to increased complexity andtighter coupling. But they have not been identi-fied in a systematic way to aid in transformation.For example, joint commands, integrated prod-uct/process teams, intelligence fusion centers,


choosing between incrementalor revolutionary approaches is not the right framework

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standing joint task forces, and integrating organi-zations are all mechanisms for horizontal coordi-nation. They are more commonly used todaythan ten years ago because the new way of war, asshown in Afghanistan and Iraq, requires more in-tegration. And computer tools are mechanisms ofintegration. GroupWare, collaboration technolo-gies, and other systems help solve problems in co-ordinating different units. They are also a re-sponse to growing complexity and tightercoupling of activities.

The trouble is that these integration mecha-nisms and computer tools are not seen as part ofa larger theory for factoring complex problemswhere strong interdependencies exist. Acquisitionspecialists, for example, see the benefits and limi-tations of integrated product/process teams. But itrarely occurs to them that there are other coordi-nation mechanisms. Liaison offices, fusion cen-ters, joint task forces, and specialized coordinat-ing organizations such as the Joint Staff offerdifferent approaches to integration.

There are many ways to put it all together.Which is best depends on considerations such asthe degree of complexity, the amount of subunitinterdependence, the degree of information to beshared, and the cost. There is no single best way.It depends on the problem and the budget.

Personnel must be trained on the new ap-proaches to systems integration. Looking at theattributes of these approaches—information vol-ume, cost, and dependence on information tech-nology—allows leaders to choose. Rather than de-bating incremental or revolutionary alternatives,attention would be far better committed tochoosing among integration alternatives matchedto the tasks of a networked force.

Outsourcing Information TechnologyComplex organizations require complex sup-

ply chains. Outsourcing is too important in thenew way of war to be left to contractors. Butwhen complexity makes a field opaque, leadershave difficulty allocating resources in a rationalway that improves the performance of the wholeorganization.

Information technology (IT) contractors, forexample, are critical for networked operations be-cause they operate and even own many of thenetworks that are the backbone of the new way ofwar. But IT outsourcing is unlike contracting forcatering or janitorial services. Rather, it is a highlyfragmented industry that causes bewilderment.Yet managing it is as important as managing anammunition supply system. The natural tendencyis to deal with complexity by outsourcing it.While that gets rid of the problem, outsourced


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networks are part of the total defense system.Leaders need to direct a networked organizationthe same way the Pentagon directs the building ofthe joint strike fighter or a new radar.

Outsourcing often leads to a confusing mix-ture of systems, personnel, and sites. Some ITstaff members are civilian employees, some aremilitary personnel, and some are private contrac-tors. Responsibility is spread across so many indi-viduals and organizations that getting a handleon it is hard. This degree of opaqueness wouldnot be tolerated on the battlefield. Yet informa-tion technology is an important contributor towhat happens on the battlefield.

What is needed is for government organiza-tions to develop an IT outsourcing review thatclearly maps this part of the defense value chain

to overall performance.That would catalog exactlywhich activities are critical,what firms are doing thework, performance bench-marks, and the company

innovation record. Some of the most importantoutsourced IT networks need to be analyzed asmuch as the organization of joint forces. Thiscould be an opportunity for major innovations.

SoftwareAt the heart of network centric warfare is

software, the glue that links the forces. Yet its im-portance is often overlooked because the Depart-ment of Defense, the services, and the intelligencecommunity are platform focused. They have a his-tory of concentrating on airplanes, ships, andsatellites. They do not yet understand the signifi-cance of network operators, whose efforts couldbe deciding factors in future mission success.

Software needs to be put on as solid a foun-dation as platforms. As a discipline, software isonly fifty years old, half the age of the aircraft in-dustry and a small fraction of shipbuilding. Ithas very different traditions than the platformindustries.

For example, when an airplane crashes thereis a well-developed approach to determine thecause. Teams of engineers and safety experts in-vestigate what went wrong and why. Their find-ings are reported to manufacturers and to AirForce and Navy organizations that exist for thepurpose of making sure the lessons are factoredinto maintenance and training.

In the future, software crashes could be moredeadly than airplane crashes. Such failure couldcause more loss of life if, for example, a recon-naissance network crashed during a battle. Yetthere is no comparable mechanism with the so-phistication or experience as those the Air Forceor Navy have for understanding airplane crashes.Indeed, software does not even have a traditionof post mortem analysis of analyzing past failures.After an intelligence setback, it is routine for theintelligence community to search for ways to im-prove the process. But in a world where net-worked operations are key, no such cultural ap-proach is being created for one of the keyingredients that run networks—software.

A related issue is productivity and networkmanning levels. For example, as part of the effortto develop efficient platform manning require-ments, the Navy DDX program will have aboutone half of the crew size of earlier ships. Similarprograms exist in other services. Yet there is littleattention to efficiently manning computer net-works. Network operations centers have becomeso complicated that they add enormous staffs.Moreover, the desktop of a network professionalis often a confusing hodgepodge of icons and yel-low Post-it notes. If any battle is fought with sucha system, senior commanders will immediatelysee the potential for disaster. Yet combat is likelyto use such systems because computer networksare becoming so integral to joint warfighting.

Streamlining networks, making them as effi-cient as fighting forces, offers a great systems in-tegration opportunity that will pay off because itaffects so many areas of the new way of war. Sys-tems integration is a powerful framework for con-sidering alternative transformation strategies. Ithighlights critical areas such as better integrationtools, information technology outsourcing, andsoftware that need more sober analysis to meetthe challenges of military transformation. JFQ


outsourcing often leads to aconfusing mixture of systems,personnel, and sites

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T he United States has engaged in severalconflicts since the Cold War. It built acoalition to drive Iraq out of Kuwait,conducted an air campaign against

Serbia with its NATO allies to halt ethnic cleans-ing in Kosovo, and defeated the Taliban inAfghanistan as part of the global war on terror-ism. And it has launched an invasion of Iraq tooverthrow Saddam Hussein. While these inter-ventions have failed to bring peace to the world,

the Armed Forces are likely to remain militarilycommitted for many years.

Recent conflicts offer insights on the con-duct of war in the early 21st century. These trendsare drawn from high-intensity combat operationsover a relatively modest timeframe. Trends overthe last decade will probably endure for anotherten years and underscore the relevance of strate-gic realities, military capabilities, and enablingtechnologies for the future.

Some Basic AssumptionsWar will continue to be an instrument of na-

tional power. The fact that there have been fourmajor conflicts since the Cold War may be evi-dence enough that the near-term future is un-likely to be peaceful. Trends revealed in these


Christopher J. Bowie is deputy director of strategic planning on the AirStaff and formerly worked for Northrop Grumman; Colonel Robert P.Haffa, Jr., USAF (Ret.), is director of the Northrop Grumman AnalysisCenter and has taught at the U.S. Air Force Academy; and Robert E.Mullins is a senior analyst at Northrop Grumman and previously was a member of the permanent research staff at the RAND Corporation.

Trendsin FutureWarfareBy C H R I S T O P H E R J. B O W I E, R O B E R T P. H A F F A, J R., and

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conflicts will not be rapidly overtaken by revolu-tionary new technologies. Those analysts whohave studied the revolution in military affairs inan historical context argue that technical break-throughs are not sufficient in themselves to bringabout an entirely different way of warfighting.Corresponding organizational and doctrinalchanges require twenty or thirty years to takeroot, mature, and evolve into new capabilities.

Trends in warfare can be plotted across arange of conflicts. The diversity of the conflicts

argues in favor of capabili-ties for both high-intensityand small-scale contingen-cies. Asymmetry is a com-modity that will be covetedby the United States and itsenemies. A conventionalimbalance will induce po-tential enemies to wage

asymmetric warfare. The Armed Forces must beprepared to confront such threats. The task is ex-amining trends that describe enemy actions in re-cent conflicts and point to areas in which Wash-ington can increase its competitive advantages.

An analysis of future warfare cannot reviewall aspects of military strategy and operations.For example, increased reliance of land, sea, andair operations on space-based assets is difficultto weigh. Moreover, areas such as informationoperations, air and missile defense, and post-conflict operations do not readily lend them-selves to trend analysis but are also clearly wor-thy of serious evaluation.

Hindsight is not always accepted as useful indeveloping recommendations on the conduct offuture war. After all, there is the old adage thatthe military often prepares to fight the last war. Acorollary may be that little can be learned frompast conflicts because of their uniqueness. Whilerecent conflicts have been unique, evidence sug-gests that the historical record is relevant.

Political-Military TrendsThe location of recent conflicts suggests a

shift from Europe toward Asia, a region of vasteconomic importance and diverse security chal-lenges. Whatever a future war in that regionmight look like, it will not resemble an intensebattle in Europe from large fixed bases dispersedover relatively short distances envisioned overthe last half century.

America depended on alliances such asNATO for collective defense during the ColdWar. In three post-Cold War conflicts, coalitions

were organized as the result of an ad hoc ap-proach to securing international support for mili-tary operations led by United States. Rather thanthe long-term arrangements that typified past al-liances, future coalitions are likely to be tempo-rary liaisons, with some partners proving morefaithful than others.

In contrast to the Cold War, recent alliedcontributions have largely come in the form ofpolitical support and access to facilities ratherthan combat forces. Trends in coalition warfarehave revealed widening disparities in capabilitiesthat will cause allies in the future to fall fartherbehind, although niche capabilities such as spe-cial operations forces will remain valuable.

Evidence underscores the potential for mili-tary showstoppers arising from political issues,the tyranny of distance, and constraints on infra-structure. Efforts to obtain political access can becomplicated, especially for conducting offensiveoperations. Moreover, Asia has a much lower basedensity and less developed infrastructure than Eu-rope and the Middle East. Although anti-accessthreats were limited in recent conflicts, powerprojection will be confounded by improvedenemy capabilities.

Enemies have sought to evoke global criti-cism and weaken coalition resolve by exploitingAmerican sensitivity about casualties and interna-tional aversion to collateral damage. Failing that,enemies have sought to reduce the vulnerabilityto coalition action through air defense, camou-flage, concealment, deception, dispersal, mobil-ity, and hardened facilities. Weapons of mass de-struction have cast a long shadow in recent years,and proliferation may be the response to the con-ventional military dominance of the UnitedStates. The consistency of these trends suggeststhat similar challenges may arise in the future.

New Ways of WarTwo consequences of increased situational

awareness and their implications for time-criticalstrike operations in the future warrant attention.First, the rapidly improving speed at which tar-gets can be generated and attacked by a combina-tion of battle management, sensor, and strikeplatforms has compressed what is known as thekill chain. For example, while the targetingprocess took weeks in operations against Iraq in1991, it was reduced to 45 minutes or less by2003. Second, the distinction between commandand control and execution is increasingly blurred,mainly because of real-time operational picturesof the battlefield as well as the role of civilian andmilitary leaders in issuing targeting guidance. Thelatter trend resulted in a creeping centralizationof command and execution as the rear echelonreaches forward to the battlefield in near-real


the distinction betweencommand and control andexecution is increasinglyblurred, mainly because ofreal-time operational pictures

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time. Because of the enhanced political contentof conflict in a world of instantaneous informa-tion, centralized execution will often accompanycentralized control.

The deliberate planning process is a legacy ofthe Cold War that sustains a predilection forscripted as opposed to dynamic military opera-tions. However, in the nonlinear and fluid operat-ing environments that will characterize future bat-tlefields, renewed emphasis on adaptive planningand dynamic operations is necessary. Experiencesin Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom,and Iraqi Freedom underscore this trend. For ex-ample, 20 percent of targets were selected after air-craft launch during the Gulf War, whereas 43 per-cent were selected once planes were airborne overKosovo. In Afghanistan 80 percent of carrier-basedsorties were launched without designated targets.The statistics for Iraqi Freedom are likely to beconsistent with this trend.

Throughout the conflicts, combat losses werestatistically insignificant despite the enemy objec-tive of causing heavy casualties to hasten termi-nation. The reasons lie in a combination of newoperational capabilities, highly survivable combatplatforms, and guidance systems to limit the vul-nerability of U.S. forces.

Long-range operations are an outgrowth ofthe access problem and migration of conflict todistant and remote regions. During the Cold War,planners developed concepts of operations basedon the premise that forward operating baseswould be available to both launch and sustaincombat. From the Gulf War to Afghanistan andIraq, the trends suggest that this assumption is in-creasingly risky. As a hedge, provision must bemade to project firepower over long distances. Forexample, problems regarding access to forwardbases in 2001 and 2003 resulted in emphasis oncarrier-based aircraft, long-range bombers, andaerial refueling.

While rapidly deployable, highly maneuver-able ground forces that can leverage the effects ofmodern precision weaponry are integral to dy-namic military operations against elusive ene-mies, there is a mismatch between slow-movingand late-deploying heavy land forces and the de-mands of the future operating environment. Inaddition, the ways of delivering firepower havechanged. As the Secretary of Defense observed:“Looking at what was overwhelming force adecade or two decades ago, today you can haveoverwhelming force, conceivably, with lessernumbers because the lethality is equal to orgreater than before.” The ground force employed


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in Iraqi Freedom was lighter than and half thesize of that in Desert Storm, but it had a moreambitious mission.

Technological AdvantagesPrecision-guided munitions have emerged as

the centerpiece of a new revolutionary style of airwarfare. One trend since the Persian Gulf War hasbeen the steadily increasing place of theseweapons in the percentage of munitions deliv-

ered: 8 percent in DesertStorm, 30 percent in Al-lied Force, 60 percent inEnduring Freedom, and70 percent in Iraqi Free-dom. Other trends arethe growing number ofprecision-guided muni-

tions delivered per sortie and the increasing per-centage that can be delivered in adverse weather,ranging from 13 percent in the Gulf War to 90percent in Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, thetrend points to new capabilities derived from in-creased payload fractionation (delivering largeramounts of smaller unguided weapons) and massprecision (rapidly releasing large numbers ofweapons). In Iraqi Freedom, a smaller organiza-tion delivered twice as many munitions per dayas the air component in Desert Storm.

Another advantage stems from the quantityand quality of sensors and their integration intosystems and networks. The trend toward network-centric operations is advanced by a promise of in-formation dominance and situational awareness.

Underpinning this promise are technologies tocreate network-centric architectures consisting ofhigh-quality sensors and rapidly transmitted datathat will be fused and integrated at commandand control centers. Conflicts since the Gulf Warwitnessed growing integration of command, con-trol, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-sance assets. In the future, less expensive, morecapable, and lighter sensors will support network-ing intelligence-quality sensors on the battlefield.Assuming that data streams from myriad sourcescan be rapidly integrated, commanders will enjoygreater situational awareness.

From the Persian Gulf to Kosovo, and to alesser degree in Afghanistan but reinforced inIraq, low-observable aircraft were used with revo-lutionary impact. Low-observable technologiesapplied to combat aircraft have allowed them tooperate with relative impunity against sophisti-cated air defenses. The ability of stealth aircraft tooperate independently has reduced the require-ment for considerable resources to escort attackaircraft. Electronic warfare assets were used insupport of stealth aircraft but were more criticalin enabling non-stealth aircraft—the mainstay ofthe current force—to survive in nonpermissiveenvironments. Emphasis on airpower-centriccampaign plans will demand renewed investmentin stealth and electronic countermeasures.

Unmanned aerial vehicles have demon-strated their increasing operational utility in thepost-Cold War era, particularly when enabled byadvances in satellite guidance and communica-tions, computerized flight control systems, andsensor technology. Indeed, unmanned systems as-sumed new roles because of improvements inrange, endurance, on-board sensors, and datatransmission. Though only one vehicle, the Pio-neer, was deployed in the Persian Gulf War, tentypes were used in Iraq in 2003 to provide situa-tional awareness in a cluttered battlespace. Andwhile they were used principally in earlier con-flicts for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-sance, they had evolved into sophisticated, air-breathing, hunter-killer platforms by 2001.

The FutureThe new way of warfare exhibited over the

last decade is not compatible with the clash of in-terstate armies that prevailed during the ColdWar. Indeed, as opposed to the Eurocentric visionof warfare encompassing large armies and vitalinterests, the strategic center of gravity hasmoved to uncertain threats emanating from Asia.This trend has been accompanied by a change inthe way allies are selected: a trend in favor oftemporary coalitions and ad hoc partners who arevalued for their political and diplomatic supportrather than direct military participation.


less expensive, more capable,and lighter sensors will supportnetworking intelligence-qualitysensors on the battlefield

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Meanwhile, enemies of the future could in-clude rogue states, nonstate actors, and possibly apeer competitor, all poised to undermine the useof force by the United States, with the objectiveof exploiting sensitivities to casualties, interna-tional public opinion, and battlefield vulnerabili-ties. In addition, enemies can be expected to ex-ploit the multifold dimensions of the accesschallenge by confounding U.S. capabilities toproject and sustain military power in the regionof conflict. Most ominously, events in Iraq sug-gest that enemies may possess and use weaponsof mass destruction, the mere possibility of whichwill deter some courses of action, limit basing op-tions in theater, compel the focus on counter-force missions by targeting weapons of mass de-struction, and frustrate campaign-level forceemployment options.

Militarily, there has been a dramatic trendaway from scripted plans and operational ordersto a fluid, nonlinear, and adaptive battlespace inwhich targets are generated while attack plat-forms are en route. Factors that account for thisapproach to target generation begin with require-ments for extended reach in recent operations.Added to the tyranny of distance is the elusivenature of enemy forces and sketchy target setscharacterized by fleeting opportunities, which aremasked by deception. These factors are offset byan order of magnitude improvement in situa-tional awareness that enables commanders on alllevels to view the battlespace and intervene innear-real time.

Battle management indicates that the trendtoward centralized execution is a growing reality.Finally, the most prominent tendencies in forcedeployment and employment include an in-creased role for naval and air forces to projectpower quickly from a distance, a diminished em-phasis on slow-moving, heavy ground forces re-quiring a large footprint in favor of agile fixingforces, and continued means and measures tolower the risk of American casualties.

With regard to technology, the trend hasbeen dominated by the use of precision muni-tions. They not only hit their targets, loweringthe level of effort and minimizing collateral dam-age, but also reduce capabilities that must be de-ployed. But such weapons are not useful withoutprecise information. They are linked to improvedtargeting guidance aided by high-quality sensors,stealth and electronic jamming, and unmannedvehicles for intelligence, surveillance, and recon-naissance as well as hunter-killer roles.

The United States has fielded impressive ca-pabilities to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era, including the global war on ter-rorism. However, the road ahead appears evermore demanding in terms of both the diversityof the threats and enemy capabilities. Such con-siderations suggest that the United States mustprepare for uncertainty by investing in concepts,capabilities, and technologies to sustain compet-itive advantages. What will ultimately be re-quired are agile, access-insensitive forces thatproject power across great distances with littlereliance on externals. JFQ


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I raqi Freedom offers not only a reprise of un-finished business from the Persian Gulf War,it is the third invasion of Iraq by GreatBritain since independence in 1932. During

World War II, Winston Churchill ordered hiscommander in chief, Middle East, General SirArchibald Wavell, to march on Baghdad. The rea-son for intervention was strikingly similar to thatadvanced more than fifty years later: to preemptAxis support for Rashid Ali el Gailani, a violently

anti-British Arab nationalist, who threatenedBritish interests. The occupation would also strikea blow at terrorism orchestrated by a charismaticIslamic cleric. Finally, intervention would protectoil reserves vital to the war effort.

Churchill forced the offensive on Wavell,who favored a diplomatic approach. The generalargued against an invasion in terms that mirroredrecent objections—he lacked the resources to addIraq to a long list of military commitments. Hebelieved intervention would make the region lesssecure because Iraqi antagonism was linked toPalestine. Wavell urged accepting a Turkish offerto mediate so London could take care of pressingaffairs elsewhere.

Douglas Porch is professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and the author of Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II.

The Other Gulf War British Interventionin Iraq, 1941By D O U G L A S P O R C H

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The OriginsThe British accorded sovereignty to Iraq in

1932, making it the first former Turkish colony inthe Middle East to gain independence. However,because Basra and Baghdad were important as anair link and land passage between India andBritish-controlled Palestine and the Suez canal, atreaty that permitted Commonwealth troops totransit Iraq also required Baghdad to “give all aid,including the use of railways, rivers, ports, andairfields” in the event of war. Iraq undertook toprovide security, especially protecting thepipelines that ran from the Mosel and Kirkuk oil-fields in northern Iraq to Haifa on the Mediter-ranean. By 1937, the British presence had beenreduced to two Royal Air Force (RAF) bases, one atShaibah, close to Basra, and the other at Hab-baniya, on the Euphrates near Baghdad.

Yet anti-British sentiment persisted, espe-cially in the army, whose officers resented foreigninfluence, took offense at the refusal to providearms, and opposed Jewish emigration to Pales-tine. But little could be done because theHashimite monarchy was imported from SaudiArabia in the wake of World War I and did nothave deep roots in the country. It was weakenedby association with the British and utterly de-pendent on the army to keep order, especiallyafter both the Assyrian rebellion in 1933 and the

tribal rebellions of 1935–36were crushed. In this tumult,Iraqi officers organized a se-cret society known as theGolden Square and kept aneye on the throne to monitor

the slightest pro-British tilt. Distrust of GreatBritain led many Iraqis to attribute the automo-bile accident that took the life of King Faisal in1939 to British agents. His demise cleared the wayfor the Golden Square to act as the principalpower broker in the country.

Iraq was obligated by treaty to side withBritain when World War II broke out. But thegovernment of the four-year-old king, under di-rection of an uncle who served as regent, provedtoo feeble to surmount the opposition of theprime minister. A lawyer and cofounder of theMuslim Brotherhood, whose cells were activeacross the Middle East, Rashid Ali el Gailani was apassionate supporter of the Arab cause in the faceof Zionist penetration of Palestine. Early Axis tri-umphs and the arrival of an Italian armisticecommission to monitor the Vichy military inSyria emboldened Rashid Ali. British insistencethat Iraq break diplomatic relations with Italybrought the situation to the brink in early 1941.

When the war cabinet recommended sending adivision from India to occupy Basra, Wavell ob-jected that British troops would only enflame na-tionalism. His decision left RAF bases in Iraq vul-nerable, guarded only by a locally recruitedconstabulary with armored cars.

After the fall of France, the Italian declara-tion of war, and the RAF victory in the Battle ofBritain, the focus of the war shifted to the easternMediterranean. Iraq was merely one piece in acomplex geopolitical jigsaw puzzle that ran fromCairo to Tehran. And while Britain had strengths,most notably the Royal Navy based in Alexandria,its principal vulnerability was the volatility of aregion ripe for Axis exploitation.

Religion and PoliticsOf particular concern was the intrigue by

Amin al-Husseini, the grand mufti of Jerusalem,who sought refuge in Baghdad after being exiledin 1937. His delicate features and gentle manneraccentuated by deep blue eyes, trim goatee, andcalm voice, concealed a zealous and violent na-ture. A former Ottoman artillery officer turnedteacher, al-Husseini was sentenced to ten years inprison by the British for his part in anti-Jewishriots in 1920 in Jerusalem. In a gesture of mis-placed leniency, he was pardoned and stood forgrand mufti in the following year, an office thatnormally went to jurists who arbitrated disputesby interpreting Koranic law.

The British calculated that there was nothingto lose in allowing al-Husseini to play the rolesince he had no adherents in the Arab commu-nity. This proved to be a mistake. As grand mufti,he was poised to exploit Arab-Jewish tension thatbegan with the exodus of Jews to Palestine in the1930s. His anti-British and anti-Semitic rhetoricfound an audience in a growing middle class,which, ironically, had prospered as the result ofJewish economic activities. As president of theSupreme Muslim Council, he controlled religiousschools and courts as well as trust funds thatspread his message in Iraq and Syria. He alsolaunched attacks on Jewish settlements and assas-sinated moderate Arabs who urged compromisebut were marginalized by terrorism and Islamicfundamentalism.

Moreover, the mufti benefitted from a de-cline in British fortunes. After 1938, Germany,Italy, and even Spain fueled Arab nationalism withradio broadcasts, cultural subsidies, and anti-Se-mitic literature that was translated and distributedthrough schools by al-Husseini. Palestinians imi-tated fascist organizations and praised Nazi raciallaws, dreaming of a day when Germany and Italywould eject the British and the Jews from the Mid-dle East. The evenhandedness of Great Britainfound few takers in the region. Palestine was rife

Iraq was obligated by treatyto side with Britain whenWorld War II broke out

Port Said

Suez Basra

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with rebellion with the outbreak of war in 1940.Some 20,000 British soldiers maintained order be-tween Muslim extremists and Jewish militants,who conducted raids as far away as Syria andLebanon. In late 1940, the British discovered thatthe Iraqi army was training a unit of Palestiniansand Iraqis to fight for the mufti. The ambassadorto Baghdad reported that, so long as London re-fused to adopt a more pro-Arab policy in Pales-tine, “in Iraq, we get the disadvantages.”1

Arab nationalist feeling within the army, in-trigue on the part of the grand mufti, and anti-British posturing by Rashid Ali combined to bringIraq to the brink of civil war. On the night ofMarch 31, 1941, tipped off that officers plannedto move against him, the regent escaped acrossthe Tigris in a motorboat and made his way tothe RAF base at Habbaniya, from which he wasflown to Basra and asylum on board HMSCockchafer. On April 3, Rashid Ali el Gailani seizedpower with the help of army and air force officersof the Golden Square and proclaimed a nationaldefense government. He warned the British am-bassador against intervention in internal affairsand dispatched a force to Basra to block Britishtroops from landing.

The coup in Baghdad threatened British in-terests by severing the air link and land route be-tween India and Egypt, endangering suppliesfrom the northern oilfields on which defense ofthe Mediterranean depended, and allowing a na-tionalist success in Iraq to subvert the tenuousposition of Great Britain in Egypt and Palestine.Against this threat, Wavell argued that his handswere full in spring 1941. He evacuated three divi-sions and an armored brigade from Greece andprepared to defend Crete against German assault.An offensive against Italian forces in East Africawas about to start. Moreover, a little-knownenemy general, Erwin Rommel, had launched asurprise offensive into Cyrenaica in March with areinforced German and four Italian divisions,driven to the Egyptian frontier, and invested36,000 British troops at Tobruk. To Wavell, evenwith enough forces on hand, this was hardly themoment to ignite Arab volatility.

InterventionWavell contended that he had more impor-

tant fires to put out, which brought his relation-ship with Churchill to the boil. On the surface,the prime minister and the general should havegotten along famously. Both were aristocrats and

P o r c h


veterans of the Boer War and World War I as wellas authors and historians with prodigious memo-ries. Both realized they were fighting a conflictthat required difficult strategic choices. And bothhad a proclivity for unorthodox solutions tem-pered by common sense. But that was the end oftheir similarities.

Churchill was a man of strategic imaginationwho demanded enthusiasm that bordered onzealotry from subordinates. Wavell was a meticu-

lous planner with a talent foradministrative detail. He wasmuch more attuned to thecomplexities of an operationthan to its visionary possibili-ties. Although regarded as apremier army trainer, Wavellwas too cerebral and taciturn

for Churchill. Conversely, the prime ministerconstantly meddled in campaign planning andinitiated courses of action from 3,000 miles away,often in excruciating detail. Wavell responded byshielding information from London. This lack oftransparency markedly increased the distrust thatChurchill harbored for his commander in chief,Middle East.

By early 1941, Churchill was beyond tempo-rizing. “War,” he said, “is a contest of wills.”2 Hehad chosen to make a major commitment to theeastern Mediterranean—against the advice of hischiefs—because there Britain could take the of-fensive and showcase its value as an ally of theUnited States. By vigorous action, he would dis-tance himself from the appeasement policies ofNeville Chamberlain. An invasion of Iraq would

forestall Axis intervention and force Baghdad tobreak with Italy, eliminate Rashid Ali and al-Hus-seini, reinforce British rights of transit, and bringTurkey into the war with Mosul as the prize.

On orders of the chiefs of staff, Delhi landeda brigade at Basra on April 30, the vanguard of10th Indian Division, which was en route to Iraq.Rashid Ali, who preferred to avoid confrontationuntil he could solidify support, decided that timewas not on his side. As a result, he assembled abrigade armed with artillery to eliminate the airbase at Habbaniya before it could be reinforced.In London, the April 30 news that a large Iraqiforce had invested Habbaniya caused the chiefs toexult that their intervention in Basra had causedRachid Ali’s plot to go off at half-cock before theAxis could organize support for the regime. But inthe short term, it was unclear who had pre-empted whom. Habbaniya was an airfield thathoused a training school of 1,000 airmen to-gether with 9,000 civilians, many British depend-ents. It was defended by a seven-mile iron fenceand constabulary of 1,200 Iraqi and Assyrianlevies backed by armored cars under a British lieu-tenant colonel. Even an attacker with a poorgrasp of tactics had to realize that eliminating thewater tower or power station at Habbaniya wouldcompromise any resistance.

The best defense of Habbaniya lay in air-power. But the task was left to half-trained stu-dent pilots flying a fleet of 78 mostly obsolete bi-planes, some hastily rigged to carry bomb loadsas small as 20 pounds, hardly more than air-launched grenades. The arrival of eight Welling-ton medium bombers from Egypt capable of de-livering 4,500-pound bomb loads, a few Gladiatorbiplanes and Hurricane fighters, the warhorse ofthe Battle of Britain, and 300 soldiers airliftedfrom the RAF base at Shaibah afforded some pro-tection against two battalions that invested thebase on April 30. A buildup of Iraqi forces outsidethe base to brigade size led the commander atHabbaniya, Air Vice-Marshal H.G. Smart, to con-clude that attack was the best form of defense.

At 0500 hours on May 2, the bombers andfighters struck Iraqi forces, who answered with anartillery barrage on Habbaniya. The Iraqi air force,based outside Baghdad at Rashid, rendered a goodaccount of itself, especially against student pilotsin trainers. Smart directed subsequent attacks onRashid and lines of communication. Fast twin-en-gine Blenheim medium bombers with 1,000-pound bombs, escorted by long-range Hurricanes,arrived from Egypt to pound airfields in Baghdadand Mosel, where a small Luftwaffe detachmentwas based. After four days of bombing and raidsby the King’s Own Royal Regiment, the Iraqis

the Iraqi air force rendereda good account of itself,especially against studentpilots in trainers

Interviewing Persianofficer.

Imperial War Museum



withdrew, leaving burning trucks and explodingammunition along the road to Baghdad courtesyof the Royal Air Force.

Axis IntrigueThe defence committee in London, armed

with Ultra intercepts detailing pleas from Iraq forAxis support, and worried by broadcasts by themufti calling for jihad against “the greatest foe ofIslam,” obliged a reluctant Wavell to invade be-fore the enemy organized support for Rashid Ali.For his part, Wavell argued in favor of accepting aTurkish offer to mediate the crisis on the basis ofa cessation of hostilities against a promise byRashid Ali that Axis forces would not be allowedinto Iraq. Churchill rejected this option but leftopen the possibility of ceding Mosul to Turkey asencouragement to enter the war. Axis propagandaextolling Rashid Ali gave the impression thatLondon had coordinated his coup with Berlinand Rome.

The prime minister had no intention of al-lowing the new regime to pull in Axis reinforce-ments or encourage imitators among nationalistofficers and supporters of the grand mufti inEgypt. But Wavell argued without avail againststripping Palestine and the Trans-Jordan of its

overtaxed garrison to invade Iraq. He reluctantlyassembled 5,800 men (known as Habforce) inPalestine under Major General J.G.W. Clark forthe march on Baghdad. Churchill became so an-noyed at the dispatches from Wavell and the lackof preparation by 1st Cavalry Division in Pales-tine, much of it on horseback and without anti-aircraft guns, that he came close to sacking him.

The preventative invasion of Iraq caughtGermany off guard, mainly because its diplomatsand military were divided over the question ofexploiting Arab nationalism. The foreign office inBerlin had been in contact with the mufti. ButHitler preferred to leave policy formulation onthe Mediterranean and Middle East to Rome. TheWehrmacht high command, whose views on Ital-ian competence are unprintable, supported Arabnationalist movements to undermine Britain.Nevertheless, the Iraqi rebellion surprised theGermans, who were engaged in ending cam-paigns in the Balkans and Greece, mounting anassault on Crete, and planning Barbarossa, the in-vasion of Russia scheduled for June 1941. AdmiralJean Darlan, reeling from the Royal Navy attackon the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir near Oran inJuly 1940, offered to release Vichy war stocks inSyria, including aircraft, permit passage of Ger-man war matériel across Syria, and provide an airlink for German support to Rashid Ali from Axis-occupied Rhodes.

By the time Hitler declared that the Arab lib-eration movement was a natural ally, Churchillhad preempted Axis intervention. Nor did Iraqfurther its cause by mistakenly shooting downthe plane with Major Axel von Bloomberg, a Ger-man negotiator sent to coordinate military sup-port. Despite efforts by Rudolf Rahn, the Germanrepresentative on the Italian armistice commis-sion in Syria, to run trains of arms, munitions,and spare parts to Iraq through Turkey and Syria,and the intervention of Axis planes, the five Iraqidivisions and 60 serviceable aircraft were nomatch for a force of 200 aircraft. Habforce, spear-headed by the Arab Legion, reached Habbaniyaon May 18 after crossing 500 miles of searingdesert in a week. By this time, RAF bombers hadannihilated the Iraqi air force and extended at-tacks to Syrian bases that serviced Axis planes.Many members of the Iraqi regime applied forSyrian visas.

OccupationThe British occupied Basra in mid-May

1941, asserted their rights under the 1930 treaty,lifted the siege of Habbaniya, and temporarilyaverted Axis intervention. But their next movewas intensely debated. In London the chiefs of

Floating bridge near Basra.

Imperial War Museum

P o r c h


staff argued for continued pounding of the Iraqisto “defeat and discredit the leaders in the hopethat Rashid’s government would be replaced.”3

For his part, the commander in chief, India,made a case for marching to Baghdad followedby the military occupation of northern Iraq,which offered the only long-term guaranteeagainst Axis intervention. Churchill compro-mised, ordering Clark to march Habforce toBaghdad but at the same time assuring Wavellthat he would not have to commit scarce forcesto a long-term occupation of northern Iraq untilRommel was defeated.

The Iraqi army, fighting from behind de-fense lines along canals and fields flooded bywater from tributaries of the Euphrates, put up arespectable resistance against Habforce, which di-vided into columns and advanced from three di-rections. On May 30, Habforce scattered the Iraqi

units supported by Italian aircraft on the out-skirts of the capital. To avoid urban warfare,Clark bluffed; an interpreter called the headquar-ters of Rashid Ali with exaggerated claims ofBritish strength. The Iraqi leader, who was de-moralized by the lack of Axis support, fled to Per-sia with the rump of the Golden Square and thegrand mufti in tow. The British signed a lenientarmistice that allowed the Iraqi army to retain itsweapons and return to their barracks. Wavell leftthe administration of Baghdad to Iraqis. The pro-British regent regained the throne on June 1, butorder disintegrated as Jewish merchants becametargets of outraged nationalists and free-lancelooters. The British army, camped outside thecity, did not intervene.

Regime change in Iraq created dominoes. Un-settled by the Vichy invitation for Germany to useSyrian air bases and goaded by the Free Frenchunder Charles de Gaulle, Churchill ordered the in-vasion of Syria and Lebanon, which fell in mid-July after a six-week campaign. In August, Britishand Soviet forces invaded Persia, overthrowingReza Shah and replacing him with his son, Mo-hammad Reza Pahlavi. Axis attempts to stoke Arabnationalism and Islamic fundamentalism to un-dermine the British base in the Middle East andeastern Mediterranean had been quashed.

Fast ForwardThe American campaigns against Saddam

Hussein and Osama bin Laden offer a reprise ofthe crusade by Churchill against Rashid Ali andthe grand mufti in 1941. The three arguments thePresident advanced in 2002 for regime change inIraq—preempting Saddam Hussein before he ac-quired weapons of mass destruction and themeans to deliver them, the link between Iraq andterrorism, and the danger that a region contain-ing 20 percent of world oil supplies could fallunder the control of a regime that might employthe resources for malevolent purposes—mirrorthe points Churchill made in a different yet simi-lar context over sixty years ago.

In 1941, Iraqi resistance against even ahastily organized, underarmed, outnumbered,and poorly supplied force proved illusory, muchas Iraqi resistance collapsed in the Persian GulfWar. Nevertheless, the debate in London on howfar to go proved remarkably similar to 1991. Un-like President George H.W. Bush, however,Churchill opted for regime change over the ad-vice of his commander, who was content withdiscrediting the leadership in the hope that Iraqiswould take matters into their own hands. Despiteinflammatory nationalist rhetoric, support for theregime of Rashid Ali proved as shallow amongIraqis as nostalgia for Saddam today.

Guarding oil facilities,Abadan.

Imperial War Museum



Lessons of HistoryA more important question is what Britain

gained from preventative war. The short answer isthat London solidified its position in the MiddleEast by preempting Axis intervention and alsobought time to bring a major ally on line, re-versed the tide of war in the Mediterranean the-ater that in spring 1941 strongly favored the Axis,and emerged among the victors of World War II.But even before the war ended, British power inthe Middle East had begun to wane, beginning inPalestine. Iraq, Iran, and Egypt were in turmoil bythe 1950s.

The prevailing verdict on British interactionwith Arab countries during World War II is thatby invading Iraq and Persia, exiling the mufti,

sponsoring Zionist counter-terror groups, and usingheavy-handed tactics inEgypt, London fueled theflames of Arab nationalismand Islamic fundamentalism.Those actions ultimatelycompromised long-term re-

gional interests. Stability in the Middle East, theBritish ambassador to Baghdad argued in 1941,hinged on Palestine. No amount of interventionto produce regime change elsewhere would re-solve that problem. At least one writer argues thatWavell was correct, that Turkish mediation andthe threat of British force could have produced acompromise that would have preserved Britishforces for more pressing operations and limitedArab resentment against colonialist policies.4

Although few lifted a finger to defend RashidAli and the Golden Square, the years from 1941to 1945 became known to Iraqis as the second oc-cupation, a time of reconstruction characterizedby heavy British troop presence, deep purges in

the army and administration, and electoral fraudto ensure that only supporters of the regentserved in parliament. Stable government underthe British brought a welcome alternative to theturmoil of the 1930s, but the long-term benefitswere less certain. The regime reinforced its tieswith tribal chiefs and favored landowners. Peas-ants fled to the burgeoning slums of Baghdad.Sunni politicians allowed Shias and Kurds onlycosmetic participation in the political process.The democratic impulse in Iraq was stillborn,while the monarchy labored with little success tobuild a popular following. The army, courted as asymbol of national unity by the monarchy andconsidered a requirement for internal order bythe British, retained its grip on areas traditionallydifficult to govern. This proved a costly solution.A growing effendi class of educated mid-level pro-fessionals and army officers attracted to pan-Arabideas and agitated by the continued conflict inPalestine articulated their discontent. The armyremoved the monarchy in 1958, and Iraq entereda period of murderous instability from which Sad-dam Hussein emerged in 1979 to seize power.

The challenge is translating victory over Sad-dam Hussein into a program that will stabilize aregion inclined toward effervescence and avoidthe need for a repeat intervention. The British ex-perience reveals that regime change alone is nopanacea. While it will eliminate the immediateproblem, it will not lead to lasting change unlessIraq is placed on a more democratic footing, andthe festering sore in the region—the Israel-Pales-tine dispute—is equitably resolved. JFQ

N O T E S

1 Mohammad A. Tarbush, The Role of the Military inPolitics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941 (London: KPI, 1982),pp. 171–79.

2 Harold E. Raugh, Jr., Wavell in the Middle East,1939–1941 (London: Brassey’s, 1993), p. 203.

3 I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and the MiddleEast, volume 2 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Of-fice, 1956), p. 186.

4 Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq, 1932–1958 (Ox-ford: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 235.

the prevailing verdict is that London fueled theflames of Arab nationalismand Islamic fundamentalism

Archibald Wavell. Imperial War Museum


O F C H I E F S A N D C H A I R M E N ■

General Wallace Martin Greene, Jr.(1907–2003)

Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

V I T A

Born in Waterbury, Vermont; attended University of Vermont (1925–26); graduated from Naval Academy (1930);basic school, Philadelphia (1931); Marine barracks, Portsmouth (1931–32); sea school, San Diego (1932); USS Tennessee (1932–34); Pensacola, Quantico, and Lakehurst (1934–36); chemical warfare school, EdgewoodArsenal; Guam (1936–37); 4th Marines, Shanghai (1937–39); junior course, Quantico (1939–40); 1st Marine

Brigade, Guantanamo (1940–41); 1st Marine Division, Quantico and New River (1941); naval observer, London; Britishamphibious warfare and demolition schools (1941–42); G–3, 3d Marine Brigade, Western Samoa (1942–43); G–3, V Amphibious Corps, Hawaii and Marshall Islands (1943–44); G–3, 2d Marine Division, Saipan and Tinian (1944); plansand policies division and personnel department, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (1944–46); amphibious trainingcommand, Little Creek (1946–48); G–3, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, at Pearl Harbor (1948–50); chief, combined armssection, Marine Corps Command and Staff College (1950–52); National War College (1952–53), special assistant to JointChiefs of Staff for NSC affairs (1953–55); assistantcommander, 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune(1955–56); commanding general, recruit trainingcommand and recruit depot, Parris Island, and CampLejeune (1956–59); assistant chief of staff (G–3),deputy chief of staff for plans, and chief of staff atHeadquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (1959–64); 23d

Commandant of the Marine Corps (1964–67); died inAlexandria, Virginia.

The Commandant is not a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs. Butwhen matters of direct concern to the Marine Corps are under consid-eration, then the Commandant meets with the Joint Chiefs and holds co-equal status with regard to such matters. . . . The Chiefs are advi-sors. They shape their advice for the good of the country—not on thebasis of priority for what their respective services may want. And theyare united as never before—more objective than ever before. . . . Eachof us expresses any opposition he may have to a particular proposal,with full supporting detail, during JCS meetings. That’s when it shouldbe done, when we’re shaping our recommendations, not after they’vegone to the Secretary or the President. . . . When asked, and during ourdeliberations, each of us states his views as a member of the JCS andas a service chief. . . . But these are views and recommendations. Theyare not decisions. The decisions are made by the Commander in Chief.

—Wallace M. Greene, Jr., “How the Joint Chiefs ofStaff View Their Dual Roles,” Armed ForcesManagement (December 1967)

U.S

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Portrait by Everett Raymond Kinstler


2004CJCS Essay CompetitionThe 23d annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition

was held on May 20–21, 2004, in Washington. This event was established byGeneral David Jones, USAF, the 9th Chairman, to challenge students at the

intermediate and senior colleges to write original essays on significant aspects of national security strategy.

N F I R S T P L A C E E S S AY S N

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HOWARD D. BELOTE, USAF(National War College)

“The Political Role of Regional Combatant Commanders”

and

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE W. SMITH, JR., USMC(Marine Corps War College)

“Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence

(Or, Have We Focused on the Wrong Transformation)”

N S E C O N D P L A C E E S S AY N

COMMANDER STEVEN W. KNOTT, USN(U.S. Army War College)

“Institutional Intellectualism as an Agent for Military Transformation”

N T H I R D P L A C E E S S AY N

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LING WEE LEE, REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE AIR FORCE

(Air War College)

“War Against Global Terrorism:

Winning the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of the Muslim World”

O F F T H E S H E L F ■

BOMBING SERBIAINTO SUBMISSIONA Review Essay by

CONRAD C. CRANE

The conflict in Kosovo spawnednumerous accounts of NATO air-

power in Allied Force. Even though twoRAND Project Air Force studies tout thesuccess of bombing in persuading Presi-dent Slobodan Milosevic to agree to a set-tlement, there are significant differencesin their analyses. But their conclusionsare provocative and troubling.

Benjamin Lambeth is a well regardedexpert on Soviet airpower and recent aircampaigns. NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: AStrategic and Operational Assessment is anexpanded version of a chapter in TheTransformation of American Airpower, pub-lished in 2001. The author details thedebate between General Wesley Clark,USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe,and Lieutenant General Michael Short,USAF, the air component commander.The former favored concentrating on Serbforces in Kosovo, while the latter wantedto destroy high-value targets in Belgradewith heavy attacks. Lambeth considersthe eventual campaign—the combinedapproach developed by Clark with incre-mental escalation intended to maintainAllied solidarity—as a mistake influencedby exaggerating the impact of airpoweron the Dayton Accords.

Lambeth does not consider the dis-jointed air operations launched to helpKosovo worthy of the designation cam-paign. But the bombing revealed weak-nesses in NATO capabilities, especially

electronic warfare and suppression of airdefenses, flexible targeting of groundforces, and interoperability. Serb airdefenses remained a threat throughout,and the air war had almost no effect onactions by Serb forces within Kosovo.Despite these deficiencies and the wrongstrategy, the ability of airpower to destroyfixed dual military-civilian infrastructuretargets in Yugoslavia, helped by theindictment of Milosevic and the loss ofinternational support, eventually inducedthe dictator to accept the terms offered bythe Alliance.

While the strength of the analysisby Lambeth is its operational assessmentof Allied Force, Stephen Hosmeradvances a particularly comprehensivestrategic analysis of the air war impact inThe Conflict Over Kosovo: Why MilosevicDecided to Settle When He Did. He sets outto explain why Milosevic did not settleearlier or hold out longer and arguesthat the Serb leader believed that accept-ing the Rambouillet terms would endan-ger his regime and that NATO could notconduct a sustained air campaignbecause of Russian pressure and coali-tion weakness. He expected to get betterterms by holding out.

Hosmer argues that Milosevic andhis henchmen eventually concededbecause they viewed the Allied offer ofJune 3 as an ultimatum preceding a geno-cidal air campaign that would devastateYugoslavia. The gradual Allied buildup,escalating attacks, and bombing of targetsthat the Serbs considered to be civilianpersuaded them that the coming assault

would cause immense hardship andimperil their rule. Milosevic believed hiswar-weary people would support a deci-sion to avoid more intensive bombing;moreover, he could maintain that thenew terms were less severe than the con-ditions offered at Rambouillet. UnlikeLambeth, Hosmer believes the gradualincrease in bombing allowed pressure tobuild, which would not have happened ifShort had been allowed to hit harder ear-lier. It also ensured the solidarity of theAlliance, which was the center of gravityfor the coalition.

The authors differ over the lessonsfor jointness. Lambeth laments the loss ofthe ground option at the beginning ofthe air campaign. But its main use wouldhave been to prevent Serb ground targetsfrom dispersing to hide from bombs, andthe errant strategy achieved the desiredresults anyway, though with considerabledelay. Some have argued that signs of animpending land invasion helped per-suade Milosevic to settle, but Lambethdiscounts the possibility because noground attack could have been executedfor months. Hosmer, in contrast, con-cludes that the ground threat persuadedthe Russians to abandon the Serbs andvoice dire warnings of an intense NATOassault, magnifying Serb fears of attackand of diplomatic isolation. The motiva-tions and effects of Russian actionsdeserve further study.

By contrast, Stephen Hosmer takesthe lessons learned too far, reading into

NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational

Assessmentby Benjamin S. Lambeth

Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2001.276 pp. $20.00

[ISBN 0–8330–3050–7]

The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle

When He Didby Stephen T. Hosmer

Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2001.155 pp. $20.00

[ISBN: 0–8330–3003–5]

Lieutenant Colonel Conrad C. Crane, USA(Ret.), is the author of American AirpowerStrategy in Korea, 1950–1953.


AP/Wide World Photos

Last exit in Belgrade.

NDU PressOn the Web

■ O F F T H E S H E L F


STATECRAFT ANDMARITIME POWERA Book Review by

THOMAS G. MAHNKEN

Anoted observer of naval and maritimeaffairs, Norman Friedman has pro-

duced a score of books and is a regularcontributor to the Proceedings of the U.S.Naval Institute. In Seapower as Strategy:Navies and National Interests, he exploresthe strategic implications of naval powerand echoes a maxim of Francis Bacon:“He that commandeth the sea is at greatliberty and may take as much or as littleof the war as he will.”

The author maintains that the flexi-bility inherent in seapower is its greateststrategic asset. The way that navies con-tribute to success has changed little,according to Friedman. Drawing onevents of the past three centuries, he dis-cusses how navies engage enemy fleets,conduct blockades and embargoes, pro-tect against invasion forces, and projectpower overseas.

The heart of Seapower as Strategy isan analysis of maritime power in twoworld wars and the Cold War. Moreover,Friedman looks at the role it might haveplayed through a consideration ofstrategic alternatives available to bel-ligerents. He concludes, for example,that the Gallipoli landing was flawed inexecution, not concept. Had that am-phibious operation succeeded, it mighthave kept Russia in the conflict, thusrelieving German pressure on the west-ern front. In opening up the Black Seaand the mouth of the Danube, it mightalso have allowed the Entente to knockAustria-Hungary out of the conflict.

On the other hand, Friedman maybe too critical of the British commitmentto the European continent, which robbedLondon of flexibility. He argues thatGreat Britain could have, or indeed

history that airpower had been the maincoercive instrument in Japan, Korea, Viet-nam, Iraq, and Bosnia. Still, the experi-ence of Kosovo offers provocative insightsfor the future. As much as Lambeth wantsto use the Gulf War as the model for theproper application of airpower, futureopponents are much more likely to be assmart as the Serbs than as inept as theIraqis. And Lambeth concedes that politi-cal constraints will probably make gradu-alism the standard method for applyingmilitary force. He wants the Air Force toincrease its targeting capabilities againstground forces but acknowledges that air-power “is, at bottom, a blunt instrumentdesigned to break things and kill people”and had its greatest effect againstYugoslavia’s dual-use infrastructure. Lam-beth is not prepared to consider theimplications of such an airpower strategy,but Hosmer is. He concludes that “attacksor threats of attacks on ‘dual-use’ militarytargets may be the most effective—and insome instances the only feasible way—tocoerce enemy decisionmakers to termi-nate conflicts and crises rapidly on termsacceptable to the United States.” Ameri-can political leaders must avoid incurringinternational and legal obligations thatcould limit such targeting options, whilemilitary leaders must continue to pursueways to limit collateral damage and civil-ian casualties.

Echoing Giulio Douhet, Hosmerargues that infrastructure attacks canquickly end wars and save both friendlyand enemy lives. He is surprised that Serbleaders viewed NATO air attacks asunconstrained while American airmenchafed under what they regarded as debil-itating restrictions. However, many Euro-peans and most of the Third World heldpositions similar to the Serbs. U.S. leadersmust realize that the international com-munity views bombing differently. Whilebriefers at the Pentagon stress the accu-racy of precision guided munitions, other

observers recall the horror of Hamburgand Dresden or Tokyo and Hiroshima—memories that are actually evidence ofthe coercive influence of airpower.

Hosmer argues that the attacks oninfrastructure also pressured Milosevic byweakening his control mechanisms andimposing costs on Serbian political elites,but the core of the campaign involveddisabling an economy already eroded bysanctions. The author deserves praise forlocating Serbian sources, which ifbelieved, reveal that the fear of massdeath or destruction was crucial to NATOsuccess. Even if the goal of air attacks wascoercion by increasing civilian hardships,it would still raise normative issues on theuse of such a strategy. One Pentagonspokesman speculated that the main rea-son for air effectiveness “was the increas-ing inconveniences that the bombingcampaign was causing in Belgrade andother cities.” The inconveniencesincluded nationwide power disruptionsand the destruction of petroleum refiner-ies, half of the television and radio broad-casting capacity, and more than half ofthe bridges over the Danube.

The implications of a strategy thattargets infrastructure and threatens civil-ians, even when it represents an optimumuse of airpower, are troubling. The U.N.International Criminal Tribunal consid-ered investigating allegations of warcrimes stemming from those attacks, anda committee of the British parliamentobserved that the Allied action was “ofdubious legality in the current state ofinternational law.” Beyond such criticism,the air campaign generated a severe back-lash against the West in Serbia. Ratherthan producing a quick victory, such acourse of action may in fact encouragepotential enemies to develop weapons ofmass destruction. Some believe that thisrationale motivates North Korea, most ofwhose cities were destroyed by Americanairpower between 1950 and 1953. JFQ

Seapower as Strategy: Navies andNational Interestsby Norman Friedman

Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001.352 pp. $36.95

[ISBN: 1–55750–291–9]

Lieutenant Commander Thomas G.Mahnken,USNR, is the author of Uncovering Ways ofWar: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign MilitaryInnovation, 1918–1941.

For more on current NDU Press

titles visit the National Defense

University Web site on the Internet

at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html



should have, allowed Germany to over-run France. But while the British mighthave survived such a disaster, as it did in1940, statesmen and soldiers clearlyfound this outcome unacceptable. Thatwas not because of ignorance ofseapower, but instead a recognition of thedire consequences of German dominance.In fact, this case illustrates that thosenations that possess seapower are notalways at liberty to take as much or as lit-tle of the war as they wish.

Another focus of Seapower as Strategyis coalition warfare. Friedman finds a nat-ural division of labor between maritimepower and continental allies. The UnitedStates, like Britain in the past, shouldremain an offshore balancer, with itsallies fielding the bulk of land forces.Although perhaps correct in theory, theauthor ignores the practical difficulties ofsuch a division. Continental allies havebeen reluctant to supply cannon fodderfor a distant maritime power. Just asBritain discovered in the Napoleonic era,monetary inducements and naval supportare often not enough to maintain coali-tions. A maritime power must often putboots on the ground as much to demon-strate political commitment as to ensuremilitary effectiveness.

Friedman is best when he turns totechnology and force structure. Twoappendices, worth the price of the book,offer a wealth of knowledge for laymen as well as experts. He speculates on therelevance of traditional concepts for net-work-centric operations, which he notesresemble conventional naval warfare.Unfortunately, he does not pursue thetheme. More debatable is his contentionthat contemporary trends decrease thevalue of landpower and airpower andincrease that of seapower. He may beright, but Kosovo and Afghanistan sug-gest otherwise.

The author offers little criticalanalysis of the theory of seapoweradvanced by Alfred Thayer Mahan, withits emphasis on decisive fleet engage-ment. Friedman chastises Britain, forexample, for failing to press home mari-time victories, yet he sidesteps the ques-tion of why a nation with seapoweroften fails to seek out and destroy ene-mies. Great Britain relied on the RoyalNavy not only for power projection, butalso to safeguard its shores from inva-sion. It is very well to claim that “it isour task to ensure that a decisive battlegoes our way,” but such statements arenot helpful to leaders charged with pro-viding national security. It is not sur-prising that dominant maritime powers

have frequently been reluctant to seekdecisive victories.

Friedman tends to generalize whenit is unwarranted. Is it really true thatonly rarely, if ever, has the United Statesfought to gain or retain territory? Andthe result of Enduring Freedom seems tocontradict the claim that “we now lackthe mass necessary to overrun, let aloneoccupy, even a moderate-size country.”Moreover, he poses strange assertions,including that North Korea and Indiawere in cahoots with Iraq during the Per-sian Gulf War. The latter point is particu-larly misplaced given that traditionallyneutral India took the unprecedentedstep of granting landing rights to theUnited States during Desert Shield. Butplacing such reservations aside, Seapoweras Strategy is a valuable synthesis of threecenturies of war at sea. JFQ

CHINESE NAVALPOWERA Book Review by

LARRY M. WORTZEL

To fill a gap in literature on the Peo-ple’s Liberation Army (PLA), The Great

Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters theTwenty-First Century by Bernard Cole sur-veys the maritime tradition, defense base,and role of seapower in China. Despite itsstrengths, some of the judgments foundin this book on the long-term intentionsof the naval buildup are questionable.The author—who teaches at the NationalWar College and served as a surface war-fare officer—believes that China has lim-ited goals while others, such as thereviewer, think they have strategic ambi-tions. But no one who follows maritimestrategy and Chinese military affairsshould ignore this book.

Cole thinks that a combination ofstrategic view, budget constraints, foreignrelations, and domestic political affairsmeans China will modernize its force tobecome a strong regional rather thanglobal navy. And he does not anticipateBeijing projecting its power around theworld in the future. The author bases thisconclusion in part on the contention thatChina has not traditionally maintainedan overseas military presence.

There is little doubt about the long-term Chinese military involvement in theconstruction of launch facilities for inter-mediate range ballistic missiles in SaudiArabia; there may still be PLA personnelsupporting them. The Tan-Zam railwaybetween Tanzania and Zambia was builtby Chinese engineers as a foreign aidproject. The Chinese People’s Volunteerswho invaded Korea remained on thepeninsula for years after the war. Andthere were some 50,000 Chinese soldiersin North Vietnam during the Indochinaconflict, and PLA forces constructed a

Colonel Larry M. Wortzel, USA (Ret.), is vicepresident of the Heritage Foundation andserved previously as director of the StrategicStudies Institute at the U.S. Army WarCollege.

The Great Wall at Sea: China’s NavyEnters the Twenty-First Century

By Bernard D. ColeAnnapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001.

288 pp. $34.95[ISBN: 1–55750–239–0]

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■ O F F T H E S H E L F


WARS AND RUMORSOF WARSA Book Review by

JAMES JAY CARAFANO

Drawing on archives at the U.S. ArmyWar College, Henry Gole has pro-

vided a revisionist interpretation of warplanning on the eve of World War II. InThe Road to Rainbow he argues that seri-ous planning for coalition warfare beganearlier than commonly assumed. In mak-ing his case, Gole assembles a wealth ofnew material on American preparationsfor global war, though his conclusion thatArmy leaders were then capable of meet-ing the challenges of a two-front war willlikely spark lively debate.

War plans are developed in a shad-owland. Preconflict planning does notusually capture the attention of historiansfor a good reason. The actions of states ina conflict often diverge from prewarthinking. Strictures considered inviolablefade once the first shot is fired. Nations atwar find themselves acting in ways thatthey would not countenance in peace-time. Conversely, unconstrained plan-ning without oversight tends to divergefrom the art of the possible to little morethan an academic exercise. Plans are sodissimilar from combat that they usuallybecome footnotes to history. One excep-tion is the Schlieffen Plan, which somebelieve was a catalyst for World War I.

Gole contends that the United Stateswas better prepared for war than histori-ans previously thought. Sidney Aster, forexample, concluded in Military Planningand the Origins of the Second World Warthat “Americans felt so secure after theFirst World War that their planning, until1938, was small scale and focused onhypothetical hostile powers.” Not so,according to Gole. At least as early as1934 the military was looking at realisticoptions for fighting Japan and later Ger-many. Long before Admiral Harold Stark,

road across northern Laos toward theThai border. On such matters Cole seemsto accept the official Chinese party line;part of his analysis minimizes the long-term military designs of Beijing.

The interpretation of Asian historyin The Great Wall at Sea is also question-able. Chinese fleets carrying invasionforces attempted to penetrate Japan in1274 and 1281. Only a typhoon, theproverbial kamikaze (divine wind),stopped their assault. The establishmentof trading colonies around Asia and theMiddle East were also based on navalpower. Admiral Zheng He (1371–1433)led seven expeditions. His fleets includedhundreds of ships and thousands oftroops dispatched to impose the will ofthe Middle Kingdom on trading states.When a Chinese admiral showed up withmore ships than had ever been seen andlanding forces larger than the local mili-tary, requests for commercial treatiesinvariably followed. This hardly consti-tutes a pacific maritime tradition.

Moreover, Cole does not examineChinese literature, but relies extensivelyon translations by the Foreign BroadcastInformation Service and other sources.There is no reference to Chinese work inthe notes or bibliography. When authorslack a working knowledge of the vernac-ular of their research, they normallyenlist the services of a collaborator withthe requisite linguistic skills. For thislapse, the Naval Institute Press bearssome of the blame for not insisting on a

survey of the major PLA sources in theoriginal language.

Scholarship aside, Cole is rightwhen it comes to military-technicalanalysis. The Chinese defense industrialbase remains weak. Moreover, Beijinghas focused on other sectors, perhaps atthe expense of near-term military expan-sion. As the author observes, China isbuying what it needs for the navy.Because it cannot manufacture sophisti-cated turbine engines and power sys-tems, it must depend on foreign sources.It is also unable to build precision target-ing and combat management systemsand so depends on the West and Russia.

Thus the picture is mixed. When ithad the strongest fleets in the region,China exercised suzerainty over its neigh-bors. Today it is seeking an indigenousnaval industrial complex. There is no rea-son to think that Beijing will limit itsambitions once its goals are met. Allthose interested in maritime powershould read this book. However, its judg-ments on long-term intentions should betempered by further study of Chinesemilitary and naval history. JFQ

Lieutenant Colonel James Jay Carafano, USA(Ret.), is the author of After D-Day: OperationCobra and the Normandy Breakout.

The Road to Rainbow: ArmyPlanning for Global War, 1934–1940

by Henry G. GoleAnnapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.

256 pp. $34.95[ISBN: 1–55750–409–1]

U.S. Navy (Nathanael T. Miller)

PLA destroyervisiting Guam.



Chief of Naval Operations, promulgatedhis famous Plan Dog memorandum in1940, Army thinking envisioned a two-front war, the need for coalition partners,and defeating Germany first.

Sorting through the contents of 25footlockers at the U.S. Army War College,Gole found student papers from 1934 to1940 on allied participation. Much of theresearch evaluated the Color Plans, prede-cessor to the better known RainbowPlans, which a joint Army-Navy boardbegan drafting in April 1940. While thepapers concerned exercises, Gole claimsthat they were relevant to war planning.Before World War II, the college waslocated at Washington Barracks (now FortLesley J. McNair). Much of the researchwas done at the behest of the War Depart-ment, which tasked students to examinestrategic planning. When the collegeclosed its doors in 1940, faculty andmany graduates were assigned to the warplans division. In addition, students whoworked on Allied planning advanced tofill senior command and staff positions(Gole provides a detailed list of graduatesin an appendix).

The Road to Rainbow contains awealth of new information, but the bookmisses opportunities to explore its sub-ject in detail because of its problematicorganization and the failure to make fulluse of the research material on hand. Partone sketches the state of military pre-paredness, general staff planning, andeducational activity between the wars.While interesting, this history isrehearsed elsewhere. It would have beenmore helpful if integrated into analysesof war planning exercises to illustratethe influence of real world events andconstraints on student thinking.

The core of this book covers eachyear of the curriculum, from the study ofwar with Japan in 1934 to requirementsfor hemispheric defense in 1939. The bal-ance of the chapters summarize eventsafter the outbreak of hostilities and activi-ties of the War Department. This chrono-logical approach is tedious, and overarch-ing themes of the work are easily lost.

The archives of the U.S. Army WarCollege also include instructor critiques,student comments, and interaction withthe War Department. This data providesevidence for assessing the worldview ofmen who fought long and hard on twofronts and shaped the Cold War. Theplans should be sifted not only forinsights on operational thinking but fornotions on technological advances andgeopolitics, as well as the assumptionsthat underpinned military decisions. Few

analyses of prewar planning root out suchmaterial in detail. Arming Against Hitler:France and the Limits of Military Planningby Eugenia Kiesling is one work that ven-tures into this area. Gole largely missedhis chance.

Finally, the general conclusion ofthis book will likely provoke discussion.Gole finds that the skills of coalition war-fare were ingrained in war college stu-dents and suffused in the thinking of theArmy Staff. If true, it is unclear why par-ticipation in coalition planning in theopening years of the war was so flawed.The Army advocated a cross-channelinvasion in 1942, which would haveresulted in one of the greatest militarydisasters in history. The poor performanceof American soldiers in North Africashould have been sufficient proof thatthey were not ready. In addition, if plan-ners had such a thorough conception ofglobal war in 1939, why were they outar-gued and outflanked by British plannersat the Casablanca Conference in 1943?

Gole rightly draws attention to stu-dent work on the eve of Pearl Harbor. Yettoo much can be made of the musings of

war college students. Many of these offi-cers had also attended the U.S. ArmyGeneral Command and Staff Collegewhere the study of coalition operationsduring World War I led to the conclusionthat “if we have to go to war again, let’sdo it without the allies.”

In a work of related interest, Alliesand Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff,the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy inWorld War II, Mark Stoler looks at plan-ning from 1939 to V–J Day. While findingthat the military was not devoid of intel-lectual horsepower to conceptualizeglobal warfare, he perceives less coher-ence than The Road to Rainbow would leadreaders to expect.

There are wars and rumors of wars—and there are war plans. Each has a placein military history. The Road to Rainbow isa powerful reminder that coalition plan-ning is essential to grooming strategicleaders. The years leading to World War IIprovide a valuable case study on harness-ing the instruments of national power ina changing world. JFQ

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