6 September 1996

Joint Pub 3-50.3

Joint Doctrinefor

Evasion and Recovery

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides operational andorganizational guidelines and establishes aframework for the planning and execution ofjoint conventional and unconventionalevasion and recovery operations. It alsoprovides specific guidance on joint tactics,techniques, and procedures (JTTP) for theconduct of certain aspects of these operations.This publication contains material commonto all the Services which can be used as sourcematerial for indoctrination, briefing, training,and operational programs at all levels. It isderived primarily from Department of Statepolicies, Office of the Secretary of Defensedirectives, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)decisions, and policies and guidancedeveloped by the JCS Executive Agent andthe individual Services. This publicationreplaces the doctrine and guidance on evasionand related subjects contained in AFM 200-3/FM 21-77A/NWP 43 (A), 1 August 1967,“Joint Worldwide Evasion and EscapeManual.” Those portions of the manualpertaining to resistance to enemyinterrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation;prisoner communications; prisoner of warcamp procedures; and escape have beensuperseded by FM 21-78, 15 June 1989,“Resistance and Escape.”

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine andselected JTTP to govern the joint activitiesand performance of the Armed Forces of theUnited States in joint operations as well asthe doctrinal basis for US militaryinvolvement in multinational and interagencyoperations. It provides military guidance for

the exercise of authority by combatantcommanders and other joint force commandersand prescribes doctrine and selected tactics,techniques, and procedures for joint operationsand training. It provides military guidance foruse by the Armed Forces in preparing theirappropriate plans. It is not the intent of thispublication to restrict the authority of the jointforce commander (JFC) from organizing theforce and executing the mission in a mannerthe JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unityof effort in the accomplishment of the overallmission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques,and procedures and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commanders ofcombatant commands, subunified commands,joint task forces, and subordinate componentsof these commands. These principles andguidance also may apply when significantforces of one Service are attached to forces ofanother Service or when significant forces ofone Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine and

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procedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluate

and follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

CARLTON W. FULFORD, JR.Major General, USMCActing Director, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..............................................................................................v

CHAPTER IGENERAL

• Evasion and Recovery Responsibilities...................................................................... I-1• Operational and Planning Considerations................................................................. I-1• Joint Search and Rescue Center................................................................................. I-3• Rescue Coordination Center...................................................................................... I-4

CHAPTER IIEVASION

• Definition..................................................................................................................II-1• Moral, Legal, and Operational Guidelines for Evasion..............................................II-1• Code of Conduct Responsibilities While Evading.....................................................II-1• Laws Governing Evasion..........................................................................................II-2• Evasion Throughout the Range of Military Operations..............................................II-4• Training for Evasion.................................................................................................II-8• Planning for Evasion.................................................................................................II-8• Evasion Strategies.....................................................................................................II-9• Aids to Evasion.......................................................................................................II-12• Support to Evaders..................................................................................................II-15

CHAPTER IIIRECOVERY

• Definition................................................................................................................ III-1• Types of Recovery.................................................................................................. III-1• Philosophy Behind Recovery Operations................................................................ III-1• Recovery Considerations......................................................................................... III-1• Categories of Recovery Operations......................................................................... III-4• Signaling...............................................................................................................III-12• Contact Procedures...............................................................................................III-12• Custody.................................................................................................................III-14• Support to E&R Operations..................................................................................III-14• E & R-Related Message Traffic........................................................................... III-15• Security................................................................................................................. III-16

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APPENDIX

A Administrative Processing of DOD Individuals Who Have Returned from Isolated Territory................................................................... A-1

B Sample Security Nondisclosure Agreement........................................................ B-1C Sample Isolated Personnel Report....................................................................... C-1D Evasion Plan of Action Format.......................................................................... D-1E Blood Chit Program Administration................................................................... E-1F Evasion and Recovery Messages......................................................................... F-1G Planning Supplement (Classified)(published separately)..................................... G-1H References......................................................................................................... H-1J Administrative Instructions.................................................................................. J-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions............................................................................... GL-3

FIGURE

I-1 Evasion and Recovery (E&R) Responsibilities................................................ I-2I-2 E&R Responsibilities of the Joint Search and Rescue Center.......................... I-5II-1 Code of Conduct -- Article II.........................................................................II-1II-2 Planning for Evasion.....................................................................................II-8II-3 Extended Versus Short-Range Evasion........................................................II-11III-1 Types of Recovery........................................................................................ III-2III-2 Recovery Considerations.............................................................................. III-3III-3 Unconventional Recovery Operations.......................................................... III-8III-4 Recovery Criteria....................................................................................... III-13III-5 Support to Evasion & Recovery Operations............................................... III-14

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

Provides General Evasion and Recovery Considerations

Covers the Moral, Legal, and Operational Guidelines for Evasion

Discusses the Philosophy and Considerations of Recovery

•

•

•

The Guidelines for Evasion

General

Evasion and recovery (E&R) operations are an integral partof military operations. The combatant commanders areresponsible for developing plans and requirements to locate,support, recover, and repatriate isolated personnel. E&Roperations improve the effectiveness of United States combatforces by preventing the capture and exploitation of USpersonnel by an enemy. E&R operations can be successfulin any environment. Detailed plans, operations, andprocedures should be developed at subordinate levels.Operational flexibility and multi-system redundancy arethe primary factors in successful recovery. The Joint Searchand Rescue Center is the organization responsible forintegrating, monitoring, and maintaining records of alloperations which support and recover isolated personnel.Component commanders establish rescue coordination centers(RCCs) to coordinate all component combat search and rescueactivities, including coordination with other RCCs asappropriate.

Evasion is an extension of combat and a refusal tocapitulate to the enemy. Potential evaders should understandtheir moral, legal, and operational responsibilities. To ensurepotential evaders are properly prepared, the Services shouldintegrate Code of Conduct and resistance training intoappropriate E&R and survival training programs. Evadersare obligated by the Code of Conduct to make every effort toavoid capture and rejoin friendly forces.

Under established international law, an evader is considereda lawful combatant until captured. A prisoner of war escapeeevading recapture is not considered a lawful combatant. TheLaw of War places certain restrictions on an evader. It is a

For evasion and recovery(E&R) operations to bemost effective, the jointforce commander shouldintegrate them fully withother available types ofoperations which supportand recover isolatedpersonnel, such as searchand rescue, combat searchand rescue, anddiplomatic negotiations.

Evasion is the processwhereby individuals whoare isolated in hostile orunfriendly territory avoidcapture with the goal ofsuccessfully returning toareas under friendlycontrol.

Evader actions aregoverned by a variety ofnational and internationallaws and conventions.

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E&R requires training,planning, strategies, andsupport.

Recovery is the return ofevaders to friendly control.

Successful recoveryoperations requireextensive preparation andplanning.

violation of the Law of War to “make improper use of ” theuniform of the enemy. It is a violation to kill, injure or capturethe enemy by feigning civilian status, sickness, or wounds, orby falsely indicating an intent to surrender or negotiate.Protected emblems, such as the red cross, may not be used asdisguises for purposes of escape or evasion in armed conflict.During military operations other than war, legalconsiderations for E&R in sovereign countries differ fromthose during war.

Successful E&R is dependent on effective training and priorplanning. Training should include the techniques of combatsurvival, evasion movement, camouflage, surface navigation,E&R equipment, aids and devices, and recovery proceduresand methods. Successful evasion is dependent on effectiveprior planning. The responsibility ultimately rests with theindividual concerned. Sound evasion planning shouldincorporate intelligence briefings; selected areas for evasionarea intelligence descriptions; E&R area studies; survival,evasion, resistance, and escape guides and bulletins; isolatedpersonnel reports; and an evasion plan of action. Evasionstrategies along the forward edge of the battle (FEBA) candepend on whether the FEBA is static, advancing, orretreating. Extended evasion occurs when the distance fromthe friendly force is much greater. Aids to evasion includeevasion charts, blood chits, and pointee-talkees. In someinstances, evaders may be isolated deep in hostile territoryand early recovery will not be possible. E&R planners shoulddevelop means to provide assistance to the evader, such as cachesand resupply operations, until recovery can be effected.

Recovery is achieved from planning, operations, and individualactions on the part of recovery planners, conventional orunconventional recovery forces, and/or the evaders themselves.Evaders may recover, or be recovered, to friendly controlin a number of ways: they may make their way to friendly orneutral territory without assistance, they may be recovered asthe result of planned conventional or unconventional recoveryoperations, or they may be recovered as the result of chancecontact with friendly elements of the local populace performingacts of mercy or seeking profit.

The elements that impact recovery operations includeavailability of resources; capabilities and limitations of thoseresources; the exploitation of options as they become available;ability to task-organize; and the establishment of recovery

The Guidelines for Recovery

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Executive Summary

criteria. The methods for recovering evaders fall into twocategories: conventional (unassisted recovery, combat searchand rescue operations, or on-scene availability, making useof conventional aerial, surface, and subsurface military forcesand equipment) and unconventional (planned assistedrecovery or unplanned assisted recovery using specialoperations forces, guerrillas, clandestine organizations, and/or specially equipped clandestinely operated aircraft).Assisted recoveries can be either planned or unplanneddue to chance. Once isolated, evaders should follow theirevasion plan of action to the best of their ability. Wheneveran individual is recovered, the most critical aspect of thatrecovery is the moment when the evader and the recoveryforce initially come together. Once in custody of the recoveryforce, evaders are searched and secured pending confirmationof their identity. All-source intelligence, civil affairs andpsychological operations, operations security/militarydeception, and communications security all support E&Roperations.

This publication provides operational and organizationalguidelines and establishes a framework for the planning andexecution of joint conventional and unconventional evasionand recovery operations. It discusses evasion and recoveryoperations across the range of military operations.

CONCLUSION

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IGENERAL

I-1

1. Evasion and RecoveryResponsibilities

a. US Government (USG). The USG hasthe responsibility to assist and plan for therecovery of personnel who are isolated inhostile territory as the result of conflictthroughout the range of mil i taryoperations. This responsibility includesobtaining the release of US citizens who areunlawfully detained by hostile or unfriendlypowers. The Department of Defense (DOD)retains primary responsibility for its personneleven though it may be necessary to coordinateor conduct recovery operations or activitiesthrough other agencies of the government.

b. DOD Organizations. The responsibilitiesof the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,the Defense Intelligence Agency, the DefenseMapping Agency, combatant commanders,and the Services are described in MCM 136-91, “Delineation of Responsibilities forEvasion and Escape Within the Departmentof Defense,” (To be replaced by CJCSI3270.01). Users of this joint publicationshould ensure they are familiar with thatdocument. Some specific evasion andrecovery (E&R) responsibilities are describedbelow and are summarized in Figure I-1.

• The combatant commanders, inresponse to strategic direction, areresponsible for developing plans andrequirements to locate, support,recover, and repatriate isolatedpersonnel. Although the supportedcombatant commander initiates these

efforts, the Joint Staff can assist Servicesand other agencies in providing support.

• The Services and the US SpecialOperations Command (USSOCOM) areresponsible for individual training ofpotential isolated personnel. TheServices and USSOCOM should developand procure equipment that meets therequirements established by the supportedcombatant commanders to locate, support,recover, and repatriate isolated personnel.Repatriation of recovered personnel is aService responsibility with the supportedcombatant commander providing directsupport.

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffhas delegated to the Chief of Staff of theAir Force (CSAF) the primaryresponsibility for developing jointE&R tactics, techniques, and procedurespublications; equipment; specializedE&R aids and tools; and for providingfunctional survival and E&R trainingexpertise to the Services and combatantcommanders. The Joint ServicesSurvival, Evasion, Resistance, andEscape (SERE) Agency (JSSA) is theaction agent for the CSAF.

2. Operational and PlanningConsiderations

For E&R operations to be most effective,the joint force commander (JFC) shouldintegrate E&R operations fully with otheravailable types of operations which support

“In no other professions are the penalties for employing untrained personnelso appalling or irrevocable as in the military.”

General Douglas MacArthurAnnual Report to the Chiefs of Staff, 1933

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and recover isolated personnel, such assearch and rescue (SAR), combat search andrescue (CSAR), and diplomatic negotiations.The following paragraphs discuss operationaland planning considerations for E&Roperations.

a. E&R operations are an integral partof military operations, improving theeffectiveness of US combat forces bypreventing the capture and exploitation of USpersonnel by an enemy.

b. E&R operations can be successful inany environment. Local conditions shouldbe considered as exploitable, surmountablefactors rather than absolute barriers tosuccess.

c. While combatant commanders providestrategic E&R guidance and specific trainingrequirements for their operational area,

detailed plans, operations, and proceduresshould be developed at subordinate levels,taking into consideration local geographic,climatic, political, cultural, and militaryfactors. The joint E&R tactics, techniques,and procedures in this publication not onlyserve as guides for planning and operations,they facilitate realistic Service E&R training.Where possible, the E&R plan should be fullycoordinated with the CSAR plan to ensurethat evader equipment and procedures arecompatible with CSAR equipment andprocedures.

d. Since the assets most suited to therecovery of an evader may not be controlledby the evader’s parent Service, evasionsupport and recovery operations normallyshould be conducted as jo int ormultinational operations, as appropriate.Coordinating individual Service efforts andintegrating organic recovery assets into joint

EVASION & RECOVERY (E&R)RESPONSIBILITIES

Combatant Commanders

Develop plans and requirements to locate, support,recover, and repatriate isolated personnel

Services and US Special Operations Command

Perform individual training of potential isolatedpersonnelDevelop and procure equipment

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Develops joint E&R tactics, techniques, andprocedures; publications; equipment; specialized E&Raids and toolsProvides functional survival and E&R training expertiseto the Services and combatant commanders

Figure I-1. Evasion and Recovery (E&R) Responsibilities

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force recovery plans avoids duplication ofeffort, establishes complementary systems,and exploits unique, specialized resources.

e. Operational flexibility and multi-systemredundancy are the primary factors insuccessful recovery. No single recoverysystem, force, or organization is suitable toall situations or can meet all requirementsin any given situation. To cover allcontingencies, a mix of conventional andunconventional recovery systems should beavailable for employment. Failure toestablish alternative recovery systems or adaptstandardized recovery systems to localconditions invites failure.

3. Joint Search and RescueCenter

The JFC normally designates the JointSearch and Rescue Center (JSRC) as theorganization responsible for integrating alloperations which support and recoverisolated personnel. The JSRC normallyvalidates and approves E&R operationsconcepts developed by the components, thenmonitors the implementation of thoseconcepts. Once the component hasimplemented an E&R operational concept,the JSRC monitors its status and implementsthe best option to support and recover isolatedpersonnel. The following paragraphs

The eight RH-53 helicopters take off from the carrier Nimitz for the rendezvouswith the C-130 transports in central Iran. It is 7:30 in the evening somewherein the Arabian Sea as the Navy Sea Stallion formation prepares for its journeyto the secret meeting on the sands of Dasht-e-Kavir desert, some 250 milesfrom the city of Tehran. The leading edges of one of the ruinous sandstormsthat developed that night are visible on the horizon at the extreme right. Themission was joined by six C-130 Hercules Cargo planes from the US Air Forceat the rendezvous site, flown in from Aswan, Egypt to refuel the choppers andjam Iranian radar. Dust storms and mechanical failures in three of the eightRH-53 helicopters forced abandonment of the mission.

The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission Begins — April 24, 1980Artist, Ren Wicks - USAF Art Collection #69.80.

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techniques, and procedures affecting potentialevaders.

b. Normally, the JSRC is augmented bycommunications specialists, intelligencespecialists, and personnel trained in SERE.During periods of conflict, the augmentedJSRC acts as the coordination center tointegrate E&R operations with other typesof support and recovery activities. The JSRCprovides the JFC the expertise required toaccomplish the recovery mission. (Refer toJoint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint CombatSearch and Rescue [CSAR],” for details onJSRC manning and operating procedures.)

c. To properly carry out its joint E&Rmanagement and coordinating functions, theJSRC performs the responsibilities listed inFigure I-2.

4. Rescue Coordination Center

Component commanders establishRCCs to coordinate all component CSARactivities, including coordination with otherRCCs as appropriate. In some cases the JFCmay task a component commander todesignate the component RCC to function alsoas the JSRC. In this event, the JFC shouldgive the component commander therequisite authority and responsibility foroperating the JSRC as required by the jointforce. (See Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine forJoint Combat Search and Rescue [CSAR],”for a detailed description of RCCresponsibilities and functions.)

describe the JSRC capabilities andresponsibilities as they relate to E&R.

a. In addition to the roles and functionsdefined in Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine forJoint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR),”the JSRC is the primary combatantcommand organization to manage andcoordinate E&R planning and operationswithin the geographical area assigned tothe joint force. The facility is operated jointlyby personnel from two or more Service orfunctional components, or it may have amultinational staff of personnel from two ormore allied or coalition nations(multinational search and rescue center). TheJSRC should be staffed by trained personneldrawn from each joint force component,including US Coast Guard participationwhere practical. During peacetime,standing JSRCs normally oversee thedevelopment of integrated evasion andrecovery concepts of operations to supportoperation plans, operation plans in conceptformat, and peacetime operations. Thestanding JSRCs should also coordinatetraining and exercises to prepare the JFC andcomponent staffs, as well as forces whichcould be involved in SAR or E&R operations,to conduct support and recovery operationsacross the range of military operations. TheJSRC coordinates the operational areas,reduces redundancy of coverage, and isfamiliar with the capabilities and limitationsof the rescue coordination centers (RCCs) andforces under their control. E&R planners usethis information to develop tactics,

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E&R RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE JOINTSEARCH AND RESCUE CENTER

Ensures that a coordinated theater evasion and recovery (E&R) program isdeveloped, and that all assigned forces possessing E&R capabilities and assets areprepared to execute the theater joint E&R mission

Maintains direct and continuous liaison with designated recovery assets andcomponent command E&R offices of primary responsibility

Develops a joint force concept of operations and related tactics in coordinationwith the component commands and recovery assets

Ensures the development of E&R annexes to all joint force plans

Ensures the standardization of joint force E&R operations procedures involvingconventional and special operations forces, and unconventional assisted recoverymechanisms, to include contact and authentication procedures

Ensures that all E&R equipment, tactics, procedures, and techniques are compatiblewithin the joint force and are disseminated to potential users

Establishes procedures to task support to recovery forces and monitor missionprogress and status of recovery assets

Establishes procedures to locate and communicate with personnel evading indenied or hostile areas

Determines evasion aid requirements

Recommends to the joint force commander E&R aids to support componentrequirements as well as the joint search and rescue center integrated supportconcept; coordinates with Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and EscapeAgency (JSSA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for production of E&R aids asappropriate

Ensures that E&R scenarios during field and command post exercises are realistic,adequate, and reflect the theater environment and operating conditions

Participates in the development of E&R tactics, including exercise planning

Maintains records containing all available data on joint force personnel isolated inhostile territory conducting E&R; when no longer needed by the joint search andrescue center, forward them to JSSA for permanent archiving; do not destroy anyrecords or case files relating to a missing, captured, or recovered person

Ensures that available data, including all-source intelligence, on the evasionenvironment in the theater is collected, maintained, and disseminated to appropriatecommands

Forwards all information concerning sightings of missing, evading, or capturedpersonnel to appropriate commands, DIA, and JSSA

Ensures that recovered and returned individuals who receive assistance fromevasion mechanisms are debriefed by qualified intelligence personnel in accordancewith the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed debriefing policies andprocedures (see Appendix A, Administrative Processing of Department of DefenseIndividuals Who Have Returned from Isolated Territory )

Ensures that the results of returnee debriefings are properly disseminated inaccordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and JSSA guidance

Coordinates on all E&R-related directives issued by involved agencies

Provides selected personnel for specialized briefings or training when sodirected by the joint force commander

“”

Figure I-2. E&R Responsibilities of the Joint Search and Rescue Center

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIEVASION

II-1

1. Definition

Evasion is the process whereby individualswho are isolated in hostile or unfriendlyterritory avoid capture with the goal ofsuccessfully returning to areas under friendlycontrol.

2. Moral, Legal, andOperational Guidelines forEvasion

Potential evaders should understandtheir moral, legal, and operationalresponsibi l i t ies, and how varyingtechniques, equipment, and support affectevasion activities. To ensure that potentialevaders are properly prepared, the Servicesshould integrate Code of Conduct andresistance training into appropriate E&Rand survival training programs and shoulddevelop E&R training and/or indoctrinationprograms for all personnel who may besubject to isolation or capture in hostileterritory.

3. Code of ConductResponsibilities WhileEvading

An evader remains a combatant for theduration of the evasion period. Article IIof the Code of Conduct is shown in Figure II-1.Evasion is an extension of combat and arefusal to capitulate to the enemy. Evadersare obligated by the Code of Conduct tomake every effort to avoid capture andrejoin friendly forces. Evaders who have beenrecovered provide useful information concerningsuccessful evasion techniques and provide theircountry with inspirational morale victories, whiledenying the enemy the opportunity to captureand exploit prisoners. Efforts to evade fulfillboth the intent and the spirit of the Codeof Conduct. Evaders not only tie up enemyforces who have been directed to capture them,they cost the enemy time and resources that couldotherwise be committed to other efforts. Even ifeventually captured, evaders have nonethelessaided their country by denying the enemypotential access to timely intelligence.

“Evasion is the highest form of Resistance.”

SERE Training Instructor, JSSA

CODE OF CONDUCT ARTICLE II—

“

”

I will never surrender of my own free will. If incommand, I will never surrender the members of mycommand while they still have the means to resist.

Figure II-1. Code of Conduct - Article II

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4. Laws Governing Evasion

Evader actions are governed by a varietyof national and international laws andconventions, depending on the type ofconflict in which individuals are engaged.

a. Legal Aspects of Evasion During War

• Under established international law,an evader is considered a lawfulcombatant until captured. A prisonerof war (POW) escapee evading recaptureis not considered a lawful combatant.

• Although this joint publication deals withprinciples and military guidance togovern the conduct of evasion andrecovery activities only, it is neverthelessimportant to stress the distinction that ismade between an evader and a POWescapee. This distinction is significantbecause although an individual who hasescaped from a confinement facilityengages in activities to avoid recapture,the individual is legally considered anescapee, not an evader, and the lawswhich protect an evader do not pertain.Under international law, an evader maycommit acts of violence againstlegitimate military targets withoutbeing liable for prosecution by the enemyfor violation of the local criminal laws.This entitlement does not extend to aPOW escapee. An escapee is no longerprivileged to commit hostile acts andmay be charged under the laws of thedetaining power for certain actscommitted against the military or civilianpopulation while escaping or avoidingrecapture. The critical difference is thefact of capture. In the first instance, theindividual is considered an evader and alawful combatant and is subject tospecific international laws; in the secondinstance, the escapee is subject to a totallydifferent aspect of the law. Anotherdistinction is made in the disposition of

evaders and escapees who find their wayinto a neutral country. The evader whocrosses into a neutral country is subjectto detention by that country for theduration of the war. A neutral powerthat receives escaped POWs will leavethem at liberty. If it allows them toremain in its territory, it may assign thema place of residence. The GenevaConventions, particularly as set forth inArticles 91-94, GPW, recognize thatPOWs have a national obligation toescape and rejoin their own forces. Underthose articles, POWs apprehended duringor after an attempted escape are subjectto disciplinary punishment only,provided any offenses they may havecommitted were for the sole purpose offacilitating their escape and providedthose offenses do not entail any violenceagainst life or limb or are acts intendedfor self-enrichment.

• The Law of War places certainrestrictions on an evader, but it alsoprovides evaders with a certain latitudein what is considered acceptable conduct.This is particularly true in the caseof disguises.

•• Wearing of Enemy Uniforms. It isa violation of international law to “makeimproper use of ” the uniform of theenemy. Persons captured while fightingin the enemy’s uniforms have traditionallybeen subject to severe punishment by thecapturing power and treated as spies. Itis, however, still permissible for militarypersonnel isolated in hostile territory touse enemy uniforms to evade capture, aslong as no other military operations areconducted while so attired. Persons whouse the enemy’s flag, uniform, insignia,markings, or emblems solely for evasionare not lawfully subject to disciplinarypunishment on that account, as long asthey do not attack the enemy, gathermilitary information, or engage in similar

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operations. However, wearing an enemyuniform is extremely dangerous becauseit could result in the mistaken but likelytreatment of the evader as a spy.

•• Wearing of Civilian Clothing. It isa violation of international law to kill,injure, or capture the enemy by feigningcivilian status, sickness or wounds, or byfalsely indicating an intent to surrenderor negotiate. For example, it would beunlawful to feign surrender and attack theenemy when they come forward to takeyou prisoner. However, it is permissiblefor military personnel isolated inhostile territory to feign civilian statuswhile evading, though they shouldavoid combatant or espionageactivities while dressed as civilians.Evaders who feign civilian status solelyfor evasion are not lawfully subject todisciplinary punishment on that accountif captured. In practice, of course, it maybe difficult for a military member toestablish this if apprehended in civilianclothing. From a practical standpoint, allpotential and actual evaders may atsome time consider the possibility oftrying to disguise themselves as local(enemy) people by putting on civilianattire in the expectation of passing asnatives. At best, that is extremelydangerous. Where the evader’s race isdifferent from that of people indigenousto the area, the procedure should beadopted only if there is no otheralternative. Even in an area where racialdissimilarities would not betray theevader, the mannerisms of walking, eating,and even smoking, plus unfamiliarity withthe language, would more than likelyquickly bring on suspicion, leading toinvestigation and capture.

•• Under certain circumstances, theadoption of varying degrees of disguisemay be logical, appropriate, andrequired. For instance, if the population

density is such that movement in uniformis not possible, the evader may berequired to adopt some sort of disguiseto transit the area. Likewise, if contactwith an indigenous assistance grouphas been established, the evader maybe required to disguise himself tofacilitate movement within an assistedevasion network. In these instances, thejudgment of the assistance group shouldbe respected. In so doing, evaders needto understand that in the event of capturethey will likely be treated exactly likemembers of the assistance group, unlessthey can convince their captors that theyare Americans. If the evaders’ assistorshave decided to disguise them in civilianclothing, they should retain at least someof their uniform. Such items as insignia,identification tags, US Armed Forces/Geneva Conventions Identification Card,and blood chit, to use as proof of status,would probably be the most convincingin the event of capture.

•• Misuse of the Red Cross and OtherProtected Emblems. Protectedemblems may not be used as disguisesfor purposes of escape or evasion inarmed conflict. Only bona fide medicalpersonnel, chaplains, and relief agencypersonnel may wear these emblemsduring armed conflict.

b. Legal Aspects of Evasion DuringMilitary Operations Other Than War(MOOTW). Legal considerations for E&Rduring MOOTW in sovereign countriesdiffer from those during war . Theprotection provided by the GenevaConventions for evaders as belligerents doesnot apply in a situation where either conflictdoes not exist or, if it does exist, the USG isnot directly involved. National laws governillegal entry, acts of violence, theft, andother aspects. US military personnel maybe subject to these national laws whileoperating in the target country. Violations

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may be necessary to execute an operation;however, physical force or violence and theftmay aggravate an individual’s legal positionand release if captured. Force may be necessaryto protect the military member’s life; however,it should be kept to a minimum. Legal concernsmay be irrelevant because political factors andthe target country’s relationship with the US maydictate the treatment of US personnel capturedin an operation.

“There is but one honourable mode ofbecoming a prisoner of war. That is,by being taken separately; by which ismeant, by being cut off, entirely, andwhen we can no longer make use ofour weapons. In this case there canbe no conditions, for honor can imposenone. We yield to irresistiblenecessity.”

Napoleon I,Maxims of War, 1831

5. Evasion Throughout theRange of Military Operations

Although the fundamental principles ofevasion remain fairly constant, varyingcircumstances influence the behavior andactions of evading personnel. Tactics,techniques, and procedures for E&R areoften determined more by the type ofconflict and its political implications thanby the intensity of the conflict. Threats toE&R in war or MOOTW can be equallyintense and may involve similar operationalrequirements, capabilities, and risks. Thepolitical situation, a major variant amongconflict types, often determines the wayE&R operations are executed. For instance,in conducting MOOTW, where the presenceof US forces is denied, disavowed, orpolitically sensitive, recovery operations mayhave to be conducted covertly or clandestinely.Covert recovery operations are conductedin a manner which conceals the identity ofthe sponsor. Clandestine operations areconducted in a manner which assures secrecyor concealment of forces while the operation

is being conducted. In war, the emphasis onsecrecy is primarily for self-protection andsurprise. Additionally, certain internationallaws, national policies, and practicalconsiderations may come into play at differenttimes and in different circumstances to furtherguide an evader’s actions. To help facilitaterecovery, evaders will need reliable,long-range, two-way communications.Personnel location systems and/orgeopositioning for personnel locationshould be used to augment long-rangecommunications wherever available.C o m m u n i c a t i o n s s h o u l d e n s u r einteroperability among friendly recoveryforces and minimize interception andjamming by enemy forces. Using dedicatedCSAR forces is the preferred mode ofrecovery whenever evaders are within rangeand the military situation permits. Use of theseforces avoids placing undue requirements onunconventional recovery assets during periodsof shifting attitudes among the indigenouspopulation. Evaders located beyond thecapabilities of dedicated CSAR forcespresent unique recovery problems. Whatfollows are the basic considerations that E&Rplanners and potential evaders must take intoaccount when planning for military operations.

a. Peacetime. There may be occasions whenindividuals will become isolated in a friendly orneutral foreign country as the result of an aircraftmishap, inadvertent border incursion, or similarcircumstance. In such situations, theindividuals’ goals should be to return tofriendly control openly and as soon aspossible. Individuals isolated under thesecircumstances should approach localauthorities and request assistance inreturning to friendly control or, if possible,openly approach a US embassy or consulateor a representative of a friendly government.On the other hand, evasion may be theproper course of action when an individualaccidentally and unintentionally becomesisolated in a foreign country that isunfriendly to the United States, in an area

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where there is no effective local government,or when there is reason to believe that thelocal population would mistreat theindividual. Whenever US personnel operatein or near such areas during peacetime,combatant commanders should ensure thatappropriate E&R plans have been developedand that recovery forces are prepared toexecute the plans.

b. Military Operations Other ThanWar. MOOTW include a wide range ofmilitary activities. Examples are: nationassistance support to counterinsurgency,shows of force, peace operations, support toinsurgency, support to counterinsurgency,combatting terrorism, foreign humanitarianassistance, noncombatant evacuationoperations, strikes and raids, protection ofshipping, recovery operations, and DODsupport to counterdrug operations. Thesetypes of military operations may include therisk that participating individuals couldbecome isolated in hostile or unfriendlyterritory and be forced to evade. Allavailable recovery resources should bereviewed for suitability, becauseconsiderations such as pre-mission operationssecurity (OPSEC) and acceptable recovery“windows of opportunity” become majordeterminants of the ultimate method torecover an individual. The nature of theoperation will dictate the time available formission planning; pre-missionreconnaissance and survey of potentialevasion routes, contact points, and recoverysites; and pre-mission stocking of caches.Such advance preparations, when possible,permit confident predictions about conditionsat locations where individuals might becomeisolated. Detailed E&R plans can be basedon these assumptions. Several types ofMOOTW are addressed below, but othertypes may result from varying crisissituations.

• S u p p o r t t o I n s u r g e n c y a n dCounterinsurgency. Individuals

involved in these types of operations whofind themselves in an evasion situationare faced with contrasting concernsdepending on whether they aresupporting an insurgency orcounterinsurgency. For example,evaders whose mission is to support aninsurgent movement can expect toreceive assistance in areas controlledby the insurgents or where the localpopulace is sympathetic to the movement.They should avoid government forces,government controlled areas, and areaswhere the population supports thegovernment in power. Evaders can alsoanticipate that any recovery effort willmost likely be conducted in a lowvisibility, clandestine, or covertmanner. On the other hand, individualsinvolved in counterinsurgencyoperations who find themselves evadingare faced with a completely differentscenario: move to government-controlledareas, seek out government forces, andexpect recovery by a force operatingin a more overt, conventional manner.Because each situation has uniquerequirements, personnel involved ineither of these scenarios, who might findthemselves in an evasion situation,should be fully briefed prior to the onsetof operations on the tactics, techniques,procedures, and assets that will be usedto effect their recovery.

• Combatting Terrorism. Individualsparticipating in counterterrorismactivities, who become evaders, are facedwith a somewhat similar dilemma. Thekey variables in this situation are thelocation where the action has occurredand where the individual is evading(i.e., is the country where thecounterterrorist action has occurred andwhere the individual is evadingsupportive or hostile to the US presenceand action?). Evasion, even in a countrywhere the government supports the US

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action, can be dangerous because theevasion area could be populated byelements supporting the terrorist group.E&R planners should consider all possiblescenarios in developing recovery plans.

• Peacekeeping Operations. Although aprerequisite for the establishment of apeacekeeping force is the consent,cooperation, and support of the partiesto the dispute (a negotiated truce), thepeacekeeping force is often required todeal with extreme tension and violence.Such conditions could lead to a situationwhere members of the peacekeepingforce find themselves in an evasionsituation. Once again, the territorywhere the evasion takes place and thepolitical attitude toward the UnitedStates of the power that controls theterritory wil l influence evaderactions. Members of the peacekeepingforce should be well briefed on thecurrent political climate and on theattitudes of the parties to the dispute, andthey should be given proper evasionguidance that takes the various possibleevasion scenarios into properconsideration. In addition, planningfor quick-response recover yoperations should always precede theinitial deployment of the force.

• Other Operations. Certain crisisavoidance or crisis-management situationsmay require the use of military force toenforce or support diplomatic initiatives,respond to emergencies, or protect UnitedStates citizens. Detailed E&R plans shouldbe developed for these operations to theextent allowed by the crisis situation.

c. War

• General Considerations

•• The operations tempo of a large scalewar along or within the forward edge of

the battle area (FEBA) may prohibit orpreclude some recovery operations.This may be complicated by a lack ofdedicated CSAR assets and limitedspecial operations forces (SOF)effectiveness in and around the FEBA.

•• In addition to these difficulties, evasionmay be severely restricted by the largenumber of enemy forces along the FEBA,by combat operations, and by thepossibility that enemy forces may possesssophisticated night-vision devices andvarious sensors. Evaders along theFEBA should concentrate on evading,hiding, and surviving. After the battlehas passed over, the evader should tryto link up with other friendly forceswithout surprising friendly patrols.They should attract friendly attention frombehind a rock or some other bulletproofobject, preferably with a white flag orlocally developed visual or verbalrecognition signal. Evaders should makeno fast or threatening moves and allowthemselves to be captured. Once contactis made, there may be unit authenticationnumbers or questions and answers thatwill identify personnel as bona fide USevaders.

•• If the evader is on enemy-controlledterritory and is unable to link up withfriendly fighting units and the situationand the environment permit, otherrecovery modes may be employed tocarry out a recovery. Aviation supportoperations along the FEBA may bediverted to make quick recoveries ofevaders. See paragraph 8a for a moredetailed discussion of evasion techniquesalong the FEBA.

• Nuclear Warfare. Planning formovement to a Selected Area for Evasion(SAFE) in a nuclear environment shouldinclude supplies to survive in apost-nuclear environment, as well as

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ESCAPE, EVASION AND RECOVERY

In June 1951, Capt. Ward M. Millar, an F-80 pilot, was shot down over NorthKorea. Injured from the ejection with two broken ankles, evasion eventuallyproved fruitless and he was soon captured by the North Koreans. These fewparagraphs summarize this airman’s exemplary behavior in the most trying ofcircumstances. Indeed, he was downed—but not defeated.

In captivity, Millar succeeded in convincing the North Koreans that he was animportant prisoner. Consequently, they conceded medical care to his brokenankles, which unfortunately, consisted of encasing his ankles without firstaligning the bones. Of course this “medical treatment” left him crippled, buthe remained determined to escape. With the injuries he endured, crawling tofreedom seemed unrealistic, so he fashioned himself special shoes made ofrubber overboots stuffed with rags. This make-shift “orthopedic correction,”when combined with long wooden poles to act as support, enabled him toregain some mobility.

In this condition, yet with his spirit unbroken, Capt. Millar planned his escape.An important part of his strategy was to fool the enemy into thinking he couldnot walk far, and therefore required little direct supervision. This allowed Millarto collect food, discarded clothing, and other “escape kit” items. Using thisstrategy, Millar seized an opportunity and succeeded in escaping. In fact, heremained loose behind enemy lines for over a week. In the end, however, hislack of mobility and the ineffective contact with the local population led to hisbeing recaptured—but only temporarily.

During his initial handling after recapture, he shrewdly befriended a NorthKorean NCO who expressed a desire to join Millar in escaping to the South.They repeatedly sabotaged the truck that would be used to transport prisonersto a POW camp, delaying Millar’s departure from the holding area. Meanwhile,Millar and the NCO schemed, trying to decide their best options for success.Should they evade to the coast; steal a boat and sail to the Yellow Sea; evadeto the front lines and contact UN forces; or devise a way to signal coalitionaircraft? This last option proved to be the solution. Capt. Millar and the KoreanNCO improvised a signal lamp from the “stalled” truck’s battery and one ofthe headlights. When this didn’t work they stole a mirror from a house andtried again. This time they succeeded in signaling a passing jet whichdescended for a closer look. The pilot, having spotted a yellow “Mae West,”which Millar had displayed as a signal, called for support to begin rescueoperations. A few minutes later Millar heard the whirling of a helicopter comingfrom the south; Millar then vectored it to a nearby clearing. With the jets holdingoff the advancing soldiers, Millar rode “piggy back” on the North Korean tothe hovering helicopter and freedom.

After three months in hostile territory, Capt. Ward Millar’s ingenuity, tenacity,and just plain guts carried him through. (The Korean soldier received a citationand an undisclosed monetary award from the Air Force.)

SOURCE: Kilbourne, Jimmy W., Escape and Evasion, 17 True Stories ofDowned Pilots Who Made it Back , Macmillan Air Force Academy Series.

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a recommended time interval whichallows for adequately reducedradiation levels before travel. Remainingin a covered area until radiation levelshave subsided enough to permit travelwill be key to an evader’s survival.

6. Training for Evasion

Successful E&R is dependent oneffective training. There is no substitute forrealistic training. In an evasion situation,there may be no second chance.High-risk-of-capture personnel should bethoroughly trained in the techniques ofcombat survival, evasion movement,camouflage, surface navigation, E&Requipment, aids and devices, and recoveryprocedures and methods. High-risk-of-capturepersonnel should be equally knowledgeable ofthe type of E&R intelligence data that is availablerelevant to their specific, potential area ofoperations. IAW DOD Directive 1300.7,“Training and Education Measures Necessaryto Support the Code of Conduct,” theseindividuals must complete a Level C SERESchool. All high-risk-of-capture personnelshould also receive survival and evasion fieldrefresher training periodically, or participatein evasion field exercises whenever possible.This training should include communicationstechniques and procedures including radiodiscipline, use of aircrew call signs, team orindividual call signs or identifiers, signalingdevices, and other actions that enhancesuccessful recovery. Evasion continuationtraining (classroom and field) at the unitlevel is essential if high-risk-of-capturepersonnel are to be adequately prepared toparticipate in combat operations at amoment’s notice. As directed by DODDirective 1300.7, “Training and EducationMeasures Necessary to Support the Code ofConduct,” E&R training will continuethroughout an individual’s career.

7. Planning for Evasion

All personnel subject to isolation in hostileterritory should be prepared for the possibilityof finding themselves in an evasion situation.Successful evasion is dependent on effectiveprior planning. Although potential evadersreceive considerable support from operations,in te l l igence, and uni t / l i fe supportorganizations and personnel as well asguidance from a variety of literature,regulations, and directives, the responsibilityfor proper preparation and planning forevasion ultimately rests with the individualconcerned. No amount of headquartersplanning effort will succeed if the potentialevaders have not personally planned forevasion. Sound evasion planning shouldincorporate, as a minimum, the informationavailable from the sources listed in Figure II-2and described below.

a. Intelligence Briefings. Informationon the mission route, enemy troopdispositions, impact of enemy operations onfriendly or multinational military forces,status of the US or multinational militarysituation, changing attitudes of the enemypopulace, and other information is essential

Figure II-2. Planning for Evasion

PLANNING FOR EVASION

Intelligence Briefings

Selected Area for EvasionArea Intelligence Description

Evasion & Recovery AreaStudies

Survival, Evasion,Resistance, Escape Guides,and Bulletins

Isolated Personnel Report

Evasion Plan of Action

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when planning potential evasion. Evadersneed to ensure that they are continually awareof changing conditions. A change in even onefacet of the enemy situation may well force majorchanges to an evasion plan.

b. SAFE Area Intelligence Description(SAID). This information can be found inAppendix G, “Planning Supplement,”(Classified).

c. E&R Area Studies. E&R areas maybe selected in any geographic regionbased on operational or contingencyplanning requirements. Although similarto SAFE areas in most respects, they differin that not all conventional selection criteriafor SAFE areas can be met because ofcurrent political, military, or environmentalfactors prevailing in the country.

d. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, andEscape Guides and Bulletins. Thesepublications are essential referencedocuments for potential evaders. Theycontain the basic information to help anindividual survive, successfully evade and,if captured, resist enemy exploitation.SERE guides and bulletins cover an entirecountry or region of the world and provideinformation on topography and hydrography,food and water sources, safe and dangerousplants and animals, customs and cultures,recognition of hostile forces, resistancetechniques in captivity, and other types ofinformation. In short, the type of generalinformation that serves as the foundation uponwhich the more specific information found inevasion charts, SAIDs, and currentintelligence briefings can be used to build asound evasion plan.

e. Isolated Personnel Report. TheIsolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) (DDForm 1833) is the document which containsinformation to facilitate recovery. Whenfilled in, the DD Form 1833 is classifiedCONFIDENTIAL. It enables a recovery

force to authenticate evaders and concludea successful tactical recovery duringassisted evasion. Both the unit and theindividual are responsible for ensuring thatthe ISOPREP is properly completed, kept onfile, and ready to be transmitted to the JSRCwhen required. Failure to accomplish thisrequirement complicates recovery planning,puts the recovery force at risk, and jeopardizesthe success of the recovery mission. (SeeAppendix C, “Sample Isolated PersonnelReport,” for an example of an ISOPREP.)

f. Evasion Plan of Action. The evasionplan of action (EPA) is one of the criticaldocuments for successful recoveryplanning. The EPA is the vehicle by whichpotential evaders, prior to their isolationin hostile territory, relay theirafter-isolation intentions to the recoveryforces. EPAs should be completed bypotential evaders with the aid of intelligencepersonnel and should be based on a thoroughknowledge of the environment whereisolation may occur. Evaders may gain suchknowledge by studying the combatenvironment and the hostile territory beforeexecuting the mission and by pre-planningtheir evasion. Sources of information thatshould be used to develop EPAs include, butare not limited to; the theater and componentconcepts to locate, support, and recoverisolated personnel; SAIDs; SEREContingency Guides/Bulletins; E&R AreaStudies; and evasion charts. All individualsoperating in or over hostile territory shoulddevelop an EPA or review an existing EPAeach time a designated target or operatingarea changes. See Appendix D, “EvasionPlan of Action Format,” for details on thecontent of an EPA.

8. Evasion Strategies

a. Along/Within the FEBA

• Static. Evasion along the FEBA isalways difficult, especially along a

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relatively static FEBA. Under theseconditions, enemy and friendly forces canbe expected to be densely arrayed andwell camouflaged, with good fields offire. Assistance may be close at handand within radio range. The sources ofassistance may be air cover by fighteraircraft, attack helicopters, helicopterrecovery assets, and rescue by groundforces. If evaders near the FEBA feelsure that friendly forces are movingin their direction, they should seekconcealment and allow friendly forcesto overrun their position. Attempts topenetrate the FEBA should be avoided.Evaders face stiff opposition from bothsides. Unit authentication numbers and/or locally developed codes may assist theevaders to safely make contact in oraround the FEBA and whenapproached by friendly forces.Evaders may also be able to move awayfrom the FEBA and contactunconventional recovery assets.

• Advancing. Individuals isolated infront of advancing friendly unitsshould immediately take cover andwait for the friendly units to overruntheir position. In these situations, theevader ’s primary goal is to seekprotection from friendly and enemy firewhile trying to avoid capture. In somecases, the evader may be able to assistthe friendly forces by reporting on keyenemy elements. Evaders should notengage the enemy unless they havebeen appropriately trained andequipped and the probability of successoutweighs the risks involved. Potentialevaders should be briefed onprocedures for safely contactingfriendly units.

• Retreating. Attempting to catch upwith retreating friendly unitsdangerously exposes the evader.Individuals between opposing forces

should immediately take cover andwait for enemy units to pass over theirposition. After most enemy units havemoved on, evaders should try to link upwith other isolated friendly elements andreturn to friendly forces.

b. Extended Evasion

• The differences between extendedevasion and short-range evasion aredepicted in Figure II-3.

• The evader may be discouraged by theknowledge that hundreds of miles oftravel over a period of months may benecessary. Therefore, a strong will tosurvive, coupled with an ability towithstand hardships and overcomeobstacles, is essential.

• Every alternative should be consideredbefore determining a course of action.For example:

•• Travel restrictions such as curfews,checkpoints, and roadblocks will have tobe anticipated.

•• Local customs should be studied forpossible imitation to avoid beingconspicuous.

•• Information on specific border areasshould be obtained and studied.

• The person who has been isolated inenemy-controlled territory needs todecide what equipment to keep andhow and where to dispose of theremainder. The individual shouldpresume that the descent or isolationhas been observed by the enemy. Theimportant thing is to avoid capture,even if it means leaving the scene ofisolation and deviating from the EPAor leaving valuable equipmentbehind.

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EXTENDED VERSUS SHORT- RANGE EVASION

Extended evasion differs from short-range evasion inseveral respects:

Distance from friendly forces is greater, rangingfrom hundreds to thousands of miles

The will to survive and the knowledge of survivaltechniques become more vital

Conditions such as travel restrictions, securitychecks, and border crossings are more prevalent

Supply economy should be planned and practiced.Items such as shoes, clothing, and supplies shouldbe taken care of to assure the evader the maximumusage

Figure II-3. Extended Versus Short-Range Evasion

• If possible, the entire journey tofriendly or neutral areas, as well as todesignated SAFE areas, should becompleted without being observed.This journey may require living off theland and completing the entire trip onfoot.

• Unplanned Assistance During Evasion.Under some circumstances, especiallywhen seriously injured in such areas asthe Arctic or desert, it may becomenecessary to seek assistance from localpeople in order to survive. However,this should be done only as a last resort.Even when evaders do not requireemergency assistance and are doingeverything possible to avoid contact withlocal people, unplanned contacts mayoccur. All such contacts are very risky;but if handled properly, they could resultin life saving-assistance during evasion.Unplanned assistance will normally

fall into one of the following categories:contact with opportunists, accidentalcontacts, or acts of mercy.

•• Contact with opportunists mayoccur when an individual or a group ofpeople seek financial or political gainby assisting or apprehending anAmerican evader. The blood chit maybe useful in this situation.

•• Accidental contact occurs when alocal person and an evader accidentallyencounter one another. Neither iscomfortable with the situation andboth are apprehensive about theoutcome. Pre-mission study of the localpeople may make the evader aware oflocal attitudes toward Americans andprovide some guidance as to how tocommunicate. A pointee-talkee or bloodchit may also assist in communicationand soliciting aid. This aid may range

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from the local person not sounding analarm, to providing directions or survivalassistance or information, to the best-case scenario where the evader isreturned to friendly control.

•• As previously mentioned, evaders indanger of dying because of environmentalextremes or injuries may elect to seekan act of mercy from an individual inthe local populace. This contact is verydangerous and may result in death orcapture. The blood chit may be useful incommunicating and convincing anindividual to engage in an act of mercy. SeeChapter III, “ R e c o v e r y,” andAppendix G, “Planning Supplement,”(Classified) of this publication forrecommended contact procedures.

9. Aids to Evasion

Evaders are challenged by the elements,terrain, hostile military forces, and thelocal populace. To overcome these and besuccessful, potential evaders should beprovided adequate training, information,and equipment before beginning theirmission. Whenever possible, potentialevaders should carry evasion aids on theirperson, because isolation is usually sudden

Lt. Collins being carried out after having evaded in the Burma jungle for 45 days.

and unexpected. Evaders may be quicklyseparated from their equipment or may nothave time to sort through it to select the mostuseful evasion items. Because spacec o n s i d e r a t i o n s a n d c l o t h i n gconfigurations may limit the number ofevasion aids which can be carried, considerselecting items of information and/orequipment that serve more than onepurpose. Suggested equipment i temsinclude evasion charts; blood chits,pointee-talkees, or other means ofcommunicating with the local populace;general reference materials on medical,surv iva l , or cu l tura l in format ion;camouflage or environmental protectionitems; and miscellaneous items such as a smallcompass, survival knife, spare radio battery,or signaling devices.

a. Evasion Charts. The evasion chart(EVC) is designed to assist isolatedpersonnel to evade capture and survive inhostile territory and to provide evaders witha means of navigating to a SAFE or otherrecovery point. The EVC program supportsoperational force requirements with a seriesof charts that covers geographic areasspecifically identified by combatantcommands. The EVC is a derivative of astandard product, the Joint Operations

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Graphic (JOG), and is made up ofapproximately eight 1:250,000-scale JOGcharts, usually four on each side. When JOGsof a particular area are not available, TacticalPilotage Charts (1:500,000-scale) aresubstituted. The EVC is produced on a verystrong material which is waterproof andresistant to tearing. Tailored to cover theindividual environmental area concerned, itis a unique, multi-purpose product whichcombines standard navigation charts withevasion and survival information locatedon the margins. A typical EVC containslocalized information on navigationtechniques, survival medicine, environmentalhazards, personal protection, and water andfood procurement as well as color pictures ofedible and poisonous plants. Additionally,the chart is overprinted with a camouflagepattern similar to the natural ground colorsof the area, and may aid an evader in hidingwhen used as a shelter/cover. The chart isfolded to fit in a flight suit leg pocket andshows an American flag on one of the outerpanels. An evader can use this to identifyhimself, especially when contacting friendlytroops in a hostile area. Procedures forordering EVCs are found in the DefenseMapping Agency (DMA) Map Catalog, Part1 (Aerospace Products), Volume 1(Aeronautical Charts and FlightPublications), Section 8 (Special PurposeProducts). Although EVCs contain muchinformation, including survival and medicalguidance, and are designed to be carried byevaders as they make their way through enemyterritory, potential evaders cannot afford to waituntil they are already isolated before they studythe chart. Effective evasion planning requiresthat potential evaders be thoroughly familiarwith the information on the charts as well ashow to use the charts before departing on theirmissions.

b. Blood Chits

• Description and Use. The blood chit isa small sheet of material on which is

imprinted an American flag, astatement in English and severallanguages spoken by the populace inthe operational area, and like numbersin each corner that identify the particularchit. The blood chit identifies the beareras an American and promises a rewardto anyone providing assistance to thebearer and/or helping the bearer to returnto friendly control. When the blood chitnumber is presented to Americanauthorities and the claim has beenproperly validated, it represents anobligation of the USG to providecompensation to the claimant for servicesrendered to evaders. (See Annex A toAppendix E, “Blood Chit ProgramAdministration,” for a sample bloodchit.)

• Individual Responsibilities

•• Although use of the blood chit is atthe discretion of the individual to whomit is issued, it should be used only afterall other measures of independentevasion and/or escape have failed andassistance is considered vital tosurvival. Unless the chit is taken by forceor threat, individuals should retain it.

•• Upon receiving assistance, theevader provides the assistor with theblood chit number (either written or onecut from the chit). If the assistor requests,the evader may provide name, socialsecurity number (SSN), and signature.Although this additional informationcould, in the long run, pose a securityproblem for the assistor, that individualmay insist on having more informationthan just a number to back up his claimfor reward. The evader should tell theassistor (or, if verbal communication isnot possible due to language barriers,point to the last lines of the statement onthe blood chit) that a reward will beprovided after the evader’s safe return to

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friendly lines and when the number ispresented to, and properly validated by,an official representative of the USG.

• The blood chit has certain limitationsas an evasion aid and form ofidentification. The person providing aidmay be skeptical of the value of a“number” as something that may producea reward. The skepticism will increaseif enemy propaganda has assured theperson providing aid of ultimate andcertain victory. When the evader tellsthe person providing aid that a reward isconditional upon the evader’s safe returnto friendly lines and validation of theblood chit number by a USG official, theassistor will be forced to choose betweenthe promise of the blood chit and theknown risks that will be assumed inassisting the evader. Also, there is astrong possibility that the person whois about to assist the evader will wantto retain the blood chit as tangibleevidence to claim the promisedreward. When the evader refuses toyield the blood chit, the assistor maybecome suspicious. Overcoming thisdifficulty will depend largely on thesalesmanship of the evader.

• When the evader is in the hands offriendly guerrilla organizations, use ofthe blood chit as a means ofidentification may depend largely onthe effectiveness of communicationsbetween the guerrilla group andAmerican forces. The evader shouldexpect to encounter some suspicion,because the guerrillas could suspect thechit may have been captured, stolen, orcould be a skillful counterfeit, and thebearer could be an enemy using it topenetrate the group. In spite of this, theblood chit is a useful evasion aid, andusing it wisely provides an excellentchance of return.

• Blood Chit Production. The DMAmaintains the capability to produce andreprint blood chits at the request of thecombatant commanders as coordinatedthrough the JSSA.

• See Appendix E, “Blood Chit ProgramAdministration,” for details of blood chitprogram administration.

c. Pointee-Talkees. Pointee-talkees aresimilar to the language guides which wereused by invasion forces during World WarII. They contain English phrases on theleft side of the page and the same phraseswritten in the foreign language on the rightside of the page. The evader selects thedesired English phrase and points to thetranslation of the phrase beside it. The evader

The blood chit, written in several languages,promises a reward for assisting US evaders.

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a. Caches. Caches may be prepositionedin enemy-controlled territory or in regionssubject to being overrun by enemy forces,and their use should be considered inenvironments where extended evasion isprojected. Evaders can use caches assources of supplies, communicationsequipment, and other evasion aids. Indenied areas, caches may be emplaced byunconventional assets before and/or afterthe outbreak of hostilities. Agencies andorganizations that direct the establishmentof caches that have the potential ofsupporting evaders need to keep the JSRCadvised of the status and locations ofthose caches to optimally support potentialevaders.

b. Resupply Operations. When an evaderis isolated out of range of rotary-wingedaircraft, there are no prepositioned caches, andrecovery forces have been committed to otheroperations, it may be possible to air-deliverpackages to evaders by fixed-wingaircraft . Planners must consider thevulnerability of the resupply aircraft.Depending upon the threat, dedicated combat

may augment the pointee-talkee by makingdrawings and signs to help communicate witha local national whose language the evaderdoes not speak or understand. The majorlimitation of the pointee-talkee, as with theblood chit, is in trying to communicate withilliterates. In many countries the illiteracyrate can be very high, so personnel may haveto resort to pantomime and sign language,tactics that have been relatively effective inthe past. Pointee-talkees should be developedin theater, where the language expertise isavailable, with the assistance of the JSSA, asrequired.

10. Support to Evaders

There may be occasions when an evader isisolated deep in hostile territory, and earlyrecovery will not be possible. In suchsituations, E&R planners should developmeans to provide assistance to the evader untilrecovery can be effected. There are two waysan evader in such a predicament can besupported: prepositioned caches andresupply operations.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIIRECOVERY

III-1

1. Definition

Recovery is the return of evaders to friendlycontrol, either with or without assistance, asthe result of planning, operations, andindividual actions on the part of recoveryplanners, conventional or unconventionalrecovery forces, and/or the evadersthemselves.

2. Types of Recovery

Evaders may recover, or be recovered, tofriendly control in a number of ways. Theymay make their way to friendly or neutralterritory without assistance, they may berecovered as the result of p l annedconventional or unconventional recoveryoperations, or they may be recovered as theresult of chance contact with friendlyelements of the local populace performingacts of mercy or seeking profit. (See FigureIII-1.) Potential evaders should be aware ofthese recovery possibilities and, when isolatedin hostile or non-US controlled territory,become an integral part of the recovery effort.

3. Philosophy Behind RecoveryOperations

Depending on the situation, successfulrecovery operations normally requireextensive preparation and planning. Thenecessary resources must be identified,scheduled, and committed as early as possible,but evaders must be prepared for extendedevasion in the event recovery operations aredelayed.

4. Recovery Considerations

The elements that impact recoveryoperations are shown in Figure III-2 and arediscussed below.

a. Availability of Resources. To increasethe chances for successful recovery, plannersshould identify well in advance theresources and assets that will be requiredfor a particular operation , ensure theseresources will be available when required, andschedule them for employment.

b. Capabilities and Limitations. Becauseeach type of resource that can be used forrecovery operations has unique capabilitiesand limitations, recovery planners should bewell versed in their respective characteristicsso that these resources can be properlyemployed in a timely manner. Such in-depthknowledge further enhances the chances forsuccessful recovery because it permitsrecovery planners to quickly developalternative courses of action and options inresponse to changing recovery scenarios.

c. Task Organizing. The nature of anygiven conflict (specific purpose, intensity, orduration) that might leave individuals isolatedin hostile territory will also dictate theresources and capabilities that will be requiredto accomplish the recovery mission.Consequently, task organizing of therecovery force will depend upon varyingresource requirements and capabilities.

“To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preservingpeace.”

General George WashingtonSpeech to Congress, 1790

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d. Recovery Criteria. There are certainessential elements of information which, whenavailable to the decision maker, can simplifythe recovery effort.

• Location and Physical Condition of theEvader. Accurate information concerningthe location and physical condition ofthe evader prior to launching therecovery mission is crucial. With this

knowledge, planners can more readilydetermine the optimum force composition,identify any requirements for specialequipment and personnel, and planrecovery force ingress and egress routesto minimize contact with hostile forces.

• Access. A critical factor in the selectionof any recovery site is whether we haveair, land, or sea access to the site. Even

TYPES OF RECOVERY

CONVENTIONAL

COMBAT RECOVERY OF ISOLATED PERSONNEL

UNCONVENTIONAL

UNASSISTED CSAR ON-SCENE

AIRCRAFTNAVAL VESSELSGROUND FORCESUSCG

EVADING TOFRIENDLYFORCES

USAF CAFUSN CVWUSA HELOUSMC TRAPUSCG

ASSISTED EVASION

PLANNED

FOLLOW-ONSOF

MISSIONS

DEDICATEDEXTRACTION

TEAMS

UARM

CLANDESTINE AIRCRAFT

HELICOPTER STAR

UNPLANNED

ACTS OFMERCY

MERCENARIESDISSIDENTSOUTLAWS

OPPORTUNISTS

GLOSSARY

CAF Combat Air Forces SOF special operations forcesCVW carrier air wing STAR surface-to-air recoveryCSAR combat search and rescue TRAP tactical recovery of aircraft and personnelHELO helicopter UARM unconventional assisted recovery mechanism

ACCIDENTAL

Figure III-1. Types of Recovery

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if the recovery site is in enemy territory(or in friendly territory occupied by theenemy), we should still consider thespatial relationships of the site withrespect to bordering friendly and neutralterritory. For example, selecting a site inenemy territory might be pointless if abordering territory refuses to grantoverflight of its territory.

• Time. Different recovery assets willbecome operational at different times.Dedicated CSAR assets are generallyoperational earlier than unconventionalassisted recovery mechanisms (UARM),and individuals may become isolated inareas where recovery assets are not yetoperational. To permit interface withavailable recovery forces, evasionplanners must ensure that all potentialevaders have access to appropriatecontact and communications procedures.Proper prior planning permits operationspersonnel to predict when the respectiverecovery assets will come on line torecover evaders. Planners should alsoensure that potential evaders are updated

in a timely manner as changes occur inthe operational recovery environment.

• Movement. Individuals will notalways be isolated within the range ofoperation of airborne recovery assetsor in areas where ground recoveryassets are operational. Normally,individuals are isolated in the vicinity ofthe FEBA, an area where unconventionalrecovery forces do not operate and whereintense enemy activity restricts CSARforces. Therefore, evaders will beexpected to hide or move to areas offeringbetter recovery opportunities. (SeeChapter II, “Evasion,” paragraph 5c, ofthis publication for detailed FEBAevasion procedures.) E&R plannersshould always keep these possibilities inmind and ensure that potential evadersare properly briefed, trained, andequipped for evasion travel.

• Capacity. Recovery forces and assetsare based or prepositioned in locationswhere they are expected to mosteffectively facilitate recovery operations.Since individuals are often isolated inunexpected areas and numbers, in somecases the capacity of available recoveryforces may be inadequate for thenumber of evaders. E&R planners mustbe prepared to reallocate recovery assetsto compensate for this imbalance or toestablish priorities to determine whichcategories of evaders will be recoveredby a limited capacity of recovery assets.If the estimated capacity of recoveryassets appears inadequate for a givennumber of evaders, planners must ensurethat potential evaders are aware of thesituation and that they are trained andequipped for extended survival andevasion.

• Risk Assessment. The benefit to begained from a recovery operation

Availability of Resources

Capabilities and Limitations

Task Organizing

Recovery CriteriaLocation and PhysicalCondition of the EvaderAccessTimeMovementCapacityRisk Assessment

RECOVERYCONSIDERATIONS

Figure III-2. Recovery Considerations

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should be commensurate with theanticipated risks of execution.Recovery operations should not undulyrisk isolating additional combatpersonnel, preclude execution of higherpriority missions, routinely exposecertain unique assets to extremely highrisk, divert critically needed forces fromongoing operations, or allow the militarysituation to deteriorate. Cost/benefitconsiderations and risk assessmentsshould balance the value of recoveringevaders against the potential loss ofrecovery assets or deterioration of thecombat effort.

5. Categories of RecoveryOperations

The methods for recovering evaders fallinto two categories: conventional andunconventional. Although each method canbe applied in a variety of situations, somemethods may have advantages over others.Therefore, recovery planning should fullyevaluate available assets and projectedconditions to determine the best method ofrecovery depending upon the threat, thecondition of the isolated personnel, and thetypes of recovery forces available to executethe mission.

a. Conventional Recovery Operations

• Forces. These operations make use ofconventional aerial, surface, andsubsurface military forces andequipment to conduct overt orlow-visibi l i ty SAR operat ions.According to Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrinefor Joint Combat Search and Rescue(CSAR),” “Each Service and UnitedStates Special Operations Command areresponsible for performing CSAR insupport of their own forces, consistentwith their assigned functions. In sodoing, each Service and USSOCOMshould take into account the availability

and capability of the CSAR-capableforces of the others, including the USCoast Guard.”

•• Examples of conventional militaryforces include the US Air Force (USAF)Combat Air Forces rescue forces, USNavy (USN) carrier air-wing helicopterassets, US Naval Reserve (USNR)Helicopter Combat Support Squadrons,and other shipborne air assets.Conventional forces may also includeUSN and Coast Guard vessels, MarineCorps air-ground task forces capable ofconducting tactical recovery of aircraftand personnel operations, US Armymedical evacuation units, and otherArmy assets (helicopters, mechanizedvehicles, and personnel).

• Types of Conventional RecoveryOperations

•• Unassisted Recovery. In unassistedrecovery, evaders independently maketheir way back to friendly control ortravel toward a point where contactwith an assistance mechanism or aCSAR force can be accomplished.Evaders may simply hide and survive ina single location while waiting to beoverrun by friendly forces or evade backto friendly or neutral territory. Unassistedrecovery is normally a back-up optionas a hedge against the failure of outsideor assisted recovery efforts. (1)Successful unassisted recovery dependslargely on the evader’s will and ability,personal background, physicalcondition, and previous SEREtraining. Evaders may need to travellong distances over unfamiliar terrain,suffering long periods of hunger, thirst,and exposure. (2) The primary concernof evaders facing these situations isreaching a location where recovery canbe effected. Air-delivered or prepositionedsupplies (caches) of evasion or survival

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equipment can significantly improvethe evader’s potential for success.Because extended unassisted recovery isalways a possibility, EPAs and evasionequipment/aids should always addresssuch evasion contingencies.

•• Combat Search and RescueOperations. CSAR is a specific task toeffect the recovery of isolated personnel

during wartime or MOOTW. Doctrineand procedures for joint CSARoperations are described in Joint Pub3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint CombatSearch and Rescue (CSAR).”

•• On-Scene Available. A third sourceof conventional recovery assets can comefrom appropriately equipped air,ground, or naval forces that are notspecifically trained in combatrecovery, but which happen to be inthe area of an isolated individual andcan be tasked to recover the evader.In such cases, recovery tasking canoriginate at the lowest organizationallevel that is aware of the situation andcan quickly react. In all cases, however,the recovery effort should be coordinatedwith the JSRC, which continuallymonitors all ongoing and planned

recovery operations. Use of such assets,including commercial ships wheneverpossible, would most likely be the resultof chance and would be most effectivein a non-hostile environment.

b. Unconventional Recovery Operations.These operations differ from conventionalrecovery operations in that they use speciallytrained and/or indigenous forces and

unique equipment to assist an evader inreturning to friendly control . Examplesof unconventional forces include SOF,guerrillas, and/or clandestine organizations.Examples of unique equipment that might beused in unconventional recovery operationsinclude submarines and specially equipped,clandestinely operated aircraft capable ofsurface-to-air recovery (STAR) operations.

• Forces. See Figure III-3.

•• SOF. Two predominant tasks of SOFare the conduct of unconventionalwarfare (UW) and direct action (DA)missions. (1) UW is a broad spectrumof military and paramilitary operations,normally of long duration, predominantlyconducted by indigenous or surrogateforces who are organized, trained,equipped, supported, and directed in

Conducting recovery operations from the SH-3 Sea King helicopter.

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SULLY’S SAGA

“I went down at high noon. The air was stifling and the silence oppressive inthe ten-foot tall Kunai grass. I was only about five and one-half degrees southof the Equator. I had been flying along at 180-200 miles per hour. Suddenly,I was on the ground with a feeling of loneliness and of being thrust backward500 years in time... I was hoping that someone would come to look for me. Butno one came. In those days, our air/sea rescue system was meager indeed,especially in the interior. Rescue efforts can be described something likethis: ‘...Instructions to all pilots—look for Sully somewhere in the jungle.’ So,they looked the next day from 25,000 feet, came back, and reported, ‘No signof Sully.’ The following day, the instructions were: ‘Don’t forget about Sully,he’s out there somewhere.’ From about 25,000 feet they did not see me again.On the third day their reaction was: ‘Too bad about Sully.’ And that was theway it was.”

On September 20, 1943, Captain Charles P. (Sully) Sullivan’s PH-38H was shotdown over the forests of New Guinea. Thirty days later he rejoined his unitafter successfully evading enemy patrols deep in the jungles of New Guinea.Fortunately today, an air crew member or other isolated US Service personnelcan expect a far more sophisticated recovery attempt, but it does not eliminatethe need to prepare for evasion as Sully’s Saga readily demonstrates.

On the fourth day Sully finally gave up on being rescued and decided to leavehis hole-up site in search of water. As he ventured out in the jungle he becamedisoriented and confused; his efforts to retrace his steps were hopeless. Henever found his wreckage or stashed equipment again. After several minutesof fearful panic, Sully remembers praying fervently to Mary and regained hiscalm. He evaded through the Guinea jungles with only the gear on his backand a 45 caliber side arm. He improvised to meet his needs, building a log raftto cross a river and a shelter out of banana leaves. He used parachute cord toset booby traps to warn him of intruders. During Sully’s initial contact withnatives he was offered food, water, and shelter, but soon he sensed membersof the tribe had turned hostile. He fled the village after defending himselfagainst an attack by two villagers. He feared being tracked and hid in thejungle continuing to evade contact with any native peoples. When he saw twohunters down the valley, he moved off the trail; snapping a twig with his shoeswhich immediately drew the attention of the two hunters. Sully removed hisshoes and moved as quickly as possible through the jungle to escape detection.He evaded barefoot for three more weeks until he spotted a “glimmer of light”.This turned out to be an Aussie long range patrol. After approaching themvery carefully, all he could think of to say was, “Well there’s another one ofthose bloody yanks.” Sully’s adventure was still not over and after an Aussieplane crash landed on its first attempt to fly him to an air field closer to his unithe wisely waited for a C-47 to come and take him back to his unit after 30 daysof survival, evasion and escape in the jungles of New Guinea.

SOURCE: O’Sullivan, Charles P., Sully’s Saga ,Air Power History, Winter 1994

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varying degrees by an external source.It includes the indirect activities ofevasion and recovery. (2) A DAmission is a specified act involvingoperat ions of an overt, covert,clandestine, or low-visibility natureconducted primarily by a sponsoringpower’s SOF in hostile or denied areas.As such, DA missions to locate, recover,and restore to friendly control personsheld captive, isolated, or threatenedin sensitive, denied, or contestedareas may be conducted when thepriority of the operation is sufficientlyhigh to warrant planning andconducting a special operation. As aresult, DA missions may be conductedwith the principal aim of recoveringpersonnel from hostile territory. (3) Ineffect, inherent SOF capabilitiesmake these forces optimally suitedfor a range of collateral activities suchas combat search and rescue, butplanners should understand that specialoperations recovery missions may differ

significantly from Service CSARoperations. To ensure a quick responserecovery capability, CSAR forcesnormally rely on dedicated assets andestablished command and control oncontinual alert. Although SOF are notorganized or trained to conduct SARand CSAR as dedicated missions, theydo maintain the capability to recoverpersonnel and equipment or assistpersonnel in evading capture andescaping from hostile, denied, sensitive,or theater areas. Therefore, there maybe situations when specialized SOFcapabilities may be tasked to recoverisolated personnel whose recovery isbeyond CSAR capability. (4) Thesem i s s i o n s w o u l d n o r m a l l y b echaracterized by detailed planning,rehearsal, and a thorough missionanalysis. SOF routinely employunconventional tactics and techniques,clandestine search, indigenous assistance,and ground combat elements. Specialoperations in permissive environments,

Waiting for a Jolly GreenArtist, Walt Green - USAF Art Collection

In Viet Nam - The rescue of a downed US Air Force pilotby a Sikorsky HH-3E (c. 1968-1970)

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Special Operations Forces

GuerrillasSponsored GroupsUnsponsored Groups

Clandestine Organizations

Specially EquippedClandestinely OperatedAircraft

UNCONVENTIONALRECOVERY

OPERATIONS

Figure III-3. Unconventional RecoveryOperations

or limit enemy activity in the group’sbase camp areas. For these reasons,evaders do not pose as great a securitythreat to guerrilla groups as they do toSOF teams. In addition, there may beless of a requirement to quicklyexfiltrate evaders from these groups.There are two types of guerrillagroups—sponsored and unsponsored.(1) Sponsored Guerrilla Groups.Sponsored guerrilla groups may besupported, led, or advised by US orallied special forces elements. Theymay be recruited and trained by friendlyforces or they may be dependent onallied countries. Because exfiltrationof personnel and materiel may be aroutine operation for these groups,evaders may be more expeditiouslyreturned to friendly territory throughtheir assistance. Planners should ensureguerrilla groups can use thecommunications, contact, andauthentication procedures which havebeen established for the theater ofoperations. Evaders who findthemselves under the control of suchguerrilla groups should comply with allreasonable instructions issued by thegroup. (2) Unsponsored Guerrilla

on the other hand, may be less complexand, therefore, may require considerablyless planning and preparation time.

•• Guerrillas. The use of guerrillas torecover evaders may provide addedoperational flexibility. Depending on thesize of the guerrilla groups and theirterritorial control, these groups may befree to operate more overtly and control

SOF forces, shown here in sniper suits, maintain the capability to conduct SARand CSAR operations to assist evading personnel.

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Groups. Unsponsored, independentguerrilla groups may be comprised ofmercenaries, dissidents, and outlaws.They may provide assistance toevaders when it is in the group’sperceived best interest, or through theconvincing lure of a blood chit reward.Psychological operations may beemployed to convince such groups it isin their best interest to aid evaders.Because it is unlikely that independentgroups will have been trained in the samecommunications, contact, and authenticationprocedures as sponsored groups, plannerstrying to make use of such groups shouldbe prepared to employ modified oralternate procedures. (a) The use ofunsponsored guerrilla groups tosupport recovery operations presentscertain problems. Communicationslimitations between friendly forces andthese guerrilla groups can increase thedifficulty in arranging the recovery ofevaders, thereby extending the evasionperiod. (b) Under certain conditions thegroup may try to use the evader toaugment its forces. This situationpresents problems because guerrillagroups may conduct operations inviolation of US policy or internationallaw. Under these conditions, evaders areto resist guerrilla attempts to solicit theirparticipation and, if forced to participate,avoid direct involvement or minimize theeffects of such actions. (c) Additionally,such groups may perceive advantagesin retaining an evader for extendedperiods for use as a bargaining chip.Because independent guerrilla groupsmay perceive the evader as a de factorepresentative of the USG, evadersshould conduct themselves with theutmost discretion while in their control.

•• Clandestine Organizations. Theseare organizations comprised mainly ofindigenous personnel operatingclandestinely or covertly in the hostile

territory who are engaged in activitiesdesigned to change the political ormilitary situation in that territory .These individuals may be politicaldissidents or minority groups that supportresistance, revolution, or friendlyintelligence activities by collecting,hiding, and forwarding materiel,information, and personnel.

•• Specially Equipped ClandestinelyOperated Aircraft. When an evader’slocation is known precisely, is withinflying range of helicopters and/orfixed-wing aircraft, and the enemy threatis sufficiently low, a single, speciallyequipped, clandestinely operatedaircraft can be used to carry out arecovery. (1) This aircraft should avoidenemy detection, quickly enter theenemy-controlled area, recover theevader, and return to friendly control.Helicopters with an air refuelingcapability, night vision devices, andterrain following radars make this aviable option. (2) For clandestinelong-range recovery, one option wouldbe to employ the fixed-wing FultonRecovery System and appropriateaircraft, also known as the STAR system.This system is air dropped to an evaderon the ground or in the water. Theevader activates the system and isrecovered.

• Types of Unconventional Recoveries.Assisted recoveries can be either plannedor unplanned, i.e., deliberately plannedor as a result of chance.

•• Planned Assisted Recovery. In thistype of operation, deliberate recoveryplanning permits the use of follow-onSOF missions, dedicated extractionteams, and UARMs that can beoperated by guerrilla groups and otherclandestine organizations to seek out,contact, authenticate, and return the

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This MC-130, equipped with the Fulton RecoverySystem, extends its on-station time through aerialrefueling operations.

the activities of the mechanisms aresupported or directed by US or alliedpersonnel. Other mechanisms or groupsoperating independently may alsodetermine it is in their own interest toassist evaders. The potential of theseorganizations to assist E&R operationsshould not be ignored and should beexploited whenever possible. (a) Valueof UARMs. UARMs are valuable assetsbecausethey can support andsupplement both conventional andunconventional recovery operations.Their potential value should always beconsidered and, if possible, incorporatedinto recovery planning. With propersupport, UARMs can be established ina lmost any env i ronment . (b )Establishment of UARMs in Advanceof Operations. UARMs should becreated and maintained in advance oftheir potential need. The process ofestablishing viable UARMs is a long andhazardous one. No amount of last-minute

evader to friendly control. (1) Follow-On SOF Missions. SOF conductingshort-term operations, such as specialreconnaissance or DA missions, can beused to assist an evader. If tasked toinclude potential recovery actions as partof their initial mission planning, SOFteams operating in or near a knownevader location can move to this area,contact, authenticate, and recover theevader. When adequate prior planningis conducted, the enemy situationpermits, and resupply operations can becarried out, SOF can be tasked to performthe recovery after the primary mission iscomplete. (2) Dedicated ExtractionTeams. Though dedicated recovery isnot a primary SOF mission, the JFC orhis designated representative can taskthe special operations component toprepare dedicated extraction teams.These unconventional elements developspecific recovery plans to complementexisting CSAR. Addition of this type ofcapability enhances the overall theaterrecovery effort, particularly when anevader is located beyond the capabilitiesor is in a heavily defended area whereuse of CSAR is impractical. In this typescenario, SOF, multinational recoveryteams (US and allied or coalition), and/or US-sponsored foreign nationals canbe inserted into hostile territory and traveloverland to a prebriefed or predeterminedrendezvous point for contact with theevader. Once contact has been made, therecovery force and the evader make theirway back to a location that is within rangeof friendly air assets. Conventional orunconventional aircraft, depending onavailability and/or the enemy threatsituation, can then be dispatched to meetand extract all personnel to friendlycontrol. (3) Unconventional AssistedRecovery Mechanisms. UARMs areassistance mechanisms that have thepotential to support E&R operations.This is particularly true in cases where

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UARM, evaders should project afavorable image of the US and itsvalues, avoid acts that violateinternational law or discredit the US,avoid expressing ideas that could bemisconstrued as official US policy orpopular American attitudes, and refrainfrom making any agreements contrary tothe interests of the US.

•• Unplanned Assisted Recoveries.Unplanned assisted recoveries may occurwhen local people in enemy-held areasassist evaders in returning to friendlycontrol. These people may be describedunder the following categories: (1)Opportunists. Some individuals orgroups who may detain an evader withthe expectation of monetary gain,materials, or political recognition for theevader’s safe return. (2) AccidentalContacts. Individuals may decide tohelp an evader they encounteranticipating the blood chit reward, or forother personal reasons. (3) Individualswho Perform Acts of Mercy. These areindividuals whom an evader hasintentionally selected in the hope thatthey will provide assistance in alife-threatening situation.

Fastroping from the HH-53 helicopter.

command interest or sudden infusion ofresources can expedite the processwithout seriously jeopardizing thesecurity of the mechanism. Constantsupport of UARMs at certain minimallevels is ultimately more successful andless expensive than sudden, sporadicsupport. Combatant commands that donot take steps to establish UARMs beforerecovery operations are required, i.e.,before initiation of hostilities, will beforced into sole dependence onconventional and other unconventionalrecovery assets. When possible, effortsshould be made to establish UARMsprior to the start of hostilities in all regionswhere military operations may occur. (c)Special Procedures for UARMs.Successful UARM operations requirespecial procedures. UARM operationscannot be conducted under the sameprinciples as conventional militaryoperations. When planning UARMoperations, all security, communications,intelligence, diplomatic, command,supply, transportation, fiscal, and legalprocedures should be consistent with thegoals of returning evaders to friendlycontrol while ensuring the continuedsurvival of the UARM. (d) Evaders’Conduct in an UARM. While in an

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•• An effective theater blood chitprogram, coupled with an activepsychological operations effort, mayencourage these types of unplannedrecoveries and, if properly exploited,could eventually be developed into anorganized UARM.

6. Signaling

Once isolated, evaders should followtheir EPA to the best of their ability,making every effort to blend in with theenvironment and avoid compromisingthe security of the contact area. Theyshould be prepared to set out two types ofsignals: a recovery activation signal (RAS)and/or a load signal. See Appendix G,“Planning Supplement,” (Classified) fora detailed discussion of RAS and loadsignals.

7. Contact Procedures

Whenever an individual is recovered withthe assistance of a dedicated recovery force,the most critical aspect of that recoveryis the moment when the evader and therecovery force initially come together.The moment of contact is very tensebecause it requires two parties, unknownto each other and located in hostile territory,to meet without being detected by eitherenemy forces or elements of the localpopulation, and without compromisingeither party’s security. Contact betweenan evader and a recovery force requires agreat deal of preplanning. The JSRC,assisted by component intelligence andoperations specialists, ensures thatappropriate contact procedures aredeveloped for use in the joint operatingenvironment. The JSRC also ensures thatjoint force components are familiar with thecontact procedures.

a. When developing standards andguidelines for contact procedures, several

factors should be considered. Theseinclude, but are not limited to, the type ofterrain in the operational or recovery area(desert, jungle, urban, and other types ofterrain), the equipment and evasion aidsthat may or may not be available to the evader,enemy capabilities (such as air superiority,reconnaissance and/or direction-findingcapabilities, and other enemy capabilities), aswell as the availability and training level ofrecovery forces.

b. The JSRC coordinates and disseminatesthe theater-specific policies that will guidean evader’s actions from the moment ofisolation to the actual contact with arecovery force. Those policies should bewidely disseminated to ensure thatcommanders, potential evaders, recoveryforces, mission planners, and briefersunderstand their respective roles in theoperation. Potential evaders are responsiblefor ensuring that the information they put intheir EPA complies with theater policies andthat, if isolated, they follow their EPA asclosely as possible. Accurate EPA data, andthe evader’s degree of subsequent adherenceto the EPA once isolated, are the principalfactors in successful contact and recoveryoperations.

c. Successful contact is the last event in aseries of specific actions the evader mustinitiate, and the entire sequence should bebased on the guidelines and policiescoordinated by the JSRC. When developingcontact procedures, recovery plannersshould adhere to JSRC policies to ensureoperational consistency throughout thejoint force, and should address the two majortypes of recovery (conventional andunconventional) because each type involvesdifferent considerations. Guidance for therecovery process conducted byconventional CSAR recovery assets iscontained in Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrinefor Joint Combat Search and Rescue(CSAR).” Guidance for contact procedures

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authentication in a progressive manner.Immediately after contact, the recovery forcewill attempt to determine by observation thatthe individual they have contacted is theevader they have been sent to recover. If therecovery force doubts the evader’s identity,the evader will be moved as a “captive” to amore secure area for continued authentication.

• Definitive authentication will be basedon the information contained in theevader’s ISOPREP, including the four-digit authentication number, personalauthentication statements, andfingerprint information. Additional

carried out by unconventional recovery forcesis discussed below. Before a recovery will beattempted, the criteria shown in Figure III-4should be met.

d. There may be occasions when thepolitical climate in the operational area wouldmake it impractical or impossible for USforces to be involved in the recovery ofevaders. In such cases, the direct assistanceof indigenous forces may be necessary tosuccessfully complete the recovery mission.

e. Once the evader has been contacted, therecovery force will most likely conduct

RECOVERY CRITERIA

The recovery force should have reasonable knowledge(probable or confirmed) of the evader's location and/orintentions.

A capable insertion or extraction platform should beavailable.

If the recovery mission is tasked as a follow-on mission,it will normally be conducted only when theprimary mission has been completed.

The time frame in which the recovery team can respond(due to considerations of distance, terrain, and mobility)and access to the evader should be feasible andacceptable.

Friendly forces in the area should be deconflicted toensure that the recovery site is secure from friendlyattack.

The political climate should be favorable for a recoveryoperation by special operations forces or other friendlyforces.

There should be no breach of operations security.

Figure III-4. Recovery Criteria

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information may be used, such asfootprint and/or dental information. Ifthe evader is unable to respond toquestioning or cannot be fingerprinted,the recovery force will follow accepteddetainee handling procedures pendingauthentication or return to friendlyterritory.

8. Custody

a. Once in the custody of the recovery force,evaders can expect to be searched and securedpending confirmation of their identity. Anyweapons will be confiscated. Evaders shouldbe quiet, avoid resisting, and carefully followall instructions to avoid compromising thesecurity of the recovery force. If the evader isincapable of answering or responding, therecovery force will follow accepted detaineehandling procedures.

b. The status of the evader can changeonce identity has been ascertained and therecovery force commander has evaluatedthe situation. The evader could be held asan unarmed detainee or made part of therecovery force. In either case, the evader willbe briefed on what to expect during theremainder of the recovery operation.Regardless of their status, evaders shouldunderstand that the recovery forcecommander is the mission commanderuntil the mission is complete. Evadersshould not ask operational questions. Theymust realize that being recovered does notnecessarily mean a quick extraction. Therecovery force will do everything within itspower to effect a return to friendly control asquickly as possible.

c. There may be occasions when therecovery force that made the initial contactwith the evader cannot, for operationalreasons, deliver the evader safely tofriendly territory. In such cases, the evadermay be turned over to another group, to aUARM or another cell within the mechanism,

or to a conventional force to complete theextraction from hostile territory. Should thishappen, it is important for the evader torealize that although the recovery forcecommander may elect not to brief the detailsof the handover or crossover, the evadershould do exactly as directed. At no timewill the evader be abandoned. The evaderwill be under positive control at all times byeither the delivering force or the receivingforce, according to prior arrangements madeby the two forces. Cooperation, trust, anddiscipline on the part of the evader areessential for mission success.

9. Support to E&R Operations

See Figure III-5.

a. All-Source Intelligence. All-sourceintelligence should be an integral part of allE&R planning and execution. Because anevader’s prospects for successful recoverydepend heavily on depth of knowledge of thearea of operations, all sources of intelligenceshould be exploited to provide potentialevaders with the most detailed and reliabledata available on the many factors thatimpact the evasion environment. This datashould be provided to potential evaders in astimely a manner as possible. All-source

SUPPORT TOEVASION & RECOVERY

OPERATIONS

All-Source Intelligence

Civil Affairs and PsychologicalOperations

Operations Security /Military Deception

Communications

Figure III-5. Support to Evasion & RecoveryOperations

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d. Communications

• Communications systems for evasion andrecovery should be established to permitthe exchange of information between USorganizations and US personnel in hostileterritory who are not in the hands ofE&R assets and/or mechanisms.Communications received or relayed bymonitoring stations from isolated personnelneed to receive a high precedencei n retransmission to the JSRC.Communications from isolated personnelwill be authenticated in accordance with thecode system listed in the EPA for use bythe isolated personnel.

• An effective E&R communicationsplan should do the following.

•• Provide for the use of communicationssystems to maintain command andcontrol of friendly forces, carry outOPSEC measures, and execute militarydeception actions.

•• Provide for secure transmission andcryptographic security to deny theenemy OPSEC indicators, evaderlocations, and classified information.

•• Provide for low probability ofdetection, interception and jamming;provide redundancy while ensuringproper authentication and physicaldefense of communications systems.

•• Provide for avoidance of mutualinterference and jamming by friendlycommunications.

10. E&R-Related MessageTraffic

Preformatted message traffic between theJSRC and recovery forces, and betweenvarious recovery forces involved in an E&R

intelligence also enhances the survivability ofconventional and unconventional recovery assetsby decreasing their vulnerability to enemycounteractions.

b. Civil Affairs (CA) and PsychologicalOperations (PSYOP). CA and PSYOPcontribute to evasion and recovery operationsand promote E&R objectives by positivelyinfluencing the attitudes and behavior of the localpopulation. These efforts should be designed todecrease the potential that evaders will bemistreated if captured and increase theprobability that evaders will be helped, or at leastnot harmed, if they contact indigenouspersonnel.

c. Operations Security/Military Deception

• The enemy will know our intentions tosome degree in a recovery situation,recognizing the value we place on therecovery of isolated personnel. Tominimize enemy exploitation of thissituation and to increase the chances forE&R success, commanders must developa comprehensive OPSEC program andincorporate military deception into theirE&R planning .

• As part of a commander’s decision onwhether or not to conduct an E&Roperation, military deception conceptsshould be considered. The guidance andconcepts should be implemented in theplanning phase and continued in thepreparation and execution phases of themission. In recognition of, and to gainadvantage from, the inevitable enemyawareness that a recovery mission willoccur, desired enemy dispositions andactions that will favor E&R missionaccomplishment must be determined.Requirements for the employment ofsimulated recovery forces in a mannerthat will manipulate the enemy in adesired fashion should be addressed.

III-16

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-50.3

responsible for identifying all personnel whorequire access to classified informationdealing with UARM operations, assets,mechanisms, programs, or equipment andensuring that they complete a ClassifiedInformation Nondisclosure Agreement (seeAppendix B, “Sample SecurityNondisclosure Agreement”).

a. Security Reporting. Identification ofall personnel exposed to such informationwill be recorded and reported to the JSSAupon request, but no later than 31 Decemberof each calendar year. This report includesname, rank, SSN, parent organization, levelof exposure, and an indication that theindividual either continues to have access toclassified information or has been placed inan inactive status regarding access. Securityguidance for all matters pertaining toE&R is contained in the Operational Evasionand Escape Security Classification Guide,November 1989. Violations of E&R securityshould be reported immediately to theJSSA (HQ JSSA, Fort Belvoir, VA22060-5212).

operation, is vital to the successful executionof the operation. Such messages permit thequick and unambiguous transmission ofinformation in fast-paced operations.Commonly used message formats thatsupport E&R operations are presented inAppendix F, “Evasion and RecoveryMessages.” (Refer to Joint Pub 3-50.2,“Doctrine for Joint Combat Search andRescue (CSAR),” for US message text formatsfor the Search and Rescue Incident Report, theSearch and Rescue Situation Summary Report,and the Search and Rescue Request.

11. Security

Personnel tasked to support or conductrecovery operations depend on effectivesecurity for their survival and missionaccomplishment. Information concerningrecovery plans, operations, capabilities, andprocedures requires continuing long-termprotection after plans have been executed oroperations completed. The E&R point ofcontact for each combatant commander is

APPENDIX AADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING OF DOD INDIVIDUALSWHO HAVE RETURNED FROM ISOLATED TERRITORY

A-1

Annex A Debriefing Statement

A-2

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-50.3

1. In accordance with MCM-136-91,“Delineation of Responsibilities for Evasionand Escape Within the Department ofDefense,” (To be replaced by CJCSI 3270.01)the following procedures have beenestablished for the administrative processingof DOD individuals who have returned fromisolated territory.

2. The unit or organization that initiallyreceives a member of the Department ofDefense who has returned from isolation,evasion, captivity, or missing in action statusis expected to:

a. Provide care, custody, and safeguards forthe returnee, including all required health careand protection from idle curiosity.

b. Confirm the returnee’s identity andreceive necessary disposition instructions bycontacting the individual’s:

• Service component or unit of assignment.

• Joint Search and Rescue Center.

• The Joint Services SERE Agency.

c. If the individual’s identity cannot beconfirmed, provide care, custody, and securitycontrols and request appropriate instructionsfrom the JSRC or nearest counterintelligenceagency.

3. Before any debriefing or questioning, thereturnee will be asked if any assistance wasreceived during evasion or if the returnee hasany knowledge of any sensitive or covertrecovery plans, procedures, organizations,programs or equipment. If the returneeindicates that to be the case, the returnee willbe directed to complete a SecurityNondisclosure Agreement (see Appendix B).

The individual will then be advised tocooperate with intelligence debriefers fortactical intelligence, but will be directed notto discuss sensitive or covert E&Rinformation with anyone except a specificrepresentative identified by the JSRC. Thefact that the returnee has had access to certainclassified programs may, in itself, beclassified, and that fact will be treated as suchwhen so directed by the director of the JSRC.

4. If the debriefer suspects the returnee ofan offense under the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice (UCMJ), the debriefer will seek theadvice of his staff judge advocate.

5. Returnees will be notified that they maynot publish or disclose the details of theirexperience while isolated or evading withoutprior approval of the JSSA. The “DebriefingStatement” (Annex A to this Appendix) willbe used to certify that the returnee has beennotified of this requirement.

6. The unit or organization that initiallyreceives the returnee and theater intelligencecollection agencies may debrief the returneefor tactical intelligence. During thisdebriefing, the returnee will not be debriefedabout sensitive or covert E&R plans,procedures, organizations, programs, orequipment unless directed by the theater JSRCor the JSSA.

7. The JSSA, in coordination with the JSRC,will determine if the returnee’s exposure tosensitive information warrants subsequentdebriefing or assignment restrictions. TheJSRC, in coordination with JSSA, will notifythe returnee’s parent Service if such action isrequired. The Services will instituteappropriate assignment restrictions, asrequired.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING OF DOD INDIVIDUALSWHO HAVE RETURNED FROM ISOLATED TERRITORY

A-3

Administrative Processing of DOD Individuals Who Have ReturnedFrom Isolated Territory

8. The JSRC will establish appropriatecommand procedures to ensure returneesunder its control are debriefed by qualifiedpersonnel. The purpose of the debriefings isto determine the effectiveness of theater E&Rconcepts, plans, operations, tactics,procedures, techniques, security, and training.The results of these debriefings and anyassociated operational after-action reports willbe forwarded to the JSSA, who will:

a. Evaluate the debriefings and reportsto determine worldwide trends.

b. Disseminate associated briefings,reports, and analyses to the DefenseIntelligence Agency (DIA), Service SEREschools, and theater E&R resources ororganizations.

c. Determine the validity of existingtheater policy, doctrine, and procedures andinstitute changes as required.

d. Maintain historical files of thedebriefings, reports, and analyses.

9. Once the debrief has been completed andproperly classified, the following instructionwill be marked on the front:

CONTENTS ARE CLASSIFIED BY______________ IN ACCORDANCEWITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958.DECLASSIFY ON: ______________. IFDECLASSIFIED, THIS INFORMATIONMUST BE REVIEWED TO ENSURETHAT THE PROVISIONS OF DODDIRECTIVE 5400.7, DOD DIRECTIVE5400.11, AND DOD REGULATION5400.7R ARE MET BEFORE PUBLICRELEASE IS MADE.

10. It is conceivable that DOD could betasked to recover non-DOD and/or non-USpersonnel. In such cases, the recoveredindividuals will be treated in accordancewith paragraphs 2a-2c of this appendix, willbe requested to complete a SecurityNondisclosure Agreement (Appendix B),and will be requested to cooperate withintel l igence debriefers for tacticalintelligence, but will be directed not tod iscuss sensi t ive or cover t E&Rinformation with anyone except a specificrepresentative identified by the JSRC

A-4

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-50.3

Intentionally Blank

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX ADEBRIEFING STATEMENT

A-A-1

DEBRIEFING STATEMENT

1. The undersigned representative of the United States Government certifies that:

a. The United States will ensure that the information provided by the returnee will not bedeclassified, downgraded, or released to the public without Department of Defense (DOD)approval.

b. The United States reserves the right to prosecute returnees for any offenses they mayhave committed under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

2. The undersigned acknowledges that:

a. Information concerning the returnee’s experience while isolated, evading or missingin action, whether debriefed to US representatives or not, remains the property of the USGovernment even after the returnee’s separation from government service, and informationmay not be published or released to the public in any form without the prior written approvalof the Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Agency.

b. Cooperation during this debriefing does not exempt the returnee from possibleprosecution or adverse administrative action for any offenses the returnee may have committedunder the UCMJ. (AUTHORITY: Title 5, United States Code, sections 552b.(a),(1),(6),(7),(A);title 18, United States Code, section 794 and 798; DOD DIR 5200.1R, Paras 1-401 and1-603b.)

Government Representative: Returnee:

Signature ___________________________ Signature ___________________________

Name ______________________________ Name ______________________________

Rank & Service ______________________ Rank & Service ______________________

SSN ______________________________ SSN ______________________________

Organization _________________________ Organization _________________________

Date________________________________ Location ____________________________

A-A-2

Annex A to Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-50.3

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX BSAMPLE SECURITY NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT

B-1

1. I, ___________________________, understand that the information concerning covertor sensitive evasion and recovery plans, procedures, organizations, programs, and equipmentbelongs to the United States Government. I understand that disclosure of this informationis punishable under title 18, United States Code, section 798 “Disclosure of ClassifiedInformation,” as amended.

2. I do solemnly swear/affirm that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by word, conduct,or by any other means such classified information or knowledge, except in the performanceof my official duties and as specifically authorized by the Joint Services Survival, Evasion,Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Agency.

3. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of myobligation under this agreement and that the provisions of the agreement will remain bindingupon me even after termination of my service with the United States Government.

4. I take this obligation of my own free will, without any mental reservation or purpose ofevasion.WITNESS___________________________SIGNED___________________________NAME_____________________________ NAME_____________________________SSN________________________________ SSN _______________________________RANK/GRADE______________________ RANK/GRADE______________________ORGANIZATION____________________ ORGANIZATION____________________

B-2

Appendix B

Joint Pub 3-50.3

POSITION__________________________POSITION__________________________

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974(5 USC 552a)

1. AUTHORITY: Title 18, United States Code, sections 794 and 798; and title 44, UnitedStates Code, section 3102.

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To maintain a record of those individuals who have beenexposed to covert or sensitive evasion and recovery procedures, organizations, and/orequipment through the use of their name and/or social security number.

3. ROUTINE USES: The social security number is to be used to identify the individual.The information is to be retained strictly within the program.

4. MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE: Information is disclosed on avoluntary basis, but withholding information will render it impossible to grant an individualaccess to or participation in the program.

APPENDIX CSAMPLE ISOLATED PERSONNEL REPORT

C-1

C-2

Appendix C

Joint Pub 3-50.3

APPENDIX DEVASION PLAN OF ACTION FORMAT

D-1

1. Individuals completing EPAs should notuse the statement “PER SAR SPINS” as asubstitute for this document. Such a statementfails to provide recovery forces with theinformation required and provides no concretedata with which to plan a recovery operation.

2. EPAs should contain the followingminimum information. Inclusion of thisprescribed information into one documentenhances operational effectiveness andprecludes the possibility that criticalinformation might not be available in atime-sensitive situation. These documentsmust be classified to at least the level of theoperation order for the mission they support.Paragraphs must be individually classified tothe appropriate level.

a. Identification

• Name and rank (for each crew or teammember).

• Mission number, aircraft or team call signor identifier, crew or team position, typeaircraft, call sign suffix, other.

b. Planned Route of Flight, Travel, and/or Delta Points on File

• If not on file, the route points must bedescribed in the EPA for both INGRESSand EGRESS.

• Describe inflight emergency plans foreach leg of the mission.

c. Immediate Evasion Actions and/orIntentions for the First 48 Hours, Uninjured(for example):

• Hide near aircraft or parachute landingsite or area of separation from team(distance and heading).

• Evade alone or link-up with crew or team(rally points).

• Travel plans (distance, duration or time,speed, and other such details).

• Intended actions and/or length of stay atinitial hiding location.

d. Immediate Evasion Actions and/orIntentions, If Injured.

• Provide hiding intentions if injured.

• Provide evasion intentions if injured.

• Provide travel intentions if injured.

• Provide intended actions at hidinglocations if injured.

e. Extended Evasion Actions and/orIntentions After 48 Hours.

• Destination (SAFE, mountain range,coast, border, FEBA).

• Travel routes, plans, and/or techniques(either written and/or sketched).

• Actions and/or intentions at potentialcontact or recovery locations.

• Recovery/contact point signals, signs,and/or procedures (written out and/orsketched).

• Back-up plans, if any, for the above.

D-2

Appendix D

Joint Pub 3-50.3

3. The following information should becompleted by appropriate communicationsand/or signal, intelligence, and life supportpersonnel and attached to the EPA.

a. Communications and Authentication

• Color and/or letter of the day, month,or quarter; base time; base heading;base altitude; base number; codeword;bona fides; other (as applicable).

• Available communications and signalingdevices; type and quantity of radios,quantity of batteries, type and quantity offlares, beacons, mirrors, strobe lights, other.

• Primary communication schedule,procedures, and/or frequencies (first 48hours and after 48 hours).

• Back-up communication schedule,procedures, and/or frequencies.

b. In addition to the above minimumrequired information, units may wish toinclude the following optional information:

• Weapons and ammunition carried.

• Personal evasion kit items.

• Listing of issue survival and evasionkit items.

• M i s s i o n e v a s i o n p r e p a r a t i o nchecklist.

• Signature of reviewing official.

APPENDIX EBLOOD CHIT PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

E-1

Annex A Sample Blood Chit

E-2

Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-50.3

1. In accordance with MCM-136-91,“Delineation of Responsibilities for Evasionand Escape Within the Department ofDefense,” (To be replaced by CJCSI 3270.01)the following procedures have beenestablished for the administration of the DODBlood Chit Program.

2. The Joint Services SERE Agency is theoffice of primary responsibility for blood chitpolicy and for authorizing the production,distribution, and use of blood chits.

3. Program Administration

a. JSSA will maintain a master controlrecord for all blood chits.

b. Each organizational level where chits areissued will maintain strict accountability byserial number.

c. Units will maintain a record of the bloodchit serial number issued to each individual.An individual may be assigned a specificblood chit for the duration of his assignmentto a unit; however, to assure positive control,the chit will only be issued before combatmissions and deployments to high-threatareas and will be collected immediately aftercompletion of missions.

d. The combatant commander will appointa theater blood chit program manager orcoordinator. This manager will maintainrecords reflecting which blood chits, bynumber, have been issued to componentorganizations. A copy of the initial inventorymust be forwarded to JSSA. The programmanager needs to establish procedures withinthe theater to maintain positive control of chits,including annual inventories.

e. The program manager must provideJSSA an annual inventory in December of

each year reflecting which components havebeen issued blood chits, by blood chit number.Additional inventories should also occur atorganizations possessing blood chitswhenever there is a change of programmanager or custodian; however, inventoryresults need not be forwarded unless adiscrepancy is noted.

f. The loss or theft of blood chits is subjectto appropriate investigation as would anycontrolled item. The report of loss or theft(specifying the blood chit serial number(s)),along with a report of investigation and adetermination or reason for the loss or theftwill be forwarded to the theater programmanager and to JSSA as soon as possible afterthe loss or theft is discovered.

4. Reporting

a. Upon notification that an individualpossessing a blood chit is isolated in hostileterritory, the theater program manager willimmediately forward to JSSA and to the DIAPOW/MIA Office the individual’s name, rank,SSN, organization, location where missing,date missing, and blood chit number. Thisinformation will help in processing potentialfuture claims against the government on aparticular chit and will provide basic recorddata on individuals who may subsequentlybecome prisoners of war.

b. Any individual who has made use of theirblood chit and has received assistance mustreport the circumstances of the incident upontheir return to US control. This informationmay be provided as part of a mission/evasiondebriefing in accordance with existing plans.A copy of the individual’s debriefing, alongwith the blood chit, must be forwarded to HQJSSA, Ft Belvoir, VA 22060, as soon aspracticable. These operationally used bloodchits will not be reissued but will become part

BLOOD CHIT PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

E-3

Blood Chit Program Administration

of JSSA’s permanent case files. Theorganization or organizations responsible forcontrol of the blood chit will besimultaneously relieved of accountability forthe particular blood chit.

5. Claims for Reward. Commander, JSSAwill establish payment limitations and willprovide or appoint an individual in-theater astheir representative to adjudicate all claims,in coordination with JSSA, as required. USGorganizations to whom claims are presentedwill forward a report detailing the claim tothe adjudicator, info JSSA, which willdetermine the amount and nature of the reward

and provide funds to the organization tosatisfy the claim.

6. Program Classification Guidance

a. All aspects of the DOD Blood ChitProgram are UNCLASSIFIED.

b. Although blood chits are unclassified,they are controlled and accountable items.

c. Inventories and reports of the loss or theftof blood chits are UNCLASSIFIED, unlessother factors in connection with the inventoryor loss or theft require security classification.

E-4

Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-50.3

Intentionally Blank

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX ESAMPLE BLOOD CHIT

E-A-1

E-A-2

Annex A to Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-50.3

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX FEVASION AND RECOVERY MESSAGES

F-1

Annex A Safe Area Activation Request (SAFER)B E&R Report and Authentication Date Request (LUCKY)C E&R Authentication Data Report (PRINT)D E&R Supplemental Data Report (EARLY)E E&R Contact Point Report (NICKY)F E&R Handover/Crossover Point Report (QUART)

F-2

Appendix F

Joint Pub 3-50.3

1. This appendix provides formats andexamples of messages used in E&Roperations. The messages should besubmitted on joint message forms.

2. The messages presented in this appendixas annexes include:

a. E&R SAFE Area Activation Request(SAFER) (Annex A).

b. E&R Report and Authentication DataRequest (LUCKY) (Annex B).

c. E&R Authentication Data Report(PRINT) (Annex C).

d. E&R Supplemental Data Report(EARLY) (Annex D).

e. E&R Contact Point Report (NICKY)(Annex E).

f. E&R Handover/Crossover Point Report(QUART) (Annex F).

3. Example messages are presented inGENADMIN format.

EVASION AND RECOVERY MESSAGES

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX FE&R SAFE AREA ACTIVATION REQUEST (SAFER)

F-A-1

1. Purpose and Description. SAFER is a message sent by the Theater Special OperationsCommand (SOC) to a special operations component (SFG[A]/NSWTG) that may haveoperational elements operating in the area of a SAFE toward which an evader or evaders maybe evading. The message directs the component to task those operational elements to activateand service the SAFE, if operationally practicable. Activation and servicing of a SAFEconsists of operational elements surveilling the SAFE and the SAFE contact point(s)(SAFE-CP) and being prepared to contact and recover evaders.

2. Sent By. THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, IMMEDIATE precedence,SECRET classification (CONFIDENTIAL for exercises).

3. Sent To. SO component (SFG[A]/NSWTG/STS) with operational element(s) in aposition to service designated SAFE areas and contact points.

4. When Sent. Upon notification that evaders are possibly or probably present in the vicinityof a given SAFE.

5. How Sent. Record traffic.

6. Responds To. None.

7. Expected Response. Special operations Service component command forwardsinformation to operational unit.

8. SAFER Format.

FM THEATER SOC//TO COMPONENT COMMANDER//CLASSIFICATIONOPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//MSGID/GENADMIN/THEATER SOC//SUBJ/SAFER/MISSION IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION//RMKS/

1. ( ) Designation of SAFE to be activated.2. ( ) DTG to commence servicing contact point(s).3. ( ) Number of evaders who may be proceeding to SAFE-CP(s)4. ( ) Additional Information. Include narrative as required to provide supplementaryinformation on the last known or estimated evader position(s), route(s) and enemy pursuit.//Declassification authority.//

NOTE: No mission support designator is shown in the subject line because this action isnot a mission support event. Also, no operational unit designator is shown in the subjectline because the unit designator is initially assigned by the special operations component.

F-A-2

Annex A to Appendix F

Joint Pub 3-50.3

9. SAFER Example

FM THEATER SOC//TO CDR SFG(A)//CLASSIFICATIONOPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//MSGID/GENADMIN/THEATER SOC//SUBJ/SAFER/EE-02A/(U)//RMKS/1. ( ) 117-2 ONE ONE SEVEN DASH TWO.2. ( ) 071700Z MAY ZERO SEVEN ONE SEVEN ZERO ZERO ZULU MAY.3. ( ) TWO.4. ( ) 1/F-15E, DOWN VICINITY (LOCATION) AT 051500Z HRS. TWO CHUTESOBSERVED. TWO RADIO CONTACTS INDICATE BOTH CREW MEMBERSPROCEEDING SOUTH SOUTHWEST. NO KNOWN ENEMY PURSUIT.//DRV FROM: (classification source)DECL ON: (declass date, event, or category)

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX FE&R REPORT AND AUTHENTICATION DATA REQUEST (LUCKY)

F-B-1

1. Purpose and Description. The purpose of the LUCKY is to report that evaders havebeen contacted and placed in protective isolation and to request data required to authenticatebefore accepting the evader into the assistance mechanism.

2. Sent By. SO component (SFG[A]/NSWTG/STS) whose operational element hascontacted and is holding evaders, IMMEDIATE precedence, SECRET classification(CONFIDENTIAL for exercises).

3. Sent To. THEATER SOC.

4. When Sent. Immediately after contacting evader(s) and placing in protective isolation.

5. How Sent. Record traffic. To submit several LUCKYs in one message, repeat thesubject line and each item as often as necessary.

6. Responds to. None.

7. Expected Response. Authentication data extracted from evader’s ISOPREP (unlessdata was sent before contact).

8. LUCKY Format:FM COMPONENT COMMANDER//TO THEATER SOC//CLASSIFICATIONOPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//MSGID/GENADMIN/COMPONENT COMMANDER//SUBJ/LUCKY/MISSION IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION//RMKS/1. ( ) First Name, Middle Name(s), Family (Last) Name, Rank/Grade, Social Security/Serial Number.2. ( ) Date of Birth.3. ( ) Nationality and Branch of Service.4. ( ) Additional Information. Identifying marks or scars.// Also, if authenticationdata has been previously received and positive identification has been made, state thatidentification is positive and request exfiltration instructions, if applicable. If no previousauthentication data has been received, request a PRINT report.Declassification authority.//

F-B-2

Annex B to Appendix F

Joint Pub 3-50.3

9. LUCKY Example:FM CDR SFG(A)//TO THEATER SOC//CLASSIFICATIONOPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR SFG(A)//SUBJ/LUCKY/EE-02A/ODA 511/NNNN/(U)//RMKS/1. ( ) ROBERT JAMES JONES, CPT, 613-91-4361.2. ( ) 26 JUN 70.3. ( ) US/USAF.4. ( ) PRINT REQUIRED.//DRV FROM: (classification source)DECL ON: (declass date, event, or category)

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX FE&R AUTHENTICATION DATA REPORT (PRINT)

F-C-1

1. Purpose and Description. The PRINT is a message sent by the theater SOC to a SOcomponent (SFG[A]/NSWTG/STS) for relay to an operational element holding an evader,which contains the authentication data on the evader(s) required to effect the evader’s positiveidentification. The PRINT contains personal and physical data, fingerprint codes, personalauthentication statements, and the authentication number of the evader(s). The data is extractedfrom the evader’s ISOPREP.

2. Sent By. THEATER SOC, IMMEDIATE precedence, SECRET classification(CONFIDENTIAL for exercises).

3. Sent To. SO component (SFG[A]/NSWTG/STS) for relay to operational element.

4. When Sent. As soon as practicable after receipt of request for authentication. May beprovided in advance for certain operations if identity of evader(s) or escapee(s) is known.

5. How Sent. Record traffic.

6. Responds To. LUCKY.

7. Expected Response. None.

8. PRINT Format:

FM THEATER SOC//TO COMPONENT COMMANDER//CLASSIFICATIONOPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//MSGID/GENADMIN/THEATER SOC//SUBJ/PRINT/MISSION IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION//RMKS/1. ( ) First Name, Middle Initial, Family (last) Name, Date of Birth. REPEAT FirstName, Middle Initial, Family (Last) Name, Date of Birth, Nationality, and Branch ofService.2. ( ) Evasion and Escape Fingerprint Codes.3. ( ) Authenticator Question; ANS: Answer REPEAT, answer.4. ( ) Authenticator Question; ANS: Answer REPEAT, answer.5. ( ) Authenticator Question; ANS: Answer REPEAT, answer.6. ( ) Authenticator Question; ANS: Answer REPEAT, answer.7. ( ) Height in Inches or Centimeters, color of eyes, color of hair.8. ( ) Authenticator Number; REPEAT Authenticator Number.9. ( ) Additional information to include disposition instructions.//Declassification authority.//

F-C-2

Annex C to Appendix F

Joint Pub 3-50.3

10. PRINT Example.

FM THEATER SOC//TO CDR SFG(A)//CLASSIFICATIONOPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//MSGID/GENADMIN/THEATER SOC//SUBJ/PRINT/EE-02A/ODA 511/NNNN/( )//RMKS/1. ( ) ROBERT J. JONES TWO SIX JUN SEVEN ZERO RPT ROBERT J. JONESTWO SIX JUN SEVEN ZERO/UNIFORM SIERRA/UNIFORM SIERRA ALFAFOXTROT.2. ( ) MM/MM/PP/NN/MM/OO/MM/KK/MM/LL.3. ( ) SPOUSE’S MIDDLE NAME? ANS: FAY RPT FAY.4. ( ) FAVORITE STATE? ANS: WYOMING RPT WYOMING.5. ( ) FATHER’S OCCUPATION? ANS: DENTIST RPT DENTIST.6. ( ) BOB’S NICKNAME? ANS: TURKEY RPT TURKEY.7. ( ) SIX EIGHT INCHES/BROWN/BROWN.8. ( ) SEVEN ONE SEVEN ONE RPT SEVEN ONE SEVEN ONE.9. ( ) IF POSITIVE ID, MOVE TO RECOVERY SITE AND EXTRACT BY AIRASSET.//DRV FROM: (classification source)DECL ON: (declass date, event, or category)

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX FE&R SUPPLEMENTAL DATA REPORT (EARLY)

F-D-1

1. Purpose and Description. The EARLY is a message whereby the theater SOC canprovide new, additional or changed information concerning recovered evaders to theoperational element via the controlling SO component (SFG[A]/NSWTG).

2. Sent By. THEATER SOC, IMMEDIATE precedence, SECRET classification(CONFIDENTIAL for exercises).

3. Sent To. SO component (SFG[A]/NSWTG) for relay to the operational element.

4. When Sent. When additional authentication data is available and needed.

5. How Sent. Record traffic.

6. Responds To. Request for additional information of changes received after dispatch ofPRINT.

7. Expected Response. None.

8. EARLY Format.

FM THEATER SOC//TO COMPONENT COMMANDER//CLASSIFICATIONOPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//MSGID/GENADMIN/THEATER SOC//SUBJ/EARLY/MISSION IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION//RMKS/1. ( ) Family (Last) Name, Rank.2. ( ) Changes or additions to print code data.3. ( ) Changes or additions to authenticator questions and answers.4. ( ) Additional information.//Declassification authority.//

F-D-2

Annex D to Appendix F

Joint Pub 3-50.3

9. EARLY Example.

FM THEATER SOC//TO CDR SFG(A)//CLASSIFICATIONOPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//MSGID/GENADMIN/THEATER SOC//SUBJ/EARLY/E-02A/ODA511/NNNN/( )//RMKS/1. ( ) JONES, CPT.2. ( ) NONE.3. ( ) SPOUSE’S MIDDLE NAME? ANS: LESLIE RPT LESLIE.4. ( ) REPORTS INDICATE POSSIBLE BROKEN RIGHT ARM.//DRV FROM: (classification source)DECL ON: (declass date, event, or category)

ANNEX E TO APPENDIX FE&R CONTACT POINT REPORT (NICKY)

F-E-1

1. Purpose and Description. The purpose of the NICKY is to report new E&R contactpoints and to terminate contact points that are no longer viable.

2. Sent By. Operational element or theater SOC through appropriate SO component,IMMEDIATE precedence, SECRET classification (CONFIDENTIAL for exercises).

3. Sent To. Theater SOC or operational unit.

4. When Sent. As soon as practicable after established contact points have beencompromised and/or more viable contact points have been identified.

5. How Sent. As appropriate.

6. Responds To. None.

7. Expected Response. None.

8. NICKY Format.

FM THEATER SOC OR COMPONENT COMMANDER//TO COMPONENT COMMANDER OR THEATER SOC//CLASSIFICATIONOPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//MSGID/GENADMIN/THEATER SOC OR COMPONENT CDR//SUBJ/NICKY/MISSION IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION//RMKS/1. ( ) Contact point to be discontinued: UTM coordinates and description.2. ( ) New contact point: UTM coordinates and description.3. ( ) Initial evader action at the contact point.4. ( ) Contact agent response to evader action.5. ( ) Final contact procedures.6. ( ) Additional information. Include observation on enemy activity in the vicinityand anticipated actions by operational unit(s).//Declassification authority.//

9. NICKY Example.

FM CDR SFG(A)//TO THEATER SOC//CLASSIFICATIONOPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR SFG(A)//SUBJ/NICKY/EE-02A/ODA 511/NNNN/( )//RMKS/

F-E-2

Annex E to Appendix F

Joint Pub 3-50.3

1. ( ) NOVEMBER INDIA 735621 SMALL WOODEN BRIDGE ON GRAVELROAD, SEVEN KM NORTHEAST OF (LOCATION/PLACE NAME).2. ( ) NOVEMBER INDIA 724598 FORK, IN GRAVEL ROAD, TWELVE KMSOUTH OF (LOCATION/PLACE NAME).3. ( ) EVADER PUTS OUT LOAD SIGNAL AT CONTACT POINT. EVADERMOVES TO SAFE DISTANCE AND HIDES.4. ( ) ASSISTER WILL ALTER LOAD SIGNAL.5. ( ) RECOVERY FORCE WILL “CAPTURE” EVADER WHEN HE COMES TOCHECK ON STATUS OF LOAD SIGNAL.6. ( ) ENEMY INCREASING PATROLS VICINITY NOVEMBER INDIA 735621.WILL CHECK NEW CP BETWEEN ONE NINE THREE ZERO HOURS AND TWOONE THREE ZERO HOURS.//DRV FROM: (classification source)DECL ON: (declass date, event, or category)

NOTE: This message is from the CDR SFG(A). It is assumed that the messageactually was initiated by SFODA 511 and transmitted to the SFG(A).

ANNEX F TO APPENDIX FE&R HANDOVER/CROSSOVER POINT REPORT (QUART)

F-F-1

1. Purpose and Description. The purpose of the QUART is to report location(s) andprocedures to be used in passing recovered personnel from one recovery operational elementto another. Considerable time may be required to transmit the message to the ultimate actionelement because one or more relay or readdressal actions may be necessary.

2. Sent By. Operational unit that will receive the recovered personnel. IMMEDIATEprecedence, SECRET classification (CONFIDENTIAL for exercises).

3. Sent To. The operational unit holding personnel to be transferred. INFO Theater SOCand other applicable SO components.

4. When Sent. As soon as practicable before time of transfer to allow for message relay(s),and movement and positioning of personnel and units in accordance with arrangementsprescribed in the QUART.

5. How sent. As appropriate.

6. Responds To. Notification of personnel to be transferred.

7. Expected Response. None.

8. QUART Format:

FM GAINING COMPONENT COMMANDER//TO LOSING COMPONENT COMMANDER//CLASSIFICATIONOPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//MSGID/GENADMIN/GAINING COMPONENT COMMANDER//SUBJ/QUART/OPERATIONAL UNIT DESIGNATOR OF TRANSFERRINGELEMENT/OPERATION UNIT DESIGNATOR OF RECEIVING ELEMENT/CLASSIFICATION//RMKS/1. ( ) Location and description of primary handover/crossover point.2. ( ) DTG of crossover (primary).3. ( ) Signals to be used by receiving unit at primary handover or crossover point(clear and danger).4. ( ) Special instructions (primary).5. ( ) Location and description of alternate handover or crossover point.6. ( ) DTG of handover/crossover (alternate).7. ( ) Signals to be used by receiving unit at alternate handover or crossover point(clear and danger).8. ( ) Special instructions (alternate).//Declassification authority.//

F-F-2

Annex F to Appendix F

Joint Pub 3-50.3

9. QUART Example:

FM COMNSWTG//TO CDR SFG(A)//INFO THEATER SOC//CLASSIFICATIONOPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//MSGID/GENADMIN/COMNSWTG//SUBJ/QUART/ODA-511/SQD21/( )//RMKS/1. ( ) ZULU WHISKEY 630520 BRIDGE OVER SMALL STREAM.2. ( ) 122200Z MAY ONE TWO TWO TWO ZERO ZERO ZULU MAY.3. ( ) CLEAR, MAN AT WEST END OF BRIDGE REPAIRING BOOT. DANGER,NO MAN REPAIRING BOOT.4. ( ) DO NOT APPROACH FROM WEST (LEFT) BANK. TRANSFERALONGSIDE OF BRIDGE ON EAST (RIGHT) BANK.5. ( ) ZULU WHISKEY 635530 FORK IN GRAVEL ROAD.6. ( ) 132300Z MAY ONE THREE TWO THREE ZERO ZERO ZULU MAY.7. ( ) CLEAR, MAN REPAIRING BOOT IN FRONT OF FORK. DANGER, NOMAN REPAIRING BOOT.8. ( ) TRANSFER IN WOODED AREA ONE ZERO ZERO METERS BEHINDFORK IN ROAD.//DRV FROM: (classification source)DECL ON: (declass date, event, or category)

APPENDIX GPLANNING SUPPLEMENT

G-1

Published Separately

G-2

Appendix G

Joint Pub 3-50.3

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX HREFERENCES

H-1

The development of Joint Pub 3-50.3 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Hague Convention No. V, 18 October 1907, “Respecting the Rights and Duties of NeutralPowers in Case of War on Land.”

2. The Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of August 12, 1949 (theGeneva Conventions), which include the following treaties to which the US Government isa party.

a. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick inthe Armed Forces in the Field (GWS).

b. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick andShipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea (GWS SEA).

c. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) (specificallyArticles 91-94).

d. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War(GC).

3. Executive Order 10631, 17 August 1955, “Code of Conduct for Members of the ArmedForces of the United States,” as amended by Executive Order 12017, 3 November 1977, andExecutive Order 12633, 28 March 1988.

4. DOD Directive 1300.7, 23 December 1988, “Training and Education Measures Necessaryto Support the Code of Conduct.”

5. DOD Directive 5100.77, 10 July 1979, “DOD Law of War Program.”

6. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

7. Joint Pub 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

8. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

9. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

10. JCS Memorandum MCM-136-91, 8 August 1991, “Delineation of Responsibilities forEvasion and Escape Within the Department of Defense,” (S) (To be replaced by CJCSI3270.01).

H-2

Appendix H

Joint Pub 3-50.3

11. AFM 200-3/FM 21-77A/NWP 43(A), 1 August 1967, “Joint Worldwide Evasion andEscape Manual” (S).

12. (U) FM 27-10, July 1956, “The Law of Land Warfare.”

APPENDIX JADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

J-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theJoint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Air Force. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsorfor this publication is the Director, J-7, Joint Staff.

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XOXD//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7/JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

J-2

Appendix J

Joint Pub 3-50.3

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttache Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington D.C. 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Navy Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (OPD)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

CA civil affairsCSAF Chief of Staff, United States Air ForceCSAR combat search and rescue

DA direct actionDIA Defense Intelligence AgencyDMA Defense Mapping AgencyDOD Department of Defense

E&R evasion and recoveryEARLY evasion and recovery supplemental data reportEPA evasion plan of actionEVC evasion chart

FEBA forward edge of the battle area

ISOPREP isolated personnel report

JFC joint force commanderJOG joint operations graphicJSRC joint search and rescue centerJSSA Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and

Escape (SERE) Agency

LUCKY evasion and recovery report and authentication data request

MIA missing in actionMOOTW military operations other than war

NICKY evasion and recovery contact point reportNSWTG naval special warfare task group

OPSEC operations security

POW prisoner of warPRINT evasion and recovery authentication data reportPSYOP psychological operations

QUART evasion and recovery handover-crossover point report

RAS recovery activation signalRCC rescue coordination center

SAFE selected area for evasionSAFE-CP selected area for evasion-contact pointSAFER evasion and recovery selected area for

evasion (SAFE) area activation requestSAID selected area for evasion (SAFE) area intelligence descriptionSAR search and rescueSERE survival, evasion, resistance, and escapeSOC special operations commandSOF special operations forcesSSN Social Security NumberSTAR surface-to-air recovery

UARM unconventional assisted recovery mechanismUCMJ Uniform Code of Military JusticeUSAF United States Air ForceUSG United States GovernmentUSN United States NavyUSNR United States Naval ReserveUSSOCOM United States Special Operations CommandUW unconventional warfare

GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-50.3

act of mercy. In evasion and recoveryoperations, assistance rendered to evadersby an individual or elements of the localpopulation who sympathize or empathizewith the evaders’ cause or plight.(Approved for inclusion in next edition ofJoint Pub 1-02.)

assistance mechanism. Individuals, groupsof individuals, or organizations, togetherwith material and/or facilities in position,or that can be placed in position byappropriate US or multinational agencies,to accomplish or support evasion andrecovery operations. (Approved forinclusion in next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

assisted recovery. The return of an evaderto friendly control as the result of assistancefrom an outside source. (Approved forinclusion in next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

authentication. 1. A security measuredesigned to protect a communicationssystem against acceptance of afraudulent transmission or simulation byes tab l i sh in g t h e v a l i d i t y o f atransmission, message, or originator. 2.A means of identifying individuals andverifying their eligibility to receive specificcategories of information. 3. Evidence byproper signature or seal that a documentis genuine and official. 4. In evasionand recovery operations, the processwhereby the identity of an evader isconfirmed. (This term and its definitionmodifies the existing term and its definitionand is approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

blood chit. A small sheet of materialdepicting an American flag and a statementin several languages to the effect thatanyone assisting the bearer to safety willbe rewarded. (This term and its definitionmodifies the existing term and its definition

and is approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

bona fides. Good faith. In evasion andrecovery operations, the use of verbal orvisual communication by individuals whoare unknown to one another to establishtheir authenticity, sincerity, honesty, andtruthfulness. (Approved for inclusion inthe next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

cache. In evasion and recovery operations,source of subsistence and supplies, typicallycon ta in ing i tems such as food ,w a t e r , m e d i c a l i t e m s , a n d / o rcommunications equipment, packaged toprevent damage from exposure and hiddenin isolated locations by such methods asburial, concealment, and/or submersion, tosupport evaders in current or futureoperations. (Approved for inclusion inthe next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

clandestine operation. An operationsponsored or conducted by governmentaldepartments or agencies in such a way asto assure secrecy or concealment. Aclandestine operation differs from a covertoperation in that emphasis is placed onconcealment of the operation rather than onconcealment of identity of sponsor. Inspecial operations, an activity may be bothcovert and clandestine and may focusequally on operational considerations andintelligence-related activities. (JointPub 1-02)

combat search and rescue. A specific taskperformed by rescue forces to effect therecovery of distressed personnel duringwartime or military operations other thanwar. Also called CSAR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat survival. Those measures to betaken by Service personnel wheninvoluntarily separated from friendly

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-3 Joint Pub 3-50.3

GL-4

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-50.3

forces in combat, including proceduresrelating to individual survival, evasion,escape, and conduct after capture. (JointPub 1-02)

contact point. 1. In land warfare, a pointon the terrain, easily identifiable, wheretwo or more units are required to makecontact. 2. In air operations, the positionat which a mission leader makes radiocontact with an air control agency. 3. Inevasion and recovery operations, alocation where an evader can establishcontact with friendly forces. (This termand its definition modifies the existingterm and its definition and is approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02.)

contact procedure. Those predesignatedactions taken by evaders and recoveryforces that permit link-up between thetwo parties in hostile territory andfacilitate the return of evaders to friendlycontrol. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

conventional recovery operation. Evaderrecovery operations conducted byconventional forces. (Approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

covert operation. An operation that is soplanned and executed as to conceal theidentity of or permit plausible denial by thesponsor. A covert operation differs from aclandestine operation in that emphasis isplaced on concealment of identity ofsponsor rather than on concealment of theoperation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direct action. Short-duration strikes andother small-scale offensive actions byspecial operations forces to seize, destroy,capture, recover, or inflict damage ondesignated personnel or materiel. In theconduct of these operations, special

operations forces may employ raid,ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplacemines and other munitions; conductstandoff attacks by fire from air, ground,or maritime platforms; provide terminalguidance for precision-guided munitions;and conduct independent sabotage. Alsocalled DA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

evader. Any person isolated in hostile orunfriendly territory who eludes capture.(Joint Pub 1-02)

evasion. The process whereby individualswho are isolated in hostile or unfriendlyterritory avoid capture with the goal ofsuccessfully returning to areas underfriendly control. (Approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

evasion aid. In evasion and recoveryoperations, any piece of information orequipment designed to assist anindividual in evading capture. Evasionaids include, but are not limited to, bloodchits, pointee-talkees, evasion charts,barter items, and equipment designed tocomplement issued survival equipment.(Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

evasion and escape. The procedures andoperations whereby military personneland other selected individuals are enabledto emerge from an enemy-held or hostilearea to areas under friendly control.(Joint Pub 1-02)

evasion and escape route. A course oftravel, preplanned or not, that an escapeeor evader uses in an attempt to departenemy territory in order to return tofriendly lines. (Joint Pub 1-02)

evasion and recovery. The full spectrumof coordinated actions carried out byevaders, recovery forces, and operational

GL-5

Glossary

recovery planners to effect the successfulreturn of personnel isolated in hostileterritory to friendly control. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02.)

evasion chart. Special map or chartdesigned as an evasion aid. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02.)

evasion plan of action. A course of action,developed before executing a combatmission, which is intended to improve apotential evader’s chances of successfulevasion and recovery by providingrecovery forces with an additional sourceof information that can increase thepredictability of the evader’s actions andmovement. Also called EPA. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

Fulton Recovery System. A method usedfor quickly extracting personnel fromisolated areas that consists of a kitcontaining a harness, tow line, andhelium-inflated balloon dropped to anindividual(s) by a specially designedaircraft that is capable of snaring the towline and extracting the harnessedindividual(s) from the area. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02.)

handover/crossover. In evasion andrecovery operations, the transfer ofevaders between two recovery forces.(Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

high-risk-of-capture personnel. USpersonnel whose position or assignmentmakes them particularly vulnerable tocapture by hostile forces in combat, byterrorists, or by unfriendly governments.(Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

isolated personnel report. A DOD Form(DD 1833) that contains informationdesigned to facilitate the identificationand authentication of an evader by arecovery force. Also called ISOPREP.(Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint search and rescue center. A primarysearch and rescue facility suitably staffedby supervisory personnel and equippedfor planning, coordinating, andexecuting joint search and rescue andcombat search and rescue operationswithin the geographical area assigned tothe joint force. The facility is operatedjointly by personnel from two or moreService or functional components or itmay have a multinational staff ofpersonnel from two or more allied orcoalition nations (multinational searchand rescue center). The joint search andrescue center should be staffed equitablyby trained personnel drawn from eachjoint force component, including USCoast Guard participation wherepractical. Also called JSRC. (Joint Pub1-02)

joint search and rescue center director.The designated representative withoverall responsibility for operation of thejoint search and rescue center. (Joint Pub1-02)

load signal. In evasion and recoveryoperations, a visual signal displayed ina covert manner to indicate the presenceof an individual or object at a givenlocation. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

pointee-talkee. A language aid containingselected phrases in English opposite atranslation in a foreign language. It isused by pointing to appropriate phrases.(Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-50.3

recovery. In evasion and recoveryoperations, the return of evaders tofriendly control, either with or withoutassistance, as the result of planning,operations, and individual actions on thepart of recovery planners, conventional/unconventional recovery forces, and/orthe evaders themselves. (This term andits definition modifies the existing termand its definition and is approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

recovery activation signal. In evasion andrecovery operations, a precoordinated signalfrom an evader that indicates his presence inan area to a receiving or observing sourcethat indicates “I am here, start the recoveryplanning.” (Approved for inclusion inthe next edition of Joint Pub 1-0.2)

recovery force. In evasion and recoveryoperations, an organization consisting ofpersonnel and equipment with a missionof seeking out evaders, contacting them,and returning them to friendly control.(Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

recovery site. In evasion and escape usage,an area from which an evader or anescapee can be evacuated. (This term and itsdefinition modifies the existing term and itsdefinition and is approved for inclusion inthe next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

rescue coordination center. A primarysearch and rescue facility suitably staffedby supervisory personnel and equippedfor coordinating and controlling searchand rescue and/or combat search andrescue operations. The facility isoperated unilaterally by personnel of asingle Service or component. For Navycomponent operations, this facility maybe called a rescue coordination team.Also called RCC (or RCT for Navycomponent). (Joint Pub 1-02)

SAFE area intelligence description. Inevasion and recovery operations, anin-depth, all-source evasion studydesigned to assist the recovery of militarypersonnel from a selected area for evasionunder hostile conditions. Also calledSAID. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

selected area for evasion. A designatedarea in hostile territory that offers evadersor escapees a reasonable chance ofavoiding capture and of surviving untilthey can be evacuated. Also calledSAFE. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

special operations. Operations conductedby specially organized, trained, andequipped military and paramilitary forcesto achieve military, political, economic,or psychological objectives byunconventional military means in hostile,denied, or politically sensitive areas.These operations are conducted duringpeacetime competition, conflict, and war,independently or in coordination withoperations of conventional, nonspecialoperations forces. Political-militaryconsiderations frequently shape specialoperations, requiring clandestine, covert,or low visibility techniques and oversightat the national level. Special operationsdiffer from conventional operations indegree of physical and political risk,operational techniques, mode ofemployment, independence from friendlysupport, and dependence on detailedoperational intelligence and indigenousassets. Also called SO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

surface-to-air recovery. Also calledSTAR. See Fulton Recovery System.

unconventional assisted recovery. Evaderrecovery conducted by directedunconventional warfare forces, dedicatedextraction teams, and/or unconventional

GL-7

Glossary

assisted recovery mechanisms operated byguerrilla groups or other clandestineorganizations to seek out, contact,authenticate, support, and return evaders tofriendly control. (Approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

unconventional assisted recoverymechanism. That entity, group ofentities, or organizations within enemy-held or hostile areas which operates to

receive, support, move, and exfiltratemilitary personnel or selected individualsto friendly control. (Approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

unconventional recovery operation. Evaderrecovery operations conducted byunconventional forces. (Approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

GL-8

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-50.3

Intentionally Blank

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope of project,references, milestones,and who will developdrafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCS receive the pub andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7, willsolicit a written report from thecombatant commands andServices on the utility and qualityof each pub and the need for anyurgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub is revised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchyas shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-50.3 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0

PERSONNELand

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINTWARFARE

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT PUB 2-0

OPERATIONS

JOINT PUB 3-0