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2011 42: 1251 originally published online 30 November 2010Journal of Cross-Cultural PsychologyHelen C. Boucher

Self-Certainty, and AuthenticityThe Dialectical Self-Concept II : Cross-Role and Within-Role Consistency, Well-Being,

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Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology42(7) 1251 –1271© The Author(s) 2011Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navDOI: 10.1177/0022022110383316jccp.sagepub.com

The Dialectical Self- Concept II: Cross-Role and Within-Role Consistency, Well-Being, Self-Certainty, and Authenticity

Helen C. Boucher1

AbstractAlthough there is growing evidence that dialectical thinkers express more inconsistency within the global self-concept, whether this holds true for inconsistency across roles and within specific roles has received little attention. I examine whether dialectical thinking is associated with less cross-role and within-role consistency and whether dialecticism moderates the relationship between self-consistency and subjective well-being, self-concept certainty, and felt authenticity. Participants completed measures of the above outcomes, a measure of dialectical thinking, and a self-description measure for both the global self-concept and within two roles (e.g., friend), from which I derived both cross-role and within-role consistency scores. Dialectical thinking predicted lower scores on both types of consistency, and in general dialecticism moderated the relationship between self-concept consistency and both subjective well-being and self-concept certainty. Dialecticism also moderated the relationship between cross-role consistency and authenticity, and the relationship between authenticity and subjective well-being. I conclude by discussing directions for future research.

Keywordsself-concept, culture, consistency, well-being, authenticity, Americans, Chinese, dialectical thinking

A central theme in classic and contemporary theorizing about the self is the importance placed on maintaining consistency in thoughts and feelings about the self (Higgins, 1987; Jourard, 1965; Lecky, 1945; Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1951), and self-consistency is linked reliably to a number of positive outcomes such as psychological and physical well-being (Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993; Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Ilardi, 1997). However, cultural research-ers are challenging the view that consistency is expressed to the same degree across cultures (Choi & Choi, 2002; Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori, Wang, & Peng, 2009; Suh, 2002). In the present research, I examine the role of naïve dialecticism, a dimension of cultural variability that highlights tolerance of contradiction, awareness of change, and appreciation of a holistic universe

1Department of Psychology, Bates College, Lewiston, Maine, USA

Corresponding Author:Helen C. Boucher, Department of Psychology, Bates College, Lewiston, ME 04240.Email: [email protected]



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(Peng & Nisbett, 1999), in predicting cross-role and within-role self-concept consistency. Also, I test whether dialecticism moderates the relationship between self-consistency and both (subjec)tive well-being and self-concept certainty. Finally, I explore how felt authenticity, or the extent to which one believes his or her behavior is freely chosen (or self-determined; Ryan & Deci, 2000), interacts with dialecticism, consistency, and well-being.

The Importance of Consistency in Western PsychologyConsistency means different things to different theorists, but generally it refers to inner consis-tency (i.e., coherence, congruence, freedom from conflict and/or ambivalence), cross-situational consistency (i.e., consistency across relationships, roles, contexts, etc.), and temporal stability; for present purposes, I limit discussion to the first two meanings of the term. However defined, the need for consistent psychological experiences is the basis for many influential theories in social and personality psychology. In social psychology, awareness that one has acted inconsis-tently with one’s attitudes or other self-views gives rise to cognitive dissonance, an aversive state that can be reduced by either changing one’s behavior or one’s attitudes (Festinger, 1957). For example, the possibility of having made a bad choice between close alternatives, and thus acting inconsistently with a self-view as competent, leads to the spreading of alternatives (i.e., bolster-ing one’s opinion of the chosen alternative and disparaging the unchosen one; Brehm, 1956). In attribution research, consistency plays a major part in the mental calculus people enact when determining whether a dispositional or situational attribution is warranted (Kelley, 1967).

In personality psychology, the weight placed on the trait concept is a testament to the impor-tance of consistency, as traits provide ready explanations for consistencies in behavior. Knowl-edge of someone’s traits is assumed to afford predictability of that person’s behavior both across situations and over time (Allport, 1937). Self researchers also rely on notions of consistency: For example, Swann and colleagues argue persuasively in self-verification research that consistency provides a powerful sense of coherence, serving both epistemic (i.e., a sense of knowing oneself) and pragmatic (i.e., smooth social interactions) needs. They show that people will go to great lengths to have others see them as they see themselves, employing strategies as varied as choos-ing verifying interaction partners to selectively remembering confirmatory feedback (for a review, see Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 2003).

Others have written about the importance of consistency for well-being. James (1929) dis-cussed at length “sick” or “divided” souls, where there is “a certain discordancy or heterogeneity in the native temperament of the subject, an incompletely unified moral and intellectual constitu-tion” that, when extreme, “may make havoc of the subject’s life” (pp. 164-166). Lecky (1945) argued that self-integrity results when “we seek those experiences which support our values, and avoid, resist, or if necessary forcibly reject those which are inconsistent with them” (p. 99). Psy-chologists in the humanist tradition also discussed the dangers associated with incongruity among self-perceptions, and inconsistency between behavior and one’s self-concept, in terms of anxiety, defensiveness, and so on (Jourard, 1965; Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1951). These theoreti-cal treatments are supported by a great deal of empirical evidence: Regarding inner consistency, the humanistic school was influential in the development of self-discrepancy theory, which doc-uments that anxiety and depression ensue from discrepancies between one’s actual self-views and one’s ought and ideal selves, respectively (Higgins, 1987). As for cross-situational consis-tency, although the self-concept is multifaceted and dynamic, in that people express different self-aspects in various roles, relationships, and situations (Chen, Boucher, & Tapias, 2006; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Sheldon et al., 1997), a great deal of differentiation among roles is associated with outcomes such as lower self-esteem, higher depression, anxiety, and psychosomatic prob-lems (Block, 1961; Donahue et al., 1993; Sheldon et al., 1997).



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Challenges to the Universality of the Consistency MotiveUntil fairly recently, researchers assumed that the need for consistency was universal and that both the expression of consistency and the deleterious effects of inconsistency would be mani-fested similarly everywhere. However, it is notable that all the research cited above was con-ducted in prototypically Western countries (usually involving participants of European descent) and there is now considerable evidence suggesting that consistency is not as prevalent in East Asia as it is in the West. For example, while European Canadians showed the spreading-of-alternatives effect in response to dissonance aroused from making a choice between two simi-larly appraised items, Japanese did not (Heine & Lehman, 1997). Even more compelling is evidence that looks directly at national or ethnic differences in self-consistency. Regarding internal consistency, Koreans, Chinese, and Japanese were more likely to indicate that contradictory traits (e.g., mature, immature) were self-descriptive, and Chinese and Chinese Americans were more likely to agree with items reflecting both positive and negative self-esteem than were European Americans (Boucher, Peng, Shi, & Wang, 2009; Choi & Choi, 2002; Kim, Peng, & Chiu, 2008; Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, Wang, & Hou, 2004; Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori et al., 2009). Inconsistency in self-views also extends to implicit self-concept and self-esteem (Boucher et al., 2009; Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori et al., 2009). Regarding cross-situational consistency, Koreans’ self-descriptions across roles were more inconsistent than those of Americans (Suh, 2002). In a six-nation study, Church et al. (2008) reported that Japanese expressed the most cross-role inconsistency, followed by Australians, who in turn were followed by American, Mexican, Filipino, and Malaysian participants. Also, the association between two relationship-specific self-views (e.g., self as friend vs. self as roommate) was less strong for East Asian Americans than for European Americans (English & Chen, 2007). Finally, inconsistency seems to be less troubling for East Asian groups. For example, while cross-role consistency was strongly subjective well-being and positive affect among Americans, this was less so for Koreans (Suh, 2002). Church et al. (2008) found a similar pattern of results, in that cross-role consistency was associated with the outcomes above in addition to greater self-esteem and less social anxiety for all groups except Japanese.

Naïve Dialecticism and Self-InconsistencyResearchers, drawing inspiration from national/ethnic differences in self-consistency, turned to understanding what it is about nationality/ethnicity that causes these differences in the first place (for a discussion, see Peng, Ames, & Knowles, 2001). In this article, I explore naïve dialecticism (or dialectical thinking) as a potent mechanism responsible for self-consistency. Dialectical thinking is an example of the beliefs or theories tradition invoked to explain cross-national dif-ferences and is a belief system thought to characterize East Asian groups. It is based in religious (especially Taoist), philosophical, and epistemological traditions, institutions, and practices and is composed primarily of three concepts: the theory of holism, in which everything in the uni-verse is interconnected and interpenetrating; the theory of change, in which the universe and everything in it are dynamic and ever in flux; and the theory of contradiction, in which both sides of an apparent contradiction hold some piece of the truth. When faced with a contradiction, dia-lectical thinkers adopt a compromise approach, trying to retain elements of both sides (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). A great deal of evidence supports the proposition that these theories are operative to a greater extent among East Asian groups than prototypical Western ones (for a review, see Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001).

Theoretically, it seems plausible that dialecticism would be related to self-inconsistency. A holistic outlook necessitates an awareness of one’s part in the surrounding context. This context




may be restricted to the immediate situation (e.g., me with my professor) or it may be so broad as to encompass the whole universe and everything in it. Individuals from groups thought to be dialectical spontaneously refer to themselves located in both kinds of contexts; for example, they are more likely to list self-statements that reflect immediate situational variation (e.g., “I am stressed out at school”) and one’s place in a system that is much larger than the individual self than are members of relatively nondialectical ones (e.g., “I am an earthling”; Cousins, 1989; Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori et al., 2009). Because all things are interconnected, holistic beliefs give rise to an acknowledgment that as the context changes, so must the elements within that context, including the self. Thus, changing across contexts, roles, and relationships is both necessary and desirable; in fact, this may be the sign of a self that is well-adjusted, mature, and able to feel attuned to and connected to important others (Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Morling, Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2001). Consistent with this, Japanese self-descriptions changed more with shifts in the immediate context than did those of Americans (Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001). Also, Chinese were more likely to spontaneously describe themselves as changing, grow-ing, and evolving (Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori et al., 2009). Finally, because change is constant, the self in one context may be contradictory to the self in another, different one. More-over, even within a given role or context, it might be necessary to be flexible in one’s behavior, adapting different kinds of behavior as the situation requires. Instead of this kind of variability and flexibility being a sign of confusion, superficiality, or neurosis, however, it is simply the inevitable result of a complex reality of interconnection. Indeed, the self, according to this set of beliefs, is nuanced and balanced.

There is now growing empirical evidence that dialecticism plays an important role in national/ethnic differences in self-consistency. For example, cross-role inconsistency was more evident and less maladaptive in Japan (believed to be collectivistic and dialectical) than in countries thought to be collectivistic but nondialectical (e.g., Mexico, the Philippines; Church et al., 2008). Other evidence comes from studies that use instruments designed to measure individual differences in dialectical thinking, such as the Dialectical Self Scale (DSS; Spencer-Rodgers, Srivastava et al., 2009). Here, dialecticism mediates the relationship between nationality/ethnicity and both self-concept and self-esteem inconsistency (Boucher et al., 2009; English & Chen, 2007; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004; Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori et al., 2009). In addition, those scoring high on dialectical thinking were more likely to prefer verifying over nonverifying feedback about a context-specific self-view than those scoring low (Chen, English, & Peng, 2006). Finally, Chinese and Asian Americans were more likely to alter their self-views when presented with inconsistent self-relevant feedback, relative to European Americans, and this effect was accounted for by dialectical thinking (Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Peng, & Wang, 2009).

The Present ResearchI had several goals in mind for the present study, which builds from previous research examining the effect of dialecticism on the self-concept. One was to examine whether dialectical thinking would be associated with less consistency in self-views across roles. While there is ample evi-dence that dialectical thinkers express more inconsistency within their global self-views (Choi & Choi, 2002; Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori et al., 2009), there is little evidence that this holds true across roles (English & Chen, 2007). To examine this, participants completed a measure of dialectical thinking and then described themselves in general (i.e., global self-concept) and in two roles (as a son/daughter and as a friend). From this, I calculated an index of cross-role con-sistency much like past researchers have done (e.g., Suh, 2002). Given English and Chen’s (2007) evidence that dialectical thinkers are more likely to elaborate upon and clearly demarcate the selves they are in specific close relationship contexts, and previous demonstrations of differences



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in cross-role consistency between countries thought to differ on naïve dialecticism (Church et al., 2008; Kanagawa et al., 2001; Suh, 2002), I expected that higher scores on dialectical thinking would be related to less cross-role consistency (Hypothesis 1).

Also, I sought to investigate whether dialectical thinkers would demonstrate more inconsis-tency within roles. To my knowledge, the only research addressing this is a finding reported by Choi and Choi (2002); specifically, Koreans were more likely to indicate that they are both extra-verted and introverted at a family dinner than were European Americans. In the present research, I investigated this phenomenon more deeply, by looking at multiple self-views within two roles. That is, for each of the roles mentioned above, participants were asked to rate themselves on contradictory pairs of traits. From this, I calculated the extent to which they endorsed both traits in each pair. Theoretically, dialectical thinkers should be more aware of and able to articulate inconsistent behavior even within a role (e.g., that one is sometimes self-confident as a friend, but sometimes insecure as well). Thus, I expected that even within roles dialectical thinking would be associated with more inconsistency (Hypothesis 2).

Next, I tested whether dialecticism moderates the relationship between cross-role consis-tency, global self-concept consistency, and within-role consistency and subjective well-being (SWB). I expected that given previous work documenting how, for groups thought to be rela-tively dialectical, the relationship between cross-role consistency and SWB is attenuated (Church et al., 2008; Suh, 2002), that this would be the case when dialecticism is used as the moderator. For dialectical thinkers, embeddedness in a context and the change and contradiction that come with it is perfectly normal; indeed, it is necessary to function competently with others. Thus, contextual variation in self-views should be less associated with well-being than it is for nondia-lectical thinkers. Moreover, inconsistency within the global self-concept and specific roles should not be particularly troublesome for dialectical thinkers either; instead, inconsistency should be seen as a mark of finding equilibrium between competing self-images. Therefore, I expected the relationship between (a) cross-role consistency, (b) global self-concept consistency, and (c) within-role consistency and SWB would be less strongly positive for high scorers on dialectical thinking, relative to low scorers (Hypothesis 3).

Next, I examined whether dialecticism moderates the relationship between cross-role consis-tency, global self-concept consistency, and within-role consistency and self-concept certainty (SCC). SCC is part of self-concept clarity, which refers to having a self-concept that is “clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and temporally stable” (Campbell et al., 1996, p. 141). Phenomenologically, it is the sense that the self coheres and that one knows oneself with certainty. Members of East Asian cultures possess less clarity about the self than members of prototypically Western cultures, as measured by the Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al., 1996). This raises an interesting question: Does the inconsistency of the self-views of dialectical thinkers lead to a less coherent, knowable, or less certain self? I think that the answer to this is “no.” First, Church et al. (2008) found that cross-role consistency was related to self-concept clarity in every culture they studied except Japan, the only culture from the ones studied thought to be relatively dialectical. Second, while East Asian Americans expressed inconsistency between their relationship-specific self-views, this inconsistency was nevertheless stable over time (as much as 6 months later; English & Chen, 2007). This suggests that inconsistency is not tanta-mount to confusion or uncertainty of self-views but is instead how personality coherence takes form with dialectical thinkers. This idea was voiced strongly by Kitayama and Markus (1999), who argued that coherence for the dialectical self is about finding harmony and balance among disparate self-aspects, such as the self that criticizes itself in service of meeting expectations and duties associated with various roles and relationships, and the self that feels compassion for itself as it perseveres in living up to those standards. I put this idea to the test, hypothesizing that for dialectical thinkers, the relationship between cross-role, global self-concept, and within-role




consistency would be less related to SCC than it would be for relatively nondialectical ones (Hypotheses 4a, 4b, and 4c).

Finally, I examined the relationship between cross-role, global self-concept, and within-role inconsistency and authenticity. Authenticity refers to a sense that one’s behavior is a true reflec-tion of the self—that is, that behavior is freely chosen and unconstrained (Sheldon et al., 1997). According to self-determination theory, people thrive when, among other things, they perceive that their actions are autonomous or controlled internally rather than externally. Under these conditions, individuals are more creative and persistent and feel better about themselves and their lives (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Theoretically, consistency and authenticity are orthogonal con-structs; that is, it is possible that an individual could act somewhat differently in different con-texts but nevertheless feel that the behavior is self-determined or that an individual could act the same across contexts and feel inauthentic. Despite this, empirically cross-role consistency is positively related to authenticity, at least in the United States (Cross, Gore, & Morris, 2003; Sheldon et al., 1997). I expected to find that this would be less true for dialectical thinkers: Since they perceive themselves and the world holistically and change and adjust themselves to fit the requirements of relationships and the immediate situation, feelings of authenticity should be less related to self-consistency than for relatively nondialectical thinkers. In support of this idea, Cross et al. (2003) found that the tendency to think of oneself in terms of close relationships moderated the relationship between cross-role consistency and authenticity. Specifically, the association between consistency and authenticity was weaker for people who think of them-selves in terms of relationships than for those who do not. I anticipated that dialecticism would operate similarly and moderate the relationship between cross-role consistency and authenticity (Hypothesis 5a). I also expected that dialectical thinking would moderate the relationship between global self-concept consistency (Hypothesis 5b) and within-role consistency (Hypothesis 5c) and authenticity.

Finally, I tested whether dialecticism moderates the relationship between authenticity and SWB. Authenticity is conceived as the sense that one is acting in accord with one’s core or “true” self with others; to illustrate, an item commonly used to measure this construct reads, “I can be my real self in this role” (Cross et al., 2003). As measured this way, authenticity across roles was associated with several indicators of well-being (Sheldon et al., 1997). For dialectical thinkers, however, the notion of a “true” self that exists independently of a web of contexts and relation-ships likely loses meaning and would not be as relevant to well-being as it is for nondialectical thinkers. That is, while the belief that one is acting in line with a core set of self-views across roles should predict SWB for those scoring low on dialectical thinking, this should be less the case for those scoring high. Therefore, I expected that dialectical thinking would moderate the relationship between felt authenticity and SWB (Hypothesis 6).

To summarize, I advanced the following hypotheses:

1. Scores on dialectical thinking will be associated with less consistency across the global self-concept and the two roles (cross-role consistency).

2. Scores on dialectical thinking will be associated with less consistency within each role (within-role consistency).

3. Scores on dialectical thinking will moderate the relationship between (a) cross-role consistency, (b) global self-concept consistency, and (c) within-role consistency and SWB.

4. Scores on dialectical thinking will moderate the relationship between (a) cross-role consistency, (b) global self-concept consistency, and (c) within-role consistency and SCC.



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5. Scores on dialectical thinking will moderate the relationship between (a) cross-role consistency, (b) global self-concept consistency, and (c) within-role consistency and felt authenticity.

6. Scores on dialectical thinking will moderate the relationship between felt authenticity and SWB.

Note that predictions center on dialectical thinking and not nationality per se, given many researchers’ call to move beyond national or ethnic differences in phenomena of interest to speci-fying what it is about nationality/ethnicity that is producing those differences (e.g., Matsumoto, 1999; Phinney, 1996). Thus, although I collected data in China and the United States, analyses focus on scores from a measure of naïve dialecticism. However, for the interested reader, I begin the Results by reporting cross-national differences and mediational analyses for key variables. Other analyses involving nationality are provided in the footnotes.

MethodParticipantsOne hundred and twenty-nine Chinese students at Beijing University (97 female, 1 who did not indicate gender, Mage = 18.96) participated for 15 yuan (about US$2) and 113 students at Bates College (82 female, Mage = 18.89) participated in partial fulfillment of course requirements. The U.S. sample consisted of 99 European Americans, 5 who indicated they were multiethnic, 3 Asian Americans, 2 African Americans, 1 of Indian descent, 1 of Latino descent, and 2 who indicated “other.”

Materials and MeasuresMaterials were translated into Chinese and back-translated into English by two Chinese-English bilinguals who were blind to the hypotheses of the study. Disagreements were resolved through discussion.

Naïve dialecticism. The 32-item DSS (Spencer-Rodgers, Srivastava et al., 2009) measures tol-erance of contradiction (e.g., “Believing two things that contradict each other is illogical” [reverse-scored]) and acknowledgement that one’s behavior changes over both time and context (e.g., “I sometimes find that I am a different person by the evening than I was in the morning”). Participants responded on the scale 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The scale has good internal reliability (Cronbach’s alphas were .78 and .87 for the Chinese and U.S. samples, respectively), test-retest reliability, and convergent/discriminant validity (Spencer-Rodgers, Srivastava et al., 2009). In other research, scores on the scale have predicted self-evaluative ambivalence (i.e., endorsing both positive and negative self-aspects; Boucher et al., 2009; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004), global self-concept inconsistency (Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori et al., 2009), and inconsistency between relationship-specific self-views (English & Chen, 2007).

Self-concept. Participants indicated how self-descriptive each of 20 traits is on a scale from 1 (not at all like me) to 7 (very much like me). The traits were mostly interpersonal in nature, sampled primarily from the extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism facets of the Big Five, and represented both socially desirable and undesirable behaviors (e.g., talkative, assertive, warm, quarrelsome, insecure, calm, serious, passionate). Six pairs of these represented conceptu-ally contradictory traits (e.g., talkative, quiet; self-confident, insecure). Participants completed this measure for themselves in general (this was the measure of global self-concept) and then in




each of two roles (as a son/daughter and as a friend). These roles were chosen because they are meaningful to college-age students and have been used extensively in previous research (Church et al., 2008; Donahue et al., 1993; English & Chen, 2007; Sheldon et al., 1997; Suh, 2002). Before completing each of the role versions, participants were asked to imagine themselves briefly in that role. The order of the traits was varied in the global, son/daughter, and friend versions.

Authenticity. This seven-item scale was taken from Cross et al. (2003) and measures the extent to which individuals feel that they can be their true selves in various relationships (e.g., “I can be my real self in this role”). Participants answered these items separately for being a son/daughter and friend, on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Cronbach’s alphas were .80 and .83 for the Chinese sample and .83 and .77 for the U.S. one. Prior to responding, partici-pants imagined the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors they experience in each role. I used these as role-specific indicators of authenticity but also computed a composite index of authenticity for the global self-concept by taking the mean of the role-based authenticity measures (! = .84 and .80 for the Chinese and U.S. sample, respectively; Sheldon et al., 1997).

SWB. The five-item Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) is a common measure of SWB (e.g., “The conditions of my life are excellent”). Participants answered on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha was .78 and .88 for the Chinese and U.S. sample, respectively.

SCC. The 12-item Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al., 1996) measures the extent to which the self-concept is internally consistent, temporally stable, and certain. Participants responded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). For purposes of the present study, I used the seven items that tap this last aspect of the clarity construct, as it best represents the sense that one knows oneself well (e.g., “In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am”). Cronbach’s alpha was .80 and .92 for the Chinese and U.S. sample, respectively.

ProcedureParticipants completed the study in groups of between one and four people. After giving informed consent, participants completed a questionnaire consisting of the self-concept measure for the global self-concept and then in each role (order was counterbalanced). After describing them-selves in each role, they rated their felt authenticity in that particular role. They then completed the measures of SWB, naïve dialecticism, and SCC. No participant needed more than an hour to complete all measures. After finishing, participants were thanked, debriefed, and paid (in the case of the Chinese participants).

ResultsConsistency IndicesIn order to compute an overall index of cross-role consistency, I adopted a procedure developed originally by Block (1961) and used widely in other research (Cross et al., 2003; Donahue et al., 1993; Suh, 2002). Specifically, I created a separate data file for each participant, in which each trait (e.g., self-confident) was treated as a case, and each self-aspect (global self-concept, self as son/daughter, etc.) became variables. Next, I performed a principal-components factor analysis on each of these data files. The percentage of variance explained by the first principal component became the cross-role consistency score, such that higher numbers indicate greater consistency.

To compute consistency within the global self-concept and each role, I relied on a number of indices that were developed originally to measure inconsistency (or ambivalence) in attitudes (e.g., holding both pro- and anti-attitudes toward gun control, simultaneously) but can be adapted



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to measure inconsistency in other self-beliefs. For example, someone responding to the contra-dictory items “shy” and “outgoing” on a 7-point scale who answered “7” and “7,” respectively, would receive a higher inconsistency score than someone answering “4” and “4,” who in turn would receive a higher score than someone answering “1” and “7.” Thus, higher values correspond to greater inconsistency. To calculate the inconsistency scores, I used three ambivalence formulas from previous research; while these differ in how they weigh the different responses, they are all designed to measure the degree to which someone is responding inconsistently (Boucher et al., 2009; for a review, see Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004). Specifically, I used the Similarity Intensity Model (SIM), the Conflicting Reactions Model (CRM), and the Gradual Threshold Model (GTM). For each index, I calculated the means of the six pairs of contradictory items from the original list of 20 and plugged them into the appropriate formula. The SIM formula was 3S – L, where S is the smaller value and L is the larger value. The CRM was 2 ! S and the GTM was 5S0.50 – L1/S.

Cross-national analyses. Three participants scored over 3 standard deviations below the mean on the SWB measure and were eliminated from analyses, leaving a final sample of 239. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and results of cross-national comparisons for all study variables (all tests are two-tailed). As would be expected given previous research, the Chinese sample reported less cross-role consistency and greater global self-concept inconsistency than the U.S. one (Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori et al., 2009; Suh, 2002). Chinese scored marginally higher on the inconsistency indices in the friend role than U.S. participants. Replicating previous research, the U.S. sample scored more highly on SWB and SCC but lower on dialectical thinking than the Chinese one (Boucher et al., 2009; Campbell et al., 1996; Suh, 2002). Finally, the U.S. sample scored higher on authenticity, especially friend authenticity.

Mediation analyses. To test for the mediating effect of dialecticism, I used Baron and Kenny’s (1986) recommendations. Consistent with the results above, nationality predicted DSS (" = .36, p < .001). Table 2 presents the results of the other regressions and shows that DSS either fully or

Table 1. Mean Ratings of Chinese and U.S. Participants and Results of Pairwise Comparisons for All Variables

Variable China U.S. df F p < !p2

Cross-role consistency 75.53 (13.05) 78.91 (12.34) 238 4.12 .05 .02Global self-inconsistency (SIM) 4.88 (2.54) 4.15 (2.69) 238 5.12 .05 .02Global self-inconsistency (CRM) 6.62 (1.49) 6.30 (1.59) 238 2.89 .10 .01Global self-inconsistency (GTM) 7.31 (1.45) 7.00 (1.49) 238 3.00 .09 .01Within-role inconsistency

Son/daughter (SIM) 3.55 (2.90) 3.79 (2.70) 238 < 1 ns —Son/daughter (CRM) 5.92 (1.66) 6.14 (1.65) 238 < 1 ns —Son/daughter (GTM) 6.56 (1.85) 6.80 (1.67) 238 < 1 ns —Friend (SIM) 3.22 (2.80) 2.61 (2.84) 237 2.73 .10 .01Friend (CRM) 5.83 (1.59) 5.46 (1.63) 237 3.12 .08 .01Friend (GTM) 6.49 (1.71) 6.07 (1.90) 237 3.21 .08 .01Subjective well-being 3.75 (1.36) 5.03 (1.28) 238 55.45 .001 .19Self-concept certainty 2.92 (0.66) 3.27 (0.98) 238 11.10 .001 .05Authenticity (composite) 5.46 (0.90) 5.84 (0.73) 238 12.98 .001 .05As son/daughter 5.52 (1.10) 5.62 (1.08) 238 < 1 ns —As friend 5.40 (1.07) 6.06 (0.78) 238 29.72 .001 .11Naïve dialecticism 4.22 (0.56) 3.72 (0.74) 238 35.44 .001 .13

Standard deviations are in parentheses. df varies due to missing data. SIM = Similarity Intensity Model, CRM = Conflicting Reactions Model, GTM = Gradual Threshold Model.




partially mediated the relationship between nationality and cross-role consistency, global self-concept inconsistency, friend inconsistency, SWB, SCC, and the authenticity composite. Note that for global self-concept and friend inconsistency, the different indices (SIM, CRM, and GTM) yielded similar results, so in the interest of clarity I report only the SIM results.

DSS analyses. In order to examine the effect of dialectical thinking, I correlated DSS scores with the outcomes of interest. Consistent with the betas reported in Table 2 and supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2, DSS scores were reliably associated with less cross-role consistency, r(238) = –.33, p < .001, and greater inconsistency within the son/daughter role, rs(238) = .20, .21, and .23 calculated with CRM, GTM, and SIM, respectively (all ps < .01), and the friend one, rs(238) = .20, .22, and .22 for GTM, CRM, and SIM, respectively (all ps < .01). Replicating previous research (Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori et al., 2009), DSS scores were associated with greater global self-concept inconsistency, rs(238) = .26, .27, and .31 for CRM, GTM, and SIM, respec-tively, all ps < .001.

Relations between DSS, inconsistency, SWB, and SCC. The correlations between DSS and both SWB and SCC were significant, rs(238) = –.35 and –.64, respectively (both ps < .001). Also, consistent with previous research (e.g., Cross et al., 2003), the correlations between consis-tency and SWB were substantial (for cross-role consistency, r(238) = .39, p < .001, while for global self-concept and within-role inconsistency, they ranged from –.12 [p = .06; son/daughter CRM inconsistency] to –.40 [p < .001; global self-concept SIM inconsistency]). Finally, cor-relations between consistency and SCC followed the same pattern (for cross-role consistency, r(238) = .47, p < .001, and for global self-concept/within-role inconsistency, they ranged from –.30 [p < .001; son/daughter CRM inconsistency] to –.41 [p < .001; global self-concept SIM inconsistency]).

To test whether scores on DSS moderated the relationship between consistency and both SWB and SCC, I performed a series of hierarchical regressions following the recommendations of Aiken and West (1991). First, I centered scores on DSS, cross-role consistency, the indices of global self-concept inconsistency (using each of the three indices described above), and within-role inconsistency for each role (again, using each of the three inconsistency indices). Thus, centered DSS, each centered consistency index (entered at Steps 1 and 2), and their interaction term (entered at Step 2) were the independent variables to predict both SWB and SCC. Table 3 presents the results for cross-role consistency, and Table 4 presents the results for global self-concept

Table 2. Summary of Mediation Analyses for the Dialectical Self Scale (DSS).

Predictor

Nationality DSSNationality/

DSS Sobel’s Test

Variable " p " p " p #" z p

Cross-role consistency $.13 .05 $.37 .001 .00 ns .13 $4.12 .001Global self-inconsistency .14 .05 .31 .001 .03 ns .11 3.59 .001Within-role inconsistency

Son/daughter $.04 ns .23 .001 — —Friend .11 .10 .22 .01 .03 ns .08 2.71 .01Subjective well-being $.44 .001 $.35 .001 $.36 .001 .08 $3.14 .01Self-concept certainty $.21 .01 $.64 .001 .03 ns .24 $5.37 .001Authenticity (composite) $.23 .001 $.40 .001 $.11 .12 .29 $4.08 .001

Nationality/DSS = effect of nationality after controlling for DSS scores. Dashes (—) indicate where the analysis was terminated due to failure to fulfill a Baron and Kenny (1986) criterion.



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and within-role inconsistency. Regarding cross-role consistency, there were strong main effects of both DSS and consistency on SWB and SCC, qualified by a significant interaction (see Table 3). This supports Hypotheses 3a and 4a.

Table 3. Results of Hierarchical Regressions for DSS and Cross-Role Consistency in Predicting Subjective Well-Being and Self-Concept Certainty

SWB SCC

Variable B " B "

Step 1DSS $.51 (.13) $.24*** $.66 (.06) $.54***Cross-role consistency .03 (.01) .30*** .02 (.003) .27***

Step 2DSS $.51 (.13) $.24*** $.66 (.06) $.55***Cross-role consistency .04 (.01) .32*** .02 (.003) .29***DSS x Cross-role consistency $.02 (.01) $.13* $.01 (.004) $.15**

SWB = subjective well-being, SCC = self-concept certainty. Standard errors are in parentheses. SWB: R2(Step 1) = .20 (p < .001), #R2(Step 2) = .02 (p < .05); SCC: R2(Step 1) = .47 (p < .001), #R2(Step 2) = .02 (p < .01).

Table 4. Results of Hierarchical Regressions for DSS and Global Self-Concept/Within-Role Inconsistency in Predicting Subjective Well-Being and Self-Concept Certainty

SWB SCC

Variable B " B "

Step 1DSS $.53 (.13) $.25*** $.69 (.06) $.57***Global self-concept inconsistency $.18 (.03) $.32*** $.08 (.02) $.24***

Step 2DSS $.54 (.13) $.26*** $.69 (.06) $.57***Global self-concept inconsistency $.16 (.03) $.29*** $.07 (.02) $.22***DSS x Global self-inconsistency .12 (.05) .15** .04 (.02) .09†

Step 1DSS $.69 (.13) $.33*** $.71 (.06) $.59***Within-role inconsistency (son/daughter) $.06 (.03) $.12† $.07 (.02) $.23***

Step 2DSS $.68 (.13) $.32*** $.71 (.06) $.59***Within-role inconsistency (son/daughter) $.06 (.03) $.11† $.07 (.02) $.23***DSS x Within-role inconsistency .07 (.05) .09 .02 (.02) .05

Step 1DSS $.63 (.13) $.30*** $.71 (.06) $.59***Within-role inconsistency (friend) $.14 (.03) $.26*** $.07 (.02) $.24***

Step 2DSS $.63 (.13) $.30*** $.71 (.06) $.59***Within-role inconsistency (friend) $.13 (.03) $.25*** $.07 (.01) $.23***DSS x Within-role inconsistency .12 (.04) .17** .07 (.02) .17***

SWB = Subjective well-being, SCC = Self-concept certainty. For global self-concept inconsistency: SWB: R2 (Step 1) = .22 (p < .001), #R2 (Step 2) = .02 (p < .01); SCC: R2 (Step 1) = .46 (p < .001), #R2 (Step 2) = .01 (p = .06). For within-role inconsistency (son/daughter): SWB: R2 (Step 1) = .14 (p < .001), #R2 (Step 2) = .01 (p = .13); SCC: R2 (Step 1) = .46 (p < .001), #R2 (Step 2) = .003 (ns). For within-role inconsistency (friend): SWB:Standard errors are in parentheses. †p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.




For each of the variables for which there were significant interactions, I performed a simple slopes analysis. This revealed that while for both groups the relationship between cross-role con-sistency and SWB was strong, this was more the case for low-DSS individuals (i.e., those scoring one standard deviation below the mean; " = .054, t = 5.18, p < .001) than high-DSS ones (i.e., those scoring one standard deviation above the mean; " = .026, t = 2.92, p < .01; see Figure 1a; figures were constructed using Jose’s, 2008, ModGraph program). Similarly, at low levels of DSS the relationship between consistency and SCC was stronger than at high levels (low DSS: " = .027, t = 5.62, p < .001; high DSS: " = .013, t = 3.16, p < .01; see Figure 1b).

For global self-concept and within-role inconsistency, as was the case when looking at the mediating role of DSS in cross-national differences, I obtained highly similar results using each

Figure 1. (a) Interaction of DSS and Cross-Role Consistency on Subjective Well-Being and (b) Interaction of DSS and Cross-Role Consistency on Self-Concept Certainty



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inconsistency index, so in the interest of clarity I report only the SIM results. As seen in Table 4, for the global self-concept there were strong direct effects of DSS and inconsistency on SWB and a significant interaction (supporting Hypothesis 3b). For each role, there were also main effects of DSS and inconsistency (with the exception of the main effect of son/daughter inconsistency) and a significant interaction in the case of the friend role (partially supporting Hypothesis 3c). Follow-up analyses revealed that for the global self-concept, the relationship between inconsis-tency and SWB was greater for low-DSS individuals (" = –.24, t = –4.20, p < .001) than high-DSS ones (" = –.08, t = –3.16, p < .01; see Figure 2). This was also the case for the friend role (low-DSS: " = –.21, t = –4.81, p < .001; high DSS: " = –.05, t = –1.03, p = .30).

For SCC, there was not much evidence in favor of the moderation hypotheses; specifically, while there were main effects of DSS and within-role inconsistency on SCC, the interaction between the variables was significant only for the friend role (partially supporting Hypothesis 4c; see Table 4). The same pattern emerged as that found for SWB, in that the relationship between inconsistency and SCC was greater for low-DSS individuals (" = –.12, t = –2.68, p < .01) than high-DSS ones (" = –.02, t < 1, ns). Although marginal, the interaction pattern for the global self-concept was highly similar (low DSS: " = –.10, t = –2.20, p < .05; high DSS: " = –.04, t < 1, ns).1

Authenticity analyses. Scores on DSS were associated with less authenticity as both a son/daughter, r(238) = –.27, p < .001, and a friend, r(238) = –.37, p < .001; the relationship between DSS and the authenticity composite was –.38, p < .001. The relationship between consistency and authenticity was also substantial: for cross-role consistency, r(238) = .40, p < .001, while for inconsistency within the global self-concept and each role, these ranged from –.29 (global self-concept CRM inconsistency and the authenticity composite) to –.51 (friend SIM inconsistency and authenticity as a friend). To test Hypothesis 5, I used the same hierarchical regressions as above, this time substituting authenticity as the dependent variable. While there were strong direct effects of DSS and each consistency index (both cross-role, global self-concept, and within-role consistency, all ps < .05), DSS moderated the relationship only between cross-role consistency and authenticity (see Table 5 and Figure 3). Follow-up analyses revealed that the relationship between consistency and authenticity was greater for low-DSS individuals (" = .027,

Figure 2. Interaction of DSS and Global Self-Concept Inconsistency on Subjective Well-Being




t = 4.99, p < .001) than high-DSS ones (" = .013, t = 2.40, p < .05). In every other case, the inter-action was nonsignificant, with no " at Step 2 exceeding –.08 (all ps > .19). Thus, I found support for Hypothesis 5a but not 5b or 5c.2

The authenticity composite was highly correlated with SWB, r(238) = .40, p < .001. I tested whether DSS moderated the relationship between the authenticity composite and SWB (see Table 6). As before, there were main effects of both DSS and authenticity, qualified by a signifi-cant interaction. Supporting Hypothesis 6, the relationship between these variables was stronger for low-DSS participants (" = .75, t = 4.98, p < .001) than high-DSS ones (" = .33, t = 2.34, p < .05; see Figure 4).3

DiscussionThe primary purpose of this article was to examine the impact of dialectical thinking, a construct that highlights tolerance of contradiction, expectation of change, and appreciation of a holistic

Table 5. Results of Hierarchical Regressions for DSS and Consistency in Predicting Authenticity (Composite Measure)

Variable B "

Step 1DSS $.34 (.07) $.28***Cross-role consistency .02 (.004) .32***

Step 2DSS $.34 (.07) $.28***Cross-role consistency .59 (.12) .34***DSS x Cross-role consistency $.01 (.01) $.12*

R2(Step 1) = .24 (p < .001), #R2(Step 2) = .02 (p < .05). Standard errors are in parentheses.*p < .05. ***p < .001.

Figure 3. Interaction of DSS and Cross-Role Consistency on Authenticity



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reality, in both cross-role and within-role self-concept consistency. In addition, I sought to dem-onstrate that dialecticism moderates the relationship between self-concept consistency and sev-eral outcomes—particularly, SWB, SCC, and felt authenticity.

Many of the hypotheses in this study received strong support. As expected, dialectical think-ing was associated with greater inconsistency across roles, within the global self-concept, and within specific roles. Dialecticism moderated the relationship between cross-role consistency and global self-concept inconsistency and both SWB and SCC (although marginally in the case of global self-concept inconsistency and SCC). Results were not as strong for the moderating role of dialectical thinking on within-role inconsistency and these variables, except for the friend role. It is not clear why this would be the case, although it is possible that the son/daughter role comes with clearer expectations for behavior; thus, deviations from the norm are construed nega-tively by dialectical and nondialectical thinkers alike. It would be important to replicate this

Table 6. Results of Hierarchical Regressions for DSS and Authenticity in Predicting Subjective Well-Being

SWB

Variable B "

Step 1DSS $.50 (.13) $.24***Authenticity composite .52 (.11) .30***

Step 2DSS $.45 (.13) $.21**Authenticity composite .54 (.11) .31***DSS % Authenticity $.30 (.14) $.13*

R2(Step 1) = .20 (p < .001), #R2(Step 2) = .02 (p < .05). Standard errors are in parentheses.*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Figure 4. Interaction of DSS and Authenticity on Subjective Well-Being




finding with a larger sample of contradictory traits before drawing this conclusion. Finally, cross-role variation was less strongly related to felt authenticity for dialectical thinkers, as was the relationship between authenticity and SWB.

While not the main focus, national-level effects were evident as well; consistent with previous research, Chinese participants reported more inconsistency across roles and within the global self-concept and reported marginally more inconsistency as a friend than did U.S. participants (English & Chen, 2007; Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori et al., 2009; Suh, 2002). They also scored lower on measures of SWB, SCC, and authenticity (particularly as a friend) and higher on dialectical thinking (Campbell et al., 1996; Spencer-Rodgers, Srivastava et al., 2009; Suh, 2002). Importantly, dialecticism fully or partially mediated national differences in all these outcomes, replicating previous research (English & Chen, 2007; Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori et al., 2009). Nationality also moderated the relationship between consistency (cross-role, global, and within-role, although marginally in the case of son/daughter consistency) and SCC and moder-ated the relationship between friend consistency and SWB. Readers may wonder, given previous research (Suh, 2002), why nationality did not moderate the relationship between cross-role con-sistency and SWB. It could be that Suh (2002) used a larger number of roles and the roles dif-fered considerably in terms of social distance (i.e., close friend, parents, professor/teaching assistant, someone younger, and a stranger). I used only friend and parents; presumably, these are the roles out of those five where participants would indicate the closest relationship. Thus, the studies are actually somewhat different, and it would be helpful for researchers to investigate whether number and type of role affects these outcomes.

The present research adds to the literature on culture and self-concept consistency in several ways. First, while there is growing evidence for the effect of dialectical thinking on consistency within the global self-concept (Boucher et al., 2009; Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori et al., 2009; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009), only one set of studies has examined the role of naïve dialecticism in the cross-role consistency of self-views (English & Chen, 2007). Conceptually replicating this research, dialectical thinking predicted both global self-concept and cross-role inconsistency. Second, this research is the first to establish that dia-lectical thinking is related to more inconsistency within discrete roles. Specifically, as a son/daughter and as a friend, dialectical thinking predicted more inconsistency, as seen in responses indicating being talkative and quiet, agreeable and quarrelsome, and so on. Thus, while different selves come to the fore in interaction with specific others, consistent with the dialectical principles of holism and change, even within these discrete role-specific selves there is malleability, con-sistent with the principle of contradiction.

Third, this is the first study to examine the moderating impact of dialectical thinking on the relationship between consistency and both SWB and SCC. As expected, and consistent with research conducted in the United States (e.g., Campbell et al., 1996; Sheldon et al., 1997), consistency was positively related to these outcomes, but more so for relatively nondialectical thinkers. Thus, this study adds to the extant research indicating that consistency may not be a panacea for everyone to the same extent (Church et al., 2008; Cross et al., 2003; Suh, 2002). Finally, this is the first study from a cultural psychological perspective to examine how authen-ticity interacts with both consistency and well-being. Authenticity is a construct that is gaining ground among social psychologists and is believed to be an important predictor of positive mental and interpersonal functioning (Ryan & Deci, 2000). The results indicate that cross-role consistency is less related to authenticity, and authenticity less related to SWB, for those scor-ing high on dialectical thinking than those scoring low. This begs the question: Is it simply the case that authenticity is a less meaningful construct for dialectical thinkers? I think not, for reasons I outline below.



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Directions for Future ResearchA potentially fruitful direction for future research is to examine the relationship between culture and authenticity more closely. Traditionally, authenticity is operationalized as the sense that one is acting in line with one’s core or true self (Cross et al., 2003; Sheldon et al., 1997). However, in a comprehensive review, Kernis and Goldman (2006) suggested that authenticity consists of four facets: awareness, or both knowing and trusting one’s internal preferences, values, thoughts, etc.; unbiased processing, or objectivity and non-defensiveness regarding one’s positive and negative self-aspects; behavior, or the free expression of one’s internal attributes, preferences, etc. rather than “false” action in response to environmental contingencies and constraints; and a relational orientation, or cultivating openness and honesty in close relationships in service of developing mutual intimacy. They developed a measure of authenticity, the Authenticity Inven-tory (AI), which taps these facets of the construct. Preliminary data indicate that the scale is reliable and converges meaningfully with constructs such as mindfulness and adaptive coping strategies (Kernis & Goldman, 2006).

Out of these four facets, the behavioral aspect seems most similar to classic notions of authen-ticity; however, I contend that dialectical thinking seems to be more directly relevant to other aspects of Kernis and Goldman’s (2006) conceptualization. In particular, part of the awareness component is integrating “one’s inherent polarities into a coherent and multifaceted self-representation” (Kernis & Goldman, 2006, p. 295). Since individuals necessarily manifest dif-ferent behavior in different situations, authenticity derives from acknowledging contradictory behavior and integrating this malleability into a coherent self-concept (e.g., “For better or for worse I am aware of who I truly am”—AI 3). This component seems closely related to what Church et al. (2008) called personality coherence, which involves finding balance between mul-tiple and possibly contradictory self-aspects. Interestingly, their measure of coherence was related to adjustment in all six cultures they studied; however, they did not report the associations between cross-role consistency and coherence or whether these differed across cultures. Unbi-ased processing involves open-mindedness to contradictory self-relevant information, especially with regard to information that could reflect badly on the self (e.g., “I am very uncomfortable objectively considering my limitations and shortcomings”—AI 7 [reversed]). Instead of defen-sively distorting or ruminating about and overgeneralizing negative feedback, individuals who score high on this component of authenticity keep both positive and negative self-relevant infor-mation in mind. Moreover, they may also be more likely to feel self-compassion in light of life’s slings and arrows (Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Neff, 2003); that is, they may extend kindness to and feel sympathy for the self instead of being harshly critical, appreciating that negative events such as loss and failure are part of the experience of being human. It is evident that these ideas owe a great debt to Eastern philosophical traditions and are wholly compatible with the dialecti-cal principles of holism, change, and contradiction.

In his dissertation, Goldman (2004, as reported in Kernis & Goldman, 2006) examined the relationships among the four facets of authenticity and various measures of self-concept organi-zation, such as self-concept clarity and self-concept differentiation (i.e., cross-role inconsistency). The four facets of authenticity were related positively to clarity (mean r = .50) and negatively to cross-role inconsistency but less strongly (mean r = –.24). This result is intriguing in that it sug-gests that authenticity in this new conceptualization is less tethered to the need to be consistent than the more classic one (compare to the mean r of –.61 that Sheldon et al., 1997, found between cross-role inconsistency and authenticity), even in an American, and thus presumably less dia-lectical, sample. The classic notion of a core or true self connotes a set of fixed attributes that are unvarying across contexts and over time. From this standpoint, it makes sense that classic conceptions




of authenticity have highlighted the struggle between individuals trying to express their true selves and environments that potentially stifle these aims (Kernis & Goldman, 2006). Thinking of authenticity in this new way suggests that dialecticism could have a stronger moderating role than what we found in the current study; indeed, the possibility exists that for those who are rela-tively dialectical, self-inconsistency could be positively related to the awareness and unbiased processing facets of authenticity. This promises to be an exciting avenue for future research.

Finally, a direction I am pursuing currently is integrating research on self-concept consistency and authenticity with research on behavioral capabilities. According to Paulhus and Martin (1988), functional flexibility refers to having a large repertoire of behaviors that can be enacted when the situation requires it. Participants are asked, for example, “How capable are you of being outgo-ing when the situation requires it?” Capability ratings are theoretically distinct from descriptive-ness ratings; that is, while people could say that overall they are not very outgoing, they could say that they can be outgoing when necessary. Factor analyses indicate that they are empirically distinct as well, and possessing flexibility in behavioral capabilities is related to both self- and peer-reported adjustment (Paulhus & Martin, 1988). Finally, functional flexibility is not the same thing as perceiving that one’s behavior is dependent on the situation or what they call situ-ationality: the key difference seems to be that flexible people see their behavior as self-directed and autonomous, rather than externally controlled. In support of this, situationality was related to lower self-esteem (Paulhus & Martin, 1988).

The construct of functional flexibility raises a number of fascinating questions: Do dialectical thinkers report more behavioral capabilities than those scoring low? Since they are attuned to the surrounding context and the kinds of behavior that are appropriate in it, they should report more comfort with flexibly changing their behavior to fit the situation. Moreover, given their greater ability to change and tolerate contradiction, perhaps flexibility will be more associated with authenticity and other indices of adjustment for dialectical thinkers than for relatively nondialec-tical ones. I am currently investigating these possibilities.

As more research accumulates, it seems clear that all people want to feel that their sense of self is coherent, that they live authentically, and that their life has meaning. Unfortunately, the tradition in psychological research has been to assume that since the end goals are universal, that the means of achieving them must be universal as well. For Western psychology, consistency has long been touted as a chief means by which everyone achieves these goals. I hope that the present findings cast additional doubt on this assumption and spur researchers to widen their lens as they consider other routes that lead to a life well-lived.

AcknowledgmentsI wish to thank Junqi Shi, Yueyi Huang, Jason Brander, Rachel Warner, and Lei Wang for their assistance in conducting the research.

Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe author declared that she had no conflicts of interest with respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.

Financial Disclosure/FundingSupport for the research was provided by a Freeman-Tanaka Faculty Research Grant.

Notes1. One may rightly wonder, given previous research (e.g., Suh, 2002), whether nationality moderated the

relationship between self-concept consistency and these outcomes. The nationality by cross-role consis-tency interaction on SWB was " = –.20, p = .27, and on SCC, it was " = –.76, p < .001. The relationship



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between cross-role consistency and SWB in the United States was " = .45, t = 5.26, p < .001, while in China it was " = .31, t = 3.64, p < .001; the relationship between consistency and SCC in the United States was " = .58, t = 7.55, p < .001, while in China it was " = .32, t = 3.71, p < .001. The nationality by global self-concept inconsistency (calculated with SIM index) interaction on SWB was " = .23, p < .19; on SCC it was " = .48, p < .01. The relationship between global self-concept inconsistency and SWB in the United States was " = –.49, t = –5.88, p < .001, while in China it was " = –.28, t = –3.30, p < .01; the relationship between inconsistency and SCC in the United States was " = –.48, t = –5.70, p < .001, while in China it was " = –.29, t = –3.43, p < .01. The nationality by son/daughter inconsistency interac-tion on SWB was " = .07, ns; on SCC it was " = .33, p = .09. The relationship between son/daughter inconsistency and SCC in the United States was " = –.40, t = –4.64, p < .001, while in China it was " = –.38, t = –4.62, p < .001. Finally, the nationality by friend inconsistency interaction on SWB was " = .47, p < .01; on SCC it was " = .53, p < .01. The relationship between friend inconsistency and SWB in the United States was " = –.50, t = –6.03, p < .001, while in China it was " = –.15, t = –1.71, p = .09; the relationship between inconsistency and SCC in the United States was " = –.45, t = –5.30, p < .001, while in China it was " = –.24, t = –2.79, p < .01. Thus, the results largely paralleled those found with DSS but in some cases were weaker (in the case of SWB, particularly) and in one case were stronger (i.e., the culture by son/daughter inconsistency interaction on SCC went from ns to marginally significant).

I also tested for mediated moderation using the guidelines of Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007); in short, the interaction term should predict the mediator, the mediator should predict the DV, and when both are entered in predicting the DV the drop in beta for the interaction should be significant. For cross-role con-sistency, the relationship between the nationality by consistency interaction term and DSS was significant, " = .18, p < .05, and Sobel (1982) tests revealed that the drops in the interaction b (.07 for SWB and .13 for SCC) were significant, z = –1.99 and –2.14, respectively, both ps < .05. Thus, the nationality by consis-tency interaction was mediated by DSS. For global and within-role inconsistency, the interaction was not significantly related to DSS (all ps # .25); thus, the analyses were terminated at that point.

2. Again, for readers interested in the moderating role of nationality on consistency and authenticity, none of these interactions were significant, save one: The nationality by friend inconsistency interaction on authenticity (as a friend) was " = –.44, p < .01. The relationship between inconsistency and authenticity in the United States was " = –.57, t = –7.74, p < .001, while in China it was " = –.44, t = –5.09, p < .001.

3. The nationality by authenticity interaction on SWB was " = –.08, p = .36.

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