JOURNAL OF EASTERN CONTENTS...Jun 02, 2012 · Winsome Chunnu-Brayda 24 On Growth Diagnostics and Grenada Kari H. Grenade 46 Contributors 84 Announcement and Call for Papers SALISES

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Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies

Vol. 37, N

o. 2, June 2012

Vol. 37, No. 2, June 2012

CONTENTS

Articles Page

Deconstructing the Barbados Agricultural Policy Process,Convergence and Divergence between Government andSmall farmers

Ronnie E. Brathwaite and Yonggong Liu 1

Querying Top-Down, Bottom-Up Implementation Guidelines:Education Policy Implementation in Jamaica

Winsome Chunnu-Brayda 24

On Growth Diagnostics and GrenadaKari H. Grenade 46

Contributors 84

Announcement and Call for Papers SALISES 14th 85Annual Conference

Call for Papers - JECS 88

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CONTENTS

Articles Page DeconstructingtheBarbadosAgriculturalPolicyProcess,ConvergenceandDivergencebetweenGovernmentandSmallfarmers Ronnie E. Brathwaite and Yonggong Liu1

QueryingTop-Down,Bottom-UpImplementationGuidelines:EducationPolicyImplementationinJamaica Winsome Chunnu-Brayda 24

OnGrowthDiagnosticsandGrenada Kari H. Grenade 46Contributors 84

AnnouncementandCallforPapersSALISES14th 85AnnualConference

CallforPapers-JECS 88

Vol. 37, No. 2, June 2012 pp. 1-23

Deconstructing the Barbados Agricultural Policy Process, Convergence and Divergence between

Government and Small farmers

Ronnie E. Brathwaite and Yonggong LiuCollege of Humanities and Development, China Agricultural

University, China

Abstract

Agriculturalpolicyisagovernment-driveninstitutionalinstrumentusedforpromotingagriculturaldevelopmentbyregulatingthebehaviourandinterestinterfaces between different stakeholders. Barbadian agricultural policysetsthestageonwhichagriculturalstakeholdersperform,andsmallfarmersbyfarrepresentthelargestgroupofagriculturalstakeholdersinBarbados.Good policymaking includes a scientific basis for action, and sustainable policysolutionswiththeinvolvementofstakeholders.ExaminationoftheagriculturalpolicyprocessinBarbadosbearsoutsomeofthesefeaturesbutinsufficient use of empirical data or stakeholder inclusion at times resulted inpoliciesthatwereoutofsyncwithfarmers’needs.

Keywords:Barbados,policymaking,agriculture,stakeholderparticipation,smallfarmers

Copyright©SirArthurLewisInstituteofSocialandEconomicStudies,UWI,(CaveHill),2012

2 JournalofEasternCaribbeanStudies

Introduction

Barbados established full internal self-government in 1961; this was thebeginningofacentralisedgovernancesystemthatwaspreviouslyplantation-based.Thismeantthattherewasashiftfromacommunity-basedsystemofruralplanningtoacentralisednationaldevelopmentplanning(Nurse,1992).Centralplanningeffectivelystreamlinedagrariansectorpolicywithnationalpolicy and this became characteristic of Barbadian agricultural policy(Singh,Rankine,andSeepersad,2005).Agricultureiswidelyrecognisedasameansofremovingthepooroutofpovertythroughjobcreation,incomegenerationandprovisionoflivelihoodsforruralpeople(TheWorldBank,2007).Increasingagriculturalgrowthhasbeendirectlylinkedtoreductioninpovertylevels(vanderPloeg,2011),andwithapovertylevelof13.9%(MinistryofSocialTransformation,2010)andunemploymentrateof10.2%(BarbadosStatisticalService,2012),providingtherightpolicysupportforgrowthintheagriculturalsectorisimportantforBarbados.

The objective of this article is to identify the existing policy gapsbetween agricultural policies in Barbados and small farmers needs whilediscussingwhereinthepolicymakingprocessthedeviationbetweenpolicyproblems and policy solutions occurred. The relevant theories associatedwith policymaking are discussed here as well as the shortcomings of thepolicymakingprocessusedbytheBarbadosMinistryofAgriculture.Howthese deficiencies have contributed to the resultant policy gaps that affect smallfarmersarealsoexamined,thenrecommendationsforimprovementstotheprocessareproposed.

LiteratureReview

Policymaking traditionally originates at the national or sector levelgovernment (Vorley, 2002). Government ultimately makes policy even iftheideascomefromoutsidegovernmentorthroughtheinteractionbetweengovernmentandnon-governmentactors.Public-privatesectorpartnershipwas a feature of Barbadian policy making since 1991 especially wherepolicies have widespread political or economic impact. (Charles-Soverall& Khan, 2004). Large-scale projects that had implications for negativeenvironmentalorsocialimpactoncommunitieswereandstillarerequiredbylawtoinvolvestakeholderdiscussionsaspartofanenvironmentalimpact

3TheBarbadosAgriculturalPolicyProcess

assessmentandoftenutilisetownhallmeetingstoprovidestakeholdersanopportunitytoexpresstheirconcerns(Dey&Husbands,2005)(Robertson&Glasgow,2010).

Socialscientistsuseacomplexarrayoftheoriesandmodelsdesignedwithina mathematical framework to explain how exogenous variables of trade,nature,externalshock, technologyoptions, ideasandbilateralagreementsand alliances with other countries all function to influence what is public policy(BinswangerandDeininger,1997)(Pearson&Monke,1989).Dye(2004)offeredamoreabridgedviewofpublicpolicyaswhatgovernmentsdo or not do. It should therefore follow logically that agricultural andruraldevelopmentpolicyiswhatgovernmentsdoornotdowithrespecttoagricultureandruraldevelopment.Agriculturalandruralpolicyestablishestheinstitutionbywhichruralactorsandorganisationsoperate.Itnotonlyoutlines thepriorityof thenationalor localgovernmentstrategy,butalsoinfluences how rural people allocate their available resources to carve out a livelihoodforthemselvesandtheirfamilies.

The Pigouvian Ideology

In the tradition of Pigou, the government is seen as an omniscient,benevolentdictatorthatintervenesintheeconomytocorrectmarketfailures(McCormick&Tollison,1981).Governmentactsasmediatororregulatortobringaboutresourcedistributiontowardasociallyoptimallevelbytheuseofpolicyinstrumentsliketaxes,subsidiesandregulations.Theassumptionhereisthatinpolicymaking,thestatehasfullinformationandthestateasanactorwillmakedecisionsforthepublicgoodwithoutself-interest. Itis also assumed that the policy improvements proposed by the state willwork better than those proposed by other stakeholders (Pigou, 2002). Itmaynotbewiseforthestatetoplaytheroleofpolicydictatorbutinstead,playthemoreproductiveroleofpolicyfacilitator.Liu(2010)observedthatstate-facilitatedstakeholderpolicymakingresultedinshort-termgainsandhadpotentialfor long-termmutualisticsymbiosis.Stakeholdersengageinopendebateofissuesandcompromisetoformulatepolicywhereallpartiesbenefited from the policy change. Wider stakeholder consultation despite the difficulties it can bring results in stakeholder consensus and becomes critical to successfulpolicymakingespeciallywhen stakeholderparticipation is akeycomponentofthepolicysolution.Stakeholderparticipationinpublic


policyisnotasimpleexerciseofexchangebutwhethertheresultantpolicyprovidesasolutiontotheexistingproblem(Webler,1995).

Pareto optimality/efficiency

Whenstakeholdersjointlyengageinsearchofapolicysolutiontheyrarelyagree to solutions that benefit one party and disadvantage another. They usually come to Pareto-optimal solutions where one stakeholder can nolonger gain any further benefits without placing others in a worse position. Cooperative social equilibrium between interests groups is Pareto-efficient andgovernmentsupportofstakeholdersreachingthisequilibriumfacilitatesthe achievement of Pareto-efficiency. Creating a policy solution that is Pareto-efficient makes political sense for government since Pareto-inefficient policies cause governments to lose political support (Bullock, 2005).According to Roth (1985) Pareto efficiency is not possible with incomplete information andwhenmanypartiesnegotiateovermanyalternatives andissues,thechanceofreachingPareto-optimalsolutionsisreduced.ToachievePareto-efficient policy solutions, government should encourage information exchangebetweenstakeholdersandmanageonlyafewpolicyissuesduringthepolicyprocess.

Policydecisionsarepublicdecisions; therefore theyhavean impactonawidevarietyofpeopleand interestgroups (Birkland,2011). Though theimpact of policy on broad sectors of the public has been used as justification forinclusionofmorestakeholdersinthepolicymakingprocessthereisstillreluctancebypolicymakerstoincludewiderstakeholderinvolvement.Publicparticipationorstakeholderinvolvementreferstotheprocesswhereby

‘people in various social classes, citizens in communities of specific regions, specific stakeholders and rights-holders participate in development or supervision of public policy formulation, publicaffairsdecision-making,publicinvestmentprojectselection,publicprojectimplementation,andanypossibleresultingimpacts’(Liuetal2012,p.22).

Su(2009)remarksthattheexclusionofstakeholdersfromthepolicymakingprocessresultsfromcentralgovernmentelite’sreluctancetocededecision-making power to other stakeholders and when they do, the transfer of


responsibilityisrarelymetwithacorrespondingtransferofresourcesandauthority.

Game theory

Gametheoryistheformalstudyofdecision-makingwhereseveralplayersmust make choices that potentially affect the interests of other players(Turocy & Bernhard, 2001). Madani (2010) applied game theory in theanalysisofstakeholderinteractioninthepolicymakingprocess,emphasisingthat stakeholder participation is a key element to finding workable policy solutions.Aradicalhypothesisinthegametheoryisthetheoryofzero-sumgames. This follows the assumption that during negotiation, each persongainsexactlythenetlossesoftheotherparticipant,itmeansthatthemorestakeholders that are involved in the process, the less influence government elites have over the final policy outcome (Madani, 2010; Richardson, 2006). Armijo and Kearney (2008) also found that with increased stakeholderconsultation, major changes in policy became more difficult, the policy processwaslengthierandmessierandincrementalchangestopolicybecamethe norm. Richardson (2006) refers to J.K. Sebenius’ work and repeatsthat in multi-stakeholder consultation, ‘uncertainty presents opportunityandalongsideuncertaintyinthepolicyprocessthereareopportunitiesformutuallearningandjointproblemsolving.Thisrequiresthateachpartlearnabout the other’s priorities so that they can craft mutually beneficial trades’ (Richardson,2006,p.329). Stakeholderparticipationhasbeenembracedby the use of technology by web-based application for expressing publicopinionandcomputersoftwarehasbeendevelopedandsuccessfullytestedto support multi-stakeholder decision making in the policy process to find Pareto-optimalsolutions.However,thekeytothesuccessoftheexerciseistheinvolvementofkeystakeholdersfromtheproblemstructuringstageto the group consensus stage and finally seeking public acceptance for the policy.

Government Failure

Government makes policy because it seeks to avoid government failure.Governmentfailurecanresultfromcircumstanceswheregovernmentfailsto take a definite course of action or misinterprets a problem and implements a policy that results in even more inefficient allocation of resources (Weimer


&Vining,2005).Misinterpretationofsectorproblemscanoccurwhenthereislackofinformationabouttheproblem,inadequateunderstandingoftheimpactonstakeholdersorabsenceofobjectiveinquiry(Keech,Munger,&Simon,2012).Itiswidelyagreedthatnegotiatedpoliciesaremoreinlinewithstakeholderneeds,arereadilyaccepted,easiertoimplementandenforce(Carraro,Marchiori,&Sgobbi,2005)andthereforecanavoidsituationsofgovernmentfailure.

Objective Inquiry

Policysciencealsohasarole in thepolicyprocessas itcanguidepolicymakersinformulatingpolicysolutionsthatwork.Policythatisnotevidence-based then reliesonemotionalappealof stakeholdersand theirparticularvalues(Grant,2009).Inthesecaseswhenempiricalevidenceisoverlooked,wegetpolicygapsandpoliciesthatignorethecomplexlocalrealityofrurallivelihoods,especiallyforsmallholders(Parsons,2002).Policygapsarenotalways negative and these gaps sometimes create the social and politicalspaceinwhichinnovativestakeholderadaptationsandnovel‘experiments’mayemergebutwithoutbroadersupport,thesesuccessesmaybeshortlived(Vorley,2002).

Parsons (2002) cited Schon’s (1983) description of public policy as ‘aswampy disorganised mess’, but it is within this mess he says that theproblemsofgreatesthumanconcernexist. Agriculturaland ruralpolicyisnotquiteasdisorganisedaprocessassomeauthorssuggestdespitethenumerous influences such as national economic strategy, food production targets,foodprices,foodsecurityandtheinterestsoffarmersorlobbyistsora combination of those which merge to influence the policy process .

Curtain (2000) provided some clarity and structure to the understandingofpublicpolicy andoutlined three elementsofgoodpolicy-making. Hestipulatedthatgoodpoliciesshould:

1)Beoutcomedriven,inthattheyarebasedonsoundresearchand/orholisticinquiry where the issues and target groups are clearly identified based on specific characteristics or criteria. Being outcome driven also means that objectivesneedtobesetwithmeasureabletargetsthatindicateasuccessfuloutcome.


2) Provide a mechanism for integrating many actors and agencies in theprocess,whichisimportant.Thisincludesgroupsincivilsocietyimpactedby theproposedpolicyaswellasothergovernmentagencies involved inproviding services to the target population.This inclusiveprocess shouldallow for information flow among all stakeholders with the objective of consolidatingcommentsandsuggestionsofallparticipants

3)Havecontinuity.Duringthecreationandimplementationsteps,evaluationandpolicyamendmentisnecessary.Thisallowsforrevisionandadjustmentsto the policy to maximise on its positive impacts. Interim evaluation isimportantanditallowsforstakeholderstogivefurtherinputinimprovingpolicy. Continuity also implies a sustainability component where cost-benefit is an important consideration. Policy creation and implementation processes all incur costs and these should be quantified to determine cost-benefit and if it is cost effective to proceed with the policy.

Theterm‘policyprocess’suggestsasetofstepsthattakeyoufrompolicyproblem to public policy and ultimately a workable solution. Thereis such a process represented by the linear or ‘rational’ model that startswith identification of a problem, discussing and deciding on a solution and endswithimplementationandevaluation.Sutton(1999)outlinedapolicyprocess model based on small modifications to existing policies, in contrast totherationalmodelbasedonempiricalstudyandrationaldecision-makingthatmayentailradicalpolicychanges.Othermodelshavebeenbasedondebatesbetweengovernmentandsocietalactors;socialexperimentswherehypotheses and social experiments are carried out and an actor-orientedmodelwhereindividualsaffectedbythepolicytakepartintheprocess.Notallscholarsbelieveinrepresentingthepolicyprocessinasystematicway.Keating2010suggeststhatpolicymakersdonotalwayshaveclearobjectivesandmustrespondtomultiplepressures,whichmakespolicymakingsporadicandoftenunconnected.Variationsofthislinearmodelhaveevolvedbasedonsystemandstyleofgovernmentandthelevelofresponsibilityattributedtostakeholdersinthepolicymakingprocess.Howeverthelinearorrationalmodelisthemostwidelyheldviewofhowpolicyismade(Sutton,1999).Birkland(2011)outlinesthe6stagesofthisbasicmodel:IssueEmergence,Agenda setting, Alternative selection, Enactment, Implementation andEvaluation.Thesestagesare latercomparedto thepolicymakingprocessusedbytheMinistryofAgriculture,Barbados.


Basedontheliteraturereviewed,itisevidentthatgovernmentinterventionis necessary and should be based on empirical data. Wide stakeholderparticipation is advocated by several scholars in the field of policy science astheinclusionofstakeholdersmakesformoreeffectivepolicyoutcomesevenifmulti-stakeholderparticipationismorechallengingtomanage,thebenefits outweigh the apparent difficulties.

ResearchDesignandMethodology

The case study group are Barbadian small farmers who farm on a statemanagedlandleaseprogramme.AcompletelistoffarmersonthelandleaseprogrammewasobtainedfromtheBarbadosAgriculturalDevelopmentandMarketing Corporation (BADMC). This list contained 114 farmers whowere all holders of valid licenses to farm on government lands. Thirtyninepercent(39%)or44farmhouseholdswereinterviewed.Duringtheseinterviews, the farmers’perceptionsofhowgovernmentpolicy initiativesenhancedorhindered their livelihoodsactivitieswere recorded. Farmerswereaskedtoidentifypolicyareasthatneededtobeaddressedsothattheirfarming activities can be improved. The respondents were also asked toidentify current policies that were beneficial to them as farmers, those that hadanunfavourableimpactontheirfarmingactivities,andtomakesomerecommendationsforfutureagriculturalsectorpolicies.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with officers of the Ministry of AgricultureFoodFisheriesandWaterResources(MOA)policymakingandimplementation departments, the Planning Unit and Services Departmentof theMOA,andBADMC. MOApersonnelprovideddataon thepolicycreationproceduresandhistoricalrecordsofpolicydecisionsfromtheMOA.Key informant interviews were conducted with present and past officers of theagriculturallandleaseprogramsresponsibleforpolicyimplementation.

ResultsandDiscussion

The Barbados Agricultural Policy Creation Process

The Barbados policymaking process comprises 6 stages, which is quitesimilar to thatoutlinedbyDye (2004,p.32) andBirkland (2011). Thesestages include: Problem Identification and Agenda Setting; Discussion


or Consultation; Drafting Policy Paper; Review of Policy Paper; PolicyApproval;andPolicyImplementation.PolicyisoftendraftedbythePlanningUnitoftheMinistryofAgriculture,whichconsistsofateamofeconomistsandagribusinessprofessionals.TheseareresponsiblefordesigningsectorpoliciesthattheMinisterresponsibleforAgriculturedeterminesarenecessaryandthatmeetstheobjectivesoutlinedinthestrategicplanforthesectorandthenationalstrategicplanofGovernment.

Step 1: Problem Identification and Agenda Setting:

Issue Emergence and Agenda setting identified in the 6 stages of the policy processbyBirkland(2011)closelyrelatestoStep1intheMinistry’spolicyprocess.Policyagendaitemscomefrommultiplesourcesallcompetingtomaketheirvoicesandissuesheardsothattheirissuesmaybeplacedonthepolicyagendaandsomeportionofthescarcepublicresourcescanbeusedto benefit their cause. Agenda items originate through written requests from industry stakeholders, farmers associations and general public or sectoralproblems that MOA officials think need to be addressed through policy. Policy issues identified through scientific research within the agricultural sector is uncommon while public opinion or industry players expressproblemsthroughthemassmedia.Issuesmakingtheirwayontothepolicyagenda through public opinion are often captured in the local print andelectronicmedia.Thesetopicalagriculturalrelatedissuesdiscussedinthemassmediacaneasilygettheattentionofpolicymakerswhocanplacethemon thepolicyagenda,however thepolicy response in thiscase ismoreareactiveandshorttermonethanaproactivelong-termsolution.

Step2:PolicyDiscussionandStakeholderConsultation

TheMOAPlanningUnit initiates thediscussionofagenda issuesand thediscussionorconsultativestepinthepolicycreationprocessmaytakeafewdaysoruptoseveralmonthsinsomeinstances.ThediscussionisprimarilyaninternalMOAconsultationbetweendepartmentsbutmayalsotaketheform of a panel discussion, group discussion or interviews with identified stakeholders.Theobjectiveofthisstepistoidentifypossiblesolutionsor‘alternative selection’asBirkland (2011) refers to it inhis6-stagepolicyprocess.Stakeholderparticipationatthisstageintheprocessisoptional.


Step3:DraftingthePolicyPaper

Twotypesof‘policy’documentsarewrittenbytheMOAtobringchangestoagriculturalpolicy. Thesedocumentsare ‘CabinetPapers’and ‘PolicyPapers’. TheAdministrationDepartmentwithin theMOA writes cabinetpapersandthesedocumentsareusedtoaddressissueswhichareclearcutand would bring obvious benefit to the sector. Policy papers are written by thePlanningUnitoftheMOAandareusedtoaddresspolicyissues,whichare technical in nature, and the benefits to the industry may not be obvious. Consultation with stakeholders at this stage is critical to finding root causes oftheproblemsandprescribingpracticalsolutions.Thepolicypapershouldhavedetailsofhowthechangeinpolicywillaffecttheindustryalongwithjustifications for a change in government policy.

Step4:Reviewofthe‘PolicyPaper’

This step is an internal review done within the MOA. The PermanentSecretaryoftheMOAreceivesthepolicydocumentfromthePlanningUnit.ThePermanentSecretarymayconsultwiththeMinisterandtechnicalstaffof theMOAifhe/shehasconcernswith thecontentof thedocumentandadjustments are made if necessary. At this stage the policy document isreviewed based on its overall impact on the industry, benefits to be gained bythenewpolicy,thenumberofpersonsthatwillbeaffectedbythechangesmade and how this policy fits into the strategic objectives of the sector and national government. This review of the policy paper is the final opportunity forstakeholderstohaveinputbeforemembersoftheCabinetofBarbadosapprove the policy. The stakeholder group identified at the consultation stage ofthisprocessshouldbegiventheopportunityatthisstagetocommentandoffer final suggestions before the paper is taken to the next step for approval. This is especially important where the proposed policy intervention is ofa technical nature and requires the input of technical persons within thesector.

Step5:Cabinetand/orParliamentaryApproval

ThepenultimatestageofthepolicyprocessisapprovalbythemembersofCabinet ofBarbados,which convenesweeklymeetings to address policyissues brought before them by the minister who is also a member of the


Cabinet. A subcommitteeofCabinetmeetson amonthlybasis andmayfirst review papers before the wider cabinet is asked to review the proposal. Thepolicymayatthisstagebeapprovedaspresentedorcabinetwillacceptwithadjustment,as itdeemsnecessary. Theapprovalorenactmentstage(Birkland, 2011) makes the policy as an official government position. The Barbados Parliament must also approve policy that involves additionalcapitalexpenditure.

Step6:Policyimplementation

The policy-implementing agency through the Permanent Secretary isinformed of the decisions of the Cabinet and is given instructions toimplementthepolicy.AtthisstagetheagencyreviewstheCabinetdecisionand implements the policy. Birkland (2011) identifies Implementation in his 6-stagepolicyprocessmodelbuthealsoincludesapolicyevaluationstageinhismodel,whichislackingintheMinistryofAgriculture’spolicyprocess.

DeterminationofEffectivePolicy

Theeffectivenessofpolicy is themeasureofhowwell itmeets itsstatedobjectives,or it canbedeterminedbyhowwell itmeets theneedsof itstargetgroup.

TodeterminehowwellcurrentMOApoliciesmeettheneedsofsmallfarmers,farmers’wereaskedtoidentifytheirneedsandthesewerecategorisedandcompared to policy areas addressed by the MOA.The highlighted issueswerevariedandincluded:improvingaccesstocapital;changingthenegativeperceptionoffarming;improvingaccesstoforeignlabour;providingreliabletractorservices; improving irrigation infrastructureandservice;providingassistance to farmers with marketing and facilitating opportunities wherewholesalers, middlemen and farmers can meet and trade; establishing aproper farmers organisation; addressing crop theft complaints; providinghousingfacilities;removingtaxesfromfarminputs;providingfreeplantingmaterialforfarmers;givingfarmersrecognitionfortheircontributiontothecountry,andpricecontrolforvegetables.

Table1showsthepoliciesimplementedbytheMOAbetween1999and2007ineightpolicycategories.Cropproductionasabroadcategoryaccounted


for44%ofthepoliciescreatedbytheMOAduringthe1999to2007period.Financialassistanceandcapacitybuildingpoliciesrepresented30%ofallpolicies, while livestock and fisheries improvement policies accounted for 18%.Irrigationandwaterconservationsupportpoliciesrepresent4%ofthepoliciescreatedduringtheperiod.

PolicyinitiativesoftheMOAdonotalwaysfallinlinewithwhattheindustrystakeholders see as important. Figure 1 shows the policies implementedbetween1999and2007,whichstillremainineffect,comparedwithwhatfarmers in the study see as important policy areas for their successfulperformance in the sector. This chart shows that financing and capacity buildingremainthemostimportantcategoriesforboththefarmersandtheMOAwhileestablishmentoffarmers’cooperativesisofminimalimportanceto both groups. Irrigation supply was one of the priority policy areasconsistently identified by farmers when interviewed and accounted for 22% oftheirneedswhilelessthan5%ofthepoliciesfromtheMOAaddressedirrigationandwaterconservationconcerns.AnotherpriorityforfarmerswasmarketingwhichwasnotaddressedintheagriculturalpoliciesarticulatedbytheMOA.

1 Policy instruments used by the Ministry of Agriculture are primarily financial incentives in theformofgrantsforfarmproductioninputsandtechnicaltraining,subventionsforfarmersgroups, rebates on purchases related to production and marketing, subsidised services,lowinterest loans, import tariffsonagriculturalcommoditiesandduty freeconcessiononagriculturalinputs.


Marketingassistanceandaccesstofarmerlabourrepresented13%and11%offarmers’needswhileimplementedpoliciesfromtheMOAaccountedfor1%and0%formarketingassistanceandaccesstofarmlabourrespectively.WiththeunderstandingthattheMOA’spolicysolutionsaddresssectorwideissuesandnotonlysmallfarmers’issues,thiscouldaccountforsomedisparitybetweenagriculturalpoliciesandwhatsmallfarmersconsiderimportanttothem. Areas like the fisheries sector and cash crop production like sugar cane andcottonaccountfor47%ofimplementedpolicies;howeversmallfarmersinthestudyandinBarbadosasageneralruleareseldominvolvedinthesethree agriculture sub-sectors. However, those areas that are relevant stillneedtobeadequatelyaddressed.Theevidencestillshowsthatmarketing,labourandirrigationstillrequiresmoreattentionbypolicymakersinordertomeetsmallfarmers’needs.

Policy Process Deficiencies

Limited Avenues for Expressing Concerns

The use of mass media can be very influential in gaining public support for policy on farmers’ causes in circumstances where farmers represent

Source:InfodrawnfromtheMinistryofAgriculturePlanningUnit


asmallpercentageof thevotingpublicandmaynothaveadirect link topolitical officials (Zhao, 1993). The use of this tactic often emerges when stakeholders want to be heard and the process for influencing policy agenda from the community level is insufficient. This trend should motivate the MOA to improve on its communication channels and its willingness toreceive ideas for policy from the general public. It should be noted thattheuseofmassmediadoesnotneedtobeunidirectionalandgovernmentofficials can use these methods of communication to their advantage and provide feedbackonpoliciesandprogrammes throughanyof the severalinstantmessagingplatformslikeTwitter,Facebook,newsblogsandsocialgroupsonsmartphonesandhandheldelectronicdevices.Interestsgroupsarealso effective ways to influence policy agenda. Of the 44 farm households surveyed,18farmersweremembersoftheBarbadosAgriculturalSociety2(BAS)farmers’association.Thisrepresentsapproximately40%ofthiscasestudygroupsoitisobviousthatlessthanhalfthefarmersarerepresentedbythisorganisation.TheBASdeclarestobethe‘onevoiceofBarbados’farmers’buttheinternalpoliticsoffarmers’groupsmaysometimesnotallowforthevoice of all members to be reflected in their message. Multiple avenues for informationcollectionbytheMOAcanassistinnarrowingthescopeofitspolicyagendaitemsto issues thatareofdirectconcernto itsconstituentsby utilising online voting or online polling as part of their developmentofpolicyagendaitems.Theuseoftechnologycanenhancetheeasewithwhichpolicymakingcanengagethepublicthroughsubmissionofideasfornewpolicies.Thismechanismwillengagethatportionofstakeholderswhomaybereluctanttotakepartinthefarmersgroupsandcanevenenhancetheparticipationofthosewhoarealreadypartofastakeholderbodybutwanttouseotherwaystointeractinthepolicyprocess.

Inadequate Stakeholder Consultation

The MOA Planning Unit initiates the discussion of agenda issues andmay choose to include or not include farmers and other stakeholders.There isnoprotocol for inclusionofmembersof thefarmingcommunity

2The BarbadosAgricultural Society (BAS) is an agricultural organisation, which is over150yearsold.Itwasestablishedin1845byanActofParliamentinBarbadosandseekstorepresenttheinterestsoftheagriculturalsectorinallrelevantforums.http://www.basonevoice.org/(2012)


or other stakeholders in the process. The MOA’s unintentional exclusionof stakeholders from the policymaking process amounts to a PigouvianapproachtostakeholderinteractionwheretheMOAmakesthedecisionforthe benefit of all. Following the logic that the MOA is capable of finding workable policy solutions without stakeholder input we have to makethe following assumptions. These assumptions are that the MOA fullyunderstands the issues facing farmers and that it has full information onwhichtobasepolicydecisionsandthissolutionwillbeinthebestinterestofthepublic.Consideringthatinformationinthecurrentprocessislackingand that scientific study or holistic inquiry is infrequently conducted, the absenceofthesemeansofachievingfullinformationonpolicyissuesmakesthe achievement of full understanding and full informationdoubtful.ThesecondassumptionisthattheMOAwillmakeapolicydecisionthatisinthebestinterestofthepublicgoodandthiscanonlybeachievedifgovernmentofficials remain as impartial stakeholders in the process. Lobbyists and interest groups that attempt to sway the objectivity of government officials canpreventsolutionsbeingmadeintheinterestofthepublic.Itwouldmeanthat even if the policymaking machinery of the MOA were to be efficient at creatingpolicies that allocate resources toward sociallyoptimal levels,therewouldneedtobeimprovementsinthelevelofevidencegatheringandempiricalstudyaswellasimpartialmediationofthepolicymakingprocess.The stakeholder consultation process goes beyond identification of issues, it clarifies the objectives and targets of the policy and proposes ideas that will not only be acceptable by stakeholders but that will solve the identified problemandstayswithintheoverallobjectiveofthesectoralandnationalstrategicplan.

Insufficient objective inquiry

These policy gaps shown in Figure 1 are attributed to insufficient use of objective scientific evidence to guide policy design and implementation. Evenwithstakeholderconsultationthereisneedforobjectiveinformationgatheringsincestakeholderseachhavetheirownexpectationsofthepolicy.Policymakers’ use of a scientific approach allows them to make balanced decisionsbasedonfactualevidenceratherthanbiaseddiscourse.Furthermore,a scientific basis allows the MOA to quantify the policy intervention in termsofhowmuchisrequiredandforhowlongtheinterventionisneeded.Measurable targets can be generated from scientific evidence and matched to


specific objectives that can guide the policy process. This framework helps duringimplementationandevaluationwhereoutcomescanbematchedbacktoobjectivesandthepolicycanbereadjustedtoachieveitsoriginalpurpose.ThepolicyagendaoftheMOAisnotalwaysgroundedinsoundknowledgeandacademicevidence,institutionalexperience,knowledgeofwhatneedstobedoneandhowtodoit.Politicalexpediencyandpressurefromindustrylobbyists influence the process and thorough investigation may be neglected in favour of a quick fix. One such example of a well-intentioned policy initiativethatwasnotbasedonholisticinquiryandsectoranalysiswastheprotectionoftheeggandpoultryproducersfromcompetitionfromimportedpoultry products. After discussions between government officials and poultry producers,importationofpoultrymeatswasdeemedashavinganegativeimpact on the development of the local poultry industry. The resultantpolicyfavouredtheregulationofpoultrymeatimportationbyimportlicenseconsistentwith Barbados’ quantitative restrictionson agricultural imports(UNECLAC, 1999). The decision to regulate the importation of poultryproductswasnotbasedonobjectiveevidencenordidtheMOAcarryoutverification of the information provided by the industry group. As a result, the local producers operated behind a protected barrier, a monopolisticsituation was created which benefited poultry producers but the benefit to consumersremainedquestionable.Widerobjectiveinvestigationbeyondthecommoditygroupassociation,analysisofthesector’sproductionlevelsandmarketanalysiswouldhaveprovidedmoreevidencetodesignapolicythatdidnotdisadvantageconsumersorimportersofpoultryproducts.

Policy design and Implementation disconnect

Ideally the policy-implementing agency should be involved during thestakeholderdiscussionandconsultation,draftingandpolicyreviewstagesofthepolicymakingprocess.Currentlythepolicy-implementingdepartmentor agency unfortunately may have little knowledge of the details of thepolicyuntil after it hasbeenapprovedand is tobe implemented.FormalcommunicationtotheimplementingagencyofpoliciestobeimplementedistobedonethroughtheMinistryofAgriculture,howeverinitialknowledgeofapolicydecisionmaysometimesoccurthroughthepublicmediawhenthe national financial estimates are presented to the nation. Although it is sometimes practiced, there is no procedural requirement for consultationbetweenagenciesthatdraftthepolicydocumentandthoseresponsiblefor


implementingthepolicy.Acomprehensivestakeholderconsultationinclusiveofpolicyimplementingagenciesatthediscussionandpolicyreviewstageswilllessenanymisinterpretationofpolicybytheimplementingagencyandmakeforamoreeffectivepolicyimplementationprocess.Wealsofoundthatthedesignstagethroughtopolicyimplementationisquitecentralisedandmostactivitiesremaintheresponsibilityofgovernmentagencies.Bringingacommunityparticipatoryelementintopolicydesignandimplementationshould result in policy fixes that work if the target groups themselves are designing the programmes and projects that fix their problems.

Policy Evaluation

One significant step in the policy creation process identified by Birkland (2011)isthe‘PolicyEvaluation’step.ThisimportantstepisomittedintheMinistryofAgriculture’spolicyprocessand it serves toverify thepolicyimpactsontargetandnon-targetgroupsanddetermineshoweffectivethepolicyhasbeenandwhatadjustmentsmayneed tobemade toeffect thedesired outcome. These adjustments are important if the desired benefits ofthepolicyaretobeachievedtomeettheneedsofstakeholders.Itisaproactivesteptodesignfeedbackmechanismsattheimplementationstage,which solicits target group feedback systematically by matching policyobjectiveswithprogrammesandoutcomes.Currentsystemsareinadequateand policy evaluations or adjustments are done following stakeholdercomplaints.

Beneficial Policies

Beneficial policies refer to those policies that provide a solution to farmers’ identified problems. Farmers identified several existing beneficial policies and those most mentioned were provision of agricultural developmentprogrammes like subsidised land lease programs, free tractor cultivationservices for new farmers on the land lease program and provision ofirrigation services at a subsidised rate. Other beneficial policies mentioned were provision of financing through two (2) government funding-agencies theRuralDevelopmentCommissionandFundAccess,whichprovidegrantsand low interest loans to farmers. Farmers all identified extension services and roads improvement programme as beneficial. They also identified marketing assistance through public farmers markets and the Barbados


AgriculturalSocietyaswellasamoratoriumonpaymentoflandrentandirrigationchargeswhenfarmersexperiencedcroplossesasaresultofnaturaldisasters.

UnfavourablePolicies

There were also several policies, which farmers identified as negatively affectingthem.Themostmentionedweretheprivatisationofthegovernmenttractorcultivationscheme.ThemarketliberalisationpolicyadoptedbytheBarbadosGovernmentforimportationoffruitsandvegetablesbyproducetraders and wholesalers was identified as one of the more unfavourable policiesthatimpactedlocalfarms.Farmerswerealsoconcernedabouttheupfrontpaymentofdutiesonfarmequipmentandsuppliesandthoughtthattheseshouldbesolddutyfreeratherthanhavingtoaccessrebatesfromthegovernmentfordutiesafterhavingpaidthem.Otherunfavourablepoliciesidentified included the farm housing policy, which restricts a farmer from constructionofadwellinghouseonpublicland;therestrictiononforeignfarmlabour;theabsenceofanationalcroppingplanandtheabsenceofadisaster relief fund or assistance for farmers. Requirements for accessingfinancing from government funding sources were described as inhibitive anddisconnectionofirrigationservicesfornon-paymentofirrigationbillsand the lack of a government-operated onion-drying facility were othergrievances.

Farmer-Recommendedpolicies

Respondents were eager to indicate new policies, which would be beneficial, andnumeroussuggestionsweremade.Themainsuggestionswhichfarmersmadewerepoliciestoaddressissuesofimprovingirrigationsystems,tractorservices and a national award recognising the important contribution offarmers.

Conclusion

There are a significant number of problems identified by farmers which did not make it onto the policy agenda and this speaks to a deficiency in the mechanismfarmersusetomaketheircollectivevoicebeheardorthewayinwhichgovernmentlistenstoitsconstituents.Thefactthatonly40%of


farmersinthecasestudygrouparepartofanorganisedfarmers’bodythatrepresentstheircollectiveinterestindicatesthattheremaining60%needaneffectivemeansbywhichtoexpresstheirconcerns.Theagenda-settingphase,whichiscomparativelymorepluralisticandarguablythemostdemocraticof the policymaking steps could also benefit from a more scientific process ofdatacollectionfromawidecrosssectionofstakeholdersincludingpolicyresearchers and not just the more vocal or influential lobbying groups.

The policy process outlined has significant deficiencies as it pertains to the inclusionoffarmersandotherstakeholdersinthepolicycreationprocess.Several researchers have emphasised the importanceof consultationwithtargetgroups increatingworkablepolicy solutions, and improvements inthisareashouldbemadeiftherateofeffectivepoliciesistoimprove.

The effectiveness and impacts of an agricultural policy depend on manyfactors,suchashowitismade,whoisinvolvedinthepolicydevelopmentprocess,domesticandglobalmarketenvironmentandgameplaybetweendifferentstakeholders.InorderforBarbadiansmallfarmerstosuccessfullycompete regionally and internationally, the policy environment has to beonethatenablesfarmbusinessestomaximiseonopportunitiesforgrowth.Thiswillbeapossibilitywhensmallfarmerlivelihood,otherstakeholderneeds,andsectoralpoliciesandnationalmacroeconomicpoliciesarebetterharmonised.

Based on the findings and results the following recommendations have been madebytheresearchers.

Recommendations

The Ministry of Agriculture should make full use of mass media andonline social network platforms to expand ways of communication withstakeholderswheretheycansolicittheiropinionsonpolicymattersinrealtime, find out about policy problems, get feedback on new policy decisions andprovideinformationtostakeholdersonfuturepolicyinitiatives.Greaterinformation exchange among stakeholders will be achieved and betterpolicies should result as stakeholders have a better knowledge base forpolicymaking.Stakeholderconsultationwithverticalandlateralactorsinthesectorincludingpolicyimplementingagenciesshouldbeacompulsorystepinthepolicymakingprocess.


While encouraging stakeholder input, Ministry officials should avoid the influence of interest groups and lobbyists, or efforts to manipulate the stakeholder consultation process, which can result in Pareto-inefficient policies when lobbyists attempt to influence policy solutions and impede mutually beneficial outcomes. Pareto-inefficiency can also be avoided by addressing single policy problems instead of multiple issues. FollowingRoth (1985) who found that simultaneously addressing multiple policyissuesreducesthechancesofreachingconsensusamongstakeholders,itisrecommendedthatoneortwopolicyproblemsbeaddressedatatimesothatreachingstakeholderconsensusismoreprobable.Also,policyresearchandobjectiveinquiryshouldbeutilisedmorebytheMinistryofAgriculturetoinform the policy making process so that specific objectives can be set and impactofimplementedpoliciescanbemeasured.


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Vol. 37, No. 2, June 2012 pp. 24-45

Querying Top-Down, Bottom-Up Implementation Guidelines: Education Policy Implementation in

Jamaica

Winsome Chunnu-BraydaOffice of Multicultural Programs, Ohio University,

United States of America

Abstract

This study was conducted in two Jamaican parishes: Kingston and St.Thomas. Designed as a case study, the research explores top-down andbottom-upimplementationapproaches,aswellaspoliticalmodeltheory.Whateffortsmakeprogramssucceed,andwhatproblemsmakethemfail?The study concludes by highlighting five major findings and suggestions forpolicyimplementation.

Key words: Policy Evaluation; Jamaican Education; Policy Analysis;PoliticalModel;ImplementationFramework;PolicyDiffusion;Politics


25EducationPolicyImplementationinJamaica

Introduction

Background

Primary education in Jamaica faces serious challenges. Starting in 1980,numerous problems were identified and policies were implemented to fix them. This study first reviews the problems, and then examines the policies that were implemented during the 1980s to fix them.

This study is organised as follows: first, there is a description of the educationalproblemsduringthe1980s(asseenbytheeducationMinister)and the policies attempted to remedy these. Second is a brief rationalefor thestudy,areviewofpriorstudiesonpolicyimplementation,andthestudy’smethodology.AdiscussionfollowsdetailingtheproblemswiththeimplementationofeducationpolicyinJamaica,asseenbytheplayersandfinally, the concluding section offers insights from the study.

In 1980, Jamaica’s parliament was informed that the country’s primaryeducationhadbeen‘reducedtoshambles’(Jamaica Hansard,1981,p.76).ThesewerethewordsutteredbythenewlyelectedMinisterofEducationMavis Gilmour, during her policy speech in the legislature. She alsoacknowledgedthatthestateofprimaryeducationpriortoindependencein1962was‘grosslyinadequate’.Inthatyear,theJamaicanGov’tinheritedschoolswhereinadequatelytrainedteachersandthestudentswerehostedinbuildingswithleakingroofsand,insomecasesthebuildingswerewithoutwindowsanddoors.Mostprimaryschoolswereovercrowdedandthebooksavailabletostudentswerescarce.ThesechallengespromptedMs.Gilmourtoseekimprovementsbyexaminingalltheelementsnecessaryforeffectivefunctioningoftheprimaryeducationsystem.

Whatdothese“elements”include?Theyincludebuildings,furniture,andequipment(whichareconsideredinput factors).Theyalsoincludeelementssuchashomeenvironment,attendance,nutrition,andcommunityrelations(whichareconsideredcontext factors).Bothinputfactorsandcontextfactorsare necessary for an efficient system (Miller, 1997).

Gilmour identified several ‘areas of deficiency’ (Jamaica Hansard, 1983, p. 187). In 1983, two years into Gilmour’s reform, UNESCO cited thefollowingsevenproblems:


• Students were classified and grouped early according to their expectedperformance.Theresultingimpermeablegroupsbecamea

self-fulfilling prophecy.• Barelyadequatepremisescausedcrowdedconditions.• Studentslackedinstructionalmaterials.• Teachersworkedinprofessionalisolation,withoutanyin-service training,supervision,and/orprofessionaladviceandsupport.• Teachersdrilledstudentsonlyinwhattheyneededtoknow topasstheexamtogetintosecondaryschool.• Therewasmalnutritionamongthestudents• Schoolshadlowattendance.

WhydidGilmour’spoliciesnotworktocureJamaica’sproblems?Dye(1976)defines policyaswhatgovernmentswanttodo.Tayloret al. (1997) define policyas‘aprocess,torefertothepoliticsinvolvedintherecognitionofaproblemwhichrequiresapolicyresponse’(p.24).AccordingtoAnderson(2006),policiesaredesignedtoaccomplishcertaingoals.

LiteratureReview

There are three generations of studies (Goggin, 1986). The first generation, byPressmanandWildavsky(1979),describeimplementationbeingcarriedoutasasingledecision,inasinglelocation.Theydiscoveredthatthereisapeculiarrelationshipbetweenpoliciesoutlinedandpoliciesimplemented(McLaughlin,1987).

Incontrast,thesecondgenerationofstudies(Mazmanian&Sabatier,1983)approach implementation as having a “political as well as a managerialdimension”(p.328).Thisgenerationofstudiesprovidesmodelsforscholarstodissect the implementationprocess,with thegoalofunderstanding therelationship between policy and practice. McLaughlin (1987) notes thatpolicyisnotthesoledeterminantofoutcomeatthelocallevel;valuesandbeliefs are central to perception of policy (and as such, implementationvaries).

Third-generation studies give priority to various outcomes. Such studiesshouldmovefromthequestion‘Whodidwhat,andwhy?’tothequestion‘Towhateffect?’Forthethirdgenerationofstudy,McLaughlin(1987)states


the challenge is to integrate policymakers with individual implementers.According to McLaughlin (1987, p. 171), before the factors that influence implementation problems were precisely known, economists vaguelydescribed poor program outcomes as ‘market failures.’ Sociologists andorganisation theorists said that program failures were due to ‘inadequateorganisationalcontrol’.

Therearetwomodelsusedtostudyimplementation:top-downandbottom-up (Matland, 1995). Top-down models (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975;Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983) consider policy designers to be the majoractors.Incontrast,bottom-upmodels(Hull&Hjern,1987;Berman,1978)recognisepolicyasitisdeliveredatthelocallevel.According toMatland(1995), the top-downmodelassumes thatpolicy isclear,withasmallnumberofactors,andthatpolicywillbeimplementedbypersonswhoaresympathetictowardthepolicy’sgoal.Criticsofthetop-downmodelclaim that thismethod ignoresdecisionsmadeearlier in thepolicyprocess.Thoseearlierdecisionsareimportantbecausetheformulationstageprovidesclues—suchascompromisesthatweremade(Nakamura&Smallwood,1980).

Thentherearethestickymattersofwhogetstoplayandtherationaleforthe implementation(in the top-downmethod). TannerandTanner(1990)state: ‘What makes the schools’ situation especially difficult is that reform proposalsareoftenpoliticallyratherthaneducationallymotivated’(Ibid1990,p.14).Thetop-downmodelisalsocriticisedforisolatingimplementationtomostlyanadministrativefunction,while ignoringthepoliticsofpolicyformulation.Policyoftencontainsvague,ambiguouslanguage.Therefore,Matland (1995) says that the top-downmodel’snotion thatpolicyshouldbeclearandexplicitisunrealistic.Matlandalsobelievesthatthetop-downmodelperceiveslocalactorsasobstaclestoimplementation.

Proponents of the bottom-up model explain that in order to understandimplementation,onemustgraspthegoalsofthelocalimplementers:‘Itisatthemicrolevelthatpolicydirectlyaffectspeople’(Matland,1995,p.149).Butnationalpoliciesusuallyignorelocalconditions,aswellasoftendiscountthegoalsandpowerofthelocalimplementers(McDonnell&McLaughlin,1982;Elmore&McLaughlin,1988;Elmore,1977;VanMeter&VanHorn,1975;andHull&Hjern,1987).


PressmanandWildavsky’s(1979)earlierworkfocusesoninstitutionalgoals.Incontrast,McLaughlin’swork(1987)shiftsthatfocustotheindividuals—their ‘incentives, beliefs, and capacity’ (p. 174). McLaughlin contendsthat individuals act onpersonalmotivations.For example,when teachersrefuse to implementmandates, theyaresometimesdescribedas ‘resistanttochange’.

Trider and Leithwood (1988) identified three factors for assessing the outcomeofimplemention:

1. specifications (the regulations in the policy)2.politicalandorganisationalcontext3.thepersonalcontext,suchastheimplementers’beliefs

Intheirstudy,theyaskedtwelveprincipalstoratethestrengthofthesethreetypes of influence on their policy-implementation practices. The principals rated personal context factors as the most influential.

Apivotalstudyin1986byLaRocquefocusedonaschoolboardthatdevotedmuchtimetoperfectingastatementoncommunityrelations.Nevertheless,theboarddidnotdiscussimplementation.Partofthepolicywasthatschoolsshould form parent advisory committees. When the board perceived thatsomeschoolswerenoteagertodothis,theboardcreatedfurtherpolicy—makingthecommitteesmandatory.

Theteachersweredisappointedbecausetheydidnothavemuchinputintothepolicy’sformulation.Theteachersconcludedthattheboardcreatedthepolicyinordertogarnervotes(LaRocque,1986,p.493).

Subsequentlytheboarddevelopedanotherpolicy:abookletfortheassessmentof the district’s elementary schools. The superintendent instructed thoseschoolstoceaseallself-assessmentsuntilthedistrict-wideassessmentwasreadytobeimplemented.Thepersonwhowasthesuperintendent(atthetime)workedtorepairadivisiverelationshipbetweenthedistrictadministrationandtheschools.Acommitteeofteachers,principals,andschoolstaffcreatedthe school assessment. However, the principals did not favorably receivethispolicy,becausetheoriginalideacamefromtheministry.Theprincipalsconsidereditanattemptbytheboardtogainvotesandremovesometeachers


(LaRocque,1986,p.493).Inthedistrict’stop-downmethod,boardmemberspassedtheirdispleasuretothesuperintendent,whopassedtheinformationtotheprincipals,whopassedittotheteachers.Althoughaworkshopwasplannedfortheself-assessment,itwascancelledwhenimplementationwaspostponed indefinitely.

The legal authority of the board was not sufficient to ensure implementation. Theschoolstaffhadnotobjectedtothegoalsoftheassessment.Rather,theydislikedthattheassessmentdisruptedtheirprocedures.Theteachersassertedthatthetimerequiredforthepolicycouldbebetterspentwithstudents.Theassessmentwasaboutinstructionandcurriculum;thesewereareasthattheteacherspreferredtodealwithonanindividualbasis.Someteachersfeltthatitwasnottheirresponsibilitytodotheassessment,andthattheschoolswerealreadyperformingwellintheseareas.AccordingtoLaRocque(1986),

“Themorethepolicychallengedorthreatenedestablishedpatterns,thegreatertheresistancetoit”(p.495).

ThesituationabovecorrespondswithasimpleobservationbyMcLaughlin(1987), that individual beliefs among actors within the districts areimportant.Teachers select thepartsofpolicies thatarealignedwith theirpersonal values and beliefs about education. Emotions play a significant role.LaRocque(1986)foundthatteachersresentedpoliciestheyhadnopartindesigning.Smit(2003)concursbyemphasisingteacherparticipationinpolicyformulationasameanofempoweringtheteachers

According to Hughes and Keith (1980), failed or partial implementationhas been attributed to unsuccessful educational innovations. In order tounderstand this trend, they explored the relationship between teachers’perceptionofaninnovativeelementarysciencecurriculumandthedegreetowhich it was implemented, based on five attributes. Relative advantageiswhentheinnovationhasanadvantageovercurrentpractice.Compatibility refers to innovations that requireminimalchanges to theexistingsystem.Complexity refers to the degree of perceived difficulty involved with new programs. Trialability means the innovation may be integrated with theexistingsystemonalimitedbasis.Finally,observabilitymeansinnovationresults can be observed by others.Their research results showed that thedegree of implementation was greater when compatibility, trialability,observability,andrelativeadvantagewereallpresent(p.48).


Hood’s (1998) cultural theoryhelps to explain implementationgaps.Thetheoryproposesthattherearefourreasonsforfailure:

1.Individualist;self-interesttrumpscollectiveinterest2.Hierarchist;bigideasareoverlydependentontopleadership3.Egalitarian;respectforprofessionaljudgmentimpedescandidpolicyconversations4.Fatalist;apathyandincompetence

Methodology

Thisevaluativecasestudyexaminestheinterrelationshipoforganisationalphenomena, management concepts, the environment, social settings, andindividuals/groups within those settings. According to Patton (1990),formativeevaluatorswhowant to improvehumanconditionsrelyheavilyon case studies and do not seek to generalise findings beyond a specific setting(p.10). Assuch, thisstudywas limited to twoparishesKingstonand St.Thomas; the bounding is consistent with a qualitative case studydesign(Creswell,1994).TheseparisheswerealsoselectedbecauseTayloret al (1997) say that implementation issues should be conducted at sitesof ‘thepolicy inpractice’ (p.41). Kingston (thecapital cityof Jamaica)wasselectedbecausethepolicieswereimplementedthere.Additionally,thevariousdistributionpointsforfurnitureandtheschoolfeedingprogramwere located in Kingston. The city is made up of people from varioussocioeconomicbackgrounds.Therearewealthyneighborhoods,aswellaslarge,inner-citycommunitiesscatteredthroughoutthecity.The1980swasapoliticallyvolatileperiod,andsomeinner-cityschoolswereplaguedwithgunbattleseruptingbetweenrivalpoliticalfactions.

St.ThomasisaruralparishineasternJamaica.ItwasselectedbecauseMs.GilmoursaidthatSt.Thomaslaggedconsiderablybehindotherparishes,withthehighest levelof illiteracyandthe lowestaverageattendance(Jamaica Hansard,1981,p.78).

Two forms of sampling were used to identify participants—purposefulsamplingandsnowballsampling.Thestudyusedtheinformalconversationalinterview. The audiotaped interviews were scheduled ahead of timein locations selected by participants and lasted from 20 minutes to three


hours.Therewere11closedandopen-endedquestions.Participantswereaskedabout their involvement in thepolicy implementationprocess,howtheir actions were influenced, and their perceived outcome of the policies. Thequestionsweredesignedtoanswertheresearchquestionsandidentifythemesemergingfromtheliteraturereview,aswellfactorsaffectingpolicyimplementation.Theinterviewswerethentranscribed.

AccordingtoPatton(2002),documentsarevaluablebecausetheresearchercan ‘learn firsthand information as well, as they may lead to other inquiries’ (p. 294).ThisstudyexaminedMs.Gilmour’sspeeches,aswellasmemos,letters,andnotesfromotherministrypersonnel.Otherdocumentsexaminedincludethe Final Report for Reform of the Jamaica School Feeding Programme,memorandaregardingtheTeacherUpgradeProgram,theJamaicaFiveYearDevelopmentPlan(1983–1988)1,theMinistryProjectsReport1980–1984,theJamaicaEconomicandSocialSurvey1985,EducationStatistics1980–1985,andtheMinistryofEducationNationalBudgetRecurrentandCapitalExpenditure1980–1985.

Thedataisorganisedbycategoryandthemes.Pattonwarnsthatsometimesthemesaregeneratedbasedontheresearcher’sperceptionandnotthedata.The interviews were colour coded according to findings from interviews and documents, and similarities were identified.

The participants’ responses (regarding the implementation process) reflect the present-day process, as well as the process during Ms. Gilmour’sadministration.Alloftheparticipantgroups(codedforanonymity)areasfollows:

1. C3 was an elected official.2. E1,E2andE3 are education officers.3. R1 is senior Public official A. 4. I1 is senior Public official B. 5. I2 is senior Public official C. 6. TheteachersfromtheKingstonparisharecodedT1throughT11.7. TeachersfromtheSt.ThomasparisharecodedT12throughT22.8. J1isseniorEducatorA.9. J2isseniorEducatorB.

1Ascapturedinthe(1991)edition:TheJamaicaFiveYearDevelopmentPlan(1989-1988)


The Policy Environments Model is utilised for interrogating the findings and situating the various respondents’ roles and expectations in policyformulationandimplementation.

Analysis

This section is a presentation of the data as well as analysis of the findings. Based on the interviews, document analysis and the literature review, five problemsemergedaspertinenttoMs.Gilmour’spolicyimplementation:

1.diffusionofpolicymeasures2.lackofconsultation3.lackofresources4.noevaluation5.mixedsignals

Diffusion of Policy Measures

There were difficulties with how policy goals and objectives were defined andcommunicated.Studyparticipantsvariedintheirbeliefsabouthowwellthingswerecommunicated.

I1explainedthatinJamaica,policiesarecommunicatedtoteachers;andthatduring training, teachers are encouraged to see the benefit of a policy:

“You have to excite them and they have to realise the same sort ofexcitementyoupasson,butwehavetogivethemsupport.”(I1)

AccordingtoI1,theministrydisseminatedinformationthroughthemedia,letters,andbulletinssenttotheschools.

The majority of teachers said that they heard about these policies on theradio,television,orfromotherteachers:

“On the news, and when the education officer called people together and tellyouaboutit.”(T17)

AccordingtoT1,policiesmaybementionedatstaffmeetings.TheJamaicaTeachers’Association(JTA)caninformitsmembersatmeetings.However,


about twenty teachers stressed that there had not been any continuousdialogue. For example, they would have wished that people address theentirestaff,sharingexamplesofwhattheministryintendedtodoandwhatoutcomewasplanned.

Trider and Leithwood (1988) assessed principals’ implementation styles.They found that opinions about what is best for students dominatedthese styles. In a similar vein of thought, McLaughlin (1987) notes thatsuccessdependsontheimplementer’smotivation.Asaresult,teachersaresometimesdescribedas‘resistant tochange’. T12andT14believed thatevenifteachersdisagreedwithsomeaspectofapolicy,thattherewouldbenochangeinthatpolicy.T15said:

“You hear of the design and it comes to you … ready for you toimplement.”

On the other hand, one education officer (E1)insistedthatpolicies’objectivesare communicated. The officer said that there are some critical policies that arehandeddownfromthetopforimmediateimplementation.Butthatmostpolicies are even piloted (tested in the field): “… nothing becomes policy until ithasbeentested”(E1).ThisassertionbyE1wassupportedbyE3,whostated,

“Well,afterthepolicyhasbeenpromulgatedandeveryoneunderstandstheintentorthegoalsofthepolicy,theimplementationwouldstartwithschools being informed of what is to be done, and education officers would know they are responsible for visiting schools to see to theimplementationoftheparticularpolicyinitiated,orprogram.”(E3)

However,T4insisted,“Ifyouaskedthequestion,theywilltellyou,‘Wearedoingapilot.’

Butmost time therewasnopilotdone;somepeopleat theministryhaveideaswhichareagreeduponandsubsequentlypassedontoteachers.”(T4)

Nevertheless,E3wasadamantaboutthedetailsoftheprocess,whichwentasfollows.Teacherswereinformedaboutpolicies.Teachersevenhadtheopportunitytoraiseconcerns,whichweresharedwiththerespectiveunitatthe ministry. The officers would have a meeting of the staff, where concerns would be raised.At this meeting, teachers would get a chance to react.


Teachers could cite any problems they were having, and the officers would takeanoteofthese.Theinformationwouldbetakentotheministry,wherediscussionswereheld.Thentheplanningunitoftheministrywouldassesstheneedforadjustment.TheywouldthenmakesomerecommendationstotheCabinetagainforchanges.(E3)

Socommunicatingpolicygoalscanbeaccomplishedbypiloting,meetings,and workshops. Another method of transmitting objectives is to useimplementationplans. AlthoughI1 said thatallpoliciesusedplans,T15disagreed:

“You implemented policies like a madwoman or a madman becausenobodyprovidedguidance.”

According toT16,T20,andT22, sometimes therewereguidelines. Butmostofthetime,theysaid,theseguidelineswerenotconducivetosituationsontheground(Hull&Hjern,1987;McLaughlin,1987;Trider&Leithwood,1988).

T19 related that he had the latitude to localise a policy. However, T20mentionedthatnotallprincipalsweresupportiveofthat:

“Someprincipalsweresonarrow-minded,too,thatifateachercameupwithasuggestion, theysaidyouweretryingtotakeovertheschool.”(T20)

Cummings(1986)hadasimilarassessmentoftheInstructionalManagementby Parents, Community andTeachers (IMPACT) project in Jamaica.Theproject was thwarted when the ministry, who did not understand the specifics oftheproject,triedtotrainteacherstoimplementit.Teachershadnovoicetoascertaintheproblems,norsetgoals.

Teachers’perspectivesinthisstudywerecomparedwiththepoliticalmodeltheory.TheirperspectivescanbeseeninEnvironmentOneofthistheory(Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980). According to the model, officials who formulatepoliciesshouldsetguidelines. Theseguidelinesshouldgovernthediffusionofpolicymeasures. Policymakersareoftennot involved intheimplementationprocess;instead,forimplementation,policymakers‘relyonanothersetofactors,’ suchas teachersandprincipals. NakamuraandSmallwood note that officials can minimize challenges by ‘being specific


aboutwhatistobeachieved,andhow’(p.33).YounisandDavidson(1990)alsosay(intheirtenpreconditionsforeffectiveimplementation)thatclearguidelinesareessentialtosuccess.Lack of Consultation

Most of the teachers said that they were not consulted (ever) before theimplementation of a policy. Although I1 said that training is conductedbeforeimplementationtakesplace,abouttwentyteacherssaidthattheyhadneverattendedaworkshop,training,orseminarrelatedtotheimplementionofanypolicy.LaRocque(1986)foundthatwhenteacherswerenotconsultedaboutpolicies,therewasadivisiverelationshipbetweentheteachersandtheMinistry. This finding is supported by Hull and Hjern (1987), McLaughlin (1987),andSmit(2003).

Mostteachersinthisstudysaidthattheministryneverconsultedthem.Theysaidthattheyhadnevergonetoanytraining,seminar,orworkshopbeforepolicies were introduced regarding the problems with the food program,teachertraining,compulsoryattendance,orschooldesks.T5stated:

“teachersfeelthattheydonothaveenoughinputattheinitialstage.”

Quite a few teachers emphasised that they were simply directed by theirprincipalstofallinlinewiththeministry’sdemands.(T3,T4,T6,T8,T9,T10,T11,T12,T15,T16,T21,T22)

Senior educator B made this revealing comment regarding the teachers’perspective:

“Ithinkthat…theyshouldrelymuchmoreonteacherinputratherthantechnicalpeopleinput.”(J2)

I1agreedthattheteacherswerenotconsulted,saying:“Sometimes the truth is we don’t go through all the steps for adirective.”

Yetshestressedthatalthoughnoteveryonewillbeconsulted,thatEducationalServices officers need to do a better job of involving more teachers in the process.


Twoteachersinthestudyremarkedthattheyhadbeeninvitedtomeetings,butthattheyquicklyrealisedthat:

“everythingwasprettymuchsignedandsealed.”

These teachers indicated that they were invited to such meetings only to‘saveface’; that theadministratorsat theministryhadalreadymadetheirdecisions.Forexample,thereweresomemeetingswhereteacherswereaskedforfeedback.Inthesecases,whenfeedbackwasprovidedbyteachers,thoseeducatorswereaccusedofbeingadversarial,ortheywerechastisedfornotcooperating(T4).T2relatedthatinmanyinstances,theministryprovidedalternatives,butthatmanyteachersdidnotcomprehendthesesuggestions.T21wasoneofonlytwoteacherswhohadattendedapolicyworkshop.Shedescribedtheexperiencethisway:

“Since workshops were crammed into single sessions, many teacherswereinadequatelytrainedtoimplementtheoriginalpolicies,furthermoretocomprehendthealternatives.”

On the other hand, an education officer declared that the teachers were being lessthanhonestintheirassessment.E1said,

“That isnot true.…Naturallywearenotpullingall teachersandallprincipals, but representatives of the various bodies, into situationswheretheyareabletotalkaboutwhatishappeningonthegroundandgivesuggestionsastohowitcanberelated.”(E1)

Senior public official A (R1)saidthatitwashardtobelievethatteachersarenotinvolvedintheprocess.Butteachers’assertionsweresupportedbyaneducation officer (E2)whostated:

“Itisjustreallythrownonthemandthentheyjusthavetoimplementit.”

E2 related that sometimes policies arrive without notice.As a result, theeducation officers were not adequately prepared to train anyone. E2revealedthatsometimespoliciesareimplementedwithouttheknowledgeofeducationofficers:

“Sometimesitgoesintotheschool;wehearaboutapolicythathadbeenimplemented and we are the officers in charge.” (E2)

AsmallnumberofteachersnotedthatsometimestheJTAconsultedteachersaboutvariouspolicies:


“Sometimesthepoliciescomeinandnotmuchconsultationtakesplace.However,thereareothertimeswhentheyconsultedthroughtheunion.”(T13)

However,T14claimedtheJTAdidmakesomedecisionswithouttheteachers’consent.Additionally,T14mentionedthatsometimestheteacherschosenottoprovidefeedbacktotheJTA,becausetheywereconvincedtheirfeedbackwouldnotbetakenintoconsideration.SenioreducatorBstated,

“TheMinistrygenerallyconsultedwith JTA in the implementationofsome programs. Some, not all. Some … sneak in through the backdoor,andwhenyouhearaboutthem,youhavetojumpatittosay:‘Thiscannotwork…Wewilladviseourteachersnottoparticipate’.”(J2)

Abouttwentyteachersstatedthattheyhadneverovertlyopposedapolicy,evenonewithwhichtheydisagreed:

“Well,theimplementationofitreallydependson(ofcourse)theteachers,so—we would try to implement what is given to us to implement.”(T12)

Lack of Resources

Inthepoliticalmodeltheory,Environment2mentionsadequateresources:“Theallocationof—andpotentialconstraintson—resourcescanhavesuchanobviousanddirectimpactontheimplementationprocessthatitishardlynecessarytodwelluponthistopicindetail”(Nakamura&Smallwood,1980,p.55).

For example, implementers need money, time, qualified personnel, and power. In this study, participants identified money as the scarcest resource. Therefore, this study focuses on financial resources. According to I1, theimplementationplanalwaysoutlinedhowapolicywouldbefunded:

“…Theimplementationplanmustoutlinehowitwillbefunded.Howareyougoingtofundit?Whowillberesponsibleforfunding?”(I1)

A significant number of teachers said that they were constantly fundraising tosupplementresources.

Twenty teachers mentioned how the lack of resources impactedimplementation.T5explainedthatJamaicaisconstantlyseekingexternal


funding. She insisted that after the first phase of a policy, the government is usually unable to sustain it financially. T11observedthatsometimesteachersareprovidedwithresources. ButT8declaredthat theywerenevergivenenough.Soteachersspenttheirownmoney,didfundraising,ormadetheirownmaterials.T12statedthatalthoughtheministryinsistedthatteachersacquirecertainmaterialsthatweretobeusedintheclassroom,thatthosematerialswerenotavailable:

“Youaretoteach“X”thing,butthereisnoresourceforyoutouse.”

T15illustrated:“It puts a lotofpressureonyou.…Youhave tobeg for crayons andthingslikethat.”

Moreover,E2 verified:“Ourresourcesarenotasmuchaswewouldhaveliked.Thatistheplaintruth.”

E2 continued that the ministry had very good policies that had to besignificantly scaled down because of inadequate resources. According to R1,

“Wherethere’sasloworlowlevelofimplementation,itcouldberelatingtolackofresources.”

C3stressed,“The biggest problem to implementing policies would be a resourceconstraint.”

However,I1states:“Soit’sjustlikeyouarespreadalittlethinly.Theprovisionisthere,butitisnotadequateprovision.”

One education officer confirmed: “We are not short of policy … but the issue is the resources toimplement.”(E3)

No Evaluation

Thereisaunitforprogrammonitoringandevaluation,whichisundertheumbrellaof theunit forpolicyandresearch. Prior to1992, therewasno


formalmechanismforevaluation.Thisunitwasconceptualisedtoevaluateamajorpolicyinitiative,andtheunitstillcontinuestoevaluatesomeprojects.I1notedthatalthoughtheunitisnotadequatelystaffed,thestructureisinplace. An education officer emphasised that the unit is located at the central Ministry:

“Because(aswitheverything)therehastobequalityassurance.”(E1)

AccordingtoE2,policyevaluationinvolvesthedirectors,theheadsoftheunits, and the assistant chief education officers:

“Theyaretheoneswhodoit,andwelooknowathowthatchildwasperformingpriortotheintervention…andthenafter.”

Senior public official A also confirmed the unit’s presence: “ThereisapolicyevaluationunitattheMinistryofEducation.”(R1)

Yetonlyoneteacher indicatedanawarenessofanevaluationprocess.T2stated:

“theygivethefeedback,butmosttimeitwasvague.”

T2alsoindicatedthatteacherswerenotintheloop;andsometimeswhenevaluations were done, the teachers never saw the written report. Themajorityof teachersdeclaredthat theyhadneverseenanyoneconductingan evaluation in their schools, and they said theyhadnever beenpart ofan evaluation.They indicated that there was no follow-up procedure. T3stated,

“Therewasnocomingintoseewhatisgoingon.So,‘Isthisworking?Isthatworking?’…Nofollow-upfromMinistry.”

Other teachers added that the education officers provided no guidance, although these officers are supposed to be the check-and-balance arm of the Ministry:

“Thatwasoneofbigproblemswehad:notmuchhelpfromtheeducationofficers, who are supposed to come out to help us.” (T20)

This lack of guidance was affirmed by T21,whostatedthattheeducationofficers:

“camelikeinspectors,toseewhatwashappening;buttheynevertoldyouwhatwasrightorwrong.”


According to I1, when implementation challenges surfaced, there wasa chain of action. First, the officers from the monitoring and evaluation unitalertedtheEducationalServicesDivision.Thedivisiontheninitiatedworkshops,inwhichteachersandprincipalswereremindedofpoliciesandprocedures. However, I2, confirmed that the unit did not evaluate most policies. In fact, the senior public official said often the unit is not aware whenimplementationofpoliciesistakingplace.

“Amatteroffact,alotofimplementationtakesplacewithoutusevenknowing about it.… Keep in mind that structure normally followsfunction;butoftentimesintheMinistry,functionfollowsstructure.”

I2mentionedthattheevaluationunitoffered to evaluatecertainpoliciesforvariousdepartmentsattheministry.Hesaidthatnooneresponded:

“Nobodycares.…peopledonotknowwhattheevaluationis.”

Hedescribedthepolicyimplementationprocessattheministryasfollows:“AcircleofthepeopleinsideintheMinistryputtogetherforums…thenthey have seminars with all the regions’ officers—and may go for a half-day.Theystandandlectureallday.Fromahalf-dayoflecturing,youarethensentouttotrainotherpeoplehowtoimplementthesepolicies.Thereisnofollow-upfromanyoneattheMinistry.Whenproblemsariseoutoftheregions,thetrainersfromtheMinistrysaid‘Peopledidnotdowhattheyweretold.”(I2)

Kingdon(1995)notes,thatsomepeopledonotwanttheirprogramstobeevaluatedbecausesometimesdirectors feel that theyaregoing tobeheldresponsible for shortfalls in theprograms. This perspective is evident inEnvironmentThreeofthepoliticalmodeltheory,whichnotesthattechnicalevaluation assesses policymakers’ and implementers’ capabilities. Anegative assessment can influence resource allocation. Although technical evaluationsstrivetobeobjective,theyare“ultimatelypoliticalthroughtheirconsequences”(Nakaruma&Smallwood,1980,p.79).I2agreedthatsomepublic officials are of the view that evaluation means “something is wrong withmyprogram.”Headmittedthattheunitisawareofthisconcern.Asaresult, they are cautious about the wording in their final report; that is, they identifytheissuewithoutpersonalisingthecause.I2concludedthattheacademicdescriptionoftheimplementationprocessis not what happens at the Ministry. Instead, certain prescriptions and


regulationsarecombined.Theseelementsareconveyed,andtheconveyanceof them becomes the implementation (as opposed to a process in whichpoliciesaresystematicallydeveloped,piloted,andevaluated).

This‘conveyance-process-as-implementation’iscompoundedbythemethodby which decisions are made. The decision-making technique rests onnotions,notdata.Further,thetechniquerelieson‘who’has‘what’authority.AsI2observedwryly:

“So that is how people make decisions about technical matters in anontechnicalway.”

Whatwouldhappenifdecisionsweremadeonreliabledata,ratherthanonnotions?Likely,then,peoplecouldseetheimportanceofevaluation.Whenpressed,RIlatervalidatedtheteachers’claims:

“Therearequiteanumberoferrorsandevidencethatpoliciesarenotbeingevaluated.”(R1)

Mixed Signals

Thevalidityof the teachers’perspectivecanbefurtherunderstoodby thecomplexityofresponsestotheprocess.AccordingtoI1,theMinistermakespolicystatements.Forexample,theMinistercouldmakethisstatement:

“Nochildshouldbeallowedtoadvanceunlessheorsheisnumerateandliterate.”

Withthatstatement,theministryimmediatelyputsmechanismsinplacetoworkfromgradeone,uptogradesix.Thispronouncement,I1says,isnotapolicy,butratherastatementofdirection,whichisdevelopedintoaconceptpaper.

What is a ‘conceptpaper’?Aconceptpapermakesclearadirective.Thepapersayswherethepolicyisintendedtogo.Thepaperissharedandseenatapolicylevel. It isthentransferredtoagroupofinterestedpersonsata roundtable. Thesepeopleexaminewhat isbeingproposed.Outof thatdiscussion, the concept paper is transformed by stakeholders to a draftpolicy. The major stakeholders are principals, teachers, and the JamaicaTeachers’Association (JTA). Dependingon theparticularpolicy’sgoals,theremaybebothinternalandexternalinterestgroups.Oncethestakeholder


meetings have taken place and the draft is finished, the draft policy is presented to the executive management group, headed by the permanentsecretary. At thismeeting therearediscussions. Thedraftpolicy is thenmovedfromexecutivemanagementtotheseniorpolicyunit(headedbytheminister). Once the policy is established, a presentation is made. Afterthe presentation, the policy is submitted to the executive unit. This unitpreparesitforsubmissiontothecabinet.Uponcabinetapproval,permissionisgrantedforimplementation.

Allpoliciesareaccompaniedbyaplan.I1stressedthisrequirement.Thisplanincludesthecostof thepolicy;howthepolicywillbe implemented;whattheprincipalimplementationprocesswillbe;andhowthepolicywillbeevaluatedforeffectiveness.

The process includes education officers, principals, and teachers. Everyone involvedintheprocessistrained.AccordingtoI1,clustertrainingismoreeffective than large-group training, because clusters foster more dialogueand exchange of ideas. From each cluster, a leader is appointed. Thisleaderassistsintheprocess.Policiesareimplementedonaphasedbasis.I1stated:

“As a Third World country, financial constraints demand that some of the thingswedowillhavetobephasedin.”

Conclusions

There are five findings in this study that could aid the understanding of implementation.First,thisstudyshowsthecomplexityoftheissues,fromstudent malnutrition to lack of government finances. These problems are complex,andmostscholarsagreethatJamaica’seducationtroublesaretheby-productsofpoverty,inequality,andthehistoricalevolutionoftheschoolsystem.Thus,policyprescriptionsaloneprobablycannotsolvetheeducationcrisisinJamaica.Second,thisstudypointsoutthatthemanagementstyleinplaceisatop-downapproach.

Third, this study details factors influencing implementation. Many elements overlapinsideandoutsidetheclassroom,anddecisionmakersneedadata-based framework to know how these elements intersect. Fourth, Miller(1997)hassaidthatpolicymakerstendtoignoreissuesthat theyconsider


irrelevanttoschools.Butitisclearwhatissuescannolongerbeignoredwhen implementing policy, such as home environment and communitypoverty. Fifth, this research underscores the importance of having clearguidelines.Fewparticipantsinthisstudywere“onthesamepage.”

ThenationmustcontinuetoimproveJamaica’sschools.With794primaryschoolsinJamaica,thisischallenging.AccordingtoJ1,

“[We’re]beyondthe‘immunisation’phase.Nosingle,smallinjectionofcapitalisgoingtohaveamassiveeffect.”(J1)

Clearly Jamaica does not have the resources to help all the schools.Fortunatelysomeschoolsdonotneedassistance.

It may be beneficial to consider Miller’s (1992) idea that policymaking can be region-specific or group-specific. Not all policies must be system-wide. If this concept is applied to Jamaica’s policies, it couldmean that scarceresourcescouldbeallocatedwhereneeded.


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Vol. 37, No. 2, June 2012 pp. 46-83

On Growth Diagnostics and Grenada

Kari H. GrenadeWalden University, Mills District

Minnesota, United States of America

Abstract

ThepurposeofthisstudyistodeterminethebindingconstraintsoneconomicgrowthinGrenadaandtheattendantpolicypriorities.UsingtheGrowthDiagnostics Methodology, the study finds that poor quality of human capital,highcostofbusinessoperations,weakregulatoryandinstitutionalsupportforbusinessactivity,andlowselfdiscoveryarethemostbindingconstraintsoneconomicgrowth inGrenada. By identifying thebindingconstraintsoneconomicgrowthandproposingtargetedcorrectivepolicies,this study has the potential to influence and improve public policy to boost andsustaingrowth.

Keywords:Growthdiagnostics,Grenada,bindingconstraintsJELCodes:O54


47GrowthDiagnostics:Grenada

Introduction

This study addresses the problem of constrained economic growth inGrenada.Thekeyhypothesisofthestudyisthatthereareseveralbindingconstraints to higher economic activity in Grenada, quite apart from thecountry’ssmallsizeandexternalvulnerabilities.Thispropositionisbasedon the fact that firms operating in the private sector are small in size and function with insufficient levels of complementary factors, in particular, humancapitalandtechnologicalknow-how.

This study is anchored in the economic growth literature pioneered byHausmann, Rodrik, and Valesco (2005), which emphasise a diagnosticsapproach to the problem of constrained economic growth. The essentialpremise of growth diagnostics is that different countries do not face thesame kinds of growth constraints; therefore, the subject of any growthdiagnosticsstudyislimitedtoonecountry.Hausmannetal(2005)explainedthat designing the same growth strategy for all countries is likely to beunproductiveandunsuccessful.Economicgrowthstrategiesrequiretargetedpolicyprioritiesbecauseitisseldomhelpfultoprovidepolicymakersinpoordevelopingcountrieswhofaceadministrativeandpoliticallimitations,witha long list of reforms, many of which may not address the most bindinggrowthconstraint(s).There has been no growth diagnostics done for Grenada. This study fills this research gap by identifying the binding constraint(s) on economicgrowth and the attendant policy priorities. This is a critical first step towards socioeconomic upliftment. It is anticipated that the research findings will helppolicymakers tobetter targetpolicies toboost and sustain economicgrowthinGrenadatoaddresstwokeyimperatives:(a)creatingemploymentopportunities,and(b)reducingpovertyrates.

The remainderof this studyproceeds as follows. Section2provides thecountrycontextwhilesection3establishestheconceptualframeworkthatgrounds thestudy. Section4dealswith thedataandmethodology,whilesection 5 undertakes the actual growth diagnostics exercise. Section 6discusses the findings and section 7 addresses the policy implications and offersrecommendations.Section8concludes.


CountryContext

GrenadaisthesouthernmostcountryintheEasternCaribbeanwithatotalland area of 344 sq. km. Based on data from the World DevelopmentIndicators (2011), the total population in 2009 was 103,930; populationgrowth averaged 0.54% during the period 1980-2009. The population isrelativelyyoung;approximately50%areundertheageof19years(CaribbeanDevelopmentBank[CDB],2009).Grenada’sHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)was0.748in2011,whichgavethecountryarankof67outof187countries.

The economic structure of Grenada was transformed (albeit slowly)during the period 1980-2008 from predominantly agriculture to services,specifically tourism, construction, financial, and educational services. Appendix1 shows thatGrenada’s economicperformanceover thepast 3decadesraisesquestionsastothefactorsthathaveinhibitedfasterratesofeconomicgrowth. Grenada’s rateofeconomicgrowthwas less than thatof theCaribbean’saverageineachperiodexcept in the1990s. BasedondatafromtheUnitedNationsStatisticalDivision(2009),therehasbeennoperiod of growth acceleration1 in Grenada during the period 1980-2008.Grenada’seconomicchallengehasbecomemoredauntinginthewakeoftheglobaleconomiccrisis.TheGrenadianeconomywasbuffetedbytheglobalcrisis;contractingby7.7%in2009andby1.4%in2010.

Evenbeforetheonsetoftheglobaleconomiccrisis,incomesofhouseholdsdid not rise significantly, while incidences of poverty and unemployment rose. BasedondatafromtheUnitedNationsStatisticalDivision(2009),Grenada’srateofeconomicgrowthaveraged2.5%duringtheperiod2000-2008,belowtheCaribbeanaverageof3.4%.Grenadahasbeenunabletomatchlevelsofeconomicdevelopmentattainedbysomeofitshigh-performingcounterpartsintheCaribbean,asindicatedbythelevelofGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)percapita.AsdatafromtheUnitedNationsStatisticalDivisionshow,GDPpercapitawastheeighthlowestofthe16Caribbeancountriesin2008.ThedataalsoshowthatGrenada’saveragelevelofGDPpercapitaineachofthe3decadesstarting1980hasbeenconsistentlylessthanthatoftheCaribbean’s

1Hausmann and Rodrick (2006) defined growth acceleration as a period when a country’s GDPpercapitagrowsbyatleast3.5%for8yearsconsecutively.


average. Poverty and unemployment rates were estimated at 37.7% and24.9% respectively in 2008, up from 32.1% and14%correspondingly in1999(CDB,2009).

Data from the United Nations Statistical Division (2009) also show thatactivity insomeof thekeyeconomicsectorshasbeenmodestduring theperiod1980-2008andtherateofgrowthhasnotbeensmooth.Forexample,activityintheagriculturalsector(theleadingeconomicsectorupuntilthemid-1990s)grewmarginally,atanannualaveragerateof0.8%inthe1980s,contractedatanannualaveragerateof1.0%inthe1990s,andreboundedthereafter,growingmodestlyatanannualaveragerateof1.3%duringtheperiod 2000-2008. Tourism activity, which became the mainstay of theeconomyfromtheearly1990s,increasedatanannualaveragerateof4.1%and5.0%duringthe1980sand1990s,respectively,butdeclinedatanannualrateof0.1%duringtheperiod2000-2008.

While erratic GDP growth is typical of some Caribbean countries, datafromtheUnitedNationsStatisticalDivision(2009)showthatvolatileGDPgrowthisaparticularlydistinctfeatureoftheGrenadianeconomy.Duringthe period 1980-2008, the volatility of GDP growth, as measured by thestandarddeviationofGDPgrowth,was5.5%,whichwaswell above theCaribbean’s average of 2.3%. High volatility suggests that Grenada hasbeen unable to sustain lengthy periods of strong and uninterrupted GDPgrowth.TotalinvestmentasaratioofGDPgrewatanannualaveragerateof0.3percentagepointsovertheperiod1980-2008.Theratiodeclinedfrom34.3%in2000to26.8%in2008.Theprecedingdiscussioncapturestheessenceoftheresearchproblemandbegstheresearchquestion:WhatarethebindingconstraintsoneconomicgrowthinGrenada?Itisagainstthisbackgroundthatitbecomescriticaltoexamine the factors constrainingeconomicactivity in thecountry so thatreform strategies can be appropriately designed and targeted at the mostbindingconstraints.

ConceptualFramework

The growth diagnostics literature underpins the design and conduct ofthis study. The growth diagnostics literature is a relatively recent one.


Hausmannet al (2005) was the first body of work that emerged in response tolimitationsofthetraditionalempiricalstudies,especiallyrelatingtotheappropriatenessandapplicabilityofgrowthpromotingpoliciesindevelopingcountries.Growthdiagnosticsidentifythebindingconstraintsoneconomicgrowth of a country so that policymakers in that country can formulatepoliciestoremovetheconstraints(Hausmannetal2005).Theyexplainedthatthecentralideaunderpinninggrowthdiagnosticsisthatfocusedpolicyinterventionsaresuperiortoanincoherentapproachtodesigningpoliciesthatareintendedtopromoteeconomicgrowth.Theycontendedthatthechronicandpersistenteconomicunderperformanceofacountryisinextricablylinkedtodistortionsthatexistineitherthepublicorprivatesector,orboth.Theydulyacknowledgedtheimpossibilityofremovingdistortionsallatonceandassertedthatwholesaleeconomicreformsarenotpragmatic.Instead,theyadvocatedthatpolicymakerspursuereformsthatwouldeliminateonlythemostbindingconstraintsoneconomicgrowth. Theprioritisingofpolicyreforms based on a country’s idiosyncrasies is the essential premise ofgrowthdiagnostics.

Growthdiagnosticsisasystematicapproachtounderstandingandexplainingtheconstraintsoneconomicgrowthofacountry(Hausmannet al2005).Theframeworkisgroundedinthetheoryofendogenouseconomicgrowthandisbasedonthefundamentalresultofatypicalendogenousgrowthmodel,which shows that economic growth of a country depends on returns toassetaccumulation,theprivateappropriabilityofthosereturns,andcostoffinancing those assets. The growth diagnostics approach is motivated by the followingconsiderations.First,highereconomicgrowthisthemostdirectwayofreducingpovertyandincreasingsocialwelfareinpoordevelopingcountries; however, increasing economic growth is a key challenge thatmany developing countries face. Therefore, reform strategies should beprincipally targeted at accelerating rates of economic growth. Second,policies to promote economic growth ought to be country and contextspecific. Therefore, designing the same growth strategy for all countries is likely to be unproductive and unsuccessful. Third, economic growthstrategiesrequire targetedpolicyprioritiesbecause it isseldomhelpful toprovidepolicymakersinpoordevelopingcountrieswhofaceadministrativeandpoliticallimitations,withalonglistofreforms,manyofwhichmaynotaddressthemostbindingconstraintsoneconomicgrowth.


Thegrowthdiagnosticsframeworkhas thedistinctfeature that therateatwhichaneconomygrowsisafunctionofthedifferencebetweentheexpectedreturns on asset accumulation and the cost of financing those assets as seen by private investors. In other words, growth problems are reflected in private investmentbehaviours.Therefore,privateinvestmentandinturn,economicgrowthcanbehamperedbylowreturnsonassetaccumulationorhighcostof financing. Hausmann et al(2005)explainedthatiftheproblemislowreturns,thiscouldbebecauseoflowsocialreturnsduetopoorgeography,inadequatehumancapital,andpoorinfrastructureoritcouldbebecauseofdifficulties of private agents to appropriate their returns on investment. Low appropriabilitymaybeduetogovernmentfailure(suchascorruption,hightaxes, high public debt, large fiscal deficits, and high inflation) or market failures (such as low self discovery). If the problem is high cost of finance, this could be because of limited access to financial markets (local and/or foreign), poor financial intermediation between investors and borrowers, andlowlevelsofdomesticsavings.Thebiggerthedifferencebetweentheexpected returns from private investments and the cost of financing those investments,thegreatertheincentiveistoaccumulateassetsandthehigherwillbetherateofeconomicgrowth.Thegrowthdiagnosticsframeworkisconceptualised as a decision tree. Each node of the decision tree—finance, infrastructure, human capital, micro risks, macro instability, and productinnovation/self discovery—represents a potential binding constraint oneconomicgrowth.

Thegrowthdiagnosticsapproachhasbeenheavilycritiqued.Startingwiththecriticisms,someofthemorerelevantonesrelatetotheimplementationof the analytical framework. Dixit (2007) argued that the framework isnotreallyadecisiontreeaspurportedbyHausmannet al (2005)sinceinreality,thereisnosinglebindingconstraint,butcomplexinteractionsmayexist between the different potential constraints. Felipe and Usui (2008)expressedconcernsaboutthestartingpoint.Theyarguedthatlowlevelsofprivateinvestmentandentrepreneurshipmaynotbethecoreproblemforaparticularcountry.Additionally,theycontendedthatitisnotalwayseasyto find signals to inform the diagnosis and asserted that it is inevitable for researcherstorelyonindirectevidencetodetermineifaconstraintisbinding.Further,theycontendedthatthegrowthdiagnosticsapproachconcentratesonreformstoremovecurrentbindingconstraintsoneconomicgrowthanddoesnotdirectlydealwiththesequencingofpolicyreforms.Thereisalsothe


argumentthatresearcherscouldeasilyfallintotheavailabilitybiastrap.Theavailability bias trap is a situation where researchers find it easier to accept orrejectavariableasabindingconstraint,forwhichdataareavailable,asopposedtoanothervariablewheredataarelimited.

ThesecriticismshavebeendulyacknowledgedandaddressedbyHausmann,KlingerandWagner(2008).InrespondingtoDixit(2007),Hausmannet al (2008)accepted that there isnosinglebindingconstraintandargued thattheoppositeisnottrue;thatis,alldetractorsfromeconomicgrowthdonotallbindsimultaneously.Regardingthestartingpointargument,Hausmannet al(2008)arguedthatthecriticismmissesanimportantpoint,whichis,akeymacroeconomicobjectiveofmostdevelopingcountries is to increaseproductive capacity. They stressed that growth problems are reflected in private investment behaviours. They argued that there are few cases ofcountrieswheredistortionssuchaspoorpropertyrightsormacroeconomicinstability are such that private investment is too high. Hausmann et al (2008)acknowledgedFelipeandUsuil’s (2008)concernabout theuseofimperfectdataincarryingoutagrowthdiagnosticsexercise.Theyreasonedthattheonlywayforwardistotakesuchshortcomingsintoaccountwhenconsidering thedegree towhichdiagnosis signalsupdateanalysts’priors.They added that analysts should triangulate constraints using as manydiagnostictestsaspossible.Inrelationtosequencingofreforms,Hausmannet al (2008)explained that the roleofagrowthdiagnosticsexercise is toidentifyapolicyorsetofpoliciestoreinvigorateeconomicactivity,givenanunderstandingofthefactorsconstrainingeconomicgrowthinaparticularcountry. Theyadmitted that agrowthdiagnosticsexercise isnot explicitabouthowtomakesuchpolicies.Policydesignandsequencingdependonthe specific binding constraint and the country’s policy space and political expediency.Inresponsetotheavailabilitybiasargument,Hausmannet al(2008) recommended that researchers go through an iterative process ofdeductionandinductionofthecountrycontextandavailabledatatoavoidanybiases.

In spite of the criticisms, the intrinsic worth of growth diagnostics hasbeenduly recognised. Misch,Gemmell, andKneller (2010) commendedHausmannet alforlinkinggrowthdiagnosticstostandardeconomictheory.Theauthorscommentedthatgrowthdiagnosticshaveexertedconsiderableinfluence in academia and among policymakers, in part because it is supported by anecdotal evidence, it is intuitively appealing, and it seems


readilyapplicableinpractice. Identifyingclearandwellgroundedpolicypriorities that reflect country-specific opportunities and constraints is much more relevant for policymaking in practice (Temple 2009). Even Felipeand Usuil (2008) who criticised the framework admitted that the growthdiagnosticsmethodologycanbeausefultoolforpolicymakerstoformulatea development strategy in the presence of limited resources. Indeed,becauseof its focusona single country,growthdiagnosticsoffer specialpolicyappeal.Rodrik(2007)pointedoutthatbyfocusingoninvestment,thepioneersof growthdiagnosticshave laudably illustrated that they arecognisantofthefactthatindevelopingcountries,acriticalproblemisthescarcityofcapitalequipmentandproductivecapacity.

Growthdiagnosticshavebeendoneformanycountriesworldwide(thatis,29publishedstudiesovertheperiod2005-2011).However,onlyfourCaribbeancountrieshavehada formalgrowthdiagnostics: Jamaica,Belize,GuyanaandTrinidadandTobago.WorldBank(2011)diagnosedlowproductivityasthemainantecedentofJamaica’spooreconomicperformanceoverthepast3decades. Thestudyexplained that themaincausesof lowproductivityare: (i) deficiencies in human capital and entrepreneurship due to low quality educationandtrainingandhighmigrationrates,amongotherfactors;(ii)highcrime;and(iii)distortivetaxincentivesandenclavedevelopmentwithlittlespilloverstotherestoftheeconomy.ThestudyonBelize(HuasmannandKlinger,2007)foundthatthemostbindingconstraintoneconomicgrowthwastheprodigiouslyhighpublicsectordebtlevelsduetoanextendedperiodof fiscal indiscipline. Belize’s high public debt levels were crowding out both privateandpublicinvestments,whichunderminedbotheconomicandsocialdevelopment.ForGuyana,Armendariz,Baena,Jessen,Shearer,Schneiderand Bristol (2007) diagnosed poor appropriability of returns on privateinvestments to be the most binding constraint on economic growth.Thisbindingconstraintactedasabrakeonproductivetransformation,economicdiversification, and capital accumulation. In their study on Trinidad and Tobago,Artana,Auguste,Moya,Sookram,andWatson (2007) found thatmacro risks (government failure), poor management, low profitability, lack ofhumancapital, poor infrastructure, andpoor access to foreignmarketswerethemostimportantfactorslimitingthecountry’sgrowth.

Hausmann andKlinger (2007) acknowledged that growthdiagnostics areneededforotherCaribbeancountrieschallengedbyconstrainedeconomic


growth and high rates of poverty; Grenada is one such country. To fill this researchgapandtobroadentheunderstandingofwhyGrenada’seconomicgrowth is constrained, this research focused on diagnosing the bindingconstraint(s) on economic growth in Grenada. Identifying the bindingconstraint(s) on economic growth and the attendant policy priorities isa critical first step in addressing the imperatives of poverty reduction and employmentgeneration.

ThisresearchdiffersfromotherCaribbeanstudiesbecausethecaseisdifferentand to that extent, the research findings, and in turn, policy recommendations to boost and sustain economic growth are specific to Grenada. Therefore, this study helps to address a research gap in the Caribbean growthdiagnosticsliteraturebymakingacontributiontotheunderstandingofwhatconstrains economic growth in another small Caribbean country with anopeneconomy.

MethodologyAndData

Given the researchproblem, aqualitativeapproachwasadopted. Withinthequalitativeresearchparadigm,thisstudywasbestsuitedforacasestudydesignsoastobeableto:(i)getadetailedunderstandingofwhyGrenada’seconomicgrowthisconstrained;(ii)drawonmultiplesourcesofevidencetodiagnosethebindingconstraint(s)tohighereconomicactivityinGrenada;and(iii)avoidsomeoftheinherentproblemsthatplaguequantitativestudiesoneconomicgrowth.Theuseofaquantitativeapproach(aneconometricsanalysis) to this specific research problem was deemed unlikely to elicit the richdatanecessarytoaddresstheresearchproblemadequately.Indeed,thegrowthdiagnosticsapproachaddressesthelimitationsofempiricalgrowthregressions.Byfocusingononecountry,thegrowthdiagnosticsapproachprovidesasystematicframeworkforidentifyingthebindingconstraintsonacountry’seconomicgrowthatanypointintime(Hausmannet al2005).Inthisrespect,theapproach,whichisessentiallycasestudymethodology(Enders, 2007), is fundamentally different from a typical econometricsgrowth regression,whichusuallyentailsapanelofcountries. Therefore,the problems of outliers, parameter homogeneity, model uncertainty, andcorrelationversuscausationdonotfeatureinagrowthdiagnosticsexercise.

Consistentwithcasestudymethodology,growthdiagnosticsstudiesutiliseawiderangeofevidencetosupportone’shypothesisofbindingconstraints


oneconomicgrowth.Casestudymethodologyusesseveralmethodsofdatacollection.Theuseofmultiplemethodsofdatacollectionisimportanttoobtainan in-depthunderstandingof thephenomenonunder investigation,through triangulation. For this study, the data and information thatwere required to answer the research question were based on the growthdiagnostics literatureandon theeconomicpeculiaritiesofGrenada. Thisstudy used qualitative information, quantitative data, and documents tofacilitatetriangulation.

Face-to-face in-depth interviewswereusedas theprimarydatacollectionmethod.Theinterviewmethodwasidealforthisstudybecausetheobjectiveof the research was not to observe participants’ behaviors, but instead togarner their views and opinions on what constrains activity in Grenada’skey economic sectors. The main reason for complementing interviewinformationwithquantitativedataanddocumentanalyseswastosatisfyafundamentalrequirementofagrowthdiagnosticsexercise,whichisusingmultiplesourcesofevidencetodiagnosethebindingconstraintsaccurately.

TofullyunderstandthefactorsthatconstraineconomicgrowthinGrenada,peoplewhoaredirectlyinvolvedineconomicactivityonadailybasis,aswellasthoseinvolvedineconomicplanning,weredeemedtobethemostfitting as research participants. The research population comprised economic planners in the public sector and owners and/or managers of firms that operateintheprivatesector,whicharemembersoftheGrenadaChamberofIndustryandCommerce(GCIC).

Theresearchsamplewaschoseninamannerthatbestbalancesthenumberofparticipants with depth of inquiry, based on the stratified purposive method. Firmswereselectedbasedonthefollowingtwocriteria:(a)theyoperateinoneofthemaineconomicsectors(tourism,manufacturingandagriculture)and (b) they employ 10 or more workers (this criterion captured small firms). Firms are classified as small if they employ between 10-24 workers (Foreign InvestmentAdvisory Service, 2004). Based on the selection criteria, theresearchsamplewastakenfromthe78GCICmembersthatoperateinoneofthemaineconomicsectors,with10ormoreemployees.Firmswereselectedto ensure that they broadly reflect Grenada’s economic structure, thereby providing rich information that is sufficiently representative of the macro economyofGrenada. Furthermore, selectedparticipants from thepublic


sectorcomprisedpeopleinseniorpositionsinkeygovernmentministries,including finance and tourism. Based on the selection criteria and the need to balance depth of inquiry with number of participants, 14 people wereinterviewed;twowerefromthepublicsectorand12fromtheprivatesector.It is important to underscore that the number of interviews refers to thenumberofin-depthinterviewsneededtodistilmeaningfulinformationfromtherawdata,ratherthansimpleinterviewsofshortduration.Appendix2liststheinterviewquestions.

Quantitative data on some of Grenada’s key macroeconomic and financial indicators are uploaded from the websites of the following regional andinternational organisations: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB),International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and United NationsStatistical Division. Archival documents (World Bank Doing BusinessReports, World Bank Governance Reports, Grenada’s Country PovertyAssessment2007/2008Report,andmacroeconomicreportsoftheECCBandIMF)underwentcriticalcontentanalysestoassessGrenada’sbusinessclimate, governance indicators, and socioeconomic profile.

The core analysis for this study involved carrying out the actual growthdiagnosticsexercisesothattheresearchquestionaboutthebindingconstraintson economic growth in Grenada could be answered. Data analysis wascarriedoutattwolevels.Theleveloneanalysisdealtwiththeapproachesandmethodsusedtoorganiseandpreparethequalitativedata,quantitativedata,anddocumentsfortheleveltwoanalysis,whichwastheactualgrowthdiagnosticsexercise.Intheleveloneanalysis,theobjectiveofthequalitativeanalysiswastoassessthethemesthatemergedfromthedatasoastomakecredible inferences aboutwhyGrenada’s economicgrowth is constrainedandnotmerelytocountorprovidenumericsummariesoftheparticipants’responses.Regarding thequantitativedataanalysis, it entailedcomputingdescriptive statistics, producing graphical representation of the data, andconstructingtablestocriticallyexaminetheunderlyingtrendsinthedata.Documentsweresubjectedtoacriticalcontentanalysis. Thequantitativeand document analyses supplemented and/or augmented the qualitativeanalysis.Hausmannet al(2008)assertedthatagrowthdiagnosticsexerciseshouldincludeacoherentstorythataccountsforthefactsobserved.

With respect to the level two analysis - undertaking the actual growthdiagnostics exercise, the objective was to answer definitively the research


question:WhatarethebindingconstraintsoneconomicgrowthinGrenada?Therefore, the exercise drew on the results of the level one analysis(interviewees’ responses, statistical data analysis, and relevant findings of the documentsanalysis)andundertookacriticalsynthesisanddeeperanalysisoftheemergentpiecesofevidence.Thegrowthdiagnosticsapproachisatopdownapproachwiththediagnosticsstartingbyaskingwhatkeepsprivateinvestment, andhence, economicgrowth, low. Accordingly, thedecisiontree(Appendix3)organisespolicyquestionsaboutconstraintsoneconomicgrowththatcanbeaskedinalogicalmanner.Thediagnosticsentailedgoingdownthegrowthdiagnosticsdecisiontreeinsearchofbindingconstraintsoneconomicgrowth.Eachnode2 of the decision tree—finance; infrastructure, humancapital,micro risks,macro instability, andproduct innovation/selfdiscovery—representsapotentialbindingconstraintoneconomicgrowth.Giventhatthegrowthdiagnosticsexerciseisatopdownexercise,movingdown the growth diagnostics decision tree was tantamount to discardingcandidatesforthemostbindingconstraintonGrenada’seconomicgrowth.As much as the data and information allowed, Hausmann et al’s (2008)Constraints Matrix (Appendix 4) was used to inform the diagnosis. Thesearchforbindingconstraintswasdoneforonesideofthediagnosticstreeatatime.

2Whilegeography is a node in thegrowthdiagnosticsdecision tree, interviewquestionsfocusedondomesticfactorsthatcouldbepotentialbindingconstraintsonGrenada’seconomicgrowthforwhichremedialactionsarepossible.Hence,intervieweeswerenotaskedabouttheirviewsongeography.Additionally,therearenoquantitativedataongeography/weatherthat could have meaningfully informed the growth diagnostics exercise. Geography wasthereforetakenasanexogenousfactor.


TheGrowthDiagnosticsExercise

Is Growth Constrained by Finance?

The findings of the in-depth interviews indicate that 71.4% of respondents do not view access to finance to be a major problem. The following are examplesofresponsesfromintervieweeswhenaskedabouttheirviewsonaccess to finance: ‘Lending policies are not prohibitive; businesses have had accesstoamplefundsovertheyears.’‘Banksareveryliquidandtheyhavebecomemoreliquid.’‘Moneyisthere,youjusthavetolookatthedatainthebankingsector,moneyisthere.’

Notwithstanding, the analysis also revealed that some micro-businesses find it difficult to obtain commercial bank financing because owners are unable tomeetthebanks’collateralrequirementsand/ortheirbusinessplansdonotmeetthebanks’standards.Thisviewwasexpressedby30%ofrespondents.Someexamplesofresponsesare:‘Accessisaproblem.Itiseasiertoborrowmoneytobuildahouseorbuyacarthangetmoneyforasmallbusiness.’‘Evenifyouhaveagoodbusinessplanandyoudonothavecollateralyouarenotgettingthefunds.’

Regarding the cost of finance, 64.2% of respondents indicated that cost of finance is not out of range for the majority of businesses. The following are examplesofresponsesfromintervieweeswhenaskedabouttheirviewsonthe cost of finance: ‘Cost of finance has been reduced, the interest rate spread has declined markedly; the data are there to show.’ ‘Cost of finance is not generally a problem, but it could be a problem if small firms want to do bank financing only.’

FinancialdatafromtheEasternCaribbeanCentralBank(2011)corroboratethe majority view of the interviewees that access to, and cost of finance, are notmajorconstraintsonbusinessactivityinGrenada.Appendix5showsthattheinterestratespreaddeclinedto6.8percentagepointsin2010from7.2 percentage points in 2005. The data also show that the interest ratespreadinGrenadahasbeenconsistentwiththoseintheothercountriesoftheEasternCaribbeanCurrencyUnion(ECCU).

ThedownwardtrendinGrenada’sinterestratespreadinrecentyearssuggeststhat financial intermediation—the extent to which banks are channelling


fundsfromsaverstoborrowers—isadequate.Additionally,theincreasingratio of credit to deposit is evidence that financial intermediation is adequate. Thecredittodepositratiogrewatanannualaveragerateof4.3percentagepoints over the period 2005-2010, reaching 83.1% in 2010. Grenada isnot blocked out of the international capital market. Therefore, althoughaggregatedomesticsavingsarenegative(grossdomesticsavingscollapsedfrom14.1%ofGDPin2005tonegative8.5%ofGDPin2009),Grenadahasadequateaccesstoforeignsourcesoffunds(Appendix6),whichbankshaveused to finance domestic investments.

Despite commercial banks’ heavy investment in government securities(bonds and treasury bills), which increased to US$48.6 million (9.3% ofGDP)in2010fromUS$42.2million(9.2%ofGDP)in2006,thedatashowthatbankshavestillmanagedtoextendcredit tobusinesses. Appendix7shows that commercial banks’ credit for business activity has been on apersistent increase since 2006. Total credit of all commercial banks forbusiness activity rose to US$235.3 million (45% of GDP) in 2010 fromUS$131.4million(29%ofGDP)in2005.

Based on the qualitative and quantitative evidence, it is difficult to argue that on a macro level, the cost of, and access to finance, is a binding constraint onbusinessinvestmentandhence,economicgrowthinGrenada.Therefore,after weighing all the evidence, finance is ruled out as a binding constraint to privateinvestmentandeconomicgrowthinGrenada.However,somemicrobusinesses experience difficulties in accessing commercial bank financing.

IsGrowthConstrainedbytheLackofComplementaryFactors?

Is Infrastructure Quality a Binding Constraint?

Based on interviewees’ responses, the infrastructure quality adequatelysupportseconomicactivityinGrenada.OftheintervieweeswhorespondedtotheinterviewquestiononthequalityofGrenada’sinfrastructure,100%opinedthattheinfrastructurequalityisgood.Thefollowingareexamplesof what some respondents said: ‘Grenada has a relatively good networkofroads;wehaveverygoodairport,aswellasseaportfacilities.’‘Notanimpedimenttobusiness,telecommunicationisoneofthebestintheregion,roads are fine and water and electricity are consistent.’ ‘I think infrastructure


inGrenadaisrelativelygood,wehaveagoodtelecommunicationsystem;sincethederegulationoftheindustry,costshavecomedown,Grenadahasarelativelygoodnetworkofroads;wehaveverygoodairport,aswellasseaportfacilities.’

QuantitativedatafromtheWorldDevelopmentIndicators(2011)onGrenada’sinfrastructurequalitycorroborate theconsensusviewof the interviewees.Appendix8showsthatusersofmobilecellularandtheInternetincreasedsignificantly during the period 2000-2009. Mobile cellular subscriptions leaped to 61.6per 100people in 2009 from4.2per 100people in 2000,while Internetusersper100people rose to24.1 from4.1,over the sameperiod.Robustcompetitioninthemobileandinternetservicemarketshasfuelleddevelopmentofthetelecommunicationsector,whichaugurswellforbusinessactivity. Grenadahasexcellentseaportfacilitiesandarelativelylarge percentage of paved roads. Grenada’s main port facility (which iscomplementedbyeightothersmallports)hasbeenextensivelydevelopedandcurrentlyhasaberthcapacityforcommercialvesselsof335metreslongwith9.1metresdepth.Regardingroadquality,approximately60%ofroadsarepaved(GrenadaIndustrialDevelopmentCorporation[GIDC],2011).

Based on the evidence uncovered, Grenada’s basic infrastructure is welldevelopedtosupportbusinessactivity.Theroadnetworkandportfacilitiesare good (there were no reports from the private sector interviewees ofcongestionatshippingportsorontheroads,hamperingtradeandeconomicactivity),waterandelectricitysupplyarereliable,andtelecommunicationsare adequate. Therefore, basedon thediagnostics, infrastructure is ruledoutasabindingconstraint toprivate investmentandeconomicgrowth inGrenada.

Is the Quality of Human Capital a Binding Constraint?

Intervieweesexpressedtheviewthathumancapitalisaproblemandthattheproblemstemsfromfoursources:(a)abundanceoflow-skilledworkers,(b)skillsmismatch,(c)workers’lowproductivity,and(d)workers’mindset.

Regardingtheabundanceoflow-skilledworkers,someintervieweesblamedmigration.Oneintervieweeopined,‘Ithinkitisamigrationissue;wedonotrespectourownprofessionals.WehaveGrenadiansprofessionalsinthe


world,butwedonothavetheminGrenada.’Anotherintervieweeremarked,‘Ourbestpeoplegoabroadandthosewhoremainherearethosewhocannotgo;ourpeoplehavebeenourgreatestexports.’ Indeed, theresultsof thequantitative analysis confirmed the migration problem. Migration data from theWorldDevelopmentIndicators(2011)showthatGrenada’sinternationalmigration stock rose to 12.1% of the population in 2010 from 10.6% in2005.

Regardingtheproblemofskillsmismatch,someintervieweesexpressedtheviewthatwhilethenumbersoftrainedschoolleavershaveincreased,theirskillsarenotsuitedtotheworkplace,owinginparttoafailureoftheeducationsystem. Oneintervieweelamented,‘Whenyoulookat thequalityofourgraduates, you get scared.’Another interviewee remarked, ‘Let’s start bysayingthatoureducationsystemhasfailedus,becausewehavegottenawayfromequippingpeoplefortheworldofworkfromtheprimaryschoollevel.’The interviewee went on, ‘We are getting more qualified people coming into theworkforce;wehavequantitybutwelackquality.’Anotherintervieweecomplained,‘Studentsleaveschoolwithpassesin10ormoresubjectsbutarealmost useless in the workplace.’ Additionally, sourcing qualified people to fill managerial and middle managerial positions is difficult. One interviewee summed it up neatly, ‘It is hard to find management personnel and middle managementisalmostimpossible.’

In respect of workers’ productivity and workers’ mindset, the prevailingsentiment was that workers tend to be nonchalant and oblivious of theperformance-remunerationnexus.Oneintervieweementioned,‘Ourmainchallengetoproductivityisattitudetowardswork;wehavealotofissuesthere. I do not think workers have the right approach when it comes toworkastheyshould.Thereisnotthethinkingthatyouhavetoperforminorder tobe remunerated.’Another intervieweesought toexplainworkers’lowproductivitythroughahistoricallens.Theintervieweedisclosed,‘Wehave a labour force that came from an agricultural background, workingonwhat used tobe large estates and the remunerationwasnot good andthe productivity was not good, so we have that same mentality comingforward.’

Given the abundance of low-skilled workers, skills mismatches in caseswhere workers have high academic or vocational qualifications, and high


employeeturnoverinsectorssuchastourism,substantialeffortsofbusinessesareaimedatprovidingcontinuoustraining.Providingcontinuoustrainingisconsideredanaddedcosttodoingbusiness.Oneintervieweestated,

“Mostoftheworkerscomeoutofthesecondaryandprimaryschoolswithverylittleskills,soitisleftuptothebusinessownerstodothattraining to move them from the theory to the industry level. Sobusinessesarefacedwiththatinitialupfrontcostsotheycannotgettheirreturns.”

Indeed, the qualitative analysis provides rich evidence of the humanresourceproblem.WhileGrenadalackscomprehensivequantitativedataonhumancapital,theCountryPovertyAssessment(CPA)byKairiConsultantsLimited (2008) divulges that the economy has not been generating sufficient employment. Based on the CPA, the labour force participation rate wasestimated tobe61.2% in2008. Moreover, of all employedpeople, only2.8%wereemployedinthemanufacturingsector,thesamepercentagewasemployedinhotelsandrestaurants,5.5%wereemployedinwholesaleandretail trade, and 8.2% in agriculture and fishing. Further the majority of employedpeople(34.3%)wereemployedintheservicessector.Additionally,theunemploymentratewasatahighof24.9%in2008;thehighestpercentageof unemployed people (23.4%) was between the ages of 20-24. Finally,only0.9%ofheadofhouseholdsurveyedaspartoftheCPAhadvocationaltraining,andonly6%ofheadofhouseholdscompletedtertiaryeducation.

The qualitative and quantitative analyses provide evidence that Grenadahasalargeunskilledlaborforce,highmigrationofskilledlabor,andskillmismatches resulting in employers devoting substantial efforts aimed atskillsenhancement.Therefore,basedonthediagnosticsitappearsthatthecurrent availability and skillfulness of Grenada’s human capital impedebusinessesfromfullymaximisingreturnsontheirinvestmentandassuch,thehumancapitalvacuumisconsideredtobeabindingconstrainttoprivateinvestmentandeconomicgrowth.


Is Growth Constrained by the Low Appropriability of InvestmentReturns?

Is Government Failure (Micro Risks) a Binding Constraint?

Basedonthequalitativeanalysis,100%ofrespondentsconsideredGrenadatobe ahigh cost destination fordoingbusiness. Thehigh cost of doingbusinessinpartstemsfromhighutilityandenergycosts,aswellashighcostoftransportation.Oneintervieweesummeditupneatly.

“IwouldsayGrenadaisahighcostdestination,whenyoulookatthe cost of electricity that alone makes the cost of the final product veryuncompetitive.Youalsohavetheproblemoftradeandexports;airfreight is very high. Trade logistics and operating costs arecriticalfactorsaffectingthegrowthofmanufacturing.Anothercostisportcharges.GrenadahasoneofthehighestportchargesintheRegion.”

Additionally, some interviewees perceive the environment as not beingentirelyfavorablefordoingbusiness.Oneintervieweecontended,

“ThebusinessclimateinGrenadaisnotaneasyone,ontopofthefact that it is costly to do business; it is not as efficient as it should be. The inefficiencies have to do with government services; it takes toolongtogetanythingdone.Betweenthenumberofproceduresandtimethosetake,overallbusinesscostisincreased.”

Interviewees also expressed frustration with the level of informationasymmetries.Oneintervieweelamented,‘Youdonotgetcorrectinformation;onedaysomeonewilltellyouonethingandthenextdaysomeonetellsyousomethingelse.’Anotherintervieweeremarked,‘DoingbusinessinGrenadais slow; there is a lot of bureaucracy, mainly from the point of view ofgettingthingsdone.Yougetthenodfromthegovernmentbuttoimplementis a problem.’ Interviewees also intimated that the civil service is inefficient, whichmakesdoingbusinessarduous.Accordingtooneinterviewee,‘Thestumbling block is in the civil service, by and large, it is very inefficient and thingsjusttaketoolong.’

Interviewees’ sentiments on the high cost of doing business and the lessthan favorable enabling environment for business activity cohered with


the findings of the World Bank’s Doing Business Report (2011) (a report coveringtheperiodJune2009toJune2010).Basedonthereport,Grenada’soverallrankwithrespecttotheeaseofdoingbusinesswas92outof183countries in 2011; one spot below the rank in 2010. The findings of the report suggestthatthereareweaknessesinGrenada’sinstitutionalandregulatoryframework.Grenadaranked161outof183countriesin2011inrespectofenforcementofcontracts.Furthermore,thereportnotesthatonascaleof0-10,where10isthehighestscore,Grenada’sStrengthofInvestorProtectionIndex was 6.3 in 2011, compared with 9.7 in New Zealand (the highest in theworld).Someintervieweesalsoperceivedregulationandenforcementtobeweak.Weakregulationhampersinvestors’abilitytoappropriatetheirreturnsoninvestments. Oneintervieweementioned,‘Wehaveaproblemwithsmugglingwherepeoplewouldbringinalcoholinbulkandbottleitoutinourbottlesandpassitoffasourproducts.Thereisnoauthoritythatregulatesthesethings.’

In addition to the weak regulatory environment, some intervieweesexpressed the view that there are fundamental mismatches between whattheGovernment’ssectoralpoliciesarticulateandhowitactuallyrespondstosectoralchallenges. Accordingtooneinterviewee,‘TheGovernment’spolicyonpaperisnotanti-businessbutwhenitcomestorealityitisadifferentsituation, and such behaviour affects businesses.’ Another intervieweedeclared,‘TheGovernmentspeaks,butinreality,whatyouexperiencewhenyougototapontotheserviceissomethingtotallydifferent.SomeofthethingstheGovernmentisdoingareblurred,notclear,andnotstraightcutandthatisahurdletodoingbusiness.’

TheWorldBank’sGovernanceReport(2009)providesadditionalevidenceofregulatoryandinstitutionalweaknesses.Appendix9showsthattherewereslippagesinkeygovernanceindicatorsovertheperiod2005-2009.OfthesixgovernanceindicatorsthataremonitoredbytheWorldBank,Grenada’sglobal rank slipped in Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption in2009, relative to 2005. Moreover, the unchanged global rankings forGovernmentEffectivenessandRuleofLawcanbeinterpretedasevidencethat they have been no perceived improvements in the two areas duringthe review period. Grenada scored significantly below the average for the countriesintheECCUinallofthegovernanceindicatorsin2009,withthegapbeingparticularlywideinallindicatorswiththeexceptionofVoiceand


Accountability.TheslippagesinGrenada’spercentileranksforRegulatoryQuality,GovernmentEffectiveness,andControlofCorruptionaretakenasmoreevidenceinsupportofinterviewees’sentimentsthatinstitutionalandregulatorylimitationshamperbusinessactivity.

TheevidenceprovidedexposesthehighcostsofdoingbusinessinGrenada,withutilitiesandtransportationcostsbeingparticularlyexpensive. Thesecosts limit businesses’ ability to appropriate their investment returns.Moreover,importantaspectsoftheenablingenvironmentfordoingbusinessareweak.Theweakareasrelatetoregulation,enforcement,andconsistencybetween government’s policy and action, which hamper entrepreneurshipandinvestment.Therefore,weighingalltheevidence,governmentfailure(microrisks),cannotberuledoutasbeingabindingconstraintonprivateinvestmentandeconomicgrowthinGrenada.

Is Government Failure (Macro Risks) a Binding Constraint?

Themajorityofinterviewees(83%)expressedtheviewthatthemacroeconomicenvironmentisnotaproblemaffectingbusinessinvestment.Thefollowingareexamplesofsomeoftheresponses.‘Ithinkmacroeconomicmanagementis good’. Another expressed, ‘The Grenadian economy has not beenmismanagedtotheextentwhereithasimpactednegativelyoninvestmentflows.’ Another remarked, ‘I supposed with everything considered it is not terrible;wehavestabilityandpredictabilitytosomedegree.’Anotheradded,‘Ithinktherehasbeenanimprovementinthemacroeconomicmanagementofthecountry.’Therewasonedissentingview.Theintervieweecontended,‘TheGovernmentdoesnotreallymanagetheeconomy,insteaditstruggleswithadministrativematters.’

Quantitative data (Appendix 10) corroborate the majority view thatmacroeconomicmanagementisadequate.Grenadahasbeenabletoachievemoderate success in macroeconomic management. The country enjoysprice stability; the inflation rate has consistently been in the low single digits and has been on par with inflation rates in other countries in the ECCU. Further, there has been a narrowing in the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP up until the onset of the global economic and financial crisis in 2008, whichbuffeted theGrenadian economyandmost other economies in theCaribbean.Consequently,theGovernment’sdebtaspercentageofGDPhasgottenmoreburdensome.


While the extant fiscal and debt situation is a source of macro risk in Grenada, the resultsof furtherquantitativeanalysis reveal thatGrenada’shigh fiscal and debt positions do not crowd out domestic private investments. An examination of public finances shows that the fiscal deficit is generally financed by foreign borrowing. The bulk of Grenada’s debt (70%) is sourcedexternally.Moreover,domesticlendingtoboththeGovernmentandbusinesseshasbeenincreasing,althoughcredittotheGovernmenthasbeengrowingatafasterpace.Thedatashowthatcommercialbanks’lendingtotheGovernment and tobusinesses increasedat an annual average rateof15%and6%respectively,duringtheperiod2006-2010.

Basedonthequalitativeandquantitativeevidence,Grenada’smacroeconomicfundamentalsarebroadlyfavorableandsimilartoitsregionalcounterparts.Inflation is not an issue for the economy, as the country enjoys price stability, whichbodeswellforentrepreneurshipandinvestment.Theincreaseinthefiscal deficit and public debt in recent years is mainly as a consequence of a series of external shocks. Indeed, the trend analysis of the fiscal and debt data does not indicate chronic or entrenched fiscal indiscipline or mismanagement. While the fiscal deficits and public debt are high, there is littleevidencethattheycrowdoutprivateinvestments.Hence,basedonthediagnostics,Grenada’smacroeconomicenvironmentisruledoutasbeingabindingconstraintonprivateinvestmentandeconomicgrowth.

Is Market Failure (Low Self Discovery) a Binding Constraint?

Thequalitativeanalysis indicates thatGrenadahasaproblemof lowselfdiscovery.Theproblemisassociatedwith(a)limitedideas,innovation,andcreativity;(b)entrepreneurs’mindset;and(c)exportsophistication(orlackthereof).

There appears to be a prevailing lackof innovation, creativity and ideas,which hampers the production and export of high value-added products.One intervieweeasked, ‘Hasanyonecomeupwithanewidea tomakeadifferentspicebasket?’Accordingtoanother,‘Grenadianshaveacopy-catmentality.’Anotheropined,‘WhatwelackinGrenadaarethinkers,ideasarethemainthingthatislackinginGrenada.’

ItalsoappearsthatGrenadianentrepreneursaretimidandreluctanttotakerisks.Tosome,theconservativestancestemsfromanunpleasantpolitical


history.Accordingtooneinterviewee,‘Therearethosewhoarenotwillingtoinvestbecauseofpastpoliticalhistory;historyhasplayedagreatroleoverthe years in undermining people’s confidence.’ Another disclosed, ‘I would say that Grenadians are probably not entrepreneurial; they had the bitterexperiencefromgovernmentsontheleftandontherightthatexpropriatedpropertyfrompeople.’

With respect to export sophistication, the qualitative analysis exposesa general discontent with the level of science and technology used inproduction,andhenceexports.Oneintervieweeexplained,‘Oursupportforagriculture is not based on scientific commercial type agriculture. You cannot go to an Agricultural Extension Officer and ask him how to plan for a large scaleagribusinessenterprise;whathecantellyouishowtoplantcarrots.’Anotherstated,‘Grenadianbusinessesrelyalotonmanualproduction,inthe sense that they do not use technology sufficiently.’ Another lamented, ‘Wearelackinginappliedscienceandtechnology;wehavebeengrowingnutmegsfor160yearsandtodaywearedoingthesamethingaswedid160yearsago.’Quantitativedatacorroboratethegeneralviewoflowvalue-addedproductionandexports.Grenada’smerchandiseexportsaredominatedbyafewprimarycommodities.Grenada’stoptwocommodityexportsarecocoaandspices.Appendix11showstheextenttowhichGrenadaspecialisesincommoditiesthatarefacinggrowingdemandinworldmarkets.Grenada’stopcommodityexportsin20083aredividedintofourcategories:(i)achieversfacingstrongworlddemand(“winners”)-theseareproductsforwhichglobaldemandisexpanding and Grenada has increased its share in world exports of theseproducts;(ii)underachieversfacingstrongworlddemand-theseareproductsfacinggrowingglobaldemand,butGrenadahasnotbeenabletomaintainitsshareofthatmarket,eitherbecauseexportsoftheseproductshavedeclinedorhavebeengrowinglessrobustlythanworldtrade;(iii)achieversfacingweakworlddemand-theseareproductsforwhichGrenadahasbeenabletoincreaseitsmarketsharebutglobaldemandfortheseproductsisweak;and(iv)underachieversfacingweakworlddemand-theseareproductsthatfaceweakglobaldemand,andGrenadahasnotbeenabletomaintainitsshareinthesemarkets.

3ThelatestperiodforwhichdataareavailablefromtheUnitedNationsStatisticalDivision(2009).


AsAppendix11shows,Grenada’sexportbasketcontainsno“winners”.ThemajorityofGrenada’stopcommodityexportsareinsectorsforwhichglobaldemandisweak.Flouristheonlycommodityforwhichglobaldemandisstrong,butGrenadahasnotbeenabletomaintainahighshareofthatmarket.ThelargenumberofproductsinGrenada’sexportbasketisevidenceofthepresenceofstrongsupply-sideconstraintsthatimpedeproductionandexports,quiteapartfromdevastationtoagriculturalcommoditiesintheaftermathofHurricaneIvanin2004.ThelargenumberofproductsinGrenada’sexportbasketsfacingweakglobaldemandhascontributedtothedecliningvalueofGrenada’stotalcommodityexportstotheworld.Appendix12demonstratesthis.Appendix13showsthatGrenada’stotalcommodityexportsassharesoftotalcommodityexportsintheECCUandinthewiderCaribbeanwerethelowestin2008.Comparedwithitspeers,Grenadahadthelowestshareoftotalworldcommodityexportsandthelowestvalueoftotalcommodityexportsin2008.

FurtherquantitativeanalysisusingsectoraldatafromtheWorldDevelopmentIndicators (2011) shows that in the caseofmanufacturing, its percentagevalueaddedtoGDPdeclinedfromanaverageof6.2%inthe1990sto4.9%in2008. High-technologyexports (asapercentageof totalmanufacturedexports) fell from30.1%in2000 to10.9%in2010. Indeed, theanalysisinthesectionthatdealtwithmicrorisksshowedthatthecostofoperatingabusiness,especiallyofthemanufacturingtype,isexpensive.Highcosts,coupled with the dominance of small and medium-sized firms, place limits onmanufacturingactivity.

Regardingtheservicessector,nontourism-relatedservicesexportsgrewbyjust 0.6% on average during the period 2005-2009, suggesting that theseservicesare far frombeing fullydeveloped. Regarding tourismservices,theyaccountedfor70%oftotalservicesexportsin2010.Notwithstandingtourism’s significant contribution to the economy, there remains much room forgrowth.Indeed,themainmessagefromintervieweesisthatnotenoughisbeingdonetodevelopthetourismsector.Oneintervieweecommented,‘Ourmajorexportistourism,whenwasthelasttimewebuiltahotelofanydecentcapacity?’Anotherremarked,‘Weneedtheextraroomstogettheairlift;weonlyhave1500roomsontheisland.’Anothercommented,‘Grenadaisnottakingtourismseriously;thetourismauthorityisnotmarketingthecountry,theyarenotspendingthemoney,andtheyarenotdoingthethingsthatdonotcostanymoney.’


Tourism data show that tourism’s value added fell from 7% of GDPin 2000 to 5% of GDP in 2009. Regarding actual tourist arrivals to thecountry,Grenada’sshareoftotaltouristarrivalstotheCaribbeanhasbeenconsistently lower than some of its tourism-dependent peers, reflecting the factthatGrenada’stourismsectorisarelativelyyoungsector.Traditionally,Grenadahasbeenanagriculturally-basedeconomy.Nonetheless,Grenadahas been unable to increase its market share in total Caribbean arrivals.Grenada’sshareintotalCaribbeantouristarrivalsfellfrom0.63%in2000to0.51%in2009.

Based on the diagnostics exercise, there are four salient factors that allsuggestthatlowself-discoveryisabindingconstraintonGrenada’seconomicgrowth. First, there isahighconcentrationofcommoditiesandproductswith lowvalue-added and technology content,which limits the country’sexportearningsandpotential.Second,manyofGrenada’sexportsfaceweakglobaldemandandare in sectors thatarenot internationallycompetitive.Third,thereisagenerallackofinvestmentideas,creativityandinnovationinproduction,stemmingfromtimidandrisk-averseentrepreneurs.Fourth,services exports are not well developed. For these reasons, low self-discoverycannotberuledoutasabindingconstraintonprivateinvestmentandeconomicgrowthinGrenada.

Tosumup,basedontheresultsofthequalitative,quantitative,anddocumentanalyses that underpinned the growth diagnostics exercise, the bindingconstraintsoneconomicgrowthinGrenadaare(a)inadequatehumancapital(both quality and quantity), (b) chronic deficiencies in the institutional frameworkthatweakentheenablingenvironmentforbusinessactivity,(c)highcostofbusinessoperations,and(d)lowself-discovery.Finance(thecostofandaccessto)isnotfoundtobeabindingconstraintoneconomicgrowth at the macro level, but some micro enterprises have difficulties securing financing from commercial banks.

DiscussionOfFindings

Regarding access to, and cost of finance, one conclusion that can be drawn from the first finding is that there is asymmetry in banks’ lending activity. Fromtheevidencepresented, itappears thatbanksprefer to lend to largeenterprises,whilemicroenterprises,althoughpredominantnumerically,do


not get enough bank loans. The evidence does not indicate inefficiencies in the financial system. Indeed, it appears that financial intermediation is adequate, to the extent that depositors’ funds are efficiently channelled to themajorityofbusinesses,especiallythelargeenterprises.Itispossiblethatbanksdeemtherisksinvolvedinlendingtomicrobusinesstobetoohighinthecontextwheresomemicrobusinessownerslackbasicbusinessacumentoensuretheviabilityoftheirenterprise.

Another conclusion that can be drawn from the first finding is that the supply of bank financing, on a macro level, is not constrained. However, this type of financing is not best suited to the needs of micro enterprises. In the situation whereaplethoraofhurdlesinthebusinessenvironmentcaneasilyunderminethe sustainabilityofmicroenterprises, it is reasonable toexpectbanks todiscriminate in their lending activities. Nonetheless, such discriminationcan introduce distortions in the process of selecting investment projects.Rodrik(2007)warnedthatwheredistortionsarerampant,theypreventthebest use of an economy’s resources and keep the economy far below itsattainableproductivity frontier. In thecontextofGrenada, it isplausiblethatasymmetriesinbanklendingpracticescouldbeintroducingdistortionsintheselectionprocessofinvestmentprojects,whichcouldbecontributingtotheunderperformanceofsomemicroenterprises.

On Grenada’s infrastructure, it is noteworthy that participants who arebusiness owners and/or managers represented companies throughout thelengthandbreadthofthecountry.Hence,itisnotthecasethatparticipantsonly represented enterprises in areas of the country where infrastructureis not an issue. A primary conclusion that can be drawn from the finding is that the various infrastructure components (roads, ports, utilities, andtelecommunications) are sufficiently developed throughout the county and do not currently require significant upgrade and renewal in order to spur businessactivity.

The third finding is that high operating costs coupled with a weak enabling business environment are binding constraints on private investment andeconomic growth in Grenada. A conclusion that can be drawn from thefinding on Grenada is that if private investments cannot be adequately protectedandtheappropriabilityofinvestmentreturnscannotbeguaranteed,economicdecisionswillbeadverselyaffected,obstructinginvestmentand


entrepreneurship.Regarding themacroeconomicenvironment,even if thequalitative and quantitative evidence suggests that the high fiscal deficits and publicdebtarenotbindingconstraintsonprivateinvestmentandeconomicgrowth in Grenada, this ought not to be taken for granted. If Grenada’shighpublicdebtcontinuestoincreaseunabated,thefutureofthecountry’seconomic growth and development could be undermined. It is thereforecritical for the Government to continue pursuing sound macroeconomicpolicies to keep fiscal deficits and the public debt at sustainable levels to supportprivateinvestmentandeconomicgrowth.

Indeed, the quality of a country’s human capital stock is difficult to measure quantitatively.Forthatreason,thisstudydrawsheavilyontheresponsesofbusinessownerswhomanageworkersonadailybasisandare,therefore,wellplacedtospeaktotheissueofthequalityofhumancapitalintheworkforce.ThereisevidencethatthecurrentavailabilityandskilfulnessofGrenada’shuman capital impede businesses from fully maximising returns on theirinvestments. A conclusion that can be drawn from the Grenada finding is thathighratesofschoolenrolmentdonotautomaticallytranslateintohighqualityof education, andbyextension,highqualityofhumancapital. ArelatedconclusionisthatpotentpoliciesarerequiredtoaddressthequalityvacuuminGrenada’shumancapitaltobettersupporteconomicactivity.

Finally,itappearsthattheuncompetitivenatureofGrenada’sexportslimitsthecountry’sexportearningsand,asaconsequence,constrainsitseconomicgrowth. A major conclusion that can be drawn from the final finding is that Grenadashouldfocusonatechnology-imbuedexport-ledgrowthstrategy,geared at promoting innovative activities and productive diversification.

Recommendations

To address the binding constraints on economic growth in Grenada, thefollowingarerecommended.

TheGovernmentshoulddevelopacomprehensivehumanresourcestrategytoguidethedevelopmentofthecountry’shumancapitaloverthemediumterm.Thehumanresourcedevelopmentstrategyshouldhaveatitscore,education,training,skillsenhancement,andprofessionaldevelopment. Thestrategyshouldalsofocusoninculcatingacultureof learningaswellas inspiring


amindsetchangethatembracesandentrenchesteamwork.Ultimately,thehumanresourcedevelopmentstrategyshouldresult inacompetent,agile,productive,andpurposiveworkforcewiththerelevantknowledgeandskillstoproducegoodsandservicesthatarecompetitive.

It is also recommended that policymakers in the Government andstakeholdersintheprivatesectorworkcloselytogethertodesignindustry-relevanttrainingprogramstoimprovetheschool-to-worktransition,sothatgraduates can be more readily employed and be more productive, whileemployed. Programmess shouldalsocater tomid-career trainingaswellastoharnessandnurtureimportanthumanresourcequalities,suchasworkethicandcreativity.Structuredandresults-orientedapprenticeshipsshouldbeanintegralpartofthetrainingprograms.Further,theGovernmentshouldinstitutionalisetheestablishmentofindustry-run,governmentco-sponsoredtraining centers in critical industries such as tourism, manufacturing,construction and agriculture to develop the skills of workers as well asmanagerialstaff.Toaddressthemigrationissue,thehighratesofemigration,whichwasonceviewedascausingabraindrain,shouldnowbeviewedasa‘brainsbank’.TheGovernmentshouldtapintoitsDiaspora‘brainsbank’with the view to incentivising (through appropriate facilitation policies)Grenadians to return to thecountry toestablishbusinessesand/orpartnerwith local entrepreneurs. The Government’s return facilitation policiesshouldtargetthemosteducatedandskilledfromtheDiaspora.

Tofomentafavorableclimateforbusinessactivity,aformalandstructuredmechanism for dialogue between policymakers in the Government andstakeholdersintheprivatesectorshouldbeestablished.Oneobjectiveofthe high-level public-private arrangement would be to achieve consensusonreformstoimprovethebusinessenvironment. ThemechanismshouldhaveahighlevelofcommitmentfromtheGovernmentresultingincompleteandtimelyimplementationofdecisions.TheGovernmentshoulddeepenitsongoingreformagendaandstepupitseffortsatreducingbureaucracy,rep-tape, and other difficulties involved in starting or operating a business. The Governmentshouldalsoexertmoreeffortatsimplifyingbusinessprocessesandtaxstructures,ensuringthatbusinesslawsarerelevantforthemoderntimesandenforcingitsownpoliciesinatransparentandcoherentmanner.Therulesthatguidetheconductofbusinessactivityshouldbeunequivocallyandeffectivelyenforced.Additionally,theGovernmentshouldtakeamore


proactiveapproachtowardsattractingforeigndirectinvestmenttostimulateproductive transformation and dynamism through new areas that couldenhanceGrenada’s comparative advantage. Investments in areas such asadventure tourism, cultural tourism, rehabilitation tourism, large-scalehigh-techagro-processing,geothermalenergyandoilexplorationshouldbeactivelyandstrategicallypursued.

To address the problem of low self-discovery, the Government shouldstrategically intervene in certain sectors where there are underexploitedopportunities. This should be done with the aim of increasing thecompetitivenessofexistingproductsand,byextension, thesophisticationofGrenada’s export basket. Basedon feedback from interviewees, therearetremendousopportunitiesintheagriculturesector,especiallytheagro-processing and fishing subsectors. The Government should therefore set medium-to-longtermtargetsforincreasedvalue-addedfromtheproductionof nutmegs, cocoa, herbs, spices and marine products within the contextof a comprehensive National Development Strategy. Furthermore, it isalso recommended that the Government include as part of the curriculaofprimaryandsecondary schools, coursesgeared towardsunlockinganddevelopingtheinnovativeandcreativetalentsofstudents.Coursesshouldalsobedesignedtoinfuseandnurtureanentrepreneurialspiritinstudents.Theobjectiveofsuchaninterventionwouldbeto laythefoundationthatwouldengenderaninnovativeandcreativebusinesscultureinthefuture.Asstudentsgraduatetheywouldbemoreinclinedtostarttheirownbusinesses,usinginnovativeandcreativeideastodevelopnewproductsandservices,whichcanbecompetitivelyexported.

Although finance is not found to be a binding constraint on growth, the issue of access to commercial bank finance is a problem for some micro enterprises. In this regard, commercial banks should consider tailoringfinancial products to better suit the needs and repayment capacity of entrepreneurs who own micro enterprises. Implementing flexibility in the currentstructureofloanstomicroenterpriseshasthepotentialtoincreasethe accessibility of commercial bank financing by many more entrepreneurs, atlowercost. Commercialbanksshouldworkcloselywithentrepreneursto incorporate adequate flexibility in loan contracts. For example, to better meettheneedsofasmallretailerwhocaterstothetourismindustry,loancontracts can reflect pre-specified reduced payments during periods of sloweconomicactivity,suchasduringthetourismoff-season.Asanother


example, loan contracts can reflect pre-specified reduced payments for farmers during the dry season when production levels are low. Reducedpaymentsshouldbenegotiatedwithunambiguousrulesoutlined.Equallyimportant, theGovernmentshouldconsiderrevampingandrefocusingtheGrenada Development Bank, with a view to mainstreaming microfinance. Tothisend,theGovernmentshouldencouragetheamalgamationofmicroenterpriseswiththeviewtocreatingaGrenadianversionofasmallbusinessesconglomerate.Entrepreneursinsimilaractivitiesshouldbeencouragedtoconsolidateresourcesandexpertise.

Itisimportanttounderscorethatthepolicyrecommendationsareintendedasalistofoptions,groundedinrobustanalysis,whichtheGovernmentofGrenadaandstakeholdersintheprivatesectorcancontemplateindevelopinganagendaforhighandsustainedeconomicgrowth.Thesequencingofpolicyreformsisbeyondthescopeofthisstudy.PolicymakersintheGovernmentand stakeholders in the private sector must decide on the sequencing ofreformsinthecontextoflimitedresourcesandcompetingdemands.

Conclusion

This research addressed the problem of constrained economic growth inGrenada. Thegrowthdiagnostics indicate that thebindingconstraintsoneconomic growth in Grenada are; (a) poor quality of human capital, (b)weak enabling environment for business activity, (c) high business costs,and(d)lowinnovationandcreativityinproduction.Theresearchwasdonetobroadentheunderstandingofwhatthebindingconstraintsoneconomicgrowthare,sothattargetedcorrectivepoliciescouldbedesignedthatwouldaccelerategrowth tobreak thechainsofpoverty. Acceleratingeconomicgrowthrequiresa teameffort thatbringstogether individuals,enterprises,andtheGovernment.Inthisregard,recommendationstoaddressthebindingconstraintsoneconomicgrowthwereofferedtotheGovernmentofGrenadaaswellasstakeholdersintheprivatesector.


APPENDIX

Appendix1:Grenada’sRealGDPGrowth:1980-2010

Appendix2:InterviewQuestions4

Maininterviewquestion:Whatdoyouthinkarethekeyconstraint(s)oneconomicgrowthinGrenada?

Follow-upquestions:1. What are your views on the cost of, and access to, finance? 2. What are your views on the quality of infrastructure in the

country?3. What are your views on the quality of human capital in the

country?4. Whatareyourviewsonthebusinessandinvestmentclimate?5. Whatareyourviewsontherisksinvolvedininvesting?6. What are the main challenges to higher productivity and

competivenessofbusiness?Why?7. Whatareyourviewsonthemacroeconomicenvironment?

4InterviewswereconductedduringtheperiodApril26-30,2011.


8. In your view, what are the key encumbrances to exports andimports?

9. Isiteasyforbusinessestointroducenewproducts?Whatarethekeyimpedimentstobusinessexpansion?

Appendix3:GrowthDiagnosticsFramework


Appendix4:Hausmannetal’s(2008)ConstraintsMatrix

Appendix5:InterestRateSpreadsinGrenadaandtheECCU


Appendix6:ExternalSourcesofFinancing

Note.DatafromWorldDevelopmentIndicators(2011).TheWorldBank’sdefinitions of the variables are as follows. Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy otherthan that of the investor. Net official development assistance consists of disbursementsofloansmadeonconcessionalterms(netofrepaymentsofprincipal) and grants by official agencies and multilateral institutions to promote economic development and welfare in countries. Total externaldebtisdebtowedtononresidentsrepayableinforeigncurrency,goods,orservices.Remittancesarecurrenttransfersbymigrantswhoareemployedorintendtoremainemployedformorethanayearinanothereconomyinwhichtheyareconsideredresidents.

Appendix7:TotalCredittoBusinesses


Appendix8:TelecommunicationsInfrastructure

Appendix9:GovernanceIndicatorsforGrenadaandtheECCU,PercentileRank

Note. Data from the World Bank Governance Report (2009). Data arereported in percentile rank term, ranging from 0 (lowest rank) to 100(highestrank).Higherrankscorrespondtobettergovernance(WorldBank’sGovernanceReport,2009).


Appendix10:SelectedMacroeconomicIndicatorsinGrenadaandtheECCU

(PeriodAverages)

Note. Data from the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (2011). The fiscal deficit is the difference between government revenue and expenditure. A minussignimpliesthatexpenditureexceedsrevenue.The central government is defined as all entities of government except statutory corporations. Inflation is defined as the year on year percentage changeintheconsumerpriceindex.

Appendix11:CompetitivenessofGrenada’sTopCommodityExports(2006-2008)


Appendix12:ValueofGrenada’sTotalCommodityExportstotheWorld

Appendix13:TotalCommodityExportsin2008

Note.DatasourcedfromtheUnitedNations’StatisticalDivision(2011).TotalECCU commodity export is defined as the aggregated value of the exports of allcommoditiesbyeachoftheECCUcountriescontainedinUnitedNations’TradeStatisticsDatabase:UNCOMTRADE. TotalCaribbeancommodityexport is defined as the aggregated value of all commodities exports by each CaribbeancountrycontainedinUNCOMTRADE.Totalworldcommodityexport is defined as the aggregated value of the exports of all commodities byeachofthe192countriescontainedinUNCOMTRADE.


References

Armendariz,E.,Baena,P.,Jessen,A.,Shearer,M.,Schneider,C.andBristol,M. (2007),‘IdentifyingBindingConstraintstoGrowthinGuyana.’ ReportNo.GY-P1030.April2011 http://www.iadb.org/research/redirect/pub_desc.cfm?pub_id=CSI-157.Artana,D.,Auguste,S.,Moya,R.,Sookram,S.andWatson,P.(2007), ‘TrinidadandTobago:EconomicGrowthinaDualEconomy.’Inter- AmericanDevelopmentBank.April2011 http://www.iadb.org/research/redirect/pub_desc.cfm?pub.CaribbeanDevelopmentBank.(2009),‘CountryStrategyforGrenada.’Report No.24/09-BD.CaribbeanDevelopmentBank.April2011 http://www.caribank.org/titanweb/cdb/webcms.nsf/AllDoc/D1FB2DA9 6EA296780425765F0071F8E3?OpenDocument.Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. (2011), ‘Monetary Statistics.’ [Data file]. EasternCaribbeanCentralBank.Enders,K.(2007),‘Egypt-SearchingforBindingConstraintsonGrowth.’ InternationalMonetaryFund.WorkingPaperWP/07/57:1-32.Dixit,A.(2007),‘EvaluatingRecipesforDevelopmentSuccess.’The World Bank Research Observer,22(2):131-157.doi:10.1093/wbro/lkm005.Felipe,J.andUsui,N.(2008),‘RethinkingtheGrowthDiagnosticsApproach: QuestionsfromthePractitioners.’AsianDevelopmentBank.April 2011www.adb.org/.../Papers/Growth-Diagnostics/growth-diagnostics pdf.ForeignInvestmentAdvisoryService.(2004),‘Grenada:ADiagnosticReviewof theInvestmentClimate.’April2011 http://www.siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Chap3_bc kgr_Grenada_Invest_Climate.pdf.GrenadaIndustrialDevelopmentCorporation.(2011),‘WhyGrenada?’Grenada IndustrialDevelopmentCorporation.April2011 http://www.grenadaworld.com/WhyGrenada/tabid/60/Default.aspx.Hausmann,R.andKlinger,B.(2007),‘GrowthDiagnostics:Belize.’April 2011http://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/cid/publications.Hausmann,R.,Klinger,B.andWagner,R.(2008),‘DoingGrowthDiagnostics inPractice:AMindBook.’CenterforInternationalDevelopmentat HarvardUniversity.CIDWorkingPaperNo.177:1-101.Hausmann,R.andRodrik,D.(2006),‘DoomedtoChoose:IndustrialPolicyas Predicament.’April2011 www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/drodrik/Research%20papers/doomed.pdf.Hausmann,R.,Rodrik,D.andVelasco,A.(2005),‘GrowthDiagnostics.’In DaniRodrik,OneEconomics,ManyRecipes:Globalisation,Institutions andEconomicGrowth,56-84.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.


KAIRIConsultantsLimited.(2008),‘Finalreportcountrypovertyassessment: Grenada,CarriacouandPetitMartinique.’April2011 http://www.caribank.org/titanweb/cdb/webcms.nsf/AllDoc/D1FB2DA9 6EA296780425765F0071F8E3?OpenDocument.Misch,F.,Gemmell,N.andKneller,R.(2010),‘IsDealingwithGrowth ConstraintsaSecond-bestPolicyStrategy?EvidencefromEndogenous GrowthModelswithPublicFinance.’April2011 www.hks.harvard.edu//Growth%20diagnostics%20papers/Misch%20bin ding%20constraints.pdf.Rodrik,D.(2007),‘FiftyYearsofGrowth(andlackthereof):AnInterpretation.’ InDaniRodrik,OneEconomicsManyRecipes:Globalisation,InstitutionsandEconomicGrowth,13-55.Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress.Temple,J.(2009),‘OneEconomics,ManyRecipes:Globalisation,Institutions andEconomicGrowth.Review3.’The Economic Journal, 119(535):224.230.doi:10.1111/1467-8586.00103.UnitedNationsStatisticalDivision.(2009),‘NationalAccountsStatistics.’ [Data file]. United Nations Statistical Division. WorldDevelopmentIndicators.(2011),‘WorldDevelopmentIndicators.’[Data file]. World Bank. WorldBank.(2011),DoingBusiness2011:Grenada–MakingaDifferencefor Entrepreneurs.’March2012http://www.doingbusiness.org.WorldBank(2011),‘JamaicaCountryEconomicMemorandum:Unlocking EconomicGrowth.’ReportNo.60374-JM.January2012http:// worldbank.org/WorldBank.(2009),‘WorldwideGovernanceIndicators:CountyDataReport forGrenada,1996-2009.’April2011http://www.govindicators.org.


Contributors

WinsomeChunnu-Brayda (Ph.D) – is the Assistant Director, Office of MulticulturalPrograms/MulticultrualCenter,OhioUniversity,USA.

Ronnie Brathwaite – is a Doctoral Student at the China AgriculturalUniversityinBeijingP.R.ChinaandtheManagerofAgriculturalServicesof the Barbados Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation(BADMC),BARBADOS

KariGrenade(Ph.D)–isanEconomistwhoiscurrentlyemployedwiththeCaribbeanDevelopmentBank(CDB),BARBADOS.

Liu Yonggong – is a Professor in Development Studies, College ofHumanitiesandDevelopment,ManagingDirectorofCenterof IntegratedAgricultural Development (CIAD) at China Agricultural University inBeijing,CHINA.

Vol. 37, No. 2 June 2012, pp. 85-87

ANNOUNCEMENT&CALLFORPAPERS

14th Annual SALISES ConferenceCave Hill Campus, BARBADOS

Monday, April 22 – Wednesday, April 24, 2013“Towards a New Development Paradigm for the Caribbean:

The Next 50 Years”Celebrating 50 Years of UWI Cave Hill

AstheCaveHillCampusoftheUniversityofWestIndiescelebratesits50thanniversary (1963-2013) of making a contribution to the development ofBarbadosandtheCaribbeanRegion,theSirArthurLewisInstituteofSocialandEconomicStudies(SALISES)atCaveHilljoinsthecelebrationwithitshostingofthe14thAnnualSALISESconferenceinBarbadosfromApril22toApril24,2013.

The conference, spread over three days during the University’s semesterbreak,linksthecelebrationofpastachievementswiththeanticipationofanewparadigmforthefuturedevelopmentoftheregion.Itisclearlyfocusedonthefuturewithitstheme:“Towards a New Development Paradigm for the Caribbean: The Next 50 Years”and,likealightrisingoutoftheWest(Oriens ex Occidente Lux), the contributions should bring enlightenmenttopolicymakers andall thosewhoneed tomakeanewway topull ourCaribbeancountriesoutofthemorassofdebt,economicandsocialhardshipand the general malaise that have been afflicting our countries particularly sincethe2008globaleconomiccrisiscompoundedtheeffectsofthewindsofchangefromthe“new”globalisation.

Thisconference takes itspointofdeparture from thecontributionsof theSALISES 50/50 conference of 2012 which was focused on “reflections.” Those reflections should now assist us in charting a path forward in a


fundamentallynewway.Thesub-themesofthisconferencecoverthesocial,economic andpolitical issues thatmust be thoroughly examined inordertomovebeyond theband-aid approach to that of radical surgery and thecauterisation of social and economic wounds for healing. Contributionsare welcome from all areas pertaining to development and persons areencouragedtoestablishorparticipateinpanels.Thesub-themesarelistedbelow.

Sub-Themes:

1. Contributions to Caribbean Development Thought: Sir Arthur Lewis; Pre and Post Lewis

2. Debt Crises and Public Sector Fiscal Deficit Issues in theCaribbean

3. IMF,WorldBankandWTO–InfluenceoftheMultilateralsintheCaribbean

4. Trade, Industrial Policy and Competitiveness in the Caribbean5. Private Sector Development, SMEs and Microfinance in a

Development Context 6. Strategies for Agriculture, Manufacturing, Tourism and

International Business Sectors7. Regional Integration and Caribbean Economic and Social

Development 8. CSME, Sovereignty and Governance Issues 9. Environment, Alternative Energy, the Green Economy and

Sustainability10. Education, Technology and Change11. Health, HIV and Dimensions of Poverty in the Caribbean12. Caribbean Social Policy in a Globalised World13. Gender and Power in Caribbean Development14. Media, Representation, Identity, History and Culture15. Crime, Illegal Substances, Justice and Security.

Announcements&CallforPapers-SALISES14thAnnualConference 87

SUBMISSIONOFFULLPAPERS

ThedeadlineforsubmissionoffullpapersisMarch15,2013.ThepapersshouldbesubmittedelectronicallyinPDFformat.

AselectnumberofpaperswillbeconsideredforpublicationinoneofthepeerreviewedSALISESjournals(SES,JECS).

Forfurtherinformationontheconference,visitourwebsite:www.cavehill.uwi.edu/salises.


JournalofEasternCaribbeanStudies(JECS)CallforPapers:

Introducing‘JournalofEasternCaribbeanStudies(JECS)’

The Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies publishes high-quality articlesfromarangeofdisciplinesandfromtrans-disciplinaryperspectives,whichseek to answer questions relevant to the experience of small states andEasternCaribbeanCountries. Particularattentionwillbegiven topapersthatseektocompareexperiences,withinandacrossregions.

AllarticlespublishedinJECSwillbepeer-reviewed.Thefollowingtypesofpapersareconsideredforpublication:

• Originalarticlesinbasicandappliedresearch.• Criticalreviews,surveys,opinions,commentariesandessays.

Our objective is to inform authors of the decision on their manuscript(s)within six (6) weeks of submission. Following acceptance, a paper willnormallybepublishedinthenextissue.Pleasefollowguidelinesassetoutunder“InformationforContributors”

SamplesofPastEssaysPublishedinJECS:

Vol.31No.4December2006VoterTurnoutinCaribbeanDemocraciesBy Scot Schraufnagel and Barbara Sgnouraki

AspectsoftheCaribbeanSingleMarketandEconomy:HowIntegratedareRegionalStockMarkets?By Justin Robinson

Vol.32No.3September2007TheImpactofAgingonPrivateSavingsintheEasternCaribbeanCurrencyUnionBy Kari Grenade and Winston Moore

CallforPapers 89

Vol.33No.1March2008LoveforMas:StateAuthorityandCarnivalDevelopmentinSanFernando,TrinidadBy Gabrielle Jamela Hosien

Vol.34No.1March2009Socio-economicDeterminantsofInfantandChildMortalityinHaitiBy Ronald M. Gordon

MediaAccountsoftheIntegrationsandSettlementof‘Island’ImmigrantsinAnglophoneCaribbeanBy Carl E. James

Vol.35No.2June2010GenderDynamicsandApproachestoSexualityasaKeytoWell-BeingBy Annecka Marshall, Sajoya Alcott and Lorna Eaton

SamplesofPastSpecialIssuespublishedinJECS:

Vol.29No.2June2004-TourismintheCaribbean:Image,DiscourseandProduct

Vol.33No.2June2008-TheCARIFORUM-EUEconomicPartnershipAgreement

Vol.33No.4December2008-GenderandEconomicsintheCaribbean

Vol.34No.4December2009 -Commemorating theAnniversaryof theConfermentoftheNoblePrizeinEconomicstoSirArthurLewis

Vol.35Nos.3&4September/December2011–GrenadaRevolution:(30)YearsAfter

Editorial Staff

Editor-in-Chief Dr. Judy WhiteheadManaging Editor Dr. Don MarshallPublications Secretary Ms. Jacqueline Thompson (Ag)

Editorial Advisory Board

Prof. Sir Hilary Beckles UWI, Cave Hill Campus, BarbadosProf. Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner City College of New York, USAProf. Sir Howard Fergus Former Resident Tutor and Head, UWI, School of Continuing Studies,

Montserrat

Editorial Committee

Prof. Eudine Barriteau Institute of Gender and Development Studies, UWI, Cave Hill Campus,Barbados

Mrs. Cynthia Barrow-Giles Faculty of Social Sciences, UWI, Cave Hill Campus, BarbadosProf. Curwen Best Faculty of Humanities and Education, UWI, Cave Hill Campus,

BarbadosMiss Beverley Hinds Documentalist, SALISES, UWI, Cave Hill Campus, BarbadosProf. Nlandu Mamingi Faculty of Social Sciences, UWI, Cave Hill Campus, BarbadosMr. Ivan Waterman Consultant, Barbados

The Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies (JECS) is the leading social science journal covering theEastern Caribbean area. It is published quarterly by the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and EconomicStudies, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, in March, June, September and December.Established in 1975 as the Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs, it was upgraded to a full peer reviewacademic journal from Volume 22, 1997. The JECS is concerned with critical and methodological

Subscription Rates are: Barbados BDS$115.00 rep volume BDS$29.00 per issueCaribbean US$82.00 rep volume US$21.00 per issueInternational rep volume US$27.00 per issue

Air Mail by special arrangement

All enquiries should be directed to Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies, Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Socialand Economic Studies, University of the West Indies, P.O. Box 64, Bridgetown, Barbados: Tel: (246) 417-4478:Fax (246) 424-7291: Email: [email protected]. Website: http://www.cavehill.uwi.edu/salises

Cover design by Selwyn Cambridge.

© 2012 All rights reserved.Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies, UWI, Cave Hill Campus, Barbados

ISSN: 1028-8813

Dr. Len Ishmael Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, St. LuciaProf. Simon Jones-Hendrickson University of the Virgin Islands, St. Thomas, USVIProf. Andy Knight University of Alberta, CanadaSir Alister McIntyre Former Vice Chancellor, UWI, JamaicaProf. Bishnodat Persaud Former Director, UWI, Centre for

Environment Development, JamaicaProf. Robert Potter University of Reading, United KingdomProf. Rhoda Reddock UWI,

Trinidad & TobagoProf. Selwyn Ryan SALISES, UWI, St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad & TobagoSir Dwight Venner Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, St. Kitts and NevisDr. DeLisle Worrell Governor, Central Bank of Barbados

Institute of Gender and Development Studies,

inquiries into the political, social, economical, business and environmental challenges of Eastern Caribbeancountries and small states.

US$105.00

Information for Contributors

Presentation

Most articles submitted for publication should be less than 9000 words, with an abstract of no more than 100 words, setting out the main concerns and findings along with key words of the article. Authors should submit:

a. Two copies of manuscripts including references, with double-spaced typing on one side of each page only; andb. Brief biographical notes with full name and associated organisation, on a separate pagec. A copy of the article electronically in Microsoft Word.

It is assumed that authors will keep a copy of their paper. Address all communications and manuscript submissions to: The Managing Editor, Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies, Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies, UWI, Cave Hill Campus, BARBADOS. The telephone number is (246) 417-4478, and the fax number is (246) 424-7291. Upon acceptance of an article for publication contributors should again submit a copy electronically in Microsoft Word when all final alterions have been made from referees report.

Copyright

Contributors are reminded that the articles are accepted with the understanding that they do not in any way infringe on any existing copyright, and further, that the contributor or contributors will indemnify the publisher regarding any such breach. By submitting their manuscript, the authors agree that the exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute their articles have been given to the Publishers, including reprints, photographic reproductions, microfilm or any other similar reproductions.

Refereeing of Articles

All articles submitted to the Journal will be anonymously reviewed to determine their suitability for publication.The final decision regarding publication rests with the Editorial Committee. Unaccepted articles will not bereturned.

REFERENCES

References to other publications should be cited thus:a. References to articles:

Author’s name (last name followed by initials or first names); the year of publication in brackets; the title of the article (in single quotation marks); the name of the publication (in italics); volume number; issue number (in brackets) followed by a colon; then the page numbers. For an article in a newspaper:The name of the newspaper; the year (in brackets); the title of the article (in single quotation marks); the day and month (in brackets) followed by a colon; then the page number (s).

b. References to books, monographs or reports:Author’s name (last name followed by initials or first names); the year of publication in brackets; the titleof the book (in italics); place of publication (followed by a colon); name of publisher; page numbers ifappropriate.

Please do not abbreviate the titles of journals and the names of publishers.

CHARTS, DIAGRAMS, FIGURES AND TABLES

We prefer essays that can incorporate empirical findings in the overall discussion, rather than an excessive reliance on graphs, tables or appendices. If necessary, we would wish that these be kept to a minimum and be submitted on separate sheets of paper. Please be reminded however of the difficulties associated with reproducing such for our readership.

The Editorial staff reserves the right to make any corrections or alterations considered necessary. Authors willreceive two complimentary copies of the Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies.

JOURNALOF EASTERNCARIBBEAN

STUDIES

Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies

Vol. 37, N

o. 2, June 2012

Vol. 37, No. 2, June 2012

CONTENTS

Articles Page

Deconstructing the Barbados Agricultural Policy Process,Convergence and Divergence between Government andSmall farmers

Ronnie E. Brathwaite and Yonggong Liu 1

Querying Top-Down, Bottom-Up Implementation Guidelines:Education Policy Implementation in Jamaica

Winsome Chunnu-Brayda 24

On Growth Diagnostics and GrenadaKari H. Grenade 46

Contributors 84

Announcement and Call for Papers SALISES 14th 85Annual Conference

Call for Papers - JECS 88