Journal of Islamic Studies 2006 Belo 177 99

Journal of Islamic Studies 17:2 (2006) pp 177–199 doi:10.1093/jis/etl022

AVERROES ON GOD’S KNOWLEDGE

OF PARTICULARS

CATARINA BELOUniversity of Cologne

Averroes (d. 1198) expounds his views on God’s knowledge ofparticulars in a response to al-Ghazz:l;’s criticism in Tah:fut al-fal:sifa(The Incoherence of the Philosophers), and addresses a central issue inthe debate between theologians (mutakallim �un) and philosophers withinIslam. In his attempt to show that Greek philosophy was incompatiblewith Islam, theologian al-Ghazz:l; charged Muslim philosopherswith unbelief (kufr) on three counts: the eternity of the world, bodilyresurrection, and God’s knowledge of particulars. According to him thephilosophers could not prove that God knows the particulars of Hiscreation or even Himself. The issue of God’s knowledge of particularswas particularly significant within an Islamic context. According to theQur’:n God knows not only Himself but also all individuals. Otherwise,how can He know for instance individual prophets or pass judgement onDoomsday? Averroes’ task is to show that philosophy, more specificallyAristotle’s philosophy, does provide an answer to the problem that iscompatible with Islam.

His response stands squarely in the Aristotelian philosophicaltradition. His Aristotelian affiliation is evinced by an endorsement ofAristotle’s fundamental conception of God as Prime Mover andIntellect—its principal activity consisting in thinking itself—expressedin such works as the Physics and the Metaphysics. This conception is alsoshared by such Muslim philosophers as Alfarabi (d. 950) and Avicenna(d. 1037). On the other hand his concern with divine providence andthe underlying theory of God’s omnipotence is best understood withinthe context of Islamic theology, although it had been discussed byHellenistic philosophers such as Alexander of Aphrodisias.

In his treatment of the topic, Averroes is aware of earlier theologicaland philosophical discussions. The main target of al-Ghazz:l;’s criticismwas Avicenna. Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars,specifically his contention that God knows particulars in a universalway, a formulation which triggered al-Ghazz:l;’s criticism, has been

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frequently discussed in recent scholarship.1 Averroes’ response on theother hand has received less attention than might be expected, given thathe devotes several chapters of Tah:fut al-Tah:fut to it.

In what follows I begin with an exposition of Avicenna’s conceptionof God’s knowledge in general and more specifically His knowledge ofparticulars. I go on to expound Ghazz:l;’s criticism of Avicenna’s theory,as well as the appraisal of that theory in modern scholarship. Finally,I give an account of Averroes’ treatment of this topic and examine theeffectiveness of his response to al-Ghazz:l;.

AVICENNA’S CONCEPTION OFGOD’S KNOWLEDGE

God is conceived by Avicenna not only as the necessary being andcause of all causes, but also as pure intellect and pure activity. God, whois Himself identified with intellect and thought, is permanently active.2

An important distinction between thought and matter is thatmatter is bound to extension (it occupies space, and can be divided),

1 One study explicitly devoted to Averroes’ theory of God’s knowledge ofparticulars, based on Latin translations of his works, is Manser’s ‘Die gottlicheErkenntnis der Einzelndinge und die Vorsehung bei Averroes’, Jahrbuch furPhilosophie und spekulativ Theologie, 23 (1909) 1–29. (This paper has beenreprinted in Islamic Philosophy, vol. 62: Ab �u l-Wal;d MuAammad ibn Rushd,Texts and Studies I, Tah:fut al-Tah:fut and General Topics (collected and repr.by Fuat Sezgin, with Mazen Amawi, Carl Ehrig-Eggert, Eckhard Neubauer;Frankfurt-am-Main: Publications of the Institute for the History of Arabic–Islamic Science, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, 1999), 143–71.) Manserholds that Averroes never denied that God knows particulars, although sucha denial was attributed to Latin Averroism. A more recent study of Tah:futal-tah:fut by Maiza Ozcoidi offers an overview of recent opinions on Averroes’response. According to her, both Barry Kogan (Averroes and the Metaphysicsof Causation (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1985), 230) and Therese-Anne Druart(‘Averroes on God’s knowledge of being qua being’ Anaquel de Estudios Arabes(Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 5), 1994, 48) call into question the effectivenessof Averroes’ case for God’s knowledge of particulars: see La Concepcion de laFilosofıa en Averroes: Analisis del Tahafut al-tahafut (Trotta: Madrid, 2001),231–40. Maiza Ozcoidi argues that according to Averroes God does knowparticulars, but in a way that is inaccessible to human understanding. See also:Iysa A. Bello, The Medieval Islamic Controversy between Philosophy andOrthodoxy: Ijma6 and Ta8wil in the Conflict between al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd,(Leiden: Brill, 1989), 111–25.

2 Avicenna (eds. C. C. Anawati, S. Dunya and S. Zayd, revised and introd.I. Madk �ur), al-Shif:8, al-Il:hiyy:t (Cairo: al-Hay8a al-62mma li-Shu8 �unal-Matabi6 al-Am;riyya, 2 vols., 1956), ii. 356.

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thought is not. Thought is the opposite of matter, which is pure passivity.Therefore, that which knows and is pure activity is not mixed withmatter.3 And because God, the necessary Being, is pure thought andcompletely detached from matter, He Himself is knowledge,4 on theassumption that, in God, thought equals knowledge.5 Also, in the perfectBeing, the subject of knowledge corresponds to the object of knowledge,which is also in accordance with the Aristotelian principle that‘knowledge in act is identical with its object’.6 In his Maq:Bid al-fal:sifa,a summary of Avicenna’s philosophy based on the D:nishn:ma, theBook of Knowledge, al-Ghazz:l; reproduces this view, asserting that:‘once it is established that the [object] known is the knowing [subject]itself, the knowledge, the knower and the known become identical.Therefore the First is in itself knower and its knowledge and the [object]known are [identical with] it’.7

As pure activity, God is also the first cause of all intelligibles, fromwhich all existents proceed. Because those intelligibles originatefrom God through His thinking Himself, i.e. through His knowledge,He must have a perfect knowledge of His creation, and of all thatoriginates from Him. One problem arises at this stage: if, as waspostulated, God’s knowledge is identical with its object and if the objectof His knowledge is a multitude of entities, must one relinquish thedoctrine of God’s oneness, established as befitting His intellectual

3 Avicenna (ed. E. Mu‘in) Il:hiyy:t: D:nishn:ma-i 6Al:8i (Tehran: Anjuman-i2s:r-i Milli, 1952), 84; Le livre de science (trans. M. Achena and H. Masse;Paris: Les Belles Lettres, Serie Persane/UNESCO, 2 vols., [1955–58] 1986); vol. 1Logique, Metaphysique, 194.

4 This echoes Alfarabi’s statement that: ‘because the First is not in matterand has itself no matter in any way whatsoever, it is in its substance actualintellect; for what prevents the form from being intellect and from actuallythinking (intelligizing) is the matter in which a thing exists’. Trans. R. Walzer,al-Farabi on the Perfect State: Ab �u NaBr al-F:r:b; ’s Mab:di8 :r:8 ahl al-mad;naal-f:@ila (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 70–1.

5 ‘The verb ‘‘to conceive’’ (6aqala) is used interchangeably with the verb‘‘to know’’ (6alima), a synonymous use objected to by Avicenna’s theologiancritics’: M. E. Marmura, ‘Some Aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’sKnowledge of Particulars’, Journal of the American Oriental Society,82 (1962), 299–312, at 301.

6 Aristotle (ed. W. D. Ross) De Anima (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956),430a19–21. W. S. Hett (trans.), On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath(London: Heinemann, 1957), 170–1. (Trans. slightly modified.)

7 Al-Ghazz:l; (ed. M. al-Kurd;), Maq:Bid al-fal:sifa (Cairo: al-Ma3ba6a al-Sa6:da, 1912), 153. See also al-Shif:8, ii. 356, where Avicenna states that God issubject of knowledge as well as of the activity of thinking. All translations aremine unless otherwise indicated.

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nature? Only material beings are divisible, hence God must be one.Avicenna claims that because God is the cause of the intelligibles, andbecause they are not the cause of His knowing them, there need not arisea multiplicity in the knower. God knows them as their creator.

In his treatment of God’s knowledge, Avicenna stresses its differencefrom human knowledge, not just in nature but also with regard to theprocess of its acquisition. Unlike God, humans are entangled in matterand live in a material world that is subject to change. Therefore,Avicenna claims that knowledge obtained by humans is the result of aprocess of separating form from matter in any given existent.8 In contrastto divine knowledge, human knowledge is passive in relation to itsobjects in the sense that it is caused by the existence of these objects,when they present themselves to the knowing subject.9 As a consequence,in their capacity as recipients of knowledge—because the objects knownto them are the cause, not the effect of their perceiving them—they haveno grasp of all intelligibles as a unity.

The difference between human and divine knowledge is tied up withthe notion that divine knowledge is purely intellectual while humanknowledge is dependent on sense perception, and has to do awayprogressively with the material element in the objects it perceives in orderto attain the form. Also, God knows all existents in an all-encompassingfashion, inasmuch as He is their cause, whereas humans usually have toperceive objects individually and in a temporal sequence, in order toseparate form from matter and thereby attain the universal notions ofspecies and genus that serve to classify each existent. Human knowledgeis seen to proceed from the particular to the universal. This process isaccompanied by the activity of the dator formarum, which imparts formsto the human intellect from without.

God, being pure intellect, bears no relation to the material world ofcoming to be and passing away, as He is pure intellect, and is thereforeunchangeable. This also means, according to Avicenna, that He bears norelation to time. Change—and time, which is an expression and measureof the process of change—only originates as a result of the combinationof matter and form in a substance, together with its accidents. Moreoverit is matter, while being the passive element in a substance, which allows

8 Avicenna, D:nishn:ma, 83–4, Le livre de science, i. 194. For intellectualforms of non-discursive thought see Adamson, ‘Non-discursive Thought inAvicenna’s Commentary on the Theology of Aristotle’, in J. McGinnis (ed. withD. Reisman) Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam(Leiden: Brill, 2004), 87–111, esp. 95, 103.

9 Avicenna, D:nishn:ma, 86, Le livre de science, i. 195–6.

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it to become individuated. Forms alone do not suffice for the purpose ofindividualization (such as a particular man) of primary substances.Particulars are always a compound of form and matter.

The question now arises: if God bears no relation to matter andtemporality, which are both closely related, and if the sensory equipmentneeded for the apprehension of particulars is not attributable to Him, canwe say that He knows particulars, or are we forced to admit that Hisknowledge extends exclusively to universals? And how is it possible forHim to know temporal processes?

Avicenna was well aware of the problem and His account of God’sknowledge of particulars was an attempt to answer possible objections.Can God actually know particulars as they come to be and pass away?Avicenna claims that God cannot know things in time because, as a resultof the identification of being and thought, should He know contingentthings or events in time He would become changeable like them, which isinconceivable of God.10 Avicenna gives the example of an eclipse. Beforean eclipse, an astronomer is aware that it is not currently taking place.During the eclipse he knows that it is happening at the present moment,and after the eclipse he knows it as a past event. Avicenna wants toillustrate the fact that in the process of knowing in the case of humans,the knowledge of the particular eclipse changes along with the process ofthe eclipse.11 The temporal process of the eclipse is accompanied by,and concomitant with, the temporal process of acquiring knowledge.Avicenna concludes that God knows the process of the eclipse in auniversal way: He knows the succession of movements in any givenstar as it becomes eclipsed by another star from an eternal perspective,His knowledge and His being remaining unaltered. This implies thatthere is no reference to a specific time in God’s thought, and that everyparticular process taking place either in the sublunary or in thesuperlunary world is known to Him in a universal way. Al-Ghazz:l;epitomizes this view in his Maq:Bid al-fal:sifa: ‘the First knowsparticulars in a universal way (bi-naw6 kull; ), intended as eternal,everlasting, and without change’, ‘and knows its cause in a universal wayfor there is in it no reference to a [specific] moment or time’.12

A clarification is needed here with regard to the terms ‘universal’ and‘particular’. A distinction must be drawn, if one follows Marmura, inthe use of the term ‘universal’ for it can refer to ‘(a) the nature of God’sknowledge as such; (b) the manner of God’s knowing; (c) the object

10 Avicenna, al-Shif:8 al-Il:hiyy:t, ii. 359.11 Avicenna, D:nishn:ma, 90–3, Le livre de science, i. 199–202; al-Shif:8, i. 360.12 Al-Ghazz:l;, Maq:Bid al-fal:sifa, 162.


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known by God’.13 As regards (a): ‘God’s knowledge is ‘‘universal’’ in thesense that it is ‘‘conceptual’’ or ‘‘intellectual’’.’14 First, this universalaspect or nature goes hand in hand with the conception of God as pureintellect and separated from matter. It refers to God’s being outside time.His eternity was traditionally conceived not as infinite duration but asabsolute detachment from time and any temporal reference. ‘Universal’also means in this context that God knows particulars inasmuch as theycome under the corresponding species and genera.15 Secondly, and withrespect to the manner of God’s knowing, He is the cause of allintelligibles and existents, in contrast with human beings, for whomknowledge is caused by its object and so ontologically preceded by it.Furthermore, according to Avicenna, God’s knowledge is not discursive,it apprehends all existents ‘instantaneously’ (daf 6atan w:Aidatan).16

What about the objects known to God? The example of the eclipseillustrates not only God’s relation (or lack thereof) to time but alsoHis mode of knowing particulars in a universal way as meaning thatHe knows them by their general nature: He ‘apprehends particularsinasmuch as they are universal, that is, inasmuch as they havequalities’.17 After giving the example of the eclipse, Avicenna concludeswith a Qur8:nic quotation (34. 3) that reads: ‘not the weight of an atomescapes Him, either in the heavens or in the earth’. The quotation servesto corroborate the notion that God knows every single particular onearth as in heaven. Does Avicenna truly believe that God knowsparticulars, and does his exposition show that that is the case? Or is hejust trying to hide his true view under Islamic trappings?

Avicenna’s concern in raising the issue of God’s knowledge ofparticulars, in spite of the Aristotelian framework, apparent notably inthe terms used by Avicenna, goes beyond Aristotle’s framework ofinquiry, because for Aristotle it was more fitting of the First, that itshould not know particulars. However, since for Avicenna it was ofparamount importance to put forth the notion of God’s universalprovidence, the issue becomes a crucial one, and this is made explicit byal-Ghazz:l;’s charge of kufr.

13 Marmura, ‘Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars’, 300.14 Ibid, 301.15 Avicenna, al-Shif:8, al-Il:hiyy:t, ii. 364, 1.2. Quoted in Marmura,

‘Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars’, 302.16 Ibid, 303: ‘God’s knowledge does not move from ‘‘concept to concept’’ to

apply to the ontological series as well as to the temporal. The entire ontologicalseries is conceived instantaneously, intuitively. God knows, as it were, all thenecessitated consequences in a timeless intuition. In other words, there is nodiscursus in God’s knowledge.’

17 Ibid. Avicenna, al-Shif:8, Il:hiyy:t, ii. 360, 1.3.

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AL-GHAZZ �AL �I’S CRITICISM OF AVICENNA

Al-Ghazz:li’s criticism is based on a conception of God and of Hisattributes which is fundamentally different from that of Avicenna.Al-Ghazz:l; starts by undermining the very fundamental conception ofGod as intellect put forth by the philosophers. Unlike the philosophers,and following the Ash6ari tradition of considering divine attributes asreal entities, he does not accept the absolute identity of God andknowledge. Hence this knowledge must be proved by a different waythan simply stating that He is knowledge. Hence Avicenna’s argumentthat God knows Himself and also all existents because His essence isknowledge is rebutted by al-Ghazz:l; as question-begging.18 As for theclaim that He knows them inasmuch as He knows Himself to be theirprinciple, al-Ghazz:l; claims that the knowledge of Himself differs fromthe knowledge of Himself as principle of other beings. The assumption ofself-knowledge in the First does not prove that His knowledge reachesbeyond His own essence: ‘the existence of self-knowledge simultaneouslywith the non-existence of the knowledge of something else is notimpossible, nor is this impossible with the knowledge of the First and itsknowledge of something else’.19

In his alternative to Avicenna’s conception, al-Ghazz:l; presents thetheologians’ argument in support of God’s knowledge of Himself andothers, i.e. His creatures. In a nutshell, according to al-Ghazz:l;, it is byaffirming a will in God that we infer His knowledge:

‘The universe is known to Him, for the universe was willed by Him and produced

by Him, and nothing comes into existence but what is produced through His

will, and nothing is everlasting but His essence alone. And once it was established

that God wills and knows what He wills, He must be necessarily living, and every

living being knows other than itself, and He is the most capable of knowing

Himself. Therefore the whole universe is known to God, and they understood

this through this argument, since they had found that He willed everything that

happens in the world’.20

In order to substantiate his criticism, al-Ghazz:l; accuses Avicennaof failing to prove that God has a will. Because the world eternally

18 Al-Ghazz:l; quoted in Averroes (ed. Maurice Bouyges S.J.), Tah:fotat-Tah:fot (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1930 [1987]), 431. Simon van den Bergh(trans. with introd. and notes) Tah:fut al-tah:fut: The Incoherence of theIncoherence (London: Gibb Memorial Trust, 1954, 2 vols.), i. 259.

19 Al-Ghazz:l; quoted by Averroes, Tah:fot, 335; Tah:fut (trans.), i. 200.20 Tah:fot, 424; Tah:fut (trans., modified), i. 255.


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emanates from God rather than being temporally created by Him,God does not will and hence does not know what proceeds from Him.To illustrate this criticism and in order to explain that, accordingto this theory, God could not prevent Himself from creating theworld, al-Ghazz:l; gives the example of the action of the sun inproducing light.21

In order to refute their proof of God’s knowledge of particulars,al-Ghazz:l; furthermore delves into the philosophers’ denial of theattributes of seeing and hearing, and their affirmation of God’s totaldetachment from matter. He states that God, if one is to follow theirtheories, cannot know individuals, because ‘the individual Zayd canonly be distinguished from 6Amr through the senses, not through theintellect’.22

The problems arising from the lack of a connection between God andmatter is a particularly important point to which I shall return.

After putting forth his demolishing criticism, al-Ghazz:l; drawsthe consequences of Avicenna’s theory regarding God’s knowledge ofparticulars. In addition to leading to the conclusion that man is moreknowledgeable than God, for humans know particulars, it clashes withIslamic doctrine on several counts. Not knowing any particular events oraccidents in time or in space, God would be unable to tell a believer froman unbeliever, would not know the time when the Prophet proclaimedhimself as such, and would be unable to know any particular prophet.23

Quite apart from going against the idea of God’s omniscience, thephilosophers also destroy alongside it the notion of God’s justice, mercyand compassion—for He cannot administer justice if He is unaware ofindividuals—and God’s generosity, for He cannot be praised for an act,i.e. creation, which is involuntary. Their theories, according toal-Ghazz:l;, also undermine the idea of God’s caring rule over thisworld, His providence. Al-Ghazz:l; thus takes Avicenna’s statement thatGod knows particulars in a universal way as tantamount to denyingGod’s knowledge of particulars. He further holds that Avicenna’scosmology, his emanation theory, leads to a denial of any knowledgein God. Before going on to present Averroes’ proposed solution it isuseful to take further account of Marmura’s position, which focuses onthe usage of ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ by Avicenna.

21 Al-Ghazz:l; quoted in Averroes, Tah:fot, 438.22 Ibid, 457; Tah:fut, i. 276.23 Averroes, Tah:fot, 457–8.

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Can God truly have a knowledge of all particulars by way of knowinggeneral principles or genera and species? According to Marmura thismethod can only be successfully used in the supralunary world. God, byknowing general principles, may indeed know not just the eclipse ingeneral but also each and every particular eclipse.24 However, this doesnot entitle Him to know just any particular, and the example of theeclipse is, on Marmura’s interpretation, misleading: Avicenna used it inorder to ward off criticism from the theologians, while putting acrossin a veiled fashion his true conception of God’s knowledge, whichappears to be more in keeping with the Aristotelian view—stressing thatGod knows primarily Himself, and Alexander’s view that God doesnot know strictly everything with a necessary knowledge, e.g. futurecontingents—than with the Qur8:nic quotation expressly asserting God’sabsolute omniscience. On Marmura’s interpretation, the condition forGod’s knowledge of particulars or individuals is that the entity knownbe the only member of its species, itself invariable and eternal, and theevent known involve such an entity. This prerequisite is met only byentities existing in the celestial realm,25 the celestial spheres—preciselythose involved in an eclipse. However, this excludes particulars in thesublunary world, the world of coming to be and passing away, the rulesgoverning which are not as strict and regular as the rules governing thecelestial spheres in the supralunary world. Therefore, ‘God’s individualknowledge of particulars is restricted to entities and events in the celestialrealm’.26 Marmura’s conclusion is that both the Qur’:nic quotation andthe example of the eclipse are meant to mislead the theologians.27

Marmura focuses on the example of the eclipse as the key tounderstanding Avicenna’s position. But if we take the example of theeclipse it becomes apparent that in knowing the eclipse God is aware ofthe chronological order, for an eclipse is a temporal process. One mightobject that Avicenna means a general eclipse, not each particular eclipse,but this would render the example meaningless and go againstMarmura’s interpretation, according to which on Avicenna’s accountGod knows particulars in the world above the moon. The objectionmade by al-Ghazz:l; that according to Avicenna God does not knowtemporal processes is thus quashed. The second aspect concerns

24 Marmura, ‘Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars’, 310.25 This principle had already been formulated by Alfarabi (trans. Walzer,

al-Farabi on the Perfect State, 116): ‘but in the case of something immaterial,nothing can be of its species except itself.’

26 Marmura, ‘Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars’, 311.27 Marmura’s view is contradicted by other texts in which Avicenna is clearer.

See Y. Michot, Lettre au vizir Ab �u Sa6d (Beirut: Les Editions al-Bouraq, 2000).


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sublunar particulars, composed of matter and form. Aristotle made asignificant distinction between the causality governing the sublunaryworld and that governing the supralunary world, a strict and regularcausality being confined to the supralunary world. Marmura’s inter-pretation of Avicenna’s views presupposes the Aristotelian strictdistinction. Yet in a passage from the Physics of al-Shif:8 concerningfuture knowledge, this distinction is clearly put aside. Accordingto Avicenna, in the same way that one who knows the principleswhich rule the occurrence of an eclipse will know, in the rightcircumstances, that an eclipse is going to take place, ‘equally, if thatperson knows that matter is becoming putrescent, he knows that a feveris in the offing’.28

In this instance Avicenna is not referring to divine knowledge inparticular but to knowledge in general and more specifically humanknowledge. Yet in doing away with the Aristotelian distinction betweensublunary and supralunary worlds Avicenna shows that matter is inprinciple no more unpredictable than celestial motions. Matter is thecause which individualizes particulars and hence would constitutethe obstacle to God’s knowledge. Yet matter is not an autonomousprinciple, but wholly subordinated to form in Avicenna’s philosophy,and does not contribute to the actuality of the thing’s existence: ‘Matterdoes not avail (yuf;du) the thing in actuality, rather it contributes thepotentiality of the thing’s existence. In turn the form is that which turnsit into actuality’.29 Thus notwithstanding Avicenna’s formulation ofdivine knowledge as a knowledge of particulars in a universal way, hisphilosophy points in principle to a theory of true divine omniscience.

Al-Ghazz:l; does not take into account the complexity and diversity ofAvicenna’s approach to the issue of divine knowledge, and possibly didnot have at his disposal other works in which Avicenna expands on theissue. At any rate he focuses on those aspects which lend themselvesto attack from a theologian’s perspective. However, the issue of God’sknowledge is an abiding theme in Avicenna’s works. In al-Ta6l;q:t,for instance, Avicenna explicitly states that if God is the cause of causesthen all causes are subordinated to His power and knowledge. Morespecifically, he says that if the First knows His concomitants andthe concomitants of His concomitants according to the way in whicheffect derives from cause, and knows which effect derives from whichcause He knows everything in a universal way. God appears to know

28 Avicenna (eds. S. Zayid and I. Madk �ur), al-Shif:8, al-Tab; 6iyy:t, al-Sam:6al-Tab; 6; (Cairo: al-Hay8a al-MiBriyya al-62mma li-l-Kit:b, 1983), 11.

29 Ibid, 37.

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everything according to laws of nature set by Himself. Since there areno inexplicable deviations to His laws, a stance which goes hand in handwith Avicenna’s determinism, He would effectively know the processbehind the coming to be of each individual.30

Avicenna’s overall determinism, expressed in the principle thatwhatever comes to be does so through a necessary cause, and ultimatelythrough God, supports his stance on divine omniscience.31 This becomesclear in Averroes’ appraisal and revision of Avicenna’s formulation.32

AVERROES’ RESPONSE TO AL-GHAZZ �AL �I

The problem of God’s knowledge of particulars is broached by Averroesin such diverse works as FaBl al-maq:l (The Decisive Treatise), theDam;ma, a shorter treatise attached to the FaBl, and his commentary onBook Lambda of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, part of which treats specificallyof the nature of God’s knowledge. But it is in Tah:fut al-Tah:fut that heprovides a full rebuttal of al-Ghazz:l;’s criticism. In what follows I willfirst look into Averroes’ theory inasmuch as it agrees with Avicenna’s,and the philosophers’, view of God. Secondly, closer attention will bepaid to the main points of agreement between Averroes’ and Avicenna’sviews on God’s knowledge. Finally, I discuss the main divergences

30 Avicenna (ed. A. Badawi), Kit:b al-Ta6l;q:t (Cairo: al-Hay8a al-MiBriyyaal-62mma li-l-Kit:b, 1973), 14.

31 ‘As long as one thing’s existence does not necessarily derive from its causesand does not leave the nature of the possible it does not come to be from them’:Avicenna, al-Shif:8, al-Tab; 6iyy:t, al-Sam:6 al-Tab; 6; , 63. At the metaphysicallevel Avicenna does not believe that something can occur or come into beingwithout a necessitating, determining cause. His case for determinism is furtherstated in natural philosophy. Avicenna denies that anything in nature can comeabout through chance, in a haphazard or spontaneous way. See C. Belo, ‘Ibn S;n:on Chance in the Physics of as-Sif:8’, in McGinnis (ed.) Interpreting Avicenna,25–41; see also: Michot, Lettre au vizir Ab �u Sa6d, 122–3, App. I.

32 In a new analysis on Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars,Peter Adamson focuses on the Aristotelian epistemological background under-pinning Avicenna’s theory. Adamson too is sceptical about Avicenna’s statementthat God knows particulars in a universal way as a theory that God truly knowsparticulars as such. As Adamson stresses, Avicenna’s theory implies certainsimilarities between human and divine knowledge. Yet this approach is rejectedby Averroes. Avicenna’s formulation of God’s knowledge, as we shall see, iscriticized by Averroes, hence his position is not subject to the same kind of attack.See P. Adamson, ‘On Knowledge of Particulars’, Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety, 105 (2005), 273–94. For a recent defence of Avicenna’s position seeR. Acar, ‘Reconsidering Avicenna’s Position on God’s Knowledge of Particulars’,in McGinnis (ed.), Interpreting Avicenna, 142–56.


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between Averroes’ and Avicenna’s conceptions of God’s knowledge ofparticulars and ascertain how the differences put forth by Averroes canbe taken as a solution to al-Ghazz:l;’s criticism.

In Tah:fut al-Tah:fut, Averroes faults the Ash6ari conception of Godand stands by the philosophers’ conception, defending it on philosophi-cal and religious grounds. His response to al-Ghazz:l; on the issue ofGod’s knowledge begins with a condemnation of the theologians’anthropomorphic conception of the Godhead, whereby the First isturned into a mere eternal man,33 differing from humans only inpossessing knowledge and power to a greater degree than humans, Hisother attributes being equally assimilated to human attributes. Accordingto Averroes the theologians fail to understand the distinction betweenthe eternal and the temporal planes. Their theory, in Averroes’ view, isto be held blasphemous for falling short of the true conception of atranscendent God patent in the Qur’:n. For Averroes, as for otherMuslim philosophers before him, God is not to be seen as a body or asubstance composed of form and matter. As we have seen, God is pureintellect in so far as He is wholly detached from the material element,and hence absolutely transcendent. The philosophers’ denial of‘corporeal’ attributes such as seeing and hearing is an obvious corollaryof this. God, as a simple being, cannot be a soul, for this implies acombination of different faculties. And only the possession of a soulallows for the existence of hearing and sight in any substance.34

More to the point are the similarities between the view of Avicennaand Averroes on God’s knowledge. Like Avicenna, Averroes postulatesthe identity between God and His all-encompassing knowledge as tied upwith His immaterial nature. God is pure intellect, pure actuality, andcause of all intelligibles and existents. His knowledge of the world isconcomitant with His principal activity, namely, thinking Himself.Moreover, His creation issues from Him as a result of His thinkingHimself. And if the First creates through His knowledge, He must needshave knowledge of His creation, comprising all that issues from Him,directly or indirectly. God’s knowledge of other beings beside Himself isdue to His being their cause, as Avicenna had stated. God’s knowledgeis always active, causative and therefore perfect, and in stark contrastto human knowledge which is the effect of its objects, therefore passive,and potential, as it is not always active. We have seen that for Averroesas for Avicenna the nature of God’s knowledge is purely intellectual.

33 Averroes, Tah:fot, 425.34 Ibid, 454; Tah:fut, i. 274: ‘The philosophers only avoid ascribing to the

First hearing and seeing, because this would imply its possessing a soul.’

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As to the manner of His knowledge, we know that it is always activeand causative. The distinction between human and divine knowledgeis better understood against the background of the philosophers’ viewsof the human intellect. The human intellect, in its knowing process,cannot attain knowledge by itself. In this it differs markedly from thedivine intellect. While the divine intellect is active and causative, thehuman intellect and knowledge are passive and receptive.

After the similarities between Averroes and Avicenna’s conception ofknowledge in the First have been dealt with, the principal divergencesmust be taken into account. This brings us back to al-Ghazz:l;’scondemnation and Averroes’ response. Two main arguments are adducedto counter al-Ghazz:l;’s criticism. One consists in affirming that becauseGod is the intelligent cause of the world, He alone knows His owncreation. This argument had already been advanced by Avicenna. YetAverroes clearly demarcates his own view from Avicenna’s formulationof God’s knowledge of particulars as a universal knowledge, or aknowledge of particulars in a universal way. For Averroes, God’sknowledge is neither universal nor particular. In addition to scrutinizingthis assertion we also have to ascertain whether Averroes is here referringto the nature, manner or object of God’s knowledge, or all three.

Let us deal first with the nature of God’s knowledge. It isfundamentally different from human knowledge, such that the sameterms cannot be applied to both human and divine knowledge.A linguistic or logical aspect comes to the fore in Averroes’ formulation.Why is it that the terms ‘knowledge’, and also ‘will’, cannot have thesame meaning when predicated of man and God? Why does Averroesstate that they are equivocally (bi-ishtir:k) applied to man and God?Equivocation, or homonymy, as opposed to univocity, is a technical termused by Aristotle at the opening of his Categories to express a set ofwords that bear the same name but have a different definition. In hisMiddle Commentary on the Categories, Averroes states that ‘those thingswhose names are common, that is, equivocal, are things that havenothing general or common to them except for the name, while thedefinition of each, which states its essence in consideration of themeaning of the equivocal name, differs from the definition of the otherand is peculiar to its own definiendum’.35 One would gather from this

35 Averroes (eds. M. M. Kassem, C. E. Butterworth and A. A. Haridi), AverroisCordubensis Commentarium Medium in Aristotelis Categorias (Cairo: al-Hay8aal-MiBriyya al-62mma li-l-Kit:b, 1980), 77; trans. with introd. and notes byH. A. Davidson, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge and onAristotle’s Categoriae (Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America,University of California Press, [1958] 1969), 32.


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statement that knowledge in God has nothing in common withknowledge in humans but the name. The following sentences of thiscommentary show more specifically in what this difference consists.Averroes says that ‘an example is the name animal when predicated bothof a drawing of a man and of a rational man, for the definitions of thesetwo differ, and the two have nothing in common except for the name’.36

The depicted man is an image of the real man and cannot be representedwithout a real, living model. But although the depicted man is in themind of the painter—and similarly, the pure form is in the ‘mind’ of theFirst—there is in both cases a difference between the form which is inmatter and the intellect which is being acted upon, and the form which isnot in matter but in an intellect permanently active. The exampleillustrates the difference between God’s and man’s knowledge, and theradically different nature of the two. It follows from the aforementionedrejection of predicating the same attributes of humans and God in thesame way, and the fact that the two do not share a genus.

As regards the manner of God’s knowing, Averroes says that God’sknowledge is neither universal nor particular. Averroes equatesuniversal knowledge with potential knowledge on the one hand andparticular knowledge with sensory knowledge on the other. He says that:‘the knowledge of things through a universal knowledge is inadequate,for it knows them in potentiality’37 and that ‘His perception is notdescribed as universal let alone as particular, because universals areintelligibles which are consequent on and posterior to existents, whereason the contrary the existents are consequent on this intellect’.38

Why is universal knowledge identified with potentiality? Within theprocess of human knowledge the terms ‘particular’ and ‘universal’ havespecific meanings. ‘Particular’ means the sensible individual directlyperceived by the human subject—it is always tied up with a sensibleapprehension of the object, first perceived by means of the senses andonly at a later stage by the rational faculty. In this sense, ‘particular’means also partial and incomplete, for the apprehension focuses on oneobject or part of it, rather than its relations to other substances.Moreover this empirical process is gradual and time-bound. Because thesensory faculties are mixed with matter, they lead to an imperfection andlimitation in the knowledge attained through them. God’s knowledge isfar removed from this type of apprehension.

36 Ibid.37 Averroes, Tah:fot, 340; Tah:fut (trans. slightly modified), i. 203.38 Averroes, Tah:fot, 339; Tah:fut (trans. modified), i. 203.

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What about the term ‘universal’? The ‘universal’, attained as a resultof the human process of knowledge, although more valuable inasmuchas it is more comprehensive, likewise lacks perfection because it isattained indirectly and mediately. This knowledge is mediated inasmuchas it results from a process which involves the aid of the senses and ofthe active intellect. When this universal knowledge—the knowledgeof the forms, of the species and genera—is attained, it can be appliedto particular instances or processes and lead to the acquisition of anencompassing view of those objects. But God’s knowledge has no parallelin human knowledge. It is forever active, because it is neither mediatedby external aids or faculties—it is not the result of a process—nor by theapplication of principles under which particular substances or eventscome. Unlike Avicenna, Averroes is not compromised by the claim thatGod knows particulars in a universal way, i.e. ‘apprehends particularsinasmuch as they are universal, that is, inasmuch as they havequalities’.39 For knowing something through its qualities, or throughits coming under a genus or species, is a type of mediated and potentialknowledge because it is conditioned by the apprehended intelligibles.For this reason Averroes says that ‘it is impossible . . . that the First shouldbe perfected through the intelligible and caused by it’.40

Because God’s knowledge is constantly active it is neither universalnor particular. Averroes states that: ‘since knowledge of the individual isfor us knowledge in act,41 we know that God’s knowledge is more likeparticular knowledge than universal knowledge, although it is neitheruniversal nor particular.’42

In the supralunary world all existents and intelligibles are alreadycontained virtually, and so too universal and particular, for accordingto Averroes: ‘the philosophers assert that these two kinds of knowledge,the universal and the particular, are one (ittaAada) in the knowledge

39 Avicenna, al-Shif:8, Il:hiyy:t, ii. 360.40 Averroes, Tah:fot, 343; Tah:fut (trans. slightly modified), i. 206.41 Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation, 244: ‘In the

Aristotelian noetic, knowledge of universals carries an additional dimension ofpotentiality vis-a-vis that of particulars �I only knowledge of universals signifiesthat the particular form actually known can be taken to characterize an indefinitenumber of such individuals. It can be used for purposes of identificationagain and again, universally. In this sense, then, the universal concept is a kindof capacity to re-apply a particular act of knowing to similar cases as they arise.To the extent that knowing universals implies this added element of capacityand potentiality, it is less adequate as a description of Divine knowledge thanknowing particulars, which always connotes actual knowing.’

42 Averroes, Tah:fot, 345; Tah:fut (trans. slightly modified), i. 207.


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which is separated from matter; and when this knowledge emanates inthe sublunary world it divides itself into universal and particular.’43

The rejection of the term ‘universal’ used by Avicenna to describeGod’s knowledge constitutes Averroes’ direct response to al-Ghazz:l;.Moreover he does not expressly fault Avicenna for his formulation,deeming instead his own account a more accurate explanation of thephilosophers’ overall view on God’s knowledge. Despite the fact that thisclarification renders our own grasp of God’s knowledge virtuallyimpossible—for we cannot really speak of a ‘mode’ or process ofknowledge—it enables us to distinguish it from human knowledge. Thesame clarification applies to will as said of man and God, and Averroestackles both these attributes in order to refute al-Ghazz:l;, who hadplaced so much weight on the issue of God’s will as providing proof ofHis omniscience. Averroes, who is often so critical of Avicenna on manyphilosophical and theological issues, is in this instance remarkablymoderate in his appraisal of his predecessor’s theory.

An important issue remains, pertaining to the objects of God’sknowledge. The terms ‘particular’ and ‘universal’ have now beenrendered inappropriate to speak about God’s knowledge, but is itpossible, according to the philosophy of Averroes, to say that God knowsin a perfect way all existents? Or, in other words, still bearing in mindal-Ghazz:l;’s criticism, is there anything that escapes God’s knowledge?Averroes and the philosophers claim that God knows all existentsinasmuch as He is their absolute and ultimate cause. Again, it has to bestressed that His knowledge, will and causation are all concomitant, foreach attribute is equally and perfectly active and cannot be preceded orcaused by something else, for this would entail some sort of potentiality.This is also made consequent upon the philosophical identification ofGod’s essence with His attributes.

What does it mean to say that God knows all existents inasmuch asHe is their cause? The term ‘cause’ had a fourfold meaning for Averroesas for Aristotle, as agent, form, end and matter.44 If we dwell on the issueof God as the efficient cause of the world some divergences can beobserved between Averroes and Avicenna. One of the accusationslevelled by al-Ghazz:l; at the latter consisted in claiming that in auniverse where the effect of God is one, and the remaining beings derivefrom that first effect in a series of processions arising in the First, onecannot say that God—who for the philosophers creates through

43 Averroes, Tah:fot, 507; Tah:fut (trans. slightly modified), i. 310.44 Aristotle (ed. W. Jaeger), Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1957), 1013a.24–36.

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His knowledge, and knows inasmuch as He is the cause of the universe—knows anything beside His first, immediate, effect. That is to say, even onthe assumption that God knows His effects, He is only responsible forone direct effect and as such He cannot be said to know that whichproceeds mediately from Him, according to al-Ghazz:l;. Yet it has to besaid that the rule that from the one only one proceeds is exclusive toa Neoplatonic emanative scheme endorsed by Avicenna but rejected byAverroes as non-Aristotelian. Avicenna’s emanative scheme was seen byal-Ghazz:l; as hampering God’s causation in the world. Also, becauseHis causation, according to the philosophers, goes hand in hand withHis knowledge, the latter was seen to be likewise affected and hampered.The rejection of emanation by Averroes lay not only it its deviationfrom the Aristotelian model but also because it served to obviateal-Ghazz:l;’s criticism against the philosophers. By extending theimmediate reach of divine causality, and saying that God creates alleffects at once, Averroes is implicitly seeking to extend His knowledgeof His effects. Although this rejection of the emanative scheme is notexpressly adduced by Averroes as proof of God’s all-encompassingknowledge in Tah:fut al-tah:fut, it clearly has a bearing on it.

However it has to be said too that al-Ghazz:l;’s attack on the theory,defended by the philosophers, that God knows the effects that mediatelyproceed from Him stems from a basic divergence between Ash6aritheology and the fal:sifa on divine causality. In their attempt to stressdivine omnipotence, the Ash6aris thought it necessary to conclude thatall events occurring in the universe, natural processes or human acts, arethe result of the direct intervention and causation by God. Everythingin the world is directly dependent on God, and to claim otherwise wouldamount to denying divine omnipotence. The fal:sifa view divinecausality differently and hold that God’s omnipotence is not affectedwhether He is the direct or indirect cause of all existents and all changein the world. They further adduce the view that God’s preoccupationwith every single detail in the world, as Ash6aris claim to be the case, isdemeaning and beneath His perfection. God must not be conceived asprimarily concerned with ruling the universe, or as being directlyenmeshed in human affairs, so as to be at their beck and call and dependon their acts and volitions. Nor can He be seen to change His decisionsaccording to the way humans conduct themselves. This view is adoptedby Averroes and epitomized in Tah:fut al-tah:fut, as evinced by thefollowing passage:

This movement . . . does not occur, according to the philosophers, according to

primary intention (6al: l-qaBd al-awwal) for the sake of this sublunary world;

that is, the heavenly body is not according to primary intention created for the


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sake of this sublunary world. For indeed this movement is the special act for the

sake of which heaven is created, and if this movement occurred according to

primary intention for the sake of the sublunary world, the body of the heavens

would be created only for the sake of this sublunary world, and it is impossible,

according to the philosophers, that the superior should be created for the sake of

the inferior; on the contrary, out of the superior there follows the existence of the

inferior, just as the perfection of the ruler in relation to his subject does not lie in

his being a ruler, but his being a ruler is only a consequence of his perfection.

In the same way the providence (6in:ya) which prevails in this world is like the

care of the ruler for his subjects, who have no salvation and no existence except

in him, and especially in the ruler who for his most perfect and noble existence

does not need to be a ruler, let alone that he should need his subjects’ existence.45

The link between providence and knowledge in this context appearsin al-Ghazz:l;’s quotation of the philosophers’ views to the effect that‘The First does not know other things according to primary intention.No, it knows its own essence as the principle of the universe, and fromthis its knowledge of the universe follows according to secondaryintention’.46 Owing to the close connection between God’s knowledgeand His being the foremost cause of the universe, the distinction betweenprimary and secondary causality bears on the issue of God’s knowledge,and this becomes patent in Averroes’ philosophy. However the existenceof a secondary causality issuing from God’s creation does not detractfrom His power or knowledge. His knowing according to secondaryintention is as perfect as His knowing according to primary intention,in the same way that His rule over the sublunary world throughsecondary causality is as powerful as His direct control over thesupralunary world. To say that God’s knowledge of the sublunary worldis according to secondary intention does not mean to say that He issubordinated to a means in order to know the world of coming to be andpassing away, for He is the foremost cause of everything. We have shownthis to be stressed by Averroes by way of offering a different formulationto that of Avicenna as regards the ‘mode’ of God’s knowledge. Moreover,in adopting the philosophers’ views on secondary causality, Averroesin not relinquishing the Islamic notion of divine omnipotence, namelythat God rules, directly or indirectly, every single existent, which goeshand in hand with the view that God creates at once all existents, ratherthan one single effect.

45 Averroes, Tah:fot, 484–5; Tah:fut (trans. slightly modified), i. 295.46 Averroes, Tah:fot, 337; Tah:fut (trans. slightly modified), i. 201.

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The assumption of God as formal and final cause is ratherstraightforward and less complex. God is the formal cause since He,the foremost intellectual being, is the cause of all intelligibles andintellects. And He is the final cause inasmuch as all beings are drawnto him. He is that to which all creatures and beings aspire in one way oranother. This is in line with the Islamic view conveyed in the Qur’:n(e.g. 96. 8) that ultimately everything returns to God. As much hadbeen maintained by Themistius, namely that the First is the efficient,formal and final cause of the universe. Averroes endorses this view,stating that God is ‘an agent, a form, and an end’.47

The material cause is the more controversial in this context. It hasto be said that God cannot be conceived as the material cause becauseHe is a purely intellectual being. To admit God as the material causeof the world would be at variance with His transcendence. Asidefrom the difficulties besetting the view that there is an element in theworld escaping God’s causal influence, which detracts from Hisomnipotence, a real problem arises for the knowledge of God, namelythat of beings that have a material element in them, i.e., all beings in thesublunary world.

The crux of the question is undoubtedly the relation obtainingbetween God and the material element in the world. That this relationlies at the root of the challenge posed by al-Ghazz:l; was seen byAquinas, who implies that God is indirectly the material cause of theworld in the sense that He is the creator of prime matter. According toAquinas,

‘it must be said that, because God is the cause of things by His knowledge . . .His

knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence, as the active power of

God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to

matter . . . the knowledge of God must extend to particulars, which are

individuated through matter’.48

Since Averroes does not provide a direct response to the problem in thethirteenth discussion of Tah:fut al-tah:fut, which is specially dedicatedto the issue of God’s knowledge of particulars, a response must be soughtelsewhere in this and other works by the Andalusian philosopher.

47 Averroes, Tah:fot, 232; Tah:fut, i. 138.48 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Pt. i, Qu. 14, art. 11 (utrum

Deus cognoscat singularia). Translation (modified) in St. Thomas Aquinas,Summa Theologica, (5 vols., trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province,Maryland; Christian Classics [repr.] 1981), i. 81.


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One can envisage an indirect response when Averroes says that God’sessence ‘is the totality of all intellects, indeed all existents’.49

What is the meaning of this apparently mysterious statement? Wemust now turn to Averroes’ conception of matter and its relation to theGodhead, and also to the relation between forms and matter, the unionof which gives rise to individuals.

Matter is the substrate in which forms inhere. It is also, in itself,pure potentiality. Now potentiality, as the opposite of actuality, is thatwhich can possibly exist but only exists once it is actualized by an agent,an active principle. For Averroes as for Avicenna matter contains apotentiality for existing but possesses in itself no capacity for self-motionor transformation. Therefore, matter exists solely through its relationto forms, and indeed it contains in potency all forms.50 According toAverroes, ‘the philosophers had seen that every sensible existent iscomposed of matter and form, and that the form is the entity throughwhich the existent becomes existent’.51 In the Long Commentary on theMetaphysics he also states that prime matter, which is divested of form,does not exist outside the mind.52

This point is further pressed in the Long Commentary on Aristotle’sMetaphysics:

[matter is] ‘this thing’ in so far as it is seen . . .The meaning of ‘it is ‘‘this thing’’

insofar as it is seen’ is: it is that the being or individual existence of which is

considered from the point of view of the thing by which it becomes perceptible,

namely the form, because matter is not perceptible by itself but only through

something else, i. e., through the form. It has no existence save insofar as it is

perceptible through something else . . .Matter has existence only in relation to the

existence through which it is seen, i.e., form’.53

The next step is to ascertain who or what is responsible for thecombination of matter and form in any given substance. This is, asAverroes himself admits in the Long Commentary on the Metaphysics,a difficult question that had divided a number of thinkers and

49 Averroes, Tah:fot, i. 202.50 For a more comprehensive treatment of the concept of matter in Averroes see

R. Ramon Guerrero, ‘Sobre el concepto de materia en Averroes’, in A. MartınezLorca (ed.), Al encuentro de Averroes (Madrid: Trotta, 1993), 71–92.

51 Averroes, Tah:fot, 432–3; Tah:fut, i. 260.52 Averroes, (ed. M. Bouyges), Tafs;r m: ba6d al-3ab; 6a (Beirut: Dar

el-Machreq, 3 vols., 1973), i. 1474.53 Ibid, 1466, 1475. Trans. C. Genequand, Long Commentary on the

Metaphysics (Leiden: E.J. Brill), 94, 98.

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interpreters of Aristotle. With regard to this issue, Averroes follows thetheory that seems to him the most faithful to Aristotle. Because bothmatter and forms are eternal—coming to be and passing a way is a resultof the combination of the two—and because nothing is generated fromnothing, the form is not created and applied to matter, thereby givingrise to an individual. Also, it is not applied to matter by a separate agent,totally detached from matter, for (as we have seen) only that can beactualized in any given being which this being already possesses inpotentiality. Averroes is thus rejecting Avicenna’s theory of the datorformarum.54 According to Averroes, the combination of matter and formis effected by an agent who turns into act the forms that are potentiallyin matter: ‘the agent produces only the compound from matter andform by moving matter and changing it to educe the potentiality it hasfor the form into actuality.’55

If we consider God as the foremost efficient, formal and final cause ofthe universe and all it contains, we are bound to conclude that accordingto Averroes He is at bottom responsible for the being of each and everyintellect and existent. And because His causality is wholly identifiedwith His knowledge, this knowledge extends equally to particulars.56

How this knowledge comes about is not, and cannot be, grasped bythe human mind, for it would require us to know the whole myriad ofcauses and effects which produce every single movement and changein the universe, i.e. it would require us to have a knowledge that isthe prerogative of God. Furthermore, we cannot speak of a ‘process’of knowing in God, since His knowledge occurs, as His creation, in aneternal ‘now’. In rejecting Avicenna’s formulation of God’s knowledge,Averroes implies that there is no ‘process’ of acquiring knowledge in thecase of God, unlike the case of humans.

54 Averroes, Tafs;r m: ba6d al-tab; 6a, i. 1497–8.55 Ibid, 1499; (trans. Genequand) Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, 109.56 Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation, 244: ‘By His

cognitional identity with the paradigms of all specific natures in their bestorder, God not only determines what the intelligible structures and causalrelations of things can be, He also sets in motion that purely natural processesthat generate particular individuals and states of affairs. All this is accomplishedinsofar as God is a final cause. The ultimate effects or objects of His knowledge,therefore, will inevitably be individuals, because only individuals can bemeaningfully understood to seek after or move toward an end.’


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CONCLUSION

In the foregoing I have discussed the issue of God’s knowledge ofparticulars according to Averroes, including al-Ghazz:l;’s criticism ofAvicenna’s theory. Al-Ghazz:l; begins by attacking the philosophers’entire conception of God as being fundamentally un-Qur’:nic andun-Islamic. From that premise he proceeds to demolish their views onGod’s knowledge, and concludes that, according to them, God does notknow Himself or any particular individual or event. The main target ofal-Ghazz:l;’s criticism was Avicenna and his contention that God knowsparticulars in a universal way.

In his response to al-Ghazz:l;, Averroes’ main contribution is hisrejection of Avicenna’s formulation that God knows particulars in auniversal way. Averroes criticizes this view because it does away with thedistinction between divine and human knowledge. While the processof human knowledge entails abstraction of universals from individualsubstances, God’s knowledge cannot be characterized as universal orparticular. His knowledge is neither particular because it does notinvolve sense experience, nor universal, because it is not abstractedknowledge.

The upshot of his qualification regarding the use of ‘particular’ and‘universal’ with reference to the ‘mode’ of divine knowledge is that theessence of God’s knowledge is at bottom unknowable to the humanmind. This position may resemble al-Ghazz:l;’s overall negative stanceconcerning our understanding of God’s knowledge but in actuality it isradically different. By way of stating what God’s knowledge is not, andby clearly showing the differences between divine and human knowl-edge, Averroes gives us a clearer grasp of what that knowledge must belike—much in the same way that in negative theology God is conceivedthrough negative attributes—although we cannot know exactly thenature of that knowledge.

The second important aspect of Averroes’ response consists in stressingthat in God causality and knowledge are identical, which echoesAvicenna’s own position. He explains the notion of God as cause,understood here in its fourfold dimension. Unlike human knowledge,God’s knowledge is causative. Although God is efficient, final and formalcause He is not mixed with matter and hence does not perceiveparticulars in the way that humans do. Although Averroes does notprovide a full-fledged and comprehensive solution to the fundamentalproblem of the connection between the intellectual and the material inthe thirteenth discussion of Tah:fut al-tah:fut, which would helps us tounderstand how God knows particulars, by drawing on other works and

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taking his overall philosophical stance into account, one can concludethat a convincing response to the issue of God’s knowledge of particularsis provided. This response is given indirectly and implicitly because itdraws on the difference between God’s and our knowledge rather thancharacterizing God’s knowledge in a positive way. And the philosophicalframework giving rise to such a reply involves not just the rejectionof al-Ghazz:l;’s view of God and how God relates to the world, butalso the rejection of a number of fundamental philosophical views heldby Avicenna concerning divine causation.

E-mail: [email protected]


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Documents

Journal of Islamic Studies 2006 Belo 177 99