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AL-MAS28IL AL-QUDSIYYA AND MULL2

4ADR2S PROOFS FOR MENTAL EXISTENCE1

R O X A N NE D . M A R C O TT EUniversity of Queensland

Aristotle noted that representation occurs through particular mentalimages and wrote that without a presentation [that is, an image]intellectual activity is impossible.2 Mental representation, therefore, lies

1 Presentations of earlier versions of this paper include Mental Existence inMull: 4adr:(d.1050/1640) in the Arabic al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, delivered at theCordoba and Isfahan International Colloquium on Two Schools of IslamicPhilosophy, Isfahan, Iran (April 279, 2002) and A Philosopher at Work: Mull:4adr:sal-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, delivered at the Department of Near and MiddleEastern Civilizations, University of Toronto, Canada (October 31, 2005). Iwould like to thank warmly Professors Mehdi Mohaghegh and HermannLandolt (my shaykh) who enabled my attendance at the Cordoba and Isfahanconference in 2002. Research for this paper was made possible by an FCAR

(Formation de chercheurs et aide a la recherche) Postdoctoral Fellowship,Quebec Government (Canada), a residency as Visiting Researcher at the Institutfrancais detudes arabes aDamas, IFEAD (June 2000 to June 2001), and at theInstitut francais de recherche en Iran, IFRI, and the University of Tehran (August2001 to May 2002) as Visiting Researcher. This enabled me to attend the classesof Professor (Eujjat al-Isl:m) MuAsayn Kadvar on Mull: 4adr: at TarbiyatModarres University (Tehran), who was a wonderful guide to the intellectualworld of Mull: 4adr:. Many insights included in this paper find their origin inour class discussions. I also wish to express my most sincere gratitude for thejudicious and most helpful comments, suggestions and corrections provided by

this Journals two anonymous reviewers. They helped me to clarify a number ofpassages and avoid many of the pitfalls any newcomer to an area of scholarship isbound to encounter. It goes without saying that any infelicities or errors thatremain are mine alone.

2 The best example being geometrical proofs, cf. Aristotle,De Anima(transl.J. A. Smith in The Works of Aristotle, under the editorship of W. D. Ross;Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1931] 1963), iii. 431b2 and 434a9 (respectively); cf.id. Posterior Analytics (transl. with notes by Jonathan Barnes; Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1975), 100a416; cf. id. Metaphysics: Newly Translated as aPostscript to Natural Science with an Analytical Index of Technical Terms

(transl. Richard Hope; New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), 980b28981a9.

The Author (2011). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Oxford Centre for Islamic

Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected]

Published online 7 April 2011

Journal of Islamic Studies 22:2 (2011) pp. 153182 doi:10.1093/jis/etr029

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at the heart of cognition and the construction of knowledge. The soulnever thinks without an image, Aristotle adding that the faculty ofthinking then thinks the forms in the images.3 It is not surprising,therefore, that epistemological issues have preoccupied the minds of

philosophers who followed in his footsteps ever since. This is not to saythat all agreed with his views, as commentators also attempted toaccount for non-discursive thinking, heralded by those who upheld moremystical epistemologies, whether this was to be found in the works of theAncients Greeks or not. This was, in fact, the position of4adr al-Dn al-Shr:z, known as Mull: 4adr: (d. 1051/1641) who attributed greatimportance to knowledge by presence (Au@


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which human beings grasp and comprehend the world. They are alsoentities constitutive of human consciousness.7

In what follows, we will present the three arguments for thedemonstration of mental existence (wuj


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included in his al-Shaw:hid al-rub


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earlier predecessors and their concerns and questions over epistemolo-gical and ontological issues raised by their analyses of mentalrepresentation to provide general background information to Mull:4adr:s discussions.

Avicenna (d.429/1037), for example, wrote about both epistemologi-cal and ontological issues related to mental existence.12 In hisal-Ta6lq:t(Notes), for example, he notes that the general meaning (ma6na) doesnot have a real existence in the extra-mental reality or in concreto(fl-a6y:n), but rather in the mind (dhihn),13 a distinction he reiteratedin his al-Ish:r:t wa-l-tanbh:t. The perception of a thing occurs via therepresentation of its reality (Aaqqa). What is perceived is the reality ofthe thing, but without possessing all the characteristics that its extra-mental existence possesses, for example, geometrical shapes, or the

image (mith:l) of something concretely existing in the external reality.What is perceived is an imprint that occurs in the essence of the onewho perceives and becomes one with the form. These representations orimages are mental (dhihniyya) forms.14 Avicenna held that there was adistinct mental existence, but nowhere did he seem to have elaboratedmuch on the issue. The closest one gets to a discussion of mental entitiesis found among discussions on intentionality.15 It will suffice, for ourpurpose, to note that, in his al-Asf:r al-arba6a, Mull: 4adr: makesextensive use ofal-TaABlof Bahmany:r Ibn Marzub:n (d. 459/1066), a

summary of sorts of Avicennasal-Shif:8, on which Mull: 4adr:relies asa representative text of the Peripatetic tradition.16

12 al-F:r:b (d. 339/950) would have, before Avicenna, discussed mentalexistence, especially in his 6Uy


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Ab< l-Barak:t al-Baghd:d (d. ca. 1160) alluded similarly to thedistinctive nature of mental existence with his nominalist (conceptualist)approach.17 In his al-Mu6tabar f l-Aikma (Considerations onPhilosophy), he noted that mental perception (idr:k dhihn) was the

perception of abstracted forms that only have an existence in the mindand which possess their own characteristics (mza) and reality(Aaq:8iq).18 Abstract forms include both concepts abstracted fromobjects that exist in the world, such as primary intelligible, of whichthe concept of humanity is an example, and the meanings ofmetaphysical entities, such as soul and entities that exist at ontologi-cally superior levels.19 These second types of mental entities are universalconcepts that are not abstracted from any particular individual entity, theso-called secondary intelligible of which some logical categories are

examples. These are the ones towards which the soul needs to turn.20Three quarters of a century later, Shih:b al-Dn al-Suhraward(d. 587/

1191) was also to discuss, for example, in his al-Mash:ri6 wa-l-mu3:raA:t (Paths and Conversations), the distinctive nature possessedby mental existence with regards to its intelligibility, that is, its capacityto be grasped by the mind.21 These discussions find parallels in the earlierworks of both Avicenna and Fakhr al-Dn al-R:z, one of al-Suhrawardscontemporaries who, in his al-Mab:Aith al-mashriqiyya (OrientalInvestigations), provided a number of proofs to establish the distinctive

nature of mental existence, different from any other type of being whose

17 Shlomo Pines, Studies in Abul-Barakat al-Baghdads Poetics andMetaphysics in The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines, 5 vols., vol. i: Studiesin Abul-Barak:t al-Baghd:d. Physics and Metaphysics (Leiden: Brill /Jerusalem: Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 5 vols., 1979), i. 259338,esp. 27486 [reprint of Scripta Hierosolymitana, 6 (1960): 12098]; cf. id.,Beitrage zur islamischen Atomenlehre (Berlin: Gra fenhainichen, Gedruckt bei A.Hein gmbh, 1936), 823; cf. id., Studies in Islamic Atomism (transl. Michael

Schwarz, ed. Tzvi Langermann; Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The HebrewUniversity, 1997).

18 Ab


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logical priority of one accident over another accident, while both occurat one and the same time.25

In what follows, we will see what influence some of these historicalarguments had on Mull: 4adr:s demonstrations of mental existence in

his al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, especially his engagement with the works ofFakhr al-Dn al-R:z and NaBr al-Dn al-F


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MENTAL EXISTENCE (WUJ?D DHIHNI) INAL-MAS28IL AL-QUDSIYYA

In a number of his works, Mull: 4adr: discusses the nature of mental

existence, seeking to explicate the nature of the independent existencemental entities possess. Among his works, al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya is ofparticular interest.29 It is considered to be one of his later works, andposterior to hisal-Asf:r al-arba6ato which it refers. Mull: 4adr:tells usthat his aim in writing this work is, first, to present a condensed selectionof arguments that is more easily accessible to readers of his works,especially in view of the fact that he scattered a number of argumentsthroughout his writings (MQ, 186.2118.2). His second aim is toprovide a readable account of three important philosophical issues,

mental existence being one of them (MQ, 187.35). When he mentionsthat his account will be readable, he most probably alludes to discussionsfound in the works of his master, Mr D:m:d, who was well known forhis use of convoluted expressions that made most of his texts verydifficult to decipher and understand. Moreover, Mull: 4adr: indicatesthat some of the arguments he includes in al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya wereprovided to him by inspirations of the heart (al-w:rid:t al-qalbiyya),such that those inspirations (some of the arguments he puts forward) arenot derived from the discursive speculations of formal philosophy

(rasmiyya), theological debates, blind imitation of the public, or the falsearguments of the sophists, hence the importance that Mull: 4adr:himself attributes to this particular work.30

Mull: 4adr: divides al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya into three parts (maq:la),each dedicated to a major philosophical issue with which he deals in hisother works. The first part consists of an analysis of the basic propertiesand divisions of existence (wuj


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or God (MQ, 210.1216.12). Finally, the third and longest section of thework presents a number of demonstrations to establish the nature ofmental existence (wuj


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existence of mental entities, their nature, their epistemological function,and their relation to the external world.

Mull: 4adr:s first remark pertains to the nature of the distinctmodalities of existence that beings possess, whether they occur in the

mind or in the external reality. The first modality of being is mental,whereas the second modality corresponds to in re existence. Theirrespective modalities of being determine the nature of these two types ofentities.34 On the one hand, entities that exist extra-mentally are deemedcomplete beings. Their quiddity (m:hiyya), which Mull: 4adr:considers mentally posited (i6tib:r), possesses all the specific effects(:th:r makhB


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therefore, of paramount importance in Mull: 4adr:s ontology, wherebybeing is both a principle of commonality and differentiation.38

Mull: 4adr:makes a further distinction between two types of mentalentitiesrepresented by Bx1 (a) and Bx1 (b), as in Diagram 2. On the onehand, mental entities can be quidditiesrepresented by xof entitiesthat exist in the external reality and have a concrete modality of

Diagram 1: Correspondence of quiddities in the mind

Diagram 2: Modalities of mental existence

38 Rizvi,Mull: 4adr:, 68.

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existencerepresented by Ax1. These mental entities correspond toconcepts, in some way, abstracted from objects existing in the extra-mental world, such asprimary intelligibleslike, for instance, the conceptof humanityrepresented by Bx1 (a). On the other hand, mental entities

can be concepts or universals that are not abstracted from any particularindividual entity that may exist in the extra-mental world, for instance,secondary intelligibles, like the concepts of causality, of the first being, orof logical categoriesrepresented by Bx1 (b).39

Mull: 4adr:also provides the example of substantiality (jawhariyya)with which he identifies the three modalities of being it possesses, anexample indicative of his gradation of being theory. A first modality ofbeing a mental entity may possess is (i) its existence itself independent ofany kind of substrate and matter, for example, its existence present in the

active intellect (or in the separate intelligences or those present in God).A second modality of being a mental entity may possess is (ii) itsexistence in matter and affected by external causes or generation andcorruption, for example, specific forms and terrestrial souls. A thirdmodality of being mental entities may possess is (iii) their existenceviewed as a type of weaker existence, for example, imagined forms,neither active nor passive (MQ, 218.411). 40 In a fashion similar todiscussions found in his al-Asf:r al-arba6a, Mulla 4adr: identifiesdifferent intellective mental forms, without, in fact, excluding the

possibilities of different, imaginative forms.41

At the heart of Mull: 4adr:s epistemic process lies a unity of reality ofall knowable entities thesis: the unity of quiddities that belong to mentalentities and those that belong to their extra-mental in re existence. Viathe apprehension of quiddities by a knowing subject, this unity ofquiddities offers a partial solution to the problem of the representa-tiveness or the correspondence of mental concepts with extra-mentalobjects. Mull: 4adr: adopts what some have labeled the essentialidentification, or the identification of quiddity thesis.42 Since both the

object in the world and its mental representation are believed to share thesame quiddity, access to the real essence of entities found in the world

39 For a study of this concept in Avicenna, see Deborah L. Black, MentalExistence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna, Mediaeval Studies, 61 (1999):4579.

40 Mull: 4adr:, al-Shaw:hid, 24.111641 Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 272.4277.4.42 Mustafa Muhaqqiq Damad, Some Notes on the Problem of Mental

Existence in Islamic Philosophy, Transcendent Philosophy, 2/1 (2001): 5361,

esp. 556; Rahman, The Philosophy of Mull: 4adr:, 46. This view appears tohave been rejected by Qu3b al-Dn al-Shr:z: see Damad, Some Notes, 57.

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becomes possible via their corresponding quiddities found in the mind,such that the extra-mental world can be truly known, as it really is. Someknowledge occurs more directly, something that knowledge by presence(6ilmAu@


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being within Mull: 4adr:s modulation of being ontology. This is theworld of power and of activity in which the soul becomes amicrocosmic reflection of the macrocosm. Within its own psychicrealm, human souls possess, in some sense, certain affinities with Gods

creative power in the external reality (MQ, 218.1218).Mull: 4adr: explains that the nature of the manifestation of a

given reality merely depends on the degree of perfection of theagent. Hence, the human soul creates entities that are deficient,since the soul itself is deficient, and that these mental entities merelyresemble entities that exist in the external reality, because the soulpossesses a limited creative power. Its creative power, nonetheless,enables it to produce mental entities. The soul ultimately leads towardsperfection so that its creative power and the images it produces increases

and strengthens.

DEFINITION OF MENTAL EXISTENCE

Towards the end of the preamble to the section on mental existence ofal-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya,46 Mull: 4adr: provides a definition of mentalexistence, one which he opposes to in re existence:

This existence that belongs to things and the quiddities upon which [all] specificeffects (:th:r) corresponding to it are not found when the soul conceives of them

(yataBawwaru-h:) and that are present (A:@ira) in the world of the soul, even

when it stops to look at the external world, is called a mental (dhihniyyan),

shadowy (Cilliyyan), and imaginal (mith:liyyan) existence.47

That other [types of existence] in which [all] the effects corresponding to it are

found is called an in re (kh:rijiyyan), concrete (6ayniyyan) and fundamental

(aBlan) existence (MQ, 220.203).

In his al-Asf:r al-arba6a, Mull: 4adr: presents a similar definition ofmental and extra-mental existences, where he also discusses the varyingdegrees of existence of mental entities in terms of modality (naAw) ormanifestation (Cuh


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DEMONSTRATIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OFMENTAL ENTITIES

Throughout his works, Mull: 4adr: provides a number of demonstra-

tions to prove the existence of mental entities. In a recent study of Mull:4adr:s metaphysics of being, Rizvi provides an excellent discussion ofthe six demonstrations that Mull: 4adr:includes in the first journey ofhisal-Asf:r al-arba6a, which can be summarized as follows:

1. An argument based on the possibility of conceiving entities that do not have a

real existence (in extra-mental reality) or that are impossible, but which the

mind can conceive;49

2. An argument based on the possibility of affirming something (predication)

about non-existent entities, such as fictional entities;

50

3. An argument based on the possibility of abstracting universals, such as

whiteness or the concept of quiddity;51

4. An argument, called an insight (istibB:r), based on the possibility of

conceiving of secondary intelligibles that can, nonetheless, be predicated of

things;52

5. An argument, identified as a divine inspiration (min al-6arshiyy:t al-w:rida),

based on the representation of the goal of every action in the mind that has, in

a sense, no existence before it has been realized;53

6. An argument based on the effects of mental entities associated with the

estimative faculty on the body.54

49 Ibid, 268.10269.13; cf. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 80.50 Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 269.14272.3; cf. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 801.51 Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 272.4274.20; cf. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 82.52 Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 274.21275.2; cf. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 82-3.53 Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 275.37; cf. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 83.54 Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 275.8277.4; cf. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 83. In his

commentary on Mull: 4adr:sal-Asf:r al-arba6a, Jav:d2mulidentifies at least

seven different demonstrations: (1) the ability to distinguish between differentnon-existents (ma6d


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All of Mull: 4adr:s demonstrations of mental existence weresubsequently discussed by H:d Sabzaw:r (d. 1289/1872) in his SharAal-ManC


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exposition that Mull: 4adr:provides of this proof when compared withwhat he included in hisal-Asf:r al-arba6a, thus providing us with greaterinsight into his elaboration of this particular demonstration.

This first demonstration rests on the capacity of the soul to envision or

to represent a non-existent entity in the form of the non-existing end thatinitiates motion. This demonstration may be labeled a teleological proof.

The first premise of his demonstration is that universal natures thatmove their elemental matters are attentive, in the sense of being inclined,to their natural ends.57 Mull: 4adr: gives three examples: first, the

abilities to contemplate (mush:had:t) the forms of that which is known (bi-Buwar al-ma6l


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attention of simple elemental entities to a certain place; second, theattention of celestial spheres to a certain position; and third, theattention of composites to a certain quality or a certain quantity.58

The second premise is that the end of every motion, even the end of a

request, must necessarily possess a certain existence (wuj


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can yearn for their final causes (6ilal gh:8iyya) and that these ends exist(mawj


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some kind of subsisting matter (amr th:bit) that indicates the existenceof the end it would possess in potentiality and of which the naturalswould possess a certain awareness (shu6


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of the motions (Aarak:t), then, these ends necessarily possess another modality

(naAw) of existence that is called a mental existence. (MQ, 221.18-222.34)

What Mull: 4adr: does is to maintain the idea that ends that lead tomotion must amount to some sort of mental existence, what he calls adeficient being (kawn n:qiB), and ascribes these mental entities to theactive power of natural bodies that is attentive to its own end (a type ofmental existence), as each universal nature yearns for its perfection.

Yearning for those ends occurs because natural bodies possessdeficiencies, deficiencies that are of two kinds. They can either beaccording to substantiality and subsistence or according to excellenceand completeness. For the first type of deficiency, Mull: 4adr:gives theexample of the motions of seminal and germinal matter that leads to thecreation of individual animals and plants. For the second type ofdeficiency, he provides the example of the motions of simple bodies andof inanimate composites in their quantities, qualities, colours, andlocations:

The active power is attentive to the deficient being (kawn n:qiB) and yearns for

its completion, and it exists in natural bodies that possess deficiencies that are

either according to substantiality (tajawhur) and subsistence (qiw:m) or

according to excellence (fa@la) and completeness (tam:m). The first is like the

motions of seminal (minawiyya) and germinal (b:dhriyya) matters for the

coming about of animal and vegetal individuals (ashkh:B). And the second is likethe motions of simple bodies, of inanimate composites in their quantities, their

qualities, their colours, and their locations. (MQ, 222.510)

But what does Mull: 4adr: mean when he writes that the activepower of natural bodies is attentive to its own end, a mental existence, aseach universal nature yearns for its completion? Although he does notelaborate,65 he had mentioned that it was established that the ends ofthese natural motions belong to another world. Here is the metaphysicalleap that permits Mull: 4adr:to maintain that ends are mental entities.

These ends are now ascribed to a distinct ontological realm:

Indeed, it has been established that the ends (maq:Bid) of those natural motions

belong to another world, that they possess a subsistence (thub


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is] the real (6ayn) world, contemplated with this eye or with any of the external

senses, and [it is] the imaginal world (6:lam al-mith:l) that those who tread the

mystical path (sull:k) and ascetics (ahl al-riy:@a) unveil. (MQ, 222.1115)

Here, Mull: 4adr:may develop an original argument by having endspostulated as causes of motion or action that can not only exist in themind, but that can also exist in natural universals (for example, universalnature), before they are ever materialized. Such a demonstration wouldrest on the assumption that natural universals exist and that they can beaware of their ends. It also supposes that they are, somehow, the forms ofconcrete individuated existences, the depositors of their ends, the finalends guiding material beings toward their completion.

THE SECOND DEMONSTRATION

The second demonstration included in al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya is well-known and appears (perhaps for the first time) in Fakhr al-Dn al-R:zsal-Mab:Aith al-mashriqiyya (Oriental Investigations).66 The demonstra-tion soon found its way into the works of numerous writers, for example,NaBr al-Dn al-F


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about something, is subordinated to the existence of that particularthing, independently of the type of existence it may possess.70

The third premise is that judgment is not limited to what exists in theexternal reality. Mull: 4adr: argues that judgments apply more

comprehensively to all entities that are realized and determined in themind. He gives the example of the Phoenix (6anq:8) and of themathematical entity of the triangle that have no existence in the externalworld. A representation of the Phoenix can occur in the mind, such thatthe following proposition A Phoenix, or any Phoenix, is a kind of birdmust necessarily be true of any representation of a Phoenix to actuallycorrespond to a Phoenix. The same holds true for the proposition thatthe sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles (that is,180 degrees).71

A final premise is that the truth-value that can be positively (Bidq al-Aukm al-j:b) ascribed to any given proposition, or being a reference,requires, first, the establishment of the existence of its substratum(maw@


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this work)in other words, a type of mental existence (MQ, 223.612).In al-Asf:r al-arba6a, for example, Mull: 4adr: notes that it ispermissible for the thing to be existent in the intellect (th:bitan fl-6aql)and non-existent in extra-mental reality (ma6d


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THE THIRD DEMONSTRATION

The third demonstration fromal-Mas:8il al-qudsiyyarests on the abilityof the human soul to conceive of universal concepts or notions (ma6n:), a

demonstration that Mull: 4adr:included in hisal-Asf:r al-arba6a(thirddemonstration) and his al-Shaw:hid al-rub


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necessarily conclude that the universal does not belong to the categoryof individual beings.79 In accordance with Mull: 4adr:s theory ofgradation of being, the essential unicity (waAdati-hi al-dh:tiyya) ofuniversals expands in stages of being (a3w:r min al-kawn) and

possesses, in as much as these are universals, different and variouseffects (:th:r) and modalities (anA:8), for example, dimension (MQ,224.1317), but whose distinctive existences only occur in the mind.

Mull: 4adr: then notes that it can be objected that entities such asgenera (ajn:s), species (anw:6) and, more generally, universal natures(3ab:8i6) all possess an existence in the receptacle of particular entities(wuj


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attribute and is the most general, it exists by means of a modality of theexistence of the material sensibles, and if it is united with existence of itsindividualities in the external reality, then it would be necessary that thequiddity consists of a unique objective (6ayn) entity in the external

reality, individualized through its numerous attributed (mar


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position taken up or criticized by later philosophers has raised a numberof problems. In al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, Mull: 4adr: discusses five ofthese problems (ashk:l) succinctly, 82 but one needs to turn to his al-Asf:r al-arba6afor more extensive discussions and arguments addressing

those problems.

MENTAL EXISTENCE IN AL-MAS28ILAL-QUDSIYYA

An understanding of Mull: 4adras views on mental existence is quiteimportant for our understanding of his gradation of being ontology, as

mental existence remains one of the three modes of being at the heart ofthis novel ontology. As such, mental entities possess various ontologicalmodes of beings and are subject, like linguistic and extra-mental entities,to the modulation of being.83 In hisal-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, a later work,Mull: 4adr: discusses only three of the six proofs he included in his al-Asf:r al-arba6a to demonstrate the existence of mental entities, threeproofs, we may assume, he deemed rather important. A first proof isbased on the ability to judge (between two mental concepts), that is, theability of the mind to predicate positive propositions onto non-existents,an argument that goes back at least to the works of Fakhr al-Dn al-R:z,Mull: 4adr:being an attentive reader of not only the latter but of bothAvicennas and NaBr al-Dn al-F


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mind, as well as in the natural universals (for example, universal nature),and become the metaphysical providers of ends to which naturals aspire,the depositors of these ends, the final ends guiding material beingstoward their completion. The additional elements that Mull: 4adr:

provides for this particular demonstration illustrate his skills at creativephilosophical investigation and his capacity to elaborate novel argu-ments regarding one of the issues that still remains of paramountimportance for the history of philosophy of mind in the Islamicateworld.85 Indeed, Mull: 4adr:s intellectual endeavours are the fruits of atrue philosopher at work.

85 al-Sabzav:r further builds on Mull: 4adras proof and adds a distinctionbetween different types of agents: agents endowed with the ability to choose

(ikhtiy:r) and to utilize (taskhr), as opposed to agents moved by compulsion(qasr), and finally, guided (hid:y:t) agents, cf.2mul,RaAq-i makht

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Journal of Islamic Studies 2011 Marcotte 153 82