JP 2-0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations"

Doctrinefor Intelligence Support

to Joint Operations

Joint Publication 2-0

9 March 2000

Intelligence plays a vital role in the conduct of successful jointoperations. Proper employment of collection and analysis assets isessential if joint force commanders are to gain and maintaininformation superiority. Without accurate intelligence, our joint forceswill lose the essential advantages of surprise, operational security,and flexibility.

We must also be cognizant of the changing roles and missionsfacing the Armed Forces of the United States and ensure thatintelligence planning keeps pace with the full range of militaryoperations. The future battlefield will demand high levels of jointinteroperability and force enhancement, and the value of intelligencesupport as an exploitable multiplier cannot be overstated.

Joint force commanders, planners, and warfighters at all levelsare encouraged to become thoroughly familiar with the doctrine inthis publication and use it as a tool for meeting the Nation’s futurechallenges.

HENRY H. SHELTONChairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication is the keystone documentof the intelligence support to joint operationsseries. It describes doctrine for intelligencesupport to interagency, joint, andmultinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrine forjoint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the Armed Forcesin preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

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Preface

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Intentionally Blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. v

CHAPTER IROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN JOINT OPERATIONS

• Intelligence and Joint Warfare ................................................................................... I-1• Intelligence Purposes ................................................................................................ I-3• Intelligence and the Range of Military Operations ..................................................... I-5• Intelligence Responsibilities ..................................................................................... I-7• Intelligence and the JFC ........................................................................................... I-8

CHAPTER IITHE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

• The Intelligence Cycle and Joint Operations............................................................. II-1• The Intelligence Cycle as a Model ............................................................................ II-1• Intelligence Disciplines and Sources ........................................................................ II-2• The Intelligence Cycle ............................................................................................. II-2

CHAPTER IIIINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

• Intelligence Operations .......................................................................................... III-1• Intelligence and the Levels of War ......................................................................... III-1• Major Intelligence Tasks ........................................................................................ III-4• Responsibilities of the Joint Force J-2 .................................................................... III-9

CHAPTER IVJOINT INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

• Purpose .................................................................................................................. IV-1• Characteristics ........................................................................................................ IV-2• Requirements ......................................................................................................... IV-2• Standards ............................................................................................................... IV-4• Organizations ......................................................................................................... IV-4• Systems .................................................................................................................. IV-9• Procedures ........................................................................................................... IV-11

APPENDICES

A Intelligence in Multinational Operations ........................................................... A-1B References ......................................................................................................... B-1C Administrative Instructions ................................................................................ C-1

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GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-3

FIGURES

I-1 Dimensions of Battlespace ............................................................................. I-2I-2 Intelligence Purposes ...................................................................................... I-3I-3 Intelligence During Military Operations Other Than War ............................... I-7I-4 Joint Force Intelligence Responsibilities ......................................................... I-9I-5 Standard Support Missions ........................................................................... I-10II-1 The Intelligence Cycle ................................................................................... II-1II-2 Intelligence Disciplines ................................................................................. II-3II-3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Process ............................. II-10II-4 Categories of Intelligence Products .............................................................. II-11II-5 Attributes of Intelligence ............................................................................. II-14III-1 Levels of Intelligence .................................................................................. III-2III-2 J-2 Responsibilities .................................................................................... III-10IV-1 Architectural Requirements ......................................................................... IV-3IV-2 Architectural Standards ............................................................................... IV-4IV-3 Joint Intelligence Organizations ................................................................... IV-5IV-4 Joint Intelligence Center and Joint Intelligence Support Element

Augmentation Sources .............................................................................. IV-8A-1 Principles for Multinational Operations ........................................................ A-2A-2 United Nations Operations in Somalia Intelligence Architecture ................... A-4A-3 US Intelligence Support to SFOR ................................................................. A-5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

•

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Intelligence provides knowledge of the enemy to joint forcecommanders (JFCs). Intelligence tells JFCs what theiradversaries or potential adversaries are doing, what they arecapable of doing, and what they may do in the future.Intelligence assists JFCs and their staffs in visualizing thebattlespace and in achieving information superiority.Intelligence also contributes to information superiority byattempting to discern the adversary’s probable intent and futurecourse of action.

In peacetime, intelligence operations seek to provide thenational leadership with the information needed to realizenational goals and objectives, while providing militaryleadership with the information needed to accomplish missionsand implement the national security strategy. During war,intelligence strives to identify the adversary’s capabilities andcenters of gravity, project probable courses of action, andassist in planning friendly force employment. During militaryoperations other than war, intelligence provides assessmentsthat help the JFC decide which forces to deploy; when, how,and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in amanner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest humanand political cost.

Knowledge of the enemy isone of the fundamentals ofjoint warfare.

Intelligence is criticalacross the range ofmilitary operations.

Explains the Role of Intelligence

Defines the Commander’s Role in Intelligence Operations

Explains the Intelligence Cycle

Discusses Intelligence Operations at Each Level of War

Establishes Standards for Joint Intelligence Architecture

Role of Intelligence

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Executive Summary

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JFCs and their component commanders are the keyplayers in the planning and conduct of intelligenceoperations. Commanders are ultimately responsible forensuring that intelligence is fully integrated into their plansand operations. Commanders state operational requirementsand provide continuous feedback to ensure optimumintelligence support to operations. This interface is essentialto the following purposes of intelligence: to support thecommander; to identify, define, and nominate objectives; tosupport operational planning and execution; to avoid surprise;to assist friendly deception efforts; and to evaluate the effectsof operations.

The intelligence cycle provides a simplified model of howintelligence operations are conducted and establishes the basisfor common joint intelligence terminology, tactics, techniques,and procedures.

Commanders are morethan just consumers ofintelligence.

The intelligence cycle is animportant joint doctrinalconcept.

The Intelligence Cycle

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

PLANNINGAND

DIRECTION

DISSEMINATIONAND

INTEGRATION

COLLECTION

PROCESSINGAND

EXPLOITATION

ANALYSISAND

PRODUCTION

MISSION

E

VALUATIO

N

AN

DEFE DBAC

K

Commander’s Role in Intelligence Operations

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Executive Summary

Intelligence operations are the wide-ranging activitiesconducted by intelligence staffs and organizations to providethe commander with accurate and timely intelligence. Effectiveintelligence operations enable commanders at all levels to applytheir available forces wisely, efficiently, and effectively.Resources used by a JFC in intelligence operations may include,in addition to those of the JFC’s own command, those ofadjacent forces, theater, and national levels.

The concept of strategic, operational, and tacticalintelligence operations aids JFCs and their intelligence staffsin visualizing the flow of intelligence from one level to thenext. The concept facilitates the allocation of requiredcollection, analytical, and dissemination resources and permitsthe assignment of appropriate intelligence tasks to national,theater, component, and supporting intelligence elements. Ateach level of intelligence operations, certain major tasks mustbe performed if the JFC is to receive the necessary intelligence.

A joint system of command, control, communications,computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissancecapabilities enables the Intelligence Community to supportthe JFC and subordinate joint force components and integratesupport from non-Defense agencies and nongovernmentalorganizations, as needed.

In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required toshare intelligence with foreign military forces and to coordinatereceiving intelligence from those forces. In some multinationaloperations, JFCs will be able to use existing internationalstandardization agreements (e.g. North Atlantic TreatyOrganization, standardization agreement) as a basis forestablishing rules and policies for conducting joint intelligenceoperations. Since each multinational operation has its uniqueaspects, such standing agreements may have to be modified oramended based on the situation. In other cases a JFCparticipating in the coalition or alliance, following national andtheater guidance, must develop the policy and procedures forthat particular operation. Intelligence efforts of the nationsmust be complementary and take into consideration the

Intelligence Operations

Joint Intelligence Operational Architecture

Intelligence operationsassist a commander inaccurately visualizing thebattlespace.

Intelligence operationsapply at all levels of war.

The joint intelligencearchitecture is a dynamic,flexible structure.

In many situations, theArmed Forces of the UnitedStates will join with foreignmilitary forces to defeatcommon adversaries or toconduct military operationsother than war.

Multinational Operations

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Executive Summary

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intelligence system strengths, limitations, and unique andvaluable capabilities each nation will have.

This publication is the keystone document of the intelligencesupport to joint operations series. This publication describesdoctrine for intelligence support to interagency, joint, andmultinational operations.

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN JOINT OPERATIONS

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1. Intelligence and JointWarfare

a. Intelligence will play a critical andcontinuous role in supporting warfighting.Advances in computer processing, preciseglobal positioning, and telecommunicationswill provide joint force commanders (JFCs)with the capability to determine accuratelocations of friendly and enemy forces, as wellas to collect, process, and disseminaterelevant data to thousands of locations. Thesecapabilities, combined with the ability to denyor degrade the adversary’s ability to collect,process, and disseminate an uninterruptedflow of information, will provide the JFC withinformation superiority. Likewise, thefusion of all-source intelligence along withthe integration of sensors, platforms,command organizations, and logistic supportcenters will allow a greater number ofoperational tasks to be accomplished faster,and will enhance battlespace awareness — akey component of information superiority.

b. Joint Publication (JP) 1, “Joint Warfareof the Armed Forces of the United States,”lists knowledge of the enemy as one of thefundamentals of joint warfare. Theintelligence community provides thatknowledge to JFCs. The intelligence systemtells JFCs what their adversaries or potentialadversaries are doing; what they are capableof doing; and what they may do in the future.

“At the heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for wagingwar in order to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faithand knowledge reinforced by experience which lays the pattern for theutilization of men, equipment, and tactics. It is fundamental to soundjudgment.”

General Curtis E. Lemay,USAF, 1968

c. The most important roles ofintelligence are assisting JFCs and theirstaffs in visualizing the battlespace (seeFigure I-1), assessing adversary capabilitiesand will, identifying the adversary’scenters of gravity (COGs), and discerningthe adversary's probable intent.Visualization includes more than havingknowledge of the characteristics of theoperational area. Visualization requiresknowing the current dispositions andactivities of adversary forces throughoutthe battlespace. It requires knowing thecurrent and future capabilities of adversaryforces to operate in and across eachbattlespace dimension based on a detailedanalysis of the effects of weather, geography,and other relevant considerations. Mostimportantly, it requires understanding theadversary’s objectives, identifying how theadversary might fulfill those objectives, anddetermining the adversary’s readiness toachieve the objectives. Together, all thesefactors make a critical contribution to theJFC’s capability to achieve informationsuperiority. However, intelligence mustenable the JFC to know the potential andprobable future state of events well in advanceof the adversary. This knowledge allows theJFC to predict the adversary’s future courseof action (COA) and scheme ofmaneuver, and to anticipate and plandetailed countermeasures to adversaryactions.

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“In antiquity (and to this day, in somecountries) kings and generals used toact on the advice of diviners or fortune-tellers. Not so the statesmen and armycommanders of today. Nevertheless,they find it hard to accept a situation inwhich nobody can foretell the future forthem. Many of them hope, or deludethemselves, that the intelligencesystem serving them can fulfill thispurpose.”

Shlomo GazitChief, Israeli Military Intelligence,

1974-1979

d. Determining the adversary’s intent isthe most difficult challenge confrontingintelligence. The factor which makes thisso difficult is the drawing of conclusionsbased upon the dynamic process of action andreaction between a joint force and itsadversary. Clausewitz referred to this as the‘process of interaction.’ He believed that “thevery nature of interaction is bound to make it

unpredictable.” Estimating the outcome ofthe ‘process of interaction’ requires theintelligence officer to know what futurefriendly actions are planned and then tosimultaneously forecast the following factors:the likelihood of the friendly action beingdetected by the adversary; how the adversarywill interpret the friendly action; theadversary’s future capabilities; and finally,how the adversary will most likely react. Thelong term projection of adversary intent isparticularly difficult because, at the time thatintelligence personnel are being asked todetermine it, adversaries may not yet haveformed their intent, may be in the process ofchanging their intent, or may not yet haveundertaken any detectable action that wouldprovide indicators of their future plans.

e. A simple example of the ‘process ofinteraction’ is the situation in which anintelligence officer, having detected certainadversary actions and correctly determined

Figure I-1. Dimensions of Battlespace

DIMENSIONS OF THE BATTLESPACE

BATTLESPACEBATTLESPACE

FutureBattle

CurrentBattle

PastBattle

Future

Forces

The Dynamicof War

ElectromagneticEnvironment

Reflections

WeaponsInteraction

InformationEnvironment

Emissions

Energy

ForceProtection

Manmade Environs

NaturalEnvironment

SeaSea

SpaceSpace

AirAir

LandLand

WeatherWeather

TempoTempo

TimeTime

AreaArea

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Role of Intelligence in Joint Operations

“An important difference between amilitary operation and a surgicaloperation is that the patient is not tieddown. But it is a common fault ofleadership to assume that he is.”

Captain Sir B.H. Liddell Hart1944

2. Intelligence Purposes

a. The Intelligence Directorate of a jointstaff (J-2) (or other designated positions) andintelligence organizations are guided byfundamental intelligence purposes. FigureI-2 summarizes intelligence purposes.

the adversary’s intent, forecasts that theadversary is preparing to attack. Thecommander reacts by having friendly forcestake appropriate defensive measures. Theadversary commander, however, detectingthese actions and deciding that attacking isno longer a desirable COA, cancels the attack.Adversary actions produced a friendlyreaction resulting in changed adversaryintent. This situation is known as the‘paradox of warning.’

f. Accurate forecasts should inform theJFC of the full range of actions open to theadversary and go on to identify whichactions are most likely. The JFC must,however, understand the dynamics that areat play in forecasting future events.

Figure I-2. Intelligence Purposes

INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

SUPPORT THE COMMANDER

IDENTIFY, DEFINE, AND NOMINATE OBJECTIVES

PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINTFORCE COMMANDER'S GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

SECURITY OF OPERATIONS AVOID DECEPTION ANDSURPRISE

SECURITY OF OPERATIONS THROUGH MILITARY DECEPTION

EVALUATE THE EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS AND MODIFYTHE APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL FORCES ORTERMINATE OPERATIONS

SUPPORT THE COMMANDER

IDENTIFY, DEFINE, AND NOMINATE OBJECTIVES

PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINTFORCE COMMANDER'S GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

SECURITY OF OPERATIONS AVOID DECEPTION ANDSURPRISE

SECURITY OF OPERATIONS THROUGH MILITARY DECEPTION

EVALUATE THE EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS AND MODIFYTHE APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL FORCES ORTERMINATE OPERATIONS

THE J-2 AND THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION MUST BEGUIDED BY FUNDAMENTAL INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES TO:THE J-2 AND THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION MUST BEGUIDED BY FUNDAMENTAL INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES TO:

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b. Support the Commander. The J-2directly supports the JFC’s responsibilitiesfor determining objectives, directingoperations, and evaluating the effects ofthose operations. The J-2 supports theexecution of the plan with the intelligenceneeded to sustain the operation, attain jointforce objectives, provide support tosubordinate commands, and continuallysupport force protection efforts. The J-2analyzes the potential threat situation andprovides assessments to support friendlyopportunities.

c. Identify, Define, and NominateObjectives. ‘Objective’ is the first principleof war to be supported by intelligence. Allother aspects of military operations aredependent on the determination of clearlydefined, decisive, and attainable objectives.In the process of identifying and nominatingmilitary objectives, the J-2 should understandthe command’s responsibilities; the JFC’smission and intent; means available, includingmultinational forces; opposing forces;weather; and characteristics of the operationalarea. Intelligence should provide thecommander with an understanding of theadversary in terms of the adversary’sprobable intent, objectives, strengths,weaknesses, probable COAs, most dangerousCOA, values, and critical vulnerabilities. TheJ-2 recommends objectives based on enemycapabilities, vulnerabilities, COGs, and likelyCOAs. Once objectives are determined bythe commander, the J-2 must continuouslyreview them with respect to the adversary andthe changing situation to see they remainrelevant to the commander’s intent.

d. Plan and Execute Operations.Intelligence should be provided at allcommand levels for planning, directing,and conducting operations once theobjectives, nature, and scope of militaryoperations have been determined by the JFC.This intelligence is critical to commanders andstaffs in identifying and selecting specific

objectives and targets, and in determining themeans, operations, and tactics to be used inachieving the JFC’s overall mission. The J-2then supports the execution of the plan withthe operational intelligence needed to sustainthe operations, attain joint force objectives,and support force protection. To maintain theinitiative, the JFC will seek to get insidethe adversary’s decision making cycle; i.e.,the JFC will seek to develop procedures andan organization in order to receive new andaccurate intelligence and respond to the newsituation faster than the adversary. The J-2must help in identifying the adversary’sdecision making cycle and identifyingvulnerabilities that may be exploited.

e. Security of Operations — AvoidDeception and Surprise. The way J-2s, theintelligence staff, and supportingorganizations approach collection, analysis,and dissemination will, to a large extent,determine friendly force vulnerability toadversary deception efforts. Despite theapparent weight of evidence and decisionmaking predisposition, intelligence analystsshould remain sensitive to the possibilitythat they are being deceived and shouldconsider any hypothesis that an adversary iscapable of supporting. Similarly, analyticalapproaches that emphasize anomaliescharacterized by a lack of activity (e.g.,absence of seasonal training, VIPs missingfrom ceremonial events) are particularlyvaluable.

f. Security of Operations ThroughMilitary Deception. Attacking the mind ofthe adversary — to mislead, delude, or createuncertainty — helps to achieve the securityand surprise principles of war. Intelligenceprovides the two critical components thatare the basis for effective friendly unit actionsand effective psychological operations insupport of deceptions that enhance operationssecurity and surprise. The first component isanalysis of the adversary’s susceptibility todeception and surprise. The second

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component is the feedback to operations onthe adversary’s actions and determining ifthey are responses to the deception. Theprocess of identifying deception objectives tocomplement operational objectives should bean interactive process, with the commanderin a central role orchestrating the efforts ofthe operations, intelligence, andcounterintelligence (CI) resources. In thisprocess, the J-2 should help the commanderand staff to gain insights into the adversary’scapability to process, filter, and evaluateintelligence on the friendly situation.

g. Evaluate the Effects of Operations.Intelligence should assist JFCs indetermining when objectives have beenattained so that JFCs can determine whetherjoint operations should be modified orterminated. Intelligence evaluates militaryoperations by assessing their effect on theadversary situation with respect to the JFC’sintent and objectives.

3. Intelligence and the Range ofMilitary Operations

Intelligence is critical across the rangeof military operations. JP 3-0, “Doctrinefor Joint Operations,” divides the range of

military operations into two major categories:war and military operations other than war(MOOTW). Even in peacetime, intelligenceoperations continue. In fact, peacetimeintelligence operations provide the nationalleadership with the intelligence needed torealize national goals and objectives, whilesimultaneously providing military leadershipwith the intelligence needed to accomplishmissions and implement the national securitystrategy.

a. Intelligence During War

• JP 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forcesof the United States,” identifies keycollective warfighting capabilities suchas exploiting the information differential;attacking the adversary’s COGs; andl eve rag ing among forces. Bydetermining the symmetries andasymmetries between friendly andadversary forces, intelligence assists theJFC and operational planners inidentifying the best means to accomplishthe joint force mission. For example, insupport of joint information operations,intelligence provides the JFC andcomponent commanders with estimatesof what the adversary’s information

Signals intelligence can assist the JFC to get inside the adversary’sdecision making cycle.

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capabilities are; when, where, and howthe joint force can exploit its informationsuperiority; and the threat the adversaryposes to friendly information andinformation systems.

• Intelligence that enables the JFC to focusand leverage combat power and todetermine acceptable risk, is key toallowing the JFC to achieve powerful,dynamic concentrations where theadversary is vulnerable, and permits theJFC to exploit the maximum range ofassigned, attached, or supportingweapon systems. Intelligence provideskey ingredients to successful targetingby providing identification of key targets,collection to detect these targets, and theassessment of the accuracy of deliverymeans and the extent of damage to thetargets. By helping the commander formthe most accurate possible vision offuture events in the battlespace,intelligence makes time an ally insteadof an adversary.

• Wartime support to the commander mustbe anticipatory and precise. Intelligencemust maximize and synchronizesupport to the JFC by focusing onsatisfying the priority intelligencerequirements (PIRs). Intelligenceprovided to the JFC must properlybalance the factors of accuracy,timeliness, completeness, andrelevancy. The result of the intelligenceprocess must be a package or service tothe friendly commander that activelysupports and enhances the commander’svision of the battlespace in a readilyusable manner.

b. Intelligence During MOOTW.Maintaining a forward presence enables USforces to gain regional familiarity and developa common understanding of importantcultural, interpersonal, and social differences.Activities such as professional military

exchanges and forward basing enhance USforces' ability to shape potential MOOTW andestablish mutual support with host countrynationals. Intelligence support is equallycritical in MOOTW involving the use orthreat of force and MOOTW not involvingthe use or threat of force (See Figure I-3).

• MOOTW Involving the Use or Threatof Force. The intelligence requirementsin support of MOOTW such as strikesand raids, peace enforcement, andcounterterrorism are similar to thoserequired during war. Intelligenceprovides assessments that help the JFCdecide which forces to deploy; when,how, and where to deploy them; and howto employ them in a manner thataccomplishes the mission at the lowestloss of life and political cost. Intelligenceis essential to protect joint forcesparticipating in these operations. Whileintelligence efforts are supportingpeacekeeping operations, intelligencemust also provide the JFC with I&W ofany possible escalation of violence and afirm basis upon which to developnecessary contingency plans.

• MOOTW Not Involving the Use orThreat of Force. Intelligence is essentialin operations such as disaster relief,foreign humanitarian assistance,noncombatant evacuation operations ina permissive environment, most supportto counterdrug operations, and securityassistance. Intelligence developsknowledge of the environment in relationto the JFC’s questions concerning actualand potential threats, terrain, climate andweather, infrastructure, culturalcharacteristics, medical conditions,population, leadership, and many otherissues concerning the operational area.Intelligence helps the JFC determinewhich forces to employ and assists inestimating the duration of theoperation. During disaster relief

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operations, intelligence can play animportant role in surveying the extent ofdamage and the level of suffering and canassist in planning for the deployment ofrelief forces.

c. Intelligence During Peacetime.During peacetime, intelligence helpscommanders project future adversarycapabilities; make acquisition decisions;protect technological advances; defineweapons systems, and command, control,communications, computers, intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)systems requirements; shape organizations;and design training to ready the joint force.Intelligence assets monitor foreign statesand volatile regions to identify threats to US

interests in time for the National CommandAuthorities (NCA) to respond effectively.

4. Intelligence Responsibilities

a. Intelligence organizations involved injoint operations provide intelligence to assistthe JFC in the achievement of militaryobjectives.

b. National-Level I n t e l l i g e n c eOrganizations. National-level intelligenceagencies and organizations support unifiedand joint operations. The Director of theDefense Intelligence Agency (DIA) andNational Military Joint Intelligence Center(NMJIC) coordinate with these agencies andorganizations to identify intelligence

Figure I-3. Intelligence During Military Operations Other Than War

INTELLIGENCE DURING MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

STRIKES AND RAIDS, PEACE ENFORCEMENT,COUNTERTERRORISM

STRIKES AND RAIDS, PEACE ENFORCEMENT,COUNTERTERRORISM

DISASTER RELIEF, FOREIGN HUMANITARIANASSISTANCE, NONCOMBATANT EVACUATIONOPERATIONS, COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS,

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

DISASTER RELIEF, FOREIGN HUMANITARIANASSISTANCE, NONCOMBATANT EVACUATIONOPERATIONS, COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS,

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

MOOTW INVOLVING THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE

MOOTW NOT INVOLVING THE USE ORTHREAT OF FORCE

helps joint force commanders (JFCs) with force deployment andemployment decisions

supports force protection mission

prepares for possible escalation to war

provides JFC with information about the operational area

helps JFC determine which forces to employ

assists JFC in estimating the duration of the operation

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requirements that may be addressed throughtheir capabilities.

A detailed discussion of each national-levelagency is contained in JP 2-02, “NationalIntelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

c. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffprovides direction to the Joint Staff Directorfor Intelligence, J-2, to ensure that adequate,timely, and reliable intelligence and CIsupport is available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) and the combatant commands.

d. Joint Staff Director for Intelligence,J-2. The Joint Staff Directorate forIntelligence, J-2, is a unique organization, inthat it is both a major component of DIA (acombat support agency) and a fully integratedelement of the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff J-2is responsible for working with national-levelorganizations to obtain intelligence that isrequired to support joint operations. The J-2keeps the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff apprised of foreign situations that arerelevant to current and potential nationalsecurity policy, objectives, and strategy.

e. The Chiefs of the Military Servicesprovide intelligence support for departmentalmissions related to military systems andequipment and training. They also supportnational intelligence activities in support ofDepartment of Defense (DOD) entities,including combatant commands, subordinatejoint commands, and Service components ofthose commands. Service intelligence staffsand organizations produce a broad array ofproducts and services (such as weaponssystem-specific targeting materials) as wellas technical expertise in specialized areassuch as information operations (IO) andforeign weapons systems. At both thecomponent and unit level, Serviceintelligence personnel are involved in theoperation of intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance assets and provide tailored

intelligence support for weapons systememployment.

5. Intelligence and the JFC

a. The combatant command J-2 assists thecommander of a combatant command (CINC)in developing strategy, planning theatercampaigns, and organizing the theatercommand relationships, includingintelligence assets, for effective joint andunified operations. Additionally, thecombatant command J-2 is responsible fordetermining the requirements and directionneeded to ensure unity of the intelligenceeffort supporting the commander’s objectives.The combatant command J-2 provideshigher echelon, up to and including theNMJIC, and subordinate commands witha single, coordinated intelligence pictureby fusing national and theater intelligenceinto all-source estimates and assessments.The combatant command J-2’s responsibilityalso includes applying national intelligencecapabilities, employing joint forceintelligence resources, and identifying andintegrating additional intelligence resourcessuch as the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC)and component command intelligence assets.Joint force intelligence responsibilities arereflected in Figure I-4. The scope of needs,resources, and procedures will depend on themission, nature, and composition of the force.

b. The combatant command's JIC ensuresthat the intelligence needs of the commandand subordinate commands are satisfied. TheJIC is organized in the manner best suited tosatisfy the combatant commander’sintelligence requirements. Functions of theJIC may include, but are not limited to:

• Coordinating the intelligence effort ofsubordinate commands;

• Coordinating the theater collection planand employment of theater assigned andsupporting sensors;

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• Developing and maintaining data basesthat support planning, operations, andtargeting; and

• Validating battle damage assessment(BDA) from higher, lower, and adjacentsources.

c. Separate intelligence units andorganizations assigned to the joint force willreceive one of the standard support missions(shown in Figure I-5) from the JFC.Intelligence staffs and forces organic to acomponent command will remain the assetsof that component commander. If the JFCwants the organic intelligence assets of acomponent to support other units, the JFCwill usually assign an intelligence supportmission to that component commander.

Support relationships are further explainedin JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF)."

“Nothing is more worthy of the attentionof a good general than the endeavorto penetrate the designs of the enemy.”

MachiavelliDiscourses, 1517

d. Commanders are more than justconsumers of intelligence. JFCs and thecomponent commanders are the keyplayers in the planning and conduct ofintelligence operations. Commanders mustknow intelligence doctrine and understandintelligence systems’ capabilities andlimitations as well as procedures and products.They must provide clear, precise guidance andmake their intelligence requirements known.Additionally, commanders (as well as otherusers) must continuously provide feedback onthe effectiveness of intelligence in supportingoperations.

e. Commanders focus intelligenceoperations by defining their mission,

operational area, area of influence, and areasof interest (AOIs) as well as providingcommander’s intent, planning guidance,PIRs, and feedback on the effectiveness ofintelligence support.

f. Commanders a r e u l t i m a t e l yresponsible for ensuring that intelligenceis fully integrated into their plans andoperations. The successfulsynchronization of intelligence supportoperations with all other elements of jointoperations begins with the commandersinvolving their intelligence planners in theearliest stages of policy development andoperation planning.

g. Commanders must actively engagetheir intelligence officers in discussions ofadversaries, force protection, and futureoperations. Commanders must hold theirintelligence personnel accountable forproviding accurate, timely, and predictiveintelligence. However, JFCs must understandthe challenges and limitations that confrontintelligence personnel in forecasting futureadversary actions.

JOINT FORCEINTELLIGENCE

RESPONSIBILITIES

•

•

•

•

Defining intelligence support

Prioritizing intelligencerequirements

Identifying intelligenceresources

Establishing intelligencesupport procedures

Figure I-4. Joint Force IntelligenceResponsibilities

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STANDARD SUPPORT MISSIONS

GENERAL

DIRECT

MUTUAL

An intelligence element in general support will provide support tothe joint force as a whole and not to any particular subordinateunit. The intelligence element responds to the requirements ofthe joint force as tasked by the J-2.

CLOSEAn intelligence element with a close support mission will provideintelligence support on targets and objectives sufficiently near thesupported force as to require detailed integration andcoordination with the fire, movement, or other actions of thesupported unit.

An intelligence element in direct support provides intelligencesupport to a specific unit. The intelligence element is required torespond to the supported unit’s intelligence requirements. As asecond priority, the intelligence element will respond to theintelligence requirements of the joint force as tasked by the J-2.

Intelligence elements receive a mutual support mission whentheir assigned tasks, their position relative to each other, andtheir capabilities allow them to coordinate their activities in orderto assist each other to respond to the intelligence requirementsof the joint force as tasked by the J-2.

Figure I-5. Standard Support Missions

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CONVOY PQ17

In June 1942, the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Sir Dudley Poundordered the Royal Navy cruisers and destroyers escorting the Murmansk boundConvoy PQ17 to abandon the convoy while it was off the North Cape of Norway.The convoy was further ordered to scatter. Each ship was to make its ownway to Murmansk.

Despite the stated position (based upon ULTRA intercepts) of CommanderN.E. Denning, chief of the German surface ship section in the Admiralty’sOperational Intelligence Centre (OIC), that the German battleship Tirpitz wasin its Norwegian port, Pound believed that the Tirpitz and its battle group hadsailed to attack PQ17. In fact, the Tirpitz had not sailed. As a result of scattering,however, the convoy became vulnerable to air and submarine attacks. Twenty-three of the thirty-four merchant ships in the convoy were sunk in one of theworse disasters to befall any Allied convoy during World War II.

Patrick Beesly, who served in the OIC during World War II, offered the followinganalysis of why the fatal decision to scatter the convoy was made:

“Quite apart from age and health (Pound was 65 and would die from a braintumor the next year), and despite his great experience as a staff officer, Pounddid not, in my opinion, understand the intelligence scene. Although the OICwas only a few minutes’ walk from his own office he very rarely visited it. Heappreciated neither the strengths or weaknesses of Special Intelligence: herequired ‘Yes’ or ‘No” answers to his questions (‘Can you assure me that Tirpitzis still in Altenfjord?’) - something that the very best intelligence officers canseldom give. In all intelligence problems there must always be some elementof uncertainty, always a last piece of the jigsaw puzzle which can only be filledin by guesswork. It may be inspired intuition, but it should always be basedon a thorough background knowledge of the enemy and his way of thinking.After three years of war it ought to have been obvious that Denning, one of themost brilliant intelligence officers of either world war, had this gift, but Poundcould not bring himself to rely on so junior an officer’s opinion. Events provedDenning right and Pound wrong. Senior officers, who have to take finalresponsibility, must not only fully understand the sources, methods, and extentof their intelligence organization, but also personally know their intelligenceofficers sufficiently well to assess their capabilities and to rely on theirassessments or, if they are not satisfied, replace them.”

SOURCE: Beesly, Patrick, Convoy PQ17, A Study of Intelligence andDecision Making, published in Intelligence and Military Operations,

Michael I. Handel, ed., London, U.K.: Frank Cass &Company Limited, 1990, 292-322

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IITHE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

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1. The Intelligence Cycle andJoint Operations

For joint operations, the intelligencecycle provides the basis for commonintelligence terminology, tactics,techniques, and procedures. Knowledge ofthe intelligence cycle is fundamental tounderstanding the intelligence operationsaddressed in Chapter III, “IntelligenceOperations.”

“The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent and need not befurther urged.”

General George Washington26 July 1776

2. The Intelligence Cycle as aModel

See Figure II-1.

a. The intelligence cycle is a simplifiedconceptual model of how intelligenceoperations are conducted. The cycle iscomposed of six phases: planning anddirection; collection; processing andexploitation; analysis and production;

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

PLANNINGAND

DIRECTION

DISSEMINATIONAND

INTEGRATION

COLLECTION

PROCESSINGAND

EXPLOITATION

ANALYSISAND

PRODUCTION

MISSION

EVA

LUATION

AN

DEFE DBACK

Figure II-1. The Intelligence Cycle

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dissemination and integration; andevaluation and feedback. The intelligenceprocess may not continue throughout theentire cycle. For example, a request forimagery will require planning and directionactivity but may not involve new collection,processing, or exploitation. The request couldgo directly to a production facility wherepreviously collected and exploited imageryis reviewed to determine if it will satisfy therequest.

b. The commander’s mission provides thefocal point for all phases of the cycle. Theactivities within each phase are conductedcontinuously and in conjunction withactivities in other phases. For instance,planning is updated based on previousinformation requirements being satisfied andupon new requirements being identified as aresult of analysis performed in the productionphase.

3. Intelligence Disciplines andSources

a. Intelligence disciplines are well definedareas of intelligence collection, processing,exploitation, and reporting, using a specificcategory of technical or human resources.Intelligence sources are the means or systemsthat can be used to observe and recordinformation relating to the condition,situation, or activities of a targeted location,organization, or individual. Intelligencesources can be people, documents,equipment, or technical sensors.

b. Intelligence sources are groupedaccording to one of the seven intelligencedisciplines: imagery intelligence (IMINT);human intelligence (HUMINT); signalsintelligence (SIGINT); measurement andsignature intelligence (MASINT); open-source intelligence (OSINT); technicalintelligence (TECHINT); and CI (FigureII-2).

Detailed descriptions of the intelligencedisciplines are contained in Appendix C(classified) of JP 2-01, “Joint IntelligenceSupport to Military Operations.” CI, whichis both a collector and a consumer ofintelligence, is also addressed in detail inJP 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine and Tactics,Te c h n i q u e s , a n d P ro c e d u re s f o rCounterintelligence Support to Operations.”

c. Information is sought from the widestpossible range of sources to avoid any biasthat can result from relying on a single sourceof information and to improve the accuracyand completeness of intelligence. Thecollection of information from multiplesources is essential to countering theadversary’s operations security and deceptionoperations. The operations of all collectionsources must be synchronized and coordinatedto allow cross-cueing and tip-off amongcollectors.

4. The Intelligence Cycle

a. Planning and Direction Phase

• Intelligence planning for rapid responseto possible theater crises occurs wellahead of time as part of a command’soverall, integrated deliberate planningprocess. The most likely threat scenariosare used as the core of this planning effort,which includes determining thepersonnel, equipment, and intelligencearchitecture essential for generic supportto theater deployments. When aparticular crisis situation unfolds, crisisaction planners develop an actualoperation plan using deliberate planningas the basis. Intelligence input to theoperation plan includes an adjusted andupdated threat scenario and anintelligence annex that tailors intelligencesupport to the geographical area, natureof the threat, scope of operations, andassigned forces. Feedback from

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deployed intelligence personnel to bothcrisis action and deliberate plannershelps ensure that benefits of lessonslearned are incorporated as soon aspossible into planning for subsequentoperations.

• In the planning and direction phase, thedirection for current and future operationsis established by the commander’sPIRs. PIRs are subsets of thecommander’s critical informationrequirements. Using the PIRs asguidance, intelligence personnel thenperform the necessary planning for howbest to provide the information neededto satisfy these requirements.

• When establishing PIRs, the commandershould request intelligence that is vitalto the joint force’s ability toaccomplish the assigned mission. ThePIRs are the commander’s statements ofthe force’s critical intelligence needs.The J-2 is responsible for assisting thecommander in determining PIRs.

• The JFC’s total number of PIRs for anyoperation (or any phase of anoperation) should be very small, e.g.,no more than six to twelve. ExcessivePIRs result in unfocused intelligencecollection and production. To preventbeing distracted by unimportantinformation, the commander mustspecifically identify the intelligence thatwill make a difference in the joint force’sability to accomplish the mission. Forcomplex, phased operations, separatePIRs should be identified for eachphase. As an operation develops, thecommander should change the PIRs toaddress new requirements or concerns.Changes in the situation will rule outsome PIRs and/or demand thedevelopment of new ones as operationsprogress. PIRs should be ranked anddisseminated in priority of importance.The methodology used to build PIRsfocuses on the level of operations to beconducted, mission, time frame ofexpected operations, and priority ofrequirements. The different levels of

INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

HUMINT Human Intelligence

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence

OSINT Open-Source Intelligence

TECHINT Technical Intelligence

CI Counterintelligence

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

HUMINT Human Intelligence

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence

OSINT Open-Source Intelligence

TECHINT Technical Intelligence

CI Counterintelligence

Figure II-2. Intelligence Disciplines

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operations will fall into two broadcategories; war and MOOTW, such aspeace operations, foreign humanitarianassistance, operations supporting civilianauthorities, and strikes and raids.

•• Using PIRs as the basis, theintelligence staff proposes thecommand’s information requirements(those items of information that must becollected and processed to develop theintelligence required by the commander).For example, if the PIR is “Will theenemy attack within the next 72 hours?”,the information requirements will bequestions such as “Where is the XXArmored Division?”; “Has the artillerysubordinate to the XX Corps deployedforward?”; “Are aircraft being loadedwith air-to-ground munitions at theforward airfields?”; and “Where are themajor surface combatants?” Informationrequirements are concerned withidentifying the specific indicators thatwill fill a gap in the command’sknowledge and understanding of thebattlespace and adversary activities.

• In addition to focusing on the jointforce’s PIRs, the intelligence staffmust be concerned with the PIRs ofhigher, adjacent, and subordinateelements. Subordinate force intelligencerequirements must be addressed andprioritized during planning. Conflicts forresources must be resolved andunnecessary redundancies eliminated.

• Once PIRs are determined, intelligencepersonnel review existing intelligencedata bases searching for answers to therequirements. If the intelligence does notalready exist, they issue requests forinformation (RFIs) and initiate thedevelopment of a collection plan. AnRFI is a specific time-sensitive ad hocrequirement for intelligence informationor products, and is distinct from standing

requirements or scheduled intelligenceproduction. An RFI can be initiated atany level of command, and will bevalidated in accordance with the theatercommand’s procedures. An RFI will leadto either a production requirement if therequest cannot be answered withinformation on hand, or a collectionrequirement if the request demandscollection of new information.Collection planning and requirementmanagement are major activities in theplanning and direction phase.

• JP 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support toMilitary Operations,” details collectionrequ i rements , opera t ions , andmanagement. It explains the relationshipbetween collection management andoperations. It also details the flow ofRFIs from the component or joint taskforce (JTF) requester to the DIA and/orNMJIC at the national-level, and theresponse back to the requester.Additionally, it describes the collectionmanager’s functions for collectionrequirements management and collectionoperations management.

• PIRs also justify national production andsystem acquisition by: (1) formulatingstatements of intelligence interest to theIntelligence Community; (2) justifyingtasking of national collection resourcesto DIA; and (3) identifying resourceshortfalls to the Services and theDepartment of Defense for longer-termsolution through acquisition and/ortraining. But the most immediate, directapplication of PIRs is in defining theintelligence support provided in theaterto deployed forces.

• Collection Planning

•• Collection planning matches RFIswith the appropriate collectioncapabilities. It also synchronizes the

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timing of collection (allowing for thetime required for the other phases of theintelligence cycle) with the operationalscheme of maneuver. Collectionplanning registers, validates, andprioritizes all collection, exploitation, anddissemination requirements. Collectionplanning culminates in preparation and/or revision of the command’sintelligence collection plan, which tasksor submits intelligence requirements tothe appropriate internal and externalsupporting intelligence organizations andagencies.

Collection planning is addressed indetail in JP 2-01, “Joint IntelligenceSupport to Military Operations.”

•• Collection managers monitor theresults of the other phases of theintelligence cycle to determine if PIRsand information requirements are beingsatisfied. The effectiveness of thecollection plan in meeting the JFC’srequirements is continuously assessedby the command’s collection managers.

•• At each level of command, J-2s andsenior intelligence officers must knownot only their command’s PIRs andinformation requirements, but also beaware of the PIRs of the next higher,adjacent, and subordinate commands.The J-2 must also be knowledgeableabout the abilities, limitations, andrequired lead times of the availablecollectors. The joint force collectionmanagers must be able to task orcoordinate with any collection capabilityassigned to the force and be able to obtainthe aid of external resources (e.g., theaterand national) in acquiring neededintelligence.

•• A variety of collection sources arerequired so that information from onesource can be tested or confirmed by

others. Multiple collection sourcesenable collection managers to ‘cross-cue’ between different sources (e.g.,using SIGINT direction finding to focuscollection by imagery systems). Thecollection system also needsredundancy so that the loss or failure ofone collection capability can becompensated for by duplicate orcomplementary capabilities.

•• During collection planning, theintelligence staff coordinates closelywith the operations staff. Collectionmanagers must ensure that the collectionplan is synchronized with the operationplan so that collection efforts are focusedcorrectly at the critical times.Additionally, reconnaissance andsurveillance operations must beintegrated with other forms ofintelligence collection operations andcoordinated with CI activities.

•• In conjunction with nationalintelligence organizations and thecomponents, collection managers will,when necessary, nominate ‘no-strike’targets to the operations staff throughthe J-2 targeting element. ‘No-strike’targets are usually adversary entitieswhose intelligence value to futureoperations may exceed the benefit to begained from attacking them.Additionally, ‘no fire’ areas may bedesignated to protect friendly operationsbehind enemy lines or other sensitivetargets.

For further information on ‘no-strike’targets, see JP 3-09, “Doctrine for JointFire Support.”

• Other Planning. Planning also entailsde te rmin ing the i n t e l l i g e n c eorganizational and equipmentrequirements and creating the necessaryintelligence architecture. How the JTF

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J-2 will be organized and where it willbe established are critical decisions thatmust be made early in the planningprocess. The available intelligenceresources, both personnel and systems,must be allocated to the assigned forces.

The unique planning requirements formultinational operations are addressedin Appendix A, “Intelligence inMultinational Operations.”

•• Joint intelligence architectureplanning requires early identification ofinformation requirements includingprocedural and technical parameters.Establishing information flow,timeliness, content, format, andpriorities will help shape the requisitejoint intelligence architecture's technicalspecifications that most efficientlysupports a JFC. Joint intelligencearchitecture planning must ensuresurvivability, secureability, andinteroperability of both informationarchitectures and the informationcontained therein for all combinationsof government-commercialconfigurations. Organizational,doctrinal, and personnel issues shouldalso be considered to maximize thebenefits of technical architectures for thegoals of the JFC.

•• Anticipated intelligence productionrequirements must be coordinated fromtactical through national levels. Theseproduction activities should be directedand coordinated to be mutuallysupporting and non-duplicative.

•• Intelligence d i s s e m i n a t i o nrequirements and procedures must beidentified and coordinated withsubordinate, lateral, and higherintelligence organizations and commandsand with the Command, Control,Communications, and Computer

Systems Directorate (J-6). An importantconsideration is the management ofin format ion t r ansmi t t ed overcommunications paths. JFCs mustconsider intelligence requirements whenprioritizing information dissemination interms of the product, the availablecommunications paths, and the timesensitivity of the product. Disseminationpriorities must be updated throughout thecourse of the operation.

•• Coordination with CI activities mustbe accomplished prior to the initiation ofoperations. Identification of ongoingand planned intelligence activities andJFC intentions will enable CI specialiststo assess physical and personnelvulnerabilities and hostile forces’capability to target military operationsusing technical means, terrorism,espionage, and sabotage, or toevoke agitational interference (e.g.,demonstrations, strikes). CI activitiesalso provide formal liaison with hostnation law enforcement and securityactivities to assist operations and providesupport to the joint force’s protection.The joint force J-2 normally organizes aCI section within the J-2 CI/HUMINTstaff element (J-2X) to specificallycoordinate and deconflict all CI activities:tactical, operational, strategic, andmultinational. JP 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrineand Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor Counterintelligence Support toOperations,” provides additional detailsof the organization and functions of aJ-2X CI staff section within the J-2X.

“Maps are necessary in order to seethe whole panorama of battle and topermit intelligent planning.”

George S. Patton, Jr.6 March 1944

•• Mapping requirements must beidentified. The Geospatial Information

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and Services Officer on the joint staffworks closely with the OperationsDirectorate (J-3) and other staff elementsto determine requirements and priorities.Maps, charts, digitized products, andprecise geodetic coordinates arecritical to mission planning and theexecution of combat operations. Earlycoordination by the combatant commandwith the National Imagery and MappingAgency (NIMA) is essential to obtainingadequate support. NIMA can providespecialized or tailored products duringcrisis situations, but must be tasked todo so during the earliest stages ofplanning operations.

JP 2-03, “Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for GeospatialInformation and Services Support toJoint Operations,” provides detailedinformation on obtaining NIMAsupport.

•• Administrative planning is alsorequired. Financial, contracting,training, personnel support, automateddata processing (ADP) requirements,physical and personnel security matters,intelligence and CI oversight compliance,Inspector General issues, releasabilityand disclosure policy, and Freedom ofInformation Act guidance are allfunctions of administrative support thatmust be addressed in the intelligenceplan.

•• Planning also requires identifyingintelligence personnel augmentationrequirements (both active and reserve)to the Manpower and PersonnelDirectorate; logistic requirements to theLogistics Directorate; lift andtransportation requirements in thetime-phased force and deployment datato the J-3; and communicationsrequirements for intelligence operationsto the J-6.

b. Collection Phase

• During the collection phase, thoseintelligence sources identified in thecollection plan collect informationabout the battlespace environmentand adversary.

• Collection requirements managementis the process that supports the taskingof requirements to appropriate organic,attached, and supporting externalorganizations and agencies. It is usedto monitor the overall satisfaction ofthese requirements and assess theeffectiveness of the collection strategyto satisfy the original and evolvingintelligence needs.

• Collected information is provided viasecure media to the appropriateprocessing and exploitation elements.

c. Processing and Exploitation Phase

• During this phase, raw information isconverted to forms that can be readilyused by intelligence analysts in theproduction phase. Processing andexploitation actions include initialimagery interpretation, data conversionand correlation, document translation,and decryption, as well as reporting theresults of these actions to productionelements. Processing and exploitationmay be performed by the same elementthat collected the information.

• An example of processing andexploitation is in taking the technicalparameters (frequency, pulse repetitionfrequency, and bandwidth) detected bya SIGINT collection system andassociating the parameters with aparticular radar system. Rather thanhaving to deal with raw data, the analystis provided with the essential fact — theidentity of the radar.

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• Different types of information requiredifferent degrees of processing beforethey can be used. In the area of SIGINT,thanks to improvements in hardware andsoftware, processing and exploitation areincreasingly being performed by thecollection systems. Captured adversarydocuments may only require translatingbefore they can be used by analysts. Onthe other hand, the technical exploitationof an item of adversary equipment mayrequire months of intensive effort beforeits full capabilities can be determined.

d. Analysis and Production Phase

• During the analysis and productionphase, all available processedinformation is integrated, analyzed,evaluated, and interpreted to createproducts that will satisfy the commander’sPIRs or RFIs. Intelligence products can bepresented in many forms. They may beoral presentations, hard copy publications,or electronic media.

• Intelligence production could befacilitated through a collaborative, orfederated, effort in which information israpidly and fully shared amonggeographically dispersed organizations.

This approach involves dividing theanalysis and production effort amongintelligence facilities in theater,intelligence centers in the continentalUnited States, and joint intelligencereserve centers to meet the intelligenceneeds of the joint force.

• Intelligence production for jointoperations is accomplished by units andorganizations at every echelon.Whereas the functions carried out in boththe collection and processing andexploitation phases were primarilyperformed by specialists from one of theintelligence disciplines, analysis andproduction is done primarily by all-source analysts.

• Intelligence is produced from theinformation gathered by the collectioncapabilities assigned or attached to thejoint force and from the refinement andcompilation of intelligence received fromsubordinate units and externalorganizations.

• A key tool for conducting intelligenceproduction is the joint intelligencepreparation of the battlespace (JIPB)process (see Figure II-3).

Unmanned aerial vehicles provide commanders withnear-real-time tactical information.

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•• JIPB is a systematic approach usedby intelligence personnel to analyzeinformation about the battlespaceenvironment and the adversary. TheJIPB process is used to define the totalbattlespace environment; describe thebattlespace’s effects on adversary orfriendly COAs; evaluate the capabilitiesof any adversary forces that may operatein that battlespace; and determine anddescribe potential threat COAs.

•• Analysts use the process to analyze,correlate, and fuse informationpertaining to all aspects of thebattlespace environment. The process

is also used to determine an adversary’scapabilities to operate in theenvironment. The process can beapplied to the full range of jointmilitary operations and to each levelof war.

The JIPB process is described in detailin JP 2-01.3, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for JointIntelligence Preparation of theBattlespace.”

• Activities during the analysis andproduction phase of the intelligence cycleresult in intelligence products.

DOD INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION PROGRAM

The DOD Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP) is structured to capitalizeon the analytical and production resources of the entire defense intelligencecommunity to focus expertise and maximize output to the consumer. Thestructure is an explicit, logical division of activities, responsibilities, andaccountability among national, Service, and combatant command productioncenters.

Production centers at all levels are assigned clearly delineated areas ofanalytical and production responsibility across the range of military operations.These centers support the efficient use of DOD resources, prevent duplicationof effort, and provide timely support to customer requirements.

A combatant command’s intelligence production is performed by a JIC, whichis assigned directly to the combatant command in support of theater orspecialized forces. The JIC serves as the cornerstone for fulfilling all theoperational intelligence requirements of the CINCs, subordinate forcecommanders, and JTFs. The production activities for the theater are scheduledand accomplished by the JIC, which focuses on producing tailored, finishedintelligence in support of theater mission planning and execution.

Subordinate forces request or pull the tailored intelligence products neededfrom intelligence data bases electronically available at intelligence centers atall levels. This concept allows joint force commanders to acquire relevantintelligence, based on their mission and the specific phase of the ongoingoperation, using intelligence data bases physically maintained at otherechelons and locations. The combatant command J-2 remains responsiblefor the coordination of intelligence in-theater, managing the flow of intelligencethrough direct communications with each command and Service.

SOURCE: Defense Intelligence Management Document, DOD-0000-151-94Subj: Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program

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Intelligence products are generallyplaced in one of six categories: I&W;current; general military; target;scientific and technical; and CI (seeFigure II-4). The categories aredistinguished from each other primarilyby the purpose for which the intelligencewas produced. The categories can and

do overlap, and the same intelligencedata can be used in each of the categories.

•• Indications and Warning. I&Wintelligence concerns foreign developmentsthat could involve a threat to the UnitedStates, US or allied military forces, USpolitical or economic interests, or to US

JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THEBATTLESPACE PROCESS

A systematic approach used by intelligence personnel

Used to analyze information about the battlespaceenvironment and the adversary

A key tool for conducting intelligence production

Can be applied to the full range of joint military operations

DEFINE THE TOTAL BATTLESPACEENVIRONMENT

STEP 1

STEP 2

STEP 3

EVALUATE THE ADVERSARY

STEP 4DETERMINE AND DESCRIBE PROBABLE

ADVERSARY COURSES OF ACTION

DEFINE THE TOTAL BATTLESPACEENVIRONMENT

DESCRIBE THE BATTLESPACE'S EFFECTSDESCRIBE THE BATTLESPACE'S EFFECTS

EVALUATE THE ADVERSARY

DETERMINE AND DESCRIBE PROBABLEADVERSARY COURSES OF ACTION

Figure II-3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Process

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citizens abroad. I&W is very time-sensitive. It includes forewarning ofadversary actions or intentions; theimminence of nuclear or non-nuclearattack on the United States, its overseasforces, or allied nations; hostile reactionsto US activities; terrorist attacks; andother similar events.

•• Current Intelligence. Currentintelligence provides updated support forongoing operations across the full rangeof military operations. It involves theintegration of time-sensitive, all-sourceintelligence and information intoconcise, objective reporting on thecurrent situation in a particular area.One of the most important forms ofcurrent intelligence is the intelligenceestimate. Estimates provide forecasts onhow the situation may develop and theimplications for planning and executingmilitary operations.

•• General Military Intelligence(GMI). GMI is intelligence concerningthe military capabilities of foreigncountries and organizations and othertopics that could affect potential US orallied military operations. This broad

category of intelligence is normallyassociated with long-term planning.Identifying and monitoring trendseffecting national security facilitates theeffective application of scarce resourcesto shape the global environment to USadvantage. However GMI is also anessential tool for the JFC, and must be inplace long before the start of preparationsfor a particular military operation. Anup-to-date, comprehensive intelligencedata base is critical to effective, rapid crisisresponse in an increasingly multipolar,global environment. GMI supports therequirement to quickly respond to differingcrisis situations with correspondingintelligence spanning the globe.

•• Target Intelligence. Targeting is theprocess of selecting adversary forces,geographical area, installations oractivities planned for capture,degradation, destruction, orneutralization by military forces andmatching the appropriate response tothem by taking into account operationalrequirements and capabilities. Targetintelligence entails the analysis of enemyunits, disposition, facilities, and systemsrelative to the mission, objectives, andthe capabilities at the JFC's disposal, toidentify and nominate specificvulnerabilities that, if exploited, willaccomplish the commander's purpose.Throughout the targeting process, itis imperative for intelligencepersonnel to ensure that all availableIntelligence Community informationis fully considered and appropriatelyde-conflicted to support proper targetnomination.

See JP 2-01.1, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures forIntelligence Support to Targeting,” forfurther information.

CATEGORIES OFINTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

Indications and Warning

Current

General Military

Target

Scientific and Technical

Indications and Warning

Current

General Military

Target

Scientific and Technical

Counterintelligence

Figure II-4. Categories ofIntelligence Products

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•• Scientific and Technical (S&T)Intelligence. S&T intelligence isintelligence on foreign developmentsi n bas ic and appl ied sc iencesand technologies with warfare potential.It includes S&T characteristics,capabilities, vulnerabilities, andlimitations of all weapon systems,subsystems, and associated materiel, aswell as related research anddevelopment. S&T also addressesoverall weapon systems and equipmenteffectiveness.

•• Counterintelligence. CI analyzes thethreats posed by foreign intelligence andsecurity services and the intelligenceactivities of non-state actors such as

organized crime, terrorist groups, anddrug traffickers. CI analysis incorporatesall-source information (derived fromSIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, HUMINT,TECHINT, and OSINT) and the resultsof CI investigations and operations tosupport a multi-discipline analysis of theforce protection threat.

e. Dissemination and Integration Phase

• During the dissemination and integrationphase, intelligence is delivered to andused by the consumer. Dissemination canbe by a variety of means. The means mustbe determined by the needs of the user.Briefings, video-teleconferences, telephonecalls, FAX transmissions, electronic

FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

“The estimate, in its entirety, is a presentation of possibilities:

• the forces available to the other side that may interfere and disrupt the militaryoperation;

• the available weapons systems and their operational characteristics; and• the possible timetable of intervention.

This is clearly not an attempt to predict the course of events. On the contrary,it can be stated with near certainty that these ‘possible courses of action’available to the enemy will never materialize, the most drastic, severe, andperilous possibilities having been deliberately chosen for presentation.Furthermore, what really happens depends, of course, on the decisions madeby the other side, their timing, their rate of implementation, the combatreadiness of their forces and their speed of action. The true test of intelligencedoes not lie in whether these possibilities actually occur, but in whether forcesof whose existence intelligence was unaware come into play, or if their speedof intervention exceeds the intelligence forecast.

For instance, before the ‘Entebbe Operation’ (July 1976), intelligence pointedout the existence of Ugandan MIG fighters at the Entebbe airport and thepossibility (even though of low probability) that they could be used to shootdown the fleet of Israeli Hercules transports during the flight north after therescue. Israel’s government, basing its decision on these data and the estimate,ordered the destruction of the MIGs on the ground to ensure the safe flight ofthe task force and the hostages.”

SOURCE: Major General Shlomo GazitChief, Israeli Military Intelligence, 1974-1979

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messages and, of increasing importance,remote terminal access to computer databases and direct data transfers are all meansof dissemination. The diversity ofdissemination paths reinforces the needfor interoperability among command,control , communications, computers,and intelligence (C4I) systems.

• The Global Command and ControlSystem will facilitate the developmentof an integrated common operationalpicture (COP), built on a foundation ofgeospatial information, that displays thedisposition of friendly, neutral, andadversary forces across the jointbattlespace. Advanced battlemanagement capabilities that allow USforces to be employed faster and moreflexibly than those of potentialadversaries are dependent upondevelopment of the COP.

• Joint intelligence dissemination must beconsistent with the C4I for theWarrior concept that allows thewarfighter to obtain functionallyintegrated or fused intelligence based onthe warrior’s requirements forintelligence exchange. This conceptallows intelligence organizationsexternal to the joint force to satisfy jointforce intelligence needs to the maximumextent possible if they: have sufficientknowledge of the joint forcerequirements through pre-planned PIRs;emphasize pushing intelligence to thewarfighter (through over-the-airupdates); and accommodate warrior pullon demand (allowing automated accessto theater and national data basesthrough such systems as the JointDeployable Intelligence Support System[JDISS]). This concept results intimely intelligence, makes maximumuse of automation, and minimizes theflow of RFI messages and intelligencereports. Broadcasts such as the tactical

information broadcast service and thetactical related applications are examplesof over-the-air updates that provide time-sensitive intelligence to tacticalcommanders.

Chapter IV, “Joint IntelligenceArchitecture,” provides a morecomprehensive discussion of the jointintelligence architecture.

• Supporting intelligence organizationsmust emphasize providing intelligence tothe warfighter using the best availabletechnology. Intelligence organizationsat all levels must ensure precision andcommonality in reporting terminology tominimize the possibility of confusion onthe part of users reviewing assessmentsand estimates.

• Intelligence organizations at all levelsmust ensure that their products aregetting to the users by the time theyare needed. Simply putting the productinto the dissemination system is notenough. Intelligence organizations mustinitiate and maintain close contact with theuser to ensure that the product has beenreceived and meets their requirements.

• After intell igence products aredelivered, intelligence personnel andorganizations are responsible forsupporting the users as they integratethe intelligence into their decision makingand planning processes. Products mayrequire further clarification or they mayraise new issues that must be immediatelyaddressed. Products may need to berelated to a larger intelligence picture.Products may cause the user to considernew operational concepts that require theintelligence to be interpreted in a newcontext.

• Rather than being the end of a process,the integration of intelligence is a

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continuous dialogue between the userand the producer. How or even whetherintelligence is used is ultimately up tothe user. The role of the producer isto ensure that the user has the bestintelligence possible for decisionmaking.

f. Evaluation and Feedback Phase

• During the evaluation and feedback phase,intelligence personnel at all levels assesshow well each phase of the intelligencecycle is being performed. Commandersand operational staff elements must providefeedback. When areas are identifiedthat need improvement, the necessarychanges are made.

• Evaluation and feedback arecontinuously performed during everyother phase of the intelligence cycle.Personnel involved in different phasescoordinate and cooperate to identify iftransitions from one phase to anotherrequire improvements. Individualintelligence operators aggressively seekto improve their own performance andthe performance of the processes inwhich they participate.

• An important aspect of evaluation andfeedback is identifying and reportinglessons learned. The Joint UniversalLessons Learned System (JULLS)provides a means for personnelparticipating in joint operations andexercises to share with otherorganizations the problems encounteredand the solutions developed to overcomethose problems. It is essential thatintelligence organizations outside thejoint force fully participate in the JULLSprocess to ensure that the benefits oflessons learned are disseminated aswidely as possible.

• The attributes of intelligence (shownin Figure II-5) are qualitative objectivesfor intelligence used to support jointoperations and standards against whichintelligence activities and products areevaluated. A failure to achieve any oneof the attributes may contribute to afailure of operations.

•• Anticipatory. Intelligence mustanticipate the informational needs of thecommander and joint force staff in orderto provide a solid foundation foroperational planning and decisionmaking. Anticipating the joint force'sintelligence needs requires theintelligence staff to identify and fullyunderstand the command's current andpotential missions, the commander'sintent, all relevant aspects of thecommand's battlespace, and all possiblefriendly and adversary COAs. Most

Figure II-5. Attributes of Intelligence

ATTRIBUTES OFINTELLIGENCE

TIMELY

ACCURATE

USABLE

COMPLETE

RELEVANT

OBJECTIVE

TIMELY

ACCURATE

USABLE

COMPLETE

RELEVANT

OBJECTIVE

AVAILABLE

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importantly, anticipation requires theaggressive involvement of intelligencein operation planning at the earliest timepossible.

•• Timely. Intelligence must beavailable when the commander requiresit. Timely intelligence enables thecommander to anticipate events in theoperational area. This, in turn, enablesthe commander to time operations formaximum effectiveness and to avoidbeing surprised.

•• Accurate. Intelligence must befactually correct, convey an appreciationfor facts and the situation as it exists,and estimate future situations andcourses of adversary action based onthose facts and sound judgment. It isnot enough that intelligence is true; tobe accurate it should also describewhat is known of the situation.

•• Usable. Intelligence must be tailoredto the specific needs of the commander.It must be provided in forms suitable forimmediate comprehension. Thecommander must be able to quickly applyintelligence to the task at hand.Providing useful intelligence requires theproducers to understand thecircumstances under which theirproducts are used. Commanders operateunder mission, operational, and timeconstraints that will shape theirintelligence requirements and determinehow much time they will have to studythe intelligence that they are provided.Commanders may not have the time tospend analyzing intelligence reports thatare excessively complex and difficult tocomprehend. Intelligence products mustbe written with the consumer, not theintelligence community, in mind. The“bottom line” must be up front and easilyunderstandable. Oral presentationsshould be simple and to the point. The

use of approved joint terms andstraightforward presentation methodswill facilitate rapid and effectiveapplication of intelligence to support jointoperations.

•• Complete. Complete intelligenceanswers the commander’s questionsabout the adversary to the fullest degreepossible. It also tells the commanderwhat remains unknown. To be complete,intelligence must identify all of theadversary’s capabilities. It must informthe commander of the possible COAs thatare available to the adversarycommander. When justified by theavailable evidence, intelligence mustforecast future adversary actions andintentions. If there is inadequateinformation upon which to base forecasts,the intelligence staff must ensure that thecommander is aware that the futurecontains much uncertainty. The effort toproduce complete intelligence neverceases. While providing availableintelligence to those who need it whenthey need it, the intelligence staff mustgive priority to the commander’sunsatisfied critical requirements.Intelligence organizations mustanticipate and be ready to respond to theexisting and contingent intelligencerequirements of commanders and forcesat all levels of command.

•• Relevant. Intelligence must berelevant to the planning and executionof the operation at hand. It must aid thecommander in the accomplishment of thecommand’s mission. Intelligence mustcontribute to the commander’sunderstanding of the adversary, but notburden the commander with intelligencethat is of minimal or no importance tothe current mission. It must help thecommander decide how to accomplishthe assigned mission without beingunduly hindered by the adversary.

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Commanders must communicate theirintent and their operational concept to theintelligence staff if they want relevantintelligence. Requirements must beupdated and refined as the friendly missionor the adversary situation changes.

•• Objective. For intelligence to beobjective, it should be unbiased,undistorted, and free from political orother constraints. The methodology,product, and use of intelligence must notbe directed or manipulated to conformto a desired result, preconceptions of asituation or an adversary, institutionalposition, predetermined objective,

operation, or method of operations.Intelligence concerning a situation isone of the factors in determiningpolicy, but policy must not determinethe intelligence.

•• Available. Intelligence must bereadily accessible to the commander.Availability is a function of not onlytimeliness and usability, but alsoappropriate security classification.Intelligence producers must strive toprovide data at the lowest level ofclassification, thereby providing thegreatest access, while ensuring thatsources of information are protected.

CHAPTER IIIINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

III-1

1. Intelligence Operations

a. Enabling a commander to accuratelyvisualize the battlespace requires carefullycoordinated and synchronized intelligenceoperations. Intelligence operations are thewide ranging activities conducted byintelligence staffs and organizations for thepurpose of providing the commander withrelevant, accurate, and timely intelligence.Effective intelligence operations enable JFCsat all levels to apply their available forceswisely, efficiently, and effectively.

b. Intelligence operations are characterizedby centralized planning and decentralizedexecution. Intelligence operations seek tomaximize the support offered to the JFC,while simultaneously providing specializedand detailed intelligence to other commandersand staffs throughout the joint force.

c. Of particular importance is the seamlessprovision of joint intelligence support tooperational forces across the range of militaryoperations as they deploy from one theaterto another. To effectively plan and executeunit missions, deploying intelligencepersonnel must know the supported theater’sintelligence concept of operations, intelligencearchitecture, estimate of the situation, mapstandards, and other theater-specificrequirements. This information should berapidly provided to deploying forces in astandardized electronic format by intelligenceproducers. This focuses the intelligence

“The great military victory we achieved in DESERT STORM and the minimallosses sustained by US and Coalition forces can be directly attributed to theexcellent intelligence picture we had on the Iraqis.”

General H. Norman SchwarzkopfCommander in Chief

US Central Command, 1991

community’s effort on satisfying operationalrequirements.

2. Intelligence and the Levels ofWar

a. Levels of War. JP 3-0, “Doctrine forJoint Operations,” discusses three levels ofwar: strategic, operational, and tactical (seeFigure III-1). The levels are a doctrinalperspective that clarify the links betweenstrategic objectives and tactical actions andapply to both war and MOOTW. The levelsof war assist commanders in visualizing alogical flow of operations, allocatingresources, and assigning tasks.

• All levels of war have correspondingintelligence operations. The concept ofstrategic, operational, and tacticalintelligence operations aids JFCs andtheir J-2s in visualizing the flow ofintelligence from one level to the next.The concept facilitates the allocation ofrequired collection, analytical, anddissemination resources and permits theassignment of appropriate intelligencetasks to national, theater, component, andsupporting intelligence elements.

• Intelligence operations at all levelsshould support the JFC. Strategicintell igence operations providecontinuity and depth of coverage evenwhile the joint force is deploying. Duringcampaign planning, strategic and

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operational intelligence operations focuson providing to the JFC informationrequired to identify the adversary’sCOGs. During execution, operationalintelligence operations provide theJFC with relevant, t imely, andaccurate intelligence relating to theaccomplishment of campaign or majoroperation objectives.

• Levels of command, size of units, typesof equipment, or types of forces orcomponents are not associated with aparticular level of intelligenceoperations. National assets such asintelligence and communicationssatellites, previously consideredprincipally in a strategic context, are animportant adjunct to tactical operations.

Figure III-1. Levels of Intelligence

LEVELS OF INTELLIGENCE

National Command Authorities

Senior Military Leaders

Combatant Commanders

Combatant and Subordinate Joint ForceCommanders and their Component Commanders

Commanders

OPERATIONAL

STRATEGIC

TACTICAL

assist in developing national strategy and policy

monitor the international situation

assist in developing military plans

assist in determining major weapon systems and force structurerequirements

support the conduct of strategic operations

focus on military capabilities and intentions of adversaries and potentialadversaries

monitor events in the joint force commander’s operational area

support the conduct of joint campaigns

support planning and conducting battles and engagements

provide the commanders with information on the imminent threats totheir forces

National Command Authorities

Senior Military Leaders

Combatant Commanders

Combatant and Subordinate Joint ForceCommanders and their Component Commanders

Commanders

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Actions can be defined as strategic,operational, or tactical based on theireffect or contribution to achievingstrategic, operational, or tacticalobjectives, but many times the accuracyof these labels can only be determinedduring historical studies. Operational andtactical intelligence operations reducethe JFC’s uncertainty about theadversary and the environment.Operational and tactical intelligenceoperations provide the JFC informationrequired to identify COGs and decisivepoints for the optimum application ofcombat power, thereby allowing the JFCto achieve leverage by bringing the JTF’sstrengths to bear on the adversary’svulnerabilities.

b. Strategic Intelligence Operations

• Strategic intelligence is produced for theNCA, the senior military leaders, andthe CINCs. It is used by the NCA todevelop national strategy and policy,monitor the international situation,prepare military plans, determine majorweapon systems and force structurerequirements, and conduct strategicoperations.

• Strategic intelligence supports jointoperations across the range of militaryoperations. Strategic intelligencedetermines the current capabilities andforecasts future developments ofadversaries or potential adversaries thatcould affect the national security andinterests.

• Strategic intelligence operations alsoproduce the intelligence required byCINCs to prepare strategic estimates,strategies, and plans to accomplishmissions assigned by higher authorities.Theater strategic intelligence includesdetermining when, where, and in whatstrength the adversary will stage and

conduct theater level campaigns andstrategic unified operations. It alsosupports IO.

c. Operational Intelligence Operations

• Operational intelligence is primarily usedby combatant commanders andsubordinate JFCs and their componentcommanders. Operational intelligencefocuses on the military capabilities andintentions of adversaries and potentialadversaries. Operational intelligencehelps the JFC and componentcommanders keep abreast of eventswithin their operational area and helpscommanders determine when, where,and in what strength the adversary mightstage and conduct campaigns and majoroperations.

• Operational intelligence operationssupport all phases of militaryoperations, from deployment throughemployment , sus ta inment , andredeployment of US forces.

• Within the theater, operationalintelligence addresses the full range ofmilitary operations. Operationalintelligence operations produce theintelligence required to accomplishstrategic objectives within theaters and/or joint operations areas (JOAs), toinclude planning and conductingsubordinate campaigns and majoroperations.

•• JP 3-0, “Doctrine for JointOperations,” defines a campaign as “aseries of related military operationsaimed at accomplishing a strategic oroperational objective within a given timeand space.”

•• Operational intelligence supportsall aspects of the joint campaign.Intelligence operations focus on

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providing the JFC information requiredto identify adversary COGs andprovide the relevant, timely, andaccurate intelligence to the JFCnecessary to execute the campaign plan.Operational intelligence also providescritical support to friendly IO.

d. Tactical Intelligence Operations

• Tactical intelligence is used bycommanders for planning andconducting battles and engagements.Relevant, accurate, and timelyintelligence allows tactical units toachieve positional advantage over theiradversaries. Precise threat and targetstatus reporting, in particular, is essentialfor success during actual missionexecution. Tactical intelligence alsoprovides critical support to friendly IO.

• Tactical intelligence addresses the threatacross the range of military operations.Tactical intelligence operations identifyand assess the adversary’s capabilities,

intentions, and vulnerabilities, as well asdescribe the environment. Tacticalintelligence seeks to identify when,where, and in what strength the adversarywill conduct tactical level operations.Together with CI, tactical intelligencewill provide the commander withinformation on the imminent threatsto the force from terrorists, saboteurs,insurgents, and foreign intelligencecollection.

3. Major Intelligence Tasks

a. At each level of intelligence operations,certain major tasks must be performed ifthe JFC is to receive the necessaryintelligence. These strategic-, operational-,and tactical-level tasks are listed in CJCSM3500.04, “Universal Joint Task List.” Sincethe tasks follow the phases of the intelligencecycle discussed in Chapter II, “TheIntelligence Cycle,” the same tasks generallyapply to each level of intelligence. However,the differing needs of JFCs at each level createdistinct tasks.

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Information, information-based processes, and information systems (such ascommand, control, communications, and computers [C4] systems, weaponssystems, and infrastructure systems) used by the US military forces will beprotected relative to the value of information contained therein and the risksassociated with its compromise or loss. Information systems defense relieson four interrelated processes. These include a process to protect informationand information systems, a process to detect attacks or intrusions, a restorationprocess to mitigate the effects of incidents and restore services, and a responseprocess. Information systems will incorporate information system defensecapabilities and employ them continuously across the range of militaryoperations . . . Intelligence is an important element in the protection process.Intelligence provides an understanding of the threat to information andinformation systems by identifying potential information adversaries, theirintent, and their known and assessed capabilities. Threat information is a keyconsideration in the risk management process.

SOURCE: CJCSI 6510.01A, 31 May 1996Defense Information Operations Implementation

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“Tell me what you know . . . tell me whatyou don’t know . . . tell me what youthink . . . always distinguish which iswhich.”

General Colin PowellChairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, 1989-1993

b. Plan and Direct IntelligenceOperations

• General Tasks

•• Intelligence personnel assist theirconsumers in determining theirintelligence requirements, then plan thecollection effort and issue the necessaryorders and requests to intelligenceorganizations. Intelligence plans areprepared. Personnel and systems areallocated.

•• Planning and directing includereviewing, validating, and prioritizingrequirements and taskings. Requirementsmay include providing intelligence forUS forces and multinational forcesengaged in a wide range of activities.

• Strategic Intelligence Tasks.Intelligence operations focus ondeveloping strategic intelligence policy;assisting and advising the NCA andCINCs on the development of policygoverning strategic intelligenceoperations; preparing the strategiccollection plan; and allocating nationalintelligence resources.

• Operational Intelligence Tasks.Intelligence personnel assist JFCs indetermining their PIRs. Operationalinformation requirements are identifiedand prioritized and the theater collectionplan is prepared. Theater intelligenceresources are allocated and support isrequested from national agencies, othertheaters, and allies. During MOOTW,operational intelligence tasks includetraining and helping allies andmultinational partners to conductintelligence operations.

• Tactical Intelligence Tasks. Intelligencepersonnel assist tactical commanders indetermining their PIRs. Tacticalinformation requirements are identifiedand prioritized and the tactical collection

Intelligence assets address the threat across the range of military operations.

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plan is prepared. Tactical intelligenceresources are allocated and support isrequested from national agencies, othertheaters, and allies.

c. Collect Information

• General Tasks

•• Intelligence collection operations areconducted to collect information from allavailable sources. Information iscollected on current and potentialadversaries. Collection operations areconducted to support component andmultinational forces.

•• Information is collected on the natureand characteristics of the battlespaceenvironment and the adversary. Itemsof interest include political, economic,industrial, geographic, demographic,topographic, hydrographic, medical,climatic, and cultural conditions.Biographic data on the adversary’sleadership is collected. Threats includethose nations and groups supporting theadversary. During MOOTW, collectionoperations are conducted against a widevariety of adversaries or potentialadversaries, to include insurgents,terrorists, illegal drug traffickers, andbelligerents.

JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for MilitaryOperations Other Than War,” listssixteen types of MOOTW.

•• Information may be collected fromcivilians, to include internees, displacedcivilians, or defectors. The informationgained could include the general attitudesof civilians towards their owngovernment as well as to US or friendlyforces. It could also include informationon potential terrorist threats to US orfriendly forces. It is important that anyinformation gained from civilians be

carefully evaluated for reliability, thenreported expeditiously to ensure theinformation is usable.

•• Reconnaissance and surveillanceoperations must be integrated with otherforms of intelligence collectionoperations at each level.

• Strategic Intelligence Tasks

•• Intelligence requirements includeactivities and situations that could impactUS national security interests andobjectives, multinational and regionalrelations, or US and allied military forces.Of particular importance is informationrelating to adversary or potentialadversary’s strategic vulnerabilities,strategic forces, strategic COGs, and anycapabilities relating to the developmentand employment of weapons of massdestruction (WMD).

•• Information is collected on strategictargets to enable the detection,identification, and location of theadversary’s strategic COGs and high-payoff targets. This task includescollecting information relating to WMDand their production and storage sites.

• Operational Intelligence Tasks

•• Information is gathered on operationaland tactical threat forces and their COGs.Locating and reporting captured orisolated personnel falls under this task.This task applies across the range ofmilitary operations.

•• Information is collected to support thedetection, identification, and location ofthe adversary’s operational COGs andhigh-payoff targets. Of particular interestare those targets which, if destroyed,would lead directly or indirectly to therapid collapse of the adversary. Of

III-7


particular interest are the production,infrastructure, and delivery systemsassociated with WMD.

• Tactical Intelligence Tasks. Tacticalintelligence tasks support the executionof battles and engagements. In additionto information from strategic andoperational sources, it includesinformation gathered from tacticalsources, such as combat reporting.Locating, reporting, and fieldinterrogation of captured or isolatedpersonnel is an integral part of thisprocess. Tactical intelligence providesthe tactical commander with theintelligence needed to employ combatforces against adversary forces andachieve the objectives of the operationalcommander. Information is gathered onoperational and tactical adversary forcesand their COGs, current activity,disposition, order of battle, weaknesses,vulnerabilities, strengths, doctrine, andother essential information as maybe directed by the commander.Additionally, information is gathered onthe nature and characteristics of thebattlespace, such as terrain, weather, andlocal population. Tactical intelligencetasks are distinguished from those at otherlevels by their perishability and abilityto immediately influence the outcome ofthe tactical commander’s mission.

d. Process and Exploit CollectedInformation

• General Tasks

•• Technical processing and exploitationoperations include activities such asimagery development and interpretation,document translation, data conversion,technical analysis of captured adversarymaterial, and decryption of encodedmaterial.

•• Information is collated to identify andgroup together related items ofinformation for comparison. Individualelements of information are associatedand combined with related informationon a single subject in order to improvethe reliability or credibility of theinformation.

• There are no distinct differences in themajor tasks relating to processing andexploitation at the strategic, operational,and tactical levels.

e. Analyze and Produce Intelligence

• General Tasks

•• Processed and exploited informationis converted into intelligence thatsatisfies the consumer’s intelligencerequirements. The conversion requiresthat information be appraised todetermine its credibility, reliability,pertinence, and accuracy; integrated byselecting and combining information toform patterns; analyzed to reviewinformation to identify significant factsfor subsequent interpretation; andinterpreted to judge the significance ofinformation in relation to the currentbody of knowledge.

•• What the adversary (or potentialadversary) can do, as well as where,when, and with what strength it can doit, are determined. Both military andnonmilitary capabilities must beaddressed. Military capabilitiesinclude ground, air, naval, nuclear,space, chemical and biological, andunconventional warfare, IO, and jointcapabilities. Nonmilitary capabilitiesinclude political and economic actions.

•• All discernible COAs open to theadversary are identified. When sufficient

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intelligence is available, the relativeorder of probability of each COA isdetermined. Any factors that mayinfluence the adversary to adopt eachCOA are identified and explained.

•• The vulnerability of vital elements ofthe adversary’s ability to conductmilitary operations are identified foreach level of war. Vulnerabilities maypertain to political, leadership,geographic, climate, economic,scientific, sociological, or militaryfactors.

•• From the results of intelligenceproduction operations, intelligenceproducts are prepared. The types ofintelligence products are described inChapter II, “The Intelligence Cycle.”

• Strategic Intelligence Tasks

•• Global and regional issues and threatsare identified to the NCA, the seniormilitary leadership, and the CINCs. Thistask includes assessing potential issues andsituations that could impact US nationalsecurity interests and objectives.

•• Worldwide strategic I&W of threatsare identified and reported. Intelligencerequirements include any foreigndevelopments that could threaten theUnited States, its citizens abroad, orallied military, political, or economicinterests. This task also includesidentifying hostile reactions to USreconnaissance activities and indicationsof impending terrorist attacks.

• Operational Intelligence Tasks

•• Information concerning the natureand characteristics of the battlespace isused to determine the type and scale ofoperations the theater will support and

the impact of significant regionalfeatures and hazards on the conduct ofboth friendly and adversary campaignsor joint operations. The analysis assistsin determining the impact of limitingfactors (for example, rules ofengagement) and the JFC’s AOI.Significant regional factors includepolitical, economic, industrial,infrastructure, geographic, demographic,topographic, hydrographic, climatic,populace, cultural, medical, lingual,historical, and psychological aspects ofthe battlespace.

•• Information relating to the adversary’smilitary and nonmilitary capabilities isused to determine the adversary’s abilityto conduct military operations. Factorsthat are addressed include mobilizationpotential; force structure (includingalliance forces); force dispositions;equipment; military doctrine; C2structure; and decision making processes.This evaluation includes continuousrefinement of the orders of battle for theentire array of joint and multinationalforces available to the adversarycommanders in the battlespace.

• Tactical Intelligence Tasks. Tacticalintelligence production tasks focus onexecuting military operations (e.g., threatand target status reporting).

f. Disseminate and Integrate Intelligence

• General Tasks

•• The J-2 staff provides intelligencepromptly, in an appropriate form, and byany suitable means to those who need it.Intelligence personnel ensure that theintelligence is understood by itsconsumers and assist the consumers asthey apply the intelligence to theiroperations.

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•• Dissemination r e q u i r e s t h ee s t a b l i s h m e n t o f appropr ia tec o m m u n i c a t i o n s s y s t e m s a n dprocedures.

•• Integration requires that the J-2 andother intelligence personnel fullyparticipate in all operation planning andexecution, and develop close workingrelationships with the JFC and other staffelements.

• The same dissemination and integrationtasks are performed at the strategic,operational, and tactical levels.

g. Evaluate Intelligence Operations

• General Tasks. Intelligence operationsare evaluated to determine how theyare being performed and to makeany necessary improvements. Theintelligence tenets identified in ChapterII, “The Intelligence Cycle,” provide thecriteria for evaluating intelligenceoperations.

• The same evaluation tasks are performedat the strategic, operational, and tacticallevels.

4. Responsibilities of the JointForce J-2

JFCs organize their joint force staff andassign responsibilities as necessary to ensureunity of effort and mission accomplishment.To plan, coordinate, and execute requiredintelligence operations, J-2s at all echelonshave the following major responsibilities (seeFigure III-2).

a. Participate in all Decision Making andPlanning. Using the intelligence estimate asa basis, the J-2 participates in the JFC’sdecision making and planning processes fromthe time that operations are first contemplated

or directed until the completion of theoperation. The JFC and the J-2 mustconduct a continuous dialog concerning theadversary’s relative ability to prevent the jointforce from accomplishing its mission.

b. Synchronize Intelligence WithOperations. The J-2 synchronizes allintelligence activities with the JFC’sconcept of operat ions . Effec t ivesynchronization results in the maximum useof every intelligence asset where and whenit will make the greatest contribution tosuccess. To achieve synchronization, the J-2must play an active role during thewargaming and analysis of all COAs andplans.

c. Develop Concept of IntelligenceOperations. To communicate guidance andrequirements to higher and lower echelons ofcommand, the joint force J-2 develops anddisseminates a concept of intelligenceoperations. The concept can include suchinformation as tasking authorities, reportingresponsibilities, required coordination,obtaining communications-related supportand backups, and requirements forintelligence-related boards, centers, andteams.

See JP 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force PlanningGuidance and Procedures.”

d. Develop Detailed Intelligence Plans.The JFC’s PIRs and the results of wargamingserve as the basis for the intelligence plan.The plan will list the JFC’s PIRs and thesupporting information requirements. Itwill identify the intelligence forces availablefor the operation, resolve shortfalls, and assignor recommend tasks (as appropriate) thatwill best support the joint force’srequirements. This plan should allocateavailable joint force and supportingintelligence assets among the elements ofthe joint force in accordance with the

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commander’s intent, main effort, and conceptof operations; the J-2 must ensure thatcomponent intelligence requirements criticalto success of key component operationsreceive appropriate intelligence support. Theplan also addresses how any shortfallsbetween assigned or attached capabilities andrequirements will be met by national andsupporting capabilities.

e. Plan to Use Operational Forces forCollection. Forward and engaged combatforces have a responsibility to reportinformation that can be integrated with

intelligence obtained from reconnaissanceand surveillance assets. A lack of contactwith the adversary may be just as significantas positive intelligence.

f. Use Special Operations Forces (SOF)to Conduct Special Reconnaissance.Special Reconnaissance provides the JFC witha unique “eyes-on-target” deep lookcapability, especially useful in areas whereother sensors are not available, or can’tprovide required “resolution.” Based onoperational requirements, the theater J-2 mustidentify the PIRs and associated reporting

J-2 RESPONSIBILITIES

Participate in all Decision Making and Planning

Synchronize Intelligence With Operations

Develop Concept of Intelligence Operations

Develop Detailed Intelligence Plans

Plan to Use Operational Forces for Collection

Use Special Operations Forces to Conduct SpecialReconnaissance

Establish a Joint Intelligence Architecture

Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort

Organize for Continuous Operations

Maintain Flexibility

Integrate National and Theater Intelligence Support

Ensure Accessibility of Intelligence

Figure III-2. J-2 Responsibilities

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criteria to properly focus on the SOFSpecial Reconnaissance assets.

g. Establish a Joint IntelligenceArchitecture. A truly joint intelligenceinfrastructure must be created to providethe best possible intelligence to the JFC. Itmust be constructed to ensure protection ofinformation and intelligence from inadvertentdisclosure, and guarantee integrity of the dataand assured access to all sources. The jointforce C4I architecture required to support theJFC’s concept of operation must be designedduring the planning phase and redefinedduring the pre-deployment phase. JTFsthat are primarily composed of forces from asingle Service should be provided thenecessary personnel and communications topermit the implementation of a jointintelligence system.

Chapter IV, “Joint IntelligenceArchitecture,” discusses the requirements fora joint intelligence architecture.

h. Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort.For each operational area, there should beunity of intelligence effort to ensurecomplete, accurate, current, and pertinentintelligence. Unity of effort is also requiredto reduce unnecessary redundancy andduplication. All joint force intelligencecapabilities must be integrated in aninteroperable and seamless architecture, sothat all joint force elements have access torequired intelligence. This approach allowsthe JFC and J-2 to orchestrate pertinentintelligence activities to meet the joint force’sintelligence requirements.

i. Organize for ContinuousOperations. Intelligence organizationsshould be structured for continuous day-night and all-weather operations. TheJ-2’s concept of intelligence operationsshould provide for continuity of support

even if communications are severelystressed or temporarily lost. Intelligenceresources, activities, and communicationsmust be structured and operated to besufficiently survivable to ensure requiredintelligence support is available to the JFC.An important component of survivabilityis redundancy in critical C4I capabilities.

j. Maintain Flexibility. Intelligencestructures, methodologies, data bases,products, and personnel must be flexible tomeet changing operational situations,needs, priorities, and opportunities.They must serve all possible strategies andtactics. JFCs need timely intelligenceproducts to identify, influence, and exploitopportunities.

k. Integrate National and TheaterIntelligence Support. The J-2 must plan forintegrating national and theaterintelligence elements and products into thejoint force’s intelligence structure. Nationaland theater intelligence organizations willmake operations feasible that could not beaccomplished without their access, capability,capacity, or expertise.

See JP 2-02, “National Intelligence Supportto Joint Operations,” for details on thecapabilities of the national intelligenceorganizations.

l. Ensure Accessibility of Intelligence.Personnel experienced with foreign disclosureregulations must be assigned to the joint forceto facilitate the efficient flow of intelligence. TheJ-2 must ensure that intelligence is readilyaccessible to the JFC and other members ofthe joint force while still adhering to securitystandards of security clearance and need-to-know. However, all efforts must be made toensure that the personnel and organizations thatneed access to required intelligence will have itin a timely manner.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVJOINT INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

IV-1

1. Purpose

a. A JFC must be capable of coordinatingthe actions of people, organizations, andresources at great distances. Successfuloperations require that the JFC besupported by an integrated C4ISRinfrastructure that is capable of generatingand moving intelligence, operationalinformation, and orders where needed in theshortest possible time.

b. To prevail, the JFC’s decision makingand execution cycles must be consistentlyfaster than the adversary’s and able toprovide better information. Being faster andbetter requires having effective control overthe collection, processing, and disseminationof information.

c. JP 6-0, “Doctrine for Command,Control, Communications, and Computer(C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations,”establishes joint doctrine for C4 support.It envisions a global communications andinformation grid into which all militaryinformation customers can plug interoperablesystems. The joint intelligence operationalarchitecture described in this chapter is anintegral part of the C4 support conceptdescribed in JP 6-0. C4 support must beinteroperable, flexible, responsive, mobile,disciplined, survivable, and sustainable.Intelligence organizations use a variety ofsensors and other information sources tocollect and analyze data and produce

“In establishing a Joint Intelligence Center at each combatant command, wehave improved the quality of intelligence support to the warfighter whiledecreasing the resources required to provide such support.”

CJCS Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functionsof the Armed Forces of the United States

February 1993

intelligence products. C4 systems supportto intelligence is normally limited toproviding the communications interfaceand media required to move intelligenceand related information. C4 systemssupport does not typically cover thecollection and production of intelligence.

d. Defense Intelligence Agency

• In coordination with the Joint Staff,national intelligence agencies, Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, and MilitaryService intelligence organizations, DIAis responsib le for developing,implementing, and managing theconfiguration of information, data, andcommunications standards forintelligence systems. DIA establishesdefense wide intelligence priorities forattaining interoperability between thetactical, theater, and national intelligencesystems and the respective C4 systemsat each level.

• The C4ISR architecture frameworkdefines a common approach for theDepartment of Defense to follow indeveloping and describing C4ISRarchitectures. In this approach, anarchitecture is designated asoperational, systems, or technical. Inthis chapter, these terms will be used todiscuss the overall C4 architecture andthe C4ISR architecture limited tointelligence operations.

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e. The joint intelligence operationalarchitecture is a dynamic, flexible structurecapable of providing global access to aninformation grid that consists of allintelligence sources at all echelons. The jointoperational architecture facilitates thecapability of the national and defenseintelligence communities to focus onsupporting the JFC and subordinate joint forcecomponents and to integrate support fromnon-Defense agencies and nongovernmentorganizations as needed. The jointintelligence operational architecture isconfigured to provide the baseline dataneeded to support commanders at all levels.The CINCs are responsible for the intelligenceoperational architecture for their commands.For contingency operations the JFC,supported by the joint force J-2, is responsiblefor establishing the joint force intelligenceoperational architecture required toaccomplish the assigned mission.

f. The Assistant Secretary of Defense forCommand, Control, Communications andIntelligence is responsible for integratingC4ISR architectures.

2. Characteristics

a. The joint intelligence operationalarchitecture is integral to each phase of theintelligence cycle — from planning anddirection through dissemination andintegration, with evaluation and feedbackbeing done throughout each phase. Thearchitecture supports intelligence functionsover a distributed global networkemploying communications systems,computers, space-based C4I support systems,and their associated resources and technologies.

b. The operational architecture supportsthe range of military operations asenvisioned in the national military strategy.The intelligence operational architecturesupports the intelligence requirements of

decision makers, from the NCA downthrough the joint force’s tactical commanders.The intelligence operational architectureincorporates the policies, procedures,reporting structures, trained personnel,automated information processing systems,and connectivity to collect, process, anddisseminate intelligence that is fused into theJFC’s C4I systems. The operationalarchitecture also provides support to naturalor man-made disaster relief efforts thatrequire military support.

3. Requirements

See Figure IV-1.

a. The joint intelligence operationalarchitecture must be capable of being tailoredto support a specific JFC’s informationrequirements. Intelligence must be providedin a form that is readily understood anddirectly usable by the recipient withoutproviding the user irrelevant data.Dissemination of intelligence consists ofboth “push” and “pull” control principles.The “push” concept allows the higherechelons to push intelligence down to satisfyexisting lower echelon requirements or torelay other relevant information to the lowerlevel. The “pull” concept involves directelectronic access to data bases, intelligencefiles, or other repositories by intelligenceorganizations at all levels. “Push” updatesmust be based on the JFC’s PIRs to ensurethat the JFC receives critical information andintelligence. Other information must beavailable on an as-needed “pull” basis so thatthe joint force J-2 avoids informationoverload. From the NCA through the tacticalcommanders, the architecture must providecomplete, tailored, all-source intelligence tothe decision maker.

“Push” and “pull” control principles arediscussed in detail in JP 2-01, “JointIntelligence Support to Military Operations.”

IV-3

Joint Intelligence Architecture

b. The operational architecture mustensure that no source of informationcollection, production, or dissemination issubject to a single point of failure. At thesame time, the architecture must identify andeliminate the unnecessary duplication ofintelligence capabilities so that scarceresources can be focused to meet prioritizedrequirements.

c. The operational architecture must becapable of accommodating the widestpossible range of missions and operationalscenarios. It must respond to the JFC’srequirements for information at any time andany place and be capable of supportingmultinational operations with no loss intimeliness. The intelligence operationalarchitecture must incorporate the capabilitiesof the national and Service intelligenceorganizations, and provide to the JTF and itscomponents the capability to access nationaland Service capabilities when necessary.

d. The operational architecture mustachieve a seamless integration of the JFC’sdecision making and execution cycles withall phases of the intelligence cycle. Indeveloping the operational architecture, theintelligence community must streamline theprocesses in each phase of the cycle to ensureresponsiveness to the JFC’s requirements.

e. The operational architecture must bedeveloped so that users can train andexercise with intelligence capabilities inpeacetime. Intelligence systems, policies,procedures, connectivity, security, and fusionrequirements must be part of joint trainingexercises and be incorporated intosimulations. During exercises, capabilitiesmust function exactly as in a real operation,so that the users train in a realistic, seamlessenvironment. The architecture must beconfigured so that real world data bases arepreserved and cannot be accidentally ormaliciously altered during an exercise.

ARCHITECTURAL REQUIREMENTS

Adapt to the joint force commander's (JFC's) requirements

Avoid single points of failure

Accommodate the full range of missions and operationalscenarios

Integrate the intelligence cycle with the JFC's decisionmaking and execution cycle

Permit users to train and exercise with intelligencecapabilities in peacetime

Incorporate new and emerging technologies

Adapt to the joint force commander's (JFC's) requirements

Avoid single points of failure

Accommodate the full range of missions and operationalscenarios

Integrate the intelligence cycle with the JFC's decisionmaking and execution cycle

Permit users to train and exercise with intelligencecapabilities in peacetime

Incorporate new and emerging technologies

Figure IV-1. Architectural Requirements

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f. The intelligence technical architecturemust provide for integration with theexisting and projected teleconferencingcapabilities of C4I systems. Secureteleconferencing will permit groups ofdispersed users to collaborate during theplanning and execution of intelligenceoperations and to coordinate with operationalusers. Dispersed users include, but are notlimited to, JFCs and their subordinatecommanders, the theater JICs and jointintelligence support elements (JISEs), theJoint Staff, Services, the combat supportagencies, and the NCA.

4. Standards

See Figure IV-2.

a. Survivable. The system designspecified in the technical architecture must beas survivable as the command structure itsupports. Assets that are vulnerable to damageor destruction must have alternative means ofproviding required data with minimal risk.

b. Interoperable. It is imperative thatintelligence and operations systemsarchitectures be fully interoperable in orderto facilitate a COP. The systems architecturemust comply with DOD joint technicalarchitecture. The technical architecture mustbe designed to accommodate interoperability

and integration with existing and projectedintelligence information systems and withthose joint C4 systems that must exchangeinformation with the intelligence technicalarchitecture.

c. Secure. Information must be protectedaccording to a developed intelligencetechnical architecture security policy. Thearchitecture must be designed so that thewidest possible access is permitted withoutcompromising security.

d. Compatible. The architecture must usecommon data elements when re-engineeringexisting systems or applications anddeveloping new systems. As a mid-termobjective, all component’s intelligencesystems must be capable of receiving andexchanging data, information and intelligenceproducts. This capability must extend toapplications, data bases, and communicationsprotocols to ensure that intelligenceinformation can be fused with operational C4Isystems.

5. Organizations

a. In addition to the J-2 staffs at every jointlevel of command, the key organizations inthe joint intelligence architecture are the JCSNMJIC, the JICs and, when formed, the JTFJISEs (see Figure IV-3). Working together,these organizations play the primary rolei n manag ing and con t ro l l i ng t heintelligence operations described in ChapterIII, “Intelligence Operations.” Theseorganizations are linked by formalrelationships that facilitate RFI managementand optimize complementary intelligencefunctions by echelon without obstructing thetimely flow of critical intelligence up, down,or laterally.

• National Military Joint IntelligenceCenter

ARCHITECTURALSTANDARDS

Survivable

Interoperable

Secure

Compatible

Survivable

Interoperable

Secure

Compatible

Figure IV-2. Architectural Standards

IV-5


•• As part of the Joint Staff J-2’s staff,the NMJIC is the channel through whichjoint forces’ crisis-related and time-sensitive intelligence requirements aretasked to the appropriate nationalagency or command, when they cannotbe satisfied using assigned or attachedassets. Requirements for national collectionand support in collection coordination arehandled by the defense collection

coordination center collocated with theNMJIC.

JP 2-02, “National Intelligence Supportto Joint Operations,” provides detailsof the support that national agenciessuch as DIA, Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA), National Security Agency(NSA), National Reconnaissance Office,and NIMA, as well as the intelligence

JOINT INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

Joint Staff J-2

National Security Agency RepresentativesCentral Intelligence Agency RepresentativesService RepresentativesOthers

Defense Intelligence Agency RepresentativesCentral Intelligence Agency RepresentativesNational Security Agency Representatives

National Intelligence Support Team

Combatant Command J-2

Joint IntelligenceCenter

Joint Task Force J-2

Joint IntelligenceSupport Element

National Military JointIntelligence Center

Defense Intelligence AgencyCentral Intelligence AgencyNational Security AgencyNational Imagery and Mapping AgencyServicesOthers

Defense Intelligence AgencyCentral Intelligence AgencyNational Security AgencyNational Imagery and Mapping AgencyServicesOthers

Joint Staff J-2National Military Joint

Intelligence Center

Combatant Command J-2

Joint IntelligenceCenter

Joint Task Force J-2Joint IntelligenceSupport Element

Figure IV-3. Joint Intelligence Organizations

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organizations of the Services, canprovide to joint forces.

•• The NMJIC is responsible for: (1)serving as the DOD single point of entryfor crisis-related and time-sensitive RFI;(2) global I&W; (3) current intelligence;(4) situation summaries; and (5) nationaltargeting support. During crises, theNMJIC expands as necessary utilizingDIA assets, establishing a workinggroup, intelligence task force or, in thecase of a major crisis like OperationDESERT STORM, an expandedintelligence task force. Besidessupporting the combatant commands andJTFs, the NMJIC supports any coalitionpartners or allies and prescribedinternational organizations.

•• The NMJIC participates in targetingby developing national-level target lists.When requested, the NMJIC supports thetheater in performing BDA.

NMJIC development of target lists isdescribed in JP 2-01.1, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures forIntelligence Support to Targeting.”

•• If the NMJIC requires DIADirectorate for Intelligence Production(DI) support to satisfy a requirement, DI’sOperational Intelligence CoordinationCenter (OICC) is contacted. The OICCserves as the crisis management officefor DI and is the single point of contactfor requirements involving supportduring crisis situations. DI’s analyticalexpertise includes military capabilities,S&T, missile, medical, estimative,military production and geography,intelligence data bases, and operationalsupport and facilities intelligence. TheOICC will prioritize and coordinatesuspenses and analytical requirementswith the NMJIC, DI elements, andconsumers as required.

•• Any JTF requirements for capturedmateriel and document exploitationsupport are coordinated with DIA bythe NMJIC. The support is tailored tothe crisis and can range from a liaisonofficer to the joint force J-2, to a robustjoint staff element with a fully staffedjoint captured materiel exploitationcenter and joint document exploitationcenter.

•• The NMJIC serves as the point ofcontact with the Director of CentralIntelligence (DCI) task force, whenestablished. The DCI may, in somesituations, establish a task force to focusCIA support for ongoing militaryoperations. The DCI task force wouldbe composed of representatives from theintelligence community.

•• At the request of the CINC, theNMJIC may deploy a nationalintelligence support team (NIST) tosupport the commander, JTF (CJTF)during a crisis or contingency operation.NIST is a nationally sourced teamcomposed of intelligence andcommunications experts from DIA, CIA,NIMA, NSA, or other intelligencecommunity agencies as required. TheNIST mission is to provide a tailorednational-level all-source intelligenceteam to deployed commanders duringcrisis or contingency operations. NISTsupports intelligence operations at theJTF headquarters and is traditionallycollocated with the JTF J-2. In directsupport of the JTF J-2, the NIST willperform functions as he or shedesignates. The NIST is designated toprovide a full range of intelligencesupport to a CJTF, from a single agencyelement with limited ultra-highfrequency voice connectivity to a fullyequipped team with JDISS and JointWorldwide Intelligence CommunicationsSystem (JWICS) video-teleconferencing

IV-7


capabilities. Current methods ofoperation continue to rely on both agencyand command-provided communicationspaths (e.g., bandwidths) to supportdeployed NIST elements. NIST providescoordination with national intelligenceagencies, analytical expertise, I&W,special assessments, targeting support,and access to national data bases, andfacilitates RFI management.

• Joint Intelligence Centers

•• The JIC is the primary intelligenceorganization providing support to jointforces at the operational and tacticallevels. The JIC concept fuses the mainsupport capabilities of all Service,combat support agency, and combat unitsinto a central location for intelligencesupport. Although a particular JICcannot be expected to completely satisfyevery RFI, it can coordinate support fromother intelligence organizations, bothlower, higher, and laterally.

•• The JIC has a flexible design andcan expand to meet the needs of theCINC as required. During non-crisisperiods, JIC personnel levels arenormally maintained at the minimumlevel required to perform essentialfunctions such as I&W, currentintelligence, collection management, andGMI production in the JIC’s area ofproduction responsibilities. Duringcrises, the JIC can be augmented withpersonnel from other theater intelligenceorganizations, other commands, andnational intelligence organizations (seeFigure IV-4).

•• As crises develop, JICs bringtogether the personnel and equipmentneeded to manage intelligence supportrequirements. Because the JICs are thefocal points for intelligence support tojoint operations, they can be augmented

with personnel drawn from manysources, including Reserve Componentsand the combat support agencies.

• Joint Intelligence Support Elements

•• At the discretion of the subordinateJFC, a JISE is established during crisesor the preparation stage for operationsto augment the subordinate joint force J-2element. Under the direction of the jointforce J-2, a JISE normally manages theintelligence collection, production, anddissemination for a joint force.

•• The size and organization of the JISEwill be determined by the JTF J-2based upon the level of augmentation thatis required. Personnel and equipmentrequirements for the JISE are submittedto the combatant command. Resourceswill be provided by the JIC, other theaterintelligence organizations, othercommands, and national organizations asrequired (see Figure IV-4).

•• When formed, the JISE may becollocated with the JTF J-2 elementin the JOA, or may operate in a "splitbase" mode. In split-base mode, theJISE's operations and personnel aredivided between two locations: with theJTF J-2 in the JOA, and outside the JOA,possibly at the JTF’s home base or atanother remote location. Split-baseoperations can be used to reduce thenumber of personnel that must bedeployed and supported in the JOA andto reduce the communicationsrequirements of the deployed force.

•• The JTF J-2 defines the JISE'sfunctions and responsibilities and itsrelationship with the J-2 staff. In manycases, specific responsibilities may beshared between the J-2 staff and JISE.For example, the J-2 plans element maybe responsible for setting forth

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JP 2-0

collection requirements, while the JISE'scollection management element willprepare the collection plan and manageits fulfillment.

b. In addition to the support provided byjoint intelligence staffs and organizations,JFCs receive valuable support from theService intelligence organizations and fromthe intelligence staffs and organizationsbelonging to the joint force components.JFCs must consider the intelligencecapabilities of these elements during theplanning and execution of all joint operations.

• Multinational Operations. In manysituations, Armed Forces of the United

States will join with foreign militaryforces to defeat common adversaries orto conduct MOOTW. Because eachmultinational operation will be unique,standardized agreements such as theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) standardization agreements(STANAGs) may have to be modifiedor amended based on the situation. Inmost multinational operations, the JFCwill be required to share intelligence withforeign military forces and to coordinatereceiving intelligence from those forces.The JFC participating in the coalitionor alliance must tailor the policy andprocedures for that particular operationbased on national and theater guidance.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER AND JOINTINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ELEMENT

AUGMENTATION SOURCES

Joint Staff J-2National Military Joint

Intelligence Center

Combatant Command J-2Joint Intelligence Center

Joint Task Force J-2Joint Intelligence Support

Element

Component Forces

National Agencies and Services

Theater Components, Services,Other Commands, and NationalAgencies

Theater Components, OtherCommands, and National Agencies

Services

Figure IV-4. Joint Intelligence Center and Joint IntelligenceSupport Element Augmentation Sources

IV-9


Intelligence efforts of the nations mustbe complementary and take intoconsideration the intelligence systemstrengths, limitations, and the unique andvaluable capabilities each nation willhave.

See Appendix A, “Intelligence inMultinational Operations,” for details.

• Multinational Intelligence Center. Justas the theater-level JIC and subordinatejoint force-level JISE are criticalcomponents of the joint intelligencesystem architecture, establishing amultinational intelligence center isnecessary for consolidating andp r i o r i t i z i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s f o rparticipating nations. Also the centermust coordinate between the collectioncapabilities of each nation.

6. Systems

a. The joint intelligence systemsarchitecture should be supported by a networkof integrated work stations, file servers, andcommunications links. These three elementsmust work together, compliant with theevolving defense information infrastructure

common operating environment and DODjoint technical architecture, to create theinteroperable information environmentrequired to support military operations.The network includes direct connectivityby appropriate communicat ions orcommunications relay link (landline, radio,satellite, and others as appropriate) andbroadcast capability to support time-sensitiveneeds.

b. The information grid concept allowsdata collected by whatever means to becommunicated directly to a user or to aprocessing site or platform by the mostefficient path, then passed on or through tothe user as appropriate. A critical aspect ofthe information grid is its ability to make allintel l igence accessible by way ofstandardized file servers to standards-compliant work stations.

c. To maximize the utility of the systemsarchitecture, systems must be compatible.Standard communications protocols andstandard encryption devices must beavailable at all echelons. The systemsarchitecture should have the flexibility toaccommodate, not to replace, existing I&Wand direct support systems. The systems

Ultralite satellite communications link joint forces to theworldwide intelligence systems.

IV-10

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JP 2-0

architecture is intended to overlay additionalcapabilities using existing communicationscarriers. Until an effective multi-level securitysystem is in place with joint forces, theintelligence architecture must support threepossible levels of information: sensitivecompartmented information (SCI), non-SCI(SECRET and below), and an architecture thatcan support intelligence releasable to alliesand coalition partners.

d. The SECRET Internet Protocol RouterNetwork and Global Command and ControlSystem are evolving into common non-SCIsupport systems for joint forces. The JWICSand JDISS currently form the foundationfor commonality among all SCI supportsystems in the joint intelligence systemarchitecture.

• Joint Worldwide IntelligenceCommunications System

•• JWICS satisfies the requirement forsecure, high-speed, multimediatransmission services for SCI. JWICS

incorporates advanced networkingtechnologies that permit greaterthroughput and capacity, making possiblethe use of applications that takeadvantage of multimedia technologiesincluding video teleconferencing.

•• Video-capable JWICS nodes cancreate, receive, transmit, and store videoimages as well as voice, text, graphics,and data. Information can be eitherbroadcast or shared interactivelyamong JWICS subscribers on a point-to-point or multi-point basis. The JWICScircuit can be managed by way ofallocation of bandwidth, allowingsimultaneous use of the link for multipleapplications.

• Joint Deployable Intelligence SupportSystem

•• JDISS provides the standardworkstation server softwareconfiguration. The basic backbone forthe dissemination of intelligence to and

NORTH AFRICA - 1941

“Evidence of foresight was conspicuously absent in the sluggish and unreliableBritish communications networks. Information was passed up and downchains of command with little or no provision for alternative routing in case offailure of one link in the chain. There was no means by which the 8th Armycommander could communicate directly with forward troops if and when heneeded to. When time-sensitive intelligence cannot be relayed quickly andreliably to those who need it most, it is of negligible value in the fast-pacedenvironment of the modern battlefield. Success in solving this problem, whichis as technical as it is organizational, requires meticulous planning andthorough testing. The Germans, who were much more experienced in mobilewarfare, were able to build effective communications systems while the Britishwere still engaged in a learning process.”

Michael I. HandelFormer Professor of National Security and Strategy

Army War College

SOURCE: Handel, Michael I., Intelligence and Military Operations, publishedin Intelligence and Military Operations, Michael I. Handel, ed., London,

U.K.: Frank Cass & Company Limited, 1990, page 62

IV-11


from deployed JDISS nodes is theJWICS network. Where JWICS is notrequired or not available, JDISS has aversatile communications capabilitythat can interface with existingcommunications systems, such as tri-Service tactical communications systems.The system architecture optimizesflexibility to focus intelligence effortsefficiently and ensures that support ismaximized for a joint force engaged inmilitary operations.

•• All-source intelligence disseminationin support of joint operations at thenational, theater, and subordinate jointforce levels is by way of JWICS andJDISS. These systems support theproduction, dissemination, and display offused intelligence critical to theater battlemanagement. The systems architectureprovides access to data from national,theater, and tactical intelligenceorganizations and sources primarily froma “push-pull” system.

•• The “pull” capability is designed toprevent communications circuitsaturation. The “pull” concept resultsin a JFC requesting and receiving onlyintelligence relevant to the mission andcurrent phase of the operation.

•• In addition, t i m e - s e n s i t i v eintelligence will be “pushed” to JFCs andcomponents by way of dedicated broadcastsin response to pre-planned PIRs. ADPinteroperability with force level systems willbe accomplished through the use of JDISS.Through JWICS connectivity, intelligence

production at the national level can beshared in near real time with the JFC andvice versa.

•• Multiprocessing combined withflexible connectivity to computer systemsat all echelons of the command structureand within the Services allow intelligenceanalysts access to imagery and multipledata bases while concurrentlyproducing intelligence products inresponse to spec i f i c mis s ionrequirements . The abi l i ty tocommunicate across all echelons of thecommand structure and within theServices, is the backbone for jointintelligence dissemination.

7. Procedures

a. Standardized procedures are the thirdcomponent of the joint intelligenceoperational architecture. Followingestablished guidelines, information isprocessed and exploited before it is passedon in the correct format to the standardizedfile servers. Where required, the data can beautomatically passed to the standardized fileservers without processing.

b. Processing and disseminatinginformation collected by an unmanned aerialvehicle (UAV) provides a good example. Veryhigh resolution video collected by the UAV canbe viewed in near real time at a downlinkprocessing site, but disseminating this videorequires high bandwidth. The unprocessedvideo can be relayed directly by fiber optic lineor satellite to a headquarters’ element orintelligence center.

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

JWICS is a sensitive compartmented information element of the DefenseInformation System Network. JWICS incorporates advanced networkingtechnologies that permit point-to-point or multi-point information exchangeinvolving voice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconferencing.

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c. At t h e s a m e t i m e , t a r g e t i n ginformation can be reported to tacticalelements by voice communications ormessage. Selected video frames can becaptured by JDISS and made available to allusers over the joint architecture. Informationprocessed by a headquarters element or JISEcould, in turn, be transmitted or madeavailable by JWICS and/or JDISS.

d. In this example, all the capabilitieslinked to and by the joint operationalarchitecture are exercised including both“pull” and “push” dissemination. Theinformation is made available for a varietyof users’ needs and is included in productsand reports that serve multiple purposes forthe tactical users.

APPENDIX AINTELLIGENCE IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

A-1

1. Nature of MultinationalOperations

a. National interests require the UnitedStates to act in concert with other nations. Inmany situations, Armed Forces of the UnitedStates will join with foreign military forcesto defeat common adversaries or to conductMOOTW.

b. Multinational operations take placewithin the structure of an alliance or coalition.Some multinational military alliances, suchas NATO and the United Nations (UN)Command in the Republic of Korea, arehighly structured and enduring. Others, suchas the coalition formed during the Gulf War,are less formal and endure for only a fewmonths.

c. In multinational operations, themultinational force commander (MNFC)exercises command authority over a militaryforce composed of elements from two or morenations. The President retains commandauthority over US forces, but may placeappropriate forces under the operationalcontrol of a foreign commander to achievespecific military objectives. However, anylarge scale participation of US forces in amajor operation will likely be conductedunder US command and operationalcontrol or through competent regionalsecurity organizations such as NATO.Therefore, in most multinational operations,the JFC will be required to share intelligencewith foreign military forces and to coordinatereceiving intelligence from those forces. Insome circumstances, the JFC will need to seekauthority to go outside the usual politico-

“We are a strong nation. But we cannot live to ourselves and remain strong.”

General of the Army George C. Marshall22 January 1948

military channels to provide information tonongovernmental and private voluntaryorganizations. Unique intelligence policy anddissemination criteria will have to be tailoredto each multinational operation.

2. Intelligence Principles forMultinational Operations

a. In some multinational operations orcampaigns, JFCs will be able to use existinginternational standardization agreements(e.g., NATO STANAGs) as a basis forestablishing rules and policies for conductingjoint intelligence operations. Since eachmultinational operation will be unique, suchagreements may have to be modified oramended based on the situation. A JFCparticipating in a coalition or alliance musttailor the policy and procedures for thatparticular operation based on theaterguidance and national policy as containedin national disclosure policy (NDP) 1,“National Policy and Procedures for theDisclosure of Classified Military Informationto Foreign Governments and InternationalOrganizations.” NDP 1 provides policy andprocedures in the form of specific disclosurecriteria and limitations, definition of terms,release arrangements, and other guidance.

b. The following general principles (FigureA-1) provide a starting point for creating thenecessary policy and procedures:

• Maintain Unity of Effort. Intelligencepersonnel of each nation need to viewthe threat from multinational as well asnational perspectives. A threat to oneelement of an alliance or coalition by the

A-2

Appendix A

JP 2-0

common adversary must be considereda threat to all alliance or coalitionelements.

• Make Adjustments

•• There will be differences inintelligence doctrine and proceduresamong the coalition partners. A key toeffective multinational intelligence isreadiness, beginning with the highestlevels of command, to make theadjustments required to resolvesignificant differences.

•• Major differences may include howintelligence is provided to thecommander (jointly or individualServices or agencies), procedures forsharing information among intelligenceagencies, and the degree of securityafforded by different communicationssystems and procedures. Administrativedifferences that need to be addressedmay include classification levels,personnel security clearance standards;requirements for access to sensitiveintelligence, and translation requirements.

• Plan Early and Plan Concurrently.JFCs need to determine what intelligencemay be shared with the forces of othernations early in the planning process.NATO and the United States-Republicof Korea Combined Forces Commandhave developed and exercisedintelligence policies and procedures thatprovide examples of how multinationalplanning can be done in advance.

• Share All Necessary Information

•• Coalition members should share allrelevant and pertinent intelligence aboutthe situation and adversary consistentwith NDP and theater guidance.However, information about intelligencesources and methods should not be sharedwith coalition members until approvedby the appropriate national-level agency.

•• Force protection is a mission inherentto any commander, and intelligencesupport to that mission is critical. Everyeffort must be made to share any data thatcould impact on the commander’s forceprotection mission.

PRINCIPLES FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

MAINTAIN UNITY OF EFFORT

MAKE ADJUSTMENTS

PLAN EARLY AND PLAN CONCURRENTLY

SHARE ALL NECESSARY INFORMATION

CONDUCT COMPLEMENTARY OPERATIONS

Figure A-1. Principles for Multinational Operations

A-3

Intelligence in Multinational Operations

•• When information relating to aparticular source cannot be shared, theintelligence derived from that sourceshould still be provided to other coalitionmembers. The J-2 must establishprocedures for separating intelligencefrom sources and methods. Intelligenceproduction agencies often print highlyclassified reports in such a manner thatcompartmented information is separatedfrom intelligence that can be widelydisseminated by a “tear line” (the J-2,G-2, and/or S-2 keeps information abovethe tear line and disseminates theintelligence below). Having intelligenceproduction agencies use such tear lineswill greatly facilitate intelligence sharing.

•• The joint force J-2 must obtain then e c e s s a r y f o r e i g n d i s c l o s u r eauthorization from DIA as soon aspossible. J-2 personnel must beknowledgeable of the specific foreigndisclosure policy, procedures, andregulations for the operation. Theefficient flow of intelligence will beenhanced by the assignment of personnelknowledgeable of foreign disclosure.

• Conduct Complementary Operations

•• Intelligence efforts of the nations mustbe complementary. Each nation will haveintelligence system strengths andlimitations and unique and valuablecapabilities. Host-nation securityservices’ capabilities, for example, willcontribute significantly to forceprotection. Furthermore, planning withfriendly nations to fill shortfalls,especially linguists requirements, mayhelp overcome such limitations.

•• All intelligence resources andcapabilities should be made available forapplication to the whole of theintelligence problem. Establishing a

multinational collection managementelement is essential for planning andcoordinating multinational collectionoperations.

3. Multinational IntelligenceArchitecture

a. An intelligence operational architecturemust be established for every multinationaloperation. The architecture discussed inChapter IV, “Joint Intelligence Architecture,”provides a starting point from which amultinational intelligence architecture can bedeveloped.

b. A multinational intelligence center isnecessary for merging and prioritizing theintelligence requirements from eachparticipating nation and for acquiring andfusing the nations’ intelligence contributions.The multinational intelligence center mustinclude representatives from all nationsparticipating in the multinational operation.Designating a single Director of Intelligencefor the multinational command will greatlyassist in resolving the inevitable differencesamong the multinational members.

c. Critical to the multinational architectureis developing a standardized methodology fordisseminating and exchanging intelligence.When possible, the methodology must beconceived and exercised as part of themultinational planning process beforeoperations begin. The effectiveness of themethodology must be monitored and, whennecessary, adapted during operations to meetchanging circumstances.

d. Intelligence liaison is critical betweencommands and among supporting andsupported organizations. Liaison personnelare instrumental in resolving problemsresulting from language barriers and culturaland operational differences that normallyoccur in multinational operations. Because

A-4

Appendix A

JP 2-0

of the inherent complexities associated withmultinational operations, an aggressive liaisoneffort is critical to developing and maintainingunity of effort. A robust liaison effort withsufficient communications is particularlycritical in the initial stages of planning andforming a coalition, particularly when the USintelligence network is not yet established.

e. The multinational operationalarchitecture portrayed in Figure A-2 wasestablished to support US and UN forces inSomalia as members of the UN Operations inSomalia (UNOSOM II) effort. Two levels ofintelligence were established: Level 1 datacould be shown to but not retained by coalitionforces or the UN, while Level 2 data was

cleared for release to the coalition and the UN.Level 1 intelligence remained within US-onlychannels, while Level 2 data flowed to theUNOSOM II information center inMogadishu either from the UN Headquartersor via the US JISE.

f. In some situations there may be morethan two levels of intelligence required. Forexample, an operation involving a mixture ofNATO and non-NATO forces could have “USOnly,” “Releasable to NATO,” and“Releasable to Non-NATO” levels. TheMNFC will play a major role in advising thenational intelligence community on theintelligence requirements for each of thecoalition members. The MNFC will need to

Figure A-2. United Nations Operations in Somalia Intelligence Architecture

UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN SOMALIAINTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

National Military JointIntelligence Center

Pentagon

US United NationsMission

New York

United NationsSituation Room

New York

UNOSOM IIInformation Center

Mogadishu

Kismayo

JDISSLevel 1

JDISSLevel 2

JDISSLevel 2

FAXVoiceJDISS

FAXRadioCourier

FAX/Radio/Courier

RadioCourier

RadioCourier

Level 1Hand Delivered

Level 1Hand Delivered

JDISS

JWICS

Gialalas

Other Locations

Baidoa

USCENTCOMJ-2

MacDill Air Force Base

US IntelligenceSupport Team (ISE)

Somalia

JDISS Joint Deployable Intelligence Support SystemJWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

JDISSLevel 2

A-5

Intelligence in Multinational Operations

recommend what intelligence should beprovided to each member.

g. Figure A-3 illustrates the intelligencestructure established by US EuropeanCommand (USEUCOM) for OperationJOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia-Herzegovinain 1996. In this situation, USEUCOMestablished national intelligence centers ateach NATO headquarters to provideintelligence support to both NATO and USforces. NISTs were deployed to ensure timelydissemination of intelligence from nationalintelligence agencies.

h. In addition, US SOF may be assigneddown to coalition brigade level to act ascoalition liaison elements. During OperationsDESERT STORM and JOINT ENDEAVOR,these teams were known as coalition supportteams. These teams have the ability to receiveand disseminate intelligence directly to andfrom their counterparts. The team membersare selected based upon their language andcultural knowledge of the area. These teamswill be in direct communication with eithertheir combined joint special operations taskforce, or the next higher special operationscommand and control element.

US INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO SFOR

NationalIntelligenceSupport

JAC

SHAPE

AFSOUTH(FWD)

NIST

AIR UNITS TF EAGLE 6th Div(FR)

NIC/NIST

NIST

3rd Div(UK)

MN BDE US BDE

ARRC

AFSOUTH

AIRSOUTH

SR JOIC/NIST

NIC/NISTCAOC

AFSOUTHAIRSOUTHARRCBDECAOCJACJOIC

Allied Forces, SouthAllied Air Forces, SouthAllied Command Europe, Rapid Reaction Corpsbrigadecombat air operations centerjoint analysis centerjoint operational intelligence center

NICNISTSFORSHAPESRTF

national intelligence centernational intelligence support teamstabilization forceSupreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europespecial reconnaissancetask force

Figure A-3. US Intelligence Support to SFOR

A-6

Appendix A

JP 2-0

4. Additional Guidance

Additional guidance on intelligenceoperations in multinational operations can befound in JP 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to

Military Operations.” Information on principlesand concepts to support multinational operationscan be found in JP 3-0, “Doctrine for JointOperations,” and JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine forMultinational Operations.”

APPENDIX BREFERENCES

B-1

The development of JP 2-0 is based upon the following primary references.

1. The National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 599, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 61 Stat. 496(July 26, 1947), as amended and codified at 50 U.S.C. 401 et. seq.

2. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L.No. 433, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 100 Stat. 1017 (Oct. 1, 1986) as amended and codified atvarious sections in 10 U.S.C.

3. The United Nations Participation Act, 59 Stat. 621 (Dec 20, 1945), as amended andcodified at 22 U.S.C. 287d et seq.

4. National Disclosure Policy (NDP) 1, “National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosureof Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.”

5. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Strengthening Defense Intelligence.”

6. Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities 46 Fed. Reg. 59441 (Dec.4, 1981).”

7. DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and its MajorComponents.”

8. DOD Directive 5240.1, “DOD Intelligence Activities.”

9. JP 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.”

10. JP 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

11. JP 1-01, Chg-2, “Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures Development Program.”

12. JP 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

13. JP 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.”

14. JP 2-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support toTargeting.”

15. JP 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CounterintelligenceSupport to Operations.”

16. JP 2-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparationof the Battlespace.”

B-2

Appendix B

JP 2-0

17. JP 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

18. JP 2-03, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information andServices Support to Joint Operations.”

19. JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

20. JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

21. JP 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.”

22. JP 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.”

23. JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.”

24. JP 3-55, “Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)Support for Joint Operations.”

25. JP 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”

26. JP 6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) SystemsSupport to Joint Operations.”

27. CJCSM 3500.04, “Universal Joint Task List.”

28. C4ISR Architecture Framework v1-0, (current version), C4ISR Architecture WorkingGroup (AWG).

29. DOD Joint Technical Architecture v1.0, (current version), ASD (C3I) and USD (A&T).

APPENDIX CADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

C-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:Commander, United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center CodeJW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments shouldaddress content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, andappearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director forIntelligence (J-2).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 2-0, 5 May 1995, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Supportto Operations.”

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2P/J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

C-2

Appendix C

JP 2-0

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant (G-OPD), US Coast Guard2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

CommanderUSJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)116 Lake View ParkwaySuffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

ADP automated data processingAOI area of interest

BDA battle damage assessment

C2 command and controlC4 command, control, communications, and computersC4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligenceC4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissanceCI counterintelligenceCIA Central Intelligence AgencyCINC commander of a combatant commandCJTF commander, joint task forceCOA course of actionCOG center of gravityCOP common operational picture

DCI Director of Central IntelligenceDI DIA Directorate for Intelligence ProductionDIA Defense Intelligence AgencyDOD Department of Defense

GMI general military intelligence

HUMINT human intelligence

I&W indications and warningIMINT imagery intelligenceIO information operations

J-2 Intelligence Directorate of a joint staffJ-2X J-2 CI/HUMINT staff elementJ-3 Operations Directorate of a joint staffJ-6 Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

Directorate of a joint staffJCS Joint Chiefs of StaffJDISS Joint Deployable Intelligence Support SystemJFC joint force commanderJIC Joint Intelligence CenterJIPB joint intelligence preparation of the battlespaceJISE joint intelligence support elementJOA joint operations area

JP joint publicationJTF joint task forceJULLS Joint Universal Lessons Learned SystemJWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

MASINT measurement and signature intelligenceMNFC multinational force commanderMOOTW military operations other than war

NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNCA National Command AuthoritiesNDP national disclosure policyNIMA National Imagery and Mapping AgencyNIST national intelligence support teamNMJIC National Military Joint Intelligence CenterNSA National Security Agency

OICC Operational Intelligence Coordination CenterOSINT open-source intelligence

PIR priority intelligence requirement

RFI request for information

S&T scientific and technicalSCI sensitive compartmented informationSIGINT signals intelligenceSOF special operations forcesSTANAG standardization agreement (NATO)

TECHINT technical intelligence

UAV unmanned aerial vehicleUN United NationsUNOSOM United Nations Operations in SomaliaUSEUCOM United States European Command

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-2

Glossary

JP 2-0

analysis. None. (This term and its definitionare approved for removal from the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

analysis and production. See intelligencecycle. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

battlespace. The environment, factors, andconditions which must be understood tosuccessfully apply combat power, protectthe force, or complete the mission. Thisincludes the air, land, sea, space, and theincluded enemy and friendly forces,facilities, weather, terrain, theelectromagnetic spectrum, and theinformation environment within theoperational areas and areas of interest. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics,capabilities, or localities from which amilitary force derives its freedom of action,physical strength, or will to fight. Alsocalled COGs. (JP 1-02)

collate. 1. The grouping together of relateditems to provide a record of events andfacilitate further processing. 2. To comparecritically two or more items or documentsconcerning the same general subject;normally accomplished in the processingand exploitation phase in the intelligencecycle. (This term and its definition modifythe existing term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

collection management. In intelligenceusage, the process of converting intelligencerequirements into collection requirements,establishing priorities, tasking orcoordinating with appropriate collection

GL-3

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

sources or agencies, monitoring results andretasking, as required. See alsointelligence; intelligence cycle. (This termand its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

collection planning. A continuous processthat coordinates and integrates the effortsof all collection units and agencies. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

combat intelligence. That knowledge of theenemy, weather, and geographical featuresrequired by a commander in the planningand conduct of combat operations. (JP1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gatheredand activities conducted to protect againstespionage, other intelligence activities,sabotage or assassinations conducted by oron behalf of foreign governments orelements thereof, foreign organizations, orforeign persons, or international terroristactivities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

direction. In artillery and naval gunfiresupport, a term used by a spotter and/orobserver in a call for fire to indicate thebearing of the spotting line. (This term andits definition modify the existing term andits definition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

dissemination and integration. Seeintelligence cycle. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

evaluation and feedback. See intelligencecycle. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

GL-4

Glossary

JP 2-0

foreign intelligence. Information relatingto capabilities, intentions, and activities offoreign powers, organizations, or persons,but not including counterintelligence,except for information on internationalterrorist activities. See also intelligence. (JP1-02)

general military intelligence. Intelligenceconcerning the (1) military capabilities offoreign countries or organizations or (2)topics affecting potential US or alliedmilitary operations, relating to thefollowing subjects: armed forcescapabilities, including order of battle,organization, training, tactics, doctrine,strategy, and other factors bearing onmilitary strength and effectiveness; area andterrain intelligence, including urban areas,coasts and landing beaches, andmeteorological, oceanographic, andgeological intelligence; transportation in allmodes; military materiel production andsupport industries; military and civilian C4systems; military economics, includingforeign military assistance; insurgency andterrorism; military-political-sociologicalintelligence; location, identification, anddescription of military-related installations;government control; escape and evasion;and threats and forecasts. (Excludesscientific and technical intelligence.) Alsocalled GMI. See also intelligence; militaryintelligence. (JP 1-02)

geospatial information and services. Theconcept for collection, informationextraction, storage, dissemination, andexploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic,imagery (both commercial and nationalsource), gravimetric, aeronautical,topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural,and toponymic data accurately referencedto a precise location on the earth’s surface.These data are used for military planning,training, and operations includingnavigation, mission planning, missionrehearsal, modeling, simulation and

precise targeting. Geospatial informationprovides the basic framework forbattlespace visualization. It is informationproduced by multiple sources to commoninteroperable data standards. It may bepresented in the form of printed maps,charts, and publications; in digitalsimulation and modeling data bases; inphotographic form; or in the form ofdigitized maps and charts or attributedcenterline data. Geospatial services includetools that enable users to access andmanipulate data, and also includesinstruction, training, laboratory support, andguidance for the use of geospatial data.Also called GI&S. (This term and itsdefinition are included for information andare proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP2-03. Note: GI&S includes what formerlyhad been referred to as “mapping, charting,and geodesy” or “MC&G.”)

human intelligence. A category ofintelligence derived from informationcollected and provided by human sources.Also called HUMINT. (JP 1-02)

imagery intelligence. Intelligence derivedfrom the exploitation of collection by visualphotography, infrared sensors, lasers,electro-optics, and radar sensors, such assynthetic aperture radar wherein images ofobjects are reproduced optically orelectronically on film, electronic displaydevices, or other media. Also calledIMINT. See also intelligence. (JP 1-02)

information. 1. Facts, data, or instructionsin any medium or form. 2. The meaningthat a human assigns to data by means ofthe known conventions used in theirrepresentation. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken toaffect adversary information andinformation systems while defending one’sown information and information systems.Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

GL-5

Glossary

information processing. None. (This termand its definition are approved for removalfrom the next edition of JP 1-02.)

information requirements. Those items ofinformation regarding the enemy and hisenvironment which need to be collected andprocessed in order to meet the intelligencerequirements of a commander. (JP 1-02)

information warfare. Informationoperations conducted during time of crisisor conflict to achieve or promote specificobjectives over a specific adversary oradversaries. Also called IW. (JP 1-02)

integration. In photography, a process bywhich the average radar picture seen onseveral scans of the time base may beobtained on a print, or the process by whichseveral photographic images are combinedinto a single image. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

intelligence. 1. The product resulting fromthe collection, processing, integration,analysis, evaluation, and interpretation ofavailable information concerning foreigncountries or areas. 2. Information andknowledge about an adversary obtainedthrough observation, investigation,analysis, or understanding. (JP 1-02)

intelligence cycle. The process by whichinformation is converted into intelligenceand made available to users. There are sixphases in the cycle: a. planning anddirection—Determination of intelligencerequirements, development of appropriateintelligence architecture, preparation of acollection plan, and issuance of orders andrequests to information collection agencies.b. collection—Acquisition of informationand the provision of this information toprocessing elements. c. processing andexploitation—Conversion of collected

information into forms suitable to theproduction of intelligence. d. analysis andproduction—Conversion of processedinformation into intelligence through theintegration, analysis, evaluation, andinterpretation of all source data and thepreparation of intelligence products insupport of known or anticipated userrequirements. e. dissemination andintegration—Delivery of intelligence tousers in a suitable form and the applicationof the intelligence to appropriate missions,tasks, and functions. f. evaluation andfeedback—Continuous assessment ofintelligence operations during each phaseof the intelligence cycle to ensure that thecommander’s intelligence requirements arebeing met. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

intelligence discipline. A well defined areaof intelligence collection, processing,exploitation, and reporting using a specificcategory of technical or human resources.There are seven major disciplines: humanintelligence, imagery intelligence,measurement and signature intelligence,signals intelligence (communicationsintelligence, electronic intelligence, andforeign instrumentation signalsintelligence), open-source intelligence,t e c h n i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e , a n dcounterintelligence. See also humanintelligence; imagery intelligence;measurement and signature intelligence,signals intelligence; open-sourceintelligence; technical intelligence;counterintelligence. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

intelligence doctrine. Fundamentalprinciples that guide the preparation andsubsequent provision of intelligence to acommander and staff to aid in planning

GL-6

Glossary

JP 2-0

and conducting military operations. Seealso joint doctrine; joint intelligencedoctrine. (JP 1-02)

intelligence estimate. The appraisal,expressed in writing or orally, of availableintelligence relating to a specific situationor condition with a view to determining thecourses of action open to the enemy orpotential enemy and the order of probabilityof their adoption. (JP 1-02)

intelligence operations. The variety ofintelligence tasks that are carried out byvarious intelligence organizations andactivities. Predominantly, it refers to eitherintelligence collection or intelligenceproduction activities. When used in thecontext of intelligence collection activities,intelligence operations refer to collection,processing, exploitation, and reporting ofinformation. When used in the context ofintelligence production activities, it refersto collation, integration, interpretation, andanalysis, leading to the dissemination of afinished product. (JP 1-02)

intelligence requirement. 1. Any subject,general or specific, upon which there is aneed for the collection of information, orthe production of intelligence. 2. Arequirement for intelligence to fill a gapin the command’s knowledge orunderstanding of the battlespace or threatforces. (This term and its definition modifythe existing term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

intelligence source. The means or systemthat can be used to observe and recordinformation relating to the condition,situation, or activities of a targeted location,organization, or individual. An intelligencesource can be people, documents,equipment, or technical sensors. (This termand its definition are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

interpretation. A part of the analysis andproduction phase in the intelligence cyclein which the significance of information isjudged in relation to the current body ofknowledge. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

joint captured materiel exploitation center.Physical location for deriving intelligenceinformation from captured enemy material.It is normally subordinate to the joint forceJ-2. Also called JCMEC. (JP 1-02)

joint doctrine. Fundamental principles thatguide the employment of forces of two ormore Services in coordinated action towarda common objective. It will be promulgatedby the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,in coordination with the combatantcommands, Services, and Joint Staff. (JP1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a forcewhich is composed of significant elements,assigned or attached, of two or moreMilitary Departments, operating under asingle joint force commander. See also jointforce commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)or operational control over a joint force.Also called JFC. See also joint force. (JP1-02)

joint intelligence architecture. A dynamic,flexible structure that consists of theNational Military Joint Intelligence Center,the theater joint intelligence centers, andsubordinate joint force joint intelligencesupport elements. This architectureencompasses automated data processingequipment capabilities, communications

GL-7

Glossary

and information requirements, andresponsibilities to provide national, theater,and tactical commanders with the full rangeof intelligence required for planning andconducting operations. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint intelligence center. The intelligencecenter of the combatant commandheadquarters. The joint intelligence centeris responsible for providing and producingthe intelligence required to support thecombatant commander and staff,components, subordinate joint forces andelements, and the national intelligencecommunity. Also called JIC. (This termand its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint intelligence doctrine. Fundamentalprinciples that guide the preparation ofintelligence and the subsequent provisionof intelligence to support military forces oftwo or more Services employed incoordinated action. (JP 1-02)

joint intelligence preparation of thebattlespace. The analytical process usedby joint intelligence organizations toproduce intelligence assessments, estimatesand other intelligence products in supportof the joint force commander’s decisionmaking process. It is a continuous processthat includes defining the total battlespaceenvironment; describing the battlespace’seffects; evaluating the adversary; anddetermining and describing adversarypotential courses of action. The process isused to analyze the air, land, sea, space,electromagnetic, cyberspace, and humandimensions of the environment and todetermine an opponent’s capabilities tooperate in each. Joint intelligencepreparation of the battlespace products areused by the joint force and component

command staffs in preparing theirestimates and are also applied during theanalysis and selection of friendly coursesof action. Also called JIPB. (This termand its definition are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint intelligence support element. Asubordinate joint force forms a jointintelligence support element as the focusfor intelligence support for joint operations,providing the joint force commander, jointstaff, and components with the completeair, space, ground, and maritime adversarysituation. Also called JISE. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that isconstituted and so designated by theSecretary of Defense, a combatantcommander, a subordinate unifiedcommand commander, or an existing jointtask force commander. Also called JTF. (JP1-02)

J o i n t Wo r l d w i d e I n t e l l i g e n c eCommunications System. The sensitivecompartmented information portion of theDefense Information System Network. Itincorporates advanced networkingtechnologies that permit point-to-point ormultipoint information exchange involvingvoice, text, graphics, data, and videoteleconferencing. Also called JWICS. (JP1-02)

measurement and signature intelligence.Intelligence obtained by quantitative andqualitative analysis of data (metric, angle,spatial, wavelength, time dependence,modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic)derived from specific technical sensors forthe purpose of identifying any distinctivefeatures associated with the emitter orsender, and to facilitate subsequentidentification and/or measurement of thesame. The detected feature may be eitherreflected or emitted. Also called MASINT.See also intelligence. (This term and its

GL-8

Glossary

JP 2-0

definition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

national intelligence support team. Anationally sourced team composed ofintelligence and communications expertsfrom either Defense Intelligence Agency,Central Intelligence Agency, NationalSecurity Agency, or any combination ofthese agencies. Also called NIST. (Thisterm and its definition modify the existingterm and its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

open-source intelligence. Information ofpotential intelligence value that is availableto the general public. Also called OSINT.See also intelligence. (JP 1-02)

operational intelligence. Intelligence that isrequired for planning and conductingcampaigns and major operations toaccomplish strategic objectives withintheaters or operational areas. See alsointelligence; strategic intelligence; tacticalintelligence. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

planning and direction. See intelligencecycle. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

priority intelligence requirements. Thoseintelligence requirements for which acommander has an anticipated and statedpriority in the task of planning and decisionmaking. Also called PIRs. (This term andits definition modify the existing term andits definition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

processing. 1. In photography, the operationsnecessary to produce negatives,diapositives, or prints from exposed films,

plates, or paper. 2. A system of operationsdesigned to convert raw data into usefulinformation. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

reconnaissance. A transitory missionundertaken to obtain, by visual observationor other detection methods, informationabout the activities and resources of anadversary or potential adversary, or tosecure data concerning the meteorological,hydrographic, or geographic characteristicsof a particular area. (This term and itsdefinition are included for information andare proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP3-55.)

request for information. 1. Any specifictime-sensitive ad hoc requirement forintelligence information or products tosupport an ongoing crisis or operation notnecessarily related to standing requirementsor scheduled intelligence production. Arequest for information can be initiated torespond to operational requirements andwill be validated in accordance with thetheater command’s procedures. 2. TheNational Security Agency/Central SecurityService uses this term to state ad hoc signalsintelligence requirements. Also called RFI.(JP 1-02)

scientific and technical intelligence. Theproduct resulting from the collection,evaluation, analysis, and interpretation offoreign scientific and technical informationwhich covers: a. foreign developments inbasic and applied research and in appliedengineering techniques; and b. scientificand technical characteristics, capabilities,and limitations of all foreign militarysystems, weapons, weapon systems, andmateriel, the research and developmentrelated thereto, and the production methodsemployed for their manufacture. Alsocalled S&TI. (JP 1-02)

GL-9

Glossary

signals intelligence. 1. A category ofintelligence comprising either individuallyor in combination all communicationsintelligence, electronic intelligence, andforeign instrumentation signals intelligence,however transmitted. 2. Intelligencederived from communications, electronic,and foreign instrumentation signals. Alsocalled SIGINT. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

strategic intelligence. Intelligence that isrequired for the formulation of strategy,policy, and military plans and operations atnational and theater levels. See alsointelligence; operational intelligence;tactical intelligence. (JP 1-02)

surveillance. The sustained systematicobservation of aerospace, surface orsubsurface areas, places, persons, or thingsby visual, aural, electronic, photographic,or other means. (This term and its definitionare included for information and areproposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP3-55.)

synchronization. 1. The arrangement ofmilitary actions in time, space, and purposeto produce maximum relative combatpower at a decisive place and time. 2. Inthe intelligence context, application ofintelligence sources and methods in concertwith the operational plan. (JP 1-02)

tactical intelligence. Intelligence that isrequired for planning and conducting

tactical operations. Also called TACINTEL.See also intelligence; operationalintelligence; strategic intelligence. (JP1-02)

target acquisition. The detection,identification, and location of a target insufficient detail to permit the effectiveemployment of weapons. (JP 1-02)

targeting. 1. The process of selectingtargets and matching the appropriateresponse to them taking account ofoperational requirements andcapabilities. 2. The analysis of enemysituations relative to the commander’smission, objectives, and capabilities atthe commander’s disposal, to identifyand nominate specific vulnerabilitiesthat, if exploited, will accomplish thecommander’s purpose through delaying,disrupting, disabling, or destroyingenemy forces or resources critical to theenemy. (JP 1-02)

technical intelligence. Intelligencederived from the collection, processing,analysis, and exploitation of data andinformation pertaining to foreignequipment and material for the purposesof preventing technological surprise,assessing foreign scientific and technicalcapabilities, and developingcountermeasures designed to neutralizean adversary’s technological advantages.Also called TECHINT. (This term andits definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

GL-10

Glossary

JP 2-0

Intentionally Blank

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCs

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

The CINCs receive the JP andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each JP and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each JP isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or JointStaff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrinepublications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 2-0 Intelligence

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub,makes required changes and prepares pubfor coordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing forapproval as a JP

STEP #4CJCS Approval

Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINTWARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF

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Documents

JP 2-0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations"