JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations95).pdf · prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces

Joint Pub 4-0

Doctrine forLogistic Support ofJoint Operations

27 January 1995

To meet our Nation’s global respon-sibilities, our ability to move and sustaincombat forces virtually anywhere in theworld must be maintained. This requiresefficiently integrating the unique logisticcapabilities of all our Services. Jointdoctrine is the underpinning that makes thishappen and optimizes the use of limitedresources, enhances interoperability, andfosters cooperation.

Joint Pub 4-0 is the keystone documentof the logistic support of joint operationsseries. It discusses principles, planningconsiderations, and responsibilities forlogistic operations. The principles providedherein serve as a guide to the combatantcommander and planners when developinga theater logistic concept.

Logistics is the foundation of our combat power. We must, therefore, continueto develop and refine joint doctrine that promotes the most efficient , effective useof all available assets. Adherence to that doctrine is the key to our success.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILIChairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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1. Scope

Joint Pub 4-0 is the keystone documentof the logistic support of joint operationsseries. It provides fundamental principlesand doctrine for logistic support of jointand multinational operations.

2. Purpose

Joint Pub 4-0 is the keystone documentof the logistic support of joint operationsseries. This publication sets forth doctrineto govern the joint activities andperformance of the Armed Forces of theUnited States in joint operations as wellas the doctrinal basis for US militaryinvolvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It providesmilitary guidance for the exercise ofauthority by combatant commanders andother joint force commanders andprescribes doctrine for joint operationsand training. It provides military guidancefor use by the Armed Forces in preparingtheir appropriate plans. It is not the intentof this publication to restrict the authorityof the joint force commander (JFC) fromorganizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance establishedin this publication apply to thecommanders of combatant commands,subunified commands, joint task forces,and subordinate components of thesecommands. These principles andguidance also may apply when significantforces of one Service are attached toforces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine willbe followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptionalcircumstances dictate otherwise. Ifconflicts arise between the contents of thispublication and the contents of Servicepublications, this publication will takeprecedence for the activities of joint forcesunless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, normally in coordination with theother members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,has provided more current and specificguidance. Commanders of forcesoperating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States.For doctrine and procedures not ratifiedby the United States, commanders shouldevaluate and follow the multinationalcommand doctrine and procedures,where applicable.

PREFACE

Preface

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................... v

CHAPTER IAUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR LOGISTIC OPERATIONS

• General ................................................................................................................... I-1• Responsibilities ...................................................................................................... I-6• Supply .................................................................................................................... I-8• Distribution ............................................................................................................ I-9• Maintenance and Salvage ...................................................................................... I-9• Facilities Engineering and Base Development ................................................... I-10• Transportation ..................................................................................................... I-10• Procurement ........................................................................................................ I-11• Health Services ................................................................................................... I-11• Field Services....................................................................................................... I-11• Command, Control, Communications, Computer Systems and

Intelligence Support .......................................................................................... I-12• Security Assistance .............................................................................................. I-12• Wartime Host-Nation Support ............................................................................. I-12• Counterintelligence Support ................................................................................ I-13

CHAPTER IILOGISTIC PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS

• General .................................................................................................................. II-1• Principles of Logistics .......................................................................................... II-1• Logistic Considerations ........................................................................................ II-4

CHAPTER IIIJOINT LOGISTIC PLANNING

• General ................................................................................................................. III-1• Importance of Logistic Planning.......................................................................... III-2• Integrating Logistic Plans .................................................................................... III-3• Levels of Logistic Planning ................................................................................. III-3• Theater Organization ........................................................................................... III-3• Special Planning Considerations ......................................................................... III-4

CHAPTER IVJOINT THEATER LOGISTICS

• General ................................................................................................................ IV-1• Combatant Commander’s Logistic Concept ....................................................... IV-1• Extending Operational Reach ............................................................................. IV-6• Applied Operational Logistics ............................................................................ IV-7

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Table of Contents

APPENDIX

A Logistic Responsibilities Within the Department of Defense ........................ A-1B Organization and Functions of Combatant Command Logistic

Staff (J-4) and Functions of Joint Logistic Centers,Offices and Boards........................................................................................ B-1

C Logistic Indicators ........................................................................................... C-1D Logistic Checklist for OPLAN Annex D ........................................................ D-1E References ....................................................................................................... E-1F Administrative Instructions ............................................................................. F-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................. GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................ GL-3

FIGURE

I-1 Areas of Logistic Responsibilities ............................................................. I-1I-2 Strategic and Operational Logistics Concepts ........................................... I-2I-3 Logistic Support Requirements Functional Areas ..................................... I-3I-4 Strategic Level Logistic Considerations .................................................... I-5I-5 Geographic Combatant Commanders' Responsibilities for Supply ........... I-8I-6 Assistance Sought from Host Nations ...................................................... I-12

II-1 Principles of Logistics ............................................................................... II-2III-1 Area Organization Influence on Logistic Decisions ................................ III-4III-2 Special Planning Considerations .............................................................. III-4IV-1 Key Elements of the Logistic System ..................................................... IV-2IV-2 Considerations in Developing a Logistic System ................................... IV-2IV-3 Applied Operational Logistics ................................................................ IV-7

TABLE

IV-1 Logistic Area References ........................................................................ IV-5

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

General Logistics Overview

Logistics is thefoundation of combatpower.

Logistic functionsinclude:

Supply systems

Maintenance

Transportation

General engineering

Health services

Logistics is the bridge connecting a nation’s economy to anation’s warfighting forces. It is the process of planningand executing the movement and sustainment ofoperating forces in the execution of a military strategy andoperations. The art of logistics is how to integrate thestrategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts withinthe theater, while scheduling the mobilization anddeployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support ofthe employment concept of a geographic combatantcommander.

Supply systems acquire, manage, receive, store, and issuethe materiel required by the operating forces. Maintenanceincludes actions taken to keep materiel in a serviceablecondition or to upgrade its capability. Transportation isthe movement of units, personnel, equipment, and suppliesfrom the point of origin to the final destination. Generalengineering provides the construction, damage repair, andoperation and maintenance of facilities or logisticenhancements. Health services include evacuation,hospitalization, medical logistics, medical laboratoryservices, blood management, vector control, preventivemedicine services, veterinary services, and dental services.For each of the above functional areas, the combatantcommander should consider the four elements of thelogistics process: acquisition, distribution, sustainment,and disposition.

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Covers Authorities and Responsibilities for Logistic Operations

Provides Logistic Principles and Considerations

Discusses Logistic Planning

Gives Guidance on Logistics at the Theater Level

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Executive Summary

Joint Pub 4-0

The exercise of directive authority for logistics by acombatant commander includes the authority to issue tosubordinate commanders directives, including peacetimemeasures, necessary to ensure the effective execution ofapproved operation plans, the effectiveness and economyof operation, and the prevention or elimination ofunnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping offunctions among the Service component commands.

Implementation and execution of logistic functionsremain the responsibility of the Services and the Servicecomponent commanders.

Each Service is responsible for the logistic support of itsown forces, except when logistic support is otherwiseprovided for by agreements with national agencies or allies,or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing.

The combatant commander will review requirements ofthe Service component commands and establish prioritiesthrough the deliberate planning process to use supplies,facilities, mobility assets, and personnel effectively.

Logistic responsibilities for subordinate forces to thecombatant command will follow single-Service commandchannels, except when specifically directed otherwise eitherby the authority assigning those subordinate forces to thecombatant command or by the Secretary of Defense; when

Combatant commandersexercise directiveauthorityfor logistics.

Services and Servicecomponents implement.

Services provide ownlogistic support.

Combatant commandersestablish priorities.

Subordinate joint forceswill normally followsingle-Service logisticsupport channels.

Responsibilities

Air refueling adds flexibility and responsiveness to the strategic airlift system.

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Executive Summary

common, joint, or cross-servicing agreements andprocedures provide other responsibilities; or the geographiccombatant commander may give the commander of asubordinate joint force directive authority for a commonsupport capability within that subordinate commander’sjoint operations area.

Combatant commanders are responsible for allocatingcritical resources, coordinating supply support betweenthe Service components, establishing supply buildup rates,and stating theater stockage levels.

Subject to combatant commanders’ responsibility andauthority, commanders of the Service component commandsare responsible for logistic support of their forces and directcommunication with appropriate headquarters on all supplymatters.

Allied nations design their logistic systems to facilitate selfsufficiency within their fiscal capabilities. Although thesustainment of its forces is each nation’s own responsibility,varying degrees of mutual logistic support among nationscan be expected.

The geographic combatant commander is responsible forprovision of supplies to civilians in occupied areas inaccordance with current directives, obligations, and treatiesthe United States recognizes.

The geographic combatant commander is responsible formaintaining an effective distribution network that isconsistent with the Services’ intertheater policy andprocedures; they are responsible for coordinatingmaintenance and salvage; establishing bases; coordinatingreal estate requirements; and planning, programming andconstructing roads, bridges, and facilities. The Servicesare normally responsible for facility acquisition fundingand support. Geographic combatant commanders areresponsible for coordinating and integrating health servicesupport and the search, recovery, identification, care, andevacuation or disposition of deceased personnel within theirtheaters.

Combatant commanderscoordinate supply supportbetween Servicecomponents.

Commanders of Servicecomponent commands areresponsible for logisticsupport of their forces.

Allied forces are normallyself-sufficient.

The geographic combatantcommander is responsiblefor supplies for civilians.

The geographic combatantcommander is responsiblefor a distribution network,maintenance and salvage,facilities engineering andbase development,coordinating healthservices, and field services.

Supply

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Executive Summary

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The Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command(USCINCTRANS) has the mission to provide strategic air,land, and sea transportation to deploy, employ, and sustainmilitary forces to meet national security objectivesthroughout the range of military operations. Combatantcommanders coordinate their movement requirements andrequired delivery dates with USCINCTRANS.

Proper logistic planning will reduce the need for emergencymeasures and improvisations, which are usually expensiveand often have an adverse effect on subordinate and adjacentcommands. Logistic planners must avoid focusing solelyon the deployment problem at the expense of sustaining theemployment concept of the campaign.

The strategic logistic concept will focus on the ability togenerate and move forces and materiel into the theater.Tactical planning is done primarily by the Servicecomponents.

Planners must identify critical or key issues unique to aspecific operation plan they must support. These issuesinclude the increased demand associated with an expandingforce; critical supply items; constricting bottlenecks;control of all means of transportation (including thatprovided by allies and host nations); and the sourcing ofsupplies and services from coalition sources.

The Commander inChief, US TransportationCommand providesstrategic air, land, andsea transportation.

The combatantcommanders’ operationplans should have logisticimplications coordinatedat all levels.

Logistic planning shouldbe done at the strategic,operational, and tacticallevels.

Special logistic planningconsiderations includedemands of an expandingforce, critical items,bottlenecks, movementcontrol, and civiliansupply sources.

Joint Logistic Planning

Hospital ships provide responsive support to deployed troops worldwide.

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Executive Summary

Combatant commanders must ensure that their campaignplans fully integrate operational and logistic capabilities.The influence of the combatant commander is essential inbridging any operations-logistics gap.

Key elements of the logistic system include lines ofcommunication, theater transportation network,specialized units, and host-nation support. Considerationsin developing a logistic system include geography,transportation, logistic capability, logistic enhancements,logistic infrastructure protection, echelon of support,assignment of responsibility, and availability of wartimehost-nation support.

The theater logistic concept should derive from the estimateof logistic supportability of one or more courses of action.It is the envisioned manner in which the capabilities andresources of the combatant commanders components willbe employed to provide supply, maintenance, transportation,and engineering services.

Logistics is the bridge connecting a nation’s economy to anation’s warfighting forces. It is the foundation of combatpower. Combatant commanders exercise directive authorityfor logistics. This includes the authority to issue tosubordinate commanders directives, including peacetimemeasures, necessary to ensure the effective execution ofapproved operation plans, the effectiveness and economyof operation, and the prevention or elimination ofunnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping offunctions among the Service component commands. Thecombatant commanders’ operation plans should havelogistic implications coordinated at all levels.

The influence of thecombatant commander isessential in bridging anyoperations-logistics gap.

The logistic systemintegrates intertheaterand intratheatertransportation.

The theater strategiclogistic concept is derivedfrom the estimate oflogistic supportability ofone or more of thecourses of action.

Joint Theater Logistics

Conclusion

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Executive Summary

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“Strategy is to war what the plot is to the play; Tactics is represented bythe role of the players; Logistics furnishes the stage management,accessories, and maintenance. The audience, thrilled by the action ofthe play and the art of the performers, overlooks all of the cleverly hiddendetails of stage management.”

LtCol George C. Thorpe: Pure Logistics (1917)

1. General

a. Logistics. Logistics provides thefoundation of our combat power. It canbe described as the bridge connecting anation’s economy to a nation’swarfighting forces. Logistics is theprocess of planning and executing themovement and sustainment of operatingforces in the execution of a militarystrategy and operations. Areas of logisticresponsibilities are shown in Figure I-1.The art of logistics is how to integratethe strategic, operational, and tacticalsustainment efforts within the theater,while scheduling the mobilization anddeployment of units, personnel, andsupplies in support of the employmentconcept of a geographic combatantcommander. The relative combat powermilitary forces can bring to bear againstan enemy is constrained by a nation’scapability to deliver forces and materielto the required points of application acrossthe range of military operations.Commanders may have more combatforces than available logistic resources tomove and sustain desired operations. Anation’s capability to deliver logisticresources has historically been a majorlimiting factor in military operations.This may be especially true in future jointoperations, when demands for militaryresources become highly competitive.

CHAPTER IAUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

LOGISTIC OPERATIONS

AREAS OF LOGISTICRESPONSIBILITIES

MATERIEL

PERSONNEL

SERVICES

FACILITIES

Design and DevelepmentAcquisitionStorageMovementDistributionMaintenanceEvacuationDisposition

MovementEvacuationHospitalization

Acqusition or Furnishing

Acqusition or ConstructionMaintanenceOperationDisposition

Figure I-1. Areas of LogisticResponsibilities

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tactical logistic responsibilities, includingdeveloping procedures, doctrine, andtraining for supplying personnel with allnecessary materiel to do their jobs. Alllevels are interrelated, with constraintsat any level limiting options ofdecisionmakers. Within their areas ofresponsibility (AORs), geographiccombatant commanders may establish atheater of war and, if needed, subordinatetheaters of operations (see Joint Pub 3-0,“Doctrine for Joint Operations”). Thelogistic concept should support theateractivity by properly organizing supportfrom the continental United States(CONUS) base to the combat zone. FigureI-2 shows a broad framework for thisorganization and the scope of logisticsupport needed to support a theater. Alllevels of logistics involve combat servicesupport and affect the sustainability offorces in the combat zone.

b. Levels of Logistic Support. Jointdoctrine states that there are three levelsof war—strategic, operational, andtactical. They apply in war and inoperations other than war. Logisticsupport within these levels isdemonstrated in the way the Joint Staff,Services, and warfighting commandershandle logistics. The Joint Staff andServices concentrate on strategic logisticmatters. The supported and supportingcommanders’ logistic staffs manage boththe strategic and operational logisticissues affecting missions assigned to thecombatant commanders (CINCs) in theJoint Strategic Capabilities Plan by theNational Command Authorities (NCA)and other such areas as directed by thecombatant commander. The Services andthe subordinate commanders down totheir battlefield logisticians at the unit andship level, deal with operational and

The Communications Zone CombatZone

Theater

Theater of War

IntratheaterLOC

IntertheaterLOC

Theater ofOperationsStrategic

LogisticsOperational Logistics

TacticalLogistics

Logistics System

STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONALLOGISTIC CONCEPTS

CONUSBase

TheaterBase

Figure I-2. Strategic and Operational Logistics Concepts

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Authorities and Responsibilities for Logistic Operations

c. Logistic Functions. Logisticsupport requirements involve six broadfunctional areas: supply systems,maintenance, transportation, generalengineering, health services, and otherservices, and are illustrated in Figure I-3.

• Supply systems acquire, manage,receive, store, and issue the materielrequired by the operating forces to equipand sustain the force from deploymentthrough combat operations and theirredeployment.

• Maintenance includes actions taken tokeep materiel in a serviceable condition,to return it to service, or to update andupgrade its capability.

• Transportation is the movement ofunits, personnel, equipment, andsupplies from the point of origin to thefinal destination. Additional guidanceis in the Joint Pub 4-01 series ofpublications.

Figure I-3. Logistic SupportRequirements Functional Areas

• General engineering provides theconstruction, damage repair, andoperation and maintenance of facilitiesor logistic enhancements required by thecombatant commander to provideshelter, warehousing, hospitals, waterand sewage treatment, and water andfuel storage distribution to enhanceprovision of sustainment and services.Additional guidance is found in JointPub 4-04, “Joint Doctrine for CivilEngineering Support.”

• Health services include evacuation,hospitalization, medical logistics,medical laboratory services, bloodmanagement, vector control, preventivemedicine services, veterinary services,dental services, and the requiredcommand, control, and communications.Additional guidance is found in theJoint Pub 4-02 series of publications.

• Other services are associated withnonmateriel support activities andconsist of various functions and tasksprovided by service troops and thelogistic community that are essential tothe technical management and supportof a force (i.e., aerial delivery, laundry,clothing exchange and bath, and gravesregistration.) Additional guidance isfound in Joint Pub 4-06, “Joint Doctrineand JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in JointOperations.”

d. Joint Support Responsibilities andRequirements. To avoid shortfalls orincreased risk in operation plans(OPLANs), logistics must be balancedbetween the combatant commander’sneeds and logistic resource availability.Logistics is also a function of command.To have control over the strategic,operational, and tactical levels of war, onemust also have control over logistics. Fora given area and for a given mission, a

LOGISTIC SUPPORTREQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL AREAS

SUPPLY SYSTEMS

MAINTENANCE

TRANSPORTATION

GENERAL ENGINEERING

HEALTH SERVICES

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES

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single command authority should beresponsible for logistics. Combatantcommanders exercise combatantcommand (command authority)

(COCOM) over assigned forces.COCOM includes directive authorityfor logistics, giving the combatantcommander the unique ability to shiftlogistic resources within the theater.COCOM cannot be delegated. Normally,this authority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Joint Pub 0-2, “UnifiedAction Armed Forces (UNAAF),” givesa full explanation of COCOM and theother command relationships ofoperational control, tactical control, andsupport. (Note: A CINC’s authority isgenerally confined to the theater, whilelogistic support beyond the theater isusually a Service’s responsibility. Thisauthority underscores the need foraccurate, and well coordinated, priorlogistic planning between CINCs,Services, supporting agencies, and allies.)Support, which often involves logistics,is the action of a force that aids, protects,complements, or sustains another forceand may involve the provision of services,

resources, and combat power but doesnot involve the transfer of forces or units.Support is characterized as mutualsupport, general support, direct support,

and close support. Joint Pub 0-2, “UnifiedAction Armed Forces (UNAAF),” alsoprovides descriptions of the concepts ofcoordinating authority, administrativecontrol, and direct liaison authorized.

“International logistic coordina-tion must always involve someinvasion of the economic rights,independence,and sovereigntyof each nation of the alliance.”

Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles:Logistics in the National Defense

(1959)

e. Multinational Logistic SupportResponsibilities and Requirements. Forcoalition and combined commands,formal arrangements for command andcontrol (C2) may not be feasible, but jointcommand relationships and proceduresgive US combatant commanders an entryposition on which to base multinationalrelationships. Combatant commanderscannot enter into multinational

Airlift is a cornerstone of global force projection.

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relationships that are contrary to US policywithout NCA direction. Allied andcoalition nations design their logisticsystems to facilitate self sufficiency withintheir fiscal capabilities. Although thesustainment of its forces is each nation’sown responsibility, varying degrees ofmutual logistic support among nationscan be expected. The exchange of logisticsupport among members of alliances orcoalitions can result in significanteconomies of effort. However, in theabsence of appropriate internationalagreements, no authority exists for thegeographic combatant commanders toprovide for or accept logistic support fromallies or coalition partners. Under thesecircumstances, multinational commandersshould attain as much control of logisticsas possible through tact, diplomacy,knowledge of allied forces’ doctrine,and generally good personal relationswith allied and coalition subordinatecommanders and political leaders.Requirements for multinational forcessupported by, or under the control of, ageographic combatant commander shouldbe screened by the commanders of theappropriate Service componentcommands and reported separately to thegeographic combatant commander’s J-4.

The combatant commander is responsiblefor establishing the necessary reportsand forwarding the requirements to theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff forobtaining NCA approval for providingsupport to multinational forces. Thegeographic combatant commander willensure that assistance is rendered tomultinational forces in accordance withassigned responsibilities and as directedby the NCA.

f. Elements of the Logistic Process.For each of the functional areas listed inparagraph 1c above, the geographiccombatant commander should considerthe four elements of the logistic process:acquisition, distribution , sustainment,and disposition. At the theater strategiclevel, specific considerations include: (1)logistic resources necessary to generatecombat forces and sustain their operations,(2) the procurement process to ensure theavailability of logistic resources in atimely manner, (3) the process ofallocating available logistic resourcesamong subordinate commands, and (4) thedistribution system necessary to achievethe maximum combat effectiveness.Theater strategic considerations are shownin Figure I-4. At the theater operational

SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS AT THE THEATERSTRATEGIC LEVEL

Logistic resources necessary to generate combat forces andsustain their operations.

The procurement process to ensure the availability of logisticresources in a timely manner.

The process of allocating available logistic resources amongsubordinate commands.

The distribution system necessary to achieve maximum combateffectiveness.

Figure I-4. Strategic Level Logistic Considerations

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level, specific considerations includei d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n a lrequirements and establishment ofpriorities for the employment of theresources provided. Geographicc o m b a t a n t c o m m a n d e r s s h o u l dunderstand that these functions will varyin definition and application, and planaccordingly. Efforts should be made tostandardize these functions withoutinhibiting operations. Logistic functionsshould use existing policies andprocedures of the Service componentswhenever possible. If it is not possibleto use existing policies and procedures ofthe Service components, the geographiccombatant commanders must identify andresolve differences with Servicecommanders early in the planning processto ascertain the degree of uninterruptedlogistic support in the theater. Theseprocedures apply across the range ofmilitary operations. Ideally, priordeliberate planning and testing of thesemodifications in joint exercises should beconducted to ensure adequate logisticsupport for the expected joint operations.

2. Responsibilities

“I don’t know what the hell this“logistics” is that Marshall is alwaystalking about, but I want some of it.”

Fleet Admiral E.J. King: To a staffofficer. (1942)

a. Authority and Control

• Commanders of combatantcommands may exercise directiveauthority for logistics (or delegatedirective authority for a commonsupport capability). The exercise ofdirective authority for logistics by acombatant commander includes theauthority to issue to subordinatecommanders directives, including

peacetime measures, necessary toensure the following:

•• Effective execution of approvedOPLANs.

•• Effectiveness and economy ofoperation.

•• Prevention or elimination ofunnecessary duplication of facilitiesand overlapping of functions amongthe Service component commands.

• This authorization of directiveauthority is not intended to:

•• Discontinue Service responsibilityfor logistic support.

•• Discourage coordination byconsultation and agreement.

•• Disrupt effective procedures,efficient use of facilities, ororganization.

• Unless otherwise directed by theSecretary of Defense, the MilitaryDepartments and Services willcontinue to have responsibility for thelogistic and administrative supportof Service forces assigned or attachedto joint commands, subject to thefollowing guidance:

•• Under peacetime conditions, thescope of the logistic andadministrative responsibilitiesexercised by the commander of acombatant command will beconsistent with the peacetimelimitations imposed by legislation,DOD policy or regulations, budgetaryconsiderations, local conditions, andother specific conditions prescribedby the Secretary of Defense or theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Where these factors preclude execu-tion of a combatant commander’sdirective by component commanders,the comments and recommendationsof the combatant commander,together with the comments of thecomponent commander concerned,will normally be referred to theappropriate Military Department forconsideration. If the matter is notresolved in a timely manner with theappropriate Military Department, itwill be referred by the combatantcommander through the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff to theSecretary of Defense.

•• Under crisis action, wartimeconditions or where criticalsituations make diversion of thenormal logistic process necessary, thelogistic and administrative authorityof combatant commanders enablethem to use all facilities and suppliesof all forces assigned to theircommands as necessary for theaccomplishment of their missions.

• A combatant commander willexercise approval authority overService logistic programs (baseadjustments, force beddowns, andother aspects as appropriate) withinthe command’s area of responsibilitythat will have significant effectson operational capability orsustainability. When the combatantcommander does not concur in aproposed Service logistic programaction and coordination between thecombatant commander and theService Chief fails to result in anarrangement suitable to all parties, thecombatant commander may forwardthe issue through the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretaryof Defense for resolution.

b. Implementation and Execution.Implementation and execution of logisticfunctions remains the responsibility ofthe Services, US Special OperationsCommand, and the Service componentcommanders.

c. Single-Service Logistic Support.Each Service is responsible for thelogistic support of its own forces, exceptwhen logistic support is otherwiseprovided for by agreements with nationalagencies or allies, or by assignments tocommon, joint, or cross-servicing. Thecombatant commanders may determinethat common servicing would bebeneficial within the theater or adesignated area. If so, the combatantcommander may delegate theresponsibility for providing orcoordinating service for all Servicecomponents in the theater or designatedarea to the Service component that is thedominant user.

d. Review of Requirements. Thecombatant commander will reviewrequirements of the Service componentcommands and establish prioritiesthrough the deliberate planning processto use supplies, facilities, mobilityassets, and personnel effectively and willprovide balanced and uniform plans infurtherance of the command’s mission.

e. Transfer of Functions andFacilities Among Services. The CINCsshould give appropriate guidance totheir components for transferringforces and rendering support. Underwartime or crisis conditions, a CINC maydirect transfer of functions as necessary.This authorization of directive authorityis not intended to abrogate Serviceresponsibility for logistic support.Every effort will be made to obtainthe Service’s concurrence through

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coordination with Service componentcommands or directly to the headquartersof the appropriate Service. Under allconditions, the implementation of sucha directed transfer, includingadministrative and procedural aspects, isthe responsibility of the Servicecomponent commanders involved. Thecombatant commander retains theresponsibility for overseeing andresolving issues.

f. Forces Subordinate to CombatantCommands

• Logistic responsibilities for forcessubordinate to the combatantcommand will follow single-Servicecommand channels, except for thefollowing:

•• When specifically directedotherwise either by the authorityassigning those subordinate forces tothe combatant command or by theSecretary of Defense.

•• When common, joint, or cross-servicing agreements and proceduresprovide other responsibilities.

• The geographic combatant com-mander may delegate to thecommander of a subordinate jointforce directive authority for acommon support capability withinthat subordinate commander’s jointoperations area.

3. Supply

a. Geographic Combatant Com-mander. A geographic combatantcommander’s responsibilities for supplyare illustrated in Figure I-5. Geographiccombatant commanders are responsiblefor effectively coordinating supplysupport between the Service components,establishing supply buildup rates, andstating theater stockage levels. Whenpractical to improve economy of effort,common-item support may be assigned toa Service component command, normally

Figure I-5. Geographic Combatant Commanders' Responsibilities for Supply

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS'RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SUPPLY

Coordinating supply support

Establishing supply buildup rates

Stating theater stockage levels

Allocating critical logistic resources

Reviewing statements of requirements

Providing supplies to civilians

Recommending the priority of the phase buildupand cutback

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the dominant user. Geographic combatantcommanders are also responsible for theallocation of critical logistic resourceswithin their theaters. They must ensurethat statements of the requirements ofassigned forces (including mutual supportarrangements and associated inter-Servicesupport agreements) are prepared andsubmitted in accordance with existingdirectives of the Secretary of Defense, theSecretaries of the Military Departments,and the Chiefs of the Services.

b. Commanders of ServiceComponent Commands. Subject tocombatant commanders’ responsibilityand authority as outlined above,commanders of the Service componentcommands are responsible for logisticsupport of their forces and directcommunication with appropriateheadquarters on all supply matters, andrelated requirements, such as thedeployment of supplies, materiel, andequipment into the AOR. Commandersof component commands will keep thegeographic combatant commanderinformed of the status of supply mattersaffecting readiness of their forces.

c. Commanders of SubordinateCommands. Commanders of subordinatecommands may be assigned theresponsibility for providing supplysupport to elements or individuals ofother Services within the theater ordesignated area.

d. Supplies for Civilians. Thegeographic combatant commander isresponsible for provision of supplies tocivilians in occupied areas in accordancewith current directives, obligations, andtreaties the United States recognizes.

e. Priority of Phased Buildup andCutback. The geographic combatant

commander is responsible forrecommending to the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff the priority of thephased buildup and cutback of supplies,installations, and organizations essentialto the mission.

4. Distribution

Distribution is a function of visibility,management, and transportation. Thegeographic combatant commander isresponsible for maintaining an effectivetheater distribution network that isconsistent with the Services’ intertheaterpolicy and procedures and for prescribingunique policies and procedures relating tothe theater’s distribution network. Ingeneral, the commanders of Servicecomponent commands will operate theirdistribution networks in accordance withestablished Service procedures, usingestablished channels of distributionwhenever possible.

5. Maintenance and Salvage

Geographic combatant commanders areresponsible for coordination ofmaintenance and salvage within thetheater. Where practical, maintenancefacilities for joint or cross-Service useshould be established, and inter-Serviceuse of salvage assets should beemphasized. However, Service-peculiaritem maintenance support should remainthe responsibility of Service componentcommanders. Maintenance prioritiesshould emphasize mission-essentialweapon systems that can be rapidlyreturned to combat readiness. Aneffective maintenance program(including preventive maintenance) canminimize retrograde and supply needs formajor end-items and enhance battledamage repair efforts.

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6. Facilities Engineering andBase Development

a. Base Establishment. Geographiccombatant commanders are responsiblefor the establishment of bases necessaryto accomplish the mission.

b. Real Estate Requirements.Geographic combatant commanders areresponsible for coordination of real estaterequirements within the theater. Inter-Service use of real estate should beencouraged to the maximum extentpossible. Geographic combatantcommanders will resolve conflictingrequirements for additional real estate andincompatible use of existing real estate.

c. Facilities Construction. Combatantcommanders are responsible forprioritizing, planning, and coordinatingthe construction of roads, bridges, andfacilities necessary to support theirmission. Overseas contingencyconstruction project requests requiregeographic combatant commandervalidation. Additionally, the CINC willdetermine priorities for programmingfacilities necessary to support the mission.

d. Assignment of Facilities. TheServices are normally responsible forfacility acquisition funding and support.Geographic combatant commandersshould ensure that the minimum essentialengineering and facilities required tosupport the theater operational and tacticalrequirements are assigned to the Servicecomponents. Based on missionrequirements, the combatant commandermay direct temporary transfer betweenService components. Use of localfacilities should be maximized, especiallyin occupied areas.

7. Transportation

The Commander in Chief, USTransportation Command (USCINCTRANS) has the mission to providestrategic air, land, and seatransportation to deploy, employ, andsustain military forces to meet nationalsecurity objectives across the rangeof military operations. Combatantcommanders coordinate their movementrequirements and required delivery dateswith USCINCTRANS who, with thetransportation component commands,provides a complete movement systemfrom origin to initial theater destination.This system includes the effective use ofmilitary and commercial assets. Finally,USCINCTRANS has the authority toprocure commercial transportationservices through component commands(within legal constraints) and to activate,with approval of the Secretary of Defense,the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, ReadyReserve Force (RRF), and SealiftReadiness Program.

a. Air Mobility Command, MilitarySealift Command, and MilitaryTraffic Management Command Trans-portation Facilities and Supplies.

Air Mobility Command (AMC),Military Sealift Command (MSC), andMilitary Traffic Management Command(MTMC) transportation facilities andsupplies not assigned to the geographiccombatant commander are normallyexempted from the logistic authority ofthe geographic combatant commander.Combatant commanders shouldcommunicate their requirements andpriorities for modification of existingfacilities and establishment ofnew transportation facilities toService component commanders andUSCINCTRANS.

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b. Air and Water Ports

Most airports and seaports locatedoutside CONUS are operated andcontrolled by host nations (HNs) but maybe augmented by US forces. Duringwartime, each Service has primaryresponsibility for loading and un-loading its military units. Theresponsibilities of AMC and individualunits moving via AMC or AMC-controlled aircraft are contained in multi-Service publications.

8. Procurement

Logistic procurement is generally anational and Service responsibility.Currently, the CINCs have only indirectinfluence on Service procurement. TheCINCs use a series of reports andmessages to the Services, Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, or DefenseProgramming Resources Board, such asthe integrated priority lists, critical itemlists, and Defense budget issues toinfluence the budget system. The CINCs’role in the Planning, Programming, andBudgeting System is changing and this

relationship will be put forth in futureDOD directives and joint publications.

9. Health Services

Geographic combatant commanders areresponsible for coordinating andintegrating health service support (HSS)within their theaters. Where practical,joint use of available medical assetswill be accomplished to support thewarfighting strategy and concept ofoperations. Combatant commanders

should ensure that the HSS systemaccomplishes the goals of returning ill andinjured combatants to duty as far forwardas possible and stabilizing and rapidlyevacuating those patients who cannotreturn to duty within the establishedtheater evacuation policy.

10. Field Services

Combatant commanders are responsiblefor the search, recovery, identification,care, and evacuation or disposition ofdeceased personnel within their theaters.The responsibility extends not only todeceased personnel of US forces, but also

The sealift element of the Strategic Mobility Triad provides logisticssupport with almost unlimited capacity.

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to allied, third country, and enemy dead.For humanitarian, health, and moralereasons, this responsibility may extend tothe local populace. Combatantcommanders are responsible for con-trolling and coordinating mortuaryaffairs operations within their theaters.This responsibility also pertains topeacetime mass fatality incidents.

11. Command, Control,Communications,Computer Systems, andIntelligence Support

E f f e c t i v e c o m m a n d , c o n t r o l ,communications, computer systems, andintelligence (C4I) are vital to planning,initiating, conducting, sustaining, andprotecting a successful joint operation.Logistic, operations, and intelligencefunctions all depend on responsive C4I,the central system tying together allaspects of joint operations and allowingcommanders and their staffs to initiate,direct, monitor, question, and react.Integrating logistic and operationalcommand, control, communications, andcomputers (C4) systems is essential.

Logistic C4 needs should be included inthe operation’s C4I system plans.

12. Security Assistance

Combatant commanders will identifymateriel requirements for regionalminimum-essential security assistance andconsolidate and prioritize wartimerequirements within their theaters.

13. Wartime Host-NationSupport

a. Authority for Negotiations.Geographic combatant commanders willobtain authority for negotiations with HNsthrough Joint Staff, Office of the Secretaryof Defense (OSD), and Department ofState channels. Assistance sought fromHNs can include, but is not limited to,petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL);transportation; telecommunications;civilian labor; rear area protection;facilities; contracting; acquisition ofequipment; supplies; services; and HSS.Areas of potential host-nation support(HNS) are shown in Figure I-6.

Figure I-6. Assistance Sought from Host Nations

ASSISTANCE SOUGHT FROM HOST NATIONS

Can include, but is not limited to:

Transportation Telecommunications

Civilian Labor Supplies

Services Health Services Support

Rear Area Protection Facilities

Contracting Petroleum

Oils Lubricants

Acquisition of Equipment

I-13


POL DRUMS AS BOARDING PASSES

Backed up against the North Korean port city of Hungnam, the U.S. X Corpsbegan an amphibious evacuation in late December, 1950. Removing thetroops, their equipment, and materiel was complicated by the presence ofthousands of North Korean refugees, who also wanted to be evacuated.Further cluttering the beach were approximately 50,000 drums of petroleum,oil, and lubricants (POL) to be brought away or destroyed. Although theNavy had plenty of ships for the evacuation, there was no manpower tomove the POL drums to the ships.

The corps commander, Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, conferredwith his staff. The POL would have to be destroyed unless a labor sourceappeared. Then, a simple and sensible solution came to him: Any tworefugees who rolled a POL drum to the waters’ edge, where it could be loaded,could also board the ship. By that simple solution, over 100,000 NorthKoreans bought passage to freedom.

SOURCE: Shepard, James C. "POL Drums as Boarding Passes", Vignettes ofMilitary History, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1976.

b. Facilities and Real Estate.Geographic combatant commanders mustcoordinate with the HN for the acquisitionand use of facilities and real estate.

c. Acquisition Cross-ServiceAgreements. Geographic combatantcommanders and component commanderswill ensure use of existing HNS, ifapplicable, to avoid duplication of effortwith the HN. Component commanderswill inform the combatant commander ifan acquisition cross-service agreement(ACSA) exists with the HN. If one doesnot exist, the CINC or subordinatecommander can take steps to initiate anACSA with the HN when having onewould be advantageous.

d. Language Support. Geographiccombatant commanders and componentcommanders should make every effort toobtain language support for negotiationswith local nationals. The most effectivenegotiations occur when military membersshow competence in local language andcustoms.

14. Counterintelligence (CI)Support

Critical to logistic operations is anaccurate picture of the threat throughwhich the theater logistic forces musttravel. Hostile activities can impedeforward movement, destroy logisticstockpiles, close airports and seaports, anddestroy prime movers of critical logisticelements. Hostile actions can renderinvalid logistic support assumptions madeduring deliberate planning. Knowledgeof the potential threat (including terrorism,hostile special operations forces, refugees,and other aspects as appropriate) is criticalto the logistic effort. CI provides threatassessments, effects liaison with HNsecurity and intelligence services, andconducts operations and investigations toidentify and/or neutralize the threat.Combatant commanders should be awareof CI capabilities and can obtain assistancethrough the CINC’s CounterintelligenceSecurity Officer.

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II-1

“In order to make assured conquests it is necessary always to proceedwithin the rules: to advance, to establish yourself solidly, to advance andestablish yourself again, and always prepare to have within reach of yourarmy your resources and your requirements.”

Frederick the Great: Instructions for His Generals, ii, (1747)

1. General

a. The principles of logistics comple-ment the principles of war. This chapterprovides logistic principles andconsiderations that historically have beenproven important. These principles andconsiderations serve as a guide tocommanders and their staffs for planningand conducting logistic support for jointoperations.

b. To support the national militarystrategy, logistics must be responsive inand capable of meeting militarypersonnel, equipment, mobility, medicalreadiness, infrastructure, and sustainmentrequirements of the Department ofDefense across the range of militaryoperations. Logistics must integrate thenational and theater effort in mobilizingand demobilizing, deploying andredeploying, and sustaining theemployment concept of a combatantcommander. Seldom will all logisticprinciples exert equal influence; usually,one or two will dominate in any givensituation. Identifying those principles thathave priority in a specific situation isessential to establishing effectivesupport. The application of the principlesto the specific mission and situationdictates the concept of logistic support.Analysis may reveal a conflict betweenthe various principles when applied in aparticular situation. For example, what iseconomical may lack responsiveness.Logistic principles, which are as much art

CHAPTER IILOGISTIC PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS

as science, are used best by experiencedlogisticians. The principles of logisticsupport are not a checklist but rather aguide for analytical thinking and prudentplanning.

2. Principles of Logistics

Figure II-1 shows the Principles ofLogistics.

a. Responsiveness. Responsiveness isthe right support in the right place atthe right time . Among the logisticprinciples, responsiveness is the keystone;all else becomes irrelevant if the logisticsystem cannot support the concept ofoperations of the supported commander.

b. Simplicity. Simplicity is avoidanceof complexity and often fosters efficiencyin both the planning and execution ofnational and theater logistic operations.Mission-type orders and standardizedprocedures contribute to simplicity.Establishment of priorities andpreallocation of supplies and services bythe supported unit can simplify logisticsupport operations.

c. Flexibility. Flexibility is the abilityto adapt logistic structures andprocedures to changing situations,missions, and concepts of operation.Logistic plans and operations must beflexible to achieve both responsivenessand economy. The commander mustretain positive C2 over subordinate

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organizations to maintain flexibility. Theprinciple of flexibility also includes theconcepts of alternative planning,anticipation, reserve assets, redundancy,forward support of phased logistics, andcentralized control with decentralizedoperations.

d. Economy. Economy is theprovision of support at the least cost.At some level and to some degree,resources are always limited. Whenprioritizing and allocating resources, thecommander must continuously considereconomy.

e. Attainability. Attainability (oradequacy) is the ability to provide theminimum essential supplies andservices required to begin combatoperations. The commander’s logisticstaff develops the concept of logistic

support, completes the logistic estimate,and initiates resource identification basedon supported commander’s requirements,priorities, and apportionment. Anoperation should not begin until minimumessential levels of support are on hand.

f. Sustainability. Sustainability is ameasure of the ability to maintain logisticsupport to all users throughout the theaterfor the duration of the operation.Sustainability focuses the supportingcommander’s attention on long-termobjectives and capabilities of thesupported forces. Long-term support isthe greatest challenge for the logistician,who must not only attain the minimumessential materiel levels to initiate combatoperations (readiness) but must alsosustain those operations.

Figure II-1. Principles of Logistics

PRINCIPLES OF LOGISTICS

RESPONSIVENESS SIMPLICITY

FLEXIBILITY

ATTAINABILITY

SURVIVABILITY

SUSTAINABILITY ECONOMY

II-3

Logistic Principles and Considerations

A HOLEY WAR

The adage “The uniform makes the soldier” was not taken seriously by theCivil War doughboy. Rather, both Yank and Reb had more ridicule for hisissue of clothing than he had praise. The soldier satire concerning hiswearing apparel provides some notes of humor which have come to betermed “the lighter side of war” but which in most cases were as serious tohim as fighting the enemy.

The black felt dress hat received much scorn. One disgusted Yank of the15th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment wrote, “My new hat looks as nearlike the pictures that you see of the pilgrim fathers landing on Plymouth,tall, stiff, and turned up on one side with a feather on it . . . I don’t wear itany more than I am obliged to.” Valerius C. Giles of the 4th Texas InfantryRegiment, C.S.A., tells the story that when he strode into camp wearing hisnew black hat, one of his company derided him with, “Where did you getthat hat? Come down out of that, I know you are there! I see your feet a-wiggling.” Giles crushed his hat so as to change its original appearanceforever, to the approval of his friends.

The issue of clothing was also ludicrous. One soldier from the 2nd NewHampshire Infantry Regiment wrote, “A company at a time, the men weremarched over to the ‘old custom house,’ made their individual selectionsfrom the grand jumble of garments, and generally went forth with misfits ofa more or less exasperating nature.” The durability of the clothing also leftsomething to be desired. A Reb wrote in 1864 that, “In this army one hole inthe seat of the breeches indicates a Captain — two holes a lieutenant andthe seat of the pants all out indicates that the individual is a private.” Adisgruntled Yank from Massachusetts covered a gaping hole in his trouserswith a shingle on which was inscribed, “The Last Shift of a Soldier.”

But the epitome of soldier expressions about uniform problems was bestdisplayed by members of Company A, 10th New York Infantry Regiment,whose uniforms had been worn to shreds and who had received no newissues except for socks, drawers, and undershirts. One afternoon thecompany fell out for parade attired only in clean underwear, under thecommand of First Sergeant Oscar F. Angell, “his sergeant’s sash, belt andsword rather too clearly defined against the ground of white.”

SOURCE: Winey, Michael "A Holey W ar", Vignettes of Military History,Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1978.

of communication (LOCs), shipping, railand road bridges, and intersections.Logistic units and installations are alsohigh-value targets that must besafeguarded by both active and passivemeasures. Active measures must includea plan for ground defense of logisticinstallations with provisions for

g. Survivability. Survivability is thecapacity of the organization to prevailin the face of potential destruction.Examples of military objectives selectedfor their effect on logistics and subsequenttheater operational capability includeindustrial centers, airfields, seaports,railheads, supply points and depots, lines

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reinforcement and fire support. Passivemeasures include dispersion, physicalprotection of personnel and equipment,deception, and limiting the size andcapabilities of an installation to what is

essential for the mission. Although thephysical environment will most often onlydegrade logistic capabilities rather thandestroy them, it must be considered whenplanning. Survivability may dictatedispersion and decentralization at theexpense of economy. The allocation ofreserves, development of alternatives, andphasing of logistic support contribute tosurvivability. These concepts are relatedto logistic indicators. (See Appendix C,“Logistic Indicators.”)

3. Logistic Considerations

“Logistics comprises the means andarrangements which work out theplans of strategy and tactics. Strategydecides where to act; logistics bringsthe troops to this point.”

Jomini: Precis de l’ Art de laGuerre. (1838)

a. Logistics as a Factor in DeterminingObjectives. Depending on the theateroperation and logistic concepts ageographic combatant commanderemploys in a campaign, logistic factors

will almost always affect a theatercampaign and exert different constraints.Strategically, logistic capabilities maylimit the deployment, concentration, andemployment options available to theNCA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, or combatant commanders.Operationally, theater logistic constraintsmay dictate the rate of strategic buildupor theater onward movement, overall sizeof the combat force, the depth of anyattack, or the speed of advance.

b. Coordination of Logistic PlanningWith Operation Planning. Operationsand logistics are inseparable facets of war.Neither can claim primacy; each is integralto the other. Integration of the operationand logistic planners’ efforts is necessarythroughout the planning and executionphases. Although obvious, suchintegration does not occur automatically.Command interest at all levels is essential.

The C-9 is the mainstay of the domestic Aeromedical Evacuation system.

II-5


c. Forward Impetus. The impetus oflogistic support is from CONUS into thetheater and forward. A system ofcontinuous replenishment may take theform of either automatic (push)replenishment or requisitioning (pull)replenishment. Whenever possible, thepush system is preferred to increasescheduled replenishment and reducerequirements on the logistic C4 system.Ideally, forward commanders should berelieved of logistic support details withoutimpairing control of their organic logisticsupport capabilities.

d. Balance Between Combat Forcesand Logistic Forces

• The aim of any military organizationis to produce the greatest possiblecombat power with the resourcesavailable. Commanders mustdetermine the proper balance basedon the differences between variouslogistic and operation concepts.Efforts to enhance combat power byarbitrarily shifting logistic manpowerinto combat units may achieve theopposite result. Each campaign oroperation demands its own analysisof the proper balance betweensupported and supporting forces:supported forces versus combatforces, and supporting forces versuslogistic force ratios are ways ofassessing requirements andcapabilities. The requisite strengthof combat support (CS)/combatservice support (CSS) elementsdepends on many factors such as thegross requirements for logisticresources and where and when theyare needed, the adequacy ofavailable transportation networksand assets, the length of the LOC,the availability of local labor, andthe types of operations beingsupported. (Commanders must be

careful making assumptions aboutuse and availability of local labor foraugmentation of support forces.Assuming local labor will provideaugmentation during hostilitiessignificantly increases risk.)

• The balance at the beginning ofhostilities is especially important.Fully trained and equipped CS/CSSelements must be available anddeployed in adequate numbers torender immediate sustained supportto the combat troops. A combat forcewithout logistic support is immobileand powerless. Commanders shouldgive serious consideration to theavailability, capability, state oforganization, and limitations of CS/CSS forces allocated to them forwartime operations. This isespecially critical when US CS/CSSforce structure has been reduced inanticipation of the availability of HNassets. Mobilization requiresparticularly close coordination ofeffort among the Department ofDefense, combatant commands, andService headquarters and between thesupporting establishment andoperating forces. Determining whenCS/CSS elements should bemobilized is based on the concept ofemployment for the combat forcesthey will support. This might requirethat CS/CSS forces be mobilized ordeployed at the same time as, or evenbefore, combat forces.

e . Command a n d Con t ro l o fLogistics

• Unity of command is essential tocoordinate national and theaterlogistic operations. Logistics is afunction of command. To exercisecontrol at the strategic, operational,and tactical levels of war,

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commanders must also exercisecontrol over logistics. For a givenarea and for a given mission, a singlecommand authority should beresponsible for logistics.

• Sound logistic planning forms thefoundation for strategic, operational,and tactical flexibility and mobility .To influence the relative combatpower of his force, the commandermust have adequate control of thecommand’s logistic supportcapability.

• The logistic support system must bein harmony with the structure andemployment of the combat forces itsupports. This unity of effort is bestattained under a single commandauthority . Wherever feasible,peacetime chains of command andstaffs should be organized duringpeacetime to avoid reorganizationduring war . This includes Reservecomponent forces (US and HN) thatmay be assigned specific theatermissions. Commanders must be ableto call forward, in a timely manner,those assets needed to initiate andsustain war.

f. Apportionment and Allocations.

• Apportionment is distribution forplanning of limited resources amongcompeting requirements, whereasallocation is distribution of limitedresources among competingrequirements for employment. Apriority is a relative order of need fora commodity or service whenrequirements exceed availability.

• The senior commander will usuallyattain the best results by apportioningand allocating reasonably expectedand available resources among

subordinate commanders based onthe concept of operations and thesubordinate commanders’ statedrequirements. Allocations will oftenbe less than the amounts requestedby, or apportioned to, some of thesubordinate commanders, because theavailability of logistic assets willoften be less than the requirement.

• Failure to maintain a system ofapportionments and allocationscan cause an inflation of priorities, theultimate breakdown of the prioritysystem, and the senior commander’sloss of control over the logisticsystem. Strategic and operationalapportionment and allocation issuescan first be addressed during thedeliberate planning process andsubsequently through either the JointStaff and combatant commandersuse of a Joint Materiel Prioritiesand Allocation Board (JMPAB) orJoint Transportation Board (JTB)as outlined in Appendix B,“Organization and Functions ofCombatant Command Logistic Staff(J-4) and Functions of Joint LogisticCenters, Offices and Boards.”

• Threat distribution and phaseduration are useful tools fordetermining the allocation ofresources. Usingthreat distri-bution, the joint force commander(JFC) will assign destruction of aportion of the enemy’s total combatcapability (i.e., forces, installations,organizations) to Service componentcommands. An example of threatdistribution would be to assigndestruction of a certain percentage ofenemy mechanized, armor, follow-on-forces, and artillery forces duringan air operations phase among theServices. The remaining percentageof the threat, increased intentionally

II-7


to provide a deliberate total overlap,would be distributed among theServices during the ground maneuveroperations phases. Phase duration

is the JFC’s projection of how long aspecific phase of an operation isexpected to last. Two examples ofphase duration: the air operation willlast a certain number of days (timeoriented) or the air operation will lastuntil a certain percentage of enemyground threat is destroyed (objectiveoriented). Threat distribution andphase duration help identify wherethe weight of the campaign will fallduring various phases to preventunnecessary duplication of support todifferent components.

g. Accommodation for WartimeRequirements. The ideal logisticorganization, within the nation’seconomy and the military, would notrequire a fundamental change tomanage the transition from peace towar to meet an emergency. Althoughcivilian and military leaders will beprevented by reason of practicability fromattaining the ideal, they should strive tocome as close to it as possible. If they do

not create and train an organization inpeacetime that will work in war, theleadership will be burdened with urgentreorganization and training requirements

at a time when they should be free to focuson the employment of that organization.

h. Logistic Discipline

• Logistic resources are alwaysconstrained. At the theater(strategic) level, these limitations areeither fiscal constraints or theunavailability of materials, industrialfacilities, and skilled labor andlong leadtimes for mobilizationand deployment, which affect thestrategic concentration of forces andsupplies within the theater. At theoperational and tactical levels,common limitations are attributed to:(a) inadequate transportation meansand port capacities; (b) insufficientquantities of certain munitions,equipment, and critical spare parts;(c) the lack of trained logisticpersonnel; and (d) the failure to planfor adequate, interoperable C4systems. Unwise use of logisticresources means combat forces will

The C-5B provides rapid response to strategic logistics requirements.

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be deprived of manpower, equipment,supplies, or training, and constitutesa disregard for economy of force.

• True economy of supply requires thecareful planning and buildup oflevels to provide those resources andcombat facilities, based on threatdistribution and phase duration, thatare essential to initiate and sustaincombat operations. At the same time,avoid building too large a stockpile.Excess stocks decrease flexibility,drain transportation resources fromother priorities, and deny sustainmentto other areas.

• In all cases, the cost of any militaryoperation must be considered;usually the most efficient meansconsistent with the concept ofoperations should be chosen.

i. Movement Control. Deploymentbegins as specified in appropriate orders.USTRANSCOM monitors and providesmovement summaries of AMC, MSC,MTMC, and organic movements fromdeparture to arrival in the theater.USTRANSCOM also maintains the JointOperation Planning and Execution System(JOPES) data base and provides analysisto the Joint Staff, supported command, andothers. This analysis includes progressreports, status, problems, force closure,port workloads, daily movement statistics,and resolution of problems encounteredwith common-user transportation means.JOPES and the Joint Planning andExecution Community provide the JFCwith a capability to change or deleterequirements during main forcedeployment. The geographic combatantcommander is responsible for theintegration of the intratheatermovement required and the strategicconcentration of forces and logistics.Inadequate control of movement, whether

into or within the theater, results in waste,reduced logistic efficiency, and,consequently, a loss of potential combatpower.

j. Deployment Information Flow.Accurate, up-to-date information isvital to effective logistic planning,coordinating unit movements, andsustainment operations. It is almost asimportant to know where units andsupplies are as it is to have them phy-sically present. OPLANs are publishedin JOPES format using the World-wide Military Command and ControlSystem (WWMCCS). JOPES is usedto monitor, plan, and execute mobiliza-tion, deployment, employment, andsustainment activities. JOPES supportsnational, theater-level, and supportingstructures in peacetime and wartime.JOPES is the single tool used by the JointChiefs of Staff, supported and supportingCINCs, and Chiefs of the Servicesto monitor and update deploymentinformation. Access to JOPES viaWWMCCS is critical to deploying andsupporting forces. During planning andexecution, the supported and supportingCINCs will in most cases make decisionsconcerning priority of forces andallocation of scarce airlift and sealift basedsolely on information in JOPES.

k. Logistic Reserves. Logistics can bea pacing factor at the operational levelof war when it determines how quickly acampaign can proceed. Just as strategicand operational reserves are necessary toexploit tactical or operational success orrespond to unanticipated contingencies,it is necessary to establish reservesof logistic resources that can becommitted only by the geographiccombatant commander. Examples oflogistic reserves are materiel andunexploited HNS resources. Combatantcommanders and Service component

II-9


commanders contemplating war andoperations other than war in undevelopedtheaters of operations must give adequateconsideration to prepositioning. Thisshould include an analysis of establishedagreements with foreign nations.

l. Industrial Base Requirements.Planners must identify the items that mustcome directly from the industrial base viceexisting stocks. Contractors may requiretime to restart production lines, acquireraw materials, and retrain their labor force.

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III-1

1. General

Joint logistics is a complex,interdependent concept that can applyleverage (plus or minus) to a combatantcommander’s combat power. An under-standing of the combatant commander’sconcept of operations and early involve-ment by the logistic staff will ensurethat national and theater deploy-ment and sustainment requirements arebalanced with logistic capabilities.Logistic planning considerations

SQUARE RIGGERS AND JERRY RIGGERS

Headlines of the mid-1970’s repeatedly proclaim the imminence of a petroleumshortage. Half a century of extensive use of petroleum fuel has created theproblem. Yet even at the dawning of the Petroleum Age there were some whosuffered from lack of it - not because it did not exist, not because it could not beobtained, but because its use was so unfamiliar.

The year was 1921. The United States Submarine R-l4 was patrolling the sea.Like an increasing number of vessels, it was powered by petroleum, not coal.But unfamiliarity with the energy capabilities of oil led to a serious miscalculation:the ship ran out of fuel and became adrift on the high seas. What was to bedone? The Navy, ever ready as always, had the answer: move backward throughtime in search of a fuel. Coal had preceded oil as an energy source, but, ofcourse, the carboniferous fuel was no more available than oil on the boundingmain. Back then to wind went the old Sea Dogs. They built masts from gunrammers and curtain rods and rigged to them sails made from blankets andhammocks. A noble clipper ship the R-14 was not, but she could at least nowmove. At the surpassing pace of two knots per hour, she sailed by wind powerto port.

SOURCE: Naval Affairs, v. LVI, no. 6, June, 1977.

CHAPTER IIIJOINT LOGISTIC PLANNING

“Logistics sets the campaign’s operational limits. The lead time needed toarrange logistics support and resolve logistics concerns requires continuousintegration of logistic considerations into the operational planning process.This is especially critical when available planning time is short. Constantcoordination and cooperation between the combatant command andcomponent staffs—and with other combatant commands—is a prerequisitefor ensuring timely command awareness and oversight of deployment,readiness, and sustainment issues in the theater of war.”

Joint Pub 1: Joint W arfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

aid the combatant commander inproviding guidance to staff planners andassessing the adequacy and feasibilityof campaign and operation plans.Joint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine for PlanningJoint Operations,” discusses sustainment planning which is directed towardproviding and maintaining levelsof personnel, materiel, and consum-ables required to sustain the plannedlevels of combat activity for theestimated duration and at the desiredlevel of intensity.

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Sustainment planning is theresponsibility of the combatantcommanders in close coordination withthe Services and Defense agencies. JointPub 5-03.2, “Joint Operation Planning andExecution System, Volume II (Planningand Execution Formats and Guidance),”requires an estimate of logistic feasibilityof the OPLAN summary and detailed

analysis relative to logistic support in theOPLAN’s Annex D. Appendix A,“Logistic Responsibilities Within theDepartment of Defense,” provides a listingof logistic responsibilities within theDepartment of Defense, and Appendix B,“Organization and Functions ofCombatant Command Logistic Staff (J-4)and Functions of Joint Logistic Centers,Offices, and Boards” provides a list ofjoint logistic centers, offices, and boardsthat can help coordinate combatantcommanders’ logistic efforts.

2. Importance of LogisticPlanning

The combatant commanders’ campaignand operation plans should have logisticimplications coordinated at all levels:international, national, Service and

functional component, and supportingcommand.

a. Adaptability. Plans should makeprovisions for changes to the concept ofoperations. These changes could includethe need for creation of logistic supportsites, additional security forces, moretransportation, expanded port capacity,

logistics over-the-shore sites, andnumerous other increases in logisticoverhead. Plans should be written toanticipate changes.

b. Benefits of Adequate LogisticPlans. Proper logistic planning willreduce the need for emergencymeasures and logistic improvisations,which are usually expensive and oftenhave an adverse effect on subordinate andadjacent commands.

c. Equivalence of Deployment andEmployment Planning. Deploymentp lanning i s more del iberate andmethodical than employment planningand lends itself better to automated dataprocessing support. Logistic plannersmust avoid focusing solely on thedeployment requirements at the expense

Logistics over the shore operations where fixed port facilities are not available.

III-3


of sustaining the employment concept ofthe campaign. Detailed logistic planningfor employment is equally important andshould neither be neglected nor delayeduntil deployment plans are completed.Only by thorough and concurrentconsideration of both deployment andemployment facets of the campaign oroperation will planners be able toconstruct adequate logistic plans.

3. Integrating Logistic Plans

Logistic plans should be integratedwith a combatant commander’soperation plan annexes and with plansof other commands and organizationswithin the Department of Defense, as wellas external departments and agencies andwartime HNS (WHNS) that will besupporting the combatant commanders.Appendix D, “Logistic Checklist forOPLAN Annex D,” contains a generic listof issues or questions that a logisticplanning staff should consider whenattempting to integrate the activities andplans necessary for a successful OPLAN.

4. Levels of Logistic Planning

Logistic planning should be done at thestrategic, operational, and tactical levels.

a. Strategic and Operational LogisticSupport Concepts. Combatantcommanders’ strategic logistic conceptwill focus on the ability to generate and

move forces and materiel into thetheater base and on to desired operatinglocations, where operational logisticconcepts are employed. With thetransportation and distribution systems inmind, planners must determine the basic,but broad, mobilization, deployment, andsustainment requirements of thecombatant commanders’ concept ofoperations.

b . Tac t i ca l Log is t i c SupportConcepts. This planning is doneprimarily by the Service components. Itincludes line-item planning and involvesthe detailed application of the bestplanning factors available from historicalusage data, analysis, or exerciseexperience. Also, planners determine thesize and precise location of logisticfacilities and units. Combatantcommanders and their staffs shouldexamine the Service components’methods, assumptions, and factors todetermine their validity and to guardagainst duplication of effort and anytendency to establish unnecessarily highsafety margins or standards of living.

5. Theater Organization

The area organization that evolves fromthe geographic combatant commander’sconcept of logistic support shouldinfluence subordinate theater-levellogistic decisions on the items shown inFigure III-1.

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III-4 Joint Pub 4-0

6. Special PlanningConsiderations

Planners must identify critical or keyissues unique to a specific joint operationplan they must support. Special planningconsiderations are shown in Figure III-2and are discussed below.

a. Demands of an Expanding Force.Execution of an operation order (OPORD)or campaign plan or response to a crisismay be accompanied by generalexpansion of the Armed Forces of theUnited States. Historically, demand foritems increases faster than the supplysystem can provide, and specialmanagement actions might becomenecessary. To anticipate campaign Figure III-2. Special Planning

Considerations

SPECIAL PLANNINGCONSIDERATIONS

Demands of an Expanding Force

Critical Items

Bottlenecks

Movement Control

Push versus Pull Resupply

Civilian Supply Sources

AREA ORGANIZATION INFLUENCE ONLOGISTIC DECISION

Responsibilities for providing common or joint servicefor maintenance, medical, salvage, transportation, andmortuary affairs.

Locations and functions suitable for contractorsupport.

Contingency plans to respond to destruction ordamage to theater infrastructure.

Requirements for long lead-time special projects.

Requirements for wartime host-nation support.

Items suitable for common supply support in specificareas: subsistence, selected POL, and selectedmunitions, Class IV (field fortification and constructionmaterial), Class VI (personnel support items), ClassVIIIA/B (medical supplies and blood), and selectedClass IX (repair parts).

Figure III-1. Area Organization Influence on Logistic Decisions

III-5


priorities, planners should: (1) provideinstructions or guidance for redis-tributing assets from low- to high-priority organizations within thecommand; (2) obtain assets fromexternal sources with lower priorityneeds; (3) control the allocation of newassets in short supply; and (4) provide

efficient means to retrograde, repair, andreissue damaged or unserviceable criticalitems.

b. Critical Items. Critical supplies andmateriel should be identified early in theplanning process. Critical items aresupplies vital to the support of operationsthat are in short supply or are expectedto be in short supply. Special handling ofrequisitions or requests for transportationand critical items may be indicated.

“Mobility is the true test of a supplysystem.

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart:Thoughts on W ar, (1944)

c. Bottlenecks. Logistic planners mustunderstand the constraining factorsaffecting all phases of the deployment andsustainment plans. Intra-CONUS,intertheater, and intratheater movementscan encounter bottlenecks that limit ordegrade the ability to support acampaign or operation plan. Identifying

bottlenecks en route to or within thetheater is the first step in coordinatingactivities to avoid overloading LOCs.Traditionally, limited unloading capacitiesat ports and airfields and limited inlandtransportation have constrained theoperational reach of combat forces.Logistic planners must anticipatecongestion and seek solutions tobottlenecks. Finally, if multinationaloperations are planned, the impact ofmultinational land, naval, and air forcesfor real estate, ship berthing and unloadingfacilities, transportation, labor, andconstruction materials on US forcedeployment and employment plans mustbe assessed.

Movement of heavy units by rail.

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d. Movement Control. Movementcontrol must coordinate the employmentof all means of transportation (includingthat provided by allies or HNs) to supportthe combatant commanders’ concept ofoperations. USCINCTRANS, as thesingle transportation manager, willprovide for proper liaison with thecombatant commanders for movementof personnel and materiel into thetheater. The geographic combatantcommanders will exercise control overintratheater movement, althoughdetailed coordination may be required toaccommodate HN or allied requirements.Whatever unique circumstances prevail ina theater, logistic plans should providecombatant commanders with the highestpracticable degree of influence orcontrol over movement. Operationalplanners should anticipate exploiting anoperational success and coordinate theprobability of high-speed pursuit withlogistic planners to ensure that the

operational forces do not operate furtherthan their logistic resupply can providetimely support.

e. Push versus Pull Resupply.Automatic resupply works best for certaincommodities and when valid usage ratesare available. Whether certain units canbe resupplied automatically (push) or inresponse to their requisitions (pull),planners should determine supplyrequirements in the context of a unit’smission and its operating area. The planshould provide flexibility to adjustplanning factors based on empirical dataand to switch between push and pullresupply for various units, depending onthe situation.

f. Civilian Supply Sources. Planningshould identify sourcing of supplies andservices from civilian sources andin tegrate them with operat ionalrequirements.

IV-1

CHAPTER IVJOINT THEATER LOGISTICS

1. General

Joint theater logistics is applyinglogistic resources to generate andsupport theater combat power. Thischapter focuses on the combatantcommander’s theater logistic concepts,including balancing objectives, scheme ofmaneuver, and operations timing. Itdiscusses the concept of extendingoperational reach and concludes with anumber of specific logistic applicationsthat apply to the theater. Combatantcommanders must ensure that theircampaign plans fully integrateoperational and logistic capabilities.The combatant commanders mustmaintain an interrelationship betweenoperations and logistics by insisting onclose cooperation and early-onunderstanding of the missions assignedto subordinate commanders. Theinfluence of the combatant commander isessential in bridging any operations-logistic gap.

2. Combatant Commander’sLogistic Concept

Although the commanders of Servicecomponent commands provide logisticresources, combatant commanders areresponsible for ensuring that the overallplan for using these resources supportsthe theater concept of operations.

a. The Logistic System. A criticalelement of a theater logistic system istimely integration of intertheater andintratheater transportation of personneland supplies in the theater distributionsystem. The means to move people andequipment forward and to evacuate themto the rear is fundamental to successfultheater operations. As previously depictedin Figure I-2, the logistic system rangesfrom CONUS or the deployed supportbase through a theater port of entry andon to the forward areas of the theater.

• Key Elements of the LogisticSystem are illustrated in Figure IV-1.

“The more I see of war, the more I realize how it all depends onadministration and transportation . . . It takes little skill or imagination tosee where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much moreknowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces andwhether you can maintain them there.”

General A. C. P. Wavell, quoted in Martin Van Creveld’s Supplying W ar,Logistics from W allenstein to Patton (1977)

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IV-2 Joint Pub 4-0

KEY ELEMENTS OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

THEATER TRANSPORTATION NETWORK

UNITS

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

The LOCs consists of all the routes (land, water, and air) that connect anoperating military force with a theater base of operations and along whichsupplies and military forces move.

The ports, bases, airports, rail heads, pipeline terminals, and trailer transferpoints that serve as the reception and transshipment points for the LOC.

Specified units are responsible for operating the seaports, bases, and airports.

Desired civil and military assistance from allies that includes: en route support,reception, onward movement, and sustainment of deploying US forces.

•• Geography. The planner mustexamine the impact of topography,climate, and external factors affectingthe logistic system, especially theimpact on the various segments of thetransportation system, including allwaterways, rail, roads, pipelines, andairways.

“Victory is the beautiful, bright-coloredflower. Transport is the stem withoutwhich it could never haveblossomed.”

Winston Churchill: The River W ar,vii (1899)

•• Transportation. Many factorsshould influence the time-phasedselection of transportation modes tomeet operational requirements. Forexample, sealift is by far the mostefficient mode for bulk tonnage;airlift is often the most expedient forpeople or for rapid movement ofequipment and supplies when time iscritical. On land, rail (for bulk

• Considerations in Developing aLogistic System are shown in FigureIV-2 and are discussed below.

Figure IV-1. Key Elements of the Logistic System

CONSIDERATIONS INDEVELOPING A

LOGISTIC SYSTEM

Geography

Transportation

Logistic Capability

Logistic Enhancements

Logistic Infrastructure Protection

Echelon of Support

Assignment of Responsibility

Availability of Wartime HNS

Figure IV-2. Considerations inDeveloping a Logistic System

IV-3


tonnage) and pipeline (for bulkliquids) are more efficient than trucks.

•• Logistic Capability. The abilityof the base infrastructure to receive,warehouse, and issue logisticresources influences the efficiency of

the entire logistic system (forexample, through the use ofspecialized container handlingequipment). Infrastructure also limitsthe size of the force that can besupported.

FOR WANT OF SHOES

Benjamin Franklin, writing in Poor Richard, 1758, provided us with the drolllittle verse which began:

“For the want of a nail a shoe was lost,For the want of a shoe a horse was lost.”

It continues through several causative links until the downfall of a kingdomcould be ultimately attributed to the loss of a shoe. Franklin did not realizehow prophetic his lines would prove to be in another conflict in his nativeland a little over a century after he penned those words.

Late June 1863, found “Marse” Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginiaconducting a strategic invasion of the North calculated to result in victoryfor the South. On June 30, one of Lee’s brigades under Brigadier GeneralJohnston Pettigrew moved eastward from Cashtown into the outskirts ofGettysburg, then a sleepy rural county seat in south-central Pennsylvania.Pettigrew’s mission was to enter the town and “liberate” a quantity of shoes,which sources had reported were there for the taking, in order that his raggedNorth Carolina infantry might be better shod.

His advance was thwarted by Brigadier General John Buford’s cavalrydivision scouting ahead of George Meade’s Army of the Potomac. ObservingFederal horse soldiers in town, Pettigrew abandoned his quest and fell backwestward to camp. He duly reported the presence of seasoned Union cavalryin Gettysburg. His division commander, Major-General Harry Heth, and hiscorps commander, Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill, were not convinced thathis observations were completely accurate. They instead surmised that thecavalry was probably just Pennsylvania militia such as Lee’s veterans hadeasily scattered in earlier engagements. The two senior officers discussedthe situation:

Heth: “If there is no objection, I will take my division tomorrow and go toGettysburg and get those shoes!”

Hill: “None in the world.”

On 1 July, Heth led his division to Gettysburg.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

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IV-4 Joint Pub 4-0

•• Logistic Enhancements. Plansshould include means to reduce theimpact of logistic bottlenecks. Someexamples are opening or gainingaccess to high-capacity ports,expanding airfield parking aprons,additional materials handlingequipment, and expedient airfieldmatting. Improved use of commercialInternational Standards Organizationcontainers vice breakbulk can aid inport clearance; but planners shouldrealize such a container policy maycreate problems elsewhere.

• • L o g i s t i c I n f r a s t r u c t u reProtection. Provisions must be madefor security of the logistic systembecause it is an integral part of combatpower. Specific discussion ofprotection of logistic infrastructureand LOCs, to include the designationof a joint rear area, is provided in JointPub 3-10, “Doctrine for Joint RearArea Operations.”

•• Echelon of Support. The logisticsystem must be responsive to theneeds of the most forward combatforces. It must start from CONUSand extend to the forward area ofoperations, providing supplies andservices when and where they areneeded.

•• Assignment of Responsibility.Combatant commanders shouldassign responsibility for operating theseaports, bases, and airports to theService components (or HNs, ifapplicable).

•• Availability of Wartime HNS.The level of assistance in terms oftransportation resources, labor,facilities, and materiel that can beprovided by allied nations affects theamount of airlift and sealift that maybe devoted to initial movement ofcombat forces or sustainment.

b. Theater Concept of LogisticSupport. The concept of logistic supportshould derive from the estimate of logisticsupportability of one or more courses ofaction (COAs). The CINC’s directoratefor logistics prepares these estimates foreach alternative COA proposed by eitherthe operations or planning directorate.The estimate of logistic supportability forthe selected COA along with the logisticsystem framework considerations outlinedabove may be refined into the concept oflogistic support for an operation orcampaign.

• The concept of logistic support is theenvisioned manner in which thecapabilities and resources of theCINCs’ components will be

Lee, at his best on the defensive in prepared positions, had planned to fightthe Yankees from the heights around Cashtown, but Hill and Heth proceededto draw him into battle in a place not of his choosing. There the Graycoatsfound not shoes but Meade’s determined Federal Army which fought themto a standstill. Lee retreated from Gettysburg, back into Virginia, and neverreturned. By spring of 1865 the Southern dream had faded, and theConfederacy died. To paraphrase Poor Richard:

“For want of some shoes a nation was lost.”

SOURCE: Agnew, James B. "For Want of Shoes", Vignettes of Military History,Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1978.

IV-5


employed to provide supply,maintenance, transportation , andengineering services. It is theorganization of capabilities andresources into an overall theaterwarfare support concept.

• The concept of logistic support

should specify how operations willbe supported. It should give specialattention to the major LOC to bedeveloped, as well as wartime HNSto be provided by each allied nation.If there is to be a communicationszone to support air or land operationsor a network of intermediate andadvanced bases to support navaloperations within a theater, thegeneral organization and functionsshould be laid out. Supportingparagraphs should cover any topicsthe CINC believes are necessary andmay include:

•• Logistic Authority and Controlof Logistic Flow. Table IV-1 listssome of the responsibilities assignedby DOD directive or discussed injoint publications.

•• Guidance on Harmonization.Multiple Military Services (UnitedStates and allied nations) mayoperate simultaneously within thetheater and the LOC approaching thetheater. Coordination of functionsamong all affected commands,nations, and agencies is essential toavoid confusion and unnecessaryduplication. The combatant com-manders should provide generalguidance, by function and area,wherever needed to ensure unity ofeffort.

Table IV-1. Logistic Area References

Function

Airlift Support

Sealift Support

Movement Control

Water Terminal Operations

Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore

Medical Services

Blood Program

Petroleum Support

Engineer Support

Mobilization Planning

Mortuary Services

Refrences

Joint Pub 4-01.1

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Joint Pub 4-01.3

Joint Pub 4-01.5

Joint Pub 4-01.6

DODD 6480 and Joint Pub 4-02series

DODD 6480 series

DODD 4140 series andJoint Pup 4-03

Joint Pub 4-04

Joint Pub 4-05

Joint Pub 4-06

LOGISTIC AREA REFERENCES

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IV-6 Joint Pub 4-0

At the strategic level, the combatantcommanders focus primarily on defeatingthe enemy’s strategy and will and ongaining strategic depth, initiative, anda d v a n t a g e b y p r o p e r s t r a t e g i cconcentration of forces and logistics. Thecombatant commanders direct theoperating forces to accomplish these tasks.The operating forces’ view of operationalreach centers on the range at whichcommanders can mass and employ forcesdecisively. It goes beyond merely

conducting reconnaissance or strikeoperations at a distance. Operational reachis influenced by the length, efficiency, andsecurity of the LOC. Operational reachalso depends on the ability to phasereserves and materiel forward. Finally, itmust include the operating ranges andendurance of combat forces andsustainment. The combatant commandermay seek to extend operational reach (withassociated increase in risk) by deployingforces ahead of supporting CSS forces.The logistician must then creatively useavailable assets to provide the minimumlevel of sustainment to the deployedforces. Operational reach may be

•• Logistic C4 Systems. In additionto standard operating procedures forC4 systems, consideration should begiven to backup plans or manualprocedures in the event of possible C4system outages or incompatibleinterfaces during combinedoperations.

•• Intratheater Support. Specificguidance should be provided foremployment of all available logistic

infrastructure, including alliedcivilian and military support. Inaddition, the geographic combatantcommander can assign logisticresponsibility for the theater to thepredominant user of a particularcategory of support (i.e., intratheatertransportation is frequently an Armycomponent responsibility).

3. Extending OperationalReach

a. Operational reach is the distanceover which military power can beconcentrated and employed decisively.

Sealifting combat and supporting units extends operational reach.

IV-7


improved by establishing advanced basesor depots and by improving the securityand efficiency of the LOC.

b. Operational reach is a relativevalue. It may be improved by denyingone or several components of the enemy’soperational reach. The essence of acampaign plan is to accomplish theassigned national strategic objectives withlogistics providing the extension of theCINC’s strategic and operational reachinto the enemy’s depths while denyingoperational reach to the enemy.

c. As CINCs move forces forward,they must gain control of C4 systemcenters, transportation nodes, andprospective base areas. These centersand areas become physical objectives forthe combat forces to seize, control, andpass to the logistic system as it movesforward to exploit new gains. Theresulting forward momentum of thelogistic system results in an extension ofthe operational reach and endurance ofthe combat forces.

“Sound logistics forms the foundationfor the development of strategicflexibil ity and mobility. If suchflexibility is to be exercised andexploited, military command musthave adequate control of its logisticsupport.”

Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles:Logistics in the National Defense

(1959)

4. Applied OperationalLogistics

Figure IV-3 below illustrates some ofthe impacts of logistics at the operationallevel of war.

a. Logistics as a Force Multiplier.Correlations of combat power between

opposing forces are often so close that asmall advantage gained by one side overthe other can prove decisive. Logisticsplays a significant role, both offensivelyand defensively, in attaining the leveragepotential from a given force configuration.It does this primarily by increasing theendurance of the force. For example,a small investment in forward infra-structure can pay large dividends byreconstituting forces rapidly andreturning them to battle in time toinfluence the outcome. Specifically,forward battle damage repair andmaintenance capability, rapid runwayrepair capability, and forward medicaltreatment facilities can help inreconstituting forces efficiently.

b. Logistics as a Deterrent. Logisticforces and the activation of logisticReserve forces play a key role indeterrence, a major element of theNation’s military strategy. Adequatelogistic resources and capabilities conveya national will to fight a protractedconflict . Also, increased states ofreadiness of logistic forces or theactivation of national defense reservelogistic assets (e.g., the RRF) or increasingthe readiness of reduced operating assets(e.g., fast sealift ships or hospital ships)may defuse tensions. These actions are

Encompasses Logistics as a:

Force Multiplier

Deterrent

Contributor to Flexibility

APPLIED OPERATIONALLOGISTICS

Figure IV-3. Applied OperationalLogistics

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IV-8 Joint Pub 4-0

usually less provocative than the posturingof combat forces and are often consideredas joint operation plan deterrent options.

c. Logistics as a Contributor toFlexibility

• The composition and disposition ofmilitary forces and logistic resourcesare important considerations indeveloping flexibility . Essentially,logistics increases the employmento p t i o n s o f t h e c o m b a t a n tcommanders’ forces.

• Logistic infrastructure and wartimeHNS agreements in place before

hostilities assist combatantcommanders in achieving themaximum use from available forcesthrough flexibility .

• To remain flexible, the logistic planshould anticipate and provide forthe next step in case of operationalsuccess or failure, partial success, orchange in the situation and intent ofthe enemy. Logistic plans and thedispositions of materiel and transportshould allow exploitation or recoveryoperations in the shortest possibletime.

A robust intratheater ground transportation system increasesforward unit flexibility.

APPENDIX ALOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(As specified by title 10, USC)

A-1

1. Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense will:

a. Develop national security emergencyoperational procedures and coordinatethem with the Secretary of Housing andUrban Development with respect toresidential property for the control,acquisition, leasing, assignment, andpriority of occupancy of real propertywithin the jurisdiction of the Departmentof Defense.

b. Review the priorities and allocationssystems developed by other Federaldepartments and agencies to ensure thatthey meet DOD needs in a nationalsecurity emergency.

c. In cooperation with the Secretary ofTransportation and the Director, FederalEmergency Management Agency, identifythose industrial products and facilities thatare essential to mobilization readiness,national defense, or postattack survivaland recovery.

d. In cooperation with the Secretary ofTransportation and the Director, FederalEmergency Management Agency, analyzepotential effects of national securityemergencies on actual productioncapability, taking into account the entireproduction complex, including shortagesof resources, and develop preparednessmeasures to strengthen capabilities forproduction increases in emergencies.

e. With the assistance of the heads ofother Federal departments and agencies,provide management direction for thestockpiling of strategic and criticalmaterials; conduct storage, maintenance,and quality assurance operations for thestockpile of strategic and criticalmaterials; and formulate plans, programs,and reports relating to the stockpiling ofstrategic and critical materials.

2. Office of the Secretary ofDefense

OSD is the civilian staff of the Secretaryof Defense. Those most concerned withlogistic matters are the Under Secretaryof Defense for Acquisition andTechnology (USD(A&T)) , UnderSecretary of Defense for Policy (USDP),and Assistant Secretary of Defense forProduction and Logistics (ASD(P&L)).T h e U S D P h a n d l e se m e r g e n c ypreparedness functions. The USD(A&T)sets policy for acquisition through DODdirectives of the 5000 series. TheASD(P&L) is the principal staff adviserto the Secretary of Defense fordetermining logistic requirements. TheASD(P&L) also carries out force structureanalysis of logistic support capabilityi n c l u d i n g r e p a i r , o v e r h a u l a n dmaintenance of equipment, and supplymanagement. Further, the ASD(P&L)directs and controls the Defense LogisticsAgency (DLA).

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A-2 Joint Pub 4-0

3. Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffis the principal military adviser to thePresident and Secretary of Defense. TheChairman’s responsibilities include thefollowing primarily logistic functions:

a. Prepare joint logistic and mobilityplans to support strategic plans andrecommend the assignment of logistic andmobility responsibilities to the ArmedForces in accordance with those logisticand mobility plans.

b. Prepare joint logistic and mobilityplans to support contingency plans andrecommend the assignment of logistic andmobility responsibilities to the ArmedForces in accordance with those logisticand mobility plans.

c. Advise the Secretary of Defense oncritical deficiencies and strengths in forcecapabilities (including manpower, logistic,and mobility support) identified during thepreparation and review of contingencyplans and assess the effect of suchdeficiencies and strengths on meetingnational security objectives and policy andon strategic plans.

d. After consultation with the CINC,establish and maintain a uniform systemfor evaluating the preparedness of eachcombatant command to carry out theirassigned missions.

e. Review the logistic plans andprograms of the CINCs to determine theiradequacy and feasibility for theperformance of assigned missions.

f. Prepare and submit to the Secretaryof Defense, for information andconsideration, general strategic guidance

for the development of industrial andmanpower mobilization programs.

g. Prepare and submit to the Secretaryof Defense military guidance for use inthe development of logistics-relatedmilitary aid programs and other actionsrelating to foreign military forces.

h. Prepare and submit to the Secretaryof Defense, for information andconsideration in connection with thepreparation of budgets, statements ofmilitary requirements based on USstrategic plans. These statements shouldinclude tasks, priority of tasks, forcerequirements, and general strategicguidance for developing militaryinstallations and bases and for equippingand maintaining military forces.

4. Military Departments

Secretaries of the Military Departmentsh a v e t h e f o l l o w i n g l o g i s t i cresponsibilities:

a. Exercise authority to conduct allaffairs of their Departments to includerecruiting, organizing, supplying,equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing,demobilizing, administering andmaintaining forces; constructing,outfitting, and repairing militaryequipment; constructing, maintaining, andrepairing buildings, structures, andutilities; and acquiring, managing, anddisposing of real property or naturalresources.

b. Prepare forces and establish reservesof manpower, equipment, and supplies forthe effective prosecution of war andmilitary operations throughout the rangeof military operations.

A-3

Logistic Responsibilities Within the Department of Defense

c. Maintain mobile Reserve forces in astate of readiness, properly organized,trained, and equipped for employment inan emergency.

d. Recruit, organize, train, and equipinteroperable forces for assignment tocombatant commands.

e. Conduct research; develop tactics,techniques, and organization; and developand procure weapons, equipment, andsupplies essential to the fulfillment offunctions assigned by the Secretary ofDefense.

f. Create, expand, or maintain aninfrastructure that supports US forcesusing installations and bases, and provideadministrative support, unless otherwisedirected by the Secretary of Defense.

5. Military Services

The Army, Navy, Air Force, and MarineCorps, under their departmentalSecretaries, and the Coast Guard, underthe Department of Transportation inpeacetime and the Department of the Navyin wartime, are responsible for thefunctions enumerated in DOD Directive5100.1. They will provide logistic supportfor Service forces, including procurement,distribution, supply, equipment, andmaintenance, unless otherwise directed bythe Secretary of Defense.

6. Defense Logistics Agency

DLA is a Combat Support Agency ofthe Department of Defense and iscontrolled and directed by USD(A&T).USD(A&T) delegates the responsibilityfor exercising direction, authority, controland staff supervision of DLA toASD(P&L). DLA functions as an integralelement of the DOD military logisticsystem by providing worldwide logisticsupport to the Military Departments andthe combatant commands across the rangeof military operations, as well as to otherDOD components, Federal agencies,foreign governments, or internationalorganizations as assigned. DLA has thefollowing logistic responsibilities:

a. Provide integrated materielmanagement of wholesale subsistence,clothing, bulk petroleum, and medicalmateriel.

b. Provide supply support for all DLA-managed materiel.

c. Perform logistic services directlyassociated with furnishing materielcommodities and items of supply.

d. Provide property disposal services.

e. Provide contract administrationservices.

Appendix A

A-4 Joint Pub 4-0

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX BORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF COMBATANT

COMMAND LOGISTIC STAFF (J-4) AND FUNCTIONS OFJOINT LOGISTIC CENTERS, OFFICES, AND BOARDS

B-1

1. General

This appendix relates some insights,gained from experience and studies, thatbear on the effective organization of acombatant command’s logistic staff (J-4),and the wartime functions of that staff.Guidance implied by these insights isgeneral in nature and not directive. Thedegree of application of the implicationsdrawn from the information provided herewill vary considerably among combatantcommands.

2. OrganizationalConsiderations

Often there may be little time to shiftfrom a peacetime organization to adifferent wartime organization. Any effortinvolved in doing so will reduce resourcesavailable to apply to the significantlogistic problems that accompanydeployment and other initial logistic tasksin war. The logistic organization,therefore, should be tailored to respondto anticipated war tasks.

a. On the combatant command staff,these tasks will most likely take the formof coordination and planning functionsand are derived from the CINC’s mission.Therefore, conducting an inventory ofwartime tasks is a preliminary requirementin validating or improving stafforganization.

b. Although the J-4 organization shouldbe based on wartime tasks, it could wellbe staffed at reduced levels in peacetime.Still, the full wartime structure should be

defined to aid in rapid expansion. The useof Reserve augments can providepretrained expertise to support thewartime structure.

c. Organizing around war tasks doesnot preclude, in fact, it encourages,delegating to Service components certainspecial logistic planning tasks or the actualoperation of certain joint logisticfunctions.

3. Key Functions

The CINCs will usually form commandcenters and operational planning teams inwartime. The logistic staff members inthese groups are usually supported by aLogistic Readiness Center (LRC) or areteamed with representatives from variousfunctional areas: fuels, ammunition,e n g i n e e r i n g , s u p p l y, s u r f a c etransportation, sealift, airlift, and medicalservices. The LRC receives reports fromService components and external sources,distills information for presentation to theCINC, and responds to questions. Inaddition to operating the LRC andproviding representation in the commandcenter, the combatant command logisticstaff performs four key functions:

a. Monitors Current and EvolvingTheater Logistic Capabilities. Thestatus information collected from Servicecomponents should support the followingquestions:

• Are any planned operations injeopardy because of logisticlimitations?

Appendix B

B-2 Joint Pub 4-0

• Are there any types of operations thatshould not be considered becausethey could not be supported?

•• The data reported should be in theform of gross comparisons of currentstock and expected consumption andshould identify the on-handpercentage of requirements of criticalitems and munitions.

•• The logistic status informationshould be converted to outputindicators; the types of operationscurrent and incoming assets couldsupport, including factors such asintensity of combat, duration of theoperation, and the operational reachthat can be attained.

•• In summary, this function involvesc o l l e c t i n g , c o n s o l i d a t i n g ,interpreting, and explaining dataregarding current and upcominglogistic status in the theater. It thenrelates those data to the operations theCINCs are considering.

b. Coordinates Logistic SupportWith Upcoming Operations. Thisfunction involves directing the shift oflogistic support from one Servicecomponent or one geographic area toanother in the theater. To perform thisfunction properly, the logistic staff needsto know materiel commonalities amongthe Services, logistic force capabilities, thelocation of Service component resources,what materiel is en route to the theater,and how to interpret the various means ofmeasuring supply levels.

c . Adv ises the CINCs on theSupportability of Proposed Operationsor COAs. Because logistic support of

Service components is a Serviceresponsibility, Service components mustalso perform this task. However, theCINC’s J-4 should be able to provide agross analysis of COAs at the combatantcommand level before the Servicecomponents get involved in detailedassessments.

d. Acts as the CINC’s Agent andAdvocate to Nontheater LogisticOrganizations. This function involvesroutinely reporting logistic status to theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffrequesting extra resources, overseeingpriorities conveyed to supportingorganizations, overseeing adjustments tothe flow of forces and supplies, andcoordinating logistics with allies and theircombatant commands.

4. Joint Logistic Centers,Offices, and Boards

The following are examples of jointlogistic centers, offices, and boards thatmay be established by CINCs orsubordinate joint force commanders tocoordinate the logistic effort:

a. Joint Transportation Board . TheJTB will establish priorities and allocatecommon-user transportation resourceswithin the theater. The JTB will processall requests for reapportionment oradjustment of established allocations fromthe component commanders.

b. Joint Movement Center (JMC)

• The JMC is established under thesupervision of the joint forcecommander’s J-4 to implement thetasking and priorities provided by theJFC.

B-3

Organization and Functions of Combatant Command Logistic Staff (J-4) and Offices, and Boards

• The JMC coordinates theemployment of all means oftransportation (including thatprovided by allies or HNs) to supportthe concept of operations. Thiscoordination is accomplishedthrough the establishment of strategicor theater transportation policieswithin the assigned theater, consistentwith relative urgency of need,port and terminal capabilities,transportation asset availability, andpriorities set by the CINCs. JointPub 4-01, “Joint Doctrinefor the Defense TransportationSystem,” will provide joint trans-portation procedures for use ofcommon-user lift assets and shouldbe, when available, consulted by thelogistic planner.

• The J-4 directs or recommends to theCINC, as appropriate, COAs withrespect to allocation of common-usertransportation capabilities whenmovement requirements exceedcapability or when competingrequirements result in unresolvedconflicts.

• Although the functions andresponsibilities of the JMC maydiffer, depending on circumstances,the JMC will normally:

•• Interface with JOPES to monitorand effect changes to the deploymentof forces and supplies.

•• Analyze user capabilities to ship,receive, handle cargo, and re-commend solutions to shortfalls.

•• Advise the J-4 on transportationmatters that would adversely affectcombat contingency operations.

•• Serve as the liaison with the HN(s)for transportation issues.

•• D i s s e m i n a t e i n f o r m a t i o nconcerning HN transportationsystems, facilities, equipment, andpersonnel.

• Communication links may berequired to support the JMC:

•• With each of the transportationcontrol elements (e.g., MovementControl Center, Airlift ControlCenter, and Water Terminal ClearanceAuthority).

•• With each component.

•• Directly with USTRANSCOMand the transportation componentcommands (AMC, MSC, andMTMC).

c . Log is t i c S ta f f O f f i ce r fo rPetroleum and Subarea PetroleumOffice

• Normally, the unified command JointPetroleum Office (JPO) providesw h o l e s a l e b u l k p e t r o l e u mmanagement support. The primaryduties of the logistic staff officer forpetroleum are as follows (see JointPub 4-03, “Joint Bulk PetroleumDoctrine,” for additional guidance):

•• Coordinate POL planning andmission execution matters.

•• Coordinate the supply of commonbulk petroleum products to joint forcecomponents.

•• Using DOD Manual 4140.25-M,“Management of Bulk PetroleumProducts, Storage, and Distribution

Appendix B

B-4 Joint Pub 4-0

Facilities,” coordinate with Servicec o m p o n e n t s i n d e t e r m i n i n grequirements for bulk petroleum andensure stockage through the DefenseFuel Supply Center (DFSC) sources.

•• Recommend necessary re-allocation and apportionment ofpetroleum products and facilities toCINCs.

•• Oversee quality surveillanceprograms.

• When tactical operations warrantextensive management of wholesalebulk petroleum in the theater, the JPOmay establish a Subarea PetroleumOffice (SAPO). Staff augmentationmay be provided by Servicecomponents. The primary functionof the SAPO is to discharge the staffpetroleum logistic responsibilities ofa joint force. The SAPO will conformto the administrative and technicalprocedures established by thecombatant command and the DFSCin DOD Manual 4140.25-M. Keyduties of the SAPO are as follows:

•• Review and consolidate arearesupply requirements through theJPO to the DFSC.

•• Release or real locate pre-positioned war reserve materielstocks.

•• Assist the DFSC in executingapplicable support responsibilities inthe AOR.

•• Take continuous action to identifyand submit requirements to HNs forpetroleum logistic support.

d. Joint Civil-Military EngineeringBoard (JCMEB)

• The JCMEB establishes policies,procedures, priorities, and overalldirection for civil-militaryconstruction and engineeringrequirements in the theater.

• The JCMEB is a temporary board,activated by the geographiccombatant commander and staffed bypersonnel from the components andagencies or activities in support of thegeographic combatant commander.

• The JCMEB arbitrates all issuesreferred to it by the Joint FacilitiesUtilization Board (JFUB) and, ifappropriate, assumes responsibilityfor the preparation of the CivilEngineering Support Plan.

• The JCMEB will coordinate itsactivities with the regional or theaterwartime construction managershaving responsibility for the assignedAOR. Construction and engineeringrequirements that the JCMEB cannotsatisfy from within joint forceresources will be elevated to theregional or theater wartimeconstruction managers for support.

e. Joint Facilities Utilization Board

• The JFUB evaluates and reconcilescomponent requests for real estate,use of existing facilities, inter-Servicesupport, and construction to ensurecompliance with JCMEB priorities.

• The JFUB is activated on order of ageographic combatant or subordinatejoint force commander and chaired bya g e o g r a p h i c c o m b a t a n t o rsubordinate joint force J-4, withmembers from components and any

B-5

Organization and Functions of Combatant Command Logistic Staff (J-4) and Offices, and Boards

required special activities (e.g., legaland civil affairs).

• The JFUB also provides admini-strative support and functions as theexecutive agency for the taskings ofthe JCMEB.

• JFUB actions will be guided by theprovisions of Joint Pub 4-04, “JointDoctrine for Civil EngineeringSupport.”

f. CINC Logistic ProcurementSupport Board (CLPSB)

• Geographic combatant commanderscoordinate contracting operationswithin their commands. Thisrequirement may be met through theCLPSB, which is a temporary boarddesigned to achieve a properlycoordinated acquisition program.

• The CLPSB is chaired by a J-4rep resen ta t i ve and inc l udesrepresentatives from each of thecomponent commands.

• CLPSB functions:

•• Coordinates with US Embassiesand host countries for acquisition ofsupplies and services and foroperations by contractors performingunder US contracts.

•• E l iminates dupl ica t ion byar rang ing for s ing le -Serv icecontracting assignments for specifiedsupplies and services, whenappropriate.

• • P r o v i d e s a n e x c h a n g e ofinformation among contractingactivities covering such matters assources of supply, prices, andcontractor performance.

•• Prov ides gu idance on theconsolidation of purchases.

•• Establishes procedures tocoordinate procurement with thesupply operations of the commanderand area.

•• Prescribes payment proceduresconsistent with currency-controlrequirements and internationalagreements.

•• Promulgates, as necessary, jointclassification and compensationguides governing wages, livingallowances, and other benefits forThird World country national andi n d i g e n o u s e m p l o y e e s , i ncoordination with appropriateagencies.

g. Theater Patient MovementRequirements Center (TPMRC). TheTPMRC is under the control of the jointforce surgeon and coordinates andcontrols, in terms of identifying bed spacerequirements, the movement of patientswithin and out of the assigned AOR.TPMRCs generate theater plans andschedules, and then modify (as needed)and execute Global Patient MovementsRequirements Center (GPMRC) deliveredschedules, ultimately delivering thepatient to the Medical Treatment Facility(MTF). The TPMRC should be task-organized to maintain flexibility inresponse to the tactical situation andmission of the CINC.

h. Joint Blood Program Office(JBPO)

• The JBPO, within the office of thejoint force surgeon, is task-organizedto meet operational requirements andis staffed by Service representatives

Appendix B

B-6 Joint Pub 4-0

who are knowledgeable in blood banktechniques.

• The JBPO plans, coordinates, anddirects the handling, storage, anddistribution of blood and bloodcomponents within the assignedAOR. The JBPO consolidates andforwards requirements for resupply tothe Armed Services Blood ProgramOffice (ASBPO).

• Area JBPO will be activated on theorder of a CINC if the situationdictates.

i. Joint Mortuary Affairs Office(JMAO)

• The Army component commander isroutinely designated executive agentfor the theater mortuary affairsprogram, which includes theestablishment and operation of theJMAO under the staff supervision ofa joint force commander J-4.

• The JMAO plans and executes allmortuary affairs programs. TheJMAO will provide guidance tofacilitate the conduct of all mortuaryprograms and to maintain data (asrequired) pertaining to recovery,

identification, and disposition of allUS dead and missing in the assignedtheater. The JMAO will serve as thecentral clearing point for all mortuaryaffairs and casualty information, andwill monitor the deceased andmissing personal effects program.

j. Joint Materiel Priorities andAllocation Board (JMPAB). TheJMPAB:

• Modifies and recommends prioritiesfor allocations of materiel assetsfor the fulfillment of logisticrequirements of the theater (both USand allied forces).

• Reviews, acts on, or forwardsrequests for modifications in forceand activity designators to the JointStaff.

• Reviews, acts on, or forwardsrequests to establish or change thepriorities in the master urgency listto the Joint Staff.

• Prepares recommendations to theJoint Staff on modifications topriorities and allocations of resourcesassigned to other combatantcommanders.

C-1

APPENDIX CLOGISTIC INDICATORS

The following logistic considerationsare a guide for use as indicators to assesslogistic feasibility of various COAs. Theindicators are by no means exclusive, buta process for identifying criticalinformation requirements or analyticalwork necessary to develop an OPLANAnnex D. Unless otherwise noted, theseindicators apply to the strategic andoperational level of logistics.

a. Materiel sourcing can only beaccomplished by the Services andsourcing agencies. Early liaison amongall concerned is essential to assess:

• Status of critical supplies and materielin the theater, in the pipeline fromCONUS to the theater, and inCONUS.

• Pre-positioning of adequate warreserves.

b. Bottlenecks en route to or within thetheater.

c. Status of facilities and resources.

d. Movement control concepts.

e. Availability of wartime HNS.

f. Time-phasing and readiness status ofCSS.

g. Manufacturing rate of the CONUSpipeline or production line needed tosustain forward operations.

h. Concentration. (Are superiorresources concentrated to support combatpower at the decisive time and place?)

i. Visibility. (Do commanders knowwhat logistic support they have and whereit is at all times?)

j . Mobi l i ty. (Do commandersunderstand the capabilities of theatermobility assets in supporting operationalmovements and how long it will take tomove forces and logistic assets to thedecisive point of concentration?)

k. Configuration of materiel fortransport. (Are there adequate means tomove materiel where and when it needsto be moved and capabilities toreconfigure it for delivery if required?)

l. Disproport ional stockpiles ofsupplies at rear echelons while front unitsare in short supply.

m. Unusually high wastage or pilferageat any point in the logistic system.

Appendix C

C-2 Joint Pub 4-0

Intentionally Blank

D-1

APPENDIX DLOGISTIC CHECKLIST FOR OPLANS ANNEX D

The following questions cover areas ofconsideration that should be addressed inAnnex D of OPLANs. Additionalguidance can be located in Joint Pub5-03.2, “Joint Operation Planning andExecution System, Volume II,” SectionIII, “Annex D Planning Guidance—Logistics.”

a. Has a thorough review of theOPLAN or OPORD been made?

b. Are logistic-related annexes andestimates prepared?

• Is initial distribution of suppliesincluded?

• Have logistic plans been coordinatedwith component commanders? Hasconsideration been given to assigningthe responsibility for theater supportto the dominant users of services?

• Are movements of personnel,equipment, and supplies included?Have adequate provisions been madefor defense during movements?

• A r e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d o t h e rengineering requirements included?Has a barrier plan been considered?Have those materiel requirementsbeen identified for sourcing?

c. How many days can assigned forcessustain operations with organic supplies?Are sustainment supplies phased toprovide uninterrupted operations? Whatis the supply safety level?

d. Petroleum

• What is the concept of operations forpetroleum support?

• What HNS is available?

• What are component responsibilitiesfor petroleum support? Havecomponents provided estimates ofPOL requirements?

• Have arrangements been made tocontract for HNS sources, with thesupported CINC’s JPO or DFSC?Should a SAPO for resupplying POLbe established?

• Has a quality control program forPOL been established?

• Have POL storage methods and sitesbeen selected? Have securityarrangements for the sites beenestablished?

• Have arrangements been made fortransportation of POL within theassigned theater?

e. Munitions

• What are the critical munitionsrequired for this operation?

• Are sufficient stocks of these criticalmunitions available?

• Have these munitions been properlyrelocated or positioned to support theoperation?

Appendix D

D-2 Joint Pub 4-0

• Can any critical munitions shortfallsbe remedied through transfer betweencomponent commands or fromforeign forces as a quick fix?

• Have components provided esti-mates of ammunition resupplyrequirements?

• Have ammunition storage sites beenselected?

• Have security arrangements for theammunition sites been established?

• Have arrangements been made for thetransportation of ammunition withinthe theater?

f. Medical Analysis

• Are the medical tasks, functions, andresponsibilities delineated andassigned?

• Are provisions made to provideemergency medical assistance to USnationals in the assigned theater andto enemy prisoners of war, civilianinternees, displaced civilians, andother detained persons?

• Has the theater evacuation policybeen established? If so, haverequirements for hospitals and patientmovement workload been identified?

• Is sufficient medical support availablefor deploying forces to ensure acontinuum of care for the ill, injured,or wounded? Do all units have time-phased force and deployment data(TPFDD) and are TPFDD scheduledfor timely arrival?

• Have estimates of medicalsustainability and anticipated

resupply requirements beenestablished?

• Have resupply channels beendetermined? If applicable, haveprovisions been made to establish amedical depot?

• Has a TPMRC been established tocoordinate movement of patientswithin and out of the assigned AOR?

• Has a JBPO or similar functionagency been activated to plan andcoordinate the handling, storage, anddistribution of whole blood within theassigned AOR and consolidate andforward resupply requirements to theASBPO?

• Have medical personnelaugmentation packages beenidentified and requirementssubmitted? Do hospitals have enoughpersonnel and equipment to supportmovement of critical patients? Arethere sufficient litters, straps,blankets, and other supplies asrequired, to support anticipatedworkload?

• Have provisions been made toestablish and operate the fixed-wingmedical evaluation system?

• Have primary and secondaryaeromedical airfields been identified?

• Have preventive medicine proceduresbeen established and sufficientpersonnel identified to ensureprotection of the health and well-being of personnel assigned to thetheater?

• Have medical communicationschannels, frequencies to be used by

D-3

Logistic Checklist for OPLANs Annex D

medical personnel, and any dedicatedor medical-unique communicationsnets, operating procedures, orrequirements been identified?

g. Sustainability Analysis

• Are procedures established formaintenance, recovery, and salvageoperations? Is there a requirement toprovide disposal support within thetheater where there is no DefenseReutilization Management Office(DRMO)? Is a DRMO that can beused located in the vicinity of thetheater?

• Are in te r -Se rv i ce orWHNSagreements or coordination required?

• Have arrangements been made toobtain maintenance support notorganic to the force?

• Has a JMAO been established to planand coordinate all mortuaryoperations such as remainsidentification, transportation andtemporary burial of the dead, andcollection and processing of personaleffects? Is there a JMAO to serve asa central point for graves registrationinformation? Have mortuary affairsguidelines been established to includethe following:

•• Current death program?

•• Concurrent return program?

•• Graves registration program?

•• Personal effects program?

•• Return of remains program?

• Have laundry and bath supportrequirements been generated incoordination with the medicalauthority, with consideration forenvironmental factors?

• Have component requests for existingfacilities, real estate, inter-Servicesupport, and construction beenevaluated and prioritized?

• Has provision been made for battledamage repair (e.g., rapid runwayrepair)?

• Is a CINC CLPSB required tocoordinate contracting operations?Are liaison personnel required toprovide in-theater assistance such asfuels and substance, reutilization andm a r k e t i n g , a n d c o n t r a c tadministration?

• Have procedures been established tocoordinate with US Embassies andhost countries for acquisition ofsupplies and services?

• Are imprest funds required? Haveimprest fund cashiers been appointedto the supporting US disbursingofficer?

• Has a joint logistic communicationsplan been developed to provide ageneral guide for logisticians’ C2requirements?

• Are adequate security proceduresestablished for classified logistic datatransmission?

• Has the need been considered foradditional US security assistance tofriendly countries in the assignedtheater?

Appendix D

D-4 Joint Pub 4-0

h. Transportation Analysis

• Have joint-use transportationrequirements been established?

• Has a JMC been established (ifneeded) to ensure that transportationrequests are validated and theatercommon-use r t ranspor ta t i onresources are employed withmaximum effectiveness?

• Are common-user transportationrequirements, capabilities, andperformance monitored?

• Are transportation shortfalls andconflicts in priorities adjudicated?

• What WHNS transportation facilitiesand equipment are available?

• Has the JMC evaluated anddisseminated information about HNtransportation systems, facilities,equipment, and personnel?

• Has JMC communication withJOPES been established to monitorand effect changes to the deploymentof forces and supplies?

E-1

The development of Joint Pub 4-0 is based on the following primary sources:

1. Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the DOD Reorganization Act of1986.

2. DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its MajorComponents.”

3. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

4. Joint Pub 1-01, “Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures Development Program.”

5. Joint Pub 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

6. Joint Pub 1-03 Series, “Joint Reporting Structure.”

7. DJSM-89-92, 27 January 1992, “Command Relationships.”

8. Secretary of Defense memorandum, 14 February 1992, “StrengtheningDepartment of Defense Transportation Functions.”

9. DOD Manual, “Management of Bulk Petroleum Products, Storage, andDistribution Facilities.”

10. NATO Logistics Handbook

APPENDIX EREFERENCES

Appendix E

E-2 Joint Pub 4-0

Intentionally Blank

F-1

1. User Comments. Users in the field are highly encouraged to submitcomments on this publication to the Joint Warfighting Center/Doctrine Division,Ingalls Road, BLDG 100, 3rd Floor, ATTN: DOC DIV, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency,and organization) and writing and appearance.

2. Authorship . The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for thispublication is the Director for Logistics (J-4).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C.20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication asan enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations arerequested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to sourcedocuments reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX FADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

Appendix F

F-2 Joint Pub 4-0

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Servicepublication centers.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatantcommands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy(Defense Attache Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Branch, C-AS1, Room 1A674,Pentagon, Washington D.C. 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November1988, “Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate JointCommands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Navy Aviation Supply OfficeDistribution Division (Code 03443)5801 Tabor AvePhiladelphia, PA 19120-5000

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-REP)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classifiedjoint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GL-1

GLOSSARYPART I - ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACSA acquisition cross-Service agreementAMC Air Mobility Command (formerly Military Airlift Command)AOR area of responsibilityASBPO Armed Services Blood Program OfficeASD(P&L) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics

C2 command and controlC4 command, control, communications, and computersC4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligenceCI counterintelligenceCINC commander of a combatant commandCLPSB CINC Logistic Procurement Support BoardCOA course of actionCOCOM combatant command (command authority)CONUS continental United StatesCS combat supportCSS combat service support

DFSC Defense Fuel Supply CenterDLA Defense Logistics AgencyDOD Department of DefenseDRMO Defense Reutilization Management Office

HN host nationHNS host-nation supportHSS health service support

JBPO Joint Blood Program OfficeJCMEB Joint Civil-Military Engineering BoardJFC joint force commanderJFUB Joint Facilities Utilization BoardJMAO Joint Mortuary Affairs OfficeJMC Joint Movement CenterJMPAB Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation BoardJMRO Joint Medical Regulating OfficeJOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJPO Joint Petroleum OfficeJTB Joint Transportation Board

LOC lines of communicationsLRC Logistics Readiness Center

Glossary

GL-2 Joint Pub 4-0

MSC Military Sealift CommandMTMC Military Traffic Management Command

NCA National Command Authorities

OPLAN operation planOPORD operation orderOSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants

RRF Ready Reserve Force

SAPO Subarea Petroleum Office

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment dataTPMRC Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center

UNAAF United Action Armed ForcesUSCINCTRANS Commander in Chief, US Transportation CommandUSD(A&T) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and TechnologyUSDP Under Secretary of Defense for PolicyUSTRANSCOM US Transportation Command

WHNS wartime host-nation supportWWMCCS Worldwide Military Command and Control System

GL-3

Glossary

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

advanced base. A base located in or neara theater of operations whose primarymission is to support militaryoperations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of responsibi l i ty. 1. Thegeographical area associated with acombatant command within which acombatant commander has authority toplan and conduct operations. 2. Innaval usage, a predefined area of enemyterrain for which supporting ships areresponsible for covering by fire onknown targets or targets of opportunityand by observation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

base. 1. A locality from which operationsare projected or supported. 2. An areaor locality containing installationswhich provide logistic or other support.3. Home airfield or home carrier. (JointPub 1-02)

combatant command (commandauthority). Nontransferable commandauthority established by title 10, UnitedStates Code, section 164, exercised onlyby commanders of unified or specifiedcombatant commands unless otherwisedirected by the President or theSecretary of Defense. Combatantcommand (command authority) cannotbe delegated and is the authority of acombatant commander to perform thosefunctions of command over assignedforces involving organizing andemploying commands and forces,assigning tasks, designating objectives,and giving authoritative direction overall aspects of military operations, jointtraining, and logistics necessary toaccomplish the missions assigned to thecommand. Combatant command(command authority) should beexercised through the commanders ofsubordinate organizations. Normally,

this authority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Combatant command(command authority) provides fullauthority to organize and employcommands and forces as the combatantcommander considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions.Operational control is inherent incombatant command (commandauthority). Also called COCOM. (JointPub 1-02)

combat power. The total means ofdestructive and/or disruptive forcewhich a military unit/formation canapply against the opponent at a giventime. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat service support. The essentialcapabilities, functions, activities, andtasks necessary to sustain all elementsof operating forces in theater at alllevels of war. Within the nationaland theater logistic systems, it includesbut is not limited to that supportrendered by service forces in ensuringthe aspects of supply, maintenance,transportation, health services, andother services required by aviation andground combat troops to permit thoseunits to accomplish their missionsin combat. Combat service supportencompasses those activities at all levelsof war that produce sustainment toall operating forces on the battlefield.(Joint Pub 1-02)

combat support. Fire support andoperational assistance provided tocombat elements. Combat supportincludes artillery, air defense artillery,engineer, military police, signal,and military intelligence support.(Joint Pub 1-02)

Glossary

GL-4 Joint Pub 4-0

depot. 1. Supply - An activity for thereceipt, classification, storage,accounting, issue, maintenance,procurement, manufacture, assembly,research, salvage, or disposal ofmaterial. 2. Personnel - An activity forthe reception, processing, training,assignment, and forwarding of per-sonnel replacements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

distribution. 1. The arrangement oftroops for any purpose, such as a battle,march, or maneuver. 2. A plannedpattern of projectiles about a point. 3.A planned spread of fire to cover adesired frontage or depth. 4. An officialdelivery of anything, such as orders orsupplies. 5. That functional phase ofmilitary logistics that embraces the actof dispensing materiel, facilities, andservices. 6. The process of assigningmilitary personnel to activities, units, orbillets. (Joint Pub 1-02)

distribution system. That complex offacilities, installations, methods, andprocedures designed to receive, store,maintain, distribute, and control theflow of military materiel between thepoint of receipt into the military systemand the point of issue to using activitiesand units. (Joint Pub 1-02)

dominant user concept. The concept thatthe Service which is the principalconsumer will have the responsibilityfor performance of a support workloadfor all using Services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

D-to-P concept. A logistic planningconcept by which the gross materielreadiness requirement in support ofapproved forces at planned wartimerates for conflicts of indefinite durationwill be satisfied by a balanced mix ofassets on hand on D-day and assets to

common servicing. That functionperformed by one Military Service insupport of another Military Service forwhich reimbursement is not requiredfrom the Service receiving support.(Joint Pub 1-02)

communications zone. Rear part oftheater of operations (behind butcontiguous to the combat zone) whichcontains the lines of communications,establishments for supply andevacuation, and other agencies requiredfor the immediate support andmaintenance of the field forces. (JointPub 1-02)

concept of logistic support. A verbal orgraphic statement, in a broad outline,of how a commander intends to supportand integrate with a concept ofoperations in an operation or campaign.(Joint Pub 1-02)

cross-servicing. That function performedby one Military Service in support ofanother Military Service for whichreimbursement is required from theService receiving support. (Joint Pub1-02)

deployment. 1. In naval usage, thechange from a cruising approach orcontact disposition to a disposition forbattle. 2. The movement of forceswithin areas of operations. 3. Thepositioning of forces into a formationfor battle. 4. The relocation of forcesand materiel to desired areas ofoperations. Deployment encompassesall activities from origin or home stationthrough destination, specificallyincluding intra-continental UnitedStates, intertheater, and intratheatermovement legs, staging, and holdingareas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

GL-5

Glossary

be gained from production throughP-day when the planned rate ofproduction deliveries to the users equalsthe planned wartime rate of expenditure(consumption). (Joint Pub 1-02)

evacuation. 1. The process of movingany person who is wounded, injured, orill to and/or between medical treatmentfacilities. 2. The clearance ofpersonnel, animals, or materiel from agiven locality. 3. The controlledprocess of collecting, classifying, andshipping unserviceable or abandonedmateriel, United States and foreign, toappropriate reclamation, maintenance,technical intelligence, or disposalfacilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

evacuation policy. 1. Commanddecision, indicating the length in dayso f t h e m a x i m u m p e r i o d o fnoneffectivness that patients may beheld within the command for treatment.Patients who, in the opinion ofresponsible medical officers, cannot bereturned to duty status within the periodprescribed are evacuated by the firstavailable means, provided the travelinvolved will not aggravate theirdisabilities. 2. A command decisionconcerning the movement of civiliansfrom the proximity of militaryoperations for security and safetyreasons and involving the need toarrange for movement, reception, care,and control of such individuals. 3.Command policy concerning theevacuation of unserviceable orabandoned materiel and includingdesignation of channels and destinationsf o r e v a c u a t e d m a t e r i e l , t h eestablishment of controls andprocedures, and the dissemination ofcondition standards and dispositioninstructions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

facility. A real property entity consistingof one or more of the following: abuilding, a structure, a utility system,pavement, and underlying land. (JointPub 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/ormilitary assistance rendered by a nationto foreign forces within its territoryd u r i n g p e a c e t i m e , c r i s e s o remergencies, or war based onagreements mutually concludedbetween nations. (Upon approval of thispublication, this term and its definitionwill modify the existing term “hostnation support” and its definition andbe included in Joint Pub 1-02.)

international logistics. The negotiating,planning, and implementation ofsupporting logistics arrangementsbetween nations, their forces, andagencies. It includes furnishing logisticsupport (major end items, materiel, and/or services) to, or receiving logisticsupport from, one or more friendlyforeign governments, internationalorganizations, or military forces, withor without reimbursement. It alsoincludes planning and actions related tothe intermeshing of a significantelement, activity, or component of themilitary logistics systems or proceduresof the United States with those of oneor more foreign governments,international organizations, or militaryforces on a temporary or permanentbasis. It includes planning and actionsrelated to the utilization of United Stateslogistics policies, systems, and/orprocedures to meet requirements of oneor more foreign governments,international organizations, or forces.(Joint Pub 1-02)

Glossary

GL-6 Joint Pub 4-0

international logistic support. Theprovision of military logistic supportby one participating nation to oneor more participating nations, eitherwith or without reimbursement.(Joint Pub 1-02)

inter-Service support. Action by oneMilitary Service or element thereof toprovide logistic and/or administrativesupport to another Military Service orelement thereof. Such action can berecurring or nonrecurring in characteron an installation, area, or worldwidebasis. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint logistics. The art and science ofplanning and carrying out, by a jointforce commander and staff, logisticoperations to support the protection,movement, maneuver, firepower, andsustainment of operating forces of twoor more Services of the same nation.(Joint Pub 1-02)

joint movement center. The centerestablished to coordinate theemployment of all means oftransportation (including that providedby allies or host nations) to support thec o n c e p t o f o p e r a t i o n s . T h i scoordination is accomplished throughestablishment of transportation policiesw i t h i n t h e a s s i g n e d a r e a o fresponsibility, consistent with relativeurgency of need, port and terminalcapabilities, transportation assetavailability, and priorities set by a jointforce commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint servicing. That function performedby a jointly staffed and financed activityin support of two or more MilitaryServices. (Joint Pub 1-02)

level of supply. The quantity of suppliesor materiel authorized or directed to be

held in anticipation of future demands.(Joint Pub 1-02)

lines of communications. All the routes,land, water, and air, which connect anoperating military force with a base ofoperations and along which suppliesand military forces move. Also calledLOC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistic assessment. An evaluation of: a.The logistic support required to supportparticular military operations in atheater of operations, country, or area.b. The actual and/or potential logisticssupport available for the conduct ofmilitary operations either within thetheater, country, or area, or locatedelsewhere. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistic estimate of the situation. Anappraisal resulting from an orderlyexamination of the logistic factorsinfluencing contemplated courses ofaction to provide conclusionsconcerning the degree and manner ofthat influence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistics. The science of planning andcarrying out the movement andmaintenance of forces. In its mostcomprehensive sense, those aspects ofmilitary operations which deal with: a.design and development, acquisition,storage, movement, distribution,ma in tenance , evacua t i on , anddisposition of materiel; b. movement,evacuation, and hospitalization ofpersonnel; c. acquisition orconstruction, maintenance, operation,and disposition of facilities; and d.acquisition or furnishing of services.(Joint Pub 1-02)

logistics-over-the-shore operations. Theloading and unloading of ships withoutthe benefit of fixed port facilities, in

GL-7

Glossary

friendly or nondefended territory, and,in time of war, during phases of theaterdevelopment in which there is noopposition by the enemy. Also calledLOTS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistics sourcing. The identification ofthe origin and determination of theavailability of the time-phased force anddeployment data nonunit logisticsrequirements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

materiel. All items (including ships,tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft,etc., and related spares, repair parts, andsupport equipment, but excluding realproperty, installations, and utilities)necessary to equip, operate, maintain,and support military activities withoutdistinction as to its application foradministrative or combat purposes.(Joint Pub 1-02)

movement control. The planning,routing, scheduling, and control ofpersonnel and cargo movements overlines of communications; also anorganization responsible for thesefunctions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

naval advanced logistic support site. Anoverseas location used as the primarytransshipment point in the theater ofoperations for logistic support. A navaladvanced logistic support site possessesf u l l c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r s t o r a g e ,consolidation, and transfer of suppliesand for support of forward-deployedunits (including replacements units)during major contingency and wartimeperiods. Naval advanced logisticsupport sites, with port and airfieldfacilities in close proximity, are locatedwithin the theater of operations but notnear the main battle areas, and mustpossess the throughput capacityrequired to accommodate incoming and

outgoing intertheater airlift and sealift.When fully activated, the navaladvanced logistic support site shouldconsist of facilities and servicesprovided by the host nation, augmentedby support personnel located in thetheater of operations, or both. Alsocalled ALSS. See also naval forwardlogistics site. (Joint Pub 1-02)

naval forward logistic site. An overseaslocation, with port and airfield facilitiesnearby, which provides logistic supportto naval forces within the theater ofoperations during major contingencyand wartime periods. Naval forwardlogistic sites may be located in closeproximity to main battle areas to permitforward staging of services, throughputof high priority cargo, advancedmaintenance, and battle damage repair.Naval forward logistic sites are linkedto in-theater naval advanced logisticsupport sites (ALSSs) by intratheaterairlift and sealift, but may also serve astransshipment points for intertheatermovement of high-priority cargo intoareas of direct combat. In providingfleet logistic support, naval forwardlogistic site capabilities may range fromvery austere to near those of a navaladvanced logistic support site. Alsocalled FLS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational control. Transferablecommand authority that may beexercised by commanders at anyechelon at or below the level ofcombatant command. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatantcommand (command authority).Operational control may be delegatedand is the authority to perform thosefunctions of command over subordinateforces involving organizing andemploying commands and forces,assigning tasks, designating objectives,

Glossary

GL-8 Joint Pub 4-0

and giving authoritative directionnecessary to accomplish the mission.O p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l i n c l u d e sauthoritative direction over all aspectsof military operations and joint trainingnecessary to accomplish missionsassigned to the command. Operationalcontrol should be exercised through thec o m m a n d e r s o f s u b o r d i n a t eorganizations. Normally this authorityis exercised through subordinate jointforce commanders and Service and/orfunctional component commanders.Operational control normally providesfull authority to organize commands andforces and to employ those forces as thecommander in operational controlconsiders necessary to accomplishassigned missions. Operational controldoes not, in and of itself, includeauthoritative direction for logistics ormatters of administration, discipline,internal organization, or unit training.Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

P-day. That point in time at which therate of production of an item availablefor military consumption equals the rateat which the item is required by theArmed Forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

pipeline. In logistics, the channel ofsupport or a specific portion thereof bymeans of which materiel or personnelflow from sources of procurement totheir point of use. (Joint Pub 1-02)

planning factor. A multiplier used inplanning to estimate the amount andtype of effort involved in a contem-plated operation. Planning factors areoften expressed as rates, ratios, orlengths of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

port. A place at which ships maydischarge or receive their cargoes. Itincludes any port accessible to ships onthe seacoast, navigable rivers or inland

waterways. The term “ports” should notbe used in conjunction with air facilitieswhich are designated as aerial ports,airports, etc. (Joint Pub 1-02)

priority. With reference to operationplans and the tasks derived therefrom,an indication of relative importancerather than an exclusive and finaldesignation of the order ofaccomplishment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programsauthorized by the Foreign AssistanceAct of 1961, as amended, and the ArmsExport Control Act of 1976, asamended, or other related statutes bywhich the United States providesdefense articles, military training, andother defense-related services, by grant,loan, credit, or cash sales in furtheranceof national policies and objectives.(Joint Pub 1-02)

sustainability. The ability to maintain thenecessary level and duration ofoperational activity to achieve militaryobjectives. Sustainability is a functionof providing for and maintaining thoselevels of ready forces, materiel, andconsumables necessary to supportmilitary effort. (From the definition of“military capability” in Joint Pub 1-02)

sustainment. The provision of personnel,logistic, and other support requiredto maintain and prolong operationsor combat until successfulaccomplishment or revision of themission or of the national objective.(Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical control. Command authorityover assigned or attached forces orcommands, or military capability orforces made available for tasking, thatis limited to the detailed and, usually,local direction and control of

GL-9

Glossary

movements or maneuvers necessary toaccomplish missions or tasks assigned.Tactical control is inherent inoperational control. Tactical controlmay be delegated to, and exercised atany level at or below the level ofcombatant command. Also calledTACON. (Joint Pub 0-2)

theater. The geographical area outsidethe continental United States for whicha commander of a combatant commandhas been assigned responsibility.(Joint Pub 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data.The Joint Operation Planning andExecution System data base portion ofan opera t ion p lan ; i t con ta instime-phased force data, non-unit-relatedcargo and personnel data, and movementdata for the operation plan, including:

a. In-place units.

b. Units to be deployed to support theoperation plan with a priority indicatingthe desired sequence for their arrival atthe port of debarkation.

c. Routing of forces to be deployed.

d. Movement data associated withdeploying forces.

e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargoand personnel movements to beconducted concurrently with thedeployment of forces.

f . E s t i m a t e o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o nrequirements that must be fulfilled bycommon-user lift resources as well asthose requirements that can be fulfilledby assigned or attached transportationresources. Also called TPFDD. (JointPub 1-02).

transportation component command.The three component commands ofUSTRANSCOM: Air Force AirMobility Command, Navy MilitarySealift Command, and Army MilitaryTraffic Management Command. Eachtransportation component commandremains a major command of itsparent Service and continues toorganize, train, and equip its forces asspecified by law. Each transportationcomponent command also continues toperform Service-unique missions. (JointPub 1-02)

transportation system. All the land, water,and air routes and transportation assetsengaged in the movement of US forcesand their supplies during peacetimetraining, conflict, or war, involving bothmature and contingency theaters and atthe strategic, operational, and tacticallevels of war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Glossary

GL-10 Joint Pub 4-0

Intentionally Blank

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope of project,references, milestones,and who will developdrafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCS receive the pub andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7, willsolicit a written report from thecombatant commands andServices on the utility and qualityof each pub and the need for anyurgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub is revised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchyas shown in the chart above. is the keystone publication for the series of jointdoctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 4-0 Logistics

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0 JOINT PUB 3-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINTWARFARE

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

JOINT PUB 2-0 JOINT PUB 4-0

C4 SYSTEMSPLANSLOGISTICSOPERATIONSINTELLIGENCEPERSONNEL

andADMINISTRATION

Documents

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations95).pdf · prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces