JP 4-01.2 JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations

9 October 1996

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for

Sealift Supportto Joint Operations

PREFACE

i

1. Scope

This publication provides a comprehensiveoverview of several key areas of sealift thatare considered essential for the successfulemployment of sealift in support of nationalmilitary strategy. These areas are thecontribution of sealift to the execution ofnational military strategy; the sealift missionand its functions in the area of strategicmobility; sealift forces, current sealift assetsand programs; the joint and Serviceorganizations for sealift; Service relationshipswith the United States TransportationCommand regarding sealift forces; thecommand and control system for employmentof sealift forces; sealift support of thegeographic combatant commander and,responsibility for planning, programming, andbudgeting for sealift forces to meet nationalmilitary objectives.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine andselected joint tactics, techniques, andprocedures (JTTP) to govern the jointactivities and performance of the ArmedForces of the United States in joint operationsand provides the doctrinal basis for USmilitary involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other joint forcecommanders and prescribes doctrine andselected tactics, techniques, and proceduresfor joint operations and training. It provides

military guidance for use by the Armed Forcesin preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques,and procedures and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine and

ii

Preface

Joint Pub 4-01.2

procedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluate

and follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

DENNIS C. BLAIRVice Admiral, US NavyDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

• Purpose..................................................................................................................... I-1• Sealift Support of National Military Strategy ......................................................... I-2• The Sealift Trident ................................................................................................... I-3

CHAPTER IIORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

• General ................................................................................................................... II-1• Forces and Authority ............................................................................................. II-1• Service-Unique, Theater-Assigned Transportation ............................................... II-1• Organizations and Responsibilities ....................................................................... II-1

CHAPTER IIIPLANNING

• General .................................................................................................................. III-1• Sealift Asset Planning........................................................................................... III-1• Other Considerations ............................................................................................ III-2

CHAPTER IVSEALIFT ASSETS

• General .................................................................................................................. IV-1• Ship Types............................................................................................................. IV-1• Sealift Ship Programs ........................................................................................... IV-7• Sealift Enhancement Features ............................................................................ IV-13• Logistics Over-The-Shore .................................................................................. IV-14

CHAPTER VVESSEL ACQUISITION AND ACTIVATION PROGRAMSAND PROCEDURES

• General ................................................................................................................... V-1• Government-Owned/Controlled Assets ................................................................ V-1• Commercial Assets ................................................................................................ V-4

iv

Table of Contents

Joint Pub 4-01.2

CHAPTER VIEMPLOYMENT OF SEALIFT FORCES

• General .................................................................................................................. VI-1• Execution Planning ............................................................................................... VI-1• Execution .............................................................................................................. VI-2• Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems .................. VI-3• Basic Cargo Planning Concepts ........................................................................... VI-7• Intermodal Operations .......................................................................................... VI-9• Protection of Shipping ........................................................................................ VI-10• Operations Security ............................................................................................ VI-11• Logistic Support ................................................................................................. VI-12• Amphibious/Expeditionary Operations ............................................................. VI-12

CHAPTER VIINAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING

• General ................................................................................................................. VII-1• Mission and Functions ......................................................................................... VII-1• Command Structure ............................................................................................. VII-1• Implementing NCS .............................................................................................. VII-3

CHAPTER VIIITRANSITION FROM PEACE TO CONFLICT

• General ............................................................................................................... VIII-1• Sealift Force Structure ....................................................................................... VIII-1

APPENDIX

A Merchant Ship Naval Augmentation Program ............................................... A-1B References ...................................................................................................... B-1C Administrative Instructions ............................................................................ C-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................. GL-1 Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-4

FIGURE

I-1 Strategic Mobility Triad............................................................................... I-1I-2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Elements of the Strategic

Mobility Triad ........................................................................................... I-2I-3 Phases of Strategic Mobility ......................................................................... I-3I-4 The Sealift Trident ........................................................................................ I-4II-1 Service-Unique or Theater-Assigned Transportation Sealift Assets ......... II-2

v

Table of Contents

II-2 Responsibilities of the Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command ....................................................................... II-4

III-1 Strategic Transportation Problem .............................................................. III-2IV-1 Types of Dry Cargo Ships .......................................................................... IV-2IV-2 Types of Liquid Cargo Carriers ................................................................. IV-6IV-3 Sealift Ship Programs ................................................................................ IV-7V-1 Sealift Acquisition and Activation Plan ..................................................... V-2V-2 Ready Reserve Force Activation Process for Contingency

Deployments of Common-User Ships ..................................................... V-4V-3 National Defense Reserve Fleet Activation/Ship Requisition Process ...... V-5V-4 Sealift Readiness Program/Voluntary Tanker Agreement

Activation Process .................................................................................. V-7VI-1 Measures of Ship Capacity ........................................................................ VI-8VI-2 Cargo Planning Factors.............................................................................. VI-9VI-3 Sealift Planning Factors ............................................................................. VI-9VII-1 Naval Control of Shipping Command Structure ...................................... VII-2VIII-1Sealift Asset Availability Times ............................................................. VIII-1

vi

Table of Contents

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

vii

Discusses Sealift Support of the National Military Strategy

Covers the Organization of and Responsibilities for SealiftSupport to Joint Operations

Presents General Sealift Asset Planning and Other Considerations

Addresses Sealift Assets Including Ship Types, Sealift ShipPrograms, Sealift Enhancement Features, and Logistics

Discusses Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs andProcedures

Covers the Employment of Sealift Forces

Describes Naval Control of Shipping

Discusses the Transition from Peace to Conflict

The strategic mobility triad of airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning (PREPO) provides the capability to respond tocontingencies. Each element of the triad has its own uniqueadvantages and disadvantages. In general, airlift transportslight, high priority forces and supplies, including personneland equipment required to rapidly form units with pre-positioning elements’ equipment and supplies. In most cases,sealift accounts for the majority of the total cargo deliveredto a theater of operations. To meet these requirements, sealiftforces are employed in the three phases of strategicmobility, which are: PREPO, deployment (or surge), andsustainment. As the principal means for deliveringequipment and logistic support, sealift impacts the ability toconduct sustained operations and may influence the outcomeof the operation being conducted.

Successful response toregional contingenciesdepends upon sufficientstrategic mobility assets todeploy combat forcesrapidly and sustain themin a theater of operationsas long as necessary inorder to meet US militaryobjectives.

Introduction to Sealift Support

viii

Executive Summary

Joint Pub 4-01.2

The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible to thePresident for the execution of the national military strategyand any other missions the President may direct. TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides proceduresfor the submission of transportation requirements, prescribesa movement priority system, and apportions and/or allocatesstrategic lift assets. The Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments maintain the duty and authority to organize,train, and equip forces for assignment to the Commander inChief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS).USCINCTRANS provides the Department of Defense withcommon-user air, land, and sea transportation across the rangeof military operations, less theater-assigned or Service-uniqueassets. USCINCTRANS is the DOD single manager fortransportation. Military Traffic Management Command isresponsible for providing responsive traffic management,terminal services, and transportation and transportabilityengineering. Responsibilities of the Military SealiftCommand (MSC) include operating and maintaining MSCforces as directed and serving as the Navy administrativecommander for MSC forces. The Maritime Administrationis responsible for promoting the development of a merchantmarine. The Joint Transportation Board ensures thatcommon-user transportation resources assigned or availableto the Department of Defense are allocated to achieve themaximum benefit in meeting DOD objectives. The supportedcombatant commander has primary responsibility for allaspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic CapabilitiesPlan or other joint operation planning authority. The USCoast Guard assures the safety and security of US ports andwaterways and its assets may be assigned to a Naval CoastalWarfare Commander overseas for similar functions in portsof debarkation.

The objective of transportation planning is to deliver thetotal prioritized movement requirements at the appropriatetime. Deliberate planning is designed to produce a detailedoperation plan or operation plan in concept format. Crisisaction planning is conducted during crisis and uses proceduresthat parallel that of deliberate planning, but is a more flexiblesystem that responds to the demands of changing events.Crisis action planning produces an executable operation order(OPORD) directly and much faster, but may lack some of thedetails. There are four steps to solving the strategic

Organization and Responsibility

The national securitystrategy depends heavilyupon our ability totransport personnel,equipment, and suppliesworldwide.

The actual orcontemplated use of sealiftassets during a crisis orconflict involvessignificant operationalconsiderations, each ofwhich must be the subjectof detailed planning.

Planning

ix

Executive Summary

Sealift forces are thosemilitarily useful merchant-type ships available to theDepartment of Defense(DOD) to execute sealiftacross the range ofmilitary operations.

Most vessels required tosupport military operationsare not under DODcontrol during peacetime.

transportation problem: to determine the cargo andsustainment movement requirement; to state the requirementin the appropriate units of measure; to simulate thedeployment using available forces; and to confirm that theplan is transportation-feasible.

The sealift force is composed of shipping from some or allof the following sources, depending on the DOD sealiftrequirement at that specific time: active government-ownedor controlled shipping; government-owned reserve or inactiveshipping; US privately owned and operated commercialshipping; US privately owned, foreign flag commercialshipping; and foreign-owned and operated commercialshipping. Sealift shipping falls into three broad categoriesand carries the following during joint operations: dry cargoships or freighters carry equipment and supplies; liquid cargocarriers or tankers carry refined petroleum, oils, andlubricants; and passenger ships carry backup troops or providenoncombatant or sealift medical evacuation. The conventionalsealift assets cannot meet all strategic sealift and sealift-relatedrequirements. Various Sealift Ship Programs, including FastSealift Ships, Auxiliary Crane Ships, Heavy Lift Ships, AviationLogistics Support Ships, Hospital Ships, and Afloat Pre-positioning Forces have been established. SealiftEnhancement Features consist of special equipment andmodifications that adapt merchant-type dry cargo ships andtankers to specific military missions. Logistics-over-the-shoreoperations enable sealift to achieve an over-the-shore dischargecapability that matches cargo deliveries in an amphibiousobjective area or other expeditionary operating area.

To acquire ships not under DOD control, some type of leaseagreement or operating agreement, also known as a charter,must be effected between the Department of Defense and theowning and controlling organizations. There are three typesof charters: bareboat, voyage, and time. Time and voyagecharters are most commonly used to acquire sealift shippingto meet short-term military requirements. Shipping that isdirectly owned by the government (including active andinactive assets) is the most readily available source for unitequipment sealift. Commercial ships will be required to fillsealift requirements in virtually every major crisis situation

Sealift Assets

Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs and Procedures

x

Executive Summary

Joint Pub 4-01.2

The employment of sealiftbegins in the executionplanning phase of theJoint Operation Planningand Execution Systemcrisis action planningprocedures.

Naval Control of ShippingOrganization tacticallyroutes merchant ships,reports their movements,and arranges for theirprotection.

and include US flag ships, effective US-controlled shipping,and foreign flag ships.

The employment of sealift forces must be undertaken withextreme care and diligence. The execution planning periodmay be weeks, days, or even hours in length, depending onthe political situation and scenario. The US TransportationCommand and its component commands are responsiblefor ensuring that adequate common-user transportation isavailable to support the OPORD when executed, fordeveloping feasible transportation schedules, establishinginitial and follow-on requirements for sealift capability,resolving transportation shortfalls, adjudicating transportationallocation conflicts, and publishing transportationcoordinating instructions. In a crisis, strategic sealift dividesinto two broad categories: surge shipping during initialmobilization and resupply or sustainment shipping. Theexecution phase starts with the National CommandAuthorities (NCA) decision to choose the military option forresolution of the crisis and to execute the OPORD. Theinherent worldwide dispersal of sealift forces mandates thatsealift command, control, communications, and computersystems be fully interoperable with the Global Command andControl System. Several basic concepts of cargo handlingand stowage must be understood by the joint planner andwill include different measures of ship capacity; brokenstowage; stowage factor or cargo density; and units of cargomeasurement. Intermodal operations provide flexibility byincorporating various combinations of sealift, airlift, rail, andtrucking operations to facilitate rapid, efficient cargomovement. The protection of ships, operations security, logisticsupport, and amphibious and expeditionary operations mustbe coordinated in order to ensure successful sealift support tojoint operations.

The mission of the Naval Control of Shipping Organization(NCSORG) is to provide for the safe movement of merchantshipping under its authority in a contingency situation, orin time of war or national emergency. The NCSORG does notdetermine the destination of ships or the cargoes they carry,does not control escort forces, and is not responsible for controlof merchant ships sailing in military convoys. The NCSORGcommand structure includes the NCA, geographic combatantcommander, area commander, operational control authority,shipping control teams, and naval liaison officers. The

Employment of Sealift Forces

Naval Control of Shipping

xi

Executive Summary

The transition from peaceto conflict represents acritical period for sealift.

procedures for implementing naval control of shipping aresimpler for sealift shipping than for shipping engaged incommercial trade.

Management of the transition during this period will have asignificant effect on the success of deployment and sustainmentmissions assigned to sealift. Transition from a peacetimetransportation role to a military deployment role requiressignificant changes that affect every portion of the sealift forces.The first and most obvious change in sealift during transitionis that the number of ships under USCINCTRANS andMSC control will rapidly and substantially increase.Depending on the mode of acquisition, ships may be delayedfor significant time periods before they can be considered asactive sealift assets.

This publication provides guidance on the planning andemployment of sealift across the range of military operations.Sealift forces are responsible for the majority of the total cargodelivered to a theater of operations. Cargo includes the majorityof unit equipment and supplies as well as some personnel.The relationships and responsibilities of the various commandsand agencies involved in providing sealift support to jointoperations are discussed. The objective of planning for theuse of sealift assets is to deliver the total prioritized movementrequirement at the appropriate time.

Transition from Peace to Conflict

CONCLUSION

xii

Executive Summary

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

I-1

1. Purpose

This document describes the role ofsealift in the US national military strategy.It identifies, describes, and defines the sealiftforces; organization for command and control(C2) of sealift forces; responsibilities forsealift support of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff (CJCS) and combatantcommands; procedures and responsibilitiesfor the generation of sealift force assets andrequirements; and doctrine for sealiftplanning, employment, and transition acrossthe range of military operations. Successfulresponse to regional contingencies dependson sufficient strategic mobility assets inorder to deploy combat forces rapidly andsustain them in a theater of operations

as long as necessary to meet US militaryobjectives. The strategic mobility triad ofairlift, sealift, and pr e-positioning(PREPO) is shown in Figure I-1. Eachelement of the triad has its own uniqueadvantages and disadvantages, as shownin Figure I-2. In general, airlift transportslight, high priority forces as well as supplies,including personnel and equipmentrequired to rapidly form units with PREPOelements’ equipment and supplies. As anoperation progresses, sealift delivers theheavy combat units and their supportequipment as well as the vital sustainmentfor deployed forces.

In most cases, sealift accounts for themajority of the total cargo delivered to a

Figure I-1. Strategic Mobility Triad

STRATEGIC MOBILITY TRIAD

FORCEPROJECTION

SEALIFTAIRLIFT

PRE-POSITIONING(AFLOAT & ASHORE)

“You can’t have any more of anything than you can haul.”

Colonel J. Monroe Johnson, USA

I-2

Chapter I

Joint Pub 4-01.2

theater of operations. To meet theserequirements, sealift forces are employed inthe three phases of strategic mobility, whichare: PREPO, deployment (or surge), andsustainment. The relationship of each phaseto the others in terms of time and quantitiesof material delivered is shown in Figure I-3.

Figure I-2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Elements of the Strategic Mobility Triad

2. Sealift Support of NationalMilitary Strategy

The United States is a nation with globalinterests and requires a military strategy thatachieves national security objectives acrossthe range of military operations. The

Advantages and Disadvantages of Elements of theStrategic Mobility Triad

ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

AIRLIFT

*

*

Rapid deployment of light combatand supporting units;Flexibility of employment.

*

**

*

Small sustained deliverycapacity;Airlane dependent;Dependent on availability ofmajor airfields;Requires cooperation of foreigngovernments.

PREPO (Ashore)

*

*

Rapid deployment of heavycombat and supporting units;Reduces movements required fordeployment and redeployment.

***

*

*

Lacks flexibility;Airlift dependent;Fixed sites may be easilytargeted for attack;Requires cooperation of foreigngovernments;Finite capability.

PREPO (Afloat)

*

*

*

Rapid deployment of heavycombat and supporting units;Reduces movements required fordeployment;Flexibility of employment.

*

**

Dependent upon suitability of portfacilities and debarkationlocations;Sealane dependent;Airlift dependent.

SEALIFT

*

*

Sustained delivery of heavycombat and supporting units andtheir sustainment;Flexibility of employment.

*

*

Seaport dependent (lessMPS/AWR 3);

Sealane dependent.

I-3

Introduction

strategy employed is based on three maincomponents: peacetime engagement;deterrence and conflict prevention; fightand win our Nation's wars. This strategycannot be executed without forward presence,power projection, and the ability to sustainforces during an operation and redeploy forceswhen the operation is terminated. As one ofthe principal means for delivering equipmentand logistic support, sealift impacts theability to conduct sustained operations andmay influence the outcome of the operationbeing conducted. To the extent that sealiftlimits deployment of forces or logistic support,geographic combatant and subordinate jointforce commanders (JFCs) and theircomponents are constrained in the strategic,operational, and tactical options that theymight choose and the forces they can employ.Flexible, assured sealift support permitsJFCs to expand the strategic, operational,and tactical options available. The currentnational military strategy of the United Statesis to deter aggression through overseaspresence and effective power projection. Inorder to provide the pre-positioned, surge,and sustainment equipment and suppliesnecessary to support our forward-deployedforces, sealift may be the movement mode ofnecessity as well as choice.

3. The Sealift Trident

During large strategic deploymentoperations, sealift support is typicallyconducted in three phases as depicted inFigure I-4. PREPO afloat is made up ofships from the Afloat Pre-positioning Force(APF) of the Military Sealift Command(MSC) . APF ships are discussed in greaterdetail in Chapter IV, “Sealift Assets.” Theflexibility inherent in the APF makes thisforce a key element in joint operationplanning; the APF is capable of supportingthe plans for the entire range of militaryoperations. Pre-positioned cargoes aboardAPF shipping include the capability toprovide humanitarian assistance with foodrations, medical supplies, habitability sets(i.e., tents), potable water-making machinery,engineer support equipment, and motortransport. To enable the early delivery ofcombat power to a theater of operations,additional equipment such as tanks andartillery are pre-positioned. Elements of theAPF may be temporarily moved to take upposition close to a potential employmentarea, either to signal national resolve duringan evolving crisis or enhance the timelydelivery of supplies and equipment upon thedecision to deploy a decisive force.

PHASES OF STRATEGIC MOBILITY

PRE-POSITIONING DEPLOYMENT (SURGE) SUSTAINMENT

DA

ILY

TO

NN

AG

ER

EQ

UIR

ED

DAYS AFTER DEPLOYMENT

Figure I-3. Phases of Strategic Mobility

I-4

Chapter I

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Figure I-4. The Sealift Trident

THE SEALIFT TRIDENT

PREPOAPF / MPS / LMSR

SUSTAINMENTUS Flag Merchant

FleetSURGE

FSS / RRF / LMSR

Sealift provides "Tactical Rhythm"

APF Afloat Pre-positioning ForceFSS Fast Sealift Ships

CRISISAREA

LMSR Large, Medium Speed Roll-On / Roll-OffMPS Maritime Pre-positioning ShipsRRF Ready Reserve Force

“Surge” includes ships from theUS Transportation Command(USTRANSCOM)-controlled fleet; forexample, the Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), theReady Reserve Force (RRF), Large, MediumSpeed Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) (LMSR)vessels, and the commercial market (whencontracted by USTRANSCOM for supportof US forces). Surge shipping types arediscussed in detail in Chapter V, “VesselAcquisition and Activation Programs andProcedures.” Surge shipping delivers theheavy combat power and accompanyingsupplies in order to facilitate the deploymentof predominantly continental US (CONUS)

based forces to anywhere in the world.Finally, “sustainment” refers to shippingprovided by the US merchant fleet, mostlycontainerships, to deliver large quantitiesof resupply and ammunition to forward-deployed forces augmented as necessaryby the RRF. Sustainment shippingconsiderations are discussed in greaterdetail in Chapter VI, “Employment of SealiftForces.” Although all three portions ofthe sealift trident are distinct entities, theyprovide a synergistic effect; removing asegment of the trident denies JFCs the fullrange of sealift support options.

I-5

Introduction

SEALIFT IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSIAN GULF

Key to the buildup and sustainment of forces was the workhorse of the strategicmobility triad sealift. Sealift in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERTSTORM was composed of ships under MSC operational control as well asdomestic and foreign ships under charter to MSC. The size and swiftness ofthe buildup required the United States to use almost every element of itssealift capability. Almost all Navy sealift elements were involved in theoperation and they were supplemented by large numbers of chartereddomestic and foreign ships. During the entire operation, 385 ships deliveredunit equipment, related support, and petroleum products.

The sealift logistics deployment and sustainment effort took place in twophases. The first sealift phase extended from August to November [1990] andwas designed to deploy and sustain forces to deter further Iraqi aggression.During that period, sealift moved the equipment of more than four Armydivisions along with sustainment for the initial defensive support requirements.By September, more than 100 of TRANSCOM’s MSC-controlled ships haddelivered the equipment and sustainment for the 100,000 US military personnelwho had deployed to the theater. When the first sealift phase ended, morethan 180 ships were assigned or under charter to MSC and nearly 3.5 milliontons of fuel and 1.2 million tons of cargo had been delivered.

The second phase began in December and extended until the end of the conflict.By 15 January [1991], the total number of US forces deployed in the theaterhad more than doubled. From the beginning, while deploying a unit, shipswere also loaded with sustainment supplies required by the forces in theater.By March, an average of 4,200 tons of cargo arrived in theater daily. The averageone-way voyage for the Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORMsealift covered nearly 8,700 miles.

SOURCE: DOD Final Report to CongressConduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, April 1992

I-6

Chapter I

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

II-1

programming and budgeting function, shallremain with the Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments. With respect to sealift,USCINCTRANS is delegated author i ty top r o c u r e c o m m e r c i a l transportationservices (including lease of transportationassets) and to activate, with the approval ofthe Secretary of Defense (SecDef), the RRFand the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP).Additionally, USCINCTRANS s h a l lcontro l the transportation accounts of theDefense Business Operations Fund (DBOF).

3. Service-Unique,Theater-AssignedTransportation

As used in DOD Directive 5158.4, “UnitedStates Transportat ion Command,”Service-unique or theater-assignedtransportation means sealift assets that areshown in Figure II-1.

4. Organizations andResponsibilities

It is DOD policy that traffic managementand transportat ion single managerresponsibilities be aligned to achieveoptimum responsiveness, effectiveness,and economy both in time of peace and timeof war. Specific sealift responsibilities follow.

a. Department of Defense. Under theSecretary of Defense, the Department ofDefense is responsible to the President forthe execution of the national military strategyand any other missions that the President may

“A shipload of war material delivered safely overseas [is] wasted if half thecargo consists of filler items not needed immediately.”

Richard Leighton and Robert Coakley(on efficiency in transportation vs. effective supply)

Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943

1. General

The Department of Defense (DOD) forcestructure is based on a highly trained,well-equipped, and mobile military force.The national security strategy dependsheavily on our ability to transport personnel,equipment, and supplies worldwide. Toensure the Department of Defense’s abilityto carry out its transportation missionseffectively, the Commander in Chief of theUnited States Transportation Command(USCINCTRANS) provides common-userair, land (CONUS only), and seatransportation to the Department ofDefense across the range of militaryoperations.

2. Forces and Authority

DOD Directive 5158.4, 8 January 1993,“United States Transportation Command,”designates USCINCTRANS as the DODsingle manager for transportation forother than Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets. Thisdirective also directs the Secretaries of theMilitary Departments (after coordinationwith the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaf f) to assign the Military TrafficManagement Command (MTMC), MSC,and the Air Mobility Command, in timeof peace and war, to USCINCTRANS underUSCINCTRANS’ combatant command(command authority) (COCOM). Theauthority and duty to organize, train, andequip forces for assignment toUSCINCTRANS, and the associated

II-2

Chapter II

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Figure II-1. Service-Unique or Theater-Assigned Transportation Sealift Assets

Assigned to the Department of the Army as Army afloatPREPO ships (prior to the initial discharge of cargo);

Assigned to the Department of the Navy as:The special mission support force of missile rangeinstrumentation ships, ocean survey ships, cableships, oceanographic research ships, acousticresearch ships, and naval test support ships;The naval fleet auxiliary force of fleet ammunitionships, submarine surveillance ships, fleet storesships, fleet ocean tugs, ballistic missile submarinesupport ships, and fleet oilers;Hospital ships;Marine Corps intermediate maintenance activity shipsor;Prior to initial discharge of cargo, maritimePREPO ships.

Assigned to the Department of the Air Force as Air Forceafloat PREPO ships (prior to the initial discharge of cargo);or

Assigned to the combatant command (command authority)of a unified command (including the US Special OperationsCommand) other than Commander in Chief, USTransportation Command.

SERVICE-UNIQUE OR THEATER-ASSIGNEDTRANSPORTATION SEALIFT ASSETS

direct. To perform these missions effectively,the Department of Defense is organized intwo functional areas. These are: first, theadministration, equipping, training, andsupport of military forces; and second, C2of military forces . Related specificresponsibilities include establishing andoverseeing implementation of overall policyfor effective and efficient use of DOD andcommercial transportation resources, and

establishing overall policy guidance governingthe transportation account of the DBOF.

b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Under DOD policy, the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff is responsible as follows.

• Prescribe procedures for the submissionof transportation requirements by theDOD components to USTRANSCOM.

II-3

Organization and Responsibilities

USCINCTRANS on the assignment ofnew missions to MSC and ensureMSC is able to meet its assignedUSTRANSCOM functions withoutdegradation. Other tasks include:

•• Coordinating with USCINCTRANS’Navy requirements for shipping supportto be drawn from the RRF.

•• Providing acquisition authority toMSC by designating Commander,Military Sealift Command (COMSC) asHead of Contracting Activity to supportUSCINCTRANS.

•• Providing litigation and legal supportfor actions arising from contracts issuedby MSC in support of USCINCTRANS.

•• Assigning to MSC Service-uniquemissions or assets.

d. Commander in Chief, US TransportationCommand. USCINCTRANS shall be theDOD single manager for transportation,other than Service-unique or theater-assignedassets. USCINCTRANS is responsible forthe items listed in Figure II-2.

e. Military Traffic ManagementCommand. MTMC is responsible forproviding responsive traffic management,terminal services, and transportation andtransportability engineering in order toprovide for safe and secure movement of unitsand personnel when and where needed.MTMC’s common-user assets in CONUSinclude military owned and operated waterterminals and heavy capacity flat cars usedto transport main battle tanks and similarequipment to the seaport of embarkation(SPOE). MTMC consists of the headquarters,area commands, Transportation EngineeringAgency, and MTMC terminals. Sealift-related responsibilities, subject to thedirection and control of USTRANSCOM,are as follows:

• Prescribe a transportation movementpriority system that will ensureresponsiveness to the requirement ofsupported combatant commanders(CINCs).

• Apportion and/or allocate strategic liftassets.

c. Secretaries of the Military Departments.Secretaries of the Military Departmentsmaintain the duty and authority toorganize, train, and equip forces forassignment to USCINCTRANS, underUSCINCTRANS’ COCOM, and along withthe associated programming and budgetingfunctions. Specifically, with respect tosealift, the Secretaries are responsible asfollows.

• The Secretary of the Army will establishand control such installation and portactivities as may be necessary for theoperation and administration of MTMC.Other tasks include:

•• Providing acquisition authority toMTMC by designating Commander,MTMC as Head of Contracting Activityto support USCINCTRANS.

•• Providing litigation and legal supportfor actions arising from contracts issuedor administered by MTMC in support ofUSCINCTRANS.

• The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)will establish, organize, train, andequip MSC as a jointly staffed majorcommand of the US Navy forassignment to USCINCTRANS’ COCOMin times of peace and war. The SECNAVwill obtain USCINCTRANS’approval on organizational changeswithin MSC t h a t may impact theability of USCINCTRANS to carry outassigned responsibilities. Th eSECNAV wi l l coord inate wi th

II-4

Chapter II

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Figure II-2. Responsibilities of the Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMANDER INCHIEF, US TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

Exercise COCOM of sealift forces, to include organizing and employing forces tocarry out missions in support of other unified commands

Coordinate and implement Defense Business Operations Fund-Transportationoperational procedures in association with component comptrollers of MilitaryDepartments and Office of the Secretary of Defense; provide guidance forstandardization of rates, regulations, operational policies, and procedures

Apply apportioned / allocated strategic sealift resources as directed by theNational Command Authorities, ensuring effective use

Procure commercial transportation services (including lease of transportationassets) in accordance with applicable laws as necessary to conduct theUSTRANSCOM mission

Establish and maintain relationship between the DOD and the commercialtransportation industry to develop concepts, requirements, and procedures forthe Sealift Readiness Program; these procedures take effect upon the approvalof the SecDef

With the approval of the SecDef, activate strategic sealift reserve / mobilizationprograms including the RRF, SRP, and the Volunteer Tanker Agreement

Coordinates and provides oversight for the joint logistics-over-the-shoreexercise program

Coordinate with the Maritime Administration and provide guidance onrequirements issues as necessary

In coordination with other agencies, provide direction and oversight for allmatters dealing with the transportation of hazardous material

Have the authority to provide management support for Service-unique ortheater-assigned transportation assets as requested by the Secretaries of theMilitary Departments and the commanders of unified commands at the directionof SecDef or when USCINCTRANS and the Service Secretary or commanderconcerned so agree

Make recommendations to the Service Secretaries via the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff concerning the capability, characteristics, design, and otherrequirements for mobility assets needed for USCINCTRANS' mission

Designate CONUS seaports of embarkation and debarkation for deploying /redeploying forces and sustainment during planning and execution; makerecommendations to the geographic combatant commanders for designation ofseaports outside CONUS that might be used in military operations

• Providing deliberate and crisis actionplanning support to USCINCTRANS toensure effective use of CONUScommon-user ocean terminals and otherCONUS transportation assets.

• Providing traffic management, CONUSsurface transportation, and CONUScommon-user ocean terminal support tosupported CINCs as directed byUSCINCTRANS.

II-5


• Recommending diversions of cargo andpassengers within the DefenseTransportation System (DTS).

• Evaluating cargo throughput capabilityof CONUS common-user oceanterminals to be used for unit deployment.

• As the single port manager for common-user water terminals worldwide, MTMCprovides those functions necessary tocontrol the strategic flow of cargo andinformation between SPOE andhand-off to the geographic combatantcommander. As port manager, MTMCassigns workloads to the port operatorbased on the CINC’s priorities. Someresponsibilities include operating theWorldwide Port System, contractingfor port services, and documentation.

• Providing freight traffic managementserv ices and obta in ing f re ighttransportation rates and services fromcommercial for hire transportationcompanies, including inland waterwayand coastal carriers. Providing routing,rates, and performance quality control.

• Providing ocean cargo booking forDO D components and ContractAdministrative Services for sealiftcargo for DOD components underauthority delegated by COMSC.

• The Transportation EngineeringAgency (TEA) serves as the Armytransportability agent and manages thatportion of the DOD Engineering forTransportability Program assigned to theArmy, to include land transportation,Army air, logistics over-the-shore(LOTS), and ocean terminals. The TEAconducts transportation and/or trafficengineering infrastructure systemcapability studies on highway and railnetworks and at installations and portsworldwide.

f. Military Sealift Command. MSCconsists of the headquarters, area commands,subarea commands, field offices, operationalcommands, and liaison offices. MSCfunctions include operating and maintainingMSC forces as directed and serving as theNavy administrative commander for MSCforces. MSC-specific sealift tasks, subjectto the direction and control ofUSTRANSCOM, are as follows:

• Providing deliberate and crisis actionplanning support to USTRANSCOM,ensuring effective use and control ofcommon-user sealift.

• Providing ocean transportation andsupport services to DOD components asrequired by USCINCTRANS.

• Ensuring effective use and control ofgovernment- and commercial-ownedocean transportation services for theDepartment of Defense.

• Informing USCINCTRANS and MTMCas to the availability of commercial andMSC controlled lift capability.

• Negotiating ocean and intermodal ratesand procuring ships and related servicesto meet DOD ocean and intermodaltransportation requirements.

• Recommending to USCINCTRANSactivation of the RRF ships and activationof the SRP.

• Preparing forecasts of ocean and maritimecommon-user transportation services basedon DOD component requirements.

• Acting as USCINCTRANS schedulingauthority for sealift support of DODrequirements.

• On behal f of USCINCTRANS,administrating and executing the SRP,

II-6

Chapter II

Joint Pub 4-01.2

exercising operational oversight of theRRF in concert with MaritimeAdministration (MARAD) and overships requisitioned, and exercisingmission control of those forces whentransferred to USCINCTRANS.

• Coordinating MSC operations withappropriate port authorities.

• Providing sealift for passengers ongovernment-owned and/or -controlled orcommercial ships as required.

• In coordination with USTRANSCOM,developing program and budgetsubmissions for strategic sealift systemrequirements.

• Performing missions and tasks asdirected by USCINCTRANS. KeepingUSCINCTRANS informed of Service-assigned missions and employment useof strategic sealift assets.

g. Maritime Administration. MARADis an agency within the Department ofTransportation (DOT), responsible forpromoting the development of a merchantmarine sufficient to meet the needs ofnational defense and the domestic and foreigncommerce of the United States. MARADfunctions include maintenance of ships inMARAD custody; administration ofsubsidy programs and other financial aidsto shipping; maritime research and development;and training of merchant marine officers.

FAST SEALIFT SHIPS

The Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) performed particularly well [during DESERTSHIELD and DESERT STORM] in their part of the overall logistics effort, doingmore relative to their numbers than any other type of sealift asset. FSSs haveboth RO/RO and limited container capabilities and are a rapid and versatiletransportation means for unit equipment. They have a larger capacity thanbreakbulk ships and require less time to load and unload. However, there areonly eight FSS ships, thus availability was limited. Unfortunately, one FSS,the Antares , failed off the East coast of the United States with a considerableamount of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) equipment aboard. Theship was towed to Spain. Some of the cargo was airlifted to Saudi Arabia butmost had to be unloaded and reloaded aboard another FSS returning from herinitial voyage. This cargo arrived about three weeks later than planned. (Beforethe war, the Antares had been scheduled for major overhaul, but this wasdelayed. Thus a degree of risk was accepted in the decision to use Antares tospeed the deployment.)

The FSS size and speed allowed the remaining seven ships to deliver morethan 13 percent of the total cargo of the unit equipment. FSS carried the 90,000short tons of equipment for the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at averagespeeds of 27 knots. Although normally on 96-hour standby, the first FSS wasready to deploy in 48 hours. The typical FSS load included more than 700Army vehicles such as M-1 tanks, M-2 fighting vehicles, and fuel trucks. Bycomparison, 116 World War II Liberty Ships would have been required to movethe same tonnage in the same period.


II-7


MARAD also functions as the NationalShipping Authority (NSA) of the UnitedStates, the emergency shipping operationsagency tasked to acquire and managemerchant shipping for government servicein time o f war or in defense-relatedemergencies. In peacetime, MARADprovides ship inventory and characteristicsinformation as well as estimates of shipforecasts for use in DOD planning. In turn,the Department of Defense provides MARADwith information on defense shippingrequirements. In a contingency, theDepartment of Defense advises MARAD oftime-phased requirements for ships by type.MARAD provides the Department of Defensewith the required ships by activation ofreserve vessels and through variousgovernment programs, including theVoluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA) andrequisitioning. In a North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) crisis, MARADwould be responsible for obtaining theNATO ships committed under the NATOReinforcement Shipping Agreement.

h. Joint Transportation Board (JTB).The JTB is composed of the Vice Directorsof the Joint Staff (J-3, J-4, J-5, and J-7) andeach Service’s Director of Transportation.The JTB is responsible to the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff for seeing thatcommon-user transportation resourcesassigned or available to the Department ofDefense are allocated to achieve the maximumbenefit in meeting DOD objectives.Specifically, the JTB will adjudicate betweensupported CINCs when disputes over movementpriorities arise that are beyondUSCINCTRANS’ ability to resolve.

i. Supported CINCs. The supportedCINC is the commander having primary

responsibility for all aspects of a taskassigned by the Joint Strategic CapabilitiesPlan (JSCP) or other joint operation planningauthority. In the context of joint operationplanning, this term refers to the commanderwho prepares operation plans (OPLANs),campaign plans, or operation orders(OPORDs) in response to the requirementsof the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Subordinate component commandersdetermine their specific force, supply, andpersonnel requirements that are then time-phased for pickup at ports of embarkation(POE) and delivered to ports of debarkation(POD). To ensure that USTRANSCOM andMSC can provide required sealift support ina timely manner, the supported CINC shouldensure that all passengers and cargo offeredfor movement are properly forecasted,documented, and prepared in accordancewith Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System, Vol I:(Planning Policies and Procedures),” andDOD Directive 4500.32R, “MilitaryStandard Transportation and MovementProcedures.”

j. Coast Guard. The US Coast Guard(USCG), an agency of DOT, is a MilitaryService with law enforcement authority. InCONUS, the USCG is responsible forassuring the safety and security of US portsand waterways and provides the followingservices: enforcing vessel cargo andwaterfront facility regulations; inspectingvessels, including vessels of the RRF;licensing of mariners; enforcing customs laws;establishing and servicing aids to navigation;regulating and administering bridges overnavigable waterways; port emergencyresponse; search and rescue; and operationof vessel traffic services in selected ports andestablishing safety and security zones.

II-8

Chapter II

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIIPLANNING

III-1

transformed into an OPORD for execution.Crisis action planning produces an executableOPORD directly and much faster, but maylack some of the details. Solving the strategictransportation problem is a four-stepprocess, as shown in Figure III-1. The foursteps are: (1) to determine the cargo andsustainment movement requirement; (2) tostate the requirement in the appropriate unitsof measure; (3) to simulate the deploymentusing available forces; and (4) to confirm thatthe plan is transportation feasible. Theplanning process for both deliberate and crisisaction planning is more fully describedin the Joint Pub 5-03 series on the JointOperation Planning and Execution System(JOPES).

2. Sealift Asset Planning

CJCSI 3110.11, “Annex J, JSCP, Mobility,”presents information and guidance on sealiftassets for two nearly simultaneous majorreg iona l con t ingenc ies and the i rcapab i l i t y to support t ime-phasedtransportation requirements. Shipping isdivided into two broad categories: common-user and noncommon-user. Common-userassets are available for joint support of allServices’ movement requirements.Noncommon-user vessels are reserved forspecific purposes and not generally availableto transport joint movement requirements.Planning for ships designated as Navy CombatLogistics Force as well as other sealiftplanning factors are covered in the JSCPMobility Supplement.

“Much of the difficulties and past inefficiency of our national transportation inwartime can be traced to: (1) A lack of understanding on the part oftransportation authorities of the problem of command; and (2) A lack ofunderstanding on the part of command as to the problems of transportation.”

Henry E. EcclesLogistics in the National Defense

1. General

The actual or contemplated use of sealiftassets during a crisis or conflict and the periodleading up to that stage involves significantoperational considerations, each of whichmust be the subject of detailed planning.Operational considerations lead to a greatmany combinations of ships that may beconsidered for prompt delivery of unitequipment and other cargo to theirdestinations. Numerous factors enter into thedetermination of which combination, fromseveral possible combinations of vessels,can deliver the total movement requirementin the shortest time period. The amount oftime available significantly influences theplanning process. Deliberate planning is theprocess used when time permits the totalparticipation of the commanders andstaffs of the Joint Planning and ExecutionCommunity (JPEC). The development of theplan, coordination among supportingcommanders, reviews by the Joint Staff, andcommunications between the members of theJPEC take many months. Crisis actionplanning is conducted during crisis and usesprocedures described in Joint Pub 5-03.1,“Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem Vol I: (Planning Policies andProcedures).” The overall process of crisisaction planning parallels that of deliberateplanning, but it is a more flexible system thatresponds to the demands of changing events.Deliberate planning is designed to produce adetailed OPLAN, or operation plan in conceptformat (CONPLAN), which is easily

III-2

Chapter III

Joint Pub 4-01.2

IDENTIFY THETOTAL MOVEMENTREQUIREMENTS

DESCRIBE THEM INLOGISTICS TERMS

SIMULATE THESTRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT

STRATEGIC TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM

OPLAN

TPFDD

TO PRODUCE ATRANSPORTATIONFEASIBLE OPLAN

USINGCOMMON-USERLIFT

SHORT TONS

SQUARE FEET

CUBIC FEET /M TONS

OPLAN

TPFDD

Figure III-1. Strategic Transportation Problem

3. Other Considerations

As mentioned in Chapter II, “Organizationand Responsibilities,” MSC and MTMCinterface in the area of water terminaloperations. It is also important to note thatUSTRANSCOM will determine the POE

in CONUS. Selection will be based onvarious factors of which the maximization ofthe arrival and marshalling and movement ofdeploying forces through a water terminalcomplex will be prime considerations. Otherfactors include Service requirements andproximity of networks to the ports.

CHAPTER IVSEALIFT ASSETS

IV-1

1. General

Sealift forces are those militarily usefulmerchant-type ships available to theDepartment of Defense to execute the sealiftrequirements of the national military strategyacross the range of military operations. Called“common-user shipping,” these ships will beengaged in the transportation of cargoes fortwo or more Services from one seaport toanother or to a location at sea in the theaterof operations pending a decision to move thecargo embarked ashore. The sealift force iscomposed of shipping from some or all of thefollowing sources, depending on the DODsealift requirement at that specific time: (1)active government-owned or controlledshipping; (2) government-owned reserve orinactive shipping; (3) US privately owned andoperated commercial shipping; (4) USprivately owned, foreign flag commercialshipping; and (5) foreign owned and operatedcommercial shipping. The precise nature ofeach type of shipping and how it is acquiredfor DOD use is discussed in Chapter V,“Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programsand Procedures.” This chapter will describethose ships and ship characteristics that aremost useful for DOD missions, discuss theadvantages and disadvantages of commonmerchant ship types for military operations,and provide a general overview of DOD sealiftship and sealift support programs.

2. Ship Types

Sealift shipping falls into three broadcategories: dry cargo ships or freighters,liquid cargo carriers or tankers, andpassenger ships. During joint operations, drycargo ships transport the equipment andsupplies required to conduct and sustain theoperation; tankers carry the refined petroleum,oils, and lubricants (POL) so critical to anoperation’s success; and passenger shipsprovide troop carrying (strategic or assaultfollow-on echelon [AFOE]) capability andnoncombatant or sealift medical evacuationcapability.

a. Dry Cargo Ships. In general, a drycargo ship is considered to be usable formilitary purposes if it has a minimum carryingcapability of 2,000 long tons (LT) of cargoand the ability to carry, without significantmodification, unit equipment, ammunition orsustaining supplies. The major types of drycargo ships are listed in Figure IV-1 anddescribed below.

• Breakbulk. The term “breakbulk ships”refers to ships characterized by large openhatches and fitted with boom-and-winchgear or deck cranes. They are primarilyused at ports which, either because of lowcargo volumes or local economic factors,lack the modern facilities and inland rail/

“The Liner, she’s a lady, and if a war should come,The Man-o-War’s ‘er ‘usband, and ‘e’d bid ‘er stay at ‘ome;But, oh, the cargo-boats that fill with every tide!‘E’d ‘ave to up an’ fight for them for they are England’s pride.”

Rudyard KiplingThe Liner She’ s a Lady, 1895

IV-2

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-01.2

highway connections required to supportefficient containership operations. Incompetition with containerships,breakbulk ships are no longercommercially viable. Fewer of theseships are being built each year, and nonehas been built for US flag owners inrecent years. The military advantagesof general cargo or breakbulk shipsinclude flexibility in the load compositionafforded by open decks and multiple

cargo holds and the ability to dischargecargo without the use of port facilities.Their military disadvantages includetime-consuming cargo operations and therequirement for large numbers of trainedpersonnel to load and unload.

• Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships. A RO/RO shipis specifically designed to carrywheeled and tracked vehicles as all ormost of its cargo. Vehicles are driven ortowed on and off the ship by means ofeither the ship’s own ramps orshore-based ramps. Because it isdesigned to accommodate cargoes whichcannot be stacked but which vary inheight, below-deck space and volumeutilization is generally less efficient thanon a containership. RO/RO ships are thuscommercially viable only in certainspecialized trades. However, the RO/ROis the preferred ship type fordeployment of military unit equipment.The military advantages of RO/ROships include the capability for rapidloading and discharge of military vehiclesand non-self-deployable aircraft, andopen deck areas well suited to thecarriage of outsized military cargo. Theirmilitary disadvantages include their

Figure IV-1. Types of Dry Cargo Ships

TYPES OF DRYCARGO SHIPS

Breakbulk

Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships

Containerships

Barge ShipsLighter Aboard ShipSeabarge

Dry Bulk Carriers

General cargo and breakbulk ships, while dated in terms of cargo loading andunloading operations, are militarily useful because of great flexibility and thecapability to operate effectively through austere ports.

IV-3

Sealift Assets

Roll-on/Roll-off ships, such as the Cape Wrath, are the preferred shiptype for military deployments.

relative unsuitability for carriage ofsustaining supplies and ammunition (incomparison with general cargo andcontainerships) and their limited availability,because their market sector is muchreduced compared with containerships.

• Containerships. Containerships arespecifically designed to carry all oftheir cargo in standard ocean shippingcontainers, which are loaded intovertical “cells” below deck and stackedand lashed on deck. They rely onshore-based cranes or Auxiliary CraneShips for cargo loading and discharge.Standard ocean shipping containers areweatherproof, made of steel or similarmaterial, constructed to withstand thehigh forces to which they may besubjected in heavy seas, and usuallydesigned and sized to permit theirefficient interchange for connectingwith intermodal systems for inlandrail or highway movement. Shippingcontainers are available in a variety ofconfigurations that include end opening,side opening, half heights, open top,flatrack, refrigerated, liquid bulk (tank),and modular (quadcon/tricon). Exceptin highly specialized trades, cargo

containers generally conform to USand international standards that havebeen developed by the AmericanNational Standards Institute and theInternat ional Organizat ion forStandardization (ISO) respectively. Thesize standards for outer dimensions ofshipping containers are 20' or 40' length,8' width, and 8' or 8'6" in height. Toincrease revenues, “high cube”containers with heights of 9'6" have comeinto common use. Fortunately, mostcontainerships can carry containers ofmixed heights without significantdifficulty. Depending on cargo density,a standard 20' container can carry up to15-20 short tons (STs) or 29 measurementtons (MT) (MT of 40 cubic feet) of cargo.Containerships generally carry a mix of20' and 40' containers, and some are fittedfor deck stowage of 45' and 48' lengths.Containership capacity is normallyexpressed in Twenty-foot EquivalentUnits (TEU), which is defined as thenumber of 20' x 8' x 8'6" containers itcan carry; or, similarly, in Forty- footEquivalent Uni ts . Containershipsvary considerably in size. Some ofthose serving major ports have capacitiesexceeding 5,000 TEU. Some recently

IV-4

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-01.2

• Barge Ships. Barge ships are designedto carry specially designed barges(lighters) or a combination of suchbarges and containers. Thus, they arenecessarily large ships with a large heavylift capability. Their design was intendedto combine the flexibility andself-sustained cargo handling capabilityof the general cargo ship with the rapidport turnaround time of the RO/RO andcontainership. This combination,however, has not proved commerciallyviable in most trades.

•• Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH). TheLASH is a single-decked vessel withlarge hatches, wing tank arrangements,and a clear access to the stern. The LASHhas a gantry crane with a cargo handlingcapacity of approximately 450 LT. Thefunction of this crane is to convey barges orlighterage from the stowed location aboardthe ship to the stern region and to lower thebarges or lighterage into the water. SomeLASH ships are equipped with containergantry cranes for the handling of theonboard complement of containers.Different classes of LASH ships have

built for feeder service (i.e., serving smalloutports from a major port) havecapacities of 400 TEU or less. Themilitary advantages of containershipsinclude their large cargo capacity,excellent suitability for carriage ofsustaining supplies and ammunition,rapid and efficient cargo operations,and the high likelihood of theiravailability due to the large numbers ofcontainerships in the world. Movementsby containers also provide greaterdegrees of cargo security, reduceinstances of pilferage and damage tocargo, reduce cargo handling costs,and result in faster more efficientdeliveries. Their military disadvantagesinclude near total dependence onspecialized shoreside equipment forcargo loading and discharge, and generalunsuitability for carriage of large vehiclesand oversized cargo unless modified toutilize heavy duty flatracks. Furtherinformation on intermodal use isavailable in Joint Pub 4-01.7, “JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forUse of Intermodal Containers in JointOperations.”

The LASH, Green Harbour, is part of the Afloat Pre-positioning Force and isdesignated for Army PREPO.

IV-5

Sealift Assets

capacities ranging from 64 to 89 bargesor a mixture of LASH barges and militarylighterage.

•• SEABARGE (SEABEE). TheSEABEE is arranged much differentlyfrom the LASH in that it has three deckson which the cargo barges or containerflats are stowed. Barges are brought toeach deck level by a stern elevator andare moved internally within the ship bythe Transporter (conveyor) System. Twobarges can be loaded or discharged in acycle of about 40 minutes. SEABEEbarge ships can carry up to 38 sea barges(97'6" long x 35' wide x 16'11" high). Theelevator capacity is 2,000 LT. TheSEABEE ship is the preferred ship totransport landing craft, utility, and lighter,amphibious resupply, cargo 60 ton. Themilitary advantages of barge carriersinclude their suitability to carry either unitequipment, sustaining supplies, orammunition; the abil ity to carryamphibious lighterage; and the capabilityto preload the barges before ship arrivaland to discharge cargo from the bargesat relatively austere port facilities, afterthe ship has sailed. Their militarydisadvantages include a completedependence on a single, very complicated

The LASH vessel is part of the Air Force PREPO force at Diego Garcia.

mechanical system for barge discharge;the barge’s dependence, once afloat,upon the availability of towage; and theoverall unsuitability of the barges fortowing outside harbors or otherprotected waters.

• Dry Bulk Carriers. Dry bulk carriersare designed to carry grain or similarcargoes in bulk (i.e., material that canbe dumped, sucked, pumped, or blown).Loading and discharge are normallyperformed at specialized terminals,using cargo handling systems that aredesigned for specific commodities.Gravity is often used for loading; thevarious discharge methods include theuse of pneumatic systems, conveyors,and excavation-type machinery. Mostdry bulk carriers are not considered tobe militarily useful. However, some arefitted with deck cranes so that, in somecases, their characteristics are similar tothose of a general cargo ship.

b. Liquid Cargo Carriers. Liquid cargoships, or tankers, are specifically designedto transport liquid cargoes in bulk.Although tankers differ greatly in size,their cargo handling equipment is similar.Specific features of the cargo handling

IV-6

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-01.2

equipment differ, however, based on theintended cargo. These differences may limitthe capability of the ship to carry cargo otherthan that for which it was designed. Tankercapacities are stated in terms of cargodeadweight (DWT) or barrels (BBL). DWTis measured in LT of 2,240 pounds and 1 BBLequals 42 US gallons. The parameters thatdefine a militarily useful tanker are thecapability of carrying POL, a capacity withinthe range of 2,000 to 100,000 DWT, and asustained speed in excess of 12 knots.Tankers are classed by size and type ofcargo. The major types of liquid cargocarriers are listed in Figure IV-2 anddescribed below. In general, smaller tankerscarry “clean” cargoes (refined products, suchas gasoline, diesel fuel, or jet fuel). Large

tankers generally carry “dirty” (black oil orcrude oil) cargoes. A tanker carrying dirtycargoes will require about 2 weeks of manuallabor to clean its tanks and piping beforecarrying clean cargo.

• Handy Size Tankers. The handy sizetanker (6,000 to 35,000 cargo DWT, orapproximately 48,000 to 280,000BBLs) is the most militarily useful .These generally carry clean or refinedproducts, although some may carryblack oil, chemicals and, occasionally,bulk grain. The term “handy sizetanker equivalent,” refers to a tankerof 200,000 BBL or approximately25,000 DWT. The military advantagesof handy size tankers include theirability to enter most of the world’stanker ports, the relatively short timerequired for tank cleaning whenrequired, and their overall flexibilitywith regard to the numbers of differentcargoes they can carry. Their militarydisadvantages include the comparativelysmall capacity and limited availabilityin the commercial market.

• Medium Size Tankers. The mediumsize tanker ranges in capacity from35,000 to 100,000 DWT (or approximately280,000 to 800,000 BBLs). As a general

The Oiler Guadalupe is a Henry J. Kaiser class replenishment oiler.

TYPES OF LIQUIDCARGO CARRIERS

Handy Size Tankers

Medium Size Tankers

Large Crude Carriers

Figure IV-2. Types of Liquid Cargo Carriers

IV-7

Sealift Assets

rule, those under 60,000 DWT cancarry “clean” cargoes while thoseover 80,000 DWT wil l , almostexclusively, carry crude oil or other“d i r ty” cargoes. The mi l i taryadvantages of medium size tankersare that they are more readily availablethan handy size tankers and are capableof delivering large quantities of POL.Their military disadvantage is that it isdifficult and time consuming (1-2 weeks)to clean the tanks and piping of tankersthat have been transporting either crudeoil or other “dirty” cargoes, so that theycan be used to transport refined POLproducts.

• Large Crude Carriers. Large crudecarriers are the largest tanker classand are solely dedicated to thetransportation of crude oil. Very LargeCrude Carriers range in capacity from100,000 to 400,000 DWT, while UltraLarge Crude Carriers have even greatercapacities. None of these ships areconsidered militarily useful.

c. Troop/Passenger Ships. Althoughgovernment-owned ready reserve troop shipsare specifically designed to transport troopsfor combat missions, the mission has changedsignificantly. Troops are generally airliftedto safe landing areas in locale of combat.Troop ships are used for movement ofmilitary troops to and from combat and safeareas where troops embark or debark militaryand commercial aircraft; passenger ships alsoserve for rest and recreation for troopsduring long periods of combat; these shipsare generally foreign flag privately ownedpassenger vessels equipped with amenities notavailable in the traditional troop ship. Readyreserve troop ships are generally convertedstate marit ime academy trainingvessels that have been enhanced to enablethe transport of troops for combat missions.These ships have limited cargo space; theycarry between 480 to 800 troops. When the

number of troops increases, the use of foldingcanvas cots, and berthing on deck and indesignated holds is required. Commercialprivately owned US and foreign flagpassenger ships are traditional cruise orconverted ferry vessels equipped with thenecessary comforts; vessel capacityvarying with the capability for messingand berthing.

3. Sealift Ship Programs

The conventional sealift assets discussedabove cannot meet all strategic sealift andsealift-related requirements alone. Theserequirements include the rapid deployment ofheavy Army combat units and Marine Corpsforces, containership discharge where portfacilities are damaged or nonexistent,expeditionary aviation maintenance support,state-of-the-art medical care for expeditionaryforces, and PREPO of combat and supportequipment and supplies. To meet these

Figure IV-3. Sealift Ship Programs

SEALIFT SHIPPROGRAMS

Fast Sealift Ship

Auxiliary Crane Ship

Heavy Lift Ship

Aviation Logistics SupportShips

Hospital Ship

Afloat PREPO Force

Maritime PREPO Ships

Afloat PREPO Ships

IV-8

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-01.2

The fleet of eight fast sealift ships (T-AKR Algor shown) is capable of liftingover 90 percent of a Mechanized Division.

requirements, various Sealift ShipPrograms have been established as shownin Figure IV-3 and described below.

a. Fast Sealift Ship. The FSSs areformer containerships, purchased by theNavy and conver ted to a RO/ROconfiguration. The present eight shipshave a joint, one-time lift capability ofapproximately 1.3 million sq ft . and alsohave a container capability. They arecapable of a sustained speed in excess of30 knots. The FSSs are berthed at

CONUS East and Gulf Coast ports ina 4-day Reduced Operational Status(ROS), each maintained by a crew of 18.

b. Auxiliary Crane Ship (ACS). ACSsare converted containerships on whichtwo or three twin-boom revolvingheavy-lift cranes have been mounted.These cranes are able to offloadcontainerships and provide a heavy liftcapability in locations where port facilitiesare nonexistent, inadequate, or damaged.ACS are capable of handling lifts up to 110

The Keystone State is the oldest of the RRF Auxiliary Craneships (ACS).

IV-9

Sealift Assets

LT, containers of all sizes, and wheeled andtracked vehicles. In addition to this uniqueoffload capability, each ACS is able to carrybetween 200 and 500 containers, seasheds,and/or flatracks (depending onconfiguration), and its main deck is alsooutfitted to carry amphibious lighterage.The ACS are part of the RRF, which ismaintained by MARAD, and are berthedon all three CONUS seacoasts.

c. Heavy Lift Ships. These specializedvessels, also known as Float-on/Float-off(FLO/FLO) or semisubmersible ships,provide the capability to load, transportand offload outsized military cargoindependent of port equipment traditionallyused for handling large or extremely heavycargo, such as tug boats, barges, landing craft,floating cranes, and single anchor leg mooringsystems. Lifts range from approximately 50to as much as 45,000 tons. These ships aredesigned to take on ballast water in floodabletanks that partially submerges the vessel.Cargo is then floated over the submergedportion of the vessel which then deballasts andsurfaces under the cargo. After the vessel isfull afloat, the cargo is secured for transport.One FLO/FLO ship is currently assigned to

the PREPO Force carrying Army lighterageand terminal service support equipment.Heavy lift ships are commercial vessels, undercontract, with unique characteristics thatprovide military usefulness. Another isplanned in the future.

d. Aviation Logistics Support Ships(T-AVBs). There are two T-AVBs thatprovide dedicated and rapid sealift forcritical movement of the Marine Corpsaviation sustainment forces of the Marineair-ground task force aviation combatelement (MAGTF ACE). The T-AVBs areoperationally controlled by MSC andmaintained in ROS-5 status byMARAD. There is one T-AVB berthedon the East and West coasts of CONUS. Theaviation sustainment forces deploy and workin standard 8x8x20 ISO containers calledmobile facilities (MF). The MFs provide thenecessary work space for personnel, supportequipment, technical publications, andspecial tools authorized in individualcontingency support packages defined underthe Marine aviation logistic support program.The T-AVB can be deployed in threemodes of operation: support, transport,and combination. In the support mode,

The heavy lift ship American Cormorant uses Float-on/Float-off capability tohandle oversized military cargo.

IV-10

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Ships). A LMSR differs from most otherRO/RO ships in that it is faster and larger.By design, a LMSR is capable of sustaininga transit speed of at least 24 knots. LMSRwill be PANAMAX ships (950' length, 105'beam, 34-35' draft), with two to three timesthe stowage capacity of the average RO/RO.The LMSR ship type is being built orconverted specifically for military use. Thereare currently no commercial equivalents.

g. Afloat Pre-positioning Force (APF).Afloat PREPO combines two elements of thestrategic mobility triad, PREPO and sealift.This program, which involves the forwarddeploying of equipment and supplies aboardships, improves sealift response time in acrisis while adding flexibility and securityto pre-positioned ships. These ships arechartered commercial vessels or activatedRRF vessels. Some of these ships have usefulfeatures that the owners provided to enhancetheir value to the military, but they are not aspecific ship type. The APF consists of themaritime pre-positioning ships (MPS) andafloat pre-positioning ships (APS).

• Maritime Pre-positioning Ships.Maritime PREPO is a strategicdeployment option that quickly

approximately 340 MFs and 325 US MarineCorps (USMC) personnel can be embarkedto provide selected seabased support for theMAGTF ACE while loaded aboard ships. Inthe transport mode, approximately 680 MFsand minimum USMC personnel can beembarked to provide maximum landbasedsupport for the MAGTF ACE when offloadedashore. In the combination mode, a tailoredmix of MFs and USMC personnel can beloaded aboard the T-AVB to optimize theseabased and landbased support for theMAGTF ACE.

e. Hospital Ship (T-AH). The T-AHs areconverted tankers equipped with 12operating rooms and 1,000 patient beds. Thetwo T-AHs in the Navy ship inventory areberthed on the East and West Coasts andmaintained in a 5-day ROS by an average crewof 13 civilian and 43 military personnel. Theships are operated by MSC. The US Navy,Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery,provides manning for the hospital facilities.

f. Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships. A LMSR is similar to any otherRO/RO ship in that it is specifically designedto carry wheeled and tracked vehicles as allor most of its cargo (see Roll-On/Roll-Off

Hospital ships enable medical facilities to be positioned in or near the jointforce area of operations.

IV-11

Sealift Assets

MPS forward-deploy MAGTF equipment and supplies.

The Buffalo Soldier, a reflagged French cargo ship, carries Air ForcePREPO equipment.

combines the substantial PREPOequipment and supplies loaded aboardthe ships of an MPS Squadron with aMaritime air-ground task force(MAGTF) to establish a formidablecombined arms force cable of sustainedoperations. The MAGTF and NavySupport Element (NSE) personnel,selected equipment, and combat aircraftare flown into the objective area wherethe MPS operations occur. The 13 MPSare specifically constructed ormodified RO/RO ships that areforward-deployed in three self-

contained squadrons. Each squadroncarries the unit equipment and 30 daysof supplies for one brigade-size MAGTF.Each ship carries a spread load of unitequipment, supplies, POL, and potablewater. Additionally, each ship isoutfitted with NSE equipmentconsisting of the camp support andlighterage needed to discharge cargoover unimproved ports or over the beach.MPS Squadron 1 (four ships) ispositioned in the Mediterranean; MPSSquadron 2 (five ships) is positionedin the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia);

IV-12

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-01.2

equipment and sustaining supplies, anda Navy fleet hospital. The tankers carryPOL for all Services and may carrypotable water when required. All shipsare capable of self-discharge in theobjective area. The Army has developeda comprehensive program of PREPO,both ashore and afloat, in responseto the Congressionally MandatedMobility Requirements Study and theArmy Strategic Mobility Program.Crucial to this concept has been theafloat PREPO of 2x2 brigade sets ofcombat equipment with a full slice ofcombat service support (CSS) and thesustainment to support three divisionsfor 30 days. This force is basically self-supportive, with the port opening andmaterials handling equipment necessaryto run austere ports or limited jointlogistics over-the-shore (JLOTS). TheArmy War Reserve-3 was initiated inFY 1994 and included seven RO/ROsfrom the RRF, one ACS, three LASHships, one Heavy Lift PREPO Ship,

and MPS Squadron 3 (four ships) ispositioned in the Western Pacific (Guamand Saipan). MPS cargo may bedischarged pierside or “in stream” byNSE personnel composed of Navy BeachGroup and Cargo Handling Battalionpersonnel, as well as Marine Corpspersonnel airlifted to the objective area.

• Afloat Pre-positioning Ships. The APS(also called PREPO ships) are government-owned and commercially charteredships on which pre-positioned militaryequipment and munitions and/orsupplies are stored to meet rapiddeployment requirements of variousServices. These ships are forward-deployed with heavy combat equipment,combat support equipment, andsustainment to support the airlift ofpersonnel and initial increments of lightcombat forces. The APS includes drycargo ships and tankers. The dry cargoships carry Army and Air Forceammunition, Army combat support

AFLOAT PRE-POSITIONING SHIPS

During the 1980s, the Army established afloat pre-positioning of equipmentin support of Southwest Asia. These ships are referred to as Afloat Pre-positioning Ships (APS) and, when the [Persian Gulf] war started, consistedof 12 ships (eight dry cargo and four tanker). Two tankers were already beingused in a fleet support role. These vessels were located at Diego Garcia, andone ship was in the Mediterranean. This program involved storage of cargoon four Army APS, which would be strategically positioned and could bemoved to support CENTCOM contingencies carrying equipment, fuel, andsupplies for the Army.

During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, these ships sailedfrom forward bases in Diego Garcia to the Middle East, and the first APS arrivedin Saudi Arabia on 17 August. The war reserve cargo on board these shipsincluded subsistence, general supplies and equipment, packaged fuel,construction and barrier material, ammunition, and medical supplies. Onesemisubmersible heavy lift vessel carried port operating equipment (e.g.,tugboats, floating cranes, utility landing craft, rough terrain forklifts, containers,and support parts). These ships proved to be indispensable during theoperation’s first days providing a readily available source of supplies.


IV-13

Sealift Assets

flap to form a flush, temporary deckwhen the flatracks are placed side byside. This temporary deck arrangementenables more than one flatrack at a timeto be stowed on, provides the capabilityto drive from one flatrack to the next, orallows a single item of cargo to occupyseveral adjacent f latracks. Forexample, three adjacent flatracks canaccommodate two M-1 tanks. Whentiered, at least one flatrack must beremoved from an upper level to provideaccess to cargo on the next lower level.Currently, heavy duty flatracks are pre-positioned at Bayonne, NJ; Charleston,SC; and Port Hueneme, CA.

• LASH Lift Beam. The LASH LiftBeam, also known as the Cantilever LiftFrame, is a special lifting device thatattaches to a LASH’s gantry crane. Itenables the crane to lift loads withdimensions up to about 90' x 60' andweights up to 200 STs without shipmodification. When equipped with thislift beam, LASH vessels are ideally suitedto handle amphibious lighterage, and cancarry up to 30 90' lighterage sections.

b. Operational Enhancements. Operationalenhancements are equipment and systems thatenable merchant ships to operate with, andprovide logistic support to, Navy warships andsupport units. These features includecommunications equipment operated byembarked military personnel, which providesthe capability for classified message traffic,and Merchant Ship Naval AugmentationProgram enhancements for underwayreplenishment (UNREP). The UNREPsystems are discussed more fully in AppendixA, “Merchant Ship Naval AugmentationProgram.”

c. Survivabi l i ty Enhancements.Survivability enhancements include internalcommunications and nuclear, biological, andchemical washdown systems.

and two container ships. Currently, theships are under the administrativecontrol of the MPS SquadronCommanders.

4. Sealift EnhancementFeatures

Sealift enhancement features (SEFs) consistof special equipment and modificationsthat adapt merchant-type dry cargo shipsand tankers to specific military missions.They are typically installed on ships of theRRF or on ships under MSC control. TheSEFs fall into three categories: productivity,operational, and survivability enhancements.

a. Productivity Enhancements. Anumber of productivity enhancementsexpand the capabilities of merchant shipsto carry military cargoes. Examples includeheavy duty flatracks, LASH lift beams,alongside refueling systems, the installationof 20' container hardpoints in 40' containercells, and installation of vehicle tie-downs(D-rings and cloverleafs) on deck. Otherproductivity enhancements provide thenecessary interfaces with ship-to-shore cargohandling systems. Examples include maindeck fittings and rails for the transport ofamphibious lighterage and alongside lightermooring systems.

• Flatracks. Heavy duty flatracks alsoprovide a capability to carry oversizedcargo and maximize containerships’capability to transport military cargo .Flatracks are portable open-top, opensided containers that provide thecapability to stow aircraft, vehicles, andoutsized breakbulk cargo that cannot beplaced into containers. There are threetypes of flatracks (type I, II, and III).Refer to FC 55-50 for specificdimensions and weight capabilities ofeach flatrack type. Flatracks may beused as individual units or combinedhorizontally with an integral folding

IV-14

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-01.2

5. Logistics Over-The-Shore

Strategic sealift also includes therequirement to achieve an over-the-shorecargo discharge capability that matchescargo deliveries in an amphibious objectivearea or other expeditionary operatingarea. This is known as LOTS. While logisticsupport of major joint forces requires theuse of established port facilities, LOTSoperations are intended to provideminimum sustainment to expeditionaryforces for not more than 60 days. LOTS

operations are conducted over unimprovedshorel ines or in ports that areinaccessible to deep draft shipping orthat are damaged or otherwise inadequate.By agreement among the Services, the Navyis responsible for ship-to-shore movementof Marine Corps cargo, and the Army isresponsible for ship-to-shore movementof Army and Air Force requirements.LOTS systems and doctrine are discussedin Joint Pub 4-01.6, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for JointLogistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).”

The American Osprey provides Offshore Petroleum Discharge Systemcapabilities during Logistics-Over-the-Shore operations.

CHAPTER VVESSEL ACQUISITION AND ACTIVATION

PROGRAMS AND PROCEDURES

V-1

1. General

The vast majority of vessels required tosupport military operations are not underDOD control during peacetime. To acquirethese ships, some type of lease agreementsor operating agreements must be effectedbetween the Department of Defense andthe owning and controlling organizations(either commercial firms or US and alliedgovernment agencies). In maritimeterminology, leasing agreements are knownas charters. Although their terms andconditions differ widely, charters are of threebasic types: bareboat, voyage, and time.A bareboat charter is a contract wherebythe charterer gets the rights and obligationsof “ownership.” The fixed duration of thistype of charter is generally for a number ofyears. The charterer pays in advance for theentire ship on a monthly or semiannual basiseven if the vessel is laid up or carries lessthan its full capacity. Under a bareboatcharter, the charterer assumes totalresponsibility for operating the ship,including manning, provisioning,maintenance, navigation, and logisticsupport. Under a voyage charter, thecharterer specifies type of vessel required,cargo to be loaded, and where the vessel is toload and discharge. The charterer pays foreither part or all of the carrying capacity ofthe vessel, usually in one payment. Theshipowner provides vessel, crew, fuel, stores,and commits the vessel to being capable ofmaking a given speed. A time charter is acontract for the service of the vessel, i.e., itscargo carrying ability, for an agreed period

of time. As with a bareboat charter, thecharterer pays for the entire carrying capacityof the vessel on a per-day rate, even if thevessel is laid up or carries less than its fullcapacity. Additionally, the chartererdetermines where the ship goes and what itcarries while paying for port charges and thevessel’s fuel. Time and voyage charters aremost commonly used to acquire sealiftshipping to meet short-term militaryrequirements. A significant amount ofmilitary cargo moves in the US flag linerships through liner agreements. MSCmoves the majority of peacetime militarycargo using commercial liner service.Military cargo is offered to carriers in lessthan full shipload lots, and moves alongestablished trade routes. This would includeoverseas movement of household goods andvehicles of US Government employees. Thesealift acquisition and activation decisionflow is detailed in Figure V-1.

2. Government-Owned/Controlled Assets

Shipping that is directly owned by thegovernment is the most readily availablesource of unit equipment sealift. However,the number of ships in this category islimited, and they are expected to support onlythe very early stages of a major militarydeployment.

a. Active Assets. The active government-owned and controlled sealift forces are MSCcommon-user point-to-point shipping and theAPF. Common-user ships are owned by or

“We have at this moment to distinguish carefully between running an industryor a profession, and winning the war.”

Winston ChurchillMemorandum for First Sea Lord, 1939

V-2

Chapter V

Joint Pub 4-01.2

under long-term time charter to MSC andare employed in providing sealift to all DODagencies on a nondedicated basis. In a crisis,these ships may be immediately diverted to aSPOE to load deploying military cargo.However, MSC common-user shippinginvolved in peacetime sealift missions maybe distant from CONUS SPOEs and thus maynot be immediately available. The ships ofthe APF will execute their missions at the timeand place required by the JFC under whosecommand the specific ships have been placed.

b. Inactive Assets. Inactive or reservesealift assets consist of Navy-owned shipsmaintained by the Navy in ROS and shipsacquired and maintained by MARAD foruse in a contingency. The latter are known asthe RRF and its larger set, the NationalDefense Reserve Fleet (NDRF). With veryfew exceptions, title to RRF and other NDRFships is vested in MARAD’s parent

organization, the DOT. The exceptions arevessels owned by the Services that have beenplaced in MARAD custody at NDRF sites,but which the owning Service can unilaterallyactivate whenever required. The RRF is aquick-response subset of the NDRF but,because RRF activation procedures differfrom those for the NDRF, they will beconsidered separately.

• Reduced Operational Status. BecauseROS ships are maintained by cadre crewsin CONUS ports, they are the first sealiftshipping available in a crisis and areexpected to be ready to execute theirmission within 96-120 hours of theactivation order. These ships’ readiness,while measured in terms of hours, isexpressed in terms of days. For example,a ROS 3 ship is expected to be underway within 72 hours; a ROS 4 shipwithin 96 hours. The Department of

- OPLAN SpecificRRF - Ready Reserve ForceSRP - Sealift Readiness ProgramVISA - Volunteer Intermodal Sealift AgreementVTA - Volunteer Tanker Agreement

SEALIFT ACQUISITION AND ACTIVATION PLAN

CompareSealift Assets

on Hand toRequirements

RequirementsMet

How Can theRequirements

be Met?

Option 1 Option 2Request

SRP/VISAand/or

VTA Activation

RequestRequisitioning

Authority

RequestAllied

Shipping

CharterAdditional

Ships

RequestRRF

Activation

First Step Second Step Third Step Fourth Step**

*

Figure V-1. Sealift Acquisition and Activation Plan

V-3


Defense is not required to coordinatewith any other agency to orderactivation of DOD ROS ships. TheNavy-owned and maintained ROS shipsinclude the FSSs, T-AHs, and T-AVBs.

• Ready Reserve Force. The RRF is themost significant source of government-owned early deployment shipping interms of both the number of ships andoverall cargo-carrying capability. RRFships are maintained by MARAD invarious specified states of readiness.Most are berthed on the three CONUSsea coasts; there are five OffshorePetroleum Discharge System (OPDS)tankers of which two are activated as partof the APF with the other three in aninactive status in CONUS. There arethree small shallow draft T1 tankers inthe RRF that are maintained in a ROSstatus in Yokohama, Japan. These shipsare activated pursuant to presidentialaction or as otherwise authorized underlaw. The specific procedures arediscussed below.

•• Status. Currently, the RRF consistsof 94 ships, including general cargoships, RO/ROs, barge carriers, tankers,troop ships (currently used as maritimeacademy training ships), and StrategicSealift Ship Program ships. The lastcategory includes the ACS, dry cargoships, tankers outfitted for UNREP, andtankers outfitted with the OPDS.

•• Ship Acquisition. RRF ships areacquired and maintained by MARADusing funds appropriated from theDepartment of Defense for that purpose.

•• Activation Process. USTRANSCOM,with SecDef approval, requests theactivation of RRF ships by MARADfor contingency deployments. Uponactivation, the ships are committed toUSCINCTRANS and are under the

mission control of COMSC. TheSECNAV will request Service-unique ortheater-assigned ships. The ships aremanned, provisioned, operated, andmaintained by commercial shippingcompanies under agreements withMARAD. The activation process isshown in Figure V-2.

• National Defense Reserve Fleet. TheNDRF (excluding its quick-responsesubset, the RRF) contains older drycargo ships, tankers, troop transports,and other types of vessels (tugs andother such types) that are maintained inMARAD custody under minimalpreservation. Current planningconsiders NDRF vessels strategic sealiftresources suitable for use as replacementsfor combat losses, for sustainment, andfor economic support. Because of theirrelatively low level of readiness, NDRFships would require a minimum of 30 to120 days to activate. They are berthedat MARAD Reserve Fleet sites in theJames River (Ft. Eustis), VA; Beaumont,TX; and Suisun Bay (Vallejo), CA.

•• As of 29 February, 1996, the NDRFconsisted of 222 cargo ships (94 in theRRF, 73 dry cargo, 20 tankers, 11 troopships, and 24 military and other typevessels). Of the non-RRF cargo ships,nearly one-half are ready for scrapping.The NDRF size is expected to declinefurther as the disposal of older shipscontinues.

•• Activation Process. NDRF ships aremade available to the Department ofDefense whenever the Presidentproclaims that the security of the nationmakes it advisable or during any nationalemergency declared by proclamation ofthe President. A flow diagram of theactivation process is shown in FigureV-3.

V-4

Chapter V

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Yes

Yes

READY RESERVE FORCE ACTIVATIONPROCESS FOR CONTINGENCY DEPLOYMENTS

OF COMMON-USER SHIPS

NoMSC RequestsRRF Activation

No Action NecessaryForwards Request for

USTRANSCOM Evaluation

Forwards toSecDef

via CJCSUSTRANSCOM Reviewsand Approves Request

No

Yes

Forward Requestto MARAD

SecDef Reviewsand Approves

Request ?

RRF Ships Assignedto USTRANSCOM

and/or MSC

MARAD ActivatesRRF Ships CJCS

MARADMSCRRFSecDefUSTRANSCOM

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffMaritime AdministrationMilitary Sealift CommandReady Reserve ForceSecretary of DefenseUnited States Transportation Command

Charter EnoughShips in Time?

SealiftRequirement

No

Figure V-2. Ready Reserve Force Activation Process for ContingencyDeployments of Common-User Ships

3. Commercial Assets

Commercial ships will be required to fillsealift requirements in virtually everymajor crisis situation. The Department ofDefense can obtain commercial shippingfrom the following sources: (1) US FlagCommercial Charters and Liner Service, (2)

Foreign Owned and Operated Ships, used inaccordance with existing laws and policies,(3) Ships/capacity committed to the SealiftReadiness Program/Voluntary TankerAgreement, (4) US-owned ships, registeredunder certain flags, known as the EffectiveUS Control (EUSC) fleet, (5) Militarily usefulUS flag ships which are subject to

V-5


NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEETACTIVATION / SHIP REQUISITION PROCESS

SealiftRequirement

Forwards to SecDefvia CJCS

SecDef Reviews /Approves ?

RequestsSECTRANSConcurrence

SECTRANSConcurs ?

SecDef / SECTRANSForward to President

MARAD Instructed toRequisition and / or

ActivateNDRF Ships

Ships Assigned toUSTRANSCOM / MSC

EnoughShips?

No ActionRequired

USTRANSCOMReviews /

Approves ?

MSC RequestsRequisitioning and / or

NDRF Activation

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No PresidentReviews /

Approves Request ?

CJCSMARADMSCNDRFSecDefSECTRANSUSTRANSCOM

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffMaritime AdministrationMilitary Sealift CommandNational Defense Reserve FleetSecretary of DefenseSecretary of TransportationUnited States Transportation Command

Figure V-3. National Defense Reserve Fleet Activation/Ship Requisition Process

V-6

Chapter V

Joint Pub 4-01.2

requisitioning. Registry proceduresbetween certain nations allow EUSC shipsunder the registries to be available to the USGovernment in a national emergency.Additionally, shipping may be obtainedthrough Allied Agreements.

a. US Flag Ships. The US flag fleet isgenerally considered to be the commercialshipping sector most responsive to DODrequirements. However, the number ofmilitarily useful US flag ships is steadilydeclining, with no reversal forecast.

• Status. Active, privately owned,oceangoing US flag ships numbered 292as of 1 January 1996, of which 207 weremilitarily useful compared to almost5,000 in 1945 and about 1,200 in 1950.

• DOD Acquisition Procedures. TheDepartment of Defense can acquire USflag shipping by four methods:commercial or open market charters,liner agreements for schedulescontainerized service, VTA and/orSRP/VISA, and requisitioning.

•• Commercial Charter. MSC frequentlycharters US and foreign flag ships duringpeacetime to provide additional sealiftcapacity. Chartering is a routinecommercial transaction that can beaccomplished in as little as two days.However, all chartered ships may not beimmediately available in time of crisis.Depending on ship location, the amountof time required to arrive at the designatedloading port may be as much as 30 days.

•• Sealift Readiness Program. TheSRP is a formal agreement, pursuantto the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,between US flag ships and theDepartment of Defense for theacquisition of ships. Commitments to thisprogram come from two sources. First,under Public Law any ship receiving a

federal subsidy must be enrolled in theSRP. Second, as a precondition foreligibility to participate in the movementof DOD cargo, 50 percent of the carrier’sfleet must be enrolled. Upon jointconcurrence between the Secretary ofDefense and the Secretary ofTransportation (SECTRANS) forprogram execution, the SRP ships aremade available to the Department ofDefense. The political and economicramifications of disrupting commercialshipping make it advisable that RRFships be in service, or under activationand committed to service, beforeactivation of the SRP. Any requirementto withdraw a substantial number ofships from commercial service in USdomestic and foreign trades couldseriously disrupt some sectors of thecivilian economy, negatively impactsome component of the nationalindustrial base, and/or cause a long-termloss of commercial market share by theaffected shipping companies. Theseconsiderations might lead the SECTRANSto recommend requisitioning authorityover activation of the SRP. The decisionflow for activation of the SRP is shown inFigure V-4.

•• Liner Agreements. A significantamount of military cargo moves in USflag liner ships. Liner operators arecommon carriers operating ships onscheduled sailings over establishedtrade routes. They provide service toall on a first-come, first-served basis.Military cargo offered by MSC to linercarriers usually is offered in less-than-fullshipload lots. This method helps sharespace with cargo shipped by privatesector business. Since the advent ofintermodal transportation, the mostcommon practice is for shipments froma variety of DOD sources to beconsolidated in containers under militaryauspices for delivery to commercial

V-7


Figure V-4. Sealift Readiness Program/Voluntary Tanker Agreement Activation Process

Ships Assigned toUSTRANSCOM / MSC

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffMaritime AdministrationMilitary Sealift CommandReady Reserve ForceSealift Readiness ProgramSecretary of DefenseSecretary of TransportationUnited States Transportation CommandVoluntary Tanker Agreement

CJCSMARADMSCRRFSRPSecDefSECTRANSUSTRANSCOMVTA

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

SEALIFT READINESS PROGRAM / VOLUNTARYTANKER AGREEMENT ACTIVATION PROCESS

Enough Chartered / RRFShips ?

MSC RequestsSRP / VTA

Implementation

No Action Necessary

USTRANSCOM Reviewsand Approves Request

Forwards toSecDef

via CJCS

SecDef Reviewsand

Approves ?

MSC RequestsRequisitioning

MSC / MARAD Implements SRP/ VTA

SECTRANSConcurs ?

SealiftRequirement

Forwards Requestto USTRANSCOM

USTRANSCOMCoordinateswith MARAD

Requests SECTRANSConcurrence

Yes

V-8

Chapter V

Joint Pub 4-01.2

terminals. There, the containers areloaded onto container ships and carriedunder terms and conditions set forth inan MSC container agreement orcontract. MSC agreements orcontracts contain uniform terms andconditions for carrying military cargobetween the United States and foreigncountries. Agreements or contracts arecompetitively solicited. Rates areproposed in response to Requests forProposals and are finalized bynegotiation between MSC and theinterested carriers.

•• Voluntary Intermodal ShippingAgreement (VISA). The objectiveof VISA is to provide theDepartment of Defense with assuredaccess to US flag assets, both vesselcapacity and intermodal systems,to meet DOD contingencyrequirements. VISA should eventuallyreplace the current SRP. This newconcept is modeled after the DODCivil Reserve Air Fleet program.Carriers will contractually commitspecified portions or capacities oftheir fleet to meet time-phased DODcontingency requirements.

•• Voluntary Tanker Agreement. TheVTA, established by MARAD, providesfor tanker owners to voluntarily maketheir vessels available to satisfy DODneeds. The VTA will be activated if theMaritime Administrator finds: (1) that atanker capacity emergency affects thenational defense; (2) that defenserequirements cannot be met bychartering; and (3) that defenserequirements can be met more efficientlyby activating the VTA than byrequisitioning ships. Tanker capacityprovided under the VTA is forpoint-to-point transport of militaryPOL. The agreement is designed to meetcontingency or war requirements, not to

deal with shortages of capacity inconnection with peacetime resupplyoperations. The decision flow foractivating the VTA is the same as thatshown in Figure V-4.

•• Requisitioning Shipping. Underauthority of Section 902(a) of theMerchant Marine Act of 1936, asamended, 46 USC 1242, theSECTRANS is authorized torequisition any vessel which ismajority owned by US citizens,whether registered under the US flag orforeign flag, whenever the Presidentproclaims that the security of the nationmakes it advisable or during any nationalemergency declared by proclamation ofthe President (and/or concurrentresolution of the Congress). Therequisitioning process is essentially thesame as that for activating the NDRF,shown in Figure V-3.

b. Effective US-Controlled Shipping.EUSC ships are majority owned by UScitizens or corporations, but are registeredand operated under the flags of theMarshal l Islands, Liberia, Panama,Honduras, the Bahamas, or othergovernments that will permit their ships tobe made available (by chartering or, ifnecessary, by requisitioning) to the USGovernment in time of emergency.

• Status. The EUSC fleet numbers over100 ships; but these are primarily tankersand dry bulk carriers and are almostentirely crewed by foreign nationals.

• DOD Acquisition Procedures. EUSCships may either be chartered commerciallyor requisitioned. The chartering andrequisitioning process is the same asthat for US flag ships. The samerequisitioning authority applies to allUS-owned ships registered under otherflags.

V-9


c. Foreign Flag Ships. As a general rule,foreign-owned and operated shipping willbe acquired through commercial charter.However, there are some shippingagreements with our allies. These include apool of approximately 600 ships, of which400 are counted on for planning, pursuant toan agreement among the NATO members.This agreement, however, is applicable onlyin a NATO conflict.

• Status of the World Fleet. The worldcommercial fleet totals over 23,000 shipswith a total DWT in excess of655,000,000 tons. Six of a total of 139countries make up 50 percent of the totalworld tonnage. These six largest fleetsin order of descending size are Liberia,Panama, Greece, Norway, Cyprus, andJapan. The current US privately ownedfleet of 292 ocean going ships and over14 million DWT is the ninth largest fleetin the world.

• DOD Acquisition Procedures. After ithas been determined that there is notsufficient voluntary US flag sealiftcapacity to meet requirements, theforeign flag ships may be chartered.

•• Commercial Charter. Ships arenormally obtained through commercial

charter. The procedure is the same asfor US flag ships.

•• Allied Shipping Agreements. Shipsare committed by individual NATOcountries (other than the United States)to augment US common-user sealift forthe rapid reinforcement of Europe by USforces. NATO member nations havemade commitments to provide 400 drycargo ships for this purpose. To providea high level of confidence in theavailability of at least 400 dry cargo ships,more ships are nominated than thecommitment requires. Only 400 shipsare available for deliberate planning.Tankers capable of carrying cleanproducts are also nominated towardmeeting NATO POL requirements, andpassenger ships are nominated towardmeeting troop requirements (includingAFOE). These assets form the NATOSealift Ships List. The lists are updatedsemiannually by the NATO PlanningBoard for Ocean Shipping. These assetswould become available only after aNorth Atlantic Council decision toreinforce NATO. There is also acommitment by the Republic of Korea(ROK) to provide a small group of ROKships for contingencies involving theKorean peninsula.

V-10

Chapter V

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIEMPLOYMENT OF SEALIFT FORCES

VI-1

1. General

The employment of sealift begins in theexecution planning phase of JOPES crisisaction planning, in which an OPORD isdeveloped for execution by using ormodifying an existing OPLAN, expanding anexisting CONPLAN, or building an OPORDwhen no plans exist. Employment continuesuntil the operation is terminated by properauthority or is completed, includingretrograde movement of forces and materiel.The employment of sealift must be undertakenwith extreme care and diligence. Errors ofjudgment in acquiring, scheduling, anddetermining C2 of sealift assets may result inlate delivery of units and supplies essential tothe successful conduct of the operation. Acomplete understanding of the organizationalresponsibilities for sealift employment is,therefore, essential.

2. Execution Planning

This period may be weeks, days, or evenhours in length depending on the politicalsituation and scenario. During this period,USTRANSCOM and its componentcommand MSC are identifying the sealiftforces required for execution of the OPORDand tentatively scheduling the sealift tomove the earliest deploying units. In general,USTRANSCOM and its componentcommands are responsible for ensuring thatadequate transportation is available to support

the OPORD when executed, developingfeasible transportation schedules, establishinginitial and follow-on requirements for sealiftcapability, resolving transportation shortfalls,adjudicating transportation allocationconflicts with the JTB, and publishingtransportation coordinating instructions.

a. Sealift Application. In a crisis, strategicsealift divides into two broad categories: (1)surge shipping during initial mobilization and(2) resupply or sustainment shipping. Surgeshipping must be capable of handlingoutsized and heavy items of unit equipment.These include large numbers of wheeled andtracked vehicles and helicopters for whichRO/RO sh ips a re mos t su i t ab le .Containerships should not be overlooked insurge operations as they have the capabilityto transport combat support (CS) and CSSequipment. Resupply and sustainmentshipping moves the equipment, parts, andsupplies necessary to sustain the force. It islargely breakbulk cargo, which is readilyconvertible to containerized storage, or POLproducts.

b. Service Requirements. The methodsby which forces are introduced into anoperational area vary from Service to Service.Sealift of accompanying supplies for Armyand/or Air Force units is normallypoint-to-point , so that any sealift assetassigned by MSC to move cargo from SPOEto seaport of debarkation (SPOD) is

“Co-equal with the security of flanks, the maintenance and full use of the lineof communications to the rear are of major concern to the commander. It ishis responsibility that the incoming supply is equal to the needs of hisdeployments and that the supporting arms and fires which have beenpromised him keep their engagements or if they do not, he must raise hellabout it.”

BGEN S.L.A. MarshallMen Against Fire, 1947

VI-2

Chapter VI

Joint Pub 4-01.2

satisfactory if the CINC’s force closurerequirements can be met. However, this isnot always true for Marine Corps forces.Amphibious capable Marine Corps unitsmay not always be employed promptlyupon arrival in theater. In fact, duringOperation DESERT STORM, the greatestvalue of the deployed amphibious forces wasthe capability they possessed to launch anattack from the sea against the Kuwaitcoastline. The threat of attack from the seacaused the enemy to devote considerableforces to the coastline and away from the areaof the coalition forces planned main attack.Whenever amphibious units of a significantsize MAGTF are employed, AFOE sealiftmust be provided for long-term operations;short-term or voyage charters will not suffice.The AFOE is more fully explained inparagraph 10 below.

c. Resource Capability. When arrangingthe duration of supporting sealift assets, it isvery important to match sealift assetcapabilities with Service orientation. Forexample, some RRF ships are self-sustaining,meaning that they can discharge to lighterageoffshore. It follows that these RRF ships arehighly suitable for amphibious operations andmay be assigned to operate with MarineCorps forces. Furthermore, because they aregovernment owned, their assured availabilitymakes it feasible to plan and train with themin preparation for a contingency. On the otherhand, the several large RO/ROs in MSC’speacetime controlled fleet as well as the FSSwith their RO/RO capabilities are bettersuited for immediate assignment andpoint-to-point delivery to move Army forces,which have a high density of tracked andwheeled vehicles.

d. Mobility and Transportation Planning.The JSCP Mobility Supplement, EnclosureC, provides planning guidance to CINCsregarding strategic sealift. Specificquestions regarding asset availability andresponsibilities for planning certain facets of

sealift (Marine Corps AFOE, for example)can be answered by consulting the JSCP.

3. Execution

This phase starts with the NCA decisionto choose the military option for resolutionof the crisis and to execute the OPORD.Acting on the authority and direction of theSecretary of Defense, the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff will issue an ExecuteOrder that directs the supported CINC tocarry out the OPORD. The supported CINCthen issues Execute Orders to subordinate andsupporting commanders directing theyexecute their supporting OPORDs. Duringthis phase, changes to the OPORD may benecessary for some or all of the followingreasons: strategic, operational, tactical, orintelligence considerations; force and nonunitcargo availability; availability of shipping;CONUS transportation system throughputcapabilities; and POE and/or PODthroughput capabilities.

a. Execution Requirements. Because theOPORD will probably require adjustment asit is executed, ongoing refinement andadjustment of deployment activities arerequired. At the time of execution, theOPORD time-phased force and deploymentdata (TPFDD) should include, at a minimum,properly identified combat, CS, and CSSunits. The area of movement control in jointoperations is covered in Joint Pub 4-01.3,“JTTP for Movement Control.”

• US Transportat ion CommandResponsibilities. Throughout theexecution of an OPORD, USTRANSCOMis responsible for coordinating withthe supported CINC the validationof transportation requirements andfor developing, monitoring, andadjusting transportation schedules.USTRANSCOM reports the progress ofthe deployment to the supportedCINC and the Chairman of the Joint

VI-3


Chiefs of Staff and identifies liftshortfalls or other transportation-relatedproblems accordingly.

• Supported CINC Responsibilities.The supported geographic combatantcommander must ensure thatUSTRANSCOM and its transportationcomponent commands clearly understandtheater transport requirements. Whiledeveloping requirements and priorities,the supported geographic combatantcommander coordinates withUSTRANSCOM to ensure that themovement control system will be readyto manage strategic movement. Thesupported geographic combatantcommander establishes a theatermovement control organization thathas a communications link with thestrategic movement system. He alsoestablishes POD support activities.These include the Arrival/DepartureAirfield Control Group (A/DACG), PortSupport Activity (PSA), and movementcontrol organization.

• Supporting CINC Responsibilities.Certain situations may require that acombatant commander support anothergeographic combatant commander.This support may range from thedeployment of forces to the provisionof sustainment. Regardless of themission, the supporting commandershould establish a movement controlsystem similar to USTRANSCOM’ssystem. A joint movement center, withsupporting component movement cells,manages all moves and assurescompliance with the supportedgeographic combatant commander’spriorities. For deployments to anothertheater, the supporting combatantcommander establishes POE activities.These include the A/DACG, PSA, andmovement control organization.

b. Resolution of Resource AllocationConflicts. If several CINC OPORDs areexecuted simultaneously, or nearlysimultaneously, resource allocation conflictsbetween the executed OPORDs may occur.CJCS policy is to allocate support forcessuch as sealift in proportion to theallocation of combat forces. Through thismechanism, each CINC is provided a shareof the available resources consistent withnational priorities. Therefore, each supportedCINC will have the same percentage shortfallof sealift assets versus requirements. If thestrategic situation requires the assignment ofa greater percentage of assets to one supportedCINC than another, the CINC desiringadditional support may request that theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffreallocate resources from other CINCs. Ifan agreement between the CINCs directlyinvolved cannot be reached, the matterwill be referred to the JTB for final resolution.The JTB’s final resolution is subject tothe approval of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff and the National CommandAuthorities (NCA).

4. Command, Control,Communications, andComputer (C4) Systems

Modern warfare is characterized byincreased pressure on commanders andtheir staffs to respond to crises very rapidly.Of particular importance to sealift forcecommanders is the ability to marshal andposition their forces as directed duringwarning time. A key ingredient to the successof every scenario involving sealift operationsis the judicious use of preconflict measuresdesigned to shorten the response time. Ofequal importance is the ability to quicklymodify, redirect, or terminate sealiftoperations in all levels of conflict. Theinherent worldwide dispersal of sealift forcesmandates that sealift C4 systems be fullyinteroperable with the Global Command

VI-4

Chapter VI

Joint Pub 4-01.2

and Control System (GCCS). GCCS is builton an open-systems concept such thatinteroperability with existing systems can beattained. GCCS will incorporate the policies,procedures, reporting structures, trainedpersonnel , automated in format ionprocessing system, and communicationsconnectivity to provide the informationnecessary in order to effectively plan, deploy,sustain, redeploy, and employ sealift forces.The sealift C4 system, in its simplest form,must enable the sealift operational commanderto monitor the situation, conduct assessments,develop estimates, plans, and schedules, issueorders and directives, and report status tohigher authority.

a. Concept of Command and Control. C2of all common-user shipping (underU S T R A N S C O M C O C O M ) i s t h eresponsibility of MSC as the Servicecomponent commander assigned operationalcontrol (OPCON) of those ships. Protectionof shipping under MSC OPCON is theresponsibility of the Navy componentcommander of geographic combatantcommanders when operating in theirrespective areas of responsibility. Thisresponsibility is normally executed throughthe exercise of tactical control (TACON) overmerchant shipping when such authority isdelegated by MSC to the respective Navycomponent commanders. This conceptrequires close coordination between MSCand the Navy component commanders toensure that merchant shipping is adequatelyprotected while transiting areas of hostileactivity (refer to Naval Control of Shippingmaterials in Chapter VII, “Naval Control ofShipping”).

b. Control of Sealift Forces. MSC, withits area commands, subarea commands, andoffices, exercises C2 of merchant shipsunder MSC control. When, in the opinionof the MSC area or subarea commander, thethreat to shipping under MSC OPCONpresents an unacceptable risk of loss or

damage to ships and cargo, the ships will beplaced under the TACON of the Navycomponent commander of the geographiccombatant commander. TACON of the shipsmay then be delegated to the commander ofthe appropriate Naval Control of ShippingOrganization (NCSORG) unit. Upon thedeparture of the ships from the danger area,control over the ships will revert to MSC.

c. Global Command and ControlSystem. GCCS will become the primarymeans of command and control for theNCA over all military forces, including sealiftforces. The GCCS will provide air, land, andsea transportation information for theDepartment of Defense, both in time ofpeace and war. GCCS is the cornerstone ofcommand, control, communications, computers,and intelligence (C4I) for the Warriorestablishing interoperability among forces,with a focus on the joint warfighter. GCCSwill be a deployable C2 system that willsupport forces for joint and multinationaloperations throughout the spectrum ofconflict anytime and anywhere in the worldwith compatible, interoperable, andintegrated C4I systems. In GCCS,components will update JOPES via the SecretInternet Protocol Router Network. Of themany elements of GCCS, the JOPES is ofprimary interest to the sealift operator.

• Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem. Integrated joint conventionalC2 system used to support sealiftoperation monitoring, planning, andexecution activities. JOPES is used totrack requirements, departures, andarrivals in the much larger DTS.

• JOPES Data Base. The deploymentdata base in JOPES consists ofrequirements that are time-phased andprioritized according to stated needs.This information is detailed and includesunit or commodity, size, weight, origin,destination, and required delivery date,

VI-5


and is updated by the planners asdirected by the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. The deliberate plannersprovide the requirements and priorities.In the next phase, USTRANSCOMplanners input the time-phasedrequirements into automated dataprocessing programs (ADP) that providetransportation schedules for theparticular plan. When an Execute Orderis given, USTRANSCOM and itscomponents enter into the JOPES database loaded for that plan. As units andsupplies move from bases or depots toload ports, each component updates thedata base with real time data for theirleg of the transportation issue.

• Sealift Transportation Movement. Theunit move begins with an Execute Ordersent out by the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. Once notified, theinstallation transportation officercoordinates with the MTMC AreaCommand to coordinate the movementrequirements for deploying units. TheMTMC Area Command inputs orupdates movement requirements inJOPES and adds the actual departuredata. The MTMC Area Command usesits automated data base programs toconfigure these requirements into shiploads along with other requirementsgoing to the same port and having thesame available to load dates. Thisupdated and coordinated requirementsand shipload information is passedthrough JOPES to the command in needof this information. This information isexchanged in the JOPES system. MSCidentifies a ship type based on thespecific requirements for the unit. IfMSC has insufficient chartered orgovernment owned sealift to satisfy therequirement, USCINCTRANS passes arequest to MARAD to activate an RRFship, invoke the SRP, or requisition USflag and EUSC ships.

• The request is received by MARAD viasecure fax or AUTODIN message (notby the JOPES system). In the event of aNATO contingency, if no acceptable USor EUSC ship is available, then MARADas the NSA intercede with the CivilSealift Group for the request of a NATOflag ship. Once the ship is found,MARAD nominates the ship to MSCheadquarters. When MSC accepts it andassumes OPCON, the ship informationis passed to the MSC Area Command,complete with berth availabilityinformation. This happens before the unitreaches the load port and, if timedcorrectly, the unit moves into the seaportby rail and proceeds to the piers wherethe ship is prepared to receive it. As notedabove, the time-phased requirementslisting is updated as directed by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.This enables the supported CINC toreprioritize the forces based on the threatand allows USTRANSCOM to adjustthese requirements based on strategic liftavailable. The systems currently underdevelopment include those listed below.

•• Global Transportation Network(GTN). GTN is the automatedcommand and control supportnecessary for USTRANSCOM toperform its mission providing global air,sea, and land transportation for theDepartment of Defense in peace and war.GTN provides scheduled and actualin-transit movement data to the jointcommunity. GTN integrates cargo,passenger, unit, and patient data withschedules and mission and voyagenumbers and also integrates supplyrequisition information with cargomovement data. A GTN prototype iscurrently operational. The network isdependent on defense, Service, andtransportation component commandsource systems for accurate and timelydata. When fully operational, GTN will

VI-6

Chapter VI

Joint Pub 4-01.2

provide force movement data from theTransportation Component CommandSystem and the Service TransportationCoordinator’s Automated Informationfor Movements System (TC-AIMS).•• Transportation Coordinator’s AutomatedInformation for Movement System.The purpose of TC-AIMS is to improvebase-level transportation activitiesthrough the application of proven,modern automation techniques. Byperforming activities common to bothunit and nonunit movements withTC-AIMS equipment, transportationpersonnel can improve overal lproductivity while maintaining proficiencyon the unit deployment system. BecauseTC-AIMS offers more timely andaccurate information to the jointdeployment community, movementplanning and execution can be far moreefficient than is currently possible.

•• Dynamic Analysis and ReplanningTool (DART). DART was developed torapidly manipulate a TPFDD and flowit for transportation feasibilityanalysis. All TPFDD manipulations aredone off-line. DART is a prototype thathas been fielded to all USTRANSCOMcomponent commanders and thegeographic combatant commanders.When fully refined and fielded, DARTis expected to expedite processing ofADP reports describing the parametersof the sealift requirement in the TPFDD.This will avoid TPFDD processingformerly done on-line. Interfacing ofDART with the Joint Flow and AnalysisSystem for Transportation (JFAST) willenable transportation planners to duplicateand evaluate sealift analysis by supportedCINCs and USTRANSCOM, therebyenhancing teamwork in devisingrecommendations for shortfall resolution.The goal is to trouble-shoot earlier inthe planning process than was previouslypossible. Once DART is fully operational,

a shortfall related to a given unit can beidentified and studied early on.

•• Joint Flow and Analysis System forTransportation. This is a transportationfeasibility evaluation tool resident in amicrocomputer. JFAST is capable ofscheduling transportation assets againsta TPFDD. This allows planners todownload specific movement requirementsfrom JOPES and identify specific problemareas in meeting latest arrival dates at thePODs. JFAST will employ the NotionalRequirements Generator which, drawingfrom a standardized data base, createsnotional movement requirement data fortransportation analysis in a no plan crisissituation.

d. Sealift Communications. Communicationssystems are critical to the flow of orders anddirectives from the sealift commander tosubordinates, and of their status reports to thecommander. However, the procedures forcommunicating with the sealift force areunique to military operations because of theheavy reliance on commercial maritimesystems. Hence, sealift communications areextremely vulnerable to exploitation byinformation warfare. Communicationsamong the military organizations involved inC2 of sealift will take place through the normalmilitary communication channels.

• Merchant Ship CommunicationsCapabilities. Long-range communicationscapabilities in strategic sealift ships rangefrom advanced military communicationsand on-line cryptographic systems onsome military-owned sealift ships toconventional high frequency (HF), singleside band voice and medium frequency(MF), continuous wave Morse codecapabilities. The vast majority of US-owned merchant ships that wouldmake up the sealift force are todayequipped with commercial satellitesystems that provide both voice and data

VI-7


communications capability 24 hours aday. Those ships not so equippedcommunicate with other ships andorganizations ashore through commercialcoastal radio stations, using conventionalHF and MF voice and Morse codecommunications. Further, those shipsoperating conventional merchant shipcommunications suites are manned byradio officers for only 8 hours a day whileunder way and shut down when the shipis in port. Unless they have had a NavalEmbarked Advisory Teamcommunications team placed aboard,merchant ships hold no cryptographicsystems and are incapable of receivingor handling classified information.Merchant ships may be provided limitedcapability for handling classifiedinformation through use of MSC-provided secure telephone unit systemsthat can be interfaced with satellitecommunications systems.

• Interface Between Commercial andMilitary Communications Systems.For naval commands to communicaterapidly and effectively with merchantships, interfaces between commercialand military satellite communicationssystems have been established.However, in most circumstancesrequiring direct communication betweenmilitary authorities and merchant ships,unclassified messages will betransmitted via commercial channels.This requires understanding of thecommunications capabilities of each shipand establishes procedures for voicecommunications and delivery of messagetraffic to the ship.

e. Operation Orders and Reports. Toensure that assigned sealift missions areaccomplished efficiently and with the desiredresults, operational C2 is implementedthrough a system that relies on standardorders and reports. These orders and

reports are designed to provide a complete,accurate, and timely flow of essentialinformation in both directions in the chainof command. COMSCINST 3121.9,“Standard Operating Manual,” specifiesreporting requirements and procedures.

5. Basic Cargo PlanningConcepts

Several basic concepts of cargo handlingand stowage must be understood by the jointplanner before proceeding with sealift planning.These are: different measures of ship capacity;broken stowage; stowage factor or cargo density;and units of cargo measurement.

a. Measures of Ship Capacity. The cargo-carrying ability of a vessel may be expressedin one or more of the following units ofmeasure (see Figure VI-1).

b. Broken Stowage. Broken stowage iscargo space left unoccupied after the ship isconsidered “fully” loaded. This occursbecause cargo sizes and shapes do not conformto those of the ship’s cargo compartments andbecause of the space required for cargo bracingand tie-down to prevent cargo shifting anddamage during the voyage. It is expressedas a percentage of the total volumeavailable for cargo stowage (bale cubic).For general cargo, broken stowage is normallyestimated to be 25 percent, indicating that thecargo actually occupies 75 percent of thevolume of the cargo holds in which it has beenstowed, even though the holds may be “full.”

c. Stowage Factor. Stowage factor is thenumber of cubic feet (ft3) occupied by 1 LT (2,240pounds) of any given cargo, without allowancefor broken stowage. For a given item orcommodity, it is computed as follows:

Cargo Stowage Factor (ft3/LT) =

Cargo Density (lb/ft3)2,240 lb/LT

VI-8

Chapter VI

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Figure VI-1. Measures of Ship Capacity

MEASURES OF SHIP CAPACITY

BALE CUBIC

CARGO DEADWEIGHT

SQUARE FOOTAGE

LIQUID VOLUME

Bale cubic is the internal volume of the below-deck cargocompartments available for general or "package" cargo. It isexpressed either in cubic feet (ft3) or in measurement tons(MTs) of 40 ft3 per ton.

Cargo deadweight is the weight of cargo that the ship cancarry when fully crewed, fueled, and provisioned (whenloaded, in salt water, to the summer freeboard marks). It ismeasured in long tons (LTs) of 2,240 pounds.

Square footage is the total of those deck areas that areconsidered usable for the stowage of cargo, expressed insquare feet.

Liquid volume is the total internal volume of the ship's liquidcargo tanks, expressed in standard barrels (BBLs) of 42 USgallons.

The stowage factor, in combination withthe estimated percentage of broken stowage,can be used to estimate either the spacerequired for loading a given cargo, or theamount of cargo that can be loaded aboard agiven ship. It can also be used to maximizethe utilization of both the cargo space (balecubic) and weight capacity (cargodeadweight) of available shipping. Generalcargo ships are typically designed to be“full and down” when loaded with cargoeshaving an average stowage factor of 40cubic feet per LT (or 1 MT per LT). Cargoeswith relatively high stowage factors (i.e., lowdensities) will fill the ship by volume before

its weight capacity is reached; conversely,cargoes with relatively low stowage factors(high densities) will bring the ship “down”to its deepest allowable draft before it is “full.”

d. Units of Cargo Measurement. Indetermining sealift transportationrequirements, the appropriate units ofmeasurement will vary with cargo type andstowage factor. See Figure VI-2. Forvehicles and other nonstackable cargo, areasquare feet is the relevant measurement. Forstackable cargoes, stowage factors willdetermine whether weight (LT) or volume(MT) is the more appropriate.

VI-9


Figure VI-3. Sealift Planning Factors

SEALIFT PLANNING FACTORS

BREAKBULK: BARGE CARRIER:

ooo

10,000 dwt, or15,000 MT, or600,000 FT3

ooo

30,000 dwt, or30,000 MT, or1,200,000 FT3

RO/RO: CONTAINERSHIP:

o 150,000 FT3 o 2,400 TEU

e. Sealift Planning Factors. Forplanning purposes, ships of various typesmay be assumed to have, on the average,the notional cargo capacities shown inFigure VI-3 . As noted above, cargocharacteristics will determine whether area,weight, or volume is the appropriateconsideration in loading general-purposevessels (the breakbulk ship and bargecarrier). However, a single criterion appliesto each of the more specialized designs;area, in the case of the RO/RO, and volume,for the containership.

6. Intermodal Operations

Intermodal operations provide flexibilityby incorporating various combinations ofsealift, airlift, rail, and trucking operationsto facilitate rapid, efficient cargomovement. In the context of commercialshipping, “intermodal” operations or systemsrefer primarily to the efficient interchange ofstandardized shipping containers betweenocean and land carriers, sophisticated systemsof container handling and storage in marineterminals, or container freight stations and

Figure VI-2. Cargo Planning Factors

CARGO PLANNING FACTORS

AREA: Vehicles and nonvehicular cargo that cannot be stacked. Forexample:

ooo

Tanks,Trucks, orGenerators.

WEIGHT: Nonvehicular, stackable cargo with a stowage factor less than 40.For example:

oo

Dumb bombs, orArtillery ammunition.

VOLUME: Nonvehicular stackable cargo with a stowage factor greater thanor equal to 40. For example:

oo

Food, orSpare parts.

VI-10

Chapter VI

Joint Pub 4-01.2

computerized tracking of shipments. Theseare perhaps epitomized by the US “LandBridge” operations in which containerizedcargoes moving between Far Eastern andEuropean seaports cross this country ondedicated “unit trains” rather than utilizingthe all-water route via the Panama Canal.The advantages include savings in transittime and delivered cost, and the arrival ofperishables in better condition because ofreduced transit times. The existence of thiscommercial infrastructure has promisingimplications for military use, particularly inmoving large numbers of containers.

a. Container Requirements. Currentcommercial sealift trends favor a heavyemphasis on the use of containers. Thesupported CINC’s ability to managecontainerized cargo from SPODs and aerialports of debarkation (APODs) to the troopsin the field depends on the sophistication ofthe host country’s infrastructure and theexpeditionary capability the deployed forcehas brought with it.

b. Theater Support Planning. Duringexecution planning, it is particularlyimportant to consider the theater’s existingtransportation infrastructure and capabilities,so as to make maximum use of its potentialfor intermodal operations. Selecting SPODsand/or APODs close to major highwaysystems, rail networks and civilian logisticsupport is important even when modern,sophisticated intermodal infrastructures do notexist.

c. Sustaining the Force. Sustaining theforce is as important as deploying it. For thisreason, intermodal operations must beplanned in depth to allow for transportationinfrastructure damage from enemy action and/or sabotage. Planning also must take intoaccount the need for additional manpower,vehicles, and other logistic support over time,especially during redeployment. Initial host-nation support may eventually be withdrawn

as that nation attempts to reestablish normalcommercial transportation operations insupport of its own economy.

7. Protection of Shipping

Merchant ships have virtually noself-protection capability, particularly againstnuclear, biological, or chemical agents. Thislack is of little consequence in peacetime orduring transit through low threat areas.However, during a crisis or conflict,unprotected merchant ships are faced withthe extreme risk of loss of ship, cargo, andpersonnel while operating in any area wherea credible military threat exists. Therefore,military forces must be assigned either toeliminate the threat so that merchant shipscan transit unopposed at any time or toprovide direct protection during transitsof threat environments. An environmentcontaminated by nuclear, biological, orchemical agents may preclude transit bymerchant ships. As directed by theirgeographic combatant commanders, theNavy component commanders are taskedwith establishing and implementing plansto provide surface and air escort for theprotection of merchant shipping. Whilemerchant ships are under escort of militaryforces, TACON is delegated by the MSC areaor subarea commander to the appropriate Navycomponent commander, who may then retainor further delegate TACON over the merchantshipping in question (refer to Chapter VII,“Naval Control of Shipping”). However,throughout the escort mission effective OPCONof the shipping remains with MSC. Protectionof shipping may be loosely divided into twodistinct areas; en route or underwayoperations and port security.

a. En Route Protection of Shipping. Thetraditional, and still very effective, means ofdirectly protecting shipping transit is a throughescort by naval combatants. However,protection of shipping does not consist simplyof those actions required to assemble and

VI-11


protect groups of merchant ships. Otheroffensive actions that eliminate threats tosealift shipping also may eliminate theneed for naval escort and be a more efficientuse of resources. These actions may involvethe use of air, land, or naval power, asappropriate. Whatever the means, the desiredend remains the safe, uninterrupted passageof shipping and the delivery of the cargoes totheir destinations.

b. Port Security. Threats to shipping inseaports are different from those found enroute. While the en route threat is primarilyfrom conventional air, surface, and subsurfaceunits and mines, the port threat is generallyfrom unconventional or special operationsforces, as well as terrorist organizationswhose purpose is the calculated use ofviolence or the threat of violence, oftenpolitical or ideological in nature. USCG isresponsible for the security of ports in theUnited States. Port security functions involvethe safeguarding of vessels and waterfrontfacilities (including key assets) within the portfrom internal and external subversive acts,accidents, thefts, or other causes of similarnature. Principal port security activitiesinclude: (1) monitoring port operations; (2)conducting harbor patrols to detect suspiciousactivity and determining if the level of securitymeasures taken by vessel and facility ownersand operators are adequate and sufficient tomeet the threat level; (3) surveying waterfrontfacilities to provide baseline data of facilitycapabil i ty that would be useful inemergency response; (4) establishing andenforcing security zones to safeguardvessels and port areas; (5) developingsteps and measures to be taken to preventacts of maritime terrorism; (6) developingand maintaining maritime counterterrorismplans and responding to marit imeemergencies involving terrorism; (7) carryingout the Special Interest Vessel Program tosafeguard US ports from external threats ofsabotage and espionage; and (8) preparingfor mobilization and national defense,

including providing waterside security andlimited landside security if required. TheNavy, Federal Bureau of Investigation,MTMC, Forces Command, FederalEmergency Management Agency, and otheragencies, as well as commands acting withand through port readiness committees, playroles in port security and harbor defensedepending on the particular crisis, situation,or geographic location. Therefore,protection of shipping in port will requireclose coordination and cooperation amongintelligence agencies and commands.

8. Operations Security

Sealift has several significant operationssecurity aspects. The first and possibly mostobvious problem is the presence of a largenumber of fully loaded merchant ships atanchor in a major port. Such a gathering overseveral days is an obvious indication that aconvoy or major operation is being plannedand is almost impossible to keep secure.Somewhat more subtler, but still obvious, isthe gathering of large numbers of sealift shipsat a forward base, particularly those shipswhich can be identified with an AFOE. Thekey point here is that, while a large mass ofmerchant shipping can be regarded as a targetin and of itself, the presence of certain typesof merchant ships can reveal the presence ofa major military operation even when the“military” end of the operation hasscrupulously observed operations securitymeasures. Although not an exhaustive list ofoperations security measures for sealift, thefollowing should be considered asguidelines: (1) Avoid massing of shippingif possible. If it cannot be avoided, minimizethe assembly time involved and limit thenumbers of ships in any one location; (2) Beaware of the inferences that can be drawnfrom the presence of certain combination ofcargoes and specific ship types; and (3) Usedeceptive routing and other, similar techniqueswhere possible, avoiding patterns in vesseloperations and routing, and routing shipping

VI-12

Chapter VI

Joint Pub 4-01.2

away from the “normal” sea lanes to avoiddetection by neutral or other shipping.

9. Logistic Support

In general, merchant ships will belogistically supported by their owner and/or operators within the terms of theircharters or other agreements when the shipsare using commercial seaports for loadingand discharge of military cargo. Merchantships are normally provisioned at thebeginning of every voyage with between 60and 90 days of consumable items. This willusually be sufficient for a ship to make theround-trip between POE and POD, includingthe required cargo discharge time at the POD.The exception to this is that merchant shipsunder military COCOM are generallysupplied with fuel from military sources.

This may take the form of direct paymentfor fuel from commercial sources or actualtransfer of military fuels to merchant ships.The latter is most likely to occur in thesupported CINC’s area of responsibility as theships deliver their cargoes after a long voyage.On shorter voyages the ships may be able toreturn without refueling. Other in-theaterlogistic support to merchant shipping willusually be limited to assistance in treatmentand repatriation of sick or injured crewmembers, expediting the arrival of crewreplacements and high priority spare parts,mail delivery, and arranging or providing tugs,pilots, and nautical charts and publicationswhen required. Should vessel repairs berequired in-theater, commercial facilities,when available, should be used due to theirfamiliarity with merchant ships requirementsand in order to keep naval repair facilitiesavailable to naval combatants.

10. Amphibious/ExpeditionaryOperations

An amphibious task force (ATF) is the taskorganization formed for the purpose of

conducting an amphibious operation. Theamphibious task force always includes Navyforces and a landing force (LF) with theirorganic aviation, and may include MSC-provided ships and Air Force forces whenappropriate. Navy elements in an ATFinclude various types and classes of ships toinclude combatant and strategic sealift andsupport units from various warfarespecialties. The LF is comprised of a C2headquarters, aviation and/or ground combatunits, and CS/CSS units and is assigned toconduct the amphibious assault. The LF isdivided into two echelons, assault echelons(AEs) and the AFOE. The AE is theelement of the LF that is scheduled for initialassault on the objective area. The AE is thosetroops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, andsupplies required to initiate the assault.The AE is normally embarked on amphibiousshipping. The AFOE is that echelon ofassault troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment,and supplies which, though not needed toinit iate the assault, are required tosupport and sustain the assault. In orderto accomplish its purpose, it is normallyrequired in the objective area no later than 5days after commencement of the assaultlanding. Portions of the AFOE may berequired ashore sooner because of the tacticalsituation. As part of the LF, the AFOE alsoshould be embarked on amphibious assaultshipping. Given the number of Navy andamphibious ships available today, only theAE is expected to be embarked onamphibious assault shipping. The AFOE isnormally embarked on strategic sealiftshipping. The AE and AFOE are integral,inseparable components of the LF. Anintegral part of the ATF is the NSE. TheNSE consists of cargo handling, beach, andlighterage groups, equipped and trained todischarge ships in stream and at pierside.Doctrine regarding the employment of sealiftin amphibious operations is contained in JointPub 3-02, “Joint Doctrine for AmphibiousOperations,” and NWP 3-02.22M (old NWP

VI-13


22-8), “MSC Support of AmphibiousOperations.”

a. Employment of Assault Follow-OnEchelon Shipping. The AFOE consists ofadditional combat troops, vehicles,non-self-deployable aircraft, equipmentand supplies that, though not essential toinitiate the assault, are required to support andsustain the assault. This organization is notto be confused with Marine Corps unitsdeployed by MPS, which will be addressedbelow. When an ATF is being formed by thesupported CINC, USTRANSCOM allocatesshipping for the AFOE mission to thesupported CINC. These ships are thenintegrated into the Navy componentcommander’s operations and incorporatedwith the forces of the commander, amphibioustask force (CATF). AFOE sealift assets willbe positioned and loaded at port facilities,generally where ATF support cargo andpersonnel can be most expeditiously andefficiently loaded to meet AFOE missionrequirements. Loadout of AFOE shippingwill be nearly simultaneous with the loadoutof AE shipping. The AFOE will deploy inaccordance with the CATF’s amphibiousoperation plan. The AFOE must bedischarged swiftly and safely in sufficient timeto support the landing force. When a ship ofthe AFOE has completed discharging itscargo, it may be returned by the supportedCINC to the USTRANSCOM common-usershipping pool. OH 7-8, “Deployment of theAssault Follow-on Echelon (AFOE),”discusses AFOE concepts and procedures indetail.

b. Transfer of Afloat Pre-positioningForce to Common-User Status. Strategicsealift in the APF will be transferred tocommon-user status when released by thesupported CINC. However, it may benecessary for the supported CINC to retainAfloat PREPO or, more probably, MPS ships

as theater support assets to meet specificoperational requirements. A prime examplearose during Operations DESERT SHIELDand DESERT STORM when suitable AFOEships could not be acquired for a Marineexpeditionary brigade. Upon arrival in-theater, MPS ships were retained by the CINCfor use as AFOE shipping. When the APFships are transferred to the common-userpool, their support is coordinated throughUSCINCTRANS and MSC in the samemanner as for all other common-user ships.

c. Logistics Over-The-Shore. Thissection provides only general, nontechnicaldescriptions of various LOTS systems. Formore detailed discussion of system description,capabilities, limitations, and requirements, JointPub 4-01.6, “JTTP for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore,” should be consulted.

The major naval systems for instreamcargo offload and discharge is the CargoOffload and Discharge System (COLDS).COLDS has two major sub-systems; for drycargo, the Cargo Offloading and TransferSystem, and for liquid cargo the Off-ShoreBulks Fuel System. Navy COLDSequipment and facilities include lighteragecauseway ferries, floating piers, the RO/RO Discharge Facilities, and ElevatedCauseway expeditionary pier. L iquidc a rg o off load is supported by theAmphibious Assault Bulk Fuel/WaterSystem and OPDS. Army JLOTS equipmentincludes Terminal Service Unit handlingequipment, barge-mounted andshorebased Reverse Osmosis WaterPurif ication Units, shorebased waterstorage systems, and the Tactical PetroleumTerminal. JLOTS operations can beconducted over unimproved shorelines,through fixed-ports not accessible to deepdraft vessels, and through fixed-portsthat are inadequate without the use ofJLOTS capabilities.

VI-14

Chapter VI

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIINAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING

VII-1

1. General

The mission and command structure of theNCSORG are described below, as well asthe procedures for implementing naval controlof shipping (NCS) for sealift shipping and forcommercial shipping.

2. Mission and Functions

The mission of the NCSORG is to providefor the safe movement of merchant shippingunder its authority either in a contingencysituation or in time of war or nationalemergency.

a. Functions Performed by the NCSORG.The NCSORG tactically routes merchantships, reports their movements, and arrangesfor their protection.

b. Related Functions Performed byOther Organizations. The NCSORG doesnot determine the destination of ships northe cargoes they carry; these functions areperformed by USTRANSCOM and MSC forcommon-user sealift shipping sailing underNCS, by the NSA (the MARAD within theDOT) for US commercial shipping sailingunder full NCS, and by civilian owners andoperators for commercial shipping when fullNCS has not been implemented. TheNCSORG coordinates the rendezvous ofmerchant ships and their escort forces butdoes not control escort forces, which is arelated but separate function of navalcommanders. In addition, the NCSORG isnot responsible for control of merchantships sailing in military convoys (i.e.,ATF forces).

3. Command Structure

The command structure for the USNCSORG is shown in Figure VII-1. Note:In the event that Naval Control of Shippingis implemented by NATO, the US NCSORGbecomes a part of the NATO NCSORG. TheNATO NCSORG command structure anddoctrine are set forth in ATP 2, Volume 1“Naval Control of Shipping Manuals” andVolume 2 “Allied Guide to Masters.” Thereare certain bilateral and multilateralagreements for NCS to which the USNCSORG is a party. Those agreementsprescribe the applicable command structureshould NCS be implemented.

a. National Command Authorities. TheNCA is responsible for approvingimplementation of US NCS for US andforeign flag commercial shipping, based onrequests for such action from geographiccombatant commanders, the SECTRANS (forUS commercial flag shipping), or theSecretary of State (for foreign flag shipping).

b. Geographic Combatant Commanders.Geographic combatant commanders(Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command;US Commander in Chief, Europe; Commanderin Chief, US Central Command; Commanderin Chief, US Pacific Command; andCommander in Chief, US Southern Command)initiate requests to implement NCS forcommercial shipping, establish overallresponsibility, and allocate escort forces.

c. Area Commander. Area commanders(Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet[CINCLANTFLT], Commander in Chief, US

“Our ships are our natural bulwarks.”

Woodrow Wilson

VII-2

Chapter VII

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Naval Forces Europe, [CINCUSNAVEUR],Commander, US Naval Forces CentralCommand, [COMUSNAVCENT], Commanderin Chief, Pacific Fleet [CINCPACFLT])conduct NCS operations in accordance withthe policies of their respective geographiccombatant commander.

d. Operational Control Authority (OCA).OCAs exercise control over movements ofmerchant ships sailing in escorted groupsor independently, maintain shipping plots,and direct actions of their subordinateShipp ing Cont ro l Teams (SCT) .CINCLANTFLT’s subordinate OCAs areCommander, Ocean Atlantic in Norfolk,Virginia; Commander, US Eastern Atlantic inLondon, United Kingdom; and NavalActivities Caribbean in Roosevelt Roads,Puerto Rico. CINCUSNAVEUR’s subordinateOCA is Commander, Fleet Air Mediterraneanin Naples, Italy. COMUSNAVCENT’ssubordinate OCA is Commander, MiddleEastern Forces located afloat in the Persian

Gulf. CINCPACFLT functions as its ownOCA.

e. Shipping Control Teams. SCT exercisecontrol of merchant shipping in the vicinityof their assigned port locations, conduct shipboardings to brief ships’ masters and officers,issue sailing instructions pursuant toguidance provided by their cognizant OCAs,report arrivals and departures of shipping,and may detail Naval Liaison Officers(NLOs) to embark on escorted orindependently sailed ships as required.The number of personnel assigned to a SCTstaff will vary depending on the volume ofshipping sailing under naval control fromthe assigned port or ports.

f. Naval Liaison Officers (Afloat). Ifmerchant ships are formed into escortedgroups, NLOs may embark on ships in thegroup to assist with tactical maneuvering andcommunications. NLOs may also embarkon independently sailed merchant ships to

Figure VII-1. Naval Control of Shipping Command Structure

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANTCOMMANDER

NAVY COMPONENT COMMANDER

OPERATIONAL CONTROL AUTHORITY

SHIPPING CONTROLTEAMS

NAVAL LIAISONOFFICERS

NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPINGCOMMAND STRUCTURE

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANTCOMMANDER

NAVY COMPONENT COMMANDER

OPERATIONAL CONTROL AUTHORITY

SHIPPING CONTROLTEAMS

NAVAL LIAISONOFFICERS

CHAIRMAN OF THEJOINT CHIEFS

OF STAFF

CHAIRMAN OF THEJOINT CHIEFS

OF STAFFCOMMUNICATION

VII-3

Naval Control of Shipping

provide advice on threat conditions, routing,communications procedures, and othermatters.

4. Implementing NCS

The procedures for implementing NCS aresimpler for sealift shipping than for shippingengaged in commercial trade.

a. Sealift Shipping. The decision to sailUS sealift shipping (including foreign flagshipping under charter to MSC) under NCSresides with the geographic combatantcommanders for the geographic areasthrough which such shipping sails. Becausethe decision to sail shipping under NCS mayaffect arrival times, the geographiccombatant commander should consult withthe supported commander and withUSCINCTRANS before implementing NCS.If the NCSORG has been activated tocontrol commercial shipping, it generallywill be most efficient to implement NCSfor sealift shipping as well. The commanderresponsible for shipping protection thenwould have to interface only with theNCSORG, not both the MSC and NCSORGtogether. When NCS is implemented forcommon-user sealift shipping, the NCSORGassumes TACON of such shipping, butOPCON resides with MSC and COCOM

resides with USTRANSCOM. Under thisarrangement, the NCSORG unilaterally canalter the routes of such shipping, but may notalter destination ports or arrival dates withoutprior consultation with MSC and/orUSTRANSCOM.

b. Commercial Shipping. The decisionto sail US and foreign flag commercialshipping under the US NCSORG requires theapproval of NCA. Because of the potentialimpact on delivery times, insurance rates,and other factors, the NSA should beconsulted prior to recommending an offerof NCS. Foreign flag commercialshipping can only be placed under NCSon a voluntary basis either by the ship’sowner or the flag state. The Chief of NavalOperations (CNO), as the NCSORGprogram sponsor, will maintain liaisonwith the NSA and other civi l ianauthorities to coordinate the exchange ofinformation with the NCSORG concerningimplementation of NCS and dissemination ofthreat and other information to US andforeign-flag commercial shipping. Uponapproval by the NCA of a recommendationto implement NCS, the CNO will arrangefor the NSA and/or the Department of Stateto promptly broadcast an NCSimplementation message or messages tomerchant ships subject to US control.

VII-4

Chapter VII

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIIITRANSITION FROM PEACE TO CONFLICT

VIII-1

1. General

The transition from peace to conflictrepresents a critical period for sealift.Indeed, management of the transitionduring this period will have a significanteffect on the success of deployment andsustainment missions assigned to sealift. Losttime is rarely made up, and it is particularlyduring the transition period that time islost. Lost time can be attributed tomisperceptions about the speed with whichthe DTS in general, and sealift in particular,can transition from a relatively smallpeacetime force to a major military force.Transition from a peacetime transportationrole to a military deployment role requiressignificant changes that affect every portionof the sealift forces.

2. Sealift Force Structure

The first and most obvious change in sealiftduring transition is that the number of shipsunder USTRANSCOM and MSC controlwill rapidly and substantially increase. It

should be noted that the number of ships underMSC OPCON may not be an accuratemeasure of ships performing the sealiftmission. Depending on the mode ofacquisition, ships may be delayed forsignificant time periods before they can beconsidered as active sealift assets. Forplanning purposes, the time periodsshown in Figure VIII-1 will be required toobtain shipping from each source or methodof acquisition. The elapsed times representthe period between the first request for thattype of shipping and the arrival of shipsat berth, ready for loadout. These include thetime required to take all of the actionsdiscussed in Chapter V, “Vessel Acquisitionand Activation Programs and Procedures,”activation time (if ROS, RRF, or NDRF) orthe time necessary to make the ship readyfor a military cargo (if a charter, SRP, and/orVTA or requisition) and transit to the desiredSPOE. In the expansion of the sealift force,several factors may further complicate therapid accumulation of sufficient shipping,particularly the acquisition of ships fromthe RRF and NDRF.

“‘Tis time to leave the books in dust, and oil the unused armor’s rust.”

Andrew Marvell, 1621-1678

Figure VIII-1. Sealift Asset Availability Times

SEALIFT ASSET AVAILAB ILITY TIMES

ROS SHIPPING:4-7 Days (depending on location)

Charter:4-30 Days (depending on location)

RRF:5-20 Days (depending on readinessand/or location)

SRP and/or VTA:21-75 Days (depending on location)

Requisitioning:14-45 Days (depending on location)

NDRF:45-135 Days

VIII-2

Chapter VIII

Joint Pub 4-01.2

These are: (1) frequency of reserve ship testactivations and exercises; (2) maintenanceeffort expended on reserve shipping; (3)shipyard capacity to activate large numbersof ships; (4) availability of trained crews, spare

parts, and logistic support; (5) availability ofmilitarily useful shipping on the world chartermarket; and (6) restrictions on the activitiesof foreign-flag ships by their respectivenational governments.

MARITIME PREPOSITIONING

The Navy-USMC maritime prepositioning program was begun in the late 1970sas a result of a DOD strategic mobility enhancement initiative to improveresponse times for SWA contingencies. Until the full Maritime PrepositioningForce (MPF) capability (specially built or converted ships) was achieved in themid 1980s, an interim measure known as Near-Term Prepositioning Ships(NTPS) was created in 1980 to provide an initial response capability. The NTPSships were on station at Diego Garcia by July 1980 and contained the equipmentand 30 days of supplies for a USMC Brigade. By early 1985, the first combinationRO/RO and breakbulk ships specifically built or converted for the Navy hadbeen commissioned and were loaded with prepositioned vehicles, equipment,and supplies. By 1987,13 ships organized in three squadrons had beencommissioned, crewed with civilian mariners, loaded, and deployed.

The ships were more than just floating warehouses. Each of the three shipscarried equipment for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), along with enoughsupply sustainment for at least 30 days. The squadrons were associated witha specific MEB to ensure effective planning and training. MPS-1, associatedwith the 6th MEB and stationed at Camp Lejeune, NC, was deployed in thewestern Atlantic; MPS-2, associated with the 7th MEB in California, wasanchored at Diego Garcia; and MPS-3, associated with the Hawaii-based 1stMEB, was home ported at Guam and Saipan. Together, each squadron and itsassociated MEB become an MPF.

The MPF concept performed largely as expected during the crisis, due to anaggressive training, exercise, and maintenance program carried out duringthe 1980s. Exercises had established planning goals of about 250 strategicairlift sorties to deploy a MEB; this figure was confirmed by the 7th MEB, whichdeployed to Saudi Arabia using 259 sorties. (The additional nine sortiesreflected the addition of an infantry battalion and more helicopter antitankassets to the MEB.) The expected time of 10 days to unload ships and marryequipment with arriving units was met by all three MPFs. In fact, 7th MEBcombat elements occupied defensive positions near Al-Jubayl in August withinfour days of their arrival. The only problem encountered during initialdeployment of the 7th MEB centered on refueling support to Marine fixed-wing aircraft flying from CONUS, which competed for scarce assets with otherService aircraft. Elements of 1st MEB and ll MEF, although deployed usingMPF concepts, did not do so as complete units. Instead, their air, ground, andlogistics elements were deployed and integrated into I MEF as they arrived,drawing their equipment from their associated MPS ships.


APPENDIX AMERCHANT SHIP NAVAL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM

A-1

1. General

Merchant Ship Naval AugmentationProgram (MSNAP) features and equipmentare designed to enable specificmerchant-type ships to augment and, whenneeded, act as CLF vessels during a crisisor conflict. These ships are CINC-allocatedassets in service with MSC or maintainedin the RRF to support Navy ships. Shipsmodified with MSNAP systems will beactivated and deployed to US or overseasports for loadout. They will resupply fleetships with ordnance, other dry stores, orPOL. The major MSNAP systems are theUnderway Replenishment Consolidation(UNREP CONSOL) System, VerticalReplenishment decks (VERTREP),Modular Cargo Delivery System (MCDS),Modular Fuel Delivery System (MFDS),and Astern Refueling Rigs.

2. Underway ReplenishmentConsolidation Systems

UNREP CONSOL systems provide acapability for merchant ships to transfer drycargo and ammunition to Navy CLF ships.These rigs have been installed on nine RRFships. Included in the installations aresliding padeyes, materials handlingequipment, cargo tie-down systems, safetyequipment, and communications equipment.

3. Vertical Replenishment

VERTREP is provided by adding anelevated deck at the stern of the ship. Thisinstallation has been done on three Consoland six MCDS ships. The deck is approvedfor daylight hours, hover-only operations.The helicopters are from ships beingresupplied. Helicopters up to the size of aCH-53E can use this system. Strike-up and

pre-stage from the ship’s hold to theVERTREP deck capability is provided.

4. Modular Cargo DeliverySystem

The MCDS enables dry cargo merchantships to perform limited StandardTensioned Replenishment AlongsideMethod (STREAM) UNREP operationswith all naval ships equipped with a drycargo UNREP receiving station. TheMCDS is a self-contained Navy Standarddry cargo STREAM station. Modificationsinclude those similar to the consolidationsystem for cargo handling cargo stowage.Additionally, two MCDS units are installedover hatches, one forward and one aft ofthe ships superstructure. Installations havebeen made on seven RRF ships.

5. Modular Fuel DeliverySystem

The MFDS enables MSC, RRF, orcommercial US flag tankers to deliver POLto Navy oilers and other ships via amodularized, alongside delivery system.The tanker modification provides twodelivery stations plus one dry cargo,receive-only station. MFDS has beeninstalled on two tankers that operate withMSC’s peacetime fleet.

6. Astern Refueling Rigs

Astern refueling rigs permit tankers toprovide limited POL transfer underway toUS and allied combatant ships. Selectedtankers are being modified for this system,which involves installation of deckmounting pads, piping modifications,manifolds, valves, and electrical powerleads to connect the normal discharge

A-2

Appendix A

Joint Pub 4-01.2

system to a manifold at the stern refuelingstation. This will permit the contingency

installation of a reel-mounted asternrefueling rig.

APPENDIX BREFERENCES

B-1

The development of Joint Pub 4-01.2 is based upon the following primary references.

1. DOD Directive 4500.32-R “Military Standard Transportation and MovementProcedures.”

2. DOD Directive 5158.4, “United States Transportation Command,” 8 January 1993.

3. Joint Staff, SM 712-93, “Unified Command Plan.”

4. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

5. Joint Pub 1-01, “Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures Development Program.”

6. Joint Pub 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and AssociatedTerms.”

7. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

8. Joint Pub 3-02, “Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.”

9. Joint Pub 3-02.1, “Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations.”

10. Joint Pub 3-02.2, “Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation.”

11. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

12. Joint Pub 4-01, “Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.”

13. Joint Pub 4-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.”

14. Joint Pub 4-01.5, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Water TerminalOperations.”

15. Joint Pub 4-01.6, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint LogisticsOver-the-Shore (JLOTS).”

16. Joint Pub 4-01.7, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Use of IntermodalContainers in Joint Operations.”

17. Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (PlanningPolicies and Procedures).”

18. AFSC Pub 1, “The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide.”

B-2

Appendix B

Joint Pub 4-01.2

19. NDP 4, “Naval Logistics.”

20. NWP 4-01.2M (old NWP 80), “Strategic Sealift Planning and Operations Doctrineof the US Navy.”

21. ATP2, “Allied Naval Control of Shipping Manual: Vol. 1, Merchant Ship Directionand Control” and “Vol. II, Guide to Masters.”

22. NWP 4-01.3M (old NWP 22-10/FMFM 1-5), “Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)Operations.”

23. NWP 3-02.23M TP/OH 7-8, “Deployment of the Assault Follow-On Echelon(AFOE).”

24. NWP 22-8, “MSC Support of Amphibious Operations.”

25. CJCSM 3122.02, “Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment DataDevelopment and Deployment Execution.”

APPENDIX CADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

C-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theJoint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Transportation Command. TheJoint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director (J-4).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFT IL//TCJ5-S//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4/J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

C-2

Appendix C

Joint Pub 4-01.2

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttache Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, D.C. 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (OPD)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

A/DACG arrival/departure airfield control groupACS Auxiliary Crane ShipADP automated data processingAE assault echelonAFOE assault follow-on echelonAPF afloat prepositioning forceAPOD aerial port of debarkationAPS afloat prepositioning ship(s)ATF amphibious task force

BBL barrel (42 US gallons)

C2 command and controlC4 command, control, communications, and computersC4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligenceCATF commander, amphibious task forceCINC commander of a combatant commandCINCLANTFLT Commander in Chief, Atlantic FleetCINCPACFLT Commander in Chief, Pacific FleetCINCUSNAVEUR Commander in Chief, Naval Forces EuropeCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCNO Chief of Naval OperationsCOCOM combatant command (command authority)COLDS Cargo Offload and Discharge SystemCOMSC Commander, Military Sealift CommandCOMUSNAVCENT Commander, United States Navy, Central CommandCONPLAN operation plan in concept formatCONUS continental United StatesCS combat supportCSS combat service support

DART dynamic analysis and replanning toolDBOF defense business operations fundDOD Department of DefenseDOT Department of TransportationDTS Defense Transportation SystemDWT deadweight tons (in long tons of 2,240 pounds)

EUSC effective United States control/controlled

FLO/FLO float-on/float-offFSS fast sealift ship(s)ft3 cubic feet

GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 4-01.2

GCCS Global Command and Control SystemGTN Global Transportation Network

HF high frequency

ISO International Organization for Standardization

JFAST Joint Flow and Analysis System for TransportationJFC joint force commanderJLOTS joint logistics-over-the-shoreJOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJPEC Joint Planning and Execution CommunityJSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities PlanJTB Joint Transportation Board

LASH lighter aboard ship (barge carrier design)LF landing forceLMSR large, medium speed roll-on/roll-offLOTS logistics over-the-shoreLT long ton (2,240 pounds)

MAGTF Marine air-ground task forceMAGTF ACE Marine air-ground task force aviation combat elementMARAD Maritime AdministrationMCDS Modular Cargo Delivery SystemMF medium frequencyMFDS Modular Fuel Delivery SystemMPS maritime prepositioning ship(s)MSC Military Sealift CommandMSNAP Merchant Ship Naval Augmentation ProgramMT measurement ton (40 cubic feet)MTMC Military Traffic Management Command

NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNCA National Command AuthoritiesNCS naval control of shippingNCSORG Naval Control of Shipping OrganizationNDRF National Defense Reserve FleetNDSF National Defense Sealift FundNLO naval liaison officer(s)NSA National Shipping AuthorityNSE Navy support element

OCA operational control authorityOPCON operational controlOPDS offshore petroleum discharge systemOPLAN operation planOPORD operation order

GL-3

Glossary

POD port of debarkationPOE port of embarkationPOL petroleum, oils, and lubricantsPREPO prepositioningPSA port support activity

RO/RO roll-on/roll-offROK Republic of KoreaROS reduced operational statusRRF Ready Reserve Force

SCT shipping control teamsSecDef Secretary of DefenseSECNAV Secretary of the NavySECTRANS Secretary of TransportationSEF sealift enhancement feature(s)SPOD seaport of debarkationSPOE seaport of embarkationSRP Sealift Readiness ProgramST short ton (2,000 pounds)STREAM standard tensioned replenishment alongside method

T-AH hospital shipT-AVB aviation logistics support shipTACON tactical controlTC-AIMS Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information

for Movement SystemTEA Transportation Engineering AgencyTEU twenty-foot equivalent unitsTPFDD time-phased force and deployment data

UNREP underway replenishmentUNREP CONSOL underway replenishment consolidationUSCG United States Coast GuardUSCINCTRANS Commander in Chief, United States Transportation CommandUSMC United States Marine CorpsUSTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

VERTREP vertical replenishmentVISA Voluntary Intermodal Shipping AgreementVTA Voluntary Tanker Agreement

active sealift forces. Military SealiftCommand active common-user sealift andthe afloat prepositioning force, includingthe required cargo handling and deliverysystems, and necessary operatingpersonnel. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

afloat prepositioning force. Shippingmaintained in full operational status toafloat preposition military equipment andsupplies in support of combatantcommanders’ operation plans. The afloatprepositioning force consists of the threemaritime prepositioning ships squadronsand the afloat prepositioning ships.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

afloat prepositioning ships. Forwarddeployed merchant ships loaded withtactical equipment and supplies to supportthe initial deployment of military forces.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

amphibious task force. The taskorganization formed for the purpose ofconducting an amphibious operation. Theamphibious task force always includesNavy forces and a landing force, with theirorganic aviation, and may include MilitarySealift Command-provided ships and AirForce forces when appropriate. Also calledATF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

assault echelon. The element of a force thatis scheduled for initial assault on theobjective area. In an amphibious taskforce, it consists of Navy amphibiousships and the assault troops, vehicles,non-self-deployable aircraft, equipment,and supplies required to initiate the assaultlanding. (This term and its definitionmodifies the existing term and definition

and is approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

assault follow-on echelon. In amphibiousoperations, that echelon of the assaulttroops, vehicles, aircraft equipment, andsupplies which, though not needed toinitiate the assault, is required to supportand sustain the assault. In order toaccomplish its purpose, it is normallyrequired in the objective area no later thanfive days after commencement of the assaultlanding. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command (commandauthority). Nontransferable commandauthority established by title 10 (“ArmedForces”), United States Code, section 164,exercised only by commanders of unifiedor specified combatant commands unlessotherwise directed by the President or theSecretary of Defense. Combatantcommand (command authority) cannot bedelegated and is the authority of acombatant commander to perform thosefunctions of command over assigned forcesinvolving organizing and employingcommands and forces, assigning tasks,designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction over all aspects ofmilitary operations, joint training, andlogistics necessary to accomplish themissions assigned to the command.Combatant command (command authority)should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations.Normally this authority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Combatant command(command authority) provides fullauthority to organize and employcommands and forces as the combatantcommander considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions.

GL-4 Joint Pub 4-01.2

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Operational control is inherent incombatant command (commandauthority). Also called COCOM. (JointPub 1-02)

command and control. The exercise ofauthority and direction by a properlydesignated commander over assignedand attached forces in the accomplishmentof the mission. Command and controlfunctions are performed through anarrangement of personnel, equipment,communications, facilities, and proceduresemployed by a commander in planning,directing, coordinating and controllingforces and operations in the accomplishmentof the mission (Joint Pub 1-02)

common-user sealift. The sealift servicesprovided on a common basis for allDepartment of Defense agencies and, asauthorized, for other agencies of the USGovernment. The Military SealiftCommand, a transportation componentcommand of the US TransportationCommand, provides common-user sealiftfor which users reimburse the transportationaccounts of the Defense BusinessOperations Fund. (Approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

common-user ocean terminals. A militaryinstallation, part of a military installation,or a commercial facility operated undercontract or arrangement by the MilitaryTraffic Management Command whichregularly provides for two or more Servicesterminal functions of receipt, transit storageor staging, processing, and loading andunloading of passengers or cargo aboardships (Joint Pub 1-02)

effective US control. Merchant ships,majority owned by US citizens orcorporations that are operated underLiberian, Panamanian, Honduran,Bahamian, and Marshall Islands registries.These ships are considered requisitionable

assets available to the US Government intime of national emergency and thereforeunder the effective control of the USGovernment. (Approved for inclusion inthe next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

fly-in echelon. Includes the balance of theinitial assault force, not included in theassault echelon, and some aviation supportequipment. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

logistics-over-the-shore operations. Theloading and unloading of ships without thebenefit of fixed port facilities, in friendlyor nondefended territory, and, in time ofwar, during phases of theater developmentin which there is no opposition by theenemy. Also called LOTS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

maritime prepositioning ships. Civilian-crewed, Military Sealift Command-chartered ships which are organized intothree squadrons and are usually forward-deployed. These ships are loaded withprepositioned equipment and 30 days ofsupplies to support three MarineExpeditionary Brigades. Also called MPS.(Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities. ThePresident and the Secretary of Defense ortheir duly deputized alternates orsuccessors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub1-02)

National Shipping Authority. Theorganization within each allied governmentresponsible in time of war for the directionof its own merchant shipping. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02.)

naval control of shipping. Control exercisedby naval authorities of movement, routing,reporting, convoy organization, andtactical diversion of allied merchantshipping. It does not include the

GL-5

Glossary

GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 4-01.2

employment or active protection of suchshipping. (Joint Pub 1-02)

naval control of shipping organization. Theorganization within the Navy which carriesout the specific responsibilities of the Chiefof Naval Operations to provide for thecontrol and protection of movements ofmerchant ships in time of war. (Joint Pub1-02)

operational control. Transferable commandauthority that may be exercised bycommanders at any echelon at or below thelevel of combatant command. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatant command(command authority). Operational controlmay be delegated and is the authority toperform those functions of command oversubordinate forces involving organizing andemploying commands and forces, assigningtasks, designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction necessary toaccomplish the mission. Operationalcontrol includes authoritative direction overall aspects of military operations and jointtraining necessary to accomplish missionsassigned to the command. Operationalcontrol should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations.Normally this authority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Operational control normallyprovides full authority to organizecommands and forces and to employ thoseforces as the commander in operationalcontrol considers necessary to accomplishassigned missions. Operational controldoes not, in and of itself, includeauthoritative direction for logistics ormatters of administration, discipline,internal organization, or unit training.Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational control authority. The navalcommander responsible within a specified

geographical area for the operationalcontrol of all maritime forces assigned tohim and for the control of movement andprotection of all merchant shipping underallied naval control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

reduced operational status. Applies to theMilitary Sealift Command ships withdrawnfrom full operations status (FOS)because of decreased operationalrequirements. A ship in reduced operationalstatus is crewed in accordance withshipboard maintenance and possible futureoperational requirements with crew sizepredetermined contractually. The conditionof readiness in terms of calendar daysrequired to attain full operational status isdesignated by the numeral following theacronym ROS (i.e., ROS-5). Also calledROS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sealift readiness program. A programrequiring commitment by US shipowners either under Public Law or as aprecondition for carriage of militarycargo for US flag merchant ships to bemade available to the Department ofDefense in a prescribed number of daysafter call-up by the Secretary of Defense,in coordination with the Secretary ofTransportation. (This term and itsdefinition modifies the existing term anddefinition and is approved for inclusion inthe next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

strategic mobility. The capability to deployand sustain military forces worldwide insupport of national strategy. (Joint Pub1-02)

strategic sealift. The afloat prepositioningand ocean movement of military materialin support of US and allied forces. Sealiftforces include organic and commerciallyacquired shipping and shipping services,including chartered foreign-flag vessels.(Joint Pub 1-02)

GL-7

Glossary

tactical control. Command authority overassigned or attached forces or commands,or military capability or forces madeavailable for tasking, that is limited to thedetailed and, usually, local direction andcontrol of movements or maneuversnecessary to accomplish missions or tasksassigned. Tactical control is inherent inoperational control. Tactical control maybe delegated to, and exercised at any levelat or below the level of combatantcommand. Also called TACON. (Joint Pub1-02)

transportation component command. Thethree component commands ofUSTRANSCOM: Air Force Air MobilityCommand, Navy Military Sealift Command,and Army Military Traffic ManagementCommand. Each transportation componentcommand remains a major command of itsparent Service and continues to organize,train and equip its forces as specified bylaw. Each transportation componentcommand also continues to performService-unique missions. Also called TCC.(Joint Pub 1-02)

type command. An administrativesubdivision of a fleet or force into ships orunits of the same type, as differentiated froma tactical subdivision. Any type commandmay have a flagship, tender, and aircraftassigned to it. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broadcontinuing mission under a singlecommander and composed of forces fromtwo or more Military Departments, andwhich is established by the President,through the Secretary of Defense with theadvice and assistance of the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Joint Pub 1-02)

voluntary tanker agreement. An agreementestablished by the Maritime Administrationto provide for US commercial tankerowners and operators to voluntarily maketheir vessels available to satisfy theDepartment of Defense needs. It isdesigned to meet contingency or warrequirements for point-to-point petroleum,oil and lubricants movements, and not todeal with capacity shortages in resupplyoperations. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

GL-8

Glossary

Joint Pub 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope of project,references, milestones,and who will developdrafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

l

l

l

The CINCS receive the pub andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7, willsolicit a written report from thecombatant commands andServices on the utility and qualityof each pub and the need for anyurgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub is revised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

l

l

l

Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

l

l

l

STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchyas shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 4-01.2 Logistics

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0

PERSONNELand

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 3-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINTWARFARE

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

l

l

l

Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,and Joint Staff

l

l

l

STEP #3Two Drafts

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT PUB 2-0

LOGISTICS

JOINT PUB 4-0

Documents

JP 4-01.2 JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations