JPSU Synopsis- Sen Romeo Dallaire (1)

8/10/2019 JPSU Synopsis- Sen Romeo Dallaire (1)

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Canadian Veterans Advocacy

one veteran, one standard

Canadian Veterans Advocacy1/14

Examination, Evaluation and Recommendations

The Joint Personnel Support Unit

By


27thJanuary 2014

Prepared by:

Sergeant Major (Retd) Barry L. Westholm, CD

At the request of:

Brigadier-General (Retd) J.G.J.C. Barab, OMM, CD

For:

Senator Romeo Dallaire,Lieutenant-General (Retd) O.C., C.M.M., G.O.C, M.S.C., C.D


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Introduction. The Joint Personnel Support Unit (JPSU) replaces an ill-advised

program called the Service Personnel Holding List (SPHL), which was a cobbled

together disaster of an idea. The SPHL was so bad, that unit commanders were not

comfortable sending their ill/injured to this organization for fear of their welfare. Sotoo, the ill and injured realized that a posting to the SPHL was the end of the line fortheir careers, or worse, it was to be forgotten.

This made it a goal then never to get posted to the SPHL or it was curtains for you,

and never to send one of your people to the SPHL for the same reason. The answer

was that the units stood-up their own internal Regimental system for injured and ill

members in unit lines, however this caused a number of issues.

Firstly, the units, in wanting to care for their members, put injured people in jobs

they could handle rather than in their actual profession. In some cases these peoplewere suffering from an Occupational Stress Injury (OSI), such as Post Traumatic

Stress Disorder (PTSD) and although it was done with the best of intentions, it had

debilitating ramifications to the person. By hiding the person and finding work

suitable for them, they also enabled the injury by not addressing it. This, if allowedto continue for any length of time, could far worsen the disorder.

For physical injuries, they could post a person internally in their Regiment to an

Injured Platoon. There the person could recover from their injuries, but more times

than not, when they returned to an active platoon they re-injured themselves

because they were not totally recovered and they went back to the Injured Platoon.In some cases the Injured Platoon was referred to as the place for the sick, lame

and lazy.With this title attached to it, many did not seek aid and in doing so injured

themselves even further, or were so mortified of being there that they returned toduty early, hiding their injuries.

This traditional Injured Platoon also placed demands on the unit that were not in

keeping with the function of the unit, for example infantry. The Infantry Regiment

should be focusing their energy on those skills and being prepared to deploy in

short order fit, trained and effective. What happened with the retention of toomany injured personnel was that the focus blurred and resources shifted.

Injured/ill people require an inordinate amount of administrative overhead,

support and tracking - appointments, paperwork; one-on-one coaching is just a part

of it. The term often used to describe this situation is that 10% of your people took

up 90% of your time, while the other 90% went about their duties with regular

supervision. An injured and ill person was most likely to fall into that 10% of higherthan normal oversight, and this is to be expected.


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In the past, when the numbers of injured personnel in the Injured Platoon became

too great, the only option available was to grudgingly post them to the SPHL where

they languished and "fell through the cracks". The SPHL suffered from

disorganization, non-standardization, low-priority (many times a secondary duty),

inefficiency, poor control, diluted leadership and poor staffing. In many instances

only one person was assigned to run the SPHL per Base and that person, being RegForce, would be posted away leaving it for the next person to deal with. Its

reputation as a military purgatory for injured and ill members was well earned.

The JPSU was designed to replace the SPHL and set a new and respectful tone for

rehabilitating and transitioning ill and injured CAF personnel. It was expected that

when an injured CAF member was posted to the JPSU, that they would have access

to immediate and professional care, services and dedicated military leadership. It

also extended its services to retired veterans, the families of the injured and

maintained contact with all veterans post-release from the JPSU. It was meant to be

everything the SPHL was not and was long overdue.

The JPSU also made available someone called a Regional Adaptive Fitness Specialist

(RAFS) who could design custom physio programs to assist seriously injured people

(amputees for example), to design specialized programs to build up their strength,

increasing confidence and independence. As well RAFS prepared rehabilitation

programs for the less seriously injured to safely speed up their recovery time. The

end result is they could return to duty faster and fully fit, confident and mentally

prepared. (Because of the initial success, injured people were actually requesting to

come to the JPSU for assistance this is not the case anymore).

Why is the JPSU failing? There is a massive disconnect between the Strategic

Headquarters (SHQ) in Ottawa and the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) located in

the eight Regions across Canada. The OHQ is on the frontlines and knows what is

required to fulfill the responsibilities and vision of the JPSU. In my experience in the

JPSU as a Regional Sergeant Major, I spared no amount of effort working with my

last Command Team partner (Major Lyndon Chubbs) in trying to convince the SHQ

to provide us adequate resources. They never came.

As time passed, the problems worsened and with the increase of posted-in and

supported personnel reached a past-critical state. At our last conference in Ottawa,

our dire situation was relayed to SHQ, as were our recommendations to solve theseissues, but to no avail. Then the conversation turned to Mission Failure, and we

were directed specifically that Mission Failure was not an option and to make it

work. Then the discussion turned to what would have to happen to declare Mission

Failure and it was broached that in the case of the civilian staff it would be defined

as 0 personnel left in the JPSU. This is to say, there would have to be nocivilian

staff remaining whatsoever in the entire unit before Mission Failure would even be

considered.


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A suggestion was floated to delay Mission Failure by reducing the amount of Out

Reach (advertising) we were performing. This essentially translated into if we dont

tell them were here, they wont come to us for help and this will keepour numbers

at a steady-state. Then it was suggested by SHQ that perhaps the only way we could

get additional resources was that if the JPSU actually did fail, then they (the highest

brass) would realize that are resources were inadequate. This coined the term in theJPSU: Success is Failure; Failure is Success.

The following points discuss the specifics of the JPSU, Commentary and

recommendations...

JOINT PERSONNEL SUPPORT UNIT: STRUCTURE

Introduction. The structure of the JPSU has been a point of contention from the

outset. Even on stand-up, mid-level leadership knew that a unit (or regimental)

structure was far too light for an organization such as the JPSU. The foundingmembers of mid-level leadership tried to convince the senior leadership of the

difficulties of operating such a vast organization with such a structure, but to no

avail. The following is the culmination of proposals over the years and what is

required to make the JPSU legitimate.

STRATEGIC LEVEL

Strategic Level Structure. The Joint Personnel Support Unit (JPSU) is a coast-to-coast

organization consisting of a Strategic Headquarters (SHQ) located in Ottawa, where

the Commanding Officer is situated. The SHQ controls eight Regionsthroughout Canada, with one of them being Eastern Ontario Region.

Commentary. A Unit or Regimental structure is something very unusual to use for

an organization such as the JPSU. Given that the JPSU stretches coast-to-coast this

would make it the most strained unitin the history of the CAF. The responsibility

of central control of this unit falls to a single double-hatted Colonel (CO JPSU and

DSCM) in Ottawa, making effective oversight and situational awareness impossible.

The once-yearly conferences (cancelled for 2013 due to budget restraints) are

meager and do not lend themselves to unit integrity, morale or efficiency.

Recommendation. The JPSU must be reconfigured in a Formation Structure, with a

General Officer Commanding in Ottawa and a series of Commanding Officers in each

Region.


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OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Operational Level Structure. Using JPSUs Eastern Ontario Region, as an example, is

structured as a Company (Coy) with its Coy Headquarters (CHQ) in Petawawa. This

Coy has four smaller sub-units known as Integrated Personnel Support Centres

(IPSCs) spread throughout the Region, with each IPSC containing a SupportPlatoon. The IPSCsare located in Petawawa, Ottawa, Kingston and Trenton with asmall detachment in North Bay it is very similar to various Regions across Canada.

Eastern Ontario Region is by far the largest (most populous) Region in Canada with

close to 500 ill/injured posted-in and caters to over 1000 non-posted-in that are still

receiving service in one form or another. Over and above this, the IPSCs must also

track recently released members for up to six-months and as well as provide

support to families of injured and ill soldiers. Each IPSC is responsible to get the

word outregarding services to the tens of thousands of people located within its

Region, and must be prepared to back up their words with action. Currently tomanage the entire Region there is an OHQ staff of only four military personnel.

Commentary. Just as a Regimental structure is unsuitable for the JPSU at the

Strategic Level, a Company structure is eminently unsuitable for a Region at the

Operational Level. No Company in existence has 5000 square kilometers to cover,

or the requirement to lead, mentor and support strength of 500 (+) posted-in

personnel and staff, not to mention the other associated duties of the JPSU to

recently retired members and military families.

Recommendation. Each Region should be reconfigured as a Regimental (+) orBrigade (-) structure. There should be a Col/LCol Commanding each Region with anappropriately sized staff.

TACTICAL LEVEL

Tactical Level Structure. The Support Platoon is the front-lines of support for our

injured and ill, recently released members of the JPSU, retired service members and

military families. It carries the enormous responsibility of being the face of this unit

and bears the scrutiny of Unit Commanders to injured Privates alike. Each platoon

contains the smallest structure, the Section; this is the place to where injured and illmembers are assigned to a solitary person the Section Commander (normally a

Sergeant). Adding complexity to the military component of the IPSC is the civilian

component Services. The Services component handles the admin aspects such as

Return To Work and part of Outreach (an information distribution task). Both the

military and civilian components are co-located in a building and together they

make up the Integrated Personnel Support Centre (IPSC). The IPSC itself is led by nosingle person an unusual arrangement.


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Commentary. The platoon structure is wholly impractical for the mission of

supporting and leading injured and ill service members at the tactical level. The size

of some platoons have swollen to approximately 150 people, while still maintaining

the administrative and leadership oversight capabilities of a platoon one Platoon

Commander (Captain) and one Platoon Warrant Officer. This means that it is

impossible for such an undersized leadership component to have proper situationalawareness. At the Section, you can often find a posted-in strength of 40-to-70

people, depending on the platoon. A Section Commander Sergeant has the

formidable task of the day-to-day oversight of a group of people who normally

require extensive administrative and one-on-one interaction. The IPSC itself has no

single point-of-contact no one who is the face of the IPSC. The reason for this is

an ongoing grudge match of who should be in charge of the IPSC a military or

civilian person. This low-level conflict has been allowed to simmer since the

inception of the JPSU, and has caused great inefficiency, tension and at times ill will.

To make things even more complicated the Services Component has a direct

stovepipe communication link to the Strategic Headquarters the SHQ Operations

Officer (Ops O). The SHQ Ops O is unlike any other, this person a civilian) dealsprimarily with the civilian staff at the IPSC bypassing both the RHQ and Support

Platoon Commanders. This makes the communications path extremely convoluted,

and one that is amplified by the JPSU COs policy that any supported member of the

JPSU or CAF can contact the CO directly, and in confidence, without anyknowledge of any of his/her CoC.

Recommendations. Each Platoon Structure must be increased to a Company

Structure (+); there must be depth to the structure as well in the form of Platoon

and Section 2 I.C.s. Currently when a Section Commanders goes on leave, his

charges are passed to other already overborne Section Commanders. Each IPSC

must have an Officer in Charge (OIC) that bridges the military and services

components, and presents a united face of the JPSU and builds unit cohesion at the

tactical level. The stovepipe communication between the Services staff and SHQ

must cease and al comms go through the Regional HQ to the IPSC OIC. The policy of

direct communications surreptitiously to the Commanding Officer must cease and

be replaced by the standard, and well-proven policy of requesting to speak with

ones CO.

JOINT PERSONNEL SUPPORT UNIT: MANNING RATIOS

Near the end of Phase III of the stand-up of the JPSU, it became very apparent to all

those on the frontlines (OHQ and IPSC) that there were significant shortfalls with

the unit. This is not to say they were difficult to overcome, but they were significant

nonetheless and pains were taken to address them. The following org chart is the

actual situation at one Support Platoon in Eastern Ontario Region:


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On the following page is the culmination of proposals over the years of what is

required to make the JPSU manning ratio adequate, in order of precedence:

PlatoonCommander

Platoon Warrant Officer

1

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

By 2013, The manning ratio for the

Kingston Support Platoon becametotally unmanageable. There was no

Section Commander, just a Platoon

Commander and Warrant Officer.(Currently there is only a Platoon

Commander). At its peak, there wereover 70 posted-in injured and ill CAF

members to manage but the

management doesnt stop there.

Due to the unique responsibilities ofthe JPSU, the staff also have to keep in

contact and check-up on recently

released CAF personnel to ensure

they had transitioned satisfactorily tocivilian life. This responsibility is

normally that of the Platoon WarrantOfficer

Over and above this are the normalresponsibilities of leadership and

administration, including bi-annual

Performance Development Reports(PDRs), yearly Performance

Evaluation Reports (PERs) and a host

of other administrative tasks.

Duties unique to the JPSU were

oversight of a Return-To-Work (RTW)

program for each person posted-in.Each posted-in person would be

found and assigned a work

environment conducive to recovery.

Then the Platoon Staff would ensurethat that environment wasmaintained.

This situation was brought up time-

and-again to the senior leadership of

the JPSU, and time-and-again they

denied us resources. There were two

suicides in this platoon and a number

of very complex injuries.

Integrated Personnel Support Centre

Kingston


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TACTICAL LEVEL: IPSC SERVICES and SUPPORT COMPANY

OIC IPSC. The addition of an Officer In Charge (OIC) of the IPSC, Major rank level,

and one per IPSC (currently there is no single person in charge of an IPSC, which is

problematic).

IPSC Sergeant Major. The addition of an IPSC Sergeant Major (Master Warrant

Officer rank level), one per IPSC. This position would provide the senior NCO

leadership required of both the Services and Support Platoon elements.

IPSC Administration. The addition of a Company Clerk (Sergeant/Warrant Officer)

would alleviate the need of.

OIC

IPSC

IPSC Services

Services Manager

Support Platoons

Platoon

Commanders/WO's

Company SergeantMajor

IPSC Clerk


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Platoon Commander. At the Platoon Commander (Captain) Level, a ratio of no morethan 1:4 (Platoon Commanders to Platoon WOs).

Platoon Warrant Officer. At the Platoon Warrant Officer Level, a ratio of no more

than 1:4 (Platoon Warrant Officer to Section Commanders (and their Supported

Troops).

Section Commander. At the Section Commander Level, a maximum ratio of no more

than 1:18 (Section Commander to Supported (Ill and Injured) Troops).

Depth. The addition of 2 I.C. positions for Section Commanders.

"A" PlatoonCommander

Section 1Commander

Posted-InMember

Posted-InMember

10

Section 1

2 I.C.

Section 2Commander

Posted-In

Member

Posted-In

Member

10

Section 2

2I.C.

Section 3Commander

Posted-In

Member

Posted-In

Member

10

Section 3

2I.C.

Platoon WarrantOfficer

The above org chart depicts an adequate structure and staff ratio to support our ill and injured at the Tactical (Platoon/IPSC) Level


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OPERATIONAL LEVEL: REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Regional Commanding Officer. The increase of the Regional Officer Commandingfrom Major to Lieutenant Colonel and authority from OC to CO.

Regional 2 I.C. The addition of a Regional Second-in-Command (Major).

Regional Adjutant. No Change.

Regional Sergeant Major. The increase of the Regional Master Warrant Officer to

Regional Chief Warrant Officer.

Regional Ops. The addition of a Regional Operations cell of one Captain and one

Sergeant.

Regional Administration. The Increase of Regional Clerk Warrant Officer, to Master

Warrant Officer. The addition of appropriate clerical staff (Master

Corporal/Corporal) based on the size of the unit, a minimum two (one Master

Corporal, one Corporal), and an additional Corporal or Master Corporal per 150 pers

posted in to the Region.

Services. The addition of a Regional Services Representative.

RegionalCommanding Officer

IPSC "A"

ServicesSupport

Company

IPSC "B"

ServicesSupport

Company

IPSC "C'

ServicesSupport

Company

IPSC "D"

ServicesSupport

Company

RegionalSergeant Major

RegionalAdjutant

RegionalOperations

Officer

Ops 2 I.C.

Regional Clerk

ClerksAsssisstant

Regional ServicesRep

Regional 2 I.C.


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JOINT PERSONNEL SUPPORT UNIT: POLICY

ANNUITANTS

Situation. When I first heard of the JPSU I was very interested in becoming a part ofit but it was a very unusual procedure to accomplish this. First I had to apply, be

interviewed by three senior officers and then again by the Officer Commanding. If

chosen, I would have to component transfer to the Reserves and become an

annuitant. Why? Well I asked that same question because my Corps (RCEME) was

prepared to allow me a term to be part of the JPSU, but the JPSU leadership did not

want me as a Regular Force soldier.

I was told that the JPSU was looking for mature soldiers with plenty of experience,

something the Regular Forces could provide, but also wanted the stability of a

Reserve soldier (no postings of career moves). This made sense to me so I

component transferred from the Regular Force to the Reserves and became what isknown as a Class B Reservist annuitant. The first generation of JPSU staff all went

through this vetting process and I believe it brought an exemplary staff to the JPSU.

I heard nothing but high praise for the staff at the IPSC level, made up almost

entirely of annuitants. This, I believe, is largely because they have all volunteered to

be there and have put their experience, leadership ability, maturity and dedication

into this project. This is a critical characteristic to maintain in the JPSU Staff, and

ironically the annuitant policy worked to ensure that the JPSU got the best there is.

Unfortunately only two years into the life of the JPSU, it was told to us that all

positions would be converted to Reg Force positions.

In doing so, the JPSU ended the critical vetting process and the philosophy of a

stable, mature, highly trained and committed staff. In the Ombudsmans Report on

the JPSU, there is mention of the Deputy Minister providing exemptions for the

hiring of 46 Class B personnel, but I am fairly certain that these are the same 46

identified in 2012 not as new positions, but as temporarily spared (from Reg Force

conversions). Also, there is mention in the report of development of a candidate

profile interview. This, I suspect is the interview process all original staff members

went through, but was cancelled.

Recommendation. If the staff of the JPSU is offered exceptions, then it will attract a

large number of applicants, from which the best can be chosen - this is an

exceptional mechanism to use to get the best people for a particularly tough job.

These annuitants, have tackled the stigma of the SPHL, worked to remove the stigma

of OSI's, added to the efficiency of the Regular Force Units from which they all came,

so of course the CAF changed the policy it was working too good for its own good!


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The use of annuitants also brings in the element of stability these injured troops

require a stable environment and stable leadership and not to have their Section

Commanders and Warrant Officers posted in and out at the needs of the Reg Force.

The effects of this on the injured from the medical staff changing over are difficultenough - the specter of both changing would be chaotic and traumatizing to them atbest.

But annuitants are not the only means, I have suggested that the JPSU become its

own trade which would also allow this stability, as would it be if belonged

to temporary component of the Cadet Organizations Administration and Training

Service (COATS), which would allow for the employment of the seriously injuredthemselves (this one is a stretch).

UNIVERSALITY OF SERVICE

Situation. I understand and support the requirement of the Universality of Service

(UoS) but I also understand the principles of war and the need for flexibility. The

government owns the UoS and can amend it or leave it as is and give a very specialunit such as the JPSU, a means to temporarily circumvent it.

Recommendation. If the JPSU was given a notwithstanding option to retain injured

troops for employment within the JPSU, they could fill our shortfalls with select

injured personnel for three-year, renewable, contract extensions which would help

the unit immensely. It would also I believe, be very popular with veterans and thecivilian populous alike.

ACCOMMODATION

Situation. There is a policy in the CAF that if a trade were under-strength

accommodation could be made to retain an injured person for a length of time. The

logic is that since the trade is under-strength, releasing the member would hurt the

trade even more; so this policy would allow retention, trade health while not

making the trade over-borne. However, if the trade was at strength, no

accommodation would be made because there was no need. And, if the person waskept, it would make the trade over-borne affecting personnel management andmovement throughout the trade group.

If a person was injured and sent to the JPSU, he or she was out of the trade stream so

to speak. Also, if this person was facing certain release, it was a given that the JPSU

was the place to be. However, when the JPSU was in dire need of specific tradespecialties we could not offer them an accommodation. Why?


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Because the accommodation policy still effected them even though they had nothing

to do with their trade, trade management or postings. For example, we desperately

required administrative staff at the JPSU, and we had some of the most experienced

administrative clerks in the CAF on the road to release. Many would have stayed to

assist the JPSU, but their trades were at strength so the policy wouldnt allow us to

accommodate them even though this would have absolutely no effect on theirtrade group.

Recommendation. If the JPSU was given a notwithstanding option to retain injured

troops for employment within the JPSU, they could fill the shortfalls with select

injured personnel for three-year, renewable, contract extensions which would help

the unit immensely and not hurt the trade group one iota. It would also I believe, be

very popular with veterans and the civilian populous alike.

TRAINING

Situation. The staff of the JPSU, particularly the front-line staff, has an

unprecedented amount of responsibility, unconventionality and stress, yet they are

not allowed to take the adequate training for the job. For example, never in the

history of the CAF will you find a Colonel in the Section commanded by a Sergeant

this is unheard of. But this is the day-to-day responsibility of a JPSU Section

Commander. To interact respectfully with a higher rank in your section takes tact,

discipline, respect and finesse. While I was a Sergeant major in the JPSU, I attempted

to get my Sergeants and Warrant Officers on available leadership courses where

they could receive higher-level training, especially in communication and

chairmanship this training was denied them.

Also, the JPSU front-line staff has an inordinate amount of interaction with soldier

suffering from OSIs such as PTSD. I tried to get these troops training on this subject,

but it was denied them. The same holds true for resiliency training, as these front-

line staff must interact with terribly injured soldiers and their family members it issomething that can be very difficult on a person. This training was denied them.

Recommendation. The CAF must train the staff working at the JPSU adequately; this

includes, but is not limited to, resiliency, leadership, communication and disputeresolution training.


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SUMMARY

The JPSU was designed to rectify the shortfalls of the SPHL but despite a great start

and vision, it is failing because of inflexibility, outdated or dysfunctional policy, poor

staff manning, questionable structure, unimaginative leadership, and intestinal

fortitude - indeed it has coasted to a stop and is now reverting back to an SPHL typeorganization.

When the JPSU first stood-up, things were manageable as the ratio between posted-

in personnel and support personnel were adequate. Also, in the move to stand-up

the organization, much effort was expended in this task and there was not much

time to take account of how we were doing; but the JPSUsnumbers have increased

steadily. My model, Eastern Ontario Region, now has the numbers that the entire

JPSU had only two years ago, and this normally would be a great and celebrated

milestone - but it is not it is instead a cause for alarm.

For some reason, the senior leadership of the JPSU and CMP will not address the

issues facing this important unit and the results I do believe have been mortal, or

have played a part through negligence, of the deaths of CAF veterans. It would be a

shame to lose what we have gained so far, and not to build on our success. The JPSU

is truly Canadian in every respect and takes care of those who gave an oath to

serve Canada, and when asked, gave of their bodies and minds to fulfill that oath -

they do not deserve another SPHL called the JPSU.

The JPSU model should have been stood-up in 1914, and should it have been, we

would have saved countless lives of Canadian soldiers, and our Country would havebeen the better for it. But it was not. Instead, those that read this paper are

encouraged to make up for the lost opportunities of our predecessors and the

mismanagement of our contemporaries we must act where they did not.

// Signed //

Sergeant Major (retd) Barry L. Westholm, CD

Director, Canadian Forces Engagement


Documents

JPSU Synopsis- Sen Romeo Dallaire (1)