JS S BARRIS TERS RULES...3.56 • west edmonton mall property inc v proctor, 2020 abqb 161 3.68 • snaychuk v edmonton (city) ... • poole v city wide towing and recovery service

ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS

Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP

JSS BA RRI STERS RULES A P R I L 2 0 2 0

Volume 2 Issue 17

Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP is pleased to provide summaries of recent Court Decisions which consider the Alberta Rules of Court. Our website, www.jssbarristers.ca, also features a fully searchable Rules database containing all past summaries up to, and including, our latest release. Below is a list of the Rules (and corresponding decisions which apply or interpret those Rules) that are addressed in the case summaries that follow.

1.1 • ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2020ABQB107

1.2 • FRANIELVTORONTO-DOMINIONBANK,2020ABQB66

• PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB87





• ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2020ABQB107

• GOCOMMUNITYCENTREVCLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTD,2020ABQB203

• NOVAPOLEINTERNATIONALINC.VPERMASTEELCONSTRUCTIONLTD,2020ABCA45

• OZARKRESOURCESLTDVTERICPOWERLTD,2020ABCA51

1.3 • STISIDORECO-OPLIMITEDVAGGROWTHINTERNATIONALINC,2020ABQB94

2.11 • TAVALBERTA(CHILDREN’SSERVICES),2020ABQB97

2.22 • FITZPATRICKVCOLLEGEOFPHYSICALTHERAPISTSOFALBERTA,2020ABCA88


3.15 • QUAYEVLAWSOCIETYOFALBERTA,2020ABQB55

• AL-GHAMDIVCOLLEGEANDASSOCIATIONOFREGISTEREDNURSESOFALBERTA,2020ABCA81

• WILCOXVALBERTA,2020ABCA104

3.27 • REYESVDYCK,2020ABQB154

3.28 • AL-GHAMDIVCOLLEGEANDASSOCIATIONOFREGISTEREDNURSESOFALBERTA,2020ABCA81

3.37 • OMNIARCHCAPITALCORPORATIONVBISHOP,2020ABQB102


3.44 • PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB89


3.56 • WESTEDMONTONMALLPROPERTYINCVPROCTOR,2020ABQB161

3.68 • SNAYCHUKVEDMONTON(CITY)2020ABQB1

• PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERSINCVPERPETUALENERGYINC,2020ABQB6

• SMITHVMOORE-JUZWISHIN,2020ABQB49

• QUAYEVLAWSOCIETYOFALBERTA,2020ABQB55

• FRANIELVTORONTO-DOMINIONBANK,2020ABQB66



ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 2

JSS BARR IST E RS RULES





• STISIDORECO-OPLIMITEDVAGGROWTHINTERNATIONALINC,2020ABQB94

• TAVALBERTA(CHILDREN’SSERVICES),2020ABQB97


• JRB’SWELDINGSERVICESINCVFAMILYDIVISION,2020ABQB126

• WESTEDMONTONMALLPROPERTYINCVPROCTOR,2020ABQB161

• YAREMKEVICHVJACULA,2020ABQB175

• RUDICHUKVGENESISLANDDEVELOPMENTCORP,2020ABCA42


• WILCOXVALBERTA,2020ABCA104

3.75 • PROSPERPETROLEUMLTDVHERMAJESTYTHEQUEENINRIGHTOFALBERTA,2020ABQB128







4.22 • CONOCOPHILLIPSCANADAOPERATIONSLTDV1835651ALBERTALTD,2020ABQB14

• PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERSINCVPERPETUALENERGYINC,2020ABCA36

• PIIKANINATIONVRAYMONDJAMESLTD,2020ABCA41

• PACERHOLDINGSCONSTRUCTIONCORPORATIONVRICHARDPELLETIERHOLDINGSINC,

2020ABCA47

• POOLEVCITYWIDETOWINGANDRECOVERYSERVICELTD,2020ABCA102

4.23 • PACERHOLDINGSCONSTRUCTIONCORPORATIONVRICHARDPELLETIERHOLDINGSINC,

2020ABCA47

4.29 • DIRKVTOEWS,2020ABQB16

• DAYVWOODBURN,2020ABQB75

• STALZER(ESTATE)VSTALZER,2020ABQB160


• OMNIARCHCAPITALCORPORATIONVBISHOP,2020ABQB102


• LOFSTROMVRADKE,2020ABQB122

• ATWALVGILL,2020ABQB146





• LOFSTROMVRADKE,2020ABQB122

• ATWALVGILL,2020ABQB146


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Volume 2 Issue 17

www.jssbarristers.ca

5.1 • GOCOMMUNITYCENTREVCLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTD,2020ABQB203



5.13 • BEHMVHANSEN,2020ABQB52

• OMNIARCHCAPITALCORPORATIONVBISHOP,2020ABQB102

5.15 • 1490703ALBERTALTDVCHAHAL,2020ABQB33

• COUNTYOFVULCANVGENESISRECIPROCALINSURANCEEXCHANGE,2020ABQB93

5.25 • FRANIELVTORONTO-DOMINIONBANK,2020ABQB66

5.29 • COUNTYOFVULCANVGENESISRECIPROCALINSURANCEEXCHANGE,2020ABQB93



5.34 • NOVAPOLEINTERNATIONALINC.VPERMASTEELCONSTRUCTIONLTD,2020ABCA45

6.3 • OZARKRESOURCESLTDVTERICPOWERLTD,2020ABCA51



6.10 • NEXENENERGYULCVITPSA,2020ABQB83

6.11 • 1490703ALBERTALTDVCHAHAL,2020ABQB33


• WESTMANVELGER,2020ABQB125

6.14 • KUZOFFVTALISMANPERUBVSUCURSALDELPERU,2020ABQB111

• SSCNORTHAMERICA,LLCVFEDERKIEWICZ,2020ABQB176


7.3 • PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERSINCVPERPETUALENERGYINC,2020ABQB6

• 1490703ALBERTALTDVCHAHAL,2020ABQB33

• FRANIELVTORONTO-DOMINIONBANK,2020ABQB66


• COUNTYOFVULCANVGENESISRECIPROCALINSURANCEEXCHANGE,2020ABQB93

• TAVALBERTA(CHILDREN’SSERVICES),2020ABQB97

• KUZOFFVTALISMANPERUBVSUCURSALDELPERU,2020ABQB111

• WESTEDMONTONMALLPROPERTYINCVPROCTOR,2020ABQB161

• SSCNORTHAMERICA,LLCVFEDERKIEWICZ,2020ABQB176

• RUDICHUKVGENESISLANDDEVELOPMENTCORP,2020ABCA42


7.7 • WESTMANVELGER,2020ABQB125

7.11 • WESTMANVELGER,2020ABQB125


9.2 • WESTEDMONTONMALLPROPERTYINCVPROCTOR,2020ABQB161

9.4 • SNAYCHUKVEDMONTON(CITY)2020ABQB1





9.4 • QUAYEVLAWSOCIETYOFALBERTA,2020ABQB55


• JRB’SWELDINGSERVICESINCVFAMILYDIVISION,2020ABQB126

• YAREMKEVICHVJACULA,2020ABQB175

9.15 • KIMVCHOI,2020ABQB51

• 801SEVENTHINCVCNOOCPETROLEUMNORTHAMERICAULC,2020ABQB198

10.10 • FLEMINGVFLEMING,2020ABQB85

10.11 • FLEMINGVFLEMING,2020ABQB85

10.28 • SELLERSVSELLERS,2020ABQB79

10.29 • BLOUGHVBUSYMUSICINC,2020ABQB19

• CRESSMANESTATE(RE),2020ABQB42

• ELDERADVOCATESOFALBERTASOCIETYVALBERTA,2020ABQB54

• QUAYEVLAWSOCIETYOFALBERTA,2020ABQB55


• SELLERSVSELLERS,2020ABQB79

• MOTTAVDAVISWIREINDUSTRIESLTD,2020ABQB136



10.30 • SELLERSVSELLERS,2020ABQB79

10.31 • ELDERADVOCATESOFALBERTASOCIETYVALBERTA,2020ABQB54




10.32 • ELDERADVOCATESOFALBERTASOCIETYVALBERTA,2020ABQB54



• BLOUGHVBUSYMUSICINC,2020ABQB19

• CRESSMANESTATE(RE),2020ABQB42

• ELDERADVOCATESOFALBERTASOCIETYVALBERTA,2020ABQB54

• ANNETTVENTERPRISERENT-A-CARCANADALTD,2020ABQB74






• ALKADRIVALKADRI,2020ABCA82



10.42 • CANLANKAVENTURESLTDVCAPITALDIRECTLENDINGCORP,2020ABQB96

10.48 • CONOCOPHILLIPSCANADAOPERATIONSLTDV1835651ALBERTALTD,2020ABQB14


10.53 • LYMER(RE),2020ABQB157

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Volume 2 Issue 17




11.27 • 801SEVENTHINCVCNOOCPETROLEUMNORTHAMERICAULC,2020ABQB198



12.36 • BLANEYVMURPHY,2020ABQB196

13.6 • KOCHVKOCH,2020ABQB65

• ANNETTVENTERPRISERENT-A-CARCANADALTD,2020ABQB74

• STISIDORECO-OPLIMITEDVAGGROWTHINTERNATIONALINC,2020ABQB94

13.7 • JRB’SWELDINGSERVICESINCVFAMILYDIVISION,2020ABQB126






14.5 • STEWARTVSCHUMACHER,2020ABQB133

• HAYDENVHAYDEN,2020ABCA37

• OZARKRESOURCESLTDVTERICPOWERLTD,2020ABCA51

• ALKADRIVALKADRI,2020ABCA82


14.8 • GEZEHEGNVALBERTA(APPEALSCOMMISSIONOFTHEWORKERS’COMPENSATIONBOARD),

2020ABCA48

14.14 • PACEVECONOMICALMUTUALINSURANCECOMPANY,2020ABCA67


14.37 • PIIKANINATIONVRAYMONDJAMESLTD,2020ABCA41

• GEZEHEGNVALBERTA(APPEALSCOMMISSIONOFTHEWORKERS’COMPENSATIONBOARD),

2020ABCA48




14.46 • EDMONTON(POLICESERVICE)VDELUCA,2020ABCA31

14.47 • KENTVMACDONALD,2020ABCA91

• RANCHERCONSTRUCTIONLTDVSCOTTCONSTRUCTION(ALBERTA)LTD,2020ABCA112


• PROSPERPETROLEUMLTDVHERMAJESTYTHEQUEENINRIGHTOFALBERTA,2020ABCA85



14.57 • PROSPERPETROLEUMLTDVHERMAJESTYTHEQUEENINRIGHTOFALBERTA,2020ABCA85








• KENTVMACDONALD,2020ABCA91

14.67 • PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERSINCVPERPETUALENERGYINC,2020ABCA36


• PACERHOLDINGSCONSTRUCTIONCORPORATIONVRICHARDPELLETIERHOLDINGSINC,

2020ABCA47

• POOLEVCITYWIDETOWINGANDRECOVERYSERVICELTD,2020ABCA102


14.72 • EDMONTON(POLICESERVICE)VDELUCA,2020ABCA31

SCHEDULE C • ANNETTVENTERPRISERENT-A-CARCANADALTD,2020ABQB74

• CANLANKAVENTURESLTDVCAPITALDIRECTLENDINGCORP,2020ABQB96



ALSTON V HAYWOOD SECURITIES INC, 2020 ABQB 107 (EAMON J)Rules 1.1 (What These Rules Do), 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 4.1 (Responsibilities of Parties to Manage Litigation), 4.2 (What the Responsibility Includes), 4.4 (Standard Case Obligations), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay), 6.11 (Evidence at application hearings), 6.37 (Notice to Admit) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)

EamonJ.dealtwithanAppealofaMaster’sDecisionto

dismissthePlaintiffs’Actiononthebasisofdelaypursuant

toRules4.31and4.33(the“UnderlingAction”).The

MasterdismissedtheUnderlyingActionpursuanttoRule

4.31againstallDefendantsduetothePlaintiffs’delay

inmovingtheActionforwardandtheresultingprejudice

sufferedbytheDefendants.TheMasteralsowouldhavealso

dismissedtheUnderlyingActionpursuanttoRule4.33.

TheAppellantsraisedconcernsthattheMasterhadignored

theirsubmissionsgenerallyandspecificallywithrespect

tothechronologyoftheUnderlyingActioncontained

predominantlyintheirResponsetoNoticetoAdmitFacts.

JusticeEamonreviewedtheapplicableRulesof6.37,

6.11,13.18andrejectedthisassertion.HisLordship

foundthataNoticetoAdmitunderRule6.37callson

anopposingpartytoprovideadmissionstodispensewith

proofofspecificfacts;however,therequiredexplanation

isnotevidencethatcanbeusedagainstthepartyseeking

theadmission.Topermitthatusewouldcircumventthe

requirementforproperAffidavitsorotheradmissible

evidenceonApplicationsunderRules6.11and13.18and

defeattheobjectivesofefficientandfairproceedingsunder

theFoundationalRules1.1and1.2.JusticeEamonfound,

inessence,thatthisuseofRule6.37wouldallowaparty

onwhomaNoticetoAdmitisservedtomakewideranging

assertionsoffactwithoutanymeansofchallengebycross-

examination.

JusticeEamonreviewedthefactualhistorybetweenthe

partiesandconcludedthattheAppellantshadfailedto

complywiththeirobligationsundereachofRules4.1,

4.2and4.4.Namely,theyfailedtoeffectivelymanagethe

litigationbyfailingtodisclosevariousrecordswhichthey

knewtheDefendantswanted(Rules1.2(2)(d)and4.2(a)),

andfailedtocooperateinschedulingarecordsproduction

Applicationonthespeciallistknowingthatthereasonable

deadlinefordiscovery(identifiedbytheparties)hadlong

passed(Rule4.4(1)(b)).Accordingly,JusticeEamon

dismissedtheAppeal.

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Volume 2 Issue 17


FRANIEL V TORONTO-DOMINION BANK, 2020 ABQB 66 (MASTER ROBERTSON)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 5.25 (Appropriate Questions and Objections) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

ThiswasanApplicationforanOrdertocompelthe

Defendanttoanswerquestionsandproviderepliesto

UndertakingsfromtheQuestioningofitscorporate

representative.Beforebeginninghisanalysis,Master

RobertsonnotedthatitseemedtheDefendant’sposition

wasthatitowednodutyofcaretothePlaintiffandthatit

wasnotobligedtoprovidecandidanswerstothequestions

thatwereasked–henotedthatifthisbeliefguidedthe

objectionstothequestionsitwasanerror.Thescopeof

questionsthatapartyisallowedtoaskisdeterminedby

thepleadings,andtherewasnoApplicationbroughtbythe

DefendanttostrikepursuanttoRule3.68noranApplication

forSummaryDismissalpursuanttoRule7.3.Inaddition,

Rule1.2directsallpartiestousetheRulesto“toprovide

aneffective,efficient,andcrediblesystemofremediesand

sanctionstoenforcetheserulesandordersandjudgments.”

OneofthequestionstheDefendantobjectedtowas

regardingwhomadethedecisiontorefusethePlaintiff’s

compensation,claimingthattheanswerwassubjectto

litigationprivilege.MasterRobertsonexplainedthatthe

propergroundsofobjectionwerelistedinRule5.25(2),

andamongstthemwas“anyothergroundrecognizedat

law”.Henotedthatinformationtoidentifyawitnessisnot

privileged.Further,caselawsuggestedthatifarational

strategyexistedforwantingtoknowtheanswertoa

question,thenitshouldbesufficient,andinthisinstance

therewasarationalstrategyforwantingtoknowtheanswer

tothequestion.MasterRobertsonfoundtheDefendant’s

absoluterefusaltoanswerthequestiontroublingandnoted

thatiftheycontinuedtoassertthattheanswerwasnot

relevant,theywouldhaveadifficulttimeiftheydecidedto

adduceevidencelateratTrial.

MasterRobertsondetermined,amongstotherthings,thatan

Orderwouldbeissuedwithspecificdirectionsregardingthe

objectionsthatweregiventoquestionsandUndertakingrequests.

PIIKANI NATION V MCMULLEN, 2020 ABQB 87 (ROOKE ACJ)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules) and 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

ThiswasanApplicationbytheDefendant,McMullen,

seekingleaveto“recuse”AssociateChiefJusticeRooke

fromhearingmattersasCaseManagementJusticeinthese

Actions.ThePlaintiffopposedtheApplication,arguingthat

itwasfrivolous,irrelevantorimproper,anabuseofprocess,

andthatitdisclosednoreasonablelikelihoodofsuccess

pursuanttoRule3.68(2).AssociateChiefJusticeRooke

agreed,giventhattheDefendanthadmostlyprovidedbare

allegationsandunsubstantiatedconclusorystatements.

ThePlaintiffalsoopposedtheApplicationbecauseitdid

“notgotoresolvingtherealissueindisputeorfacilitatethe

quickestmeansofresolvingtheclaimattheleastexpense”

andwasthereforeinconsistentwithRule1.2.Associate

ChiefJusticeRookeagreed.TheDefendant’sApplication

wasdismissedwithCosts.

PIIKANI NATION V MCMULLEN, 2020 ABQB 88 (ROOKE ACJ)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules) and 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

IntwocomplexActionsjointlymanagedbyAssociateChief

JusticeRooke,theself-representedDefendant,McMullen,

broughtsixApplicationsforleaveseekingtochallengethe

conductofvariouslawfirmsandtheCourt.AssociateChief

JusticeRookedecidedeachApplicationforleaveseparately.

InoneApplicationforleave,theDefendantsought

disqualificationofalawfirmactingforpartiesadverse

ininteresttohim,whetherwithrespecttotheActions

generallyorwithrespecttoarelateddisqualification

Applicationbroughtagainstanotherlawfirm.TheCourtwas

notsatisfiedthattheDefendanthadofferedanyevidence

orlegalpropositiontoestablishaconflictofinterestor

abuseofprocess,andnotingnoreasonablelikelihoodof

success,deniedleave.Moreover,AssociateChiefJustice

RookeidentifiedtheDefendant’spursuitofdisqualification

asacolourableattempttoinduceaconflictofintereston

whichtogroundthedisqualification,constitutinganabuse

ofprocesscontrarytoRules3.68(2)and1.2.




PIIKANI NATION V MCMULLEN, 2020 ABQB 89 (ROOKE ACJ)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 3.44 (When Third Party Claim May be Filed), 3.45 (Form of Third Party Claim), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)

TheDefendant,McMullen,soughtleavetobringaThird

PartyClaimagainstseveralindividualsandlawfirms

(the“ProposedThirdParties”).TheCaseManagement

JusticedeniedtheleaveApplicationforseveralreasons

including:theDefendantfailedtofileandservetheThird

PartyClaimsunderRule3.45(c)(i)withinsixmonthsof

filinghisStatementofDefence;theCourtfoundtherehad

beeninordinatedelaybytheDefendant,andtherewereno

credibleorreasonableexcusesforthedelay;andtherewas

noreasonablelikelihoodofsuccess.

TheDefendantattemptedtoexplaintheinordinatedelayby

arguinghe“wasdisinclinedtotakestepswhichmayhave

theeffectofresettingthethreeyear‘dropdead’clock”

pursuanttoRule4.33,buttheCourtfoundthatthereasons

forthedelayvis-à-visthePlaintiffinrespectofRule4.33

donothaverelevancetothedelayvis-à-vistheProposed

ThirdParties.

TheDefendantalsotriedtoclaimcontributionfromthe

ProposedThirdPartiesunderRule3.44butfailedtoallege

adutyowedbytheProposedThirdPartiestohimself.The

CourtconfirmedthataThirdPartyClaimcannotbeusedto

enforcedutiesowedbytheProposedThirdPartiestothe

Plaintiff.

TheCourtfoundtheDefendant’sfailuretoproceedina

timelybasiswasanabuseofprocessunderRule1.2and

determinedithadnolikelihoodofsuccessunderRule

3.68.RookeA.C.J.dismissedtheApplication.

PIIKANI NATION V MCMULLEN, 2020 ABQB 90 (ROOKE ACJ)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of these Rules), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 5.33 (Confidentiality and Use of Information)

IntwocomplexActionsjointlymanagedbyAssociateChief

JusticeRooke,aselfrepresentedDefendant(“McMullen”)

broughtanApplicationforleave(the“TPCLeave

Application”)toassertaThirdPartyClaimagainstseveral

CIBCentitiesandBlake,Cassels&GraydonLLP(“Blakes”).

Inresponse,BlakesbroughtanApplicationforleave

tostriketheTPCLeaveApplication(the“StrikeLeave

Application”)andJensenShawaSolomonDuguidHawkes

LLP(“JSS”)broughtanApplicationforleavetofind

McMullenincontemptofCourt(the“ContemptLeave

Application”).

AssociateChiefJusticeRookestayedtheTPCLeave

ApplicationuntilfurtherCourtOrder,astheApplication

couldnotproceeduntilthesubstanceoftheStrike

LeaveApplicationandContemptLeaveApplicationwere

determined.

InconsideringtheContemptLeaveApplication,Associate

ChiefJusticeRookefoundthatleaveshouldbegranted

onanApplicationiftheApplicationdoesnotconflictwith

thepurposesoftheRules,asoutlinedinRule1.2,and

disclosesareasonablelikelihoodofsuccesspursuantto

Rule3.68.AssociateChiefJusticeRookefoundthatthere

wassomeevidenceofMcMullen’scontemptandgranted

JSSleavetomaketheContemptLeaveApplication.

InconsideringtheStrikeLeaveApplication,Blakesargued

thatMcMullenhadrelieduponprivilegeddocumentsand

recordsthataresubjecttotheimpliedundertakingrule

ascodifiedinRule5.33.Specifically,Blakesallegedthat

McMullenreliedoninformationfromanotherActionwhich

McMullenwasnotapartyto,withoutCourtOrderand

withoutconsent,contrarytoRule5.33.AssociateChief

JusticeRookefoundthattheargumenthadsomemeritand

mettherequirementsforleaveunderRules1.2and3.68.

HisLordshipalsograntedBlakesleavetomaketheStrike

LeaveApplication.

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PIIKANI NATION V MCMULLEN, 2020 ABQB 92 (ROOKE ACJ)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 4.1 (Responsibilities of Parties to Manage Litigation), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

TheDefendant,DaleMcMullen(“McMullen”),broughtan

ApplicationforleaveregardingtheunderlyingActionof

Piikani Nation (Nation) et al v McMullen et al,QBAction

No.100110326(the“UnderlyingAction”),tostrikeor

dismisstheUnderlyingActionpursuanttoRules4.31,

4.33,7.3,or3.68.Inthefourthalternative,McMullen

soughtleavetobringanApplicationtostriketheUnderlying

ActionforbreachofacovenantbythePiikaniNation(the

“Nation”)tocausethePiikaniInvestmentCorporation

(“PIC”)totakeinsurancetoindemnifyMcMullenforlosses

andinjuryallegedintheUnderlyingAction(collectively

the“LeaveApplication”).Thiswasthesixthsuchleave

decisionintheUnderlyingAction(“LeaveDecision#6”).

RookeA.C.J.,astheCaseManagementJustice,referenced

andrepeatedmuchofthehistoricalsettinggivingrise

totheotherfivedecisionsprecedingLeaveDecision#6.

Reviewingthecomplexproceduralhistoryamongthe

parties,AssociateChiefJusticeRookefoundthatthe

UnderlyingActioninvolvedcomplexmattersoffactandlaw

thatcouldnotbeclearlydeterminedwithoutacomplete

Trial.HisLordshipnotedfurtherthattheNation’sclaims

intheUnderlyingActionwerenothopelessunderRule

3.68,asitwasnotplainandobviousthattheycouldnot

succeed.Further,AssociateChiefJusticeRookenoted

thattheallegedagreementwhichMcMullenreliedupon

forthefourthalternativereliefwasclearlystillinissue,

astheNationhaddeniedthattheallegedagreementwas

validorenforceable.Accordingly,AssociateChiefJustice

RookedeniedMcMullen’sLeaveApplicationpertainingto

SummaryDismissalunderRule7.3,abuseofprocessunder

Rule3.68;andtheallegedbreachofcovenant.

TurningtothereliefsoughtunderRules4.31and4.33,

AssociateChiefJusticeRookefoundthattheremaybe

“oddstaken”onwhetherMcMullen’sproposedApplications

undertheseRuleswouldbesuccessful,andwhatCosts

mayflowfromadecisiononthoseissues.Accordingly,

AssociateChiefJusticeRookeconcludedbyallowingthe

LeaveApplicationtoproceedonthesetwoheadsofrelief.

HisLordshipcautionedthatallaspectsoftheUnderlying

ActioncontinuetointerferewithRule1.2,andreiterated

theobligationofthepartiestoresolvetherealissuesin

disputebyfacilitatingthequickestmeansofresolvingthe

disputeattheleastexpenseanddelay.

HisLordshipconcludedbynotingthatLeaveDecision

#6wasstayeduntilfurtherOrderoftheCourt,withthe

intentthatitwouldcontinuetobestayeduntiltheissue

ofMcMullen’sotheroutstandingApplicationtodisqualify

GowlingsLLPastheNation’scounselwasdetermined.

GO COMMUNITY CENTRE V CLARK BUILDERS AND STANTEC CONSULTING LTD, 2020 ABQB 203 (RENKE J)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of these Rules), 5.1 (Purpose of this Part), 5.4 (Appointment of Corporate Representatives), 5.6 (Form and Contents of Affidavit of Records), 6.6 (Response and Reply to Application), 10.29 (General Rules for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award), 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award), 10.35 (Preparation of Bill of Costs), 10.48 (Recovery of Goods and Service Tax) and Schedule C

TheDefendantssuccessfullyappealedfromtheDecision

ofaMasterdismissingtheirApplicationtosummarily

dismisstheclaimsagainstthem.TheirAppealswere

allowed,andtheclaimsagainstthemweresummarily

dismissed.ThepartiescouldnotagreeastoCosts,sothey

providedwrittensubmissionstoRenkeJ.TheDefendants

werewhollysuccessfulonAppealandthereforeentitled

toCosts–buttheyalsosoughtelevatedCosts,Costs

respectinganuncontestedthird-partyproductionOrder,

extraCostsonaccountofa“latefiled”Affidavitbya

witnessforthePlaintiff,Costsforsecondcounselon

Appeal,disbursementsforatranscript,andrepaymentof

theCostsawardedbytheMasterintheDecisionbelow.The

PlaintiffalsoquestionedwhetherGSTwaspayableonthe

Defendants’CostsunderRule10.48.




Attheoutset,RenkeJ.notedthatthePlaintiffhadeither

expresslyorimplicitlyconcededthatCostswereowedtothe

DefendantsastheyhadbeenwhollysuccessfulonAppeal,

thatsecondcounselCostsonAppealshouldbeallowed,

thattheDefendantsshouldrecovertheCoststheypaid

pursuanttotheMaster’sOrderintheDecisionbelow,andthat

disbursementsforTranscriptsshouldbeincluded.However,

thepartiescouldnotagreeontheelevatedCostssoughtby

theDefendants,Costsrespectinganuncontestedthird-party

productionOrder,ortheDefendants’entitlementtoextraCosts

relatingtoa“latefiled”AffidavitbyawitnessforthePlaintiff.

RenkeJ.consideredthePlaintiff’sassertionthatthe

DefendantswerenotentitledtoGSTaspartoftheirCosts.

PursuanttoRule10.48(2),GSTcannotbeclaimedwhere

theamountisrebate-ableorrefundableundertheExcise

Tax Act,RSC1985,cE-15.RenkeJ.alsoreferenced

thewarrantyundertheGSTclaiminaForm44Billof

CostscontemplatedbyRule10.35(1).HisLordshipnoted

thattheDefendantshadnotbeenabletorespondtothis

assertion,andorderedtheDefendantstodosowithin45

days,failingwhichtheywouldbedeemedtohaveconceded

thatGSTwasnotpayable.

RenkeJ.didnotagreewiththePlaintiff’sassertionthat

theDefendantsshouldnotbeawardedCostsrelatingto

anuncontestedthird-partyproductionOrderbecausethe

informationsoughtthroughtheOrderwas“duplicative”,

andRenkeJ.thereforeawardedthoseCosts.

HisLordshipthenconsideredwhethertheDefendants

wereentitledtoextraCostsonaccountofthePlaintiff’s

“latefiled”Affidavit,andnotedthatpursuanttoRules

6.6(1)and(3),Affidavits(andotherevidence)aretobe

servedontheotherparties“areasonabletimebeforethe

[A]pplicationistobeheardorconsidered”,andthat“the

Courtmayimpose[C]ostsonthepartywhodidnotgive

reasonablenotice”.RenkeJ.heldthattheAffidavithad

beenfiledwithinareasonableperiodoftimebeforethe

Applicationwasheard,andthereforetheDefendantswere

notentitledtoCostsrelatingtoit.

RenkeJ.nextconsideredtheDefendants’claimsfor

elevatedCosts.BothDefendantsclaimedforCostsbased

onColumn5ofScheduleC,withdifferentmultipliers.

OneDefendantalsoalternativelysoughtCostsonapartial

indemnitybasisat54%ofitslegalfees.ThePlaintiff

arguedthattheDefendantsshouldbeentitledtoCosts

basedonColumn4ofScheduleC,withamultiplierof

1.5toaccountforinflation.HisLordshipnotedthatthe

RuleswereamendedonMarch17,2020tosubstitutea

newDivision2tariffforScheduleC,whichadjustedthe

columnrangesupward,andwhichrelieved“someofthe

inflationarypressuremotivatingdifferentapproachesto[C]

osts”.However,thematterbeforeRenkeJ.wasrequiredto

bedecidedundertheunamendedScheduleC.

RenkeJ.reviewedthepurposesbehindtheCostsregime,

includingthatCostsshould“justly”beallocatedtothe

unsuccessfullitigantunderRule10.29(1),andthatCosts

shouldbeproportionate,promoteefficiency,andremain

inlinewiththeFoundationalRules,includingRule1.2.

HisLordshipconsideredtheframeworkforconsidering

CostsawardsdescribedthroughRules10.31and10.33,

notingthattheyasktheCourttoconsiderseveralfactorsin

assessingCosts.HisLordshipemphasizedthatthedecision

toawardCostsisdiscretionary,butthatdiscretionmust

beexercisedjudiciallyandinlinewiththefactorssetout

inRule10.33.HisLordshipfurthernotedthatthetariff

inScheduleCwassetin1998andwasnotrevisedbythe

newRulesin2010.Whiletheywereintendedtopartially

reimburselitigants“intheneighbourhoodof30-50%of

actualcosts”,theynolongerdoso.

HisLordshipalsoconsideredseveralpolicyconcerns

respectingwhetheranadjustmentforinflationshouldbe

made,oranyothertoolsshouldbeusedtoarriveatajust

andfairCostsAward.RenkeJ.notedthatRules10.31(1)

and(3)expresslypermit“anarrayoftoolsormechanisms

forarrivingatareasonablecostsaward”,andthatprevious

caseshavepermittedtheuseofan“inflationaryfactor”,

Costsmultipliers,orawardsbasedonapercentageofthe

actuallegalfeesincurredbythesuccessfulparty.

RenkeJ.notedthattheDefendantswere“completely

successful”andthatthePlaintiff’sclaimwas“not

significantlyabove”theColumn5thresholdandthe

proceedingswerenotunusuallylong,butwere“atleast

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moderately[…]complex”.Further,HisLordshipconsidered

theparties’conductinthelitigationwhichlengthenedthe

Action,perRule10.33(2)(g),andnotedtheDefendants’

concernsthatthePlaintiffhadwithheldsomeimportant

recordsuntilaftertheApplicationsbeforetheMasterwere

heard—someofwhichweredisclosed“onlyabout2

weeksbeforetheappeal”.ThePlaintiffsarguedthattheir

corporaterepresentativeshadnotintentionallywithheldthe

records,andthattheDefendantswerepartiallyresponsible

fortheirfailuretodisclosethemastheyhadfailedtocross-

examineawitnessonhisAffidavitofRecords.RenkeJ.

disagreedandnotedthatevenifthePlaintiff’sprincipals

hadnotintentionallyactedimproperly,theyhadacted

“unreasonably”andengagedin“misconduct”withinthe

meaningofRule10.33(2)(g).PursuanttoRule5.1,one

ofthepurposesofPart5oftheRulesistoencourageearly

disclosureoffactsandrecords.PursuanttoRule5.6(1),

anAffidavitofRecordsisrequiredtodiscloseallrelevant

andmaterialrecords.Further,underRule5.4(2)corporate

representativesarerequiredto“informthemselvesof

relevantandmaterialrecords”andinformation.Renke

J.alsoconsideredtheDefendants’legalfees,the

reasonablenessofthePlaintiff’sclaim,theparties’relative

economicimbalances,thePlaintiff’sconcessionrespecting

inflation,andthereputationalimpactofthelitigationas

partofHisLordship’sanalysisof“anyothermatter”under

Rule10.33(1)(g).HisLordshipultimatelyawardedCosts

underColumn5ofScheduleC,adjustedforinflationusing

a1.5multiplier,withafurthermultiplierof1.5forcertain

stepstakenintheAction.

NOVA POLE INTERNATIONAL INC. V PERMASTEEL CONSTRUCTION LTD, 2020 ABCA 45 (STREKAF, KHULLAR AND PENTELECHUK JJA) Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 4.1 (Responsibility of Parties to Manage Litigation), 4.2 (What the Responsibility Includes), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay) and 5.34 (Service of Expert’s Report)

InSeptemberof2016theRespondentsappliedtohave

theunderlyingActionsdismissedpursuanttoRules4.33

and4.31.TheMasterhadrefusedtodismissthoseActions,

andtheChambersJudgeallowedtheAppealoftheMaster’s

DecisionanddismissedtheunderlyingActionspursuantto

Rule4.31.TheAppellantsthenappealedthatDecisionof

theChambersJudge.

TheAppellantssubmittedthatwhentheChambersJudge

determinedthattheAppellantshadconcededthatthe

delaywasinexcusable,theJudgehaderred.Theyfurther

submittedthatthisledtotheJudgemistakenlypresuming

thatsignificantprejudicewasestablishedpursuanttoRule

4.31(2).TheCourtdeterminedthatwhethertheAppellants

hadconcededthepointornotwasnotrelevantasthe

ChambersJudgehadundertakenherownanalysis.

InassessingwhethertheChambersJudgeerredin

determiningwhetherthedelaywasinexcusable,theCourt

notedthattheRulesplacedanobligationonallparties

to“toadvanceanactioninatimelyandcost-effective

way”andreferredtoRules1.2,4.1and4.2.TheCourt

notedthatRule5.34providedthataTrialdatecouldnot

bescheduledunlessexpertreportshadbeenexchanged.

TheRulesdidnotpermitapartytorefusetoconduct

Questioninguntilexpertreportswereprovided.Inthe

underlyingActions,theRespondentsandtheAppellants

agreedtodelayQuestioninguntilexpertreportswere

provided.TheCourtdeterminedthattheChambersJudge’s

failuretoconsidertheroleoftheRespondentsinthe

arrangementtohaveexpertreportsexchangedbefore

QuestioningwasanerrorinprincipleandtheAppealwas

allowed.

OZARK RESOURCES LTD V TERIC POWER LTD, 2020 ABCA 51 (ANTONIO JA) Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of these Rules), 6.3 (Applications Generally), 6.4 (Applications Without Notice), 14.5 (Applications Only With Permission), 14.48 (Stay Pending Appeal) and 14.71 (Interlocutory Decisions)

ThiswasanApplicationtorestoreanAppeal,tostayalower

Court’sOrderpendingtheAppeal,and,inthealternative,

forpermissiontoAppeal.AlloftheApplicant’sApplications

weredismissed.

TheApplicantfiledaNoticeofAppealarguing,amongst

otherissues,thattheChambersJudgeerredinfailingto

heartheApplicantanddenyingtheApplicant’srequest




foranadjournment,ingrantingtheOrdertheRespondent

soughtnotwithstandingtheirfailuretocomplywithRule

6.3.Rule6.3statesthatanApplicationmustbeinan

appropriateform,listcertainthings,andbefiledandserved

onallpartiesandpeopleaffectedbytheApplicationfiveor

moredaysbeforeitwastobeheard.

TheApplicantarguedthatpermissionwasnotrequiredto

Appeal.TheCourt,however,foundthattheAppealfrom

theadjournmentclearlyfellunderRule14.5(1)(b),and

thereforepermissionwasrequired.Regardless,theAppeal

wasmoot.

InaddressingtheApplicant’salternativeargument,Her

Ladyshipconsideredthetestforgrantingpermissionto

AppealunderRule14.5(1)(b).Thetestaskedwhetherthe

Appealraisedseriousquestionsofgeneralimportance,

andwhetherithadareasonablechanceofsuccess.

JusticeAntonionotedthattheApplicant’sargumentthat

theChambersJudgeerredinproceedingnotwithstanding

theRespondent’sfailuretocomplywithRule6.3,failed

toconsiderRule6.4whichpermitsJudgestoproceed

withanApplicationdespiteRule6.3iftheyweresatisfied

thatnonoticewasnecessary,orthatservingnoticeofthe

ApplicationcouldcausetheApplicantunduehardship.

JusticeAntonionotedthatpursuanttoRule1.2,the

roleofaChambersJudgeistobalancetimelinessand

cost-effectivenesswhenmakingafairdetermination.

HerLadyshipdeterminedthatnoneoftheApplicant’s

argumentshadareasonablechanceofsuccess.

TheApplicantalsosoughttohavetwoOrdersstayed.Rule

14.48allowsforstaysofApplicationspendingAppeal;

howevertherewasnoAppealofoneoftheOrders,so

itcouldnotbestayed.TheApplicanthadarguedthat

Rule14.71allowedtheCourttostayanOrderdespite

therehavingbeennoAppeal.Therewas,however,no

remainingcontextinwhichtoconsiderRule14.71,andthe

Applicationsforstaysweredismissed.

ST ISIDORE CO-OP LIMITED V AG GROWTH INTERNATIONAL INC, 2020 ABQB 94 (FRIESEN J)Rules 1.3 (General Authority of the Court to Provide Remedies), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)

FollowingsuccessatTrial,thePlaintiffsoughtleaveto

amenditsStatementofClaimtoincludeaprayerfor

prejudgmentinterest.TheCourtfirstconsideredwhether

anawardofprejudgmentinterestcouldbegrantedwhere

thatremedyhadnotbeenpleaded.Inpart,thePlaintiff

arguedtheCourt’sbroadauthoritysetoutinRule1.3to

grantaremedy“whetherornotitisclaimedorsought”.

TheDefendantarguedthatRule13.6(2)(c)(iii)specifically

requiresthattheparticularsofinterestbepleaded.The

Courtheldthatprejudgmentinterestmustbepleaded

wheresought.

TurningtothePlaintiff’srequestforleavetoamend,the

Defendantarguedthattheproposedamendmentwas

hopeless.TheCourtdescribedahopelessamendment

asonethatwouldhavebeenstruckiforiginallypleaded.

JusticeFriesenconsideredtheconditionsforstriking

apleadingunderRule3.68,findingthattheaddition

ofaprayerforprejudgmentinterestdidnotmeetthose

conditions.TheCourtgrantedleavetoamendthe

StatementofClaimandorderedprejudgmentinterestas

claimedintheamendment.

TA V ALBERTA (CHILDREN’S SERVICES), 2020 ABQB 97 (DEVLIN J) Rules 2.11 (Litigation Representative Required), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

ThePlaintiffs(“TA”andherchildren)filedaStatement

ofClaimagainstnumerouspartiesafterthechildrenwere

apprehendedbyEdmontonChildren’sServices.TheClaim

made“broadassertions”andsought“broadremedies”

relatingtochildwelfarepoliciesinvolvingindigenous

children.TheDefendantsappliedtostriketheStatement

ofClaimpursuanttoRule3.68asanabusivecollateral

attackonchildprotectionproceedingswhichwerestill

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underway,andbecauseitdisclosednocauseofaction.

TwooftheDefendants,whowereaccusedofnegligence

anddefamationrelatingtotheirfindingsinapsychological

report,alsoappliedforSummaryDismissaloftheAction

againstthem.

First,DevlinJ.notedthatTAbroughttheActioninherown

nameandinthenamesofhersixminorchildren,butthat

shewasneverappointedastheirlitigationrepresentativeas

requiredbyRule2.11.DevlinJ.dismissedtheActionasit

relatedtothechildren,withoutprejudicetoitbeingbrought

inaccordancewiththeRulesatafuturetime.

Next,DevlinJ.reviewedRule3.68.HisLordshipnoted

thattheorderscomplainedofinthechildprotection

proceedingswerenotappealed,andthatattemptingto

relitigateamatteralreadydeterminedisanabuseof

process.Further,DevlinJ.determinedthatthewrongs

complainedofbythePlaintiffdidnotcreatecausesof

actionagainsttheDefendants,andthattheremedies

shesoughtweremostlybeyondthejurisdictionofthe

Court.Assuch,theStatementofClaimwasstruckinits

entirety,exceptforthedefamationclaimrespectingthe

psychologicalreport.

DevlinJ.thenconsideredtheSummaryDismissal

Application,andnotedthatRule7.3(b)allowsaDefendant

toseekSummaryDismissalwherethereisnomerittoall

orpartofaclaim.HisLordshipreviewedtheframework

fordeterminingwhetheraclaimissuitableforSummary

DismissalfromWeir-Jones Technical Services Incorporated

v Purolator Courier Ltd,2019ABCA49,andheldthat

SummaryDismissalwasappropriateinthecircumstances.

TheApplicantshadfiledanexpertreportdemonstrating

thattheyhadmetthestandardofcare,alongwithevidence

thatthereportwascreatedinasituationofqualified

privilege,whichprovidedafulldefencetothedefamation

claim.TAhadnotfiledanyevidenceinresponse.Assuch,

thefactscouldbeprovenonabalanceofprobabilities,and

therewerenogenuineissuesrequiringaTrial.

FITZPATRICK V COLLEGE OF PHYSICAL THERAPISTS OF ALBERTA, 2020 ABCA 88 (HUGHES JA)Rules 2.22 (Self-Represented Litigants), 2.31 (Withdrawal After Trial Date Scheduled) and 14.2 (Application of General Rules)

ThePlaintiffs,beinganindividualandhercorporation,

appealedtheSummaryDismissaloftheirAction.

Approximatelytwomonthspriortothehearingbeforethe

CourtofAppeal,Plaintiffs’counselsoughttowithdrawfor

non-paymentoffees,seekingthepermissionoftheCourt

requiredpost-JudgmentunderRule2.31,arguingthatRule

2.31appliedtoappellatepracticebyoperationofRule14.2.

DrawingontheSupremeCourtofCanada’spronouncement

inR v Cunningham,2010SCC10,JusticeHughesset

outtoconsiderseveralfactors,aswellasthestandards

enunciatedintheLawSocietyofAlberta’sCode of Conduct.

TheCourtultimatelyfoundinfavourofwithdrawal,

notwithstandingtheharmtotheadministrationofjustice

whichwouldbecauseduponadjournmentoftheAppeal

Hearing,inthelikelyeventthattheallottedtimecouldnot

beotherwiseusedbytheCourtonshortnotice.

Giventhatthewithdrawalwasgranted,andgiventhatcase

lawinterpretingRule2.22hasfoundthatanindividualis

prohibitedfromactingonbehalfofacorporation,theCourt

proactivelyorderedthatthecorporatePlaintiff’sAppeal

wouldbedeemedabandonedunlessthecorporatePlaintiff

retainedcounselthreemonthsbeforetherescheduled

Appealhearing.

QUAYE V LAW SOCIETY OF ALBERTA, 2020 ABQB 55 (ROOKE ACJ) Rules 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders) and 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs)

TheApplicanthadpreviouslymadeanOriginating

ApplicationseekingJudicialReview,whichAssociateChief

JusticeRookehadruledtobeanApparentlyVexatious

ApplicationorProceeding(“AVAP”)andhadordered,

pursuanttoCivilPracticeNoteNo.7(“CPN7”),thatthe




reasonableprospectofsuccesswithinthemeaningofRule

3.68;andsummarilydismissedotherclaimswhichlacked

meritpursuanttoRule7.3.GossJ.wentontodeclarethe

Appellantavexatiouslitigant,referringtovarioussituations

ofvexationorabuseofprocessasoutlinedinRules3.68(2)

(c)and(d).

InaffirmingallofGossJ.’sfindings,theCourtofAppeal

notedthatHerLadyshiphadcorrectlyreviewedthelawwith

respecttoApplicationstostrikepursuanttoRule3.68,

andSummaryDismissalpursuanttoRule7.3,bothwith

referencetoHryniak v Mauldin,2014SCC87.

TheCourtofAppealalsoaffirmedGossJ.’sDecisionson

Rule3.15,findingthattheAppellant’sApplicationfor

JudicialReviewhadnotbeenfiledorservedintime.The

Appealsweredismissed.

WILCOX V ALBERTA, 2020 ABCA 104 (GRECKOL JA)Rules 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review) and 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

AnOriginatingApplicationfiledbytheAppellantforhabeas

corpuswasprocessedinaccordancewithCivilPractice

NoteNo.7(“CPN7”).

TheChambersJudgeruledtheApplicationtobean

ApparentlyVexatiousApplicationorProceeding(“AVAP”)and

ordered,pursuanttoCPN7,thattheAppellanthad14daysto

providetheCourtwithwrittensubmissionsto“showcause”

astowhytheAVAPshouldnotbestruckpursuanttoRule

3.68.TheChambersJudgereviewedthewrittensubmissions

providedbytheAppellanttotheCourtanddeterminedthat

theAVAPshouldbestruckpursuantRule3.68.

TheAppealCourtnotedthatalowerCourt’sdecisionto

strikeapleadingpursuanttoRule3.68isgenerallyentitled

todeferenceabsentanerroroflaw,thoughwhetheraclaim

constitutesanabuseofprocessisreviewedforcorrectness.

TheAppealCourtfoundthattheChambersJudgeerred

inholdingthatthepleadingsamountedtoanabusive,

vexatiousfiling.

Applicanthad14daystoprovidetheCourtwithwritten

submissionsto“showcause”astowhytheAVAPshould

notbestruckpursuanttoRule3.68.RookeA.C.J.reviewed

thewrittensubmissionsprovidedbytheApplicanttothe

CourtanddeterminedthattheAVAPshouldbestruck

pursuanttoRule3.68.

Inaddition,RookeA.C.J.foundthattheApplicantdidnot

explainwhytheApplicationwasservedontheRespondents

weeksafterthesix-monthperiodprovidedforfilingand

servinganApplicationforJudicialReviewincontravention

ofRule3.15(2).

TheCourtalsoorderedtheApplicanttopayeachofthe

Respondents$1,000.00inCosts,citingRule10.29(1)

fortheprinciplethatthesuccessfulpartyispresumptively

entitledtoCostsunlesstheCourtotherwiseorders.The

CourtalsodispensedwiththeApplicant’sapprovalofthe

formofOrderpursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).

AL-GHAMDI V COLLEGE AND ASSOCIATION OF REGISTERED NURSES OF ALBERTA, 2020 ABCA 81 (COSTIGAN, WATSON AND FEEHAN JJA) Rules 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review), 3.28 (Effect of Not Serving Statement of Claim in Time), 3.68 (Significant Deficiencies), and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

Havingbeenfoundavexatiouslitigantincontemptof

Court,theAppellantappealedtheentiretyoftwoDecisions

renderedbyGossJ.InthefirstDecision,HerLadyship

determinedthatnofurtherActioncouldbetakenagainst

Defendantswhowerenotservedintime,pursuantto

Rule3.28;strucksomeActionswhichhadnoreasonable

prospectofsuccessonthebasisofRule3.68;andalso

summarilydismissedsomeActionspursuanttoRule7.3.

InthesecondDecisionunderAppeal,GossJ.had

dismissedfourActionspursuanttoRule3.15,asthe

OriginatingApplicationforJudicialReviewwasneither

servednorfiledintime;foundthatotherActionscouldnot

moveforwardaspartieswerenotservedintimeasrequired

byRule3.28;strucksomeActionswhichdisclosedno

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TheAppealCourtalsofoundthattheChambersJudgeerred

inholdingthattheAppellant’shabeas corpusApplication

combinedincompatiblepleadings.TheCourtunderscored

thatunderRule3.15(1)(a),JudicialReviewandhabeas

corpusarepartsofthesameprocess.GreckolJ.A.allowed

theAppeal.

REYES V DYCK, 2020 ABQB 154 (BURROWS J)Rule 3.27 (Extension of Time for Service)

HavingfailedtoserveaStatementofClaimintime,the

PlaintiffinapersonalinjuryActionsoughttoextendthe

serviceperiod.ThePlaintiffrelieduponRule3.27(1)(a),

whichallowsforrelaxationoftheserviceperiodwherea

DefendantcausesaPlaintifftoreasonablybelievethat

theDefendanthasbeenserved,orthatliabilitywasnot

beingcontested.Atfirstinstance,MasterSchulzpermitted

theextension.OnAppeal,JusticeBurrowsconfirmed

theextension,findingthattheDefendant’sadjusterhad

lulledthePlaintiff’slawyerintobelievingthateitherthe

Defendanthadbeenserved,orthatliabilitywasnotbeing

contested,andthat“lulling”,evenwhereunintentional,

amountsto“causing”forthepurposesofRule3.27.

OMNIARCH CAPITAL CORPORATION V BISHOP, 2020 ABQB 102 (DILTS J)Rules 3.37 (Application for Judgment against Defendant Noted in Default), 3.40 (Continuation of Action Following Judgment), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.34 (Stay of Proceedings on Transfer or Transmission of Interest) and 5.13 (Obtaining Records from Others)

ThePlaintiffsclaimedagainstseveralDefendants.After

thePlaintiffssettledwithsomeoftheDefendantsand

notedothersindefault,onlyoneDefendantremained.

ThePlaintiffsassignedtheirlitigationintereststoanew

corporation,andtheActionwasautomaticallystayed

pursuanttoRule4.34.

ThisDecisiondealtwiththreeApplications:(1)the

PlaintiffsappliedtocontinuetheActionafteritwasstayed

pursuanttoRule4.34;(2)theremainingDefendantapplied

todismisstheActionagainstitpursuanttoRule4.31;and

(3)thePlaintiffsalsosoughttoproceedwithanoralhearing

toassestheirdamagesclaimedagainsttheDefendantswho

hadbeennotedindefault.

DiltsJ.firstconsideredwhethertheActionshouldbe

permittedtocontinueunderRule4.34andexplainedthat

pursuanttotheRule,anActionisautomaticallystayed

whentheinterestorliabilityofapartyistransferredto

anotherperson,andmaybere-starteduponthePlaintiff’s

Application.InassessingwhetheranActionmaybe

continued,theCourtshouldconsiderwhethertherewere

validreasonsfortheassignment,andwhetherthereare

policyorotherconcernstosuggestthattheActionshould

notbecontinued.Nosuchconcernsexisted,andDiltsJ.

orderedthattheActionbecontinuedasawhole.

HerLadyshipalsoexplainedthatunderRule4.34(4),ifan

ApplicationtolifttheRule4.34stayisnotmadewithin

areasonableperiodoftime,theDefendantmayapplyto

dismisstheActionfordelaypursuanttoRule4.31.Itwas

throughthismechanismthattheremainingDefendant

appliedpursuanttoRule4.31todismisstheAction.

DiltsJ.explainedthatunderRule4.31,theCourtmust

assesswhetherdelayinprosecutingtheActionasawhole

resultedinsignificantprejudicetoaparty.IftheApplicant

demonstratedinordinateandinexcusabledelay,then

significantprejudiceispresumedandtheburdenshiftsto

theRespondenttorebutthepresumption.DiltsJ.found

thattherehadbeendelayintheAction,butnoinordinate

orinexcusabledelaysincethedelaywasnot“muchin

excess”ofwhatwasreasonableinthecircumstances.

Further,DiltsJ.heldthatthedelaydidnotresultin

significantprejudicetotheremainingDefendant.The

remainingDefendantarguedthatithadnotbeennotified

ofthePlaintiffs’settlementwithsomeoftheother

Defendants,andasaresultitwasprejudicedbecause

ithadlosttheopportunitytoobtainaproceduralOrder

toclaimcontributionorindemnityfromthesettling

Defendants,andwouldbeunabletoquestionorobtain

recordsfromcertainwitnesses.HerLadyshipnotedthat

theremainingDefendantstillhadtherighttoapplyforan

Orderrequiringproductionofthirdpartyrecordspursuant

toRule5.13,andthateveniftheremainingDefendant

hadsufferedprejudice,itwasnotasaresultoflitigation




delay–rather,itwasasaresultof“theactionorinaction

ofthePlaintiffsandtheirformercounsel”.HerLadyship

concludedthattheActionshouldnotbedismissedfordelay

pursuanttoRule4.31.

Finally,DiltsJ.heldthatthePlaintiffscouldproceedwith

anassessmentofdamagesagainsttheDefendantsthathad

beennotedindefault.TheremainingDefendantobjected

totheassessmentonthebasisthatitcouldbeprejudiced

by“anydeterminationofthePlaintiffs’losseswithoutits

fullparticipation”.HerLadyshipacceptedthePlaintiffs’

argumentsthatRules3.37and3.40expresslyallowa

Plaintifftoengageinadamagesassessmentagainstonly

someDefendants,whilecontinuingtheActionagainst

others.Further,DiltsJ.notedthatallowingthePlaintiffsto

proceedwithadamagesassessmentagainstthedefaulting

Defendantswouldassisttheminrecoveringtheirlosses

withoutunduedelay,andwouldnotcauseunfairnesstothe

remainingDefendantasanydamagesagainstitcouldbe

assessedindependentlyonamorecompleterecordafter

documentproduction,Questioning,andTrial.

WEST EDMONTON MALL PROPERTY INC V PROCTOR, 2020 ABQB 161 (MAH J) Rules 3.56 (Right to Counterclaim), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 9.2 (Preparation of Judgments and Orders)

ThePlaintiffssoughtanInjunctionagainstaformertenant

preventingherfromdefamingthem.ThePlaintiffsalso

soughttostriketheDefendant’spleadingsunderRule3.68,

andsoughtSummaryJudgmentofaStatementofClaim

andaCounterclaimbroughtbyanon-partypursuanttoRule

7.3.ThePlaintiffsalsosoughtadeclarationunderCivil

PracticeNote7thattheDefendantwasavexatiouslitigant.

TheDefendanthadaddedanon-partytothelistof

Defendants.JusticeMahfoundthat,pursuanttoRule3.56,

aCounterclaimmadebyanon-partyisanullity.Further,

theCourtfoundthattheDefendantwasessentiallyseeking

torelitigatesomethingforwhichafinalCourtOrderhad

alreadybeenissued,andthatthisamountedtoanabuseof

processpursuanttoRule3.68(2)(d).Inaddition,theCourt

foundthatnocauseofactionunderlaytheCounterclaimfor

monetarydamagesof$35million.Forthesereasons,the

CourtstrucktheCounterclaim.

InconsideringRule7.3,theCourtfoundthattherecord

wascompleteandallowedtheCourttomakethenecessary

findingsoffact,andheldthattherewasnogenuineissue

requiringaTrial.MahJ.grantedthePlaintiff’sApplication

forSummaryJudgment.

Lastly,theCourtruledthat,withrespecttotheOrderfrom

thisDecisiontheDefendant’sapprovalwasnotrequired

pursuanttoRule9.2(4)(c).TheCourtdidnotfindit

necessarytodecideiftheDefendantwasavexatious

litigantastheCourthadalreadystrucktheDefendant’s

pleadings.

SNAYCHUK V EDMONTON (CITY), 2020 ABQB 1 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)

ThiswasanApplicationreviewedbyAssociateChiefJustice

NielsenasbeinganApparentlyVexatiousApplicationor

Proceeding(“AVAP”).PursuanttoCivilPracticeNote7,

AssociateChiefJusticeNielsenorderedthattheApplicant

had14daystoprovidewrittensubmissionstotheCourt

to“showcause”astowhytheAVAPshouldnotbestruck

pursuanttoRule3.68.

AssociateChiefJusticeNielsenalsoruledthatthe

Applicant’sapprovaloftheOrdergrantedwasdispensed

withpursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS INC V PERPETUAL ENERGY INC, 2020 ABQB 6 (NATION J) Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

PricewaterhouseCoopersInc.(“PWC”)wastheTrusteein

bankruptcyoftheestateofSequoiaResourcesCorp.PWC

filedaStatementofClaimdeclaringanassettransactionto

bevoidasagainsttheTrustee,orinthealternative,seeking

Judgmentinexcessof$217million.TheDefendantswere

PerpetualEnergyInc.andanumberofitsrelatedentities,

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andoneofPerpetualEnergyInc.’sdirectors.Sequoia

ResourcesCorp.wasformerlyPerpetualEnergyOperating

Corp.,arelatedentityoftheDefendants.

TheStatementofClaimraisedfourdifferentclaims:(i)a

claimundertheBankruptcy and Insolvency Act,RSC1985,

cB-3(the“BIA”)fortheundervaluedassettransaction;(ii)

anoppressionclaim;(iii)apublicpolicyclaim;and(iv)a

claimagainstthedirector.

TheDefendantsfiledanApplicationtohavetheclaims

struckorsummarilydismissedunderRules3.68(2)(b)and

7.3(1)(b).

JusticeNationnotedthatinaccordancewithRule3.68(3),

noevidencemaybesubmittedwhenmakinganApplication

underRule3.68(2)(b).TheCourtmustacceptthe

allegationsintheStatementofClaimastrueforthepurposes

oftheApplicationunlesstheyareassumptions,speculation,

patentlyridiculous,orincapableofproof.JusticeNation

alsonotedthatalthoughnoevidencemaybesubmitted,a

Courtmayconsiderthecontentofanydocumentreferred

tointheStatementofClaim.ACourtmayalsoconsiderthe

circumstancesandlitigationhistorytodeterminewhetherthe

pleadingdisclosesareasonableclaim.

InconsideringanApplicationpursuanttoRule7.3(1)(b),

JusticeNationnotedthattheDefendants“needtoestablish

thereisnomerittotheparticularclaim”andthatSummary

JudgmentorSummaryDismissalisonlyappropriatewhen

aCourtcanmakenecessaryfindingsoffactsandapplythe

law,andtheprocessisaproportionate,expeditious,and

lessexpensivemeansofachievingajustresult.

InconsideringtheseRules,JusticeNationfoundthat

theoppressionclaimdisclosednoreasonableclaimand

wasstruckpursuanttoRule3.68.HerLadyshipcameto

thisconclusionasPWC(astheTrustee)wasnotaproper

“complainant”forthepurposesoftheBIA.JusticeNation

alsostruckthepublicpolicyclaimunderRule3.68as

HerLadyshipdeterminedthatitdisclosednocauseof

action.Theclaimsbroughtagainstthedirectorwerebarred

byareleaseexecutedbetweentheparties,andtherefore

JusticeNationdeterminedthattheclaimsshouldbestruck

underRule3.68fordisclosingnoreasonableclaim,and

summarilydismissedunderRule7.3.

TheclaimsundertheBIAwereallowedtostandandwere

notstruckordismissedpursuanttoRules3.68or7.3,

respectively.

SMITH V MOORE-JUZWISHIN, 2020 ABQB 49 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)

TheCourtdeterminedthattheStatementsofClaimfiled

bythePlaintiffwereApparentlyVexatiousApplicationsor

Proceedingsbecausetheyhadmanyelementssuggesting

theymaybehopelessandabusive.ThePlaintiffhadmade

bald,unsupportedallegations,andrequestedexcessive,

impossibleordisproportionateremediesforwhichthe

StatementsofClaimcontainednofactualfoundation.

TheCourtdeterminedthatbothStatementsofClaimshould

bereviewedpursuanttoCivilPracticeNoteNo.7(“CPN7”)

todeterminewhethertheyshouldbestruckunderRule

3.68,andtheCourtrequestedwrittensubmissionsfromthe

PlaintiffpursuanttoCPN7.TheCourtdirectedtheClerkof

theCourttoprepareandserveaninterimOrderstayingthe

ActionspursuanttoRule9.4.

SMITH V MOORE-JUZWISHIN, 2020 ABQB 108 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)

ThePlaintiffhadpreviouslyfiledtwoStatementsofClaim

whichtheDefendantsreferredtoreviewunderCivilPractice

NoteNo7(“CPN7”)asconstitutingApparentlyVexatious

ApplicationsorProceedings(“AVAPs”).AssociateChief

JusticeNielsenconductedthereview,concludingthat

theStatementsofClaimwereAVAPs,andorderedthat

thePlaintiffhad14daystoprovidetheCourtwithwritten

submissionsto“showcause”whytheAVAPsshouldnotbe

struckpursuanttoRule3.68.




ThePlaintiffprovidedwrittensubmissionswithrespectto

eachoftheStatementsofClaim.AssociateChiefJustice

Nielsenreviewedthewrittensubmissionsanddetermined

thattheStatementsofClaimshouldbestruckpursuant

Rule3.68.TheCourtalsodispensedwiththePlaintiff’s

approvaloftheOrdergrantedpursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).

JRB’S WELDING SERVICES INC V FAMILY DIVISION, 2020 ABQB 126 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders) and 13.7 (Pleadings: Other Requirements)

ThiswasanApplicationreviewedbyAssociateChiefJustice

NielsenasbeinganApparentlyVexatiousApplicationor

Proceeding(“AVAP”).PursuanttoCivilPracticeNoteNo7

(“CPN7”),AssociateChiefJusticeNielsenorderedthatthe

Applicanthad14daystoprovidewrittensubmissionstoHis

Lordshipto“showcause”astowhytheAVAPshouldnotbe

struckpursuanttoRule3.68.Inpart,theCourtnotedthat

anallegationofmisrepresentationhadnotbeenpleaded

withsufficientparticularityasrequiredbyRule13.7.

TheCourtalsoruledthattheApplicant’sapprovaloftheOrder

grantedwasdispensedwithpursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).

YAREMKEVICH V JACULA, 2020 ABQB 175 (MICHALYSHYN J)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)

TheCourtinthiscasehadpreviouslydeterminedthatthe

StatementofClaimfiledbythePlaintiffwasanApparently

VexatiousApplicationorProceedingbecauseithadmade

bald,unsupportedallegationsthatdidnotprovideabasis

fortheDefendantortheCourttorespond.ThePlaintiffwas

given14daystofileawrittensubmissionsettingouthow

herStatementofClaimprovidedanadequatebasisforthe

DefendantandtheCourttomakeameaningfulresponse.

ThePlaintiffsubmittedwrittensubmissionsasperthe

previousCourtOrder.

TheCourtconsideredthePlaintiff’swrittensubmissionsand

foundthePlaintiffhadfailedtoshowthatherStatementof

Claimwasnothopeless,andstrucktheStatementofClaim

underRule3.68.TheCourtwastoprepareandservean

interimOrderstayingtheActionswhichdidnotrequirethe

Plaintiff’sendorsementpursuanttoRule9.4.

RUDICHUK V GENESIS LAND DEVELOPMENT CORP, 2020 ABCA 42 (VELDHUIS, STREKAF AND PENTELECHUK JJA) Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

ThePlaintiffsappealedadismissaloftheirSummary

JudgmentApplication,andoneoftheDefendantscross-

appealedadismissalofhisApplicationtostrikethe

Plaintiffs’StatementofClaim.

ThePlaintiffsinthiscaseweretwoformeremployeesof

GenesisLandDevelopmentCorp.(“Genesis”)whofileda

claimforwrongfuldismissalagainsttheirformeremployer.

TheemployeesalsobroughtclaimsagainsttheChairofthe

BoardofDirectors(“Griggs”)fornegligenceandinducing

breachofcontract.

ThePlaintiffshadappliedforSummaryJudgmentpursuant

toRule7.3againstGenesisforwrongfuldismissal.A

MasterhadgrantedSummaryJudgment,butthatholding

wasoverturnedonAppealtotheCourtofQueen’sBench.

BeforetheCourtofAppeal,thePlaintiffsarguedthatthe

ChambersJudgehadmadeapalpableandoverriding

errorinconcludingtherewasacredibilitycontestwhich

wouldrequireaTrial.TheCourtofAppealfoundnosuch

error.TheCourtofAppealheldthatthereweresufficient

inconsistenciesintheevidencefortheChambersJudgeto

makethatfinding.ThePlaintiff’sAppealwasdismissed.

Separately,Griggsbroughtanunsuccessfulmotiontostrike

aclaimunderRule3.68(1)(a)and(2)(b),whichhethen

appealed.TheCourtofAppealcitedKnight v Imperial

Tobacco Canada Ltd.,2011SCC42fortheprinciplethata

claimshouldonlybestruckwhen,assumingthefactspleaded

tobetrue,thepleadingdisclosesnoreasonablecauseof

action.TheCourtfoundthatGriggshadfailedtodemonstrate

thefactspleadeddidnotdiscloseareasonablecauseof

action.TheCourtofAppealdismissedGriggs’cross-Appeal.

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PROSPER PETROLEUM LTD V HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ALBERTA, 2020 ABQB 128 (ROMAINE J)Rule 3.75 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties to Originating Application)

RomaineJ.heardanApplicationbyathirdpartytohave

itaddedasaRespondenttotheActioncommencedby

OriginatingApplication.Rule3.75providesthattheCourt

mayaddapersonasaRespondenttoanOriginating

Application“iftheCourtissatisfiedtheordershouldbe

made.”

TheCourtdeterminedthattherewerenolegally-recognized

interestsofthethirdpartythatwouldbeaffectedby

theApplication,norwoulditslegalrightsbeaffected.

Furthermore,theCourtfoundthataddingthethirdparty

wouldcausecost,complexityanddelayanditwasnotjust

andconvenienttoaddthethirdpartytotheAction.Lastly,

theCourtconfirmedthatthethirdpartyhadnotestablished

thatithadaninterestthatneededtobeprotected.The

CourtdeniedtheApplication.

CONOCOPHILLIPS CANADA OPERATIONS LTD V 1835651 ALBERTA LTD, 2020 ABQB 14 (MASTER ROBERTSON)Rules 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order) and 10.48 (Recovery of Goods and Services Tax)

ThePlaintiffsbroughtanApplicationforSecurityforCosts

ineachoftworelatedActionswhichconcernedentitlement

tomineralinterestsasbetweenlessors,activelessees,

andatoplessee.TheRespondentwasthetoplesseeand

acorporateentity,promptingtheCourt’sconsiderationof

section254oftheBusiness Corporations Act,RSA2000,c

B-9,whichprovidesforaSecurityforCostsawardagainsta

corporatePlaintiff.

MasterRobertsonnotedconflictingauthorityonthe

interplaybetweenRule4.22,respectingSecurityfor

Costsgenerally,andsection254.Whilesection254was

technicallynotinissueastheRespondentcorporation

wasaDefendantandnotaPlaintiff,MasterRobertsonwas

nonethelesspreparedtoreadsection254andRule4.22

together.

MasterRobertsonalsonotedconflictingauthorityasto

theproofofaRespondent’sinabilitytopaywhichshifts

theevidentialonustotheRespondent.TheCourtdidnot

requireproofonabalanceofprobabilities,butrather

“areasonablebasistoshow,oratleastthereisenough

evidencetoinfer,thattherespondentAlberta-based

litiganthasinsufficientassets,theburdenthenshiftsto

therespondenttodemonstratethatitdoeshavesufficient

assets.”

TheCourtthenappliedthefactorssetoutinRule4.22

tothecircumstances.Therewasenoughevidenceforthe

CourttobesatisfiedoftheRespondent’simpecuniosity,

shiftingtheonustotheRespondent,butlittleevidenceon

anyotherkeypoint.TheCourtsawfittodrawanadverse

inferenceagainstthePlaintiffs,assumingthestrengthof

theRespondent’sposition,ultimatelydecliningtogrant

SecurityforCosts.Inpassing,theCourtobservedthatthe

Plaintiffs’claimforGSTwasinappropriate,asRule10.48

“preventstherecoveryofGSTinacostsawardwherethe

partyclaimingthecostsreceivesaninputtaxcreditunder

theExcise Tax Act”.

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS INC V PERPETUAL ENERGY INC, 2020 ABCA 36 (VELDHUIS JA)Rules 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order) and 14.67 (Security for Costs)

ThePlaintiff’sclaimshadbeensummarilydismissedand/

orstruck.OnAppeal,theDefendantssoughtSecurityfor

Costs.

AsthePlaintiffwasabodycorporate,theCourtnoted

theunsettledauthorityrespectingwhetherSecurityfor

CostsistobeassessedagainstRule4.22,asreferredto

inRule14.67forthepurposesofAppeal,orsection254

oftheBusiness Corporations Act,RSA2000,cB-9(the

“Business Corporations Act”).JusticeVeldhuisdeclinedto

resolvetherelationbetweenRule4.22andsection254,

findingthatbothteststhereunderweresatisfiedinfavourof

theDefendantsinthecircumstances.ThePlaintiff’sTrustee

inbankruptcyhadrefusedtoprovidecurrentfinancial

disclosuretorebutthedatedevidenceofimpecuniosity

advancedbytheDefendants.




Withrespecttoquantum,theCourtwasnotsatisfiedthat

Costsestimatedonasolicitor-clientbasiswereappropriate,

butdidelecttograntCostsestimatedonanenhanced

basistoaccountforthevolumeofevidenceintheAppeal

RecordandthePlaintiff’sintentiontoseekleavetofilea

50-pageFactum.TheCostsawardwasthenreducedby

20%,reflectingtheproportionofthePlaintiff’sclaimwhich

JusticeVeldhuischaracterizedasrelatingtooppression,

inlightoftheprohibitioninsection243oftheBusiness

Corporations ActonawardingSecurityforCostsagainsta

complainantofoppression.

PIIKANI NATION V RAYMOND JAMES LTD, 2020 ABCA 41 (STREKAF JA)Rules 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order), 14.37 (Single Appeal Judges), 14.38 (Court of Appeal Panels), 14.40 (Applications to Single Appeal Judges), 14.41 (Responses to Applications to Single Appeal Judges), 14.55 (Responsibility of Parties to Manage an Appeal), 14.56 (Orders to Facilitate Appeal) and 14.67 (Security for Costs in Appeal)

TheCourtgrantedtheRespondents’Applicationfor

SecurityforCosts,anddismissedacross-Applicationbythe

Appellantseekingvariousformsofreliefincluding:seeking

todisqualifycounselfromactingfortheRespondents,to

setasideorvarypreviousOrdersoftheCourt,andastayof

theSecurityforCostsApplication.

TheAppellantcharacterizedherApplicationasbeingforadvice

anddirection.TheCourtconfirmedthatwhiletheAppellant

couldseekadviceanddirectionrelatedtotheAppealpursuant

toRule14.56andRule14.55(bywhichaJudgeortheCase

ManagementOfficercouldgrantproceduralorotherOrdersto

ensureanAppealismanagedproperly),ultimatelythecross-

ApplicationwasnottheappropriateforumfortheAppellantto

seektherequestedrelief.

TheCourtconfirmedthatpursuanttoRules14.37and

14.38,ApplicationsbroughtbeforeasingleJudgeinthe

contextofanAppealmustbeforthepurposeofaddressing

mattersincidentaltotheAppeal,providedsuchmatters

werenotrequiredtobeheardbyapaneloftheCourtof

Appeal.TheCourtdeterminedtheAppellant’sApplication

wasnotincidentaltotheAppealand,inregardtoseekingto

setasideorvarypreviousCourtOrders,theApplicationwas

moreappropriateforapanel,notasingleAppealJudge.

TheCourtsuggestedthattheAppellantcouldpursuean

ApplicationtodisqualifytheRespondents’counselat

alaterdateaslongasthepartiesfiledtheirmaterials,

ascontemplatedinRules14.40and14.41,byadate

directedbytheCourt.

RegardingtheRespondents’SecurityforCostsApplication

pursuanttoRule14.67(1),theCourtorderedthatthe

AppellantprovideSecurityforCosts.TheCourtconsidered

thefactorslistedinRule4.22anddeterminedthatitwas

unlikelythattheRespondentswouldbeabletorecover

theirCostsoftheAppealfromtheAppellantiftheAppeal

wasdismissed;therewasnoevidencethattheAppellant’s

abilitytocontinuetheAppealwouldbeundulyprejudiced

byanOrderforSecurityforCosts;anditwasappropriateto

requireSecurityforCoststobeposedbytheAppellant.

PACER HOLDINGS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION V RICHARD PELLETIER HOLDINGS INC, 2020 ABCA 47 (O’FERRALL JA) Rules 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order), 4.23 (Contents of Security for Costs Order) and 14.67 (Security for Costs)

TheRespondentintheAppeal,PacerHoldingsConstruction

Corporation(“Pacer”),soughtanOrderdirectingthe

Appellant,RichardPelletierHoldingsInc.(“Pelletier”),to

paySecurityforCosts,andtoliftthestatutorystayofthe

BankruptcyOrdergrantedtoPelletier.

InapplyingRules14.67(1)and4.22,whichsetoutthe

Court’sconsiderationsinassessingwhetherSecurityfor

Costsshouldbeordered,theCourtfoundthat:(a)itwas

uncertainwhetherPacerwouldbeabletoenforcean

OrderorJudgmentagainstPelletier’sassetsinAlberta;(b)

PelletierhadnoassetstopayaCostsAward;(c)themerits

ofPelletier’sAppealwerequestionable;and(d)aSecurityfor

CostsOrderwouldnotundulycompromisePelletier’sability

tocontinuetheAppeal.O’FerrallJ.A.consideredtheabove

factorsandfoundthatSecurityforCostswaswarranted.

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Next,theCourtaddressedwhichcolumninScheduleC

wouldbeappropriatefortheSecurityforCosts.TheCourt

notedthatiftheappealedBankruptcyOrderwasultimately

foundtobevalid,assetsexceeding$1.5million(the

Column5amount)mayultimatelybecomerecoverable.

Therefore,theCourtawardedSecurityforCostsreflectiveof

Column5ofScheduleC.

TheCourtwaspreparedtoorderthattheSecurityforCosts

strictlycomplywithRule4.23,butgavethepartiesan

opportunitytotrytoagreeontheirownarrangementfirst.

InregardtotheApplicationtoliftthestatutorystayofthe

BankruptcyOrder,theCourtfoundthat“theappealisnota

strongoneand…theapplicantwillbeprejudicedifthestay

isnotliftedandtherespondentwillnot.”TheCourtfound

thatitwasintheinterestsofjusticetoliftthestay.

POOLE V CITY WIDE TOWING AND RECOVERY SERVICE LTD, 2020 ABCA 102 (FEEHAN JA) Rules 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order) and 14.67 (Security for Costs)

ThiswasanApplicationbythePlaintiffforastaypending

theAppealofanOrder,andaCross-Applicationbythe

DefendantforSecurityforCosts.JusticeFeehanexplained

thattheapplicableRulesforSecurityforCostswereRule

4.22and14.67.FeehanJ.A.explainedthatanApplicant

bearstheburdenofestablishingthatonabalanceof

probabilities,grantinganOrderforSecurityforCostswould

bejustandequitable,andthatRule14.67providesthat

whereapartydoesnotprovideSecuritywhenordered,that

anAppealisdeemedtobeabandoned.

IndecidingwhethertomakesuchanOrder,theCourtmust

takeintoconsiderationtheelementscontainedwithinRule

4.22.JusticeFeehanexploredtheRule4.22factorsin

relationtothefactsofthecase.ThePlaintiff’sdirefinancial

situationandotherunpaidCostsOrdersweighedinfavour

ofgrantingaSecurityforCostsOrder.Themeritsofthe

AppealandpotentialprejudiceagainstthePlaintiffbeing

abletopursuetheAppealifanOrderwasgrantedweighed

againstgrantingtheOrder.JusticeFeehandeterminedthat

onabalanceitwouldnotbejustandreasonabletograntan

OrderforSecurityforCostsanddismissedtheApplication,

anddismissedtheDefendant’sApplication.

ThePlaintiff’sstayApplicationwasgrantedinrespectof

onlypartoftheOrderthatwasbeingappealed.

DIRK V TOEWS, 2020 ABQB 16 (ASHCROFT J)Rules 4.29 (Costs Consequences of Formal Offer to Settle), 8.16 (Number of Experts), 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and 10.34 (Court-Ordered Assessment of Costs)

ThePlaintiffappliedforsolicitor-clientCostsorenhanced

Costs,andfulldisbursementsfollowinghersuccessatTrial.

ThePlaintiffclaimed,amongotherthings,thatshewas

entitledtodoubleCostsfromthedateofaFormalOffer

issuedpursuanttoRule4.29.TheCourt,however,found

therewasnocompromiseintheFormalOfferandtherefore

itdidnotfallunderRule4.29anddoubleCostswerenot

appropriate.

TheCourtconsideredtheCostsinlightofthefactorsin

Rule10.33andfoundthatsolicitor-clientCostswerenot

warranted,butinsteadawardedCostsonaparty-and-party

basisandappliedaninflationadjustmentfactortoaccount

forScheduleCbeingoutofdate.

Regardingthedisbursements,theDefendantobjectedto

severalofthePlaintiff’sexpertfeesandpointedtoRule

8.16(1)whichstatesthat“unlesstheCourtotherwise

permits,nomorethanoneexpertispermittedtogive

opinionevidenceonanyonesubjectonbehalfofaparty.”

TheCourtagreedwiththeDefendantanddisallowedseveral

expertfeesthatitconsideredtobeduplicative.

TheCourtdirectedallremainingissuesregardingfeesand

disbursementstotheAssessmentOfficerpursuanttoRule

10.34.




DAY V WOODBURN, 2020 ABQB 75 (RENKE J) Rules 4.29 (Costs Consequences of Formal Offer to Settle), 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)

ThiswasaDecisionregardingcostsfollowingRenke

J’sdismissalofthePlaintiff’sAction.Themainissue

ontheApplicationwaswhethertheDefendant(“EPS”)

shouldreceivedoubleCostsforlitigationstepsfollowing

itsFormalOffertoSettle,pursuanttoRule4.29.The

Courtdeterminedthat,althoughthePlaintiff’sActionwas

defeated,EPSshouldnotbeawardeddoubleCosts,as

itsFormalOffertoSettlewasnot“genuine”enough,as

definedbythecaselaw.

ThepartiesagreedthatanawardofCostsfallswithina

TrialJudge’sdiscretion,pursuanttoRules10.29(1),10.31

and10.33.Thepartiesalsoagreedthatanoffertosettle

mustbe“genuine”forittoattractdoubleCosts.TheCourt

reviewedthecriteriafora“genuineoffer”,citingShelleyJ.

inBruen v University of Calgary,2018ABQB650.

Amongstotherfactors,agenuineoffertosettleshould:(1)

containanelementofcompromise;(2)realisticallyreflect

themeritoftheparties’relativepositionsatthetimeofthe

offer;and(3)bemadewithareasonableexpectationof

acceptanceratherthansolelytoinvokedoubleCostslater.

Anoffertosettleislikelytobefoundgenuinewhereatthe

timeofoffer,theofferorhasalreadyincurredsubstantial

legalcosts,andwheretheActionhasnoobviousmerit.An

offertowaiveCostsislesslikelytobegenuinewhenitis

“madeatanearlystageoflitigation,wheretherehasbeen

minimaldisclosureandquestioning”.

Initsassessmentofgenuineness,theCourtaskedwhether

theFormalOffertoSettleinthiscasereflectedanobjective

viewoftherelativemeritsoftheparties’positions.The

CourtfoundthatEPS’offertosettledidnotproperlyreflect

themeritsoftheparties’positionsatthetimeofoffer.

Amongstotherthings,theadmissibilityofcertainevidence

hadnotyetbeenresolved,therewasvideoevidencethat

couldhavesupportedthePlaintiff’scontentions,andon

theevidence,onereasonablepotentialoutcomeoftheTrial

couldhavebeenthatthePlaintiff’sclaimwasmeritorious:

“whentheofferwasmadeandwhileitwasopen,the

outcomeofthecasewasunpredictableanddependent

entirelyonevidence,credibilityofwitnesses,andfact-

findingattrial”.

Ultimately,theCourtfoundthatagenuineofferwouldhave

includedsomecompensationbeyondEPSforegoingits

Costs.TheCourtdidnotawardEPSdoubleCosts,butdid

awardCoststoEPSunderColumn2ofScheduleC.

STALZER (ESTATE) V STALZER, 2020 ABQB 160 (LOPARCO J)Rules 4.29 (Costs Consequences of Formal Offer to Settle), 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)

ThiswasaDecisionregardingCostsfollowingaSummary

Trialregardingthefinaldivisionofmatrimonialproperty.

JusticeLoparcoexplainedthatRule10.29(1)providesthata

successfulpartyisentitledtoCostsagainstanunsuccessful

partyandthatRule10.33(1)providesseveralfactorsthat

theCourtmayconsiderinmakingaCostsAward.

TheApplicantsoughtdoubleCosts,asRule4.29provides

thatapartywhobeattheirFormalOffertoSettleis

entitledtodoubleCostsaftertheFormalOfferismade.

TheApplicanthadmadeaFormalOffertoSettleonthe

basisthattheRespondentwouldkeepsomeoftheassets

inexchangeforapaymentof$100,000.TheJudgment

arisingfromtheSummaryTrialheldthattheequalization

paymentduefromtheRespondentwas$105,524.25.

JusticeLoparcohadtoconsiderwhetheronepartywas

substantiallysuccessful,or,whethertherewasdivided

successleadingtonoCostsbeingawarded.JusticeLoparco

foundthatnopartyhadbeensubstantiallymoresuccessful

thantheother.HerLadyshipalsofoundthatthefinal

equalizationpaymentdidnotmeetthehighdegreeof

certaintythatwouldentitletheApplicanttodoubleCosts

pursuanttoRule4.29.JusticeLoparcodid,however,

ordertheRespondenttopaytheApplicant$2,500fornot

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respondingtoarequesttosetmattersdownforahearingin

atimelyfashionandfordelaysinfinalizinganoutstanding

issuepursuanttoRule10.29(g).

LOFSTROM V RADKE, 2020 ABQB 122 (GRAESSER J) Rules 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay) and 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)

ThiswasanApplicationtodismisstwoActionsfordelay

pursuanttoRule4.31andRule4.33.TheActionsarose

fromthecollapseofacommonlawrelationshipbetween

Mr.LofstromandMs.Radke.Mr.Lofstrom’sfirstActionwas

forguardianshiprightsoverMs.Radke’sbiologicalchildren

(the“ParentingClaim”),andthesecondActionwasfor

divisionofcommonlawproperty(the“PropertyClaim”).

WithregardstotheParentingClaim,JusticeGraesser

firstconsideredRule4.33,whichrequirestheCourtto

dismisstheActiononApplicationifthreeormoreyears

havepassedwithoutsignificantadvanceintheAction.

JusticeGraesserfoundthatsignificantstepshadbeen

takenbyMr.LofstromtoadvancetheParentingClaimsince

August26,2016.Specifically,Mr.Lofstromhadmadean

ApplicationforaninterimparentingOrderin2017,which

wasa“significantstep”forthepurposesofRule4.33.

JusticeGraesserthenturnedtoconsiderRule4.31.Rule

4.31requiresanApplicanttoprovethatthePlaintiffhas

failedtosignificantlyadvancetheActionasaresultof

inordinate,inexcusabledelayandthattheApplicanthas

beensignificantlyprejudicedbythedelay.JusticeGraesser

foundthattwoyearsofinactionwasinordinateinthe

contextofparentingandcontactApplications.HisLordship

furthernotedthattherelationshiphadendedmorethan

fiveyearspriorandassuch,therewaspresumedprejudice

toMs.Radkeandherchildren.JusticeGraessercouldfind

noreasontoallowtheParentingClaimtoproceedand

thereforedismissedtheParentingClaimpursuanttoHis

Lordship’sdiscretionunderRule4.31.

WithregardstothePropertyClaim,Mr.Lofstromreliedon

theadvancesinacriminalproceedingtoarguethatthe

PropertyClaimwasbeingadvanced.Mr.Lofstromalso

filedanewAffidavitofRecordsbutretractedpreviously

disclosedrecords.JusticeGraesserfoundthatneither

thecriminalproceedingsnorthenewAffidavitofRecords

significantlyadvancedtheAction.Afterreviewingthe

proceedingsofthePropertyClaim,JusticeGraesserfound

thatnoneofMr.Lofstrom’sactivitiesafterAugust26,

2016constitutedasignificantadvanceoftheProperty

Claim.Specifically,Mr.Lofstrom’sfailuretoproduce

recordsandproceedtoQuestioning,asdirectedbytheCase

ManagementJustice,showedthatnosignificantstephad

beentakentoadvancetheAction.JusticeGraessergranted

Ms.Radke’sApplicationtodismissthePropertyClaimfor

delayunderRule4.33.JusticeGraesserthenconsidered

Rule4.31inthealternative.JusticeGraesserfoundthe

delayonthePropertyClaimtobeinordinateandthatMr.

Lofstromhadnoreasonableexcuseforthedelay,butthat

therehadnosignificantprejudicetoMs.Radke.Therefore,

JusticeGraessernotedthathewouldnothavegrantedthe

ApplicationtodismissthePropertyClaimunderRule4.31.

ATWAL V GILL, 2020 ABQB 146 (MASTER PROWSE)Rules 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay) and 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)

TheDefendantappliedtodismisstheActionfordelay

pursuanttoRules4.31and4.33.MasterProwserejected

theApplicationtodismisstheActionpursuanttoRule

4.33,butagreedtodismisstheActionfordelaypursuantto

Rule4.31.

PursuanttoRule4.33,MasterProwsefoundthata

DecisioninaseparateActioninvolvinganissuecommonto

theActionhadremovedoneofthelitigationissuesinthe

Action,andthereforeconstitutedasignificantadvance.

InassessingRule4.31,MasterProwsedeterminedthat

therehadbeenaninordinatedelaybecausedespite

elevenyearspassing,thematterhadnotbeensetforTrial.

Furthermore,hedeterminedthatthedelaywasinexcusable,

mostlythefaultofthePlaintiffs,andnotedthatthe

Plaintiffsdidnotrebutthepresumptionofsignificant

prejudicearisingfromRule4.31(2).AsMasterProwse

foundtherewasnocompellingreasonnottodismissthe

Actionfordelay,hedismissedtheActionagainstthe

DefendantpursuanttoRule4.31.




BEHM V HANSEN, 2020 ABQB 52 (LEMA J)Rules 5.13 (Obtaining Records from Others), 13.13 (Requirements for all Filed Documents) and 13.19 (Requirements for Affidavits)

TheTrialoftheActionhadbeenadjournedinorderto

providethePlaintiffwithanopportunitytoobtainfurther

evidenceastotheDefendant’spossibleinterestina

business.FollowingtheadjournmentoftheTrial,the

PlaintifffiledanApplicationseeking,inter alia,anOrder

againstathird-partyindividual,Dr.Elloumi,underRule

5.13,whichprovidesaproceduretoobtainrecordsfrom

non-partiestolitigation.Dr.Elloumihadpreviouslysigned

anAffidavitpurportingsomeknowledgeoftheDefendant’s

businessinterest.

ServiceofDr.Elloumihadbeenanissue:theAffidavit

previouslyswornbyDr.ElloumiincludedtheDefendant’s

counsel’saddressforserviceasthepartyfilingthe

document.JusticeLemanotedthatRule13.19(1)requires

thatAffidavitsmustincludeallenumeratedaspects

underRule13.13.Rule13.13(2)(f)requiresanaddress

forservicefortheaffiant,andRule13.19requiresthat

theAffidavitbeinForm49.HisLordshipnotedthatthe

templateoftheformincludesasectionfortheaddressand

serviceofthepartyfilingthedocument,whichHisLordship

foundcouldbeadifferentaddressthanrequiredinRule

13.13(2)(f).

JusticeLemafoundthatDr.Elloumicouldnotbeserved

throughtheDefendant’scounsel.Astherewasnoaddress

forserviceforthethird-partyaffiantincludedinthe

Affidavit,HisLordshipsuggestedthatalternativeattempts

atserviceshouldbeattemptedbeforefilinganApplication

tovalidateservice.

1490703 ALBERTA LTD V CHAHAL, 2020 ABQB 33 (MASTER MASON)Rules 5.15 (Admissions of Authenticity of Records), 6.11 (Evidence at Application Hearings) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

ThePlaintiffcorporationpurchasedresidentialreal

estatewhich,upontransferoftitle,remainedsubjectto

anencumbrancethatwasultimatelyenforcedthrough

foreclosure.ThePlaintiffbroughtanActionagainstseveral

lawyersthatithadretainedtoadministertheconveyance

(the“ConveyanceLawyers”).TheConveyanceLawyers

broughtanApplicationforSummaryDismissalontheground

thattheActionhadbeenfiledoutsidethelimitationperiod.

InconsideringtheSummaryDismissalApplication,Master

MasonreliedonseveralAffidavitsandcross-examination

transcripts.Thepartiesalsoreferredtoafiled“Bookof

Documents”whichcontainedthePlaintiff’sAffidavitof

Records.MasterMasonnotedthattherecordscontainedin

theAffidavitofRecordshadbeendeemedauthenticthrough

passageoftime,asprovidedforinRule5.15,andthat

admissiblerecordsdisclosedinanAffidavitofRecordscould

beconsideredintheApplicationpursuanttoRule6.11,but

notasevidenceofthetruthoftherecords’contents.

TheCourtheldthattherewassufficientundisputed

evidencetoinformthelimitationsissueandappliedthe

testforSummaryDismissalsetoutinRule7.3andclarified

bytheCourtofAppealofAlbertainWeir-Jones Technical

Services Incorporated v Purolator Courier Ltd.,2019ABCA

49.MasterMasondeterminedthatinjuryarisinginthe

courseofconveyancehadbeenobjectivelydiscoverable

morethantwoyearspriortothefilingoftheAction.The

ActionwasdismissedagainsttheConveyanceLawyers.

COUNTY OF VULCAN V GENESIS RECIPROCAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 2020 ABQB 93 (GRAESSER J)Rules 5.15 (Admissions of Authenticity of Records), 5.29 (Acknowledgment of Corporate Witness’s Evidence), 5.31 (Use of Transcript and Answers to Written Questions), 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)

GenesisReciprocalInsuranceExchange(“Genesis”)and

theCountyofVulcan(“Vulcan”)appealedtheDecision

ofMasterBirkettunderRule7.3dismissingGenesis’

ApplicationforSummaryDismissaloftheActionand

Vulcan’sApplicationforSummaryJudgmentofitsclaims

againstGenesis(the“Appeals”).TheAppealsrelatedto

whetherinsurancecoverageexistedunderaninsurance

policyforVulcan(the“Policy”)inrelationtoerrorsallegedly

committedbyitsformerchieffinancialofficer.Master

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BirketthaddismissedbothApplicationsholdingthatmore

evidencewasneededtoproperlydecidetheissues.

Asapreliminarymatter,Vulcanarguedthattherecord

wasinsufficientforGenesis’SummaryDismissal

ApplicationbecauseGenesiswasrelyingonhearsay

evidenceinitsApplicationwithreferencetoitscorporate

representativeunderRules5.29and5.31(the“Corporate

Representative”)andtheCorporateRepresentative’s

understandingofvariousrecordsinevidence.Vulcan

cited,amongotherthings,Rule13.18(3)whichsaysthat

onlydirectevidencecanbeusedinApplicationsseeking

finalrelief.JusticeGraesseraddressedthisargumentby

reviewingtheseminaldecisionofWeir-Jones Technical

Services Incorporated v Purolator Courier Ltd.,2019

ABCA49andbyexplainingthattheabilityofacorporate

representativetobeabletoreviewdocumentsinthe

possessionofthecorporatebodyandsummarizethemor

tobeabletointroducesuchdocumentsintoevidenceisa

practicalnecessity.

JusticeGraesseralsoreviewedtheadmissibilityofalegal

opinionandvariousemailsandletterswrittenbyand

amongcouncillorsofVulcan,itsemployees,anditsformer

Reeve,whichVulcanarguedwerealsohearsay.Justice

Graesserexpresslynotedthatthehearsayargumentwas

contrarytothe“documentsinpossession”doctrineand

Rule5.15,andconcludedthatthisevidenceformedsome

oftheevidenceofVulcan.GraesserJ.emphasizedthatit

isnotnecessarytohavedirectevidenceofthesendersor

recipientsofbusinessrecordstomakethemadmissible.

JusticeGraesserreviewedtheprinciplesofSummary

JudgmentunderRule7.3andfoundthatthecasewas

suitableforsummaryprocedures.GraesserJ.notedthatthe

caseturnedlargelyontheinterpretationofthePolicyand

thatthefactswerenotsignificantlyindispute.HisLordship

addedthattheApplicationsweremadeafterdocument

productionandQuestioningbyeachparty.

AfteranextensivereviewofthefactsbeforetheCourt,

JusticeGraesserconcludedbyfindingthattherewere

enoughfactstofairlyandjustlyconclude,amongother

things,thatVulcanhadnotcompliedwithPolicyandthat

anycoverage,ifitexistedatall,wasnotavailabletoit.

Accordingly,JusticeGraessergrantedGenesis’Application

forSummaryDismissalofVulcan’sclaimsanddismissed

Vulcan’sApplicationforSummaryJudgment.

NEXEN ENERGY ULC V ITP SA, 2020 ABQB 83 (NIXON J) Rules 6.10 (Electronic Hearing), 11.25 (Real and Substantial Connection) and 11.31 (Setting Aside Service)

TheApplicant,aSwisscompany,appliedtosetasidean

Orderforserviceex jurisonthebasisthatthePlaintiff

failedtocomplywithitsdisclosureobligationsinobtaining

theex parteserviceex jurisOrder.Italsosoughttostrike,

dismiss,orstaytheActionagainstit,arguingthattheCourt

eitherdidnothavejurisdictiontoheartheActionagainst

it,oralternativelythatitshoulddeclinetoexerciseits

jurisdictiontodoso.

Priortoenteringintoanycontracts,theApplicanthad

providedthePlaintiffwitha“Proposal”whichcontaineda

forumselectionclauseinfavouroftheCourtsofLausanne,

Switzerland.Thepartieshadalsoenteredintofour

Agreements,oneofwhichcontainedagoverninglawand

forumselectionclauseinfavourofAlberta.

NixonJ.firstconsideredthePlaintiff’sdisclosure

obligations.InobtainingtheOrderforserviceex juris,the

Plaintiffhadonlyreferencedoneoftheseveralagreements

(the“Agreements”)betweentheparties,andnotthe

ProposalorothersoftheAgreements.NixonJ.heldthat

ithadnotacteddeceitfullyorina“verymisleading”

manner;rather,ithadtakenthepositionthatitsclaimwas

solelybasedononeoftheAgreements,anddisclosedthat

AgreementinwholetotheCourt.Assuch,HisLordshipdid

notsetasidetheOrderonthebasisofnon-disclosure.

NextNixonJ.consideredwhethertheCourthadjurisdiction

toheartheAction.HisLordshipreviewedRule11.25(2),

whichsetsouttherequirementsforaserviceex juris

Order,andnotedthatcommencementdocumentsmaybe

servedoutsideofCanadaifthereisarealandsubstantial

connectiontoAlberta,andtheCourtpermitssuchservice

onanApplicationsupportedbyAffidavitevidence.The

partiesagreedthattheestablishmentofa“goodarguable




case”fromtheoldRulesalsoremainsarequirementunder

Rule11.25(2),eventhoughitisnotexplicitlyreferencedin

theRule.HisLordshipalsonotedthattheCourtisentitled

torefertothecommencementdocumentandanymaterials

filedinsupportofanApplicationtosetasideservice

pursuanttoRule11.31(1)inassessingwhetherthetestfor

serviceex jurishasbeenmet.

NixonJ.foundthattheApplicationandAffidavitevidence

submittedbythePlaintiffsdiscloseda“goodarguable

case”.HisLordshipexplainedthata“goodarguablecase”

isestablishedwherethePlaintiffhasputforward“some

evidencethatthecaseitproposedtobringhasafoundation

infact”.Theevidence“neednotbebasedonfirst-hand

informationorrequireapositivefactualconclusion”.His

Lordshipfurtherheldthatarealandsubstantialconnection

toAlbertahadbeenestablished.Indoingso,NixonJ.

reviewedthelistof“presumptiveconnectingfactors”set

outbytheSupremeCourtinVan Breda v Village Resorts

Ltd,2012SCC17,aswellasthefactorslistedinRule

11.25(3).HisLordshipfoundthattheforumselection

clauseinfavourofAlbertawas“broad,unambiguous,and

unqualified”,andthattheProposalcontainingtheclausein

favourofLausannewasnotapplicable.

Finally,NixonJ.consideredwhethertheCourtshouldnot

exerciseitsjurisdictioninspiteoftheforumselection

clausenamingAlberta,onthebasisthatitisforum non

conveniens.Indoingso,HisLordshipnotedthatforum

selectionclausesareencouragedbecausetheycreate

certaintyincross-bordertransactions,andshouldonlybe

disregardedwheretheApplicantshows“strongcause”that

itshouldnotbecompliedwith.NixonJ.foundthat“strong

cause”hadnotbeenestablished-inparticularbecausethe

majorityofwitnessesweresituatedinAlberta,andthose

whowerelocatedinSwitzerlandcouldprovidetestimony

electronicallypursuanttoRule6.10.

WESTMAN V ELGER, 2020 ABQB 125 (BURROWS J)Rules 6.11 (Evidence at Application Hearings), 7.7 (Application of Other Rules) and 7.11 (Order for Trial)

ThiswasanApplicationfortheassessmentofpersonal

injurydamagesbywayofaSummaryTrial.ThePlaintiff

attemptedtorelyonunswornexpertevidence.Justice

BurrowsnotedthatAffidavitevidenceisrequiredtobe

usedwhentheCourtistodecideanApplication,pursuant

toRule6.11(1)(a).HisLordshipexplainedthatDivision3

oftheRulesdealswithSummaryTrialsandexplainedthat

pursuanttoRule7.7(2),Part6oftheRules(includingRule

6.11(1)(a))appliestoSummaryTrialsexcepttotheextent

modifiedbyDivision3.JusticeBurrowsnotedthatthereis

nothingwithinDivision3thatmodifiestherequirementthat

theCourtrelyonswornAffidavitevidencewhenconsidering

anApplication.HisLordshipconsideredorderingaTrialof

theissuepursuanttoRule7.11,whichallowstheCourt

todosoatanystageofaSummaryTrial,butultimately

heldthatthePlaintiff’smaterialsforhisApplication

weredeficient,andorderedthatthattheApplicationbe

adjournedsine dieuntilthedeficiencieswereremedied.

KUZOFF V TALISMAN PERU BV SUCURSAL DEL PERU, 2020 ABQB 111 (HOLLINS J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal from Master’s Judgment or Order) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

JusticeHollinsdismissedtheAppellant’sAppealfroma

DecisionofaMastertosummarilydismisstheAction.

HerLadyshipnotedthatpursuanttoRule6.14(3),an

AppealfromaMastertoaJusticeoftheCourtofQueen’s

BenchisanAppealontherecordandthestandardof

reviewiscorrectness.

JusticeHollinsultimatelydeterminedthattheMasterhad

correctlydetermined,underRule7.3,thattheAppellant’s

claimwaswithoutmeritandthereforesubjecttoSummary

Dismissal.Specifically,theMastercorrectlyfoundthatit

waspossibletofairlyresolvethedisputeonasummary

basisastherewasnogenuineissueforTrial;theDefendant

hadsuccessfullyshownthattherewasnomerittothe

claim;thePlaintiffdidnotdemonstrateagenuineissue

requiringaTrial;anditwasappropriatetoexercisejudicial

discretiontosummarilyresolvethedispute.

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SSC NORTH AMERICA, LLC V FEDERKIEWICZ, 2020 ABQB 176 (FETH J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal from Master’s Judgment or Order) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

AMastergrantedSummaryJudgmentagainstthe

Defendants,FederkiewiczandKnowLimitsPrivateLending

Inc.TheDefendantssuccessfullyappealedtheSummary

Judgment.

JusticeFethnotedthatRule6.14(3)allowsanAppealfrom

aMaster’sJudgmenttorelyonadditionalevidencethatis

relevantandmaterialintheopinionoftheJudgehearing

theAppeal.HisLordshipfoundthatnewevidenceonly

neededtoberelevantandmaterialandisnotrequiredto

meetanyotherrequirementsforfreshevidencesuchasin

othertypesofappeals.Asaresult,JusticeFethaccepted

newevidenceonforeignlawsandotherevidencefrom

expertAffidavitsasrelevantandmaterialtotheAppeal.

JusticeFeththenconsideredwhetherthefactsofthecase

wereappropriateforSummaryJudgment.HisLordship

appliedRule7.3whichlimitsSummaryJudgmentonly

inthecasewherethereisnodefenceormerittoaclaim

(orpartofit)orwhentheonlyrealissuetobetriedisthe

amounttobeawarded.JusticeFethfoundthattheclaim

hadhighlycontestedandcomplicatedfacts.Summary

adjudicationwasnotappropriateforthedifficultfactual

questionsandcontestedfacts.

JusticeFethallowedtheAppealandsetasidetheSummary

Judgment.

KIM V CHOI, 2020 ABQB 51 (MICHALYSHYN J) Rule 9.15 (Setting Aside, Varying and Discharging Judgments and Orders)

TheApplicants(the“Chois”)appliedtosetasideanOrder

obtainedbytheRespondents(the“Kims”)inFebruaryof

2017,pursuanttoRule9.15.TheOrderatissueawarded

JudgmenttotheRespondents,plusinterestandsolicitor

andownclientCosts,andcertainotherreliefrelatingtothe

Chois’rightsasshareholdersanddirectorsofacorporation.

MichalyshynJ.consideredthetestforsettingasidea

DefaultJudgmentpursuanttoRule9.15(1),whichrequires

theCourttoaskthreequestions:(a)isthereanarguable

defence;(b)didtheApplicantnotintendtoallowthe

Judgmenttogobydefault,andcantheApplicantprovidea

reasonableexcuseforthedefault;and(c)didtheApplicant

movepromptlytosettheDefaultJudgmentasidewhen

itcametohisorherattention.Further,pursuanttoRule

9.15(3),theCourtretainsresidualdiscretiontograntthe

relief,evenifthetestisnotmet,iffairnessrequiresit.

MichalyshynJ.assessedtheevidenceanddeterminedthat

theChoishadestablishedareasonablymeritoriousdefence,

hadnotintendedtheJudgmenttogobydefault,andhad

movedpromptlytosetasidetheDefaultJudgmentwhen

theybecameawareofit.Therealquestionwaswhether

theirexcusesforthedefault-thattheycouldnotremember

beingadvisedbytheirlawyersthattheyhadagreedtothe

Applicationdate,andthatMr.Choihadbeenill-were

reasonable.HisLordshipnotedthattheburdenwasonthe

Choistodemonstratethattheyhadareasonableexcusefor

failingtoopposetheApplication,andheldthattheyhad

failedtodoso.They“kneworoughttohaveknown”about

theApplicationanddidnothingtorespondtoit,andthe

Kimshadalso“madevalidpoints[…]regardingtheChois’

apparentdisregardfortheproceedings”.

Nevertheless,MichalyshynJ.waspersuadedthatgiven

thecircumstancesofthecase,“fairnessdictate[d]that

notwithstandingtheabsenceofareasonableexcuse,the

Choisshouldhaveanopportunitytoadvancetheirpossibly

reasonablymeritoriousdefence.”HisLordshipalsoset

asidecertainreliefthatwasgrantedintheOrder,becauseit

hadnotbeensoughtintheKims’originalApplication.

Finally,MichalyshynJ.orderedthat“theChois’abilityto

advancetheirdefencewillbeconditionalonthepayment

forthwithof[C]oststotheKims”.HisLordshipasked

thepartiestoprovidefurthersubmissionsastothescale

ofCosts,butwarnedthatHisLordshipwouldnotorder

solicitor-clientCostsorSecurityforCosts.Rather,His

LordshipwouldbepreparedtoawardCostsinaccordance

withColumn4ofScheduleCorenhancedCosts.




801 SEVENTH INC V CNOOC PETROLEUM NORTH AMERICA ULC, 2020 ABQB 198 (DILTS J)Rules 9.15 (Setting Aside, Varying and Discharging Judgments), 11.25 (Real and Substantial Connection), 11.27 (Validating Service) and 11.31 (Setting Aside Service)

Following801SeventhInc.’s(“801”)successfulreceipt

ofOrderspermittingserviceex juris,andsubsequently

validatingthatservice,MadamJusticeDiltspresidedover

thisApplicationtosetasidebothOrders.Indeterminingthat

theApplicationshouldbedismissed,HerLadyshipclarified

thatanApplicationtosetasideanOrderforserviceex juris

isproperlybroughtpursuanttoRule11.31,asopposedto

Rule9.15.JusticeDiltsalsoconcludedthatanOrderto

validateservicecanbegrantedpursuanttoRules11.27(1)

and11.27(4)(b)inamannerconsistentwiththeprinciples

oftheHague Convention,solongasevidencecanbeoffered

whichshowsthatservicewaseitheraffectedorfrustrated.

TheApplicantalsosoughttoinvalidatetheserviceex juris

OrderpursuanttoRule11.25(3)onthebasisthatseveral

misstatementsmadebythearticlingstudentwhoobtained

thatOrdercompoundedandwereultimatelyfatal.Madam

JusticeDiltsaddressedtheseapparentdeficiencies,and

concludedthatalthoughthearticlingstudentmayhave

conveyedsomefactualinconsistencies,thedispositive

evidencenecessarytodeterminewhethertogranttheex

parteApplicationwasproperlyputbeforetheCourt.

Lastly,MadamJusticeDiltsexaminedthethreshold

requirementreadintoRule11.25(3)thatanApplicant

mustdemonstrateagoodarguablecase.HerLadyshipheld

thattomakeoutagoodarguablecase,itisnotnecessary

totenderevidenceofeverysinglecauseofaction,asan

Applicantispermittedtopleadinthealternative.

FLEMING V FLEMING, 2020 ABQB 85 (LEMA J) Rules 10.10 (Time Limitation on Reviewing Retainer Agreements and Charges) and 10.11 (Who May Request Review of Lawyer’s Charges)

Aftertheirmatrimonialpropertywasdivided,aformerwife

challenged,amongotherexpenses,thequantumoflegal

feesanddisbursementsincurredbyherformerhusband

andchargedagainsttheproceedsofcertainlandsthathad

beendividedandsold.

Thehusbandarguedthatthewifewasbarredfrom

challengingthelegalfeespursuanttoRule10.10(2),which

requiresthatalawyer’schargesbereviewedwithin6months

ofthedateoftheaccountbeingsenttotheclient.Lema

J.agreedthatthechallengewasoutoftime,asmorethan

6monthshadgonebysincetheaccountwasissued.His

LordshipalsocommentedthatunderRule10.11,boththe

formerhusbandandwifewereconsidered“clients”entitled

tohavetheaccountreviewedpursuanttoRule10.10

becausetheywereeachliabletopaythelawyer’scharges.

SELLERS V SELLERS, 2020 ABQB 79 (RICHARDSON J) Rules 10.28 (Definition of “Party”), 10.29 (General Rules for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.30 (When Costs Award May be Made), 10.31 (Court-ordered Costs Award), 10.32 (Costs in Class Proceeding) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)

AfterRichardsonJ.grantedaJudgmentofDivorce,divided

theparties’matrimonialproperty,andorderedthepayment

ofchildandspousalsupport,thepartiescouldnotagree

onCosts.Boththehusbandandwifearguedthattheyhad

been“moresuccessful”thantheotherintheAction,and

thereforethattheywereentitledtoCosts.

RichardsonJ.firstnotedthatauthoritytoawardCostsis

governedbyRules10.28to10.33,andthatCostsshould

beawardedinamannerthatisfair,efficient,just,and

cost-effective.HerLadyshipfurtherexplainedthatonegoal

ofCostsistooffsetthefinancialimpactofbeingforcedto

attendCourtwithoutvalidreason,andthatRule10.33lists

additionalfactorsthattheCourtmayconsiderinawarding

Costs.Ultimately,becausethepartiesenjoyedmixed

success,RichardsonJ.orderedthattheyeachbeartheir

ownCosts.

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BLOUGH V BUSY MUSIC INC, 2020 ABQB 19 (JONES J) Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)

ThisCostsDecisionaroseoutoftwointerlocutory

Applicationsbroughttoaddressissueswithproductionof

documents,aswellasUndertakingsrefusedandobjections

raiseonQuestioningonanAffidavitofawitness.Jones

J.confirmedthatpursuanttoRule10.29andtheCourt’s

discretion,asuccessfulpartytoanApplicationisentitledto

Costspayableforthwithagainsttheunsuccessfulparty,and

theCourtwillconsiderthefactorssetoutinRule10.33,

specificallytherelativesuccessofthesuccessfulparty.The

Courtdeterminedthatthesuccessfulpartyhadachieved

“substantialsuccess”andwasentitledtoCosts.

IndeterminingtheproperquantumoftheCoststobe

awarded,giventhattheApplicationsweremattersnot

involvingmonetaryamounts,theCourtconsideredwhether

anawardshouldbebasedontheamountsoughtinthe

mainAction(whichwouldhaveengagedColumn4of

ScheduleC)or,asthemattershadnomonetaryamount,

ifColumn1ofScheduleCshouldbeusedassuggestedin

ScheduleC.

TheCourtawardedCostsinfavourofthesuccessfulparty

pursuanttoColumn1ofScheduleCpayableforthwith,rather

thaninthecauseasrequestedbytheunsuccessfulparty.

CRESSMAN ESTATE (RE), 2020 ABQB 42 (NATION J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs) and 10.33 (Court-Ordered Costs Award)

ThisDecisionrelatedtotwoquestionsputbeforetheCourt.

OneofthequestionstheCourtwastaskedwithdetermining

wasiftheApplicantwasresponsibletopayCostsasshe

haddiscontinuedherApplication.JusticeNationnoted

thatRule10.29wasthegeneralRuleforthepaymentof

litigationCostsandthatRule10.33listedseveralfactors

thattheCourtcouldconsiderwhendeterminingCosts

Awardsincluding“(1)theconductofanypartythatwas

unnecessary,orthatunnecessarilylengthenedordelayed

theaction;(2)arefusaltoadmitanythingthatshould

havebeenadmitted;and(3)whetheranyapplication

wasunnecessary,improperoramistake.”HerLadyship

createdatimelineofsalientfactsandappliedthelaw

tothosefacts.JusticeNationultimatelydecidednotto

awardsolicitor-clientCostsagainsttheApplicantdueto

theRespondent’sowncontributionstotheconfusionon

certainissuesandsuspiciouscircumstances.Instead,

theRespondentwasentitledtotaxableCostsagainstthe

ApplicantunderColumn5ofScheduleCforeachstep

takenbytheRespondentrelatingtocertainclaimswithina

certaintimeperiod.

ELDER ADVOCATES OF ALBERTA SOCIETY V ALBERTA, 2020 ABQB 54 (ROSS J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award), 10.32 (Costs in Class Proceeding) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)

TheDefendantinaClassActionsoughtanOrderforCosts

againstthePlaintiffsandtheircounsel,whichthePlaintiffs

opposed.ThePlaintiffscross-appliedforanOrderforno

Costs.JusticeRossnotedthattherelevantRulesinthe

proceedingwereRules10.29,10.31,10.32and10.33.

HerLadyshipexplainedthatthefactorsinRule10.33

relatedtotheamountofCostsawarded,andthatRule10.32

addressedwhetheraCostsAwardshouldbemadeagainstan

unsuccessfulrepresentativepartyinaClassAction.

JusticeRossconsideredthefactorssetoutinRule10.32,

whichrequiredtheCourttoconsiderthepublicinterest,

whethertheActioninvolvedanovelpointoflaw,whether

theproceedingwasatestcase,andaccesstojustice

considerations.HerLadyshipfoundthattheunderlying

Actionwasnotatestcaseandthatallthe10.32factors

weighedinthefavourofthePlaintiffs.Theissuesinthe

ClassActionproceedingwereissuesofpublicimportance,

andissuesofstatutoryinterpretationpresentinthe

underlyingActionthathadnotbeenpreviouslyanalyzedby

theCourtcouldbeconsideredanovelissue.Theclaimwas

potentiallymeritorious,triable,andwasbroughtforwardon

behalfofclassmemberswhoweredisadvantagedandinthe

interestsoftheiraccesstojustice.JusticeRossdismissed

theDefendant’sApplication,andgrantedthePlaintiffs’

ApplicationfornoCosts.




MOTTA V DAVIS WIRE INDUSTRIES LTD, 2020 ABQB 136 (DEVLIN J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and Schedule C

ThiswasaDecisionregardingCostsfollowingaTrial.In

thepreviousTrialDecision,JusticeDevlinfoundthatthe

DefendanthadcausetoterminatethePlaintiff,butthe

DefendantalsoowedthePlaintiff$36,912forunpaid

vacationentitlement.Assuch,thePlaintiffwaspartially

successfulfollowingTrialandsoughtCosts.TheDefendant

alsosoughtCosts,asitwassuccessfulindefendingalarge

portionofthePlaintiff’soriginalclaim.

JusticeDevlinnotedthatCostsareawardedas

compensationandarehighlydiscretionary.Pursuantto

Rule10.29,thesuccessfulpartyisnormallyentitledto

Costs.JusticeDevlinconsideredtheTrialinitsentiretyand

determinedthesuccessfulpartytobethePlaintiff.

JusticeDevlinreliedonitem1(3)(b)undertheFramework

ofScheduleC,whichdictatesthatthecolumnforaCosts

AwardagainstaDefendantisdeterminedbytheamount

recovered,nottheamountclaimed.AsthePlaintiffwas

awarded$36,912,thisputtheCostsAwardinColumn1of

ScheduleC.

JusticeDevlinthenturnedtoRule10.33todeterminethe

appropriatefactorsapplicableinmakingtheCostsAward.

JusticeDevlinfoundthattheTrialshouldhavebeenshorter,

andthatpartoftheblameforthelengthoftheTrialsat

withthePlaintiff.HisLordshipthenreducedtheCosts

AwardfortheextraTrialtimeonthePlaintiff’sunsuccessful

portionofhisclaim,namelytwoandahalfdays.Pursuant

toitem1(3)(b)undertheFrameworkofScheduleC,

thereductionwascalculatedonColumn3toreflectthe

unsuccessfulamountclaimedbythePlaintiff.

ANNETT V ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR CANADA LTD, 2020 ABQB 74 (RENKE J) Rules 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award), 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements) and Schedule C

ThisDecisiondealtwiththeparties’entitlementtoCosts

aftertheTrialoftheAction.

ThePlaintiffhadoriginallyclaimedagainstEnterprise

Rent-a-CarCanadaLimited(“Enterprise”)andtheCalgary

PoliceService(“CPS”),butlaterdiscontinuedhisAction

againstCPSonawithoutCostsbasis.Thereafter,Enterprise

obtainedaConsentOrderpermittingittoserveaThird

PartyNoticeonCPS.AftertwoweeksofTrial,thePlaintiff

andEnterprisereachedasettlement.Thereafter,theCourt

foundthatCPSwasnotliabletothePlaintifforEnterprise.

InitsrulingonCosts,theCourtfirstaddressedthe

questionofwhatCostscolumninScheduleCappliedfor

determiningCPS’sCosts.Thepartiescouldnotagreeas

totheapplicableCostscolumnbecausethePlaintiffhad

claimedforgeneraldamagesintheamountof$200,000,

andpecuniaryandspecialdamageswithoutquantifying

them.JusticeRenkecommentedthatthePlaintiff’s

pleadingsmayhavebeendeficient,astheydidnotcontain

anestimateoftheamounttobeclaimedasrequiredby

Rule13.6(2)(c)(ii).Later,whileatTrial,Enterprisehas

valuedthePlaintiff’sclaimat$1.5millionor$1.7million;

andtheninitsclosingsubmissions,hadstateditwas

seekingcontributionof$303,750basedonitsshareof

thesettlementamount.JusticeRenkeconsideredRule

10.33(1)andnotedthattheRule“referstotheamount

claimed[inthepleadings]andtheamountrecoveredas

mattersthatmaybeconsideredinacostsaward.”His

Lordshipalsohighlightedtwoobjectivesofatariffoffees

(ScheduleC,Division2):(1)toprovidecertaintytoparties;

and(2)topromoteparityorfairnessforlitigantsthrough

similartreatment.TheCourtfoundthatColumn3of

ScheduleCwastheappropriateonefordeterminingCPS’s

Costs,asboththePlaintiff’spleadingsandthesettlement

amountsfellunderColumn3.

JusticeRenkenextconsideredwhetherEnterpriseshould

payallofCPS’sCosts,oronlythoseCostsincurredafterit

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serveditsThirdPartyNoticeonCPS.TheCourtfoundthat

therewasnothingthatdisentitledCPStoCostsfromthe

beginningoflitigation.

ALKADRI V ALKADRI, 2020 ABCA 82 (O’FERRALL JA)Rules 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and 14.5 (Appeals Only With Permission)

Theparties,AntoineAlkadri(the“Applicant”)andKhaled

Alkadri(the“Respondent”)werebrotherswhohad

startedthecompanyTiles4Less(the“Company”).The

brothers’businessrelationshipbecamecontentiousand

theRespondentfiledanoppressioncomplaintpursuantto

section242oftheBusiness Corporations Act,RSA2000,c

B-9(the“Act”)againsttheCompanyandtheApplicant(the

“UnderlyingAction”).

TheApplicantsoughtpermissiontoappealaninterlocutory

Order(the“Order”)inwhichtheCaseManagementJudge

(“CMJ”)hadorderedtheCompanytopaytotheRespondent

interimCoststocover,amongotherthings,legalfeesand

disbursementspursuanttosection243(4)oftheAct(the

“Appeal”).TheApplicantargued,amongotherthings,that

theCMJerredinexercisinghisdiscretiontoawardinterim

CostsbyfailingtoconsiderthefactorsinRules10.33(2)(a)

and(f).TheApplicantsubmittedthattheRespondenthad

delayedtheUnderlyingActiontherebyincreasingthecost

oftheproceedings,andthatthisconductshoulddisentitle

himtoanyassistance.

O’FerrallJ.A.foundthatpursuanttoRule14.5(1)(e),an

ApplicantmustreceivepermissiontoappealaDecisionas

toCostsonly.TheApplicantmustbeabletodemonstrate:

(a)agoodarguablecase;(b)issuesofimportancetothe

partiesandingeneral;(c)thattheAppealhaspractical

utility;and(d)thatnodelayinproceedingswillbecaused

bytheAppeal.

JusticeO’FerrallnotedthatCostsawardsarediscretionary

andarereviewableonthestandardofpalpableand

overridingerror.Afterreviewingtherelevantfactualhistory,

HisLordshipfound,asdidtheCMJ,thattheRespondent

owned40%oftheCompanyandtheOrderwasdraftedto

operateasaloan,securedbywayofConsentJudgment

infavouroftheCompanyasagainsttheRespondent.

Accordingly,iftheRespondentwastolosetheUnderlying

Action,hewouldhavetorepaytheloan.JusticeO’Ferrall

furtherfound,asdidtheCMJ,thatitappearedthatsome

ofthedelaywasduetotheinactionoftheCompanyand

theApplicant.Accordingly,O’FerrallJ.A.dismissedthe

Applicants’ApplicationforpermissiontoAppeal.

CANLANKA VENTURES LTD V CAPITAL DIRECT LENDING CORP, 2020 ABQB 96 (HALL J) Rule 10.42 (Actions within Provincial Court Jurisdiction) and Schedule C

ThiswasaDecisionregardingCosts.ThePlaintiffhad

madeclaimsinrespectoffourdifferentmortgages.Three

oftheclaimsfailed,butJusticeHallfoundinfavourofthe

Plaintiffforthefourthclaim.Damageswereassessedat

$25,000.

ThePlaintiffmaintainedthatitshouldbeawardedCosts

asthesuccessfulparty.ThePlaintifffurtherarguedthat

ScheduleCisoutdatedanddoesnotproperlyreflecta

litigant’sactuallegalcosts.ItarguedthatCostsshouldbe

40%to50%ofactuallegalcosts,yieldingatotalofover

$106,000.

TheDefendantarguedthatitwassubstantiallysuccessful

initsdefenceandsoughtCostsinaccordancewithColumn

2ofScheduleC.Inthealternative,ifCostsweretobe

awardedtothePlaintiff,theDefendantarguedthatthe

CostsshouldbelimitedbyRule10.42(2)(a).Pursuant

toRule10.42(2)(a),whereanActionisbroughtinthe

CourtofQueen’sBenchbuttheamountawardeddoesnot

exceedthejurisdictionoftheProvincialCourt,thenCosts

mustbeassessedatnomorethan75%oftheColumn1of

ScheduleCunlesstheCourtotherwiseorders.

JusticeHallfoundthatneitherofthepartieswas

particularlysuccessfulatTrial.HisLordshipagreedwith

theDefendantthatRule10.42(2)(a)applied,andawarded

75%ofColumn1tothePlaintiff,equatingtoCosts

awardedof$11,907.43.




anadultinterdependentpartnershipaswell.The“special

circumstances”portionofthetestdoesnotoftencreate

animpedimenttomatrimonialorfamilylawcases.Infact,

interimCostsareoftengrantedinthattypeoflitigation.

HisLordshipfoundthatthenatureofthelitigationinthe

underlyingActionwasonewhichfellwithinthescopeof

casesoftenrecognizedinthethirdpartofthetest;however,

thepresumptionwasrebuttable.JusticeFethalsonoted

thatevenifallthreepartsofthetestweremet,granting

CostswasstillattheCourt’sdiscretion.

HisLordshipappliedthetesttothefactsandfound

thatalthoughtheApplicanthadmetthesecondand

thirdelementsofthetest,shehadnotdemonstrated

impecuniosity.JusticeFethdismissedtheApplicationfor

advanceCosts,grantedinterimpartnersupportsubjectto

setoff,andreservedtheApplicationforretroactivesupport

forTrial.

KOCH V KOCH, 2020 ABQB 65 (KENNY J)Rule 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)

ReasonsforJudgmentwereissuedinthisfamilylaw

disputeonOctober5,2017.Severalissuesremained

outstandingbetweenthepartiesfollowingJudgment.One

issuewaswhetherinterestwasowedonthesaleofsome

ofthematrimonialproperty.JusticeKennyreferredto

Rule13.6whichrequiresapartytospecificallypleada

statementofanyinterestclaimed,thebasisfortheinterest,

andthemethodofcalculatingtheinterestintheStatement

ofClaim.

JusticeKennyreviewedtheStatementofClaim.The

Judgment Interest Act,RSA2000,cJ-1waspleadedin

theStatementofClaimfortheclaimforstatutorypre-

judgmentinterest.HerLadyshipnotedthatadifferent

interestratewasraisedinargumentwhichhadnotproperly

beenpleaded,butthatawardingpre-judgmentinterest

wasdiscretionary.Ultimately,JusticeKennyorderedpre-

judgmentinterestinthelumpsumof$30,000.

LYMER (RE), 2020 ABQB 157 (MASTER SMART)Rule 10.53 (Punishment for Civil Contempt of Court)

ThebankruptApplicantinthiscasesoughtadeclaration

fromtheCourtthathehadpurgedhiscontempt.Hehad

previously,onnumerousoccasions,providedfalseor

incompleteinformationtocreditorsthathadopposedhis

dischargefrombankruptcydespiteCourtOrdersrequiring

completeandhonestproduction.

MasterSmartconsideredRule10.53(3)whichallowsthe

Courttowaiveorsuspendapenaltyorsanction“[i]fa

persondeclaredtobeincivilcontemptofCourtpurgesthe

person’scontempt.”

Ultimately,MasterSmartdeterminedthatthemostrecent

productionoftheApplicantfailedtoanswerthecentral

questiontothelitigation(i.e.wherehadthemoneygone?)

and,therefore,theApplicanthadfailedtopurgehis

contempt.

BLANEY V MURPHY, 2020 ABQB 196 (FETH J)Rule 12.36 (Advance Payment of Costs)

ThiswasanApplicationforongoingandretroactive

interimpartnersupportandforadvanceCosts.Rule12.36

addressesadvanceCostsinthefamilylawcontext.FethJ.

exploredthecaselawthatdevelopedaroundtheRule,and

notedthatthecaselawprovidesathree-parttestthatalso

appliesinfamilylawandmatrimonialcases.

FethJ.explainedthatthethreeparttestconsidersfirst,

theimpecuniosityoftheApplicant;second,whetherthe

Applicanthasestablisheda“primafaciecaseofsufficient

merit”,andthird,whether“specialcircumstances

bringingtheclaimwithintheclassofcasestowhichth[e]

extraordinaryremedyapplies”.HisLordshipexplainedthat

inmaritallitigation,thesecondpartofthetestisusually

metduetoarebuttablepresumptionthatadisputearising

fromtheprocessofmarriageanddivorcewasa“prima

faciecaseofsufficientmerit”;however,thisApplication

arosefromadisputeinacommonlawrelationship.

JusticeFethnotedthatthepresumptionfoundinmarital

litigationlogicallyandoftenfollowsforclaimsbasedon

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HAYDEN V HAYDEN, 2020 ABCA 37 (ROWBOTHAM JA)Rule 14.5 (Appeals Only With Permission)

TheApplicantinthiscasesoughtpermissiontoappealfrom

theDecisionofasingleAppealJudgetoapanelofthree

judges,pursuanttoRule14.5.

RowbothamJ.A.determinedthattheApplicantdidnot

meetthetestforpermissiontoappealfromthedecisionof

asingleJudge;specifically,theApplicantfailedtoestablish

(a)aseriousquestionofgeneralimportance;(b)apossible

erroroflaw;(c)anunreasonableexerciseofdiscretion;or

(d)amisapprehensionofimportantfacts.

RowbothamJ.A.confirmedthattheApplicationdidnot

meritthescrutinyofthreeAppealJudgesanddismissedthe

ApplicationtoforpermissiontoAppeal.

PIIKANI NATION V RAYMOND JAMES LTD, 2020 ABCA 116 (STREKAF JA)Rule 14.5 (Appeals Only With Permission)

TheApplicantsoughtpermission,pursuanttoRule14.5(1)

(a),toappealthedecisionofStrekafJ.A.(the“Application

toAppeal”)whichgrantedSecurityforCoststothe

RespondentsinrelationtotheApplicant’sAppealofan

interlocutoryOrdergrantedbyaCaseManagementJudge

toafullpanel,anddismissingthebulkoftheApplicant’s

cross-Application(the“UnderlyingApplication”).

JusticeStrekafreviewedsomeoftheconsiderablefactual

historyintheUnderlyingApplicationandtherelevant

jurisprudenceapplicabletoRule14.5.HerLadyship

outlinedthetestandfactorstoconsiderinallowingan

ApplicationtoAppealandnotedthatpermissioncanbe

grantediftheApplicantestablishesthatthereis:(a)a

questionofgeneralimportance;(b)apossibleerrorof

law;(c)anunreasonableexerciseofdiscretion;or(d)a

misapprehensionofimportantfacts.

JusticeStrekaffound,inter alia,thattheApplicantsought

torelyonanAffidavitwhichcontainedwrittenargument

(whichwasnotproperlythesubjectofanAffidavit),

attemptedtorelitigatethemeritsoftheCostsAwardthat

STEWART V SCHUMACHER, 2020 ABQB 133 (ROOKE ACJ)Rule 14.5 (Appeals only with Permission)

InanunderlyingActionallegingharassment(the“Action”)

commencedbyaradioannouncer(the“Plaintiff”)against

oneofherlisteners,theApplicant/Defendant,John

Schumacher(“Mr.Schumacher”),hadpreviouslymade

anApplication(the“Application”)whichAssociateChief

JusticeRookeruledtoexhibitseveralindiciaofabusive

litigation.HisLordshiphadimposedinterimCourtaccess

restrictionsonMr.Schumacherandinvitedhimandthe

Plaintifftoprovidewrittensubmissionsaddressingtwo

questions:(1)whetherMr.Schumachershouldbesubject

toindefiniteCourtaccessrestrictions;and(2)ifso,what

formthoseCourtaccessrestrictionsshouldtake.

BecauseMr.Schumacherhadattemptedtobringthe

Plaintiff’semployer,aradiostationanditsowner(the

“RadioStation”andthe“Owner”,respectively)intothe

litigation,theywerealsoinvitedtomakesubmissions.The

CourtreceivednosubmissionsfromthePlaintifforMr.

Schumacherbutdidreceiveajointsubmissionfromthe

RadioStationandOwner(the“Owner’sSubmission”).

Afterreviewingtherelevantproceduralhistoryandthe

Owner’sSubmission,AssociateChiefJusticeRooke

foundthatthecircumstancesofthecase,inparticular

theconcernforthesafetyofMs.Stewart,weighedin

favourofindefiniteCourtaccessrestrictionsasagainst

Mr.Schumacher.HisLordshipprovidedalitanyof

prohibitionsandrestrictionsasagainstMr.Schumacher

whichincludedarequirementthatMr.Schumachermust

applytoasingleAppealJudgeforleavetocommenceor

continueanyAppeal,Application,orotherproceedingin

theAlbertaCourtofAppeal,andifasingleAppealJudge

grantedMr.SchumacherleavetocommenceanAppeal,

thenMr.Schumachermayberequiredtoapplyforfurther

permissiontoAppealunderRule14.5(1)(j).

HisLordshipconcludedbynotingthattheCourt

wouldprepareandfiletheappropriateOrdertoreflect

thisDecision,andthatapprovalofthatOrderbyMr.

Schumacherwasnotrequired.




HerLadyshipfoundthattheAppealwasnothopelessor

frivolousandgrantedtheApplicationtoextendthetimeto

appealpursuanttoRule14.37(2)(c).

PACE V ECONOMICAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 2020 ABCA 67 (STREKAF JA)Rules 14.14 (Fast Track Appeals), 14.17 (Filing the Appeal Record – Fast Track Appeals), 14.64 (Failure to Meet Deadlines) and 14.65 (Restoring Appeals)

TheAppellant,RochellePace(“Ms.Pace”),soughtto

restoreanAppealthatwasstruckbytheRegistrarfor

failuretocomplywiththedeadlinesforaFastTrackAppeal

pursuanttoRules14.17(1)and14.64.Ms.Pacehad

commencedanActioninAugustof2014againstthedriver

ofanATVonwhichshewasapassengerforinjuriesshe

sustainedasaresultofanaccidentwhentheATVstruck

atree(the“UnderlyingAction”).TheRespondentinsurer,

whowasaddedasaThirdPartytotheAction,applied

toamendthedriver’sAmendedStatementofDefenceto

particularizethecausationissueandtopleadadditional

defences(the“UnderlyingApplication”).TheUnderlying

ApplicationwasgrantedbyaChambersJudgeandappealed

byMs.Pace.

Ms.PacehadindicatedonherNoticeofAppealthatthe

AppealwasnotrequiredtobedealtwithasaFastTrack

Appeal.ByaletterdatedthesamedaytheAppealwas

filed,theCourt’sCaseManagementOfficeradvisedthe

partiesthattheAppealwasaFastTrackAppealpursuant

toRule14.14.Ms.Pacefailedtomeetthedeadlinesofa

FastTrackAppealunderRule14.17andaccordingly,the

Appealwasstruck.

StrekafJ.A.foundthatanAppealthathasbeenstruck

mayberestoredpursuanttoRule14.65(1).HerLadyship

reviewedtherelevantjurisprudencenotingthatthetest

torestoreanAppealiswell-settledandbasedonfive

factors:(1)arguablemerit;(2)explanationforthedefect

ordelaythatcausedtheAppealtobetakenoffthelist;

(3)reasonablepromptnessinmovingtocurethedefect

andhavetheAppealrestored;(4)timelyintentionto

proceedwiththeAppeal;and(5)potentialprejudicetothe

Respondents(includingthelengthofthedelay).

gaverisetoacontemptOrder,andprovidedinformation

thatcouldhavebeen,butwasnot,providedinthe

UnderlyingApplication.

StrekafJ.A.furtheremphasizedthatthequestionof

whetherSecurityforCostsisappropriateisdiscretionary,

and,giventhattheApplicanthadnotdemonstratedany

importantlegalissuewhichwasraisedbytheDecisionto

grantSecurityforCosts,theApplicanthadnotmetthe

applicabletesttogranttheApplicationforpermissionto

Appeal,andtheApplicationwasdismissed.

GEZEHEGN V ALBERTA (APPEALS COMMISSION OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD), 2020 ABCA 48 (SCHUTZ JA) Rules 14.8 (Filing a Notice of Appeal) and 14.37 (Single Appeal Judges)

TheApplicantunsuccessfullypursuedJudicialReviewof

adecisionfromtheAppealsCommissionoftheWorkers

Compensation Act,RSA2000,cW-15.Withinthemonth

followingtheJudicialReviewDecision,theApplicantfiled

anApplicationtoextendthetimetoappealratherthana

NoticeofAppeal.

JusticeSchutzconsideredRule14.8(2)(iii),whichrequires

theApplicanttofileNoticeofAppealwithinonemonthof

thedateoftheDecision.JusticeSchutzthenconsidered

Cairns v Cairns,1931CanLII471(ABCA),forthefactors

whichshouldguidetheCourt’sexerciseofdiscretionon

whethertoextendthetimetoappeal:(1)whetheran

intentiontoappealwasheldbytheAppellantwhilethe

righttoappealexisted;(2)whetheranexplanationexists

whichservestojustifyorexcusethelateness;(3)whether

theopposingpartywasseriouslyprejudicedbythedelay;

(4)whethertheAppellanthadtakenbenefitsofthe

JudgmentfromwhichanAppealissought;and(5)whether

theAppealhasareasonablechanceofsuccess.

JusticeSchutzdidnotaddressthefourthfactorbutfound

thattheApplicanthadmadeoutthefirstthreefactors.

JusticeSchutzthenturnedtoconsiderwhetherthe

Applicanthadareasonablechanceofsuccess.Although

JusticeSchutzindicatedthattheAppealmaybedifficult,

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JusticeStrekafemphasizedthatnosinglefactoris

determinative.Weighingthesefactors,JusticeStrekaf

concludedthatitwasintheinterestsofjusticetorestore

theAppeal;howeverHerLadyshipawardednoCosts

toeitherparty,determiningthat,whileMs.Pacewas

successful,theApplicationwasoccasionedbyMs.Pace’s

failuretocomplywiththedeadlinesinRule14.17.

EDMONTON (POLICE SERVICE) V DELUCA, 2020 ABCA 31 (FEEHAN JA)Rules 14.46 (Application to Reconsider a Previous Decision) and 14.72 (Binding Precedents)

In2007,theAlbertaCourtofAppealpronouncedthe

DecisionofEdmonton Police Association v Edmonton

(City of),2007ABCA147(“Murdoch”).Theissuebefore

theCourtinMurdochwaswhetheradisputebetweenthe

EdmontonPoliceAssociationandtheCityofEdmonton

wasalabourrelationsmatterthatshouldbedealtwithby

grievanceunderacollectiveagreement,orwhetheritwasa

matterofpolicedisciplinethatshouldbedealtwithunder

thePolice Service Regulation,AltaReg356/1990.Eleven

yearslater,theApplicant,theChiefoftheEdmontonPolice

Service(the“Chief”),inanunderlyingAppealofaDecision

fromtheLawEnforcementReviewBoard(the“Underlying

Decision”),appliedtotheCourtofAppealtoreconsiderits

earlierprecedentsetinMurdoch.

FeehanJ.A.notedthatRules14.46and14.47allowa

paneloftheCourttograntpermissionforapartytoargue

thatapriorprecedentialDecisionshouldbereconsidered.

Citingtherelevantjurisprudence,JusticeFeehannotedthat

thispowershouldbeexercisedcautiouslyandbyapplying

abalancedanalysisofthefollowingfactors:(a)ageofthe

Decision;(b)whethertheDecisionhasbeenreliedupon

soastocreatesettledexpectations;(c)treatmentofthe

issuebyotherAppealCourts;(d)whethertheDecision

hasanobvious,demonstrableflaw;and(e)whetherit

wasclassifiedas“ReasonsforJudgmentReserved”ora

“MemorandumofJudgment”.

Inbalancingthesefactors,JusticeFeehanfoundthat

whileMurdochwasdecidedin2007,theimpactofthe

DecisionwasnotmadeclearuntiltheUnderlyingDecision

inOctoberof2018.Given,amongotherthings,that

bothMurdochandtheUnderlyingDecisionwereboth

MemorandaofJudgmentandthattheseDecisionshave

notresultedinsettledexpectations,HisLordshipgranted

theChief’sApplicationtoreconsidertheCourtofAppeal’s

decisioninMurdoch.

KENT V MACDONALD, 2020 ABCA 91 (FEEHAN JA)Rules 14.47 (Application to Restore an Appeal), 14.60 (Judicial Dispute Resolution of an Appeal), 14.61 (Suspension of Time Periods) and 14.65 (Restoring Appeals)

TheApplicantsappliedtorestoretheirAppealthathad

beenpreviouslystruckforfailuretofiletheAppealRecord

withinthetimesetoutintheRules.

UnderRule14.65,onApplicationofapartyunderRule

14.47,asingleCourtofAppealJudgecanrestorean

AppealthathadbeenstruckbyoperationoftheRules.

TheCourtfoundthattherewasarguablemerittothe

Applicants’Appeal,thattheApplicantsmovedwith

reasonablepromptnesstohavetheAppealrestored,had

intentionintimetoproceedwiththeAppeal,anddidnot

causeprejudicetotheRespondents.FeehanJ.A.foundthat

theApplicantshadmetthetestforrestoringtheAppeal

byprovidinganexplanationforthedelaywhichcausedthe

Appealtobestruck.

InrestoringtheAppeal,FeehanJ.A.encouragedtheparties

toconsideranappellateJudicialDisputeResolution

pursuanttoRules14.60and14.61.

RANCHER CONSTRUCTION LTD V SCOTT CONSTRUCTION (ALBERTA) LTD, 2020 ABCA 112(VELDHUIS JA)Rule 14.47 (Application to Restore an Appeal)

TheApplicant,ScottConstruction(Alberta)Ltd.,applied

torestoreitsAppealafterithadbeenstruckanddeemed

abandonedduetotheAppellant’sfailuretofiletheirAppeal

Recordwithintherequireddeadline.

JusticeVeldhuislistedtherelevantfactorsforwhetherto

restoreanabandonedAppeal:(i)whethertheApplicant




aconcurrentApplicationtobeaddedasaRespondent,or

alternativelyforintervenorstatus,ontheAppeal.

AlbertaappliedforthestaypursuanttoRule14.48.Justice

StrekafadoptedthetestforastaypendingAppealfromRJR

MacDonald v Canada,1994CanLII117(SCC):(1)aserious

questionmustbedeterminedonAppeal;(2)theApplicant

willsufferirreparableharmifthestayisnotgranted;and(3)

thebalanceofconveniencefavoursgrantingthestay.Justice

StrekaffoundthatAlbertahadmettheironusonallthree

partsofthetestandgrantedthestay.

FMFNappliedtobeaddedasaRespondenttothe

AppealpursuanttoRule14.57.JusticeStrekafapplied

thetestfromCarbon Development Partnership v Alberta

(Energy and Utilities Board),2007ABCA231,inorderto

determinewhethertheApplicanthasalegalinterestinthe

outcomeoftheAppeal.TodetermineiftheApplicanthasa

legalinterest,theCourtmustconsiderwhetheritisjustand

convenienttoaddthepartyandwhethertheApplicant’s

interestcouldonlybeadequatelyprotectedifgrantedparty

status.JusticeStrekaffoundthatFMFNdidnotmeetthe

testasthesubjectmatteroftheAppealdidnotnecessarily

affectthelegalinterestsofFMFN.TheApplicationunder

Rule14.57wasdenied,butJusticeStrekafdidgrant

intervenorstatustoFMFN.

intendedintimetoproceedwiththeAppeal;(ii)the

Applicant’sexplanationforthedelayordefectcausingthe

Appealtobedeemedabandoned;(iii)whethertheApplicant

movedwithreasonablepromptnesstohavetheAppeal

restored;(iv)whethertheAppealhasarguablemerit;and

(iv)whethertheRespondenthassufferedanyprejudice.

JusticeVeldhuisheldthatthefactorsshouldbeconsidered

asawholeandthataDecisiontorestoreanAppealis

discretionary.InHerLadyship’sconsiderationofthefactors,

shefoundthattheApplicant’sAppealdidnothavearguable

meritandthatitwasnotintheinterestofjusticetorestore

theAppeal.JusticeVeldhuisdismissedtheApplication.

PROSPER PETROLEUM LTD V HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ALBERTA, 2020 ABCA 85 (STREKAF JA)Rules 14.48 (Stay Pending Appeal) and 14.57 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties to an Appeal)

AmandatoryinterimInjunctionwasgrantedbyaChambers

JudgewhichtheApplicants,HerMajestyintheRightof

Alberta,theLieutenantGovernorinCouncilandtheMinister

ofEnergy(collectively,“Alberta”)soughttostaypending

Appeal.TheInjunctionorderedAlbertatodecidewhether

toauthorizeProsperPetroleumLtd.’soilsandsproject

within10days.FortMcKayFirstNation(“FMFN”)made

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