Finnish Institute of International AffairsFinnish Institute of International AffairsHelsinki, FinlandHelsinki, Finland

2 September 20132 September 2013

The Regional Context of the Syrian Crisis:The Regional Context of the Syrian Crisis:Iran’s Strategy in the LevantIran’s Strategy in the Levant

Jubin M. GoodarziJubin M. Goodarzi

International Relations DepartmentInternational Relations Department

Webster University GenevaWebster University Geneva

SwitzerlandSwitzerland

Iran and SyriaIran and SyriaNotable QuotesNotable Quotes

““The chain of resistance against Israel by Iran, Syria, The chain of resistance against Israel by Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the new Iraqi government and Hamas passes Hezbollah, the new Iraqi government and Hamas passes through the Syrian highway. Syria is the golden ring of through the Syrian highway. Syria is the golden ring of the chain of resistance against Israel.the chain of resistance against Israel.” ” Ali Akbar Velayati, Ali Akbar Velayati, Senior Advisor for Foreign Affairs to Iran’s Supreme Senior Advisor for Foreign Affairs to Iran’s Supreme Leader. 6 January 2012Leader. 6 January 2012

““What is happening in Syria is not an internal issue, but a What is happening in Syria is not an internal issue, but a conflict between the axis of resistance and its enemies in conflict between the axis of resistance and its enemies in the region and the world. Iran will not tolerate, in any the region and the world. Iran will not tolerate, in any form, the breaking of the axis of resistance, of which form, the breaking of the axis of resistance, of which Syria is an intrinsic partSyria is an intrinsic part.” .” Saeed Jalili, Head of Iran’s Saeed Jalili, Head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. 6 August 2012Supreme National Security Council. 6 August 2012

Syria’s Importance to IranSyria’s Importance to Iran(1979 to Present)(1979 to Present)

1.1. Most Important & Only Longstanding Arab AllyMost Important & Only Longstanding Arab Ally

2.2. Provides Tehran with Access to the Levant & Provides Tehran with Access to the Levant & the Arab-Israeli Arenathe Arab-Israeli Arena

3.3. Serves as a Major Conduit for Iranian Arms and Serves as a Major Conduit for Iranian Arms and Assistance to Hezbollah in LebanonAssistance to Hezbollah in Lebanon

4.4. Enduring Example of Arab-Iranian Cooperation Enduring Example of Arab-Iranian Cooperation on Several Important Levels (Political, on Several Important Levels (Political, Economic, Strategic/Military, Intelligence, Economic, Strategic/Military, Intelligence, Ideological, Etc.)Ideological, Etc.)

Iran and SyriaIran and Syria

The Seven Stages in the Evolution of the AllianceThe Seven Stages in the Evolution of the Alliance

Between Iran and Syria – 1979 to PresentBetween Iran and Syria – 1979 to Present

1.1. The Emergence of the Iranian-Syrian Alliance 1979-82The Emergence of the Iranian-Syrian Alliance 1979-82

2.2. The Zenith & Limits of Iranian-Syrian Power 1982-85The Zenith & Limits of Iranian-Syrian Power 1982-85

3.3. Intra-Alliance Tensions & Consolidation of the Axis 1985-88Intra-Alliance Tensions & Consolidation of the Axis 1985-88

4.4. The Containment of Saddam's Iraq in the Levant & Gulf 1988-91The Containment of Saddam's Iraq in the Levant & Gulf 1988-91

5.5. Alliance Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era 1991-2003Alliance Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era 1991-2003

6.6. The Reinvigoration of the Alliance after the Iraq War 2003-11The Reinvigoration of the Alliance after the Iraq War 2003-11

7.7. The Syrian Civil War and Iran’s Involvement 2011-PresentThe Syrian Civil War and Iran’s Involvement 2011-Present

National Security

Arab Interests (Syria)Islamic Interests (Iran)

RegimeSurvival

Iranian and Syrian Foreign Policy Priorities

The Evolution of the Power Structure in the Iranian-Syrian Alliance (1979 to Present)

1980s1980s 1990s1990s 2000s2000s

Syria – The Dominant Partner Due toSyria – The Dominant Partner Due to: : TransitionTransition Iran – The Dominant Partner Due toIran – The Dominant Partner Due to::

Syrian Military Presence in Lebanon Syrian Military Presence in Lebanon (since 1976)(since 1976)

Syrian Military Withdrawal from Syrian Military Withdrawal from Lebanon (2005)Lebanon (2005)

Syria's Political Prominence due to Syria's Political Prominence due to Egypt's Banishment from the Arab Fold Egypt's Banishment from the Arab Fold (1979-87) & Iraq's Entanglement in the (1979-87) & Iraq's Entanglement in the Gulf War (1980-88)Gulf War (1980-88)

Soviet political, military & economic Soviet political, military & economic support for Syriasupport for Syria

Collapse of the Soviet Union (1991)Collapse of the Soviet Union (1991)

Syria Conduit for Arms Shipments to Syria Conduit for Arms Shipments to Iran Iran

Iran Finances Syria's Foreign Arms Iran Finances Syria's Foreign Arms PurchasesPurchases

Arms Embargo on Iran (US-led Arms Embargo on Iran (US-led Operation Staunch since 1983) Operation Staunch since 1983)

Development of Indigenous Iranian Development of Indigenous Iranian Arms IndustryArms Industry

Iranian Military Exports to SyriaIranian Military Exports to Syria

Iranian Oil Shipments to Syria (1982-Iranian Oil Shipments to Syria (1982-1989)1989)

Iran at War with Iraq (1980-88)Iran at War with Iraq (1980-88)

Iran's Isolation in the Arab World, Iran's Isolation in the Arab World, Alliance with Syria to Dispel Arab-Alliance with Syria to Dispel Arab-Iranian RiftIranian Rift

Iran Mends Fences with Many Arab Iran Mends Fences with Many Arab States after Eruption of Kuwait CrisisStates after Eruption of Kuwait Crisis

Iran's Political Posturing on the Nuclear Iran's Political Posturing on the Nuclear Issue (2003-Present)Issue (2003-Present)

Prominence of pro-Iranian Hezbollah on Prominence of pro-Iranian Hezbollah on Lebanese Political Scene (since 2000 & Lebanese Political Scene (since 2000 & 2005)2005)

US overstretched in Iraq & Afghanistan US overstretched in Iraq & Afghanistan (Iran's Neighbors)(Iran's Neighbors)

Iran Reaping Political & Economic Iran Reaping Political & Economic Advantages of High Oil PricesAdvantages of High Oil Prices

Iran and SyriaIran and SyriaThe Outbreak of the Syrian CrisisThe Outbreak of the Syrian Crisis

To Support or Not to Support?To Support or Not to Support? Iran Faces Hobson’s Choice:Iran Faces Hobson’s Choice:

1.1. Support Assad and Face the Support Assad and Face the ConsequencesConsequences

2.2. Withhold Support and Hope that a New Withhold Support and Hope that a New Syrian Regime Will Be a Friend of the Syrian Regime Will Be a Friend of the Islamic RepublicIslamic Republic

Iran’s Support for DamascusIran’s Support for Damascus

1.1. Crowd Control Equipment & Technical AidCrowd Control Equipment & Technical Aid

2.2. Guidance/Assistance on Monitoring the Guidance/Assistance on Monitoring the Internet & Mobile Telephone NetworkInternet & Mobile Telephone Network

3.3. Financial ResourcesFinancial Resources

4.4. Arms & Ammunition (i.e. via Iraq)Arms & Ammunition (i.e. via Iraq)

5.5. Oil Shipments (via sea)Oil Shipments (via sea)

6.6. Provide Personnel & Specialist UnitsProvide Personnel & Specialist Units

7.7. Train the National Defense ArmyTrain the National Defense Army

The Evolving Nature of Iran’s PositionThe Evolving Nature of Iran’s PositionSince the Outbreak of the Syria CrisisSince the Outbreak of the Syria Crisis

1.1. Steadfast Support for Damascus (Spring 2011)Steadfast Support for Damascus (Spring 2011)

2.2. Growing Doubts & Negotiations with the Syrian Growing Doubts & Negotiations with the Syrian Opposition (Summer 2011)Opposition (Summer 2011)

3.3. Emergence of a Proxy War & Stalwart Support for Emergence of a Proxy War & Stalwart Support for Assad Regime (Autumn 2011 & Winter of 2011/12)Assad Regime (Autumn 2011 & Winter of 2011/12)

4.4. Support for Multilateral Negotiations Mediated by Support for Multilateral Negotiations Mediated by the UN/AL (Spring & Summer 2012)the UN/AL (Spring & Summer 2012)

5.5. Continued Backing for Damascus and Exploring Continued Backing for Damascus and Exploring Other Options & Exit Strategies (Autumn 2012 to Other Options & Exit Strategies (Autumn 2012 to Present)Present)

Other Motivations for Supporting DamascusOther Motivations for Supporting Damascus

““Defensive” Considerations:Defensive” Considerations:

1.1. Thwart the Dismantling of the “Axis of Thwart the Dismantling of the “Axis of Resistance”Resistance”

2.2. Prevent Regime Change in Syria and IranPrevent Regime Change in Syria and Iran

3.3. Syria is the “First Line of Defense” Against FoesSyria is the “First Line of Defense” Against Foes

4.4. Contain the Crisis in Order to Contain the Crisis in Order to Avoid Spillover Avoid Spillover intointo Lebanon and Lebanon and Iraq in ParticularIraq in Particular..

5.5. The “Mother of All Nightmares” – Regime The “Mother of All Nightmares” – Regime Change in Syria and IraqChange in Syria and Iraq

Possible Future ScenariosPossible Future Scenarios

1.1. The Survival of a Weakened Assad The Survival of a Weakened Assad Regime in Syria or Part of the CountryRegime in Syria or Part of the Country

2.2. Regime Collapse & Continued Civil Strife Regime Collapse & Continued Civil Strife & Instability in Post-Assad Era& Instability in Post-Assad Era

3.3. The Emergence of a Secular or Sunni The Emergence of a Secular or Sunni Islamist Regime in DamascusIslamist Regime in Damascus

4.4. Continued Conflict & a Negotiated Continued Conflict & a Negotiated Settlement / Political TransitionSettlement / Political Transition

A Political Solution to the Syrian Conflict A Political Solution to the Syrian Conflict With Iranian Involvement?With Iranian Involvement?

Incentives for a Negotiated Settlement:Incentives for a Negotiated Settlement:

1.1. Contain the Damage & Cut Losses – the Pre-March 2011 Political Contain the Damage & Cut Losses – the Pre-March 2011 Political Status Quo Ante Cannot Be Restored.Status Quo Ante Cannot Be Restored.

2.2. Prevent the Dissolution of Syria and Spillover of Conflict into Prevent the Dissolution of Syria and Spillover of Conflict into Neighboring States (Lebanon and Iraq).Neighboring States (Lebanon and Iraq).

3.3. Demonstrate Iran’s Importance as a Key Regional Actor to Reach a Demonstrate Iran’s Importance as a Key Regional Actor to Reach a Diplomatic Solution.Diplomatic Solution.

4.4. Avoid Further Polarization and Total Transformation of the Conflict Avoid Further Polarization and Total Transformation of the Conflict into a Regional Sectarian War (Sunni vs. Shia).into a Regional Sectarian War (Sunni vs. Shia).

5.5. Facilitate the Emergence of a National Unity Government in Facilitate the Emergence of a National Unity Government in Damascus that is Not Hostile to Tehran.Damascus that is Not Hostile to Tehran.

6.6. Iran Cannot Indefinitely Provide Support to Assad in View of its Own Iran Cannot Indefinitely Provide Support to Assad in View of its Own Domestic Woes and Foreign Sanctions.Domestic Woes and Foreign Sanctions.