JUDGE ANNA BROWN IN OREGON GRANTS TRO STOPPING FORECLOSURE SALE

8/6/2019 JUDGE ANNA BROWN IN OREGON GRANTS TRO STOPPING FORECLOSURE SALE

1/22

IN THE UN IT ED STATES D IS TR IC T C OU RT

F O R T HE D IS TRI CT OF O R E G O N

P OR TL AN D D IV IS IO N

JEFFREY D. BARNETT,

Plaintiff,

BAC HOME LOAN SERVICING,L.P., FEDERAL NATIONALMO RT GAG E A SS OCI AT IO N f kaFANNIE MAE, and RECONTRUSTCOMPANY , N. A. ,

Defendants.

KELLY L. HARPSTER

Harpster Law, LLC4 8 00 S.W. Meadow RoadSuite 300Lake Oswego, OR 97035(503) 534-3686

11-CV-213-ST

T EM PO RA RY R E ST R AI N IN GORDER

ified to b e a t rue and cor rec tof original filed in this District.

p i' 7Attorneys for Plaintiff

.

1 - TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER


2/22

BROWN, Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion

(#2) for a Temporary Restraining Order and PreliminaryInjunction.

For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's

Motion to the ex tent that the Court TEMPORARILY RESTRAINS

Defendants from proceeding with the February 28, 2011,foreclosure sale of Plaintiff's property.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint:On September 20, 2006, Plaintiff Jeffrey D. Barnett entered

into an InterestFirst Adjustable Rate Note with Columbia RiverBank secured by property located at 3769 N.W. First Court,

Hillsboro, Oregon. Plaintiff also entered into a Trust Deed asto that property with Plaintiff as grantor; First American TitleCompany as Trustee; and Mortgage Electronic Registration System(MERS) solely as nominee for the beneficiary, Columbia RiverBank. The Trust Deed provided, among other things, that

Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior toacceleration following Borrower's breach of anycovenant or agreement in this Security Instrument.... The notice shall specify: (a) thedefault; (b) the action required to cure thedefault; (c) a date, not less than 30 days fromthe date the notice is given to Borrower, by whichthe default must be cured; and (d) that failure tocure the default on or before the date specifiedin this notice may result in acceleration of the



3/22

sums secured by this Security Instrument and saleof the Property. The notice shall further informBorrower of the right to reinstate afteracceleration and the right to bring a court actionto assert the non-existence of a default or anyother defense of Borrower to a cc el er at io n a n dsale. If the default is not cured on or beforethe date specified in the notice, Lender at itsoption may require immediate payment in full ofall sums secured by this Security Instrumentwithout further demand and may invoke the power ofsale and any other remedies permitted byApplicable Law.

Compl., Ex. A at 12. Pursuant to the Trust Deed MERS held, atmost, no more than "bare legal title" to Columbia River Bank'sbeneficial interest in the Trust Deed and never had any legal orbeneficial interest in the Note-.

The Trust Deed was recorded in Washington County, Oregon onSeptember 25, 2006.

Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that afterSeptember 20, 2006, Columbia River Bank sold or otherwiset ran sfe rre d the Note and its beneficial interest in the Trust

Deed to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. Thereafter, Countrywidetransferred its interest in the Note and Trust Deed to Defendant

Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). None ofthese transfers were recorded in the real property records ofWashington County, Oregon.

On December 11, 2009, Defendant BAC Home Loans Servicing,L.P., acting as the agent for Fannie Mae sent Plaintiff a writtenagreement to permanently modify Plaintiff's Note and Deed of



4/22

Trust as follows: (1) Reduce the interest rate on the loan from6.25% to 2% for an initial five year period, with the rateincreasing to 3% in the sixth year, 4% in the seventh year, and5% in the eighth year through maturity; (2) Reduce the monthlyinterest-only payment to $661.10 for an initial five year period,with the payment increasing to $878.10 in the sixth year,$1,143.09 in the seventh year, and $1,398.08 in the eighth yearthrough maturity, and; (3) Bring the loan current by adding thetotal delinquency, $17,8 92.20, to the principal balance. S e eCompl., Ex. B at 1. The Modification Agreement provided aftermodification Plaintiff's initial monthly payment would be$1,114.23.

In order to accept the terms of the Modification AgreementBAC required Plaintiff to execute the Modification Agreement inthe presence of a notary and to return to BAC by January 7, 2010,the executed Agreement with the first payment of $1,114.23 in apreaddressed, prepaid FedEx envelope provided to Plaintiff byBAC.

Plaintiff alleges he executed the Modification Agreementbefore a notary and mailed the required materials as well as acashier's check for $1,114.23 to BAC in the provided envelopebefore January 7, 2010.

On January 13, 2010, BAC returned the cashier's check, butnot the signed Modification Agreement to Plaintiff by mail.

4 - TEMPORARY R ES TR AI NI NG O RD ER


5/22

According to Plaintiff, he called BAC and was informed BAC hadaccepted the Modification Agreement and the cashier's check hadbeen returned to Plaintiff in error. BAC instructed P la in ti ff to

resend the check to the address noted in the Modification

Agreement.On January 21, 2010, MERS executed an Assignment of Trust

Deed in which it

grant[ed], convey[ed], assign[ed], andtransfer[red] . . . all beneficial interest [toBAC] under that certain Deed of Trust, dated09/20/2006, executed by JEFFREY D. BARNETT,Grantor(s) to FIRST AMERICAN TITLE, Trustee, andMORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., asBeneficiary.

Compl., Ex. D at 1. On that same day, BAC executed anAppointment of Successor Trustee naming Defendant ReconTrustCompany, N.A., as Successor Trustee of the Trust Deed.

On January 26, 2010, Plaintiff resent the cashier's check toBAC by express mail to the address noted in the ModificationAgreement.

On January 28, 2010, ReconTrust recorded the Assignment ofTrust Deed in the real property records of Washington County,Oregon.

On January 28, 2010, Plaintiff received a Notice of Salefrom ReconTrust, listing a scheduled foreclosure sale date of -June 4, 2010. Plaintiff called BAC and BAC confirmed it hadaccepted the Modification Agreement. BAC informed Plaintiff that

5 - T EM PO RA RY R ES TR AI NI NG O RD ER


6/22

because the loan had been permanently modified it would cancelthe foreclosure sale. BAC subsequently cancelled the June 4,2010, foreclosure sale.

On January 29, 2010, Plaintiff received a monthly statementfrom BAC noting the principal balance, interest rate, and monthlypayment amount as set out in the Modification Agreement as wellas $90 in unspecified "fees due."

Plaintiff called BAC to inquire about the "fees due" andagain was told BAC had accepted the Modification Agreement andthat the $90 fee was probably a modification fee.

According to Plaintiff, on February 17, 2010, without noticeto Plaintiff BAC reduced the principal balance to the amount ofprincipal owing before the Modification Agreement. OnFebruary 25, 2010, BAC issued Plaintiff a monthly statementidentifying the $1,114.23 Plaintiff submitted with theModification Agreement as a "partial payment." BAC failed toapply the payment to the modified loan and instead placed thepayment in a "suspense account."

After he received the February 25, 2010, statement Plaintiffcalled BAC to inquire about the readjustment of the principalbalance and designation of his payment as a "partial payment."Plaintiff alleges BAC again confirmed it had accepted themodification but because there was a backlog of modifications,"not all departments have access to modification information, and



7/22

. . . it would take time for the 'codes' to update." Plaintiffalleges BAC instructed him to continue to make the modifiedpayments and advised Plaintiff it could take several months forhis monthly statements to reflect the Modification Agreement.

Plaintiff alleges he made the payments required under theModification from February through August 2010, but BAC continuedto fail to apply any of his payments to interest or escrow andinstead to post those payments to the "suspense account."

On August 24, 2010, ReconTrust recorded a Notice of Defaultand Election to Sell Plaintiff's property in the real propertyrecords of Washington County, Oregon. The Notice of Defaultlisted, among other things, MERS as the beneficiary of the TrustDeed; Plaintiff's monthly payments under the Note as $2,471.38;the interest rate for the Note as 6.25%; and the principalbalance of the Note as the principal balance before Plaintiffexecuted the Modification Agreement.

On December 9, 2010, Plaintiff's sent a letter to ReconTrustand BAC noting the loan modification, Plaintiff's payments, anddefects in the pending foreclosure sale. Plaintiff requested BACand Rec onTrust r esc in d the foreclosure sale. BAC and ReconTrust

did not rescind the foreclosure sale.

Plaintiff's property is scheduled to be sold at publicauction on February 28, 2011.

On February 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this



8/22

Court bringing claims against BAC for (1) fraud; (2) violation ofthe Oregon Unfair Trade Practices Act (OUTPA) , Or. Rev. Stat. 646.605, et seg; (3) violation of the Real Estate Settlementand Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605; violation of Or.Rev. Stat 86.205, et s e q . ; and (4) accounting. Plaintiff alsobrings claims against BAC and Fannie Mae for (1) specificperformance of the Modification Agreement, (2) breach of theModification Agreement, and (3) promissory estoppel. Plaintiffbrings claims against ReconTrust for (1) violation of the FairDebt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, et seg.;(2) violation of Oregon's Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act(UDCPA), Or. Rev. Stat. 646.639, et seg.; and (3) breach oftrustee's duty. Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive and/ordeclaratory relief.

On February 18, 2011, Plaintiff also filed a Motion forTemporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction in whichPlaintiff moves for the entry of an order preventing Defendantsfrom proceeding with the February 28, 2011, non-judicialforeclosure sale until the Motion for Preliminary Injunction canbe heard and a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants fromselling Plaintiff's residence in a non-judicial foreclosure salepending a trial on the merits.



9/22

STANDARDS

A party seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminaryinjunction must demonstrate (1) it is likely to succeed on themerits, (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in theabsence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tipsin its favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.Winter v . N a t u r a l R e s . D e f . C o u n c i l , 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008)."The elements of [this] test are balanced, so that a strongershowing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.For example, a stronger showing of irreparable harm to plaintiffmight offset a lesser showing of likelihood of success on themerits." A l l i a n c e F o r The Wild R o c k i e s v. C o t t r e l l ,No. 09-35756, 2011 WL 208360, at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 25,2011)(citing Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 392). Accordingly, the NinthCircuit has held "'serious questions going to the merits' and abalance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff cansupport issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as theplaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparableinjury and that the injunction is in the public interest." I d . ,at *7.

"An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion" and is"an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clearshowing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter ,129 S. Ct. at 376, 381.



10/22

DISCUSSION

I. Merits

Plaintiff seeks an order preventing Defendants fromproceeding with the proposed foreclosure sale of Plaintiff'sproperty as scheduled because, among other things, Defendantsfailed to comply with Oregon Revised Statute 86.735(1), BAC andFannie Mae failed to satisfy "all conditions precedent todeclaring a default and accelerating the Note," the Notice ofDefault does not comply with Oregon Revised Statute 86.745, andBAC and Fannie Mae breached the Modification Agreement.

A. Plaintiff is likely to succeed in proving Defendantsfailed to comply with Oregon Revised Statute 86.735(1) .In Burget t v . Mortgage E l e c t r o n ic R e g is t r a t i o n Systems,

District Judge Michael Hogan explained the mortgage practiceengaged in by MERS as follows:

"In 1993, the Mortgage Bankers Association, FannieMae, Freddie Mac, the Government National MortgageAssociation (Ginnie Mae), the Federal HousingAdministration, and the Department of VeteransAffairs created MERS. MERS provides ^electronicprocessing and tracking of [mortgage] ownershipand transfers.' Mortgage lenders, banks,insurance companies, and title companies becomemembers of MERS and pay an annual fee. Theyappoint MERS as their agent to act on allmortgages that they register on the system. AMERS mortgage is recorded with the particularcounty's office of the recorder with ^MortgageElectronic Registration System, Inc.' named as thelender's nominee or mortgagee of record' on themortgage. The MERS member who owns the beneficialinterest may assign those beneficial ownershiprights or servicing rights to another MERS member.

10 - T E MP O RA R Y R E ST R AI N IN G ORDER


11/22

These assignments are not part of the publicrecord, but are tracked electronically on MERS'sprivate records. Mortgagors are notified oftransfers of servicing rights, but not oftransfers of beneficial ownership."

2010 WL 4282105, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 20, 2010)(quoting GeraldKorngold, Legal and Pol icy Choices in the Aftermath o f theSubprime and Mortgage Financing C r i s i s , 60 S.C. L.Rev. 727,741-42 (2009)). In Burgett , the plaintiff, a mortgagee, broughtan action against MERS and the servicer of the plaintiff'smortgage loan alleging, among other things, a claim for breach ofcontract and seeking declaratory relief to prevent a foreclosuresale of his property. The plaintiff contended the MERS practiceset out above was not permitted under Oregon trust-deed lawbecause it allowed assignment of beneficial interests withoutrecording. I d . The defendants moved for summary judgment.Judge Hogan noted the plaintiff's contention did not "necessarilymean that the arrangement violates the Oregon Trust Deed Act suchthat foreclosure proceedings could not be initiated by MERS orits substitute trustee." I d . Judge Hogan, however, denied thedefendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff'srequest for declaratory relief and claim for breach of contracton the ground that the defendants failed to "record assignmentsnecessary for the foreclosure." I d . , at *3. Judge Hoganreasoned:

Under ORS 86.705(1) a "'Beneficiary' means theperson named or otherwise designated in a trust



12/22

deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deedis given, or the person's successor in interest,and who shall not be the trustee unless thebeneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under ORS86.790(1) (d) ." Plaintiff contends that MERScannot meet this definition because there is noevidence that the trust deed was made to benefitMERS. However, the trust deed specificallydesignates MERS as the beneficiary. Judge HenryC. Breithaupt provides a persuasive discussionrelated to this issue:

[T]he interest of MERS, and those for whom itwas a nominee, in question here was recordedand known to Plaintiff when it r ec eiv ed t helitigation guarantee document prior tostarting this action.The Statutes do not prohibit liens to berecorded in the deed of records of countiesunder an agreement where an agent will appearas a lienholder for the benefit of theinitial lender and subsequent assignees ofthat lender-even where the assignments of thebeneficial interest in the record lien arenot recorded. It is clear that suchunrecorded assignments of rights arepermissible under Oregon's trust deed statutebecause ORS 86.735 provides if foreclosure bysale is pursued all prior unrecordedassignments must be filed in connection withthe foreclosure. The trust deed statutestherefore clearly contemplate thatassignments of the beneficial interests inobligations and security rights will occurand may, in fact, not have been recordedprior to foreclosure. The legislature wasclearly aware such assignments occurred andnowhere provided that assignments needed tobe recorded to maintain rights under the lienstatutes except where foreclosure by sale waspursued.

Letter Decision in P a r k i n Electric, I n c . v .S a f t e n c u , No. LV08040727, dated March 12, 2009(attached as Exhibit C to the second declarationof David Weibel (# 60)).



13/22

The problem that defendants run into in this caseis an apparent failure to record assignmentsnecessary for the foreclosure. As JudgeBreithaupt notes, ORS 86.735 provides that ifforeclosure by sale is pursued, all priorunrecorded assignments must be filed in connectionwith the foreclosure. ORS 86.735(1)specifically provides

The trustee may foreclose a trust deed byadvertisement and sale in the manner providedin ORS 86.740 to 86.755 if:

(1) The trust deed, any assignments of thetrust deed by the trustee or the beneficiaryand any appointment of a successor trusteeare recorded in the mortgage records in thecounties in which the property described inthe deed is situated.

I d . , at *2-*3. Judge Hogan noted Oregon Revised Statute 86.735requires any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or thebeneficiary and any appointment of a successor trustee to berecorded. The record in Burget t , however, did not reflect alltransfers to the subsequent lenders/servicers had been recorded.Id.

Similarly, in Rinegard-Guirma v . Bank o f America,District Judge Garr M. King granted the plaintiff, a mortgagee, atemporary restraining order against the defendants, MERS andothers, prohibiting the defendants from conducting a foreclosuresale of the plaintiff's home because the plaintiff established"nothing [was] recorded with Multnomah County [that] demonstratesthat LSI Title Company of Oregon, LLC is the successor trustee."No. 10-CV-1065-PK, 2010 WL 3655970, at *2 (D. Or. Sept. 15,



14/22


15/22

B. Plaintiff is likely to succeed in proving BAC andFannie Mae failed to satisfy the conditions precedentto declaring a default and accelerating the Note.As noted, the Trust Deed required, among other things,

BAC and/or Fannie to provide 30 days notice to Plaintiff beforeacceleration of the Note. The Trust Deed required the notice toadvise Plaintiff: (a) of the default; (b) of the action requiredto cure the default; (c) of a date by which the default must becured; and (d) that failure to cure the default on or before thedate specified may result in acceleration of the debt. Inaddition, the Trust Deed specifically provided

[i]f the default is not cured on or before thedate specified in the notice, Lender at its optionmay require immediate payment in full of all sumssecured by this Security Instrument withoutfurther demand and may invoke the power of saleand any other remedies permitted by ApplicableLaw.

Compl., Ex. A at 12. The Trust Deed did not contain anyprovision that would allow Defendants to accelerate the debtwithout providing the notice set out in Trust Deed 30 days priorto acceleration.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants did not provide Plaintiffwith the notice required by the Trust Deed. Plaintiff contendsbecause BAC and Fannie Mae failed to provide the required notice,they failed to satisfy the conditions precedent for acceleratingthe debt and declaring Plaintiff to be in default. The Courtagrees and concludes Plaintiff has established for purposes of



16/22

his Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order that he is likely tosucceed as to his request for injunctive and/or declaratoryrelief related to Defendants' failure to comply with conditionsprecedent to accelerating his debt and declaring Plaintiff to bein default.

C. Plaintiff is likely to succeed in proving the Notice ofDefault does not comply with Oregon Revised Statute 86.745.

Plaintiff asserts the August 24, 2010, Notice ofDefault recorded by ReconTrust does not comply with OregonRevised Statute 86.745 and, therefore, ReconTrust is notentitled to proceed with the foreclosure sale.

Oregon Revised Statute 86.753(3) provides inpertinent part that a trustee may foreclose a deed of trust bysale if "[t]he trustee . . . has filed ... in the countyclerk's office in each county where the trust property . . . issituated, a notice of default containing the information requiredby ORS 86.745." Oregon Revised Statute 86.745 provides inpertinent part:

The notice of sale shall:

(1) List the names of the grantor, trustee andbeneficiary in the trust deed, and the mailingaddress of the trustee.

***

(4) State the default for which the foreclosureis made.

(5) State the sum owing on the obligation that

16 - T E MP O RA R Y R ES T RA I NI N G ORDER


17/22


18/22

with 86.745(9) because it does not contain.the statutorynotices required by that section nor does it contain thestatutory language required by that section.

The Court concludes Plaintiff has established for

purposes of his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order that he islikely to succeed as to his request for declaratory and/orinjunctive relief related to Defendants' failure to comply withOregon Revised Statute 86.745.

D. Plaintiff is likely to succeed in proving BAC andFannie Mae breached the Modification Agreement.Plaintiff asserts BAC and Fannie Mae breached the

Modification Agreement. The record reflects BAC sent Plaintiffthe Modification Agreement and Plaintiff's January 25, 2010,statement from BAC reflects the higher principal balance, lowerinterest rate, and lower monthly payment set out in theModification Agreement, which indicates BAC had received andaccepted Plaintiff's executed copy of the Modification Agreementand cashier's check. In addition, Plaintiff alleges he spokewith representatives from BAC numerous times and they reassuredPlaintiff that BAC had accepted the Modification Agreement.BAC's representatives encouraged Plaintiff to continue to makepayments as set out in the Modification Agreement and advised himthat it might take several months for his monthly statement toaccurately reflect the terms of the Modification Agreement.Nevertheless, BAC failed to credit Plaintiff's payments to



19/22

interest or to escrow and ultimately declared Plaintiff to be indefault in breach of the Modification Agreement.

The Court concludes on this record and for purposes ofPlaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order that Plaintiffis likely to succeed on his claim for breach of the ModificationAgreement.

E. Irreparable HarmThe C ou rt c on cl ud es Plaintiff also has established he

is likely to experience irreparable harm if the scheduledforeclosure proceeds unabated. The Court, therefore, concludesthe balance of hardships tips sharply in Plaintiff's favor, andthere are at least serious questions as to the merits ofPlaintiff's request for declaratory judgment.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for aTemporary Restraining Order and hereby RESTRAINS Defendants fromproceeding with the February 28, 2011, foreclosure sale ofPlaintiff's property as ordered herein.II. Notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) provides in pertinentpart:

(1) Issuing Without Notice. The court may issue atemporary restraining order without written ororal notice to the adverse party or its attorneyonly if:

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or averified complaint clearly show thatimmediate and irreparable injury, loss, or



20/22

damage will result to the movant before theadverse party can be heard in opposition; and(B) the movant's attorney certifies inwriting any efforts made to give notice andthe reasons why it should not be required.

Plaintiff's counsel notes in her Declaration that in January2011 Plaintiff placed BAC and Fannie Mae on written notice thatPlaintiff intended to file a Complaint and to seek injunctiverelief if the parties were not able to resolve their issues byFebruary 11, 2011. Counsel notes BAC and Fannie May assigned

individuals to review and to respond to Plaintiff's allegations.On February 17, 2011, Plaintiff's counsel faxed copies of

the Complaint, Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, andMemorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to the appropriateindividuals at BAC and ReconTrust. Counsel did not receive anyresponses to the documents from BAC or ReconTrust.

Also on February 17, 2011, Counsel emailed copies of theComplaint, Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, and Memorandumin Support of Plaintiff's Motion to the appropriate individual atFannie Mae. Counsel was informed Fannie Mae "was continuing toresearch the issues" but Fannie Mae did not respond to counsel'sinquiry regarding Fannie Mae's intent to appear.

Plaintiff asserts there will not be sufficient time to servethe Motion and to ensure that the foreclosure sale will behalted.

On this record the Court issues the order temporarily20 - TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER


21/22

restraining Defendants from proceeding with the proposedforeclosure sale of Plaintiff's property without notice toDefendants be cau se th ere is insufficient time before the

scheduled foreclosure sale to compel Defendants to appear and torespond to the Motion. In addition, Plaintiff's counsel has madereasonable efforts to notify Defendants and has been unsuccessfulin securing the presence of a responsive party. Finally, theCourt concludes the risk of irreparable harm to Plaintiff issignificant when weighed against the temporary delay authorizedby this Order.Ill. Security

Pursuant to Rule 65(c), the Court requires Plaintiff to posta $500.00 bond or to pay $500.00 into the registry of the Courtfor purposes of security by 1:00 p.m., February 25, 2011, as areasonable security for any costs or damages sustained by anyparty found to have been wrongfully restrained.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion (#2)for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction tothe extent that the Court hereby TEMPORARILY RESTRAINS Defendantsfrom proceeding with the February 28, 2011, foreclosure sale ofPlaintiff's property. The Court DIRECTS Plaintiff to post a$500.00 bond or to pay $500.00 into the registry of the Court for



22/22

purposes of security by 1:00 p.m., February 25, 2011.IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 23th day of February, 2011.

This order is issued on February 23, 2011, at 2:00 p.m., andexpires on March 9, 2011, at 2:00 p.m., unless extended by orderof the Court.


ANNA J. BROWN "U ni te d States District

Documents

JUDGE ANNA BROWN IN OREGON GRANTS TRO STOPPING FORECLOSURE SALE