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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIONS
INCLUDED IN THE NINTH SCHEDULE
INTRODUCTION
The limit of the power of judicial review is a recurring theme in the evolution of our
constitutional jurisprudence. In some of its celebrated judgements, the apex court has defined the
contours of sovereign power as distributed amongst the three branches of government - the
legislature, the executive and the judiciary.
In recent days, the debate has been brought into sharper focus following views expressed
by scholars, parliamentarians and judges on the question of reservations for the OBCs in
educational institutions[1]
.
The Indian Constitution which embodies republican aspirations propounds the
philosophy of separation of powers emanating from a distrust of concentration of power in any
one organ of the state. Within their defined spheres and subject to express limitations including
those sanctified by the hallowed conventions of the Constitution, each branch of government has
a wide range of freedom to act.
The question then is: Can the will of the people reflected in the passage of a unanimously
approved parliamentary enactment be questioned by the Supreme Court in the absence of any
doubt as to Parliaments legislative competence to pass the law? Also, can the judicial power of
review of legislation be exercised to usurp Parliaments primacy in its lawmaking function?
On the other hand, there is a compelling argument, i.e. that the power of judicial review
entrusted to our superior courts in various provisions of the Constitution itself is as much by the
command of the people. Defenders of this view argue that judicial scrutiny of the validity of
legislation is a necessary protection against the oppression of transient majorities, that the judges
do not check the people, the Constitution does and since the Constitution itself is popularly
ratified, there is nothing undemocratic in the power of judicial review.
Chief Justice Marshalls reminder that when courts invalidate as unconstitutional an act
of a legislative body they do so by the command of the people (Marbury Vs. Madison) remains
the much-invoked basis of judicial power. The justification of judicial review articulated by the
American statesman Alexander Hamilton, finds its echo in the current debate.
____________________________
1. Jain, MP, Indian Constitutional Law, 5th Ed. (Rep.) 2006, Wadhwa & Co.
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Unanimity or consensus in legislation as the sole basis of a coherent moral vision binding
on all, it is argued, is to be rejected in the face of explicit constitutional limitations which are
intended to serve as a bulwark against temporary majorities, particularly, when written
constitutions seek to harmonize the principle of popular choice with inherent rights.
All these points were dealt in detail recently by a nine judge bench in the case of I RCoelho (Dead) by LRs Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others
[2]. And this project aims to
discuss the different points of view and the final position in this regard after the said judgement.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NINTH SCHEDULE
After independence, zamindari abolition and land reforms laws were passed as a move
towards more egalitarian society, but the Government efforts of social engineering faced several
problems, the land legislations were challenged in the courts. The first case challenging the land
law was Kameshwar Singh V State of Bihar, in this case the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 was
challenged on the ground that the classification of zamindars made for the purpose for givingcompensation was discriminatory and denied equal protection of laws guaranteed to the citizen
under Article 14 of the Constitution. The Patna High Court held this piece of legislation as
violative of Article 14 as it classified the zamindars for the purpose of payments of compensation
in a discriminatory manner. As a result of these judicial pronouncements, the Government got
apprehensive that the whole agrarian reform programmes would be endangered. To ensure that
agrarian reform legislation did not run into heavy weather, the legislature amended the
Constitution in the year 1951 which inserted Ninth Schedule.
Article 31-B[3]
was inserted by the First Constitutional (Amendment) Act 1951 Thus
Article 31-B of the Constitution of India ensured that any law in the Ninth Schedule could not bechallenged in courts and Government can rationalize its programme of social engineering by
reforming land and agrarian laws. In other words laws under Ninth Schedule are beyond the
purview of judicial review even though they violate fundamental rights enshrined under part III
of the Constitution. On the one hand considerable power was given to legislature under Article
31-B and on the other hand the power of judiciary was curtailed, this is the starting point of
tussle between legislature and judiciary.
____________________________
2. AIR 2007 SC 8613. Article 31B: (Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31A), none of the
Acts and Regulations specified in the ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to
be void, or ever to have become void, on the grounds that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent
with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and
notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts
and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in
force.
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The other feature of Article 31-B is that it is retrospective in nature that is when a statute
is declared unconstitutional by a court and later it is included in the Ninth Schedule, it is to be
considered as having been in that Schedule from its commencement. Thus it provides blanket
protection to all laws under the Schedule. In case ofJeejeebhoy V Asst. Collector, Thane, the
Supreme Court held that Article 31-B represents novel, innovative and drastic technique of
amendment. Legislative enactments are incorporated into the Constitution and immunized
against all attacks on the grounds of breach of any of the Fundamental Rights. Since 1951, the
Ninth Schedule has been expanded constantly so much that today 284 Acts are included therein.
By the First Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1951 13 laws were added to the Ninth Schedule. It
was again amended by Fourth Constitutional (Amendment) Act and six more Acts were added.
By the 17th Amendment Act 44 laws were added. The Constitution 29th (Amendment) Act,
1972 added 20 more laws. In 1975, the Constitution 39th (Amendment) Act added 38 more laws.
In 1976, the Constitution 42nd (amendment) Act further added 64 laws to the Ninth Schedule.
The 47th Constitutional Amendment, 1984 added more laws and the number of Acts in the Ninth
Schedule rose to 202. Again in 1990 the 66th Amendment Act inserted 55 Land Reforms Actsinto the Schedule. The Constitutional 76th (Amendment) Acts 1994 has been passed by the
Parliament to accommodate Tamil Nadu Government's Legislation in the Ninth Schedule to take
the legislation out of the ambit of the judicial review, which provided 69 percent reservation for
backward classes. The Constitutional 78th (Amendment) Act 1995 again amended the Ninth
Schedule and added 27 Land Reforms Laws, taking the total number of Acts to 284.
The rationale for Article 31-B and the Ninth Schedule was to protect legislation dealing
with property rights and not any other type of legislation. But, in practice, Article 31-B has been
used to invoke protection for many laws not concerned with property rights in anyway. Article
31-B is thus being used beyond the socioeconomic purpose for which it was enacted.
AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION- A SCENARIO AFTER
KESHVANAND[4]
A.DOCTRINE OF BASIC STRUCTUREThe doctrine of basic structure of the Constitution refers, as its name suggests, to those
fundamental, crucial and inalienable principles that form its very crux and are the foundation on
which it has been erected. This basic structure doctrine was reiterated and infact, reinforced, in
the landmark judgment of Keshavananda Bharti[5]
.
_____________________________
4. AIR 1973 SC 14615. Durga Das Basu, Adminsitrative Law, 5th edn., Kamal Law House, Calcutta(1998).
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The 13-judge bench in this case termed Part III of the Constitution as a basic feature, and held
that the Parliament had no constituent authority to amend or abridge it.
The question examined in Waman Rao and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors[6]
. Was whether
the device of Article 31B could be used to immunize Ninth Schedule laws from judicial review
by making the entire Part III inapplicable to such laws and whether such a power wasincompatible with basic structure doctrine. The answer was in affirmative. It has been said that it
is likely to make the controlled Constitution uncontrolled. It would render doctrine of basic
structure redundant. It would remove the golden triangle of Article 21 read with Article 14 and
Article 19 in its entirety for examining the validity of Ninth Schedule laws as it makes the entire
Part III inapplicable at the will of the Parliament. This results in the change of the identity of the
Constitution which brings about incompatibility not only with the doctrine of basic structure but
also with the very existence of limited power of amending the Constitution.
The object behind Article 31B is to remove difficulties and not to obliterate Part III in its entirety
or judicial review. The doctrine of basic structure is propounded to save the basic features.Article 21 is the heart of the Constitution. It confers right to life as well as right to choose. When
this triangle of Article 21 read with Article 14 and Article 19 is sought to be eliminated not only
the 'essence of right' test but also the 'rights test' has to apply, particularly when Keshavananda
Bharti and Indira Gandhi case[7]
have expanded the scope of basic structure to cover even some
of the Fundamental Rights.
The constitutional amendments are subject to limitations and if the question of limitation is to be
decided by the Parliament itself which enacts the impugned amendments and gives that law a
complete immunity, it would disturb the checks and balances in the Constitution. The authority
to enact law and decide the legality of the limitations cannot vest in one organ. The validity tothe limitation on the rights in Part III can only be examined by another independent organ,
namely, the judiciary. The power to grant absolute immunity at will is not compatible with basic
structure doctrine and, therefore, after 24th April, 1973 the laws included in the Ninth Schedule
would not have absolute immunity. Thus, validity of such laws can be challenged on the
touchstone of basic structure such as reflected in Article 21[8] read with Article 14[9] and
Article 19[10], Article 15[11] and the principles underlying these Articles scope of basic
structure to cover even some of the Fundamental Rights.
_____________________________
6. AIR 1981 SC 2717. AIR 1975 SC 22998. Protection of Life & personal liberty- No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to the procedure established by law.
9. Equality before Law- The state shall not den to any person equality before the law or the equal protectionof laws within the territory of India.
10. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.11. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth.
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B.SEPARATION OF POWERThe separation of powers between Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary constitutes basic
structure, has been found in Kesavananda Bharati's case by the majority. Later, it was reiterated
in Indira Gandhi's case. A large number of judgments have reiterated that the separation of
powers is one of the basic features of the Constitution. Montesquieu finds tyranny pervades
when there is no separation of powers: "There would be an end of everything, were the same
man or same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of
enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals."
The main thrust of the argument is that post- 1973, it is impermissible to immunize Ninth
Schedule laws from judicial review by making Part III inapplicable to such laws. It is
incompatible with the doctrine of basic structure. The existence of power to confer absolute
immunity is not compatible with the implied limitation upon the power of amendment in Article
368, is the thrust of the contention.
The key question, however, is whether the basic structure test would include judicial review ofNinth Schedule laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights. Thus, it is necessary to examine
what exactly is the content of the basic structure test. According to the petitioners of Ceolho
case, the consequence of the evolution of the principles of basic structure is that Ninth Schedule
laws cannot be conferred with constitutional immunity of the kind created by Article 31B.
Assuming that such immunity can be conferred, its constitutional validity would have to be
adjudged by applying the direct impact and effect test which means the form of an amendment is
not relevant, its consequence would be determinative factor. The power to make any law at will
that transgresses Part III in its entirety would be incompatible with the basic structure of the
Constitution. The contention is that there is no judicial review in absolute terms and Article 31B
only restricts that judicial review power. The effect of placing a law in Ninth Schedule is that it
removes the fetter of Part III by virtue of Article 31B but that does not oust the court jurisdiction.
C.AN INVISIBLE AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTIONBy making 24th April 1973 as cutoff date, judiciary admits introduction of a new Chapter called
Basic Structure to the Constitution, to be a touchstone, to test the state action and it is in the
nature of an invisible amendment without inserting any letter to the Constitution.
Certainly, judiciary does not have powers to amend the Constitution, but by propounding the
Basic Structure doctrine as touchstone to test the legislative actions and by evolving the samefrom Keshavananda Bharati case to the present case and making the same as an enforceable
doctrine, the judiciary had exceeded its delineated powers. Basic Structure Doctrine is certainly
an invisible amendment to the Constitution or otherwise the date 24th April 1973 is irrelevant.
The Judiciary can have the Constitution as touchstone and not the doctrines, theories,
propounded later by the judiciary. Again, the big question is who can review the power of
judiciary to make such invisible amendments to the constitution. There is no provision or
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mechanism spelt out in the Constitution to review the judicial action by any independent organ,
similar to judicial review of legislative action read into Article 32 of the Constitution. At times,
legislature and the executive could only be helpless spectators of judicial action. The Supreme
Court openly admitted in the recent case of Ceolho that they are bound by not only provisions of
the Constitution but also Basic Structure Doctrine and it evidences that Basic Structure Doctrine
is apart from the Constitution and not part of the Constitution.
TUSSLE BETWEEN LEGISLATURE AND JUDICIARY-EVOLUTION OF
LAW
Till a long time, the Hon'ble Court's view was in conformity and similar with that of the
Legislature. The Supreme Court viewed that there was no threat from the enhanced power of the
legislature and that the radical agrarian reform was necessary to curb down the menace of
poverty and change the system unequal distribution of land holdings in the countryside. In
addition the insertions of various laws with in the Ninth Schedule also supported the faith of the
Court on the statecraft of the leaders like Jawahar Lal Nehru and Lal Bhadur Shastri. However,
the co-ordination between the judiciary and the legislature did't last for long, as the power
granted under Article 31-B was being widely misused by the legislature to achieve their political
ends. This provoked judiciary to control the enhanced legislative power of the legislature.
The decision of thirteen judges of the Honble Supreme Court of India in Kesavananda
Bharti, marked the crystallisation of a benchmark called basic structure to measure whether the
Parliament is seeking to destroy the Constitution, by using its powers under Article 368, which
was so far, understood to be a power, the exercise of which was not subject to judicial scrutiny.
Basic Structure is not contained in one or more provisions of the Constitution of India, but it is
supposed to be the sum total of the core of our Constitution. Judicial review has been expressed
to be part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
So what really is judicial review? And how has it been evaded? Courts have pronounced on
these themes in a number of judgments.
Coming to the role that the idea of judicial review plays in the non-derogable basic structure of
the Constitution, one needs to start with Keshavananda itself, where Khanna Js judgment is
educative.
"...The power of judicial review is, however, confined not merely to deciding whether in making
the impugned laws the Central or State Legislatures have acted within the four corners of the
legislative lists earmarked for them; the courts also deal with the question as to whether the laws
are made in conformity with and not in violation of the other provisions of the Constitution.... As
long as some fundamental rights exist and are a part of the Constitution, the power of judicial
review has also to be exercised with a view to see that the guarantees afforded by those rights are
not contravened.... review has thus become an integral part of our constitutional system and a
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power has been vested in the High Courts and the Supreme Court to decide about the
constitutional validity of provisions of statutes. If the provisions of the statute are found to be
violative of any article of the Constitution, which is the touchstone for the validity of all laws,
the Supreme Court and the High Courts are empowered to strike down the said provisions."
In Minerva Mills vs. UOI[12], it was held by the Supreme Court that the clauses of Article 31-C as introduced by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, which sought to take away
the power of judicial review were unconstitutional. Reaffirming that the width of the
constitutional amendment had to be looked at in order to determine its validity, and accordingly
finding that a large number of laws could be brought within the ambit of Article 31-C by
invoking Part IV of the Constitution, it was held that those clauses seeking to take away judicial
review must be struck down lest Article 13 become a dead letter law and large scale violations of
fundamental rights take place. However, judicial review per se was not held to be part of the
basic structure of the Constitution by the majority in this decision, although Bhagwati J. in his
minority decision traced the power of judicial review to Articles 32 and 226 and held it to be a
part of the basic structure of the Constitution, and if taken away by a constitutional amendment
would amount to subversion of the Constitution. However, he went on to add that it is not
necessary to concentrate the power of judicial review in the constitutional courts; and if
effective alternate institutional mechanismsor arrangements for judicial review were made by
Parliament, then such amendment would be within its powers.
An authoritative pronouncement on this aspect was rendered by a decision of seven judges of the
Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India[13]. Chief Justice Ahmadi, speaking
for all seven members of the bench, went into an exhaustive review of all the developments in
this regard, and held as under "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is..... A law repugnant to the Constitution is void; ... courts as
well as other departments are bound by that instrument."
He also referred to a very early judgment ofChief Justice Patanjali Shastri in State of Madras
v. V. G. Row, where he held -
". . . Our Constitution contains express provision for judicial review of legislation as to its
conformity with the Constitution, unlike as in America where the Supreme Court has assumed
extensive powers of reviewing legislative acts under cover of the widely interpreted 'due process'
clause in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
____________________________
12. (1980) 3 SCC 62513. (1997) 3 SCC 261
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If, then, the courts in this country face up to such important and none too easy task, it is not out
of any desire to tilt at legislative authority in a crusader's spirit, but in discharge of a duty plainly
laid upon them by the Constitution. This is especially true as regards the 'fundamental rights', as
to which this court has been assigned the role of a sentinel on the qui vive. While the court
naturally attaches great weight to the legislative judgment, it cannot desert its own duty to
determine finally the constitutionality of an impugned statute."
Justice Ahmadi then went on to examine whether the power of judicial review vested in the High
Courts and in the Supreme Court under articles 226/227 and 32 is part of the basic structure of
the Constitution.,
The judges of the superior courts have been entrusted with the task of upholding the
Constitution and to this end, have been conferred the power to interpret it. It is they who have to
ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the Constitution is maintained and that the
Legislature and the executive do not, in the discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional
limitations
Responding to Justice Bhagwathis argument in Minerva Mills that effective alternate
institutional mechanisms or arrangements to exercise the power of judicial review could be
created by Parliament; he put forth the following argument.
The constitutional safeguards which ensure the independence of the judges of the superior
judiciary are not available to the judges of the subordinate judiciary or to those who man
tribunals created by ordinary legislations. Consequently, judges of the latter category can never
be considered full and effective substitutes for the superior judiciary in discharging the function
of constitutional interpretation. We, therefore, hold that the power of judicial review overlegislative action vested in the High Courts under article 226 and in this court under article 32 of
the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its
basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of the High Courts and the Supreme Court to test
the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded.
After Chandra Kumar, it is clear that judicial review is an integral part of the Constitution; and
the position is that even though tribunals may be created to adjudicate on various matters, the
jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and that of the Supreme Court under
Article 32, wherein lies their power to question executive and legislative judgment, and
scrutinize executive and legislative action vis--vis the Constitution, cannot be excluded even bya constitutional amendment.
What does then one make of various constitutional provisions (like A.30, A.358, etc.) that
provide, form the very outset, for exclusion of judicial review in certain cases? Is the exercise of
power under Article.31B, by the Parliament, post-1973 a complete or a partial exclusion of
judicial review, as the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Courts are still not shut out, vis--vis the
grounds of legislative competence? If it is partial exclusion, then does the elimination of Part III
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rights as a ground for challenge still violate basic structure? These are the complicating factors
that were recently argued from both points of view before the nine judges who had to decide the
question of reference order, keeping in mind, the need for continuous balance between individual
and societal claims, while interpreting the evolving Constitution.
I R Coelho (Dead) by LRs Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others[14]
In I.R.Coelho V State of Tamil Nadu , The Constitution bench of 5 judges referred the case to
higher bench. The problem that drew attention before the nine judge bench was whether such
evasion of judicial review, using the constitutional device of Article 31B, violates the basic
structure, therefore making the exercise of Article 31B r/w Article 368 (post-1973), a violation of
basic structure. The above judgments drew the attention of the nine judges.
On January 11 2007 while delivering the judgment the 9 Judge Constitutional Bench of the
Supreme Court held that All amendments to the Constitution made on or after 24th April 1973
by which the Ninth Schedule is amended by inclusion of various laws therein shall have to betested on the touchstone of the basic or essential features of the Constitution as reflected in
Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19, and the principle underlying them. To put it
differently even though an Act is put in the Ninth Schedule by a Constitutional Amendment, its
provision would be open to attack on the ground that they destroy or damage the basic structure
if the fundamental right or rights is/are taken away or abrogated pertains or pertain to the basic
structure[15]
. The Supreme Court further stated that if the validity of any Ninth Schedule law has
already been upheld by this Court, it would not be open to challenge such law again on the
principles declared by this judgment. However, if a law held to be violative of any rights in Part
III of the Constitution is subsequently incorporated in the Ninth Schedule after 24th April 1973,
such a violation / infraction shall be open to challenge on the ground that it destroys or damagesthe basic structure as indicated in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19, and the principles
underlying there under.
Now after the landmark judgement of Supreme Court in I.R.Coelho which was delivered on
January 11 2007 it is now well settled principle that any law placed under Ninth Schedule after
April 23 1973 are subject to scrutiny of Court's if they violated fundamental rights and thus put
the check on the misuse of the provision of the Ninth Schedule by the legislative.
THE COUNTER ARGUMENTS
The supporters of the view that there are no fetters on Parliament to include laws in the Ninth
Schedule (Article 31-B) of the Constitution and such inclusion cannot be subjected to judicial
____________________________
14. AIR 2007 SC 86115. Thakker C.K., Lectures on Administrative Law, Eastern Book Co, 4th edn., Lucknow (2003).
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scrutiny give various arguments in favour of this.
The effect of Article 31-B is to remove a fetter on the power of Parliament to pass a law in
violation of fundamental rights. On account of Article 31-B, cause of action for violation of
fundamental right is not available because the fetter placed by Part III of the Constitution on
legislative power is removed and is non-existent. Non-availability of cause of action based onbreach of fundamental right cannot be regarded as exclusion or ouster of judicial review.
Article 31 B has stood the test of time and successfully weathered constitutional challenges. It is
part of our Constitution and was validly enacted in compliance with the requirements of Article
368. The same people who enacted the Constitution and the chapter on fundamental rights after
full deliberations enacted article 31 B. It was not enacted by a motley conglomeration in order to
deprive the people of fundamental rights.
One of the reasons for putting an Act in the Ninth Schedule was to remove uncertainties about its
validity arising out of forensic challenges of divided judicial pronouncements and to preventtime-consuming litigation which would impede speedy and effective implementation of the
statute in question.
There is no warrant to assume that Acts are put in the Ninth Schedule with the sole purpose of
preventing judicial scrutiny[16]
. That would be attributing mala fide to Parliament, which is not
permissible.
Above all, judicial review and scrutiny is always available in respect of the basic condition
which an amendment has to satisfy, namely that it does not damage or is violative of the basic
structure of the Constitution.
Occasions may well arise in future to insert laws in the Ninth Schedule because of possible
challenge in courts, divergent judgments and the time and resources expended on litigation.
CONCLUSION
To carry the debate forward, the fundamental assumptions and irrefutable basis of our
constitutional scheme need to be reiterated. First, the people have given unto themselves a
written Constitution that embodies and defines the diffusion of sovereign power. Secondly, the
power of judicial review is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, unalterable even by a
constitutional amendment as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Keshvananda Bharti. And thirdly,representative democracy as an expression of the peoples will speaking through their elected
representatives is a non-negotiable premise of our republican charter which itself is the product
of an exercise of the unbroken sovereign power.
____________________________
16. Dr. Rega Surya Rao, Lectures on Legal Language and Legal Writing, Asia Law House, Hyderabad (2001).
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Two sides of the debate must thus be tested on the basis of these sacrosanct assumptions
which define our constitutional democracy. It is argued on behalf of those expounding the
primacy of the popular will as reflected in an act of Parliament, that the people having spoken
through their elected representatives cannot be stalled by courts since that would be a negation of
democracy and the legislative supremacy in the field of lawmaking. Pertinent questions continue
to be raised in the background of current political realities, our historical past and a deep-rooted
commitment to constitutional democracy. Those who distrust the power of judicial veto continue
to ask: Whether it is wise to subordinate the legislative process representing a wide margin of
considerations which address themselves only to the practical judgement of a legislative body to
judicial fiat?
And why should the personal preferences and prejudices of judges be allowed to be read
into the Constitution in the garb of interpretation? Is it not that judicial review involves an
exercise of political power in as much as it involves the "sovereign prerogative of choice" but
without commensurate political responsibility? And why should the courts rather than the other
two branches be the exclusive arbiter of the Constitution?
These questions have acquired a pronounced resonance in our transforming society and
evolving democracy. The way we approach and address these issues will define the quality of
our polity. For these to be addressed for posterity consistent with the first principles of
republican democracy, we need men of wisdom to work our institutions in harmony so that the
primary control of government remains with the people while judiciary fulfills the important role
as an auxiliary precaution against the excesses of majoritarian democracy. In this sense,
judicial review will be seen as essential to the promise of democracy and not antithetical thereto -
a sure guarantee of its longevity.
It has been the glory of our democracy in action that consistent with the mood of the
people we have been able to maintain harmony between different branches of government in a
manner that have thus far ensured the resilience of the institutions of a liberal democracy. By
way of a caveat however, one may add that in the fulfillment of its function to define values and
proclaim principles, the apex court as the guardian of democratic morality will doubtless
remember that the exercise of constitutional power is sustained in the final analysis by the
intellectual integrity, independence and fearlessness of judges.
The Supreme Court held that if the validity of any IX Schedule law has already been
upheld by this Court, it would not be open to challenge such law again on the principles declaredby this judgment. However, if a law is held to be violative of any rights in Part III is
subsequently incorporated in the Ninth Schedule after 24th April, 1973, such a violation/
infraction shall be open to challenge on the ground that it destroys or damages the basic structure
as indicated in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19 and the principles underlying there
under.
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It may be argued that in 2007 there is no threat to the private property rights as the
country has shifted its stand from socialism to neo capitalism and that the goals have 13 shifted
from equal distribution of wealth to accumulation of wealth by the nation through the
individuals, organisations and corporations, for economic growth without compromising with
socialistic pattern of society. With weak governments at the centre there is no real or apparent
threat abrogating the fundamental rights by constitutional amendments. The judgment in fact
comes by way of affirming of the judicial powers of review of all the laws on the touchstone of
rights guaranteed in Part III and thereafter basic structured doctrine.
The unanimity of the judgment is a unique feature. But for the scholars of law the
unanimity of opinion amongst judges even to establish law, is an encouraging feature of the
strength of the judiciary.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Jain M.P. & Jain S.N., Principles of Administrative Law, N.M. Tripathi Ltd., Bombay(1979).
Dr. Rega Surya Rao, Lectures on Legal Language and Legal Writing, Asia Law House,Hyderabad (2001).
Thakker C.K., Lectures on Administrative Law, Eastern Book Co, 4th edn., Lucknow(2003).
Durga Das Basu, Adminsitrative Law, 5th edn., Kamal Law House, Calcutta(1998). Jain M.P., Cases and Materials on Indian Administrative Law, vol. 1, 1st edn., Wadhwa
and Company Law Publishers, Nagpur(1999).
Secondary Sources
1. www. google.com
2. www. manupatra.com
3. www.indiankanoon.com