COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

COMMANDAN~

MAJOR GENERAL G. H. DAVIDSON

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

BRIGADIER GENERAL W. F. TRAIN

DIRECTOR OF INSTRUCTION

COLONEL W. W. CULP, Armor

DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

COLONEL S. L. WELD, JR., Artillery

SECRETARY

COLONEL JOHN F. FRANKLIN, JR., Armor

DEPUTY POST COMMANDER

COLONEL C. P. ROBBINS, Armor

MILITARY REVIEW

VOLUME XXXVI JUNE 1956 NUMBER 3

CONTENTS Western Defense Planning............ ..... ......... ....................... .

Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, British Army, Retired 3

SKYCA V Operations During Exercise Sagebrush ..... Colonel Stewart L. McKenney, General Staff

11

Dien Bien Phu and the Future of Airborne Operations. Lieutenant Colonel Norman E. Martin, Artillery

19

Heel of Achilles............. .......................................... . Major Reginald Hargreaves, British Army, Retired

27

To Shoot or Not to ShooL.......... ............ .............. . Lieutenant Colonel Allan W. Mitchell, Artillery and Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Knowles, Artillery

35

What Is the Army's Job? ..... James E. Cross

43

Shotgun Marriage .................. . Major Charles A. Dickey, Jr., Armor

48

Joint Medical Services in Theater Operations .... Captain H. J. Bowen, United States Navy

55

MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD .. 65 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS ............... ..

Allied Naval and Air Commands in the Mediterranean ... The Origin of the Von Manstein Plan .. . : ..................... . Bridging the Gap............. .......................... . ....... .... . ......... .. Intelligence in Atomic Warfare ......................... .

75 75 86 97 102

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO THE MILITARY READER ............... .. 108

This copy is not for sale. It is intended for more than one reader. . PLEASE READ IT AND PASS IT ALONG

MILITARY REVIEW STAFF

EDITOR IN CHIEF

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM D. McDoWELL

MANAGING EDITOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES A. CHRISTlN, JR.

SPECIAL SECTIONS EDITORS

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT M. WALKER

MAJOR JOHN J. EARLEY

SPANISH-AMERICAN EDITION

Editor: MAJOR GILBERTO GONzALEz-JULIA

Assistant Editors: MAJOR TOMAS H. GUFFAIN, CAPTAIN ORLANDO ORTIZ MORENO

BRAZILIAN EDITION

Editor: LIEUTENANT COLONEL HERMANN BERGQVIST

Assistant Editor: LIEUTENANT COLONEL TACITO T. G. DE OLIVEIRA

Administrative Officer Production Officer

MAJOR LINO BONUCCI MAJOR JAMES A. TRENT

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget 2 July 1953.

MILITARY REVIEW:"'Publfshed monthly by the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in the English, Spanish. and Portuguese languages. Entered as second-class matter August 81. 1934. at the Post Office at Fort Leavenworth, KansaB. under the Act of March 3. 1879. Subscription rates: $3.60 (US currency) a year in the United States, United States military post offices, and those countries which are members of the Pan..American Postal Union (including Spain): $4.60 a year in all other countriea.

INDIVIDUAL REPRINTS, except for copyrighted material, are authorized provided the author is given credit and the following credit line is displayed prominently: "Reprinted from the (state month and year) issue of the MILITARY REVIEW, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas."

WESTERN .DEFENSE PLANNING

Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, British' Army, Retired

The views eXp1"e8Sed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army 01' the Command and General Staff Col/ege.-The Editor.

ADJUSTMENT to the new realities of the atomic age is depressingly slow among the powers that be-both in high military quarters and in the centers of government. Yet, one can sympathize with the planners in their effort to adapt military doctrine to the supcrrevolutionary effects'of atomic energy. It is very difficult for reason and imagination to bridge the gulf between warfare in the past and warfare where atomic weapons-bombs, missiles, and shells-can be used in hundreds or thousands, and where hydrogen bombs, each equivalent to millions of tons of high explosive, are also available. What that means may be better realized if we remember that the original atom bomb used at Hiroshima, with shattering effect, was merely equivalent to 20,000 tons of high explosive. On a realistic reckoning of the effects

of present weapons, it is evident that present defense planning is far from being adt'quately adjusted to new conditions. While there is much talk of preparedness for nuclear warfare. the actual changes which have been made in military organi2atlOn are relatively slight compared with thp immensity of the problems arising

from development of nuclear weapons. The defense measures of the NATO

countries have a palpable air of unreality, and the forces they have been building up are still very markedly under the influence of "war as it was"-in 1945 and, earlier. In the continental countries this persisting outlook may be partly explained by the fact that their leaders are less closely in touch with nuclear potentialities than those of the United States, not having taken a hand in the development of nuclear power. They are also habituated to thinking of warfare mainly in terms of land operations with large conscript armies, an ingrained tendency which led them into disastrous trouble even in World War II by causing them to overlook the extent to which the airpower of that date could upset their military ground plans. I.n France there is more sign than elsewhere of an effort to think out the military problem afresh, but the process and its application have been hindered by ceaseless colonial distractions-for years in Indochina and now in North Africa. Moreover, the influence of new French thinking tends to be diminished by the loss of prestige which France has suffered since the disasters of 1940. In Germany there is a fund of military

experience greater than anywhere else, and -eventual defeat in World War II should not only produce more readiness to learn from its lessons but also create an atmosphere favorable to fresh think-

The H.bomb is a weak deterrent to small aggression. Its primary drawback is that if it does not succeed as a deterrent, and if .it is put info action, it automatically entails suicide for Western civilization

4 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 19QG

ing and new techniques. On the other hand, however, the chiefs of the new Ministry of Defense (Amt Blank) are handicapped by a lO-year blank in experience of dealing with military problems. They naturally tend to look at these problems through' 1945 eyeglasses, while the very mastery they acquired in conducting "operations" makes it more difficult for them to visualize a kind of warfare in which there will be no scope for such large-scale maneuver. Moreover they have been working out plans for the new German forces on the lines laid down for them several years ago by NATO, and they fear to consider changes that would upset their carefully planned structure.

Visiting the army and air force execu, tive headquarters of the NATO forces in Germany and elsewhere, one finds more realism. But as they have to carry out NATO plans, they are bound to put compliance with the existent plans ahead of adjustment to new conditions. Moreover, they have to train the forces under their control, which has to be done through a framed pattern of exercises, and these have to be based on things as they al'e, rather than on what should be.

"Integrity of NATO" At Supreme Headquarters Allied Pow

ers Europe (SHAPE), the fountainhead, the primarY concern has been to "maintain the integrity of NATO" under increasingly difficult circumstances. So the heads of SHAPE shrink from any adjustment which may imperil, in their view, what they havc built up with so much dif-

Captain B. H. Liddell Halt is a prominent British military writel. He served during World War I and retired in 1927. He has been military correspondent of the London Daily Telcgraph and The Times and military editor of the Encyclopedia Britannica. He has written more than 30 books on military subjects. He is the author of "Can We Defend the Middle East?" which appeared in the December 1951 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.

ficulty. A keynote at SHAPE is "objectivity," and it has been applied well ill avoiding national bias in dealing with Western defense problems. But that keynote is not really compatible with the present paramount concern to avoid any changes that might upset the "integrity of NATO." Such a concern is essentially political and entails an attitude to military problems that is not truly scientific. This political concern is quite understandable when one realizes that the 5-year struggle to build up Western defense on the NATO basis has presented varied political complications and objections from many different countries.

NATO and SHAPE plans were good military sense when they were framed5 years ago. But they have been whittled down repeatedly so that they no longer provide adequate defense insurance 011 their original basis-to furnish an effective altentalive to dangerous reliance on the atom bomb. By the very risk of bringing on an all-out atomic war the adoption of tactical atomic weapons undermines the original basis and guiding principle. Moreover that basis has been badly shaken by the im1;l1ense development of nuclear weapons since 1950-above all the H-bomb with its overwhelming powers of destruction and suicidal consequences, if. used.

Compound Pressures At the same time the NATO defense

structure is now endangered by compound pressures-financial, psychological, and political.

Financial.-The desire and need of all governments to reduce military exp('nditures which would be ruinous if forces of all types were maintained ~ planned scale, and also if they are to be'equipped with new kinds of increasingly exp!"nsive weapons. Psychological.-The growing view of

the public everywhere-which is not blinkered by vested interest-that the

5 WESTERN DEFENSE PLANNING

older forms of force are out of date and irrelevant to real defense problems. This vfew and feeling is multiplying the financial pressure. Political.-The new and more friendly

line taken by the Soviet Union which fosters the feeling, not only among the public, that the danger is diminishing and that defense expenditure is becoming unnecessary. This, again, multiplies the pressure. In Germany an important subsidiary factor is the Germans' natural desire for reunification, and the growth of a feeling that this can only be attained by detachment from NATO and becoming neutral. All these factors and pressures are likely

to increase in the near future. If the heads of NATO and SHAPE cling to their present structure (and pattern of forces) and shrink from readjustment, there is all too much likelihood that the alignment will crumble away like a sand castle. It is foolish t~ pursue politicll! expediency to tht' point where it does not make sense militarily. Western defense planning has the omi

nous appearance of having traversed a "full circle" since the outbreak of the Ko!'l'an conflict in ] 950. To be more precise, it has moved round a spiral course and back to the same point but on a more p.. rilous plane, while receding from its cl'ntral object. When the invasion of South Korea dem

onstrated that the United States possession ot such a supreme weapon as the atom b'-mb was not sufficient to deter such Comn'lInist aggression, the Western Powers e"lbarked on rearmament programs which w-:re aimed to re-create a surer form of d,fense with enlarged conventional forces. The principal effort was made in continent I Europe with the formation of NATO lhd under the military direction of SHAPE - hut the planned scale of strength in n-:mber of divisions was never attained. Il.deed, the program itself was both whit

tIed and slowed down-partly because the contributing governments, particularly those on the Continent, found that the bur~ den was greater than they were willing to bear; and also in the case of France because her forces were drained away to deal with widespread colonial troubles. At the same time new varieties of the

nucle;tr weapon were being developed which appeared at first sight to be an easy and hopeful means of offsetting the deficiency in conventional forces. One development was the thermonuclear weapon of such immensely destructive effect as to be capable of destroying an entire city. Another was a range of new atomic weapons small enough to be of tactical use against troops and airfields.

Fateful Decision These developments produced a new turn

in Western defense planning-back toward reliance on nuclear weapons to counterbalance the Communist bloc's much larger numbers of troops. That decision was aceompanied by a fresh and very dangerous complication arising from the fact that the Soviets had already begun to develop

weapon~ of a similar type. The fateful decision was made plain

when General Alfred M. Gruenther stated in June 1954 that: "In our thinking we visualize the use of atom bombs in the support of our ground troops. We also visualize the use of atom bombs on targets in enemy territory." The implications of General Gruenther's announcement were made more emphatic by Field Marshal Montgomery in October when he declared:

I want to malce it absolutely eleal' that we at SHAPE al'e basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermonuelear weapons in QUI' defense .. With us it is no longel'; 'They may possibly be used.' It is vel'y definitely; 'They will be used, if we an; attacked.' Yet, a few sentences later he stated

that: "There is no sound civil defense 01'

6 MILITaRY REVIEW JUNE 1956

ganization in the national territory of any NATO nation"-and added that unless such security exists' "a nation will face disaster in a world war, since the homefront will collapse." It seemed extremely illogical that the heads of SHAPE should base all their operational planning on a course of action that, even in their view, is bound to result in "collapse." Yet, the statesmen of the NATO countries at their meeting in Paris just before Christmas endorsed this planning policy. Field Marshal Montgomery's declara

tion was made in a lecture in London entitled "A Look Through a Window at World War Ill," and he pictured this as a prolonged struggle in three phases, ending in victory and the enemy's surrender -as in World Wars I and II. Repeatedly: throughout his lecture, he used the traditional terms "win the battle" and "win the war," and talked of thus "bringing the war to a successful conclusion." These are out-of-date terms and concepts in the atomic age.

Significant Change A year later, in October 1955, he de

livered a subsequent lecture in London which showed a significant change of outlook when he said at the end: [ now put it to you that the words 'win'

or 'lose' no longer apply to contests between nations which have nuClear power of any magnitude . ... I have been studying nllc[ea) war for a considerable time and I have come to the conclusion that man will have it in his power in the futwe to desl1oy himself and every living thing on this planet. . . . Our aim must be to ple1'ent war; the prospect of winning or losing is not a profitable subject. But NATO planning has not yet been

adjusted to this revised and wiser conclusion, whereas thoughtful people in most of the countries concerned reached such a conclusion long ago. The gap has produced a growing gulf between military

and public opmlOn and unless early and adequate steps are taken to bridge this gap the entire prospect of Western defense may founder. Defense planning creates no incentive for defensive effort if it offers no better hope than mutual suicide when put into action. The NATO nations are in danger of apathetically sinking into a "Slough of Despond." If that is to be prevented, the entire system of defense must be thought out afresh with the aim of producing a nonsuicidal form of defense.

Retaliation versus Deterrence The power of retaliation-with the H

bomb-is the most effective deterrent to deliberate agg!"ession on a large scale, for the aggressor, even if not destroyed, would suffer damage far exceeding anything he could gain. The capacity for "massive retaliation" with H-bombs thus renders very unlikely any "massive aggression"-such as an attempt to overrun Western Europe, or to paralyze Great Britain and the United States by surprise air attack. But this power of retaliation is far less sure as a deterrent to smaller scale aggression or as a check on the risk of an unintentional slide into an all-out war of mutual suicide. The fundamental drawback of present

defense policy, based on the H-bomb, is that it tends to become an "all or nothing" course. The consequences of unlimited war with nuclear weapons would be so fatal to everyone involved that the prospect causes hesitation, delay, and feebleness in reacting to any agglession which is not obviously and immediately a vital threat. The general effect is weakening the wiJI to make a stand against aggression, particularly any that occurs outside the vital area of Europe, while increasing the risk that an all-out war may be precipitated through an emotional spur of the moment decision. The Western allies' position would b~

firmer and their prospect better if thel' had an intermediate course-a policy Gf

7 WESTERN DEFENSE PLANNING

"graduated deterrence" and a plan of graduated action. Such a policy would show a sane realization that the concepts of "victory" and "unlimited war" are utterly out of date and nonsensical. Instead, this intermediate co~rse would be based on the principle of applying the, minimum force necessary to repel any particular aggression; its action would be directed primarily against the forces engaged in the aggression. This new aim would be to make the aggressors abandon theil' purpose, in place of the traditional war-aim of "conquering" them and compelling their "surrender"-an older concept that has always been foolishly shortsighted in modern times and which has now become insanely suicidal in the atomic age. The hydrogen bomb is a fatal boomer

ang that impels a new trend to the limitation of war and the avoidance of any action likely to drive an opponent to desperation. The chief hindrance to this newer aim is the habit of thought that lingers among a generation of leaders who grew up in the period and climate of "total war," It is more difficult for them to adjust their minds and planning to the need for limitation and the principle of "graduated action" than it would have been for the wiser statesmen of previous centuries. They admit that the unlimited use of nuclear weapons would be "suicide," but the fOl'lll of their defense planning, and their spl'eches about it, show little realization of thl' fact. Continued reiteration is needed to keep them conscious of this aspect.

I'he prospects of limitation of war w

8 MILITARY REVIEW

thinking on our part but also an underlying lack of determination to use the H-bomb. If the. Western Powers rely on the H

bomb deterrent to prevent war, and really intend to use this weapon sliould the deterrent fail, the logical course would be to reduce all conventional forces to the minimum required to check minor frontier en

9

i

WES'l'ERN DEFENSE PLANNING

in rearward areas might be moved up as reinforcements to the forWard layers of the defense if, and as, conditions allowed. , With suitable planning this can be achieved and such forces will not need the large scale of organic transport and equipment that makes the existing NATO type divisions so vulnerable, as 'YaH as so costly. The "local" type forces should be backed

NATO Bloc

Fo/'ward France Centcr Belgium

Holland Denmark West Germany

puse United KingdomItalyPortugal

Left Wing Norway Right Wing Greece

Turkey

Back United States Canada

Friendly Finland Sweden Switzerland Rpain

Millions 42 9

11 4 49 115 50 53 9

227 3 8

23 261 161 15

437 4 7 5 29

482

would only be practicable for relatively small forces. The idea that. the present NATO forces are capable of fighting "a mobile battle" is another current illusion. It would lie with the oversea members of NATO, especially. Great Britain and the United States, to provide most of the new model mobile forces. Relieved of conscription and the demand for quantity the Eu-

Soviet Bloc

USSR (Europe) Poland Czechoslovakia East Germany

Hungary

BulgariaRomania

USSR (Asia)

Millions 170 25 13 17

225 10

7 17

259 42

301

by lnobile forces composed of professional troops, mounted entirely in armored crosscoulltry vehicles, streamlined in organizatiOII. and trained to operate in "controlled disl'L'l'sion" like a swarm of hornets. Wil h such quality and mobility, fewer tro. ps would be required than in the present NATO divisions and they would be bet.! "I' fitted for guerrilla-like war as well as 'or atomic war wherein mobile action

ropean members could do this more effectively. and less expensively than today.

Conclusions To rely mainly on the "Great Deterrent,"

the H-bomb, would be the cheaper defense policy if carried out logically. Great savings would then be possible, thus relieving the economic strain thl;lt has become an increasing handicap on the Western coun

10 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1956

tries. But the "Great Deterrent" is a weak deterrent to small aggression, and a very insecure insurance against the risk of this spreading to the point of becoming a common slide into a suicidal great war. Indeed, its basic drawback is that if it fails as a deterrent, and is put into action, it automatically entails suicide for Western civilization.

To adopt the principle of "graduated action" would be the safer defense policy. Moreover, by making it clear that we intend only to use the H-bomb as the last resort. we should strengthen our moral position, diminish the fear that any stand against aggression will be more certainly fatal than giving way, and check the spread of neutralism. The use of this principle would allay the growing antagonism in Asia which has been fostered by the way that Western leaders, by their harping on "massive retaliation," have lent color to the idea they are the most likely "mass destroyers" of mankind. The problem of establishing differential

stages of action with nuclear weapons is difficult, requiring special study which it

has not hitherto received. But even if battlefield action in frontier zones were found to be the only practicable differential short of unlimited warfare, even that limitation would be well worthwhile because of its moral and political advantages. This would give the defense the best chance of pr,ofiting by unconventional weapons without precipitating an all-out war.

The safest degree of graduation, however, would be to develop ground forces adequate to repel invasion without any recourse to nuclear weapons, and thereby likely to deter any attempt at invasion, even in a minor way. It is largely an organizational problem, and its solution depends on a clear grasp of the problem and the will to solve it, rather than on additional outlay of money. At present we are "getting the worst of

both worlds" by incurring the heavy expense of trying to create the forces required for both policies without having the potential advantages of either. The lack of clarity tends to combine maximum cost with maximum insecurity.

We are in the proeess of passing from a gunpowder Army to an atomie Army, a transition period which will take years but which requires extremely important decisions to be taken now. It is a period in which the Army is required to be ready not only for the great atomic war, which we all fear and hope to prevent, but also for possible small aggressions any place about the world_ To be ready for large wars and small wars, using atomic weapons or no atomic weapons or perhaps a limited combination of atomic and conventional weapons, poses enormously complicated problems. We must, of course, be ready for large wars, but it i's equally important that we be ready for the small ones.... Like the forest ranger, the Army must not only keep ready the men and equipment to stop a huge conflagration, but it must also have the means to put out the brush fires when they occur.

General Maxwell D. Taylor

SKYCAV Operations

During Exercise Sagebrush

Colonel Stewart L. McKenney, General Staff XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Command and General Staff Collegc.-The Editor.

DURING Exercise SagebrHsh the Army organized, equipped, trained, and tested a new organization, a provisional reconnaissance troop, colloquially called SKYCA V. What is SKYCAV, how is it organized, how does it function, and how does it fit into the current reorganizational structure of Army forces? The history of our Army is replete with

the achievements of the Cavalry and of its "apability for reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, harassing action, and sur prise action against designated objectives deep in hostile rear areas. Prior to World War II the Cavalry was characterized by a high degree of battlefield mobility, and the rapidity and ease with which its firePOll cr could be moved from one locality to anl.ther contributed immeasurably to the whIning of wars. With the development of 1he maneuverable tank the reconnaissan:e mission of the Cavalry was taken OVl" by Armor to a considerable extent.

The tactics and techniques of the Cavalry were subordinated to the principles of shock action, maneuver, and firepower with this transfer of functions. These principles proved successful, although the two disastrous events of the December 1944 German offensive in the Ardennes and the Communist China breakthrough in 1950 in Korea might not have occurred if greater emphasis had been placed on intelligence and reconnaissance measures. With the advent of atomic weapons and

their adaptation to tactical means of delivery on the battlefield by air, guided missile, and artillery capabilities it became necessary to re-evaluate our concept of organization and our application of the principles of war. Although the principles remained the same, a study of the capabilities of nuclear warfare made it evident that to live on the battlefield, units had to be organized and equipped to operate with greater mobility, flexibility, and dispersion.

The application of the concept of dispersion, employing self-contained battle groups, inherently introduced a new factor-that of sufficient reconnaissance of the enemy so that his forces could not secretly infiltrate in force through the

WIth atomic warfare a reality, we must possess a tool that will find till' enemy, distinguish battlefield vacuums quickly, and be capable of bi(,eking mobile enemy groups prior to commitment of main battle forces

MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1956

gaps left between friendly units. At the same time, anticipating that enemy forces will also be employed in small, mobile battle groups, a means was needed to find the enemy, his flanks, strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities in order to exploit to the fullest advantage the element of surprise and to reduce the possibilities of being surprised.

Original Concepts The requirement for increased effective

ness in the performance of reconnaissance and security roles in warfare has been highlighted by the inability of purely surface means to reconnoiter and block or delay in rough areas such as the mountains of Italy, the Vosges Mountains, the Ardennes ForLt, and in Korea. While surface means of reconnaissance have served well along roads, in corridors, and over trafficable open terrain, there have been large~, rugged areas where reconnaissance and security were inadequate because there was no way to get our reconnaissance and security forces to the right points quickly. In earlier years the man on horseback

could perform these functions adequately, but in modern times the horse can no longer meet the need and it has not been until recent years that technology has begun to provide suitable means for filling this gap. While recognizing the shock power of armored formations in perform-

Colonel Stewart L. McKenney graduated from the United States Military' Academy in 1940. He served for 3 years i11 the El~ropean thcatcr with the Office 01 StmtegwServices Allied Force Hcadqllalters. and II Corp;. Altel' the Wal' he served in the C3 Orqanization and Training Section. Department of th" Armu. Washington. He commanded a field a1,tillery battalion in the 82d A irbome Division and subsequent/IIserved at West Point and with Headquarters European Command. He is presently assigned as C2, XVIII Airborne Corps and participated in Exercise Sagebrush' wherein SKYCAV opemtions and techniques were tested.

ing the classical cavalry role of exploitation, the inherent limitations of surface reconnaissance vehicles left much to be desired in World War II and Korea. Surface means of reconnaissance alone

are considered inadequate for the future for two reasons. The first reason is that the entire front or flanks cannot be covered adequately if rugged or nontrafficable terrain intervenes. Assuming that trafficability presents no problem, the second reason is that it is doubtful if sufficient manpower can be provided to me~t the reconnaissance and security requirement if only surface methods with their limitations in movement and visibility are employed. Understanding the classical cavalry role to be reconnaissance and security, as well as exploitation. SKYCAV was conceived to expand the reconnaissance and security capabilities now possessed to a limited extent by the reconnaissance units of divisions and the armored cavalry regiments. In order to provide a balanced unit,

SKYCAV, as originally conceived. included three basic elements: a reconnaissance and surveillance element capable of reconnoitering day and night by aircraft and tec.hhical means over the entire front; a small, but he:}vily armed, blocking force capable of being lifted quickly to advantageous points such as mountain tops or road junctions where, with its firepower. it. could delay the enemy or develop the enemy situation with the view of making the enemy disclose his intentions; and a third element to provide artillery-antitank backup capable of quickly moving to the contact area under the security provided it by the reconnaissance of the aircraft overhead and the actions of the bloc1,ing force. With a force of this structure availnble

to him. the reconnaissance unit ('ommander for a division would have greatly enhanced capabilities for finding the enemy wherever he might be and fixing him

13

1'"'",::

, in order t.o estimate his capabilities and perhaps his intentions, and at the same time covering the movement of the main body while it moves into battle. These same capabilities would also serve admirably in flank and rear area security while

SKYCAV OPERATIONS DURING EXERCISE SAGEBRUSH

rather than OVer only the parts of it trafficable to surface vehicles. With this in mind the provil'ional reconnaissance troop (SKYCAV) was organized to give to the commander a unit with highly mobile and flexible reconnaissance capabilities.

.. INDICATES BLOCKING ELEMENTS DUG IN COVERING PASSES THROUGH HIllS

the main body is locked in battle. Figure 1 schematically portrays this concept. Note the helicopters maintaining constant surveillance of the enemy while the blocking and artillery-antitank forces are being brought up to the decisive point to deploy and emplac-e their weapons on favorable ten .lin in order to delay the enemy advanl',. III translating this initial concept up

IVaI d to reconnaissance battalions and reg- . imebts, it seemed that by integrating the thr, basic elements described. in appropriate proportion to one another, the capahili! ies of reconnaissance forces could be gre' tly increased, and the classical cavalry functions could again be funy perforl1 ed over the entire area of operations,

This unit was to be tested during Exercise Sagebrush.

Objectives of the TestThe objectives of the test of SKYCAV

were to: Determine whether Army aircraft re

connaissance and transport capabilities could be combined with ground reconnaissance facilities to form an effective reconnaissance unit with a high degree of flexibility and mobility.

Determine whether the latest electronic surveillance devices could be effectively integrated into and efficiently used by such a unit.

Determine whether such a unit had the potentialities of satisfying the require

14 MILITAR.Y REVIEW JUNE 1956

ments of division, corps, and army commanders for improved reconnaissance and target acquisition means.

Determine whether such a unit was suitable for replacing the reconnaissance unit in the infantry and airborne divisions. Determine whether additional experi

mentation and testing of such a unit might lead to supplementing reconnaissance battalions of armored divisions and armored cavalry regiments with organizations having the characteristics evolved from such experimentation and tcsting.

Organization SKYCAV was organized 1 June 1955 at

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, by the 82d Airborne Division using the division reconnaissance company as a nucleus for the unit. Units from four and personnel from five different Army areas contributed personnel and equipment to fulfill the organizational requirements. Its mission as defined by paragraph 2a, Training Text 17-23, Reconnaissance Troop (Provisional), June 1955, was "To perform air and ground reconnaissance and battlefield surveillance for the unit to which assigned or attached. The troop may fight as infantry when required." The organizational concept involved bringing together in one unit, under one commander, hetel'(}geneous Army reconnaissance and security capabilities, some of which had been tested and approved in the past; others were new and reflected the state of development of new types of equipment.

A review of the various elements of SKYCAV is as follows (Figure 2) : Reconnaissance. Platoon.-This platoon

was organized as a reinforced armored reconnaissance platoon consisting of light tanks Ml;l, and a scout section of 1,4-ton trucks. The platoon obtained military information and provided physical security, employing tactics and techniques proved during World War II and improved through research and test during the past decade.

Assault Platoon.-The assault platoon was organized as a reinforced i~fantry rifle platoon containing four rifle squads and a weapons section consisting of 81mm mortars, 57-mm recoilless rifles, and light machineguns. The platoon obtained military information by dismounted patrolling, operating either as a platoon or in smaller patrols. It infiltrated enemy lines and was motorized on occasion from sources outside tbe platoon. The unit used tactics proved in World War II and Korea and, in addition, employed helicopterborne reconnaissance patrols, following techniques which bad been successfully tested at The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. In this connection the word "assault" is a misnomer and should be eliminated. It connotes something beyond the capability of the reconnaissance forces and something they are not designed to accomplish. "Support" is possibly a bettet designation for this element. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Pla

toon.-This platoon contained a variety of sections combining capabilities which had been fully pI'oved and others which were new and relatively untried. Visual and air photo reconnaissance were tested and (ound suitable both in World War II and in Kore~; improved techniques and results were dependent upon improvement in aircraft and in photographic equip ment. The various electronic and other special devices used for intrusion detection and battlefield surveillance had been theoretically proved feasible in the laboratory. Their use in Exercise Sagebrush indicated they possessed considerable military po tential, although technical improvement is still required to provide adequate vh;ual observation or discernment of enemy activity. This pJatoon had no capability to provide physical security except for the protection of its own personnel and equipment. Aviation Platoon.-The aviation platoon

was organized and equipped similarly to the platoons of the transportation company

SKYCAV OPERATIONS DURING EXERCISE SAGEBRUSH

" (helieopter) The platoon proved capable of fulfilling its mission of transporting the assault platoon and providing logistical support to the remainder of the troop. The platoon had no capability for providing physical security except for the protection of its own personnel and equipment.

Operations During Sagebrush During Exercise Sagebrush, SKYCAV

performed a variety of missions, includ

the GZ. It is estimated that the troop furnished a large perce'ntage of the information available to the division G2 in the attack and retrograde phases of the maneuver.

As a result of operations the following conclusions were tentatively drawn: The concept of integrating all elements

essential to the accomplishment of the mission at the operational level was sound, since coordination with major combat ele

ing air photo reconnaissance, visual air recom:aissance, tactical troop lifts, troop resup,dy, intrusion battle sUl'velliance, and se\,. fal classified missions. During both the .,ttack and defense phases of Sagebrush all , 'connaissance capabilities of SKYCAV we1 employed in varying combinations and 'degrees in urder to test as many differ. 'It techniques as possible under simulat.'.: battle conditions. In the conection of int, ':igence information the collection effor' was under the command of the troop

con;~'Hmder and the staff supervision of

131 041

ments was facilitated and duplication of reconnaissance effort was minimized. The authorized allotment of personnel

and equipment (especially communication) in the troop headquarters was inadequate to provide command control of the various elements of the unit and to permit full coordination to be effected with adjacent and higher headquarters. In this connection a considerable amount of the troop commander's time was utilized in coordinating the reconnaissance effort with the flight operations center, the fire support co

16 MILITARY REVIEW . JUNE 1956

ordination center, and the division G2. Additional persolmel and -equipment are needed to ensure that all elements of the troop receive proper operational direction and administrative and logistical support. When all tactical elements \of the troop

were engaged in a common mission-the collection of information-the capability was established for flexible operations. However, this capability was not fully exploited when the reconnaissance platoon or the assault platoon was engaged in a mission of providing physical security. In this connection the absence of an air-transportable light tank, or conversely, the lack of an air-transport capability for a light tank, compounded this problem. Although the reconnaissance and assault platoons were designed to function together whe'n necessary as a tank-infantry team in screening, delaying, or blocking action, the capability was not exploited.

SKYCAV was proved to be of actual or potential value to the Army; therefore, the concept of organization need only be further considered in the light of unit effectiveness.

No Agreement Reached Before th,.e termination of the maneuver

an unfortunate tendency developed to separate the air and ground elements of SKYCAV. The division G2 assumed the role of operator of the air and ground elements attached to subordinate combat units as augmentation or used as extended ground patrols. The aforementioned inability to airlift the present light tank M41 undoubtedly contributed to this tendency; however; this situation did lead to unrealistic conclusions being drawn as to the unit's capabilities. In this connection it appears that the development of a light, air-transportable, ;highly mobile armored vehicle with a shock capability, possibly along the lines of the T-101, 90-mm self-propelled gun, is highly desirable. Prior to the Olganization of SKYCAV

no agreement was reached between the Army and the Air Force regarding one basic assumption; that the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Army and the United States Air Force as set forth in Special Regulations 95-400-5, 19 November 1952, would be rescinded or amended to permit the use of Army aviation as envisaged in the SKYCAV concept. Paragraph 2 of this agreement, while limiting the empty weight of fixed-wing organic Army aircraft to 5,000 pounds, does not limit the size, weight, or capacity of rotary-wing aircraft, used for certain designated purposes. Included in these designated purposes are "aerial observation ... limited aerial photography" (paragraph 2a), "transportation of Army supplies, equipment, personnel, and small units within the combat zone" (paragraph 2e). In addition, the regulation states that

"Army organic aircraft will be used by the responsible Army commander as he considers necessary for the discharge of his military mission" (paragraph 3). Paragraph 6c states that the Air Force will furnish "airlift for the air movement of troops, supplies, and equipment in the assault and subsequent phases of airborne operations." It is the opinion of the Air Force that the SKYCAV concept envisages the use of Army aircraft within the meaning of "airborne operations" and during Sagebrush agreement had to be obtained between the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force to permit the use of Army aircraft for operations behind the "enemy lines" during the maneuver only. The airborne Army officer does not interpret "airborne operations" as the term is used in SR 95-400-5, to include the use of organic Army aircraft within the SKYCAV concept, since it is felt that the term connotes large-scale parachute or air landing operations using aircraft developed by the Air Force for that purpose, In this connection the regulation further

17 SKYCAV OPERATIONS DURING'EXERCISE SAGEBRUSH

"states, "The provisions of this memorandum are not intended to apply to convertiplane type aircraft nor will this agreement be interpreted to prohibit the continuing research, development, and testing of such aircraft for the Army" (paragraph 9), Since the convertiplane is a fixed-wing aireraft that employs more efficiently the vertical and horizontal displacement factors inherent in a helicopter and is to be used for transporting supplies, personnel, and equipment freely in the combat zone, ~ither before or behind e"nemy lines, the Air Force argument does not appear to bear substance. In the opinion of the numerous observ

ers Exercise Sagebrush demonstrated that the SKYCA V concept of organization and operations provided the commander with a l'econnaissance tool wh0ge potential capability is only limited by the characteristics of equipment. It was determined beyond doubt that Army organic aircraft reconnaissance and transport capabilities could be combined with ground reconnaissance facilities to form an effective reconnaissance unit, with a high potential for improved range, coverage, and speed in the collection of intelligence information. While technical improvement is still required in present electronic surveillance equipment, the potential capability and suitability of such equipment was definitely established. The effective integration into and efficient use by SKYCAV type units of such equipment is dependent only upon the required technical improvement and the availability of trained operators. ,Ob

18 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1956

sidered in the light of a replacement or augmentation for existing reconnaissance units. The division reconnaissance units >should retain their mission and should operate up to 10 miles in advance of the frontlines. SKYCAV should be used to extend the vision of the corps commander :from> the next important terrain feature to a depth of up to 30 miles. The cavalry role must not be forgotten-once the initial contact is made, the enemy's flanks and center of gravity determined, and evaluated information dispatched to the higher commander, the security elements of SKYCAV must fight "dismounted" to force the enemy to deploy and to delay or block him until the main body of friendly forces can engage.

Such is the concept, the traditional and elassic cavalry concept, of finding, fixing, and holding the enemy within the unit capability. The sometimes unrealistic con-

elusions evolved from the test during Sagebrush resulted from a tendency to not fully understand the capabilities of the troop, to use it not as true cavalry, but as an information gathering agency for the G2 and as augmentation attachments to sub ordinate combat units. The limitations im. posed by currently available equipment can be overcome by technical improvement; however, the basic reason for the organiza. tion of SKYCAV must not be overlooked. With atomic warfare a reality, present and future commanders must possess a tool that will not only find the enemy and dis tinguish battlefield vacuums quickly, but will possess the inherent capability to block mobile enemy groups rapidly prior to the commitment of the main battle forces. True security is not only in "see ing" the enemy, but in "seeing and being" -seeing where he is and being in a ready position to block his advance.

Radical changes are emerging in the development of the implements of war. To meet the challenge of new weapons of war, our concepts of time and space have been expanded. The combat zone in an atomic war will be vastly extended in depth. Combat action will be characterized by fluidity. Units will be dispersed in space, but through greatly increased mobility will be capable of greater concentration for concerted elTort in terms of time. On the future battlefield the decisive margin of strength will fall to the side possessing superior mobility to exploit the elTects of weapons yielding greatly increased firepower.

Tactical areas, as in the past, must be fought for and held, and the result ing battle will be characterized by many violent clashes of relatively short duration. These tactical areas will be held, not as ends in themselves, but as a means of controlling the battle or creating favorable opportunities for the employment of nuclear weapons.

Lieutenant General James M. Gavin

OlEN BIEN PHU AND THE

fUTURE Of AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

Lieutenant Colonel Norman E. Martin, Artillery

Faculty, Command and General Staff College

The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not neces~ sarily those of the Department of the Army or the Command and General. Staff College.-The Editor.

I N APRIL 1954 thl? Vietminh over'whelmed the French Union airborne defenders at Dien Bien Phu and thus rang down the curtain on the world's most recent and most disastrous airborne operation. The sequel of this event was the downfall of the Cabinet of Premier Laniel and the ultimate French surrender of northern Indochina.

Two years ago Dien Bien Phu held the center of the world stage. However, with the passage of time the glare provided by contemporary news coverage fades and gem'ral interest has inevitably waned. Detailed information on the campaign is difficult to uncover. Insofar as airborne operations are concerned, these various reasons combine to explain a tendency to slide by an evaluation of Dien Bien Phu. Furthermore, the operation ended in abysmal failure: What proponent of airborne warfare enjoys writing about the defeat of 811 courageous an airborne force?

N"netheless, there are at least three

reasons why a thorough examination of the Dien Bien Phu operation should be made and why information on the campaign should be widely disseminated.

First, is the recently announced increase in the number of United States airborne divisions from 2 to 3. This means the proportion now rests at 3 airborne divisions out of a total of 19 divisions for the Active Army, or over twice the proportion existent at the end of World War II. Are we headed in the proper direction?

Second, developments in the field of air transportation and air-deliverable ground weapons and equipment endow, or soon will endow, airborne forces with an unprecedented versatility. Would the versatility provided by such developments have made any difference at Dien Bien Phu?

And last, our concepts for employment of airborne forces must be continually reviewed in accordance with actual and anticipated developments in weapons, transportation, and the test of war. Is any addition, modification, or change of current airborne doctrine indicated by Dien Bien Phu? .

Hostilities in Indochina between French Union forces and Vietminh Communists commenced in 1946. By the end of the

TIl(' outcome of the Dien Bien Phu operation indicates that if we are to attain the utmost from our airborne capability, we must give acfded' emphasis and attention to the important raid type airborne operation

20 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1956

rainy season in November 1953, the terrain controlled by French Union forces in the area of interest had contracted to the Red River delta area surrounding the principal city of Hanoi and a narrow strip extending along the northeast coast (Figure 1). Isolated French garrisons were being precariously maintained in western Tonkin and northern Laos. Unchallenged air supremacy rested with the French. The French Government had obstinately

avoided making political concessions at the expense of popular support for the Frenchbacked non-Communist native government. As a consequence popular support shifted to the Communists who successfully exploited the nationalistic sympathies of the populace.

Communist Offensive Preparations The Communists were preparing for an

offensive against the French forces in the Red River delta area employing all major Vietminh units with the exception of the 316th Division. This division was in the process of moving west from the Delta area with the probable mission of eliminating French Union garrisons and French-sponsored guerrillas in western Tonkin and northern Laos. In order to thwart the 316th Division and at the same time to

DIEN BIEN PHU AND THE FUTURE OF AIRBORNE OPERATIONS 21

offensive against the French forces in the Red River delta area. At this time three courses of action were

open to the French: withdraw from Dien Bien Phu before encirclement; prevent the all-out concentration of major Vletminh forces against Dien Bien Phu by diversion-

c

NORTHERN INDOCHINA MAIN OVERLAND SUPPLY ROUTES

TO OlEN BIEN PHU JANUARY 1954

CJ AREAS UNDER YlfTMINH CONTROl 5. 100

MILES

aI', operations in other sectors; or defend Di, n Bien Phu taking the calculated risk thal French tactical air supremacy would permit effective interdiction of Vietminh cOhlmunications routes and the neutralizatio,! of enemy artillery as well' as satisfy

ing French supply and evacuation require. ments by air. The last course of action was selected.

Organization for Defense The French selected and organized po

sitions in the flat valley floor and on the

low hills rising from the valley floor sur rounding the main airfield in the area (see Figure 2). Excluding the Isabelle position to the south, the airhead formed an ellipse about 2,500 yards in width ap.d 3,600 yards in length. Commanding ground to the east

22 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1966

and north overlooking the valley was not occupied.

Vietminh Buildup The first Vietminh forces to reach the

Dien Bien Phu area occupied the commanding high ground on the east and north without opposition and by 1 January the defenders were completely isolated except

8B8~176 o I

MILES

xx t8J316(-)

12 MARCH 1954 LEGEND

D APPROXIMATE LOCATION Of VlnMINH UNITS = ROAp

-AIRFIELD

by air. Taking their time the Vietminh continued their buildup until approximately four infantry divisions and one artillery division had been concentrated, together with necessary supporting units and supply. Chinese Communist assistance played a major part in achieving the 10. gistical buildup. Surprise was furthered by keeping secret, until the assault, an

antiaircraft and field artillery capability sufficient to cut off French air-landed reo supply. Not only was the Vietminh abil ity to concentrate field artillery under. estimated, but in contrast to previous years Vietminh gunnery techniques and fire coordination proved markedly superior. During the Vietminh buildup, how. ever, the defenders had little inkling of the un;>leasant developments in store for them.

Developments of the Battle The Vietminh began their assault on the

night of 13-14 March with an attack of the outlying positions Beatrice and Gabrielle, each of which was manned by a battalion of seasoned veterans. Strong point Beatrice, attacked by two regiments, fell on the first night and the defending battalion was annihilated. On the next night Gabrielle was overrun, also by two regiments. Concurrently with this at tack, Vietminh artillery neutralized French artillery located at strong point Isabelle. As the first phase ended the Vietminh

were able to move their antiaircraft artillery closer to the main airfield. The observation afforded by the high ground to the east and north, which the Vietminh had been p,ermitted to occupy without opposition, enabled tile attackers to subject both airfields to artillery fire and the French Union forces became entirely dependent upon air-dropped supply. The situation is shown in Figure 3. The second phase of the battle began on

the evening of 30 March with heavy attacks by two divisions, initially from the east and later shifting to the west, which continued with diminishing intensity until 4 April. While loss of ground was limited, the Vietminh seized and held high ground in strong points Dominique and Elaine directly overlooking the main airfield, the drop zones, and the French positions on the valley floor. As Vietminh antiaircraft moved closer, supply plane losses mounted, and drops had to be made at

23 DIEN .BIEN PHU AND THE FUTURE OF AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

higher altitudes with reduced effectiveness. Eventually a substantial portion of the daily supply drop fell directly into enemy hands. Both sides suffered heavy losses. Al

though the French had received a reinforcement of two battalions of paratroopers after the initial assaults, the defenders were now without fresh reserves and were

bers, Thereafter, each day French 'casualties from artillery and mortar fire alone exceeded replacements.

Upon termination of the second. phase of the battle in early April, the Vietminh forces began a series of entrenching operations and "strangulation" tactics designed to cut off French positions which were either abandoned by the French or

, .... ~1 'OlrMtR fRENCH IJN/ON ...... 1 POSITIONS

N

ISABElLE 1 1 ~ 'f fiGURE 3

57125.1 304

16 APRI~ 1954

o AP~~OV~~::~HU~~~;~ON = ROAI)

_AJRFlEtt)

o FRENCH UNION POSITIONS fl;P ;~~~:~::ENCH uNIQN

'===..=,"',,=S==:=~ unable to evacuate their wounded which, at thi' point, probably numbered about 5,000. Although sustaining losses perhaps three times as great, the Vietminh were able to both evacuate and to bring in replacelne'lts. After the second contraction of the air

hend (Figure 4) the French were unable to "einforce except in very limited num

overrun by the Vietminh, By 1 May the airhead was less than a mile in diameter.

On the night of 1-2 May, following an intensive artillery preparation, the Vietminh launched their third series of mass attacks, and by 3 May had seized six positions in strong points Huguette, Elaine, and I8abelle. The defenders later recaptured two of these positions in counterat

24 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1956

tacks. The airhead situation, however, was further weakened by heavy rains which threatened to collapse bunkers and to flood the poorly drained defensive positions on the valley floor.

Final Assault The final assault on Dien Bien Phu be

gan after dark on 6 May following an intensive artillery preparation which in-

eluded use of mUltiple rocket launchers. The preparation neutralized all remaining French artillery and caused many rainsoaked shelters and dugouts to cave in. The assault did not end with dawn, as

had all previous Vietminh assaults, but pressure continued from the east with fierce hand-to-hand combat during the

morning and afternoon of 7 May. Early on the morning of 7 May infiltration by Vietminh troops began from the west and soon after all French positions in the main airhead were overrun. Radio contact with the French commander, Brigadier General Christian de Castries, ceased at 1945 on 7 May, and all organized resistance in the main resistance center 800n crumpled. By nightfall the strong point Isabelle was also overcome. After 54 days of combat quiet fell on Dien Bien Phu.

Reasons for Failure Some of the reasons for failure are

apparent in the foregoing account of the campaign.

1. Vietminh capabilities were grossly underestimated. This, in part, led to the French failure to organize and defend dominant terrain.

2. French Air Force capabilities were overestimated. The French Air Force proved incapable of fulfilling its assigned mission of neutralizing Vietminh artillery and of effectively interdicting the line of communications. By retaining the initiative the Vietminh were able to select for their attacks those times when their supply levels were adequate. 3. Limitation's imposed on the theater

commander by the French Government in effect forbade the aggressive military action required by circumstances and permitted by the existing French strategic capability. For example, the decisive concentration of Vietminh force in the Dien Bien Phu area could have been prevented by: attacks in the Red River delta area; attacks to sever the enemy's line of communications; or the timely dispatch of a link-up force. Too late a link-up force arrived within 48 hours marching time of Dien Bien Phu on the day the airhead was overrun, which, incidentally, was also the day international discussion of Indochina differences commenced at Geneva. Whether the forced inactivity re

25 DIEN BIEN PHU AND THE FUTURE OF AIRBORNE "OPERATIONS

"suited from a French hope of achieving a more amicable settlement of Indochina differences cannot be said. But it can be said that the Communists once again proved the thesis that, "in war there is no substitute for victory."

Impact on Airborne Concepts What are the lessons of the Dien Bien

Phu campaign? Certainly the validity of present concepts of control of the ail', of preference for the daylight assault, the use of the aircraft to overcome terrain obstacle,:; and distances, the vital influence of dominant terrain and obstacles in the selection and organization of the airhead, and the effectiveness of surprise combined with mass were amply confirmed. Well attested were the greater risks of the independent type airborne operation stemming from the need to control air-landing facilities and from an inability to narrow down an enemy's reinforcement capability from a time-distance standpoint such as may often be successfully calculated in a 2- or 3-day early link-up type airborne operation. Forcibly driven home is the fatal weakness of an air,borne fOl:ce confronted with an enemy possessing, and prnl'idcd with the 0ppOItunity of exercising. a superior buildup capability. In reviewing the history of airborne

warfare and relating the sustained combat power of any particular airborne force to the enemy's buildup potential, it becomes apparent that almost without exception all airborne operations of taetical significance have been conducted against an overwhelming enemy buildup potential. It is also evident that the successful airborne op{Tation has, by one means or anotheT. dellled the enemy the opportunity of exercising his superior buildup potential. One such approach has been the early link-up, which, for example. in the seizure of Corregidor and in the .seizure of the cau;eway exits behind Utah Beach in Normandy, took place in a matter of hours. Int,>rdietion has played an important and

sometimes "a decisive role, as in the German seizure of Crete, wherein the Luftwaffe, combined with an assist from isolated German parachute units, prevented the British commander from shifting his numerically superior forces to the critical Maleme Airfield area. More often the formula for success has been a brief period until link-up combined with a strong interdidion effort. A third means of achieving the same vital ingredient of success, that is of preventing the enemy from exercising his buildup potential, is inherent in the raid type airborne operation with its planned withdrawal so timed as to escape enemy counteraction. The raid type airborne operations of

World War II were of necessity small in size and of little tactical significance. The British raid for intelligence purposes on the German radar station at Bruneval, France, in 1942 and the German raid to free the captive Mussolini in Italy in '1944 are examples. Limitations were imposed by the close disposition of units throughout western Europe from a timedistance standpoint and by a 'technical inability to withdraw, by air, more than a handful of troops. At Dien Bien Phu, however, for the first time in airborne warfare there existed a set of circumstances permitting the planned withdrawal by air of an airborne force of tactical significance. The complete destruction and dispersal of Vietminh forces in the immediate objective area and the relative isolation of the " objective area from enemy reinforcements made withdrawal simple to execute, and on a'leisurely basis, during the latter part of November or early December 1953.

Although the exact nature of future war remains unpredictable, it is widely acknowledged that such a conflict will probably be" chal'acterized by extended frontages and depths, widely separated relatively small units, and great fluidity. Such conditions strongly favor the raid type airborne operation on a scale per

26 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1956

mitting important tactical results. The inclusion of successful raid type airborne operations directed against the Vietminh line of communications in the Dien Bien Phu operation would have assuredly put the shoe on the 'other foot. While insufficient information is at hand to evaluate the practicability of such action on the part of the French, developments do suggest the practicability of such a concept of employment insofar as our own airborne forces are concerned. Pointing in this direction, for example, are impending improvements in landing and takeoff characteristics of aircraft, and the completion of a family of lightweight air-deliverable engineer equipment specifically designed for construction of those minimum ait

landing facilities essential for execution of raid type operations with fixed-wing assault transports over wide areas of the, world. Adding to our prospective airborne raid capability is the increased awareness of things "airborne" as exemplified by the recent creation of a third airborne division.

Conclusion The Dien Bien Phu operation, considered

in the light of advances in the airborne field and in the nature of future warfare, indicates the feasibility of tacticaJly important raid type airborne operations. If we are to attain the utmost ftom our airborne capability, added emphasis and attention to the raid type airborne operation is in order.

THE MISSION OF THE MILITARY REVIEW

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personnel of the uniformed services of the United States Armed Forces and students of Allied countries while attending the Command and General Staff College) in the magazine is on a competitive basis. .

Monthly Award-All articles written by military authors published in each issue are reviewed by a board of officers representing the Command and General Staff College. The board selects the first and second best articles published each month. The authors of the selected articles receive $100 and $50, respectively.

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The selecti~n of both monthly and annual awards is based upon the soundness, readability, completeness, reader appeal, accuracy, substance, originality of thought, authoritativeness, and the over-all merit and quality of the article.

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HEEL OF ACHILLES

Major Reginald Hargreaves, British Army, Retired

He who suppresses or subdues mankind Must look down on the hate of thos.e below.

-Byron

The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not nece8sarily those of the Department of the A"my or the Command and General Staff College.-The Editor.

FROM a world which vehemently protests its rejection of conflict as a means of settling international disputes, the grim specter of war refuses to be banished. The sincerity of the Western Powers'

desire to avoid armed strife is scarcely to he questioned. Committed to a policy in which military action; if embarked upon at all, would be purely retaliatory, the very fact that they have declared for restraint has inevitably had the effect of surrendering the initiative to opponents whose abiding creed is best summed up in the words of Stalin:

We live not only in a state but in a ~Y8te)" of state8; and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to exist indefinitely side by side with the Imperialist states. Ultimately, one or the other must conquer. Pending thi8 development. a number of terrible cla8he8 between the S

28 MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1956

the appalling price of all-out conflict than the .Western peoples; its aim has always been to weaken men so thoroughly by fear of war that they become ready and willing to accept dictatorship, For all that, the Soviet Union would

almost certainly initiate a full-scale shooting war were any of the fonowing circumstances to arise:

If the United States, wearying of the evasion and irresolution of European politics, should embark UpOll an "agonizing reappraisal" of her policy, leading to the withdrawal of her Armed Forces from the European mainland and the surrounding seas. That would make a present to the Soviet Union of continental Europe, with all its vast resources in plants, raw materials, and potential slave labor; possession of which would, of course, put the Soviet leaders in a much stronger position to pursue their plan for world conquest. If the men in the Kremlin deemed the

moment pmpitious for an attempt to organize world revolution, following a trial of arms, m01'e 01' less 011 the Ko?'ean pattern, in which the Western Powers had demonstrably failed io assert theh' superiority. If Westel'n Gel'many, without the sup

port of the United Statcs and Great Britain, were to attempt the recovery of her Eastern pl'ovinces by force of arms. As a red herring, a last ?'esort to dis

tract attention from diffuse but widespread unrest within ihe Soviet Union,

Maj01' Reginald Hargreaves, British Army, Retired, served in France and at Gallipoli during World Wm' I at which time he was severely wounded and subsequently retired. He was recalled to active duty in 1939. He has prepared numerous military topics for publicationq throughout the world during the past years. A frequent contributor to the MILITARY REVIEW, he is the author of "Vital Spark" (October 1953), "Molehill to Mountain" (June 1954), "The Link" (February 1955), and "Gadgets and the Man on the Ground" (September 1955).

by an appeal to national unity in the face of alleged anti-Soviet aggression. It should always be borne in mind that,

fundamentally, Soviet imperialism would be far less reluctant than the Western Powers to incur the risks involved in full-scale global conflict. Soviet Russiathe heartland of the entire monstrous conspiracy to secure world hegemony-has already surrounded herself with a girdle of satelli te states to buffer the first shock of arms. Her own enormous territories, moreover, have permitted the widest dispersal of her heavy industrial plants, military depots, and centers of production for materiel of war. Targets would be remote, far from easy access, and extremely difficult to pinpoint. Since they would exercise the initiative, the Soviet leaders would have an additional advantage in that the Western Powers would be thrown on the defensive at the outset-a situation from which the hard-pressed forces of freedom would only recover at the cost of infinite sacrifice and resolution, sustained over a nerve-racking period of time. Even when counterattack became a pos

sibility, it would be found that men such as Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov, and Malen!mv would accept the astronomical losses in human life that the intensified means of destruction would involve with an equanimity which is impossible for the Western mind readily to imagine. FOl' they are Asiatics with whom the West, erner's belief in the sanctity of human life simply does not exist. To them it is immaterial how many eggs are broken so long as they ultimately achieve their omelette. This has been made plain a hundred times but never with more brutal clarity than at Sevastopol at the momen.t when the German advance was temporarily sweeping all before it. When the collapse of Muscovite resistance became clearly inevitable, rather than permit the enormous stock of munitions stored in Fort Maxim Gorki II to fall into enemy hands, the local

29 HEEL OF ACHILLES

eom~issars touched off everything, blowing 'ammunition, hundreds of their own wounded, and scores of prisoners of war sky-high in one ghastly' holocaust. It is not, of course, for one moment to

be believed that in the long run the West would not prevail. With its superior technical and material resources, its infinitely greater industrial power, and with land, sea, and air forces whose quality would more than offset the enemy's superiority in numbers, eventual victory would be certain. But it would be won at such a cost that only the spiritual and political freedom characterizing the survivors would serve to differentiate it from defeat. Under the circumstances it is inevitable

that one should echo the query of Colonel Slocum" the United States military representative at the head-on battle of Spion Kop, who pertinently demanded, "Isn't there any way round?" Superficially, the Soviet Union, an au

tarchy with the power to beat the intransigent into submission, appears invulnerable. For all that, even this armored monster "girt in steel and arm'd cap-apie," has an indubitable Achilles' heelthe many, virile clans and peoples who have lIever yet been browbeaten or beguiled into genuine acceptance of the CommuniRt subhuman way of life.

~Ianifesting Their Resentment Re"i"tance to Bolshevik rule did not

end with the defeat of the armies of Wrangel, Kolchak, and Denikin. Numerous element.s among those supposed to bllnefit frol11 the "triumph of the proletariat" lost no time in manifesting' their resentment of any attempt to sovietize them. The R,,\'iet Union is largely a country of agricUlturists and the highly individualistic pC:Jsant mentality, more than a little grasping and amazingly self-centered, stubbornly refuses to accept any suggestion of collectivization. The small-holder, the cultivator with a few hundred acres,

will only work for himself, never for an idea. So it alwa~s has been, so it always will be. lt is scarcely surprising, therefore, that

h'ouble first arose and long continued in the rural areas. During 1928-29 there were no less than 130 uprisings against' the authorities. The Ukrainians were in the forefront of many of these movements to resist the imposition of Soviet rule, as they were the staunchest supporters of that Far Eastern Republic which managed to retain some semblance of independence until 1922. After the forcible incorporation of the Far Eastern Republic into the USSR the Soviet authorities arrested most of the contemporary Ukrainian leaders, and in 1924 a monstrous farce of a trial was staged in the city of Chita which temporarily-but only temporarily -broke the spirit of Ukrainian resistance. Defiant opposition continued, however, even after the drastic measures taken by Stalin in 1932-33 to break the stubborn opposition of the kulaks-a campaign of terrorism and brutality which, it is credibly reported, cost the lives of abgut 10 million men, women, and children. Yet, despite the remorseless punishment

meted out, the spirit of insurrection refused to be subdued. The erstwhile American Communist, Andrew Smith, has recorded how, in his early days in the Soviet Union in 1934, news reached Moscow of another serious outbreak of trouble in the ever-turbulent Ukraine. There were endless stories of strikes and sabotage on the state farms and in the mines, and of damage done to the railroads. Local Party leaders were' promptly removed and the insurrectionary movement forcefully put down, while Skrypnik, Vice President of the Council of People's Commissars, was blandly reported to have "committed suicide." By mid-1934 the movement of revolt, hitherto very largely confined to the countryside, had spread to the industrial centers and was particularly widespread

,30 MlLITARY REVIEW JUNE 1966

among the metal workers of Kazan. Smith, through his open expressions of disgust at the tyranny and corruption with which he was confronted on every hand, was

eve~tually put in touch with the resistance leaders in his own electric plant-industrial workers to a man, and to a man most bitterly opposed to a regime which had falsified their dearest hopes. In December 1934 Smith was making an

inspection tour of a factory when the news came through of the assassination of Kirov, a prominent member of the aJlpowerful Political Bureau. He noted:

At fi,st a curious quiet settled upon the workers. Everyone was afraid to comment although the bare facts passed with lightning speed through the factory. G'radually, however, the first shock wore off and one could hear occasional comments in the toilets, in the c01ridors, or, as I passed from one machine to another. Some smiled significantly to each other, when they were sure they were not being observed by the propagandists. Everybody was on edge as if they expected something even more momentous to take place. One worker said to me, 'Did you hear what happened? You will hear more later, just wait and see.' Another assured me that 'Something will happen soon.' A machine hand named Vassil even went 80 far as to say to me, 'It would have been much better if it had been Stalin instead of Kirov.' Such was the mood of the workers in

whose name the glorious Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsya had been staged and brought to victory! .

When Hitler invaded the domain of the Northern Bear in June 1941, with typical oriental guile Stalin waved the sacred banner of "Mother Russia" to unify the people in patriotic defense of the Fatherland. Despite this rousing appeal to militant love of country, there were tens of tllOusands of dissidents prepared to welcome the invaders as their liberators-

especially in the Ukraine. The Don and Kuban Cossacks seized the opportunity to spring to arms in a separatist movement to free their territories from the Soviet yoke. With the shadow of inevitable defeat hanging over them, they were still stubbornly fighting when the war ended. On the Soviets' Western Front, at one period, volunteer Russian units, totaling 200,000 officers and men, were entrusted with the guardianship of the German lines of communication. They ser:ved under the over-all command of 'General Koestring, former Military Attache in Moscow, and initially proved entirely reliable. But Hitler's imbecile failure to repress

Rosenberg, with his outrageous theory of Herrenvolk and ,Untermenschen, proved almost as fatal as his omission to restrain the sadistic thugs Kock and Sauckel. For Rosenberg's ad hoc race policy relegated the Russians to "the lesser breeds without the law," to be treated like vermin and utterly destroyed; and the Gestapo went gleefully to work with torch and firing squad to ensure their extermination. General Vlassov's offer of a corps of Russian volunteers for frontline duty was contemptuously rejected; while news of the widespread atrocities perpetrated by Kock and Sauckel dammed the tide of de sertions and -turned approximately 1.6 miJIion trained men, who had deserted to "fight for freedom," into bitter enemies. There were many, however, who, while

scorning all thoughts of collaboration with the Teutonic enemy, were determined to strike a blow for their own freedom. At the time of the German advance on Stalin grad there were serious anti-Soviet revolts among the Kalmuks, the Tchnetnics, the Tartars of the Nogai Steppes, and many of the Kuban Cossack clans. The Cossacks deliberately slaughtered

their political commissars, and put up a tremendous fight before they were overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers, disarmed, and marched off to the Bykovsky

31 HEEL OF ACHILLES

PeresOV dej;ention camp. Here they were subjected to the Suvorov method of dealing with rebels-noncommissioned officers and other ranks being lined up and 1 man in 3 taken out and shot. In this way 15,000 insurgents were executed, their bodies being buried in the sands of the Caspian Sea, at the mouth of the Volga. Victor Semenovitch Arbarkinov, with his practiced death-squads, was in charge of operations which were kept a dead secret until revealed by the fugitive Soviet staff officer, Ivan Krylov. In November 1942 Stalin deemed it nec

essary to hasten off to Astrakhan, where the Kalmuks of the Great Steppes had been in arms against the regime since the previous' August. These Kalmuks form part of the tribal community of the lower Volga which in all numbers about 8 million souls. The suppression of this warlike elan called for military measures on a very considerable scale. The metal work-

I ers of Kazan also rose in rebellion, but were ruthlessly dealt with; 500 of them were shot and the remainder transported to Siberia. Unrest among the irrepressibly chau

vinistic people of the Crimean Autonomous i RepUblic led to the insubstantial charge

of colIaboration with the Germans being laid against them, and they were severely "disciplined" by the firing squad and by wholesale exile to Siberia. A similar fate was meted out to the insurgent Ingushes, Balkan;, and Karachins.

Spontaneous Insurrection Nor have these particular victims of

Soviet Tmperialist expansion been the only ones to raise the standard of revolt. In June 1953 the workers on the Stalinallee building project in East Berlin broke into spontaneous insurrection. Opposition to Sovi('t rule was categorically affirmed in the demonstrators' slogan, "This is a people's uprising-we demand free, secret electionf !"

By evening the crowd was deliberately tearing down Soviet emblems, banners, and posters. The Red Flag over the Brandenburger Tor was ripped from its staff and rent into shreds, despite the fire leveled at the surging mob by the VOp08 (People's Police). So threatening had the demonstrators' attitude become that the Soviet authorities dispatched the 1st Mechanized Division of the Red Army to the scene of the disturbance. T-84 tanks charged headlong into the milling crowd in the Potzdammer Platz, and the military commander of the Soviet Sector of Berlin proclaimed a state of martial law. The assembly of more than three people was specifically banned, and a curfew decreed between the hours of 2100 and 0500. Since sticks and stones and naked fists cannot hope to prevail against armored cars and 30-ton tanks. the local uprising was eventually quelled. In the meantime, however, unrest had

spread like wildfire throughout all of the Communist-controlled East German zone. Soviet officials were seized in Bremen, and res'cued only with the advent of Soviet Army troops. At Halle demonstrators raided the headquarters of the dreaded State Security Service tearing up files and burning records. At Magdeburg workmen from the Krupp Grusonwerk stormed the jail and released over a hundred political prisoners. It was in Magdeburg, indeed, that the fighting reached its most savage pitch; at least 40 demonstrators were killed, while a number of the hated VOp08 were lynched by the, infuriated crowds. To suppress this wave of embittered in

surrection the Soviets deployed a force of 275 tanks-more than Rommel ever had at his disposal at one time in the Western Desert. But put down it was, since an unarmed and unorganized mob can never hope to hold its own against wen-armed and disciplined troops operating under a competent central command. The sequel was a widespread campaign of terrorism

32 , ""'!!'!!I

MILITARY REVIEW JUNE 1956 '

which included 25,000 arrests and 42 death sentences among those charged with having led the movement. Poland, like Eastern Germany, simmers

with irrepressible discontent; her refusal to knuckle under to Communist domination has the powerful, if covert, support of the Church. To the North the Baltic States and Finland may be momentarily quiescent, but remain sullenly opposed to Soviet rule.

Perhaps the biggest center of latent disaffection is to be found in Siberia, which the Cossack Yermak Timofevevitch started to colonize in 1581 with every circumstance of brutality. Although the conquest was made in the name of the Czar in Moscow, the Cossacks would scorn to regard themselves as Russian. In 1917 the' Cossacks of the Don, Terek, and Astrakhan, as well as those of Kuban, were in the forefront of resistance to the Soviet regime, and the temporary enforcement of submission to "the Party Line" has only strengthened their fundamental sense of independence.

He that complies against his will Is of his own opinion still UnfortunatelY, by forcibly repatriating

some 30,000 Cossacks-to barbaric destruction or permanent exile--out of the Cavalry Corps which had fought against the Soviet Republic rather than for the Nazis, the Allies unwittingly destroyed one of the most formidable nuclei of opposition to Communist oppression in all the land. Despite all that a strong element of irreconcilables still survives. Among the other dissident settlers in

Siberia may be counted many Ukrainians and Byelorussians, while numerous Caucasian, Bait, Turkestani, Buriat, Yakut, Tartar, Jewish, and Polish communities share a common detestation of Muscovites, Czarist or Communist alike. To these covert enemies of the regime--numbering over 25 million-must be added the 10 million population of the slave labor camps, of whom the American citizen,

John Noble, has affirmed that "only a spark is needed to set them off in revolt." 1 In short, Siberia, with a population !!f

malcontents that far outnumbers the trueblue members of the Communist Party constitutes an abiding threat to the crazy regime whose writ is based upon the devious policies of a score of mutually suspicious adventurers housed in Moscow's ancient Kremlin.

The President of the United States has pledged his word to work for the peaceful liberation of the satellite countries at present held in bondage. In this context the adjective can surely be regarded as no more than a concession to the language of diplomacy. Only positive action can bring about the liberation of these bondslaves; and a potential line of action undoubtedly exists which rather than precipitate global warfare would, if successful, obviate all likelihood of its occurrence.

The people of East Germany and the satellite states, together with those of the clans and tribal communities who have always openly or covertly resisted Soviet domination, should be organized to embark on a nationwide effort to win back their own freedom. To date, their efforts at revolt have failed because they have been put into execution piecemeal. They have been sporadic and entirely lacking in integration instead of being properly organized and closely dovetailed, staunchly cooperative and mutually supporting.

Isolated revolts can easily be dealt with by local forces reinforced, if necessary, from a central reserve. It would be a very different story if instead of a purely localized conflagration, the spirit of revolt everywhere burst into flame at one and the same moment. Of the Soviet Union's 2(10 million pop

ulation only 7 million are members of the Communist Party, and that total includes 10n 9 March 1956 thousands of rioters ill Tjfl~1

capital of Soviet Georgia. were subdued by SOviet Army troops and tanks after more than 100 persons were machinegunned.-The Editor.

33 HEEL OF ACHILLES

the intelligentsia of technicians, bureaucrats, and minor Party bosses-all of them untrained in arms. They would constitute a relatively minor hindrance, although it is possible that even in the face of a nationwide insurrection the armed forces of the MVD, totaling about 2 million would stand firm in defense of the men in the Kremlin for whom they act as a type of Praetorian Guard. But it is highly questionable if the mass

of the Soviet Army would be found on the side of the oppressors. As Captain Khokhlov, the refugee intelligence expert, has summed it up: "Millions of Russian soldiers, common people with weapons in their hands, could be the prime factor in the future overthrow of the Soviet system." In such circumstances it is a moral certainty that the 60-70 well-armed divisions of satellite troops would follow suit. Straws show the way the wind blows, so

it is of especial significance that during the revolt at Magdeburg the Soviet soldiers guarding the jail refused to intervene when the workers broke into the prison to release their comrades, although this gesture of defiant restraint was subsequently penalized by the execution of 18 noncommissioned officers and men. Furthermore, during the Bander rising in the Ukrainf>, which coincided with Lavrenti Beria's bid for power, several Soviet Army units openly joined forces wit;h the Insurgents. Indeed, opposition to the regime hu~ never been absent from the Soviet Army ranks. How can we otherwise account for the flight to sanctuary in the We~t of 150,000 officers and men over the years since 1945 in the face of almost insuperable difficulties? The I aw material obvi