June 2009Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 1 Moving Forward with (Coastal) Design and Management J. W. Kamphuis Queen’s University Kingston, ON, Canada

June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis

1

Moving Forward with (Coastal) Design and Management

J. W. Kamphuis

Queen’s University

Kingston, ON, Canada

K7L 3N6

[email protected]

2009 CSCE-ASCE-ICE Triennial Conference, St John’s


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International scientific consensus agrees thatincreasing levels of man-made greenhouse gases

are leading to global climate change. Possibleconsequences of climate change include rising

temperatures, changing sea levels, and impactson global weather. These changes could have

serious impacts on the world’s organisms and onthe lives of millions of people, especially thoseliving in areas vulnerable to extreme natural

conditions such as flooding and drought.Royal Society, London, UK

Conference Statement


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Some Compelling Evidence

Thank you Susan Torrence, Quilter

☺


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We'll rant and we'll roar like true Newfoundlanders

We'll rant and we'll roar on deck and below

Until we strikes bottom inside the two sunkers

When straight through the channel to Toslow we'll go

Courtesy Great Big Sea

Communicative Intermission☺


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1. Very Large changes in design conditions (sea levels, global weather patterns, higher population concentrations)

2. Very Large changes in design concepts (failure, living with failure, resilience)

3. Very large changes in social context (decision making – participatory democracy)

We Face☺


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1. With some careful thought

2. Discarding some “Accepted” Values

3. With some innovation

But…

We can move forward


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Moving forward with (Coastal) Practice and Education

J. W. Kamphuis

Queen’s University

Kingston, ON, Canada

K7L 3N6

[email protected]

CSCE Meeting St John’s, May 2009

Companion Paper


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1. The System

2. Contemporary Decision Making

3. Failure

4. Resilience

5. Introducing Resilience

6. Moving Forward7. Addenda are not presented; the complete

presentation will be on www.civil.queensu.ca

Outline of this Presentation

NEW ! ?


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1. The System

(Details in Addendum 1)

(As we should design it)


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Hi-Ya !


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Loading - Water Levels, Waves

Resistance - Structures + Environment (PES)

Base of Support - Governments, Economy, Stakeholders (SES)

The System

PES – Physico-Environmental SubsystemSES – Socio-Economic Subsystem


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The system = PES + SESNot just any combination of PES and

SES; SES must form the Base of Support for the PES

The System

SES

PES+

SES

PES



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2. ContemporaryDecision Making


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Contemporary Decision Making

• Contemporary: Based on Democratic Principles; relevant to countries with democratic governance, e.g. Canada, US, EU. There are still many jurisdictions with different (often simpler) rules and processes, based on their particular cultures.

•Decision Making: Can refer to projects that are basically non-engineering (e.g. studies, policy formulation, ICM strategies) or to engineering projects, involving design of works. Emphasis in this presentation will be on the more difficult and controversial engineering design projects.


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Early Decision Making

Project Formulation

Coastal Engineers

Decision Makers

Project Design

Coastal Issue

Coastal Scientists

Implementation

(Used Ad hoc)

All early projects were essentially design projects


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Coastal Issue

Judgment

Modelling (uncertainties)

Alternatives

Theoretical and Empirical

Relationships

Solution

ProblemFormulation

Physics

Chemistry

Biology

Geology

Coastal Scientists

OthersApprovals

Socio-EconomicInput from

Stakeholders

Coastal Project Management

Decision Makers Coastal Engineers

Implementation

Monitoring

Interest Groups

Governments

Law

Government

Non-Gov’t Orgs

Citizens

Regulation

Public Input

Knowledge

?????


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Resilience

DefinitionsRequirementsOpportunities

SystemDesign

PES Design

Resilient System

Concepts

Decision Makers (often Government)

Resilient System

Knowledge

-Pre-Design

SES

Public Government Stakeholders

Communication

Design


Decision

Engineering Projects

Difficult

Timeline


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ProjectCompletion

Resilient System

Decision Makers (often Government)

Resilient System

-

SES

Public Government Stakeholders

Communication


Still Difficult

ProjectDevelopment

ProjectInitiation

Decision

Timeline

Policy Formulation, ICM, etc.


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1. Coastal Project Management is central to success of a project

2. Communication skills are vital.3. Coastal Engineers are not well trained in

communication and usually not very much involved in social issues; therefore they are not properly prepared to take on the whole CPM portfolio.

4. Coastal Managers also are not trained to manage the whole CPM portfolio, particularly technical aspects.

5. So ??? Let’s get this right !

Notes on Coastal Project Management (CPM)



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3. Failure


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Here is What Happen

Failure

???

Failure

can,does,may be predicted to


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What to Do ?

Increase the Strength of the PES (Structures)

(Mitigation)

Typical Engineering

Solution

Loading

Resistance (PES)

Base of Support (SES)

Failure


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What Else ?

Rethink “Failure”Live with Failure. This means building

Resilience into the System (PES + SES) (Adaptation)

Loading

Resistance (PES)


Failure


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We have traditionally defined failure in a narrow probabilistic sense by the limit state equation (as for the structures). When the loading exceeds the structural

resistance (strength) we have Failure Design Criterion: Probability of Failure

(PF) as low as possible

Rethinking FailureFailure


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Rethinking Failure

New Definitions:

•R≤S is not Failure

•Call R≤S “PES Failure”

•(Real) Failure is when SES cannot bear the consequences (damage, $, deaths, etc)

Designing for real failure involves the concept of “Living with (PES) Failure”

Failure


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Involves ResilienceSimple definition: What is the potential of the

system (PES + SES) for recovery from damage after PES Failure?

In practical context resilience is difficult to define. It is regularly defined incorrectly

More in Section 4 “Resilience”

Living with PES FailureFailure


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Along with probability of failure PF , we must now consider the consequence of PES failure

This has introduced a new design criterion: Minimum Risk.

Definition: R = ∑ PF * C

• R = Risk, • C= Consequence of PES Failure

Failure

Risk


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The methodology of designing for minimum risk for a system (consisting of PES + SES), was simply and without much thought transferred from structural design.

It is useful for design of structures where PF and C refer to the same (limited scope) structures.

Risk

Caveats on Risk


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But there are Problems using Risk as a design criterion for a complete system (PES+SES) ; for example:

1. How do you combine $ damage with lives lost?

2. PF is by design; C is mostly by historical evolution e.g. development and population growth in urban areas, often in flood prone areas.

Risk Caveats


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3. PF concerns individuals for whom the consequence of a PES failure is fairly fixed - they want lowest PF; C (and R) concerns the collective (governments, communities). They want the minimum total cost. These are opposing expectations

Risk Caveats


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Caveats on PF

1. PF is a statistical quantity that must be based on an appropriate data base.

2. There is no data base for direct hits by large cyclones and tsunamis at a location.

3. Basing PF for major disasters (but also for

regular designable projects) on 100 years of (quiet) records is wrong – the wrong data base

Resilience

We assume we know all about PF, but do we?


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More caveats on PF

4. Basing PF for major disasters on a synthesized

data base can be dangerous with inappropriate and largely unverified data.

5. Using an inappropriate PF makes any design or

risk analysis meaningless.

6. What is PF for “non-standard” design projects, such as nature reserves, designs involving impact of projects on fauna, etc?

Resilience


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Since the collective (community, government) normally ends up paying for the protection and any disasters, it expects to be able to minimize its

TOTAL COST = (PES + R)The following points stand out.

Minimum Total Cost (Details of minimum total cost calculations are

found in Addendum 2)


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When risk (consequence of PES failure) is high (e.g. urban areas), the minimum total cost solution yields a low value of PF.

When risk is small (e.g. rural areas), the minimum total cost solution yields a higher value of PF

For mixed urban/rural areas, minizing the cost of PES failure unfortunately implies lower design values of PF for urban areas and higher values of PF for rural areas.

This results in very difficult stakeholder meetings, long discussions about resilience, compensation, etc. – why should one group suffer more ?

Minimum Total Cost


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4. Resilience


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Resilience

Hot Topic Indian Ocean Tsunami, New Orleans,

Bangladesh and Burma Cyclones

Simple Definition*: Potential (of the system) to recover from damage

Opposite of fragility: little or no recovery

* Diamond (2005)


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Why Sudden Interest?

Traditionally components of coastal systems have been designed for “suitably low PF”

But PF is often based on dubious or inappropriate statistics

Low PF may not be affordableThus, as recent disasters show, failure, even

for low design PF, does happen.

Resilience


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There are other major concerns: “Secondary” Processes (“negligible”

processes such as climate change, sea level rise, subsidence, “low probability” tsunami and storm surge)

Infrastructure Concerns Rampant and Unsafe Development More detail in Addendum 3

Resilience

Other Concerns re Resilience


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5. Introducing Resilience


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There are Three Stages of resilience design Stage 1: Design of a resilient PES Stage 2: Design of resilient government

interface (explained below) Stage 3: Design of a resilient Base of

Support (SES)

Introducing Resilience


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Difficulty

Stage 1 << Stage 2 << Stage 3Usually the only stage considered

Usually not considered – thought to be too difficult



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Stage 1: Resilient PES

Loading

Resistance (PES)


Resilience, like Rubber



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Translation

Structure does not collapse and can be repairedEcosystem recovers from impacts

Usually the discussion on resilience stops here; resilience is mostly thought of as a technical problem !



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Stage 1: Design of Resilient PES

Traditionally in design of structures the Benefit/Cost Ratio (BCR) was maximized

This criterion is no longer valid, since environmental impacts (EI) must be minimized

Instead of designing structures we must now design PES (structures + impacts)

Stage 1


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In the design of (PES), BCR and EI are equally important Unfavorable BCR is rejected by the client Unfavorable EI is rejected by the

regulators, the public and stakeholders.

Design of PESStage 1


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Designing a PES instead of just structures is a paradigm shift in design philosophy.

Incorporating Resilience in the PES is: A second, necessary shift in design

philosophy Results in more costly structures Carries large additional socio-economic

costs

Design of PESStage 1


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Example:

Resilient PES for New Orleans(Presented in Addendum 4)


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But We Can Do (Much) Better

Introduce resilience throughout the complete system (PES + SES)

Within the SES, we must consider Governments - their powers and provisions – separately from the individuals and the public: Governments are collective; the public

consists of individuals Governments have a different focus from

the rest of BOS (e.g. minimum total cost vs low PF).



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We will think of Government and its services as an interface between the PES and the (rest of) the SES



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Stage 2: Resilient Government Interface

Government Provisions


Loading

Resistance (PES)


Resilience, e.g. Rubber


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Translation

Resilient Government Provisions (they keep going or recover quickly) Research and Development Advance Warning Systems Laws, Regulations, Zoning and Permitting Communication, Transportation Networks Utilities (electricity, water, sewage, garbage

collection) Rescue, Evacuation and Emergency Provisions



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Stage 3: Resilient BOS

Loading

Resistance (Structure)

Resilient BOS, e.g. Rubber



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Translation

All Stakeholders Have been consulted and involved from the

beginning of the project Understand the project, benefits and impacts Are comfortable with designs and decisions Are aware of risks involved (before design is

completed) All stakeholders are in agreement



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Well… (Perhaps more likely)


We have done our best to inform and discuss with all stakeholders and have been partially successful to obtain agreement. But we can justify our positions in any meetings of stakeholders, regulating bodies and the courts.


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Note on Innate Resilience of the BOS

No-one wants to die or loose everything in a disaster

Most people will attempt anything to improve their dire situation (and hopefully to help others)

Afterward, people want get on with life ASAPIn resilience design, we must fully

incorporate any innate resilience


(Very important but hardly considered)


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Two Examples of the Innate Resilience of the BOS

Red River flood of 1997 (Manitoba) Gov’t officials + farmers + volunteers + army +

contractors, were all resilient

Hurricane Charley, 2004 Peace River Quilters’ Guild of Punta Gorda, FL



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100

km

1997

Red River

Typical Rural/Urban mix

Minimum total Cost means:

Winnipeg: high risk, therefore low PF

Valley: lower risk, therefore higher PF

Tiresome in 2009 !!


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Red River

Thanks to J. Doering


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Reflecting on THE flood

Emerson

Rosenort

Grande Pointe

Ste. Agathe



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Z dyke

34 km extension of west dyke

Roughed out in 3 days

Completed in 6 days

Cost: ~7M$

Excavated: 825,000 m3.

381 pieces of equipment

Red River



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“Tropical Beauty”

Peace River Quilters Guild’s Response to Hurricane Charley

Shown with thanks to the Peace River Quilters Guild


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6. Moving Forward

With coastal design and management


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1. Learn to make decisions within a cumbersome, complex contemporary decision-making process

Work the process. Improve Coastal Project Management

train coastal engineers to be able to communicate and facilitate discussions; and get them involved in political and social issues

train coastal managers to be able to manage and co-ordinate the whole CM portfolio (including technical aspects)

Moving Forward


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2. Learn to think in terms of (and design) complete coastal systems, consisting of a PES supported by SES.

3. Learn to define and use PF properly

4. If the system can be designed with a “suitably low PF”, agreement and approvals will be easier since all parties are satisfied with this solution. Learn to design and examine this alternative carefully (mitigation).

Moving Forward


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5. PES Failure (exceedence of the design conditions) happens, because often we cannot build to a “suitably low PF” or we do not have a data base to define PF properly; Learn to incorporate PES Failure in design (adaptation)

6. Adaptation means learning to design Resilience into the System.

Moving Forward


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7. Resilience design involves conflicting expectations, for example:

Individuals want low PF while the Collective wants minimum total cost.

Minimum cost involves higher PF in rural areasLearn how to deal with the implications

8. Resilience Design also involves fully incorporating SES and its innate resilience.

9. Learn to incorporate and evaluate consequences of PES failure and re-examine the concepts of Risk and Minimum Cost.

Moving Forward


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Design resilient Physico-Environmental Subsystems (PES)

Facilitate the matching of the resilient PES with the Socio-Economic Subsystem (SES) within the complete system

10. Resilience design is like a coin made up of two (very different) sides. Learn how to:

Moving Forward


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Thank You

This Presentation is posted on:

www.civil.queensu.ca


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Addendum 1

The System


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The SystemEvery design involves a systemEven a small coastal protection project

involves a physical construction that impacts physical processes such as erosion/accretion; biological processes such as fish migration; environmental issues such as water quality socio-economic considerations such as local development (parks, houses, hotels)

Addendum 1 - The System


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Traditionally we designed structures Maximum Benefit/Cost Ratio (BCR) This paradigm is no longer valid, since

environmental impacts (EI) must be minimized

Instead of designing structures we must now design Physico-Environmental Systems (PES)

Structures + impacts



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In the design of (PES), BCR and EI are equally important Unfavorable BCR is rejected by the client Unfavorable EI is rejected by the

regulators and the public.Designing a PES instead of just structures is

a paradigm shift in design philosophy.



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The system we must design = PES + SESNot just any combination of PES and

SES; SES must form the Base of Support for the PES

SES

PES

SES

PES




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Resistance (PES) - Structures + Environment

Base of Support (SES) - (Governments, Economy, Stakeholders)



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In modern design, it is not possible to consider design of structures, etc. without including the environmental impacts in the design. This combination of structures and their environment, which essentially go hand-in-hand we will call the Physico-Environmental Subsystem (PES).



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System = Physico-Environmental Subsystem (PES) + Socio-Economic Subsystem (SES)

PES = Structures + Environment (Impact)SES = Public + Government + Economy

SES (mainly permitting)

PES

Small system

SES

PES

Large system

SES (government provisions - transportation, health care, research, permitting, etc. - plus stakeholders and the economy)



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System Representation



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The system is not just any combination of PES and SES, but SES must form the Base of Support for the PES

SES

PES

SES

PES



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Resistance (PES) - Structures + Environment

Base of Support (SES) - (Governments, Economy, Stakeholders)



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Addendum 2

Calculation of Minimum Total Cost


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Since the collective (community, government) normally ends up paying for the protection and any disasters, it expects to be able to minimize its

TOTAL COST = (PES + R)

Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost

Minimum Total Cost (Details of minimum total cost calculations are

found in Addendum 2)


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Minimum Total Cost

PF

$, €

PES

Risk

Minimum

TotalCost



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Minimum Total Cost (Exponential)

Log PF

Log $, €

Risk ~ 1011 ∙ PF

Minimum

PF=2x10-3

TotalCost

10-5 100

1010

10-110-3

107

10-4

106

10-2

108

109

1011

PES ~ 106 ∙ PF-0.8



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This solution results in PF ≈ 2x10-3 at minimum total cost

This PF may be higher than individuals are prepared to accept and will lead to difficult stakeholder negotiations in the decision making process

If the cost of Consequences (or Risk) is very high, it is possible that the marginal cost of providing greater protection is small (relative to Risk)

Minimum Total Cost



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Log PF

Log $, €

Minimum

PF=4x10-5

TotalCost

10-5 100

1010

10-110-3

107

10-4

106

10-2

108

109

1011

Risk ~ PF 5

PES ~ 106 ∙ PF -0.8



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Log PF

Log $, €

Minimum

PF=4x10-5

TotalCost

10-5 100

1010

10-110-3

107

10-4

106

10-2

108

109

1011

PES ~ 106 ∙ PF-0.8

Risk ~ 1000 (1011 ∙ PF



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These figures point to the easy route through the contemporary decision making process for high risk areas.

Minimum cost results in a low PF ≈ 4x10-5.

This is the traditional engineering solution - “failure” must be prevented at all cost !

This solution satisfies everyone Individuals like the high PF The collective likes the low cost



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We actually discussed two typical regions The solution with the relatively low cost

consequences is representative of rural areas; the resulting PF is higher

The solution with the relatively high cost consequences is representative of urban areas; the resulting PF is lower.

Consider one (the commonest type of PES failure – Flooding. For minimum total flood management cost, the cost for all elements in the flood plain must be summed.



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To minimize total Flood Management cost of a mixed area, PF has to vary from high in rural areas to low in urban areas, i.e, flood agricultural land to increase the safety of urban areas.

This results in very difficult stakeholder meetings, long discussions of resilience, compensation, etc.



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Note with respect to flood management: High PF in rural areas decreases the urban

PF even more if the rural areas are upstream of the urban areas in a drainage basin!

Politically Correct Decision - Everyone same PF - results in: Raising urban PF, which makes both the urban

individuals and the collective unhappy. Lowering rural PF, which makes the collective

unhappy. Bad decision!



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Addendum 3

Other Concerns about Resilience


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There are other major concerns: “Secondary Processes” Infrastructure Concerns Rampant and Unsafe Development

Addendum 3 – Other Concerns


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There are other major concerns: “Secondary” Processes (“negligible”

processes such as climate change, sea level rise, subsidence, “low probability” tsunami and storm surge)

Infrastructure Concerns Rampant and Unsafe Development More detail in Addendum 3

Resilience

Other Concerns re Resilience


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“Secondary” Processes

They cause p(f) ↑ with time, e.g. p(f)=10-4→10-2

To return to e.g p(f)=10-4 is very costlySince upgrading and maintenance have been

delayed, many systems are now vulnerable



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Infrastructure Concerns

Much coastal infrastructure has been designed and built over the last 50 years and approaches the end of its useful life.

Much infrastructure was poorly designed and built.

Much infrastructure was built to nebulous and often unrelated standards.



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Rampant and Unsafe Development

In “developing” countries: Overcrowding pushes the people toward relatively

empty shores (often emptied by recent disasters and therefore vulnerable by definition).

Economic migration from the countryside to overcrowded cities, often located along rivers and estuaries and expanding into flood prone areas.

There is an economic push to develop tourism facilities close to the shores.



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Rampant and Unsafe DevelopmentIn “developed” countries:

Push by developers - the more area they develop, the more money they earn.

Much of this real estate expansion has taken place in “empty”, but flood-prone areas (e.g. filled-in wetlands), often in cooperation with government agencies who need the money from• Cost sharing to build flood protection works, • Increased income from property taxes.



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Rampant and Unsafe Development

In “developed” countries (2): Much of this real estate development has

taken place in the attractive and often overcrowded shore zone, leaving many expensive properties exposed to destruction by high water levels and wave action.



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Addendum 4

Design Example:Resilient PES for

New Orleans


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From IPET (2006)

Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans


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Den Haag

Arnhem


From IPET (2006)


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From IPET (2006)



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Problem 1: The design of a resilient PBS for New Orleans can not be done in some theoretical vacuum.

New Orleans is a living city. The world did not stop moving for its citizens.

Citizens are understandably impatient with the progress made since the disaster. They need shelter, housing, clean water

immediately. They want to move back in quickly. They need aid and relief ASAP and government

agencies are perceived to be too slow. They want all government agencies to cooperate

and provide for them.



104

Problem 2: “Hope springs eternal” – San Francisco, Vancouver, Bangladesh, New Orleans, Netherlands

Property owners want to renovate, rebuild immediately in the same vulnerable location

As a result, many building permits have been issued quickly, which leaves little opportunity for proper planning, new layouts, new zoning, etc.

Many (often stop-gap) measures were initiated soon after the disaster to rebuild existing protection leaving little opportunity for new design.

Planning and design after such a disaster aims at a moving target.



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Option 1: Reconstruct PES properlyMake all the necessary corrections and

improvements in design and construction with benefit of hindsight

This would be a gigantic projectIt would be very costlyIt would still result in a brittle or rigid (non-

resilient) system



106

Option 2: Resilient New Orleans PES would require all of the above, plus the following: Large mass earthen dikes instead of the vertical

walls Secondary dikes to subdivide flood-prone areas

into smaller sub-basins Networks of interconnected drainage channels

with sufficient pumping capacity to evacuate hurricane rainfall. Pumps should continue to function under all hurricane conditions.



107

Direct cost of such a resilient system would be much greater than simple reconstruction.

But, there is also a large socio-economic cost to provision of this resilience, for example: Design and construction will take much longer Large footprints of the larger and more

numerous structures will seriously reduce available real estate area.

Systems of dikes and channels will severely impact the city’s communication/transportation systems



108

Yet, all this only refers to the costs of Stage 1 - constructing a resilient PBS.

Appropriate Stage 1 design of PES will take a long time to plan, design and carry out

The citizens don’t have that time.Yet Stage 1 is the only sensible alternative to

haphazard reconstruction of ineffective protection in this vulnerable location.



109

Option 3: Much additional resilience can be gained through contributions from the Socio-Economic System (SES), e.g: Resilient government provisions such as

research, zoning laws, emergency evacuation, health care, social assistance (Stage 2)

Citizens’ awareness and involvement (Stage 3) Agreements on Flood Management Practice on

the lower Mississippi River. (Stage 3)These Stages 2 and 3 will take even much

longer

SES DesignStages 2 and 3


110

Addendum 5

Design Example:Red River Flood 1997

Material from Prof J. Doering, U. Manitoba ☺!


111

100

km

1997

Red River

Typical Rural/Urban mix

Minimum total Cost means:

Winnipeg: high risk, therefore low PF

Valley: lower risk, therefore higher PF


112

Red River Floods

1852 – 165,000 cfs 1826 – 225,000 cfs = 6400 m3 /s

1997 – 162,500 cfs = 4600 m3 /s 1861 – 125,000 cfs

1979 – 106,000 cfs

1950 – 104,000 cfs = 3000 m3

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

1800 1850 1900 1950 2000

Flow

(cfs

)

Source: Manitoba Water Resources Branch

1826

19501861

1852 1997

1979

2x Rhine


113

1826 – Flooded the Red River Settlement 1950 - Winnipeg flooded 1966, 1979, 1997 – Winnipeg in danger 1950 Flood:

Q= 3000 m3/s 100,000 evacuate, Hospitals evacuate 10,000 homes flooded City Centre submerged 700M$ damage (p.v.)

Red River


114

Winnipeg, 1950

Red River


115

Winnipeg, 1950

Red River


116

Winnipeg, 1950

Red River


117

Primary Dykes

Response: Strengthen the structures Primary diking system was constructed

in 1950 by Greater Winnipeg Diking Board

Built to: 15 m width raise to 1950 level + 0.6 m two traffic lanes on dry side

Capacity: ~ 2300 m3/s (= ½ of 1997 flood discharge)

Length: ~ 111 km 31 pumping stations built Cost: 4.6M$


118

Subsequent Investigations

Two Investigations Red River Basin Investigation

• 1952 to 1956 Royal Commission on Floods

• 1956 to 1958

• recommendations:– Winnipeg Floodway

– Portage Diversion

– Shellmouth Reservoir


119

WinnipegBrandon

PortageDiversion Winnipeg

Floodway

Assiniboine R.

Red

R.

ShellmouthReservoir

The Infrastructure

Recommendations

Winnipeg FloodwayPortage DiversionShellmouth Res.


120

Floodway: Cost: 63.2 M$ (1960’s) • 9 m deep • 200 – 300 m wide • 47 km long • Started: Oct ‘62 / Completed: March ‘68 • Excavation: 100,000,000 m3

- 40% of Panama Canal excavation - more than Suez Canal - required most of Manitoba’s equipment

Red River


121

Floodway: 2400 m3/s is practical capacity of floodway 1997 Flood (1900 m3/s in floodway) 2300?

Red River


122

1997


123

6,608,000 sandbags 24/7 cartage of clay for secondary dykes

(360,000 m3) 8,500 armed forces personnel Built 34 km west dyke extension (72 hrs) “countless” volunteers Resilient Population: people + equipment

The 1997 FloodRed River


124

Red River


125

Red River


126

Z dyke

34 km extension of west dyke

Roughed out in 3 days

Completed in 6 days

Cost: ~7M$

Excavated: 825,000 m3.

381 pieces of equipment

Red River


127

Ring Dykes

Post 1966 Flood

Ring Dykes: Cost: 2.7M$ Completed: 1972

EmersonLetellierSt. JeanMorris

Brunkild

Dominion City

Rosenort

Ste. Adolphe

Post 1997 Flood

Ring Dykes: Lowe Farm (☻) Rosenfeld (☻) Gretna (☻) Riverside (☻) Ste Agathe (i.p.) Grande Pte (i.p.) Niverville (x) Aubigny (x)


128

The area experienced a flood of 7.5 m in 1997; 28,000 people were evacuated and there was $500 Million in damage to property and infrastructure, even with the flood protection measures

Environmental implications were: Water Quality of the Red Sea and Lake Winnipeg Chemicals were released in the floodplain Wells and groundwater were contaminated

The 1997 FloodRed River


129

Reflecting on THE flood

Emerson

Rosenort

Grande Pointe

Ste. Agathe


130

Winnipeg, 1950

Red River


131

The Options after 1997

Source: KGS Group, Nov. 2001

1. Expand the Floodway


132

The Options


Open except when flow exceeds floodway capacity

Otherwise it is passive (no influence on water levels)

2. Ste. Agathe

Detention Structure


133

The Options (Summary)

OptionsLimit to Level of

Protection

P.V. of Cost

[M$]

No. 1 expand floodway raise west dyke raise primary dykesupgrade city flood protection infrastructure

1 in 250 yrs.

(natural)

1 in 700 yrs.

(emergency)

658

No. 2 Ste. Agathe detention structure upgrade city flood protection infrastructure

1 in 1,000 yrs.

543



134

The best choice is clearly the second option - the Ste Agathe structure because:

Most economical Safest Provides most resilience Minimises Risk (not flooding Winnipeg).

Ideally, parts of both schemes should be implemented for maximum resilience (through (redundance) and least impact upstream.

The economics for this look very good: the total cost of $ 1.2 B for the combination vs the social and economic disruption of flooding Winnipeg (provincial capital – 700,000)

The ChoiceRed River


135

The Choice

Yet, Floodway Expansion was Preferred

No legal agreements required (no delays!) No Environmental assessments required Incremental benefits for incremental work Visibility (used 2 out of 3 years vs. 1 in 90 yrs) Could be expanded in the future No upstream flooding This choice obviously made to circumvent a

lengthy decision making/approvals process


136

After the 1997 Flood, there was time to do proper pre-engineering and engineering design.

With early involvement of all (particularly rural) stakeholders, starting immediately after the flood, with excellent communication, the combination solution (Ste Agathe dam + Floodway could have been achieved.

Missed OpportunityRed River

Documents

June 2009Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 1 Moving Forward with (Coastal) Design and Management J. W. Kamphuis Queen’s University Kingston, ON, Canada