Justificatory Liberalism - An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory - Gerald F. Gaus
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O X F O R D P O L I T I C A L T H E O R Y
Series Editors: David Miller and Alan Ryan
J U S T I F I C A T O R Y L I B E R A L I S M
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O X F O R D P O L I T I C A L T H E O R Y
Oxford Pol i t ica l
T h eo r y
presents
the
best
poli t ical
theory. It is i n te nde d to be
broad in scope, inclu din g or iginal
contr ibut ions to poli t ical philosophy,
and also work in applied poli t ical
theory. T he series will con tain works o f ou ts tand ing qu ali
ty with n o
restriction
or
O T H E R
T I T L E S I N T H I S S E R I E S
Justice
Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority
Rights
W i ll Ky m l i c ka
Real Freedom for All: What
(i f
anything) Can
Anne Phil l ips
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A n E s s a y o n E p i s t e r n o l o g
y
and
Theory
J U S T I F I C A T O R Y
L I B E R A L I S M
G E R A L D F .
G A U S
N ew Y o rk O x f o rd
OXFORD U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S
1996
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OXFORD
U N I VE R S I T Y P R E SS
O x f o r d N ew Y o r k
A t h e n s A u c k l a n d B a n g k o k B o m b a y
Calcu t ta Cape
S a laam D elh i
Florence Hong K ong I s tanbu l K ar achi
Kuala L u m p u r M a d ra s M a d ri d M e lb o u rn e
M e x ic o Ci ty N a i r o b i Paris
Singapore
Taipei T o k y o
Toronto
and
Berl in I b a d a n
C o p y r ig h t © 1996 b y Oxford Universi
ty Press, Inc.
Published b y Oxford Univers i ty Press , Inc. ,
1 98
M a d is o n A v e n u e ,
N ew
N ew
York 10016
O xf or d is a regis tered t rademark of O
xf or d U ni v er s i ty P r es s
Cov er a r t : © 1995 T .H. B enton a n d
R .P. B enton Tes tam entary Trus ts /Licensed b y V A
G A , N ew Y o r k , N Y
A ll rights reserved.
this publicat ion
m ay be
r epr oduced ,
stored in a retrieval sys tem, or t ransmit ted, in any
form or by any means ,
electronic , mechanical , pho tocopyi ng ,
recording, o r otherwise,
w i thou t th e p r i o r permission
of Oxford Univers i ty Press .
L i b r a r y
of
Gaus , Gerald
F .
J us t i f i c a t o r y
liberalism : a n essay o n epis
temology
and political theory
Includes bibl iographical references and index.
ISB N 0-19-509439-5 (cloth)
ISBN 0-19-509440-9 (paper)
1 . L iberal ism. 2 . Social contract . 3 . Jus t i f icaton
(Theory of knowledge)
I .
title.
II .
Series.
320.5 '13—dc20 94-49138
Printed in the
States of
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This
book completes , but in do ing
so extends , the p ro jec t begun in
Value and Justification. In
t h a t
people conceive
o f
u n d e r -
s tand ourselves and others as capable of pu t t in g aside
personal va luing s ,
and o f ac t ing on norms tha t can be
just if ied
of this conception,
I
a r g u ed , w o u l d u n d er m in e
o u r
u n d er s t a n d in g s
o f
life,
l eaving u s wi thou t ra t iona l g
rounding
for
are,
I
we are
to the
just if ied
mora l i ty .
In the last chapters of Value and Justification I
sketched som e of the
main elements of publ ic ly
just if ied
m oral i ty , foc using on a r ight to p er-
sonal f reedom
the
At the
t im e
I recognized that these were va gu e requ irem ents;
I assumed tha t fu r ther
work w ould yield m ore specif ic pol i t ical pr inciples, a
jus t i f ica t ion of
cer ta in pol i t ical ins t i tu t ions , and, indeed,
policy
o f a
p u b l i c m o r a l i t y
has
great
o f
w as
w as
no t ,
as I
orig inal ly envisaged, more detai led publ ic jus t
i-
f ica t ions—the arguments fo r which were manifes t ly inconc lus
ive—but
an an alysis of how pol it ical in s t i tu t io ns cope w ith this
inconclusiveness.
T he conception of pol i t ical ins t i tu t
ions as simply expressing or con-
f o r m in g
to
way to a
more complex idea ,
that pol i t ical ins t i tu t ions n o t only express
what can b e moral ly jus t i-
f ied,
b u t
a lso respond to our pervasive inabil ity
to provide decisive
jus t i f icat ions .
All this ra ises a fundamental puzzle: Each of us is commit ted to
our
polit ical views,
fo r
H o w
a
a re
T o
solve this puz-
z le we need a much more sophis t ica ted accoun t o f
jus t i f ied
belief than
that employed
A t
a m a z i n g
featu res of con tem po rary pol i tical philosophy is the
way in
which i t has taken a " jus t if ica tory tu rn ," yet the w ork of
epis tem olo-
gists
an d c ogn it ive psycho log is ts has been a l l but igno
red. I bel ieve this
is a
ser ious mis take; ep is temolog is t s
an d
cog ni t ive psycho log is t s have
looked hard
a t
these issues
fo r
an d
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sure , l earn ing
f r o m
a lways easy; the ir a rgu -
m e n t s a re r a t h e r m o re t e c h n i c a
l an d f o r m a l than is typ ica
l in m o r a l
an d
B u t t he
e f for t ,
pol i t ical
phi losophy tha t i s c leare r abou t what i t m eans by jus t i f
i ca t ion , and so
a v o i d s m a n y
of the
so
m u c h c o n t e m p o r a r y
w ri ting on p o l it ica l jus t i f i ca t ion . P ar t I o f thi
s
book
ep is temology
of
w h a t it is for an i n d i v i d u a l
to possess
jus t i f ied
beliefs . I call this a
theory
o f
personal j u s t i f ic a t i o n . B a s e d
o n
I I
deve lops
a theory o f public j u s t i f i c a t i o n — h
o w m o ra l c l a i m s c a n b e
jus t i f ied
to
others . F inal ly part III ana
lyzes political j u s t i f i c a t i o n — t h
e way pol i t ical
inst i tu t ions cope with
the
just i f icat ions.
As wi th every th ing I wri te , th is book
has been deep ly in f luenced by
m y c lose assoc ia t ion w i th S tan ley B en n; i f I had been
ab le to a rgue
w i t h him a b o u t it, this would have
been a m uch be t te r p iece of
philoso-
phy. My w o r k on jus t i f i ca t
ion was spurred long ago by Fred
D'Agos-
tino; though we disagree about a good deal , I have learned a
lo t
f r om
him
and his work, and I t h a n k him for
it. My phi losophica l conversa-
t io n s w ith J u l ia n L a m e n t — i n M e lb o u r n e , B r
is b a n e , W o l lo n g o n g and
Atlan ta—have been immense ly benef ic ia l . I t i s a lways en l
igh ten ing , and
always a j o y , to ta lk phi losophy
with
J u l i a n . As should be c
lear to
every reader ,
by the
o f
my
thanks
A
b y
L o re n L o m a s k y w h i l e
w e w e re s h o p p i n g at the Super
One s u p e r m a r k e t in D u l u t h ;
I w o u l d
l ike
h im for
of the
o ther
shoppers who w e re a bit perp lexed
by the loud voices over the fish
c o u n t e r .
I
g re a t l y b e n e f i t e d f ro m c o m m e n t s
on
I and II by
J u l i a n
L a m e n t , F r e d D ' A g o s t i n o ,
John
C h ris M o r ris .
I a lso would l ike to t ha n k S t ev e M a c e
d o , J e re m y S h e a rm u r , John
C h a p m a n , E r i c M a c k , D a v id G o w , C a ro ly n M o
r il lo , J o n a t h a n R il ey ,
Steve B u c k l e , Ian Shapiro , Wil l iam
Nelson,
Philip Pettit, S t u a r t W a r -
ner , Danie l Shapiro and Jim Fetzer .
I l earned a g rea t dea l f rom var ious p resen ta t ions o f par
t s o f the
book.
of
life is
tha t
o ne
p resen ta t ions
to "go
wel l ,"
but one
a lot
m o r e
f r om those that "g o bad ly ," i . e . ,
in which ques t ions a re asked fo r
which one has no coheren t answer . In a
few cases it
took
years f o r me
to f o r m u l a t e an a n s w e r . S o
m y t h a n k s to par t i c ipan ts a
t seminars an d
sess ions a t the fo l low ing , e spec ia l ly to those w ho em ba
rrassed m e: the
North A m e r i c a n S o c i e t y f o r S o c i a l P h i l
o s o p h y , t h e I n t e rn a t i o n a l E c o -
n o m i c s
a n d Phi losophy Socie ty , the A m e r i
c a n P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i -
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r x
a t ion , the N ew Zealand D ivis ion o f the A us t ra las ian A
ssoc ia t ion o f
Phi losophy,
T he
M u r p h y I n s ti tu t e
o f
P o l it ic a l E c o n o m y ,
the
phi loso-
p h y d ep a r t m en t s o f t h e Un iv er s i t y o f N ew E n g
l a n d , L a T r o b e Un iv er -
s i ty , the A us t ra l ian N at iona l U nivers ity , the U
nivers i ty o f W ol lon-
gong , and B ow l ing G reen S ta te U nivers i ty , and the po l i
tics and
philosophy d ep a r t m en t s a t Vic t o r ia U n iv er s
it y in W ell in g t o n , M o n a s h
U nivers ity , and , o f course , the U nivers ity o f M inneso ta
, D u lu th .
A
of the
of
appeared
as
" P u b l i c J u s t i f i c a t io n
a nd
D e m o c r a t i c A d j u d i c a t i o n "
in Constitutional
Political Economy (Fa l l 1991). A pre l im inary st a
tem ent o f the a rg um en t
of sect ions
12 and 16
as
L a w "
in Ian Shapiro (ed.), Nomos XXXVI: The Rule of Law (New York
Universi ty Press , 1994). Some materia l
f rom
section 9.1, on the idea of
the reasonable, appears in "The Rat iona l
, the Rea s o n a b l e , an d J u s t i f
i -
c a t io n , "
The Journal o f Poli t ical
Philosophy
(1995) .
In i t ia l work o n this book w as u
n d er t a k en w h i le I was a Visit ing Fel-
low in Philosophy and Pol i t ics a t the Univers i ty of New
England, in
Ar m id a l e , N ew South Wales . I w o u
l d l ike to express m y appreciat
ion
to the
E n g l a n d
for i ts financial support an d
hospi-
m y
par t s
d u r in g
m y
as a
a t
B ow l ing G reen S ta te U nivers ity .
I am
deeply appre-
ciative
o f the suppor t p rovided by the Cen ter ; I am par t icu
la r ly
grateful
to Fred M i ll er, Ko ry Swanson an d S t e rl
in g B u r n e t t . M y thanks a lso to
the
for its
generosi ty
in
g r a n t in g a c a d em ic
leaves and f inancial
I would
m y a p -
prec ia t ion to Alan Ryan and Oxford Univers i ty Press fo r thei
r ear ly
suppor t o f the p ro jec t .
Duluth, Minn. G. F. G.
March
1995
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C O N T E N T S
A B B R E V I A T I O N S x v
1 .
INTRODUCTORY:
E P I S T E M O L O G Y
A N D
1.1 . Ju st i f ica tory L iberalism 3
1 .2 . M ora l E p istemology 5
1.3. Pu bl ic and Personal Ju st i f ica t ion 10
1.4. Plan
of the
I — P E R S O N A L
J U S T I F I C A T I O N
2. B E L I E V I N G
F O R
1 7
2.1 . G iving, H aving, and B el ieving for R easons 17
2.2. Reasons as Causes of
Beliefs
19
2 .3 . Sus ta in ing C auses and Jus t i f i ed Belief
23
2 .4 .
2 5
Reasons
28
3 . THE I N T E R N A L AND E X T E R N A
L
P E R S P E C T I V E S 30
3.1. Open and Closed Jus t i f i ca t ion
30
3.2. E xternal is t Ju st i f ica t ion s 32
3.3 . B e lie f C om m itments and Tac i t
Beliefs
35
3.4. R ela t ivism of R easons 38
3.5. R ela t ivism and B el ief Systems 42
4 . TAMING R E L A T I V I S M 4 5
4.1.
to
45
4 .2 . N a t u ra l M e n t a l Lo g i c 4 7
4.3. M utu al In tel l igibi l i ty and the L imits of P lura l ism
48
4.4. St ich 's Object ion to the B r id g e h ea
d 52
4.5. Infe rent ia l E rrors 54
4.6 . A re the Sub jec ts R ea lly W ron g? 59
5 . I N F E R E N T I A L JUSTIFICATION 6 3
5.1 .
T he
A r g u m e n t T h u s
F a r 6 3
5 . 2 . F o u r A x i o m s o f
In fe ren t ia l
Ju s t i f i c a t i o n 6 4
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6.2. Global Coherentism 76
7.1. Coherence Theories
an d Sel f- Just i f ied Be l ie fs
85
7.2 .
Equilibrium
101
I I — P U B L I C
J U S T I F I C A T I O N
8. P R I V A T E , S O C I A L , A N D
P U B L I C
R E A S O N E R S 1 1 3
8.1. Private Reasoners
8.4. Moral Demands and Moral Authority 123
8.5. Public Reason and Moral Demands 129
9 .
WHAT
9.2.
Openly
10 .3 .
a s D e f e a t e d
Proposals
10 .4 .
T he Public a n d P r i v a t e 1
71
10.5.
R e f lcx iv i ty Requirement
Is
Misguided
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T w o
U n acce p tab le R e sp o n s es
to
P A R T
I I I — P O L I T I C A L
J U S T I F I C A T I O N
1 2 . THE RUL E OF LAW 195
12.1. T hree A spects
of the
of Law 196
12.2 . The In ternal M oral ity o f Law 197
12.3. R ights 199
and
21 3
L A W - M A K I N G
INSTITUTIONS
215
13.1 . L aw -M aking Ins t i tu t ions
21 5
and
R a n d o m D e m o c r a c y
223
13.5. D eliberative Proc edures
230
1 4 .
14.1.
of the
C onsequent ia l is t Jus t i f ica t ion
of
246
14.2.
The Pr incip le o f E qu al i ty and Po l i tica l E qu al i
ty 248
14.3.
On
2 5 8
15.1. T he C hallenge from Social C hoice T heory 258
15.2.
26 0
15.3. Poli t ics , Self- interest , and A dju dic atio n 263
15.4. V ote T rading 26 7
15.5 . A dju dica t ion versus M ediat ion 271
1 6 .
as
275
16 .2 . J u d ic ia l R e v iew 279
16.3. The
M o r a l O b l ig a t io n
to
286
16 .4 . R e v o l u t i o n
an d
U t o p i a n A s p i r a t i o n s
2 88
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A N D I T S RIVALS 2 9 2
APPENDIX: LIBE RAL PRINCIPLES IN A
WORLD OF STATES 296
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A B B R E V I A T I O N S
The
Exclusive disjunction ("or,
jus t i f i c a t ion
E q u i v a l e n c e
Not
equivalent
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J U S T I F I C A T O R Y
L I B E R A L I S M
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C H A P T E R 1
I n t r o d u c t o r y : Epistemology a n d
Polit ical
1 .1 Jus t i f i ca to ry
Liberalism
b e
called a justificatory conception of liberalism. On this
view, to
quote Stephen Macedo, "[t]he moral lodestar
of liberalism is ... the
project of public justification."
"are committed
to a
woman,"
of the
social world should either be acceptable or be capable
of being made
acceptable to every last individual."
2
person
as an end is to insist that coer-
cive or political principles be just as jus
t i f iable to that person as they
are to us.
Given the actual disagreement in our Western societies over
liberal
ideals, it is manifest that
jus t i f i ca tor y
liberalism cannot explicate "pub-
positions,
justificatory liberalism
to vindicate substantive liberal principles. Justificatory liberals
require
a normative theory o f justification—
a theory that allows them to claim
that some
set of
even given
fac t that
they are contested by some. And this, in turn, appears to call for
a
moral epistemology,
in the
moral belief ,
or at
to
a
conception that puts jus t i f i c a t ion
at
the very core o f political philosophy would
p r o f f e r a n explicit a n d rich
theory
political
j u s t i f i ca t i o n .
Remarkably,
the
adherents
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of
l iberal ism
epis temology,
bu t insist tha t a bs ta in ing f rom presen t ing one is fun da m
en ta l to thei r
posi t ion . John Rawls , for ins tance, maintains that
"reasonable
jus t i f i -
cat ion" is a "pract ical" and not an "epis temological"
problem.
4
are
open to ra t ional d ispute, and so are not
in the requ is i t e sense pub-
licly jus t i f ied.
5
Thus Rawls seeks to avoid an y
complex ep is temolog ica l
claims,
relying instead
o n
c o m m o n s e n s e
notions
abou t reasonab leness
and d isagreement . T he p r o b l e m ,
as R a w ls and others see it, is to
avoid
content ious epis temological issues and focus on the pract ical
pol i t ical
t ask o f secur ing agreement .
6
Consequen t ly , ra ther than " jus t i f ica to ry
l iberal ism," Rawls , Larmore, and o thers describe their view
as
"politi-
cal
l iberal ism."
I believe this to be a f u n d a m e n ta
l error. If pub l ic jus t i f ica t ion is
the
core
of
of
an
liberalism
its
ep is temology .
I shal l argue in part I I that , in
fact ,
not real ly
epis temic commitments; ins tead, they res t their
case
on a v a g u e , bu t nevertheless c lear ly
erroneous, normat ive theory of
jus t i f icat ion .
9
Just if icatory l iberal ism, I maintain , must ar t icula
te i t s
mora l ep is temology ,
and show why i t is to be
p refer red . Some
philoso-
phers bel ieve that this is imp ossible, ins ist ing
that ju s t i f ica t ion and pu b-
lic
jus t i f ica t ion a re "essentially
contested concepts." Ac c o r d in g to F .
B .
D'Agostino,
T o
o f
it is
therefore neces-
sary to sett le qu est ions, a t least to ou r ow n sat isfact ion,
which are them selves
properly poli t ical quest ions.
T he
o f
just i f ica t ion
t her e f o r e c a nno t
be beyond or prior to pol i t ics i tself . I t is not a
meta-poli t ical project , as some
have
itself
a pa r t o f properly pol i ti ca l a
rgum en-
tation.
10
D'Agostino
o f
pub l ic jus t i fica t ion inheren t ly
in -
cline toward
som e pol i t ical prescrip t ions ra ther than o thers . R
aw ls 's
"pragmat ic notion o f
jus t i f ica t ion ,"
he
says,
is
inherent ly ant ipaternal is-
t ic , w hereas mo re "rational is tic" acco unts such as the im
part ia l specta-
to r
W e
the
o f
dif ferent
of
Let us
D'Agostino
that
a
theory
of
p u b l i c jus t i f ica t ion
wil l not be "neutral with respect to the topics and
o u t c o m es o f
a r g u m e n t a t i o n . "
1 1
it
does
n o t
f o l l o w f r o m t h i s
tha t se t t l ing
on a
p a r t i c u l a r c o n c ep t io n
o f
jus t i f ica t ion is to
set t le
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ques t ions tha t
are
a
of
jus t i f ica t ion, we are in
a
posi t ion to ins is t that substant ive pol i t ical views
that cannot be jus t i-
fied
w ithin this con cept ion are prop erly ru led out . T hat ,
for ins tan ce,
the proper theory of publ ic
jus t i f ica t ion
makes it easier to jus t i fy l iberal
than s ta t is t views does n o t show tha t we a
re p r e e m p t i n g "properly"
pol i t ical quest ions; it shows, rather, that
the proper d o m a i n of the po-
litical is
c i r c u m s c r ib ed
by the
o f
pub l ic jus t i f ica t ion . D 'Agos t ino
disagrees
he is
to
show that any one concept ion of pu bl ic jus t i f ica t ion
is superior to the
rest ; consequent ly , the choice of a concept ion must , on his
view, i t sel f
be mot iva ted by po l i t ica l p references .
1 2
Ap p ea l s t o w h a t c a n b e p u b -
licly just if ied t h u s a p p ea r
as
to deify
som e po l it ica l p reference s
an d
thereby short-circuit polit ical discussion.
Such skept ical chal lenges cannot be put to rest
b y avo id ing mora l
ep is temology and re ly ing ins tead on commonsense no t ions o f
just if ica-
tion.
the
skeptic.
F or the ske ptic 's charge is tha t in the end al l theories of ju
st if ic at i on
are manifes ta t ions of merely personal moral and pol i t ical
preferences .
Consequent ly , avoiding detai led defenses conjoined with the c la
im that
everyone agrees with one's ra ther vag ue unde rs tand
ing o f jus t i f ica t ion
plays in to
he
j u s t w h a t
one would c la im when t rying to pass off pol i t ical preferences
as rea-
son.
13
A n d t he skeptic is r igh t abo u
t a t least o n e thing. Polit ical l
iberals
such as R a w l s do rely o n a
theory o f jus t i f ica t ion tha t is far
f rom u n-
controversial . A s
points out , the theory has a s t
rong prag-
m at ic ben t , par t o f w hich is a heavy re liance on norm s o f
com m onsense
reason ing . B u t , as we shall see, there
is overwhelming evidence tha t
such
commonsense methods a re normat ively f l awed . Thus , I
sha l l a r -
gue , n ot
o f
but far
f r o m b e in g u n c o n t en t io u s ,
it is one
be re-
jected .
1 .2 M o ra l E p is te m o l o g y
1.2.1
Robustness
In
path against which pol i t ical l iberals warn:
I
develop
a
theory
bel iefs , inc lud ing
those
m o r a l i t y
a n d
sha l l thus approach some cen t ra l
issues
an d
p o l it ic a l p h i l o s o p h y t h r o u g h ep i s tem
o l o g ic a l in v es -
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contemporary moral and political theory. For most of
this century,
moral philosophers have focused on the meaning of moral language
or
the metaphysics of morals. Questions such
as "What does
'good'
or
'right'
mean?"
and
(or
the staple of metaethics, as
well as much normative ethics.
14
Here I
wish to f o c u s instead on "How do we jus t i
fy our moral judgments,
both to ourselves and others?"
15
This approach, I think, has a crucial fea tu re sought by
political liber-
als, though
2
in
of some competing theory
T
2
'— do not weaken the jus t i f ica t ion of
T
1
Robustness is to be con-
trasted with sensitivity; to the extent that the justification
of T
l
to various metaphysical and epistemological theories, views of the
good
life
and of morality, and so on. That is, Rawls's aim
is to articulate a
set
of
regardless
of
which one may someday be demonstrated true—political liberalism
will
be
and in
this sense
is a
grea t
merit in a political theory; if the
justification o f a political theory
is
highly sensitive to the
justification of metaphysical, epistemological,
and moral theories, and to substantive ideals of the good or the
holy
life,
order.
17
The question is how much robustness can be achieved, and
at
what cost. My central claim in this book is that
justificatory liberalism
cannot achieve
jus t i f ica-
tion;
for good or ill, it
can only be as strong as the
account of jus t i f ica-
tion
on
which
This, however, is consistent with considerable robustness in other
ar-
eas. For
example, most
morality. Following David O. Brink, we can characterize moral
real-
ism
thus:
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M R : (1 )
itself
an
account
jus t i fy
world
or to
"facts." W e c a n thus distinguish theories o
f jus t i f ied belief from theo-
ries
o f truth. For a moral realist,
a theory o f jus t i f ied belief
would
provide the standards for judging whether or not something is
true;
Brink,
tified
belief in terms o f coherence (see
chap. 6) . Bu t h i s distinctive claim
as
a moral realist is not that
justification is a matter o f
coherence, b u t
that
moral
beliefs
which is independent of the
justified bel ief . Coherentist epistemol-
ogy and realist metaphysics are detachable. One could embrace a
co-
herentist moral epistemology but deny the existence of any
moral facts
independent of jus t i f ied belief: the only
moral "truth," one might say,
is
T he distinction between epistemological an
d meta-
physical commitments is perhaps even more obvious
in a theory o f
empir ica l
which explicitly combines
belief
with
a
are, Bonjour maintains, jus t i f ied
in believing an empirical claim if it
coheres in the right w ay with
the
rest
B o s a n q u e t held
both
a coherence account o f jus t i f
ied belief and a co-
herence theory of truth.
theory
o f jus t i f ied bel ief—the
epistemology—I defend in this
book
m y
this
is
consistent
with
a
range
of
this extent,
at least, I agree with Rawls that questions of the truth
or falsity of our
moral judgments
can be
instead f o c u s
o n
whether they a re reasonable a n d jus t i
f ied .
2 2
Many students o f meta-
ethics will resist this; the very statement of the problem—"How
are
moral beliefs o r judgments to
be justified?
— s e e m s
to presuppose what
to
respond
to
of
its many senses, cognitivism is much
the same as moral realism—a
metaphysical doctrine
facts
maintaining that moral judgments
c o m m e n t s about robustness
vis-a-vis
notion
o f c o g n i t i v i s m .
However, another version
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In
a p p r o p r ia te
to say
beliefs a re
facts or can be
j u d g m e n t s are
cognit ive
insofar as
they
are
g e n u in e j u d g m e n t s t ha t
a re
2 4
pose this sort
aside dis-
pu tes as to whether e th ica l judgments a re t rue o r
refer t o m o r a l
facts,
I suppose that they can be just if iable, f i t t ing,
appropr ia te , mis taken ,
and
25
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
m y
is not
f o r m s o f
emot iv ism tha t deny tha t mora l judgments
are
this sense.
H ow ever , m uch o f what I a rgu e is robus t even w i th respec
t to var ie-
ties o f emot iv ism.
2 6
We can dis t inguish three broad types of emot ivis t
theories.
B .
B rand t ca ll ed C .L . S teven-
son's
theory
"blind" emot ivism, meaning, roughly, that one 's emot
ive
react ions toward X can change indepen den t o f
changes in
one's
"cogni-
tive
field."
Hold ing cons tan t one ' s percep t ions ,
beliefs,
one 's emot ive a t t i tudes toward
X m ay
nonethe-
less
change. B rand t a rgued tha t on S tevenson 's b l ind em
ot ive theory ,
the rela t ion of moral react ions to o ther
beliefs
jus t i f ica tory. O n e
c a n n o t
say
that
a
is
based
on irrelevant beliefs or con vict ions , bec
ause the b l ind theory
holds tha t the emot ive judgments may change freely
irrespective of the
cogni t ive
crit icism of Stevenson's theory
tha t i t does no t a l low for genu ine mora l judgments tha t can
be reason-
able
o r u n r ea s o n a b l e .
2 8
2.
Affective-cognitive mo ral judgments. B e c a u s
e the mos t p laus ib le
accoun ts o f emot ions do no t charac ter ize them as pure ly b l
ind , no n-
cognit ive,
react ions , emot ivis t moral theories need not , and
should not , b e bl indly emotivist . F o r
example, suppose that the m o d e l
of
a m o r a l j u d g m e n t is som ething
l ike : "Y uck T hose are despicable
things ."
the
j u d g me n t i s
composed
a t t i tud ina l response ("Yuck " )
and a cognit ive basis for i t ("I t is appropriate to
feel
this way toward
things with those fea tures . They a re
yucky th ings ." ) O n this view,
t h o u g h an a t t i tude is a necessary
par t of a mora l response (and so is
emot ive
in one
for
criticism
2 9
S u ch em o t iv e j u d g m en t s
may be
if
they
are
beliefs.
Suppose , fo r ins tance , you a re asked why you bel ieve
Hunan
chicken is
and you
r ep l y " W h o w o u l d n ' t
disl ike
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Poli t ical Theory 9
covered w i th H ershey 's choco la te syrup? " In th is case you r
g rou nd ing
beliefs,
a n d s o y o u r j u d g m en t , i s u n s o u n d .
3 0
3 . Affective-cognitive basic mo ral judgments. T
he above theory char -
acterizes e v e r y m o r a l j u d g m e n t as
a f fec t ive-cogni t ive . A s a conse-
q u en c e ,
the
space
the
belief
l
2
as (a)
an affective
belief and (b)
affective
logical
difficult
to
show, for example, that one moral belief f o ll o w s f
r o m a n o t h er . H o w -
ever,
an
emotive
affective
re-
sponse is a necessary par t of all m o r a
l j u d g m e n t s . T he emotivist can
dis t inguish basic
o r
or ig ina l mora l judgments f rom der ived
o r
a
neces-
sary
affective
e l em en t , w h i l e d e r iv ed j u d g m en t s
can be
the basic ones .
is
the first option,
bl ind emot ive theory. Ho w ev er , I th
ink it wil l emerge that m y a c c o u n
t
is
consis tent with the third , foundat ional , emot ive
theory. I wil l defend
the
idea
of
f o u n d a t io n a l j u d g m en t s , t h o u g h
I
shall
in
w h ic h
all m ora l jud gm en ts a re a f fec t ive-cog ni t ive , i
s harder to d iv ine . T hough
m u c h
is
Ro bustness Distinguished from Unco ntroversiality
I have t r ied to indicate that the analysis of moral
beliefs
f icat ion
m a y
in
justificato ry liberal. B eing
robus t i s no t the same as being uncon t rovers ia l . A theory
may wel l be
consis tent with , say, a var iety of metaphysical views, theories
of mean-
ing, personal ideals,
is not to be
o r
a
m a j o r d iv id e b e t w een
m y jus t i f ica tory
l iberal ism
a n d
c o n t em p o r a r y
pol i t ical l iberal ism.
M y a im is to
exp lore
o f
an d
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Political Theory
in so doing show w hy liberal
democracy is jus t i f ied; it is not to
show
that popular consensus o n this
justification c a n b e obtained among a ll
reasonable people.
sociologi-
cal sense o f that complex word,
the legitimacy o f a liberal regime
de-
pends o n widespread acceptance of i
ts justification, o r perhaps
the jus-
tice of its institutions. A n d i t would
be as wonderful as it would be
re m a rk a b l e
if the
best justification
of the
the
grounds
o n which most citizens support it.
Nevertheless, a test for the
jus t i f ica-
tion
citizens
with good reasons to support it—is not
whether that just i f icat ion is
widely accepted,
or is
uncontroversial.
Which is just as well, for in
some respects the account o f just i f icat
ion
I present here is controversial. I
shall challenge a fundamental
ortho-
doxy
in
same;
reasons fo r belief c a n b e distinguished
from reasons to act, a n d norma-
tive
beliefs
this analysis applies
empirical beliefs. Thus
most o f part I is devoted to
the general idea o f a rational belief
system;
though
topics familiar to moral philosophers such
as reflective equilib-
rium (sec. 7.4) will b e considered, the
main focus will be on general
epis temologica l
part
with
shall avoid many
of the perplexities an d pitfal ls
that plague current discussions o f public
just i f icat ion .
1 .3
and Personal Ju st ificat ion
At the outset, the task o
f developing a theory o f justification
confronts
a deep
begin
with
an individual system o f beliefs and
how, within it, a person just if ies
her beliefs? Or do we
commence by examining interpersonal jus t i f
ica-
tion—what beliefs
jus t i fy
each other? Contemporary political
philosophers incline toward the latter. T
he interpersonal conception o f
jus t i f i ca t ion is most clearly
articulated in Jurgen Habermas's discourse
t h e o r y . F o r Habermas, moral
ju s t i f ica t ion
is necessar i ly i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e
,
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in
the
reasoned agreement (under idea l conversa-
t iona l cond i t ions) among par t ic ipan t s in the
d iscourse . H is discourse
ethics thus supposes that "the
jus t i f ica t ion
o f n o r m s a n d c o m m a n d s
requires that a real d iscourse be carr ied out and thus
cannot occur in a
s t r ic t ly monological form, i .e . , in the fo rm
of a hypothet ical process of
argumenta t ion occurr ing in the ind iv idua l
mind."
35
catory liberalism
on the
p r im a r y c o m m i t m en t :
to
f icat ion, i t may
wel l seem that nothing
but the
36
Stanley
"[t]oo
of this in terpersonal concern ." H e con t inues
:
Within
the
is
located
in the first in-
s tance not in the muster ing of knockdown arguments to persuade
or jus t i fy
oneself to others but in the process of individual choice and
judgment . Each
person's moral consciousness is something
that
shape.
37
B enn 's analysis of the "m odern con sciousness" sets the stage
for the
problem of Rawlsian pol i t ical l iberal ism, namely, that in a p
lural is t ic
society such
to
arrive
often
s t i l l reasonable, judgments concerning moral i ty
an d
the good life. Rawls and others call this
the supposit ion of reasonable
p lura l ism.
3 8
N ow reasonab le p lural ism can
occur only if people arrive
a t reasonab le judgments tha t a re no t pub l ic ly
jus t i f ied; ex hypothesi ,
these are reason able views, b u t
they are m a n y in n u m b e r and
are incon-
sistent
with
that
b e
P a r t
jus t i-
fied beliefs that a re incompat ib le with
each other . This theory o f per-
sonal justification
shows how reasonab le p lural ism is possib le. Pos-
sessing a just if ied set of beliefs
does n ot require that the set be publ ic
ly
jus t i f ied:
one can
P u b l i c
just i f icat ion ,
I shal l argue, is a far more s t renuous
t es t
than persona l just i f icat ion; m a n y o f o u r m o
r a l beliefs that are person-
ally
Talk o f personal
justification
runs the risk o f immedia te ly a l
iena t ing
some readers , who m ay b e t empted to
reject the en t i re accoun t as bi-
ased
toward
an
of
view,
there-
fore
w r o n g h e a d e d
from the
d o es c o m m en c e
with persona l j us t i f ica t ion , there
is
to
s t a n d a b ly
I do not think i t is ei ther b i a s e d o r w
r o n g h e a d e d . H o w e v e r ,
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12 Introdu ctory: Epistemo logy and Pol i t ical
Theory
many readers a re ,
apt to
o v e re s t i m a t e
the
i n d i v i d u a l i s t ic n a t u re
of
the analysis . Later (sec. 8 .2) I shal l t ry to show in
what way al l
r e a s o n i n g — i n c l u d i n g
perso na l jus t i f ica t ion— is social ; to say that a l
l
reason ing does
p u b l i c
jus t i f i ca t ion
is no t to say
that
it is
thoroug hly p r iva te and asoc ia l . B u t these a re com plex i
ssues , the d i s -
cuss ion o f which mus t wai t un t i l we have cons idered
justified
it to
the
ind iv idua l i s t i c charac te r
of the analysis is moderated by three points.
1 . A s
B enn qu i te righ t ly po in ts o u t ,
a
on
persona l jus t i f i ca t ion
is
cons is ten t with recogniz ing tha t an ind iv
idua l ' s cogn i t ive and mora l
resources
sense
a
ciples
and
values
are
us,
ex
nihilo. They have been adop ted , incu lca ted , absorbed f
rom an enve l -
op ing soc ia l envi ronment ."
3 9
One can
cat ion given such
pluralist ic society
this inheri tance i tse l f i s d iverse and confl ic t ing , and
so working out a
just i f ied
2 .
Second ,
shall
see
tha t pe rsona l jus t i f i ca t ion u l t imate ly mus
t
b e
respons ive
to the
chal lenges
an d
fully a d e q u a t e
analysis o f pe rsona l jus t i f i ca t ion thus w i ll l
ead us to in te rpersona l jus t i -
f ica t ion, so not
even persona l jus t i f i ca t ion
is
s t ric t ly m ono logical .
3. Final ly , I s h a ll a rg u e t h a t w h en
m a k i n g m o ra l d e m a n d s on others,
pe rsona l jus t i f i ca t ion i s no t suff ic ient ;
such demands mus t be pub l ic ly
jus t i f ied, an d this is indeed
a f o r m o f in te rpersona l jus t i f i ca t
ion . T he
g a p b e t w e e n
m y
an d
H a b e rm a s ' s , t h e n ,
is
first
appear ,
in te rsu b jec t ive charac te r
o f
reason ing i s
the
j u s t i f i c a t i o n
of
principles
jus t ice ,
and here we agree tha t pu b l ic jus t i f i ca t ion i s
the u l t ima te
s t a n d a rd .
4 0
of the book
I ad-
vances a theory o f pe rsona l jus t i f i ca t ion , o
r , we might say , a mode l o f
just i f ied
systems of reasons and
the
idea
o f
re a s o n a b l e p l u ra li sm . P a r t
I I
jus t i f i ca t ion .
I shall arg ue that the theories of pu bl ic jus t i f ic at
io n ad-
v a n c e d by poli t ical l iberals and o
ther " in te rsub jec t iv i s t s ," whi le p rovid-
in g
some insights , are incompat ib le wi th the best theory
of jus t i f ied
belief .
on the
of
jus t i f i ca t ion , I
d i s t in gu ish three
m a i n o u t c o m e s o f p u b l i c jus
t i f i c a t ion : v ic to ry , defea t , a n
d i n c o n c l u -
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siveness
(u n d ef ea t ed , u n v ic t o r io u s
beliefs). As I said earl ier, I shal l ar-
gue tha t , tho ug h som e subs tan t ive fun da m en ta l m ora l
p r inc ip les can be
victor iously publ ic ly
jus t i f ied in our
soc ie ty , thei r number
is
Victorious publ ic
are
fairly
rare in a p lural is t ic society
such as ours; in con t ras t , u nd efea ted , unv ic to
r ious jus t i f ica t ions— those
that a re reasonab le b u t a l so con ten
t ious—abound . Par t I I I then ana-
lyzes polit ical
w ho
other
with inconc lus ive pub l ic jus t i f ica t ion s . I
argue here that the ins t i tu t ions
of l iberal const i tu t ional democracy
are
w a y s
o f
c o m p et in g u n d ef ea t ed p u b l i c j u s t if i c
a t io n s
o n substant ive issues o f jus t ice and
the c o m m o n good. In this par t
I
shal l examine such
topics
as the ju s t if ica t ion of liberal dem ocracy, con-
s t i tu t iona l ism, jud icia l review,
and the
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P E R S O N A L
J U S T I F I C A T I O N
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1
Reasons
2.1
for
R e a s o n s
M y ul t im ate con cern in this boo k is w i th m oral , and
especial ly pol it i-
c a l ,
just i f icat ion in which part icipants advance to
others their reasons
for beliefs, principles, an d policies. B u
t part icipat ion in pol i t ical just i -
f icatory discourse presupposes that people enter wi th
beliefs
her
belief
to
others,
she
ordinari ly supposes that she has good
reasons for i t . As a par t i c ipant
in
such interperso na l jus t i f ica tory discourse , then,
one typical ly en -
deavors to
show
o thers what one th inks a l ready obta ins , namely , tha
t
one has good reasons for what one bel ieves. To be sure , as
discussion
proc eeds one m ay revise this ini t ial est im ate; w e shal l see
in part I I that
the effort to
of ten
resul ts in revision
of one's bel iefs . So I certainly do not wish to deny
that interpersonal
discussion is d y n a m i c , an d indeed ul
t imately necessary fo r personal jus -
t i f icat ion . Y et n o n e o f t h i s u
n d e rm i n e s the p r e s u m p t i o n t h a
t a t any
given t ime
o n e
p r o d u c e s
belief
chan g e j u s t b e cau se p a r t i c i p an t s
a re
to
reply
to
queries
ab ou t , an d chal lenges to , their beliefs by poin t
ing to specific reasons
su p p o r t i n g t he m .
2
yo u
t ha t yo u r su p p o r t i n g re aso n s
are
of
belief
are
by, or
fo l low f r o m , re aso n s
I
shall call in-
ferent ia l ly j u s t i f i e d .
3
jus t i f ied
belief , it is no t
sufficient
is a
co n c l u si v e a rg u m e n t
to
. b . A t a m i n i m u m , o n e m u s t acce p t R.
So m e o n e who
justifies
a
belief
by appeal ing to a reason he
does no t accept is not s imply
ra-
t ional izing
the belief (see sec. 2.3), but is
be-
in g h ypo cr i t i ca l ( sec . 9 .2 .2) . C on sider
, fo r i n s t a n c e , A n n a , a F r e u
d i a n
therapis t
w h o ,
a f ter
c o n f r o n t i n g re se a rch on the c
o m p a r a t i v e effect ive-
ness of v a r i o u s p s y c h o t h e r a p i e s , c o n c
l u d e s
t h a t
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18
Personal
Justification
B ut she has a l a rge p rac t ice and her pa t ien ts expec t F
reud ian exp lana-
t ions , so that is what she gives them. Say, then, she has a be l
ief : "Li t t le
Hans has a case o f hys te r ica l
phobia"—he is so
afraid
not go out on the
s t ree t .
The
F re u d i a n re a s o n s u p p o r t i n g
the
d i a g n o s is
of n euros i s o r phobia i s "one th ing a lone : the rep
lacem ent o f h is fa the r
b y a h o rs e "— h e has displaced
his
fear
o f be ing cas t ra ted by his
fa ther
4
Of c o u rs e , A n n a d o e s not bel
ieve this ; she believes
tha t L i t t l e Hans ce r ta in ly
has a
but she
does
not
accept
the F re u d i a n a c c o u n t t h a t
she passes on to Li t t le Hans's p a re
n t s .
She, in
fac t ,
has based her d iagnos is on a N ew A ge se l f -he lp bo ok
.
Now
a s s u m e t h a t F re u d i a n i s m a c t u a ll y p ro
v i d e s
the
c o r re c t a c c o u n t
an d
t h e N e w A g e
s e lf - h e lp b o o k d o e s n o t . D o e s A n n a ha v
e
a
justified
say
sense that
jus t i f ied,
b u t g i v e n t ha t A n n a
rejects
jus t i fy
say
jus t i f ied. B e i n g
jus t i f ied in be lievin g is not the sam e as be ing righ
t; as we shall see, it
is possib le to be
jus t i f ied
in ho ld ing a false bel ief .
W e s e e here tha t o n e
can
hold
a
correct belief
bu t no t be jus t i f ied in
d o i n g
so .
jus t i f ied
i n b e l i e v i n g B o n e m u s t have or
accept
even this
A s
to be
just i f ied
in be l iev ing one m us t no t on ly have
or possess
, but
Case 1: Alf Believes the
Right
5
are
lovers ,
m a n y
that indicate
tha t B e t ty is u n f a i t h f u l ; he has seen
receipts from
little-out-
of- the-way hote ls in her p o c k e t b o o k ( a n
d he hasn' t visi ted
such hote ls w i th B et ty s ince their affair b e f o
re
she
d ivorced
Charl ie) , she has been working la te every night for two
m o n t h s n o w , she keeps call ing him "
D e a re s t F ra n k , " and the
l ike . Alf can be said to have perfect ly good reasons for
be-
l ieving B et ty is unfa i th fu l . B ut supp ose that
, desp i te a l l the
evidence that B et ty
ha s
a n d n o
coun te revi -
A lf
s imply
refuses to
he
seeks
to
convince h imse l f tha t it could not be t
ru e .
6
A s s u m e n o w ,
though , tha t he enro l l s in a
night-school sociology cou rse on
"Relat ionships in the '90s" an d discovers
that there is a .25
chance
in the
infers
in the
last year.
bel ief ( that B et ty
has
cheated)
he has
g o o d re a s o n s ;
is it a just if ied
be l ie f ?
N o , m o s t o b v i o u s l y b e c a u s e , t h o u g
h the belief is jus t i f iab le g
iven his
belief
Al f has no t
b a s e d
his
on the beliefs
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Believing for Reasons 19
jus t i fy
it. To infer in this way that something with a .25
probability
has
occurred
if Alf had
In
He
believes
the
a jus t i f ied
belief , it is not enough, then, for Alf
merely to have good (or even
concl us ive ) reasons for believing b.
7
The last few decades of analytic epistemology have been
character-
ized
cau-
tious about following this path by placing
too much weight on such
examples.
8
ment
to
As
Jon Elster observes in his analysis of the rationality of wishful
thinking
and ideology,
and not to be
jus t i f ied
because they
arid not jus t i f ied
b e c a u s e we sense that they would be just as satisfied
were the reasons
to
disappear."
10
To
take
a
dents,
we
getting
the
belief,
one
has
to
make
the
relevant
consid-
erations.
2.2
Reasons
as
Causes
of
Belief
If, then, a belief is jus t i f
ied because of its supporting reasons, i t
is not
enough that such reasons
basing relation
holds that
"rational beliefs are caused by the reasons
which are their grounds."
11
is
inferentially jus-
tified only if he has good reasons for b
and these good reasons cause
A lf
c lar i fy ing the
n a t u r e o f this causal link turns out to be
a good deal more d i f f i cu l t
than
it
appears.
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was
caused
by
the high winds that blew the branch that
smashed the glass. In this
instance the wind was the impetus for
the change. At first the branch
was
at
rest
caused
a change in the state of the window. Afterward the wind
died
down
this
In
this second sense of cause we can say that
pillars cause the roof to
r e m a i n
up; the
12
In sections 2.2 and 2.3 I consider sustaining causal accounts
of
jus t i f ied
b e l i e f ;
I turn to eff icient
causation in section 2.4.
T he
held.
This
suggests
a
counterfactual
e l imina t ing
them would not cause the roof
to
drop.
Similarly, we might
say (as a first approximation) that in Alf's
belief system S, (3 is
sustained by R
R
w o u l d c a u se B
to
drop
not suff ice.
Putting aside worries about the best way to
explicate counterfactuals,
we have at least to take account of the possibility of
overdetermina-
tion.
13
To
revert
the
structure, but there is a backup system; cables hung from the
outside
would
hold
up the roof in case of pillar failure. In this case, as long
as
the
pillars
soon
as
the pillars give way, the cable system will
engage and keep the roof
f r o m
counterfactual test:
Even if the pillars were eliminated, the
roof would not drop. Yet it
certainly seems that right
engages.
A g a i n , this is no mere philosopher's fancy. In an
interesting series of
e x p e r i m e n t s
Lee Ross and his colleagues induced
subjects to develop
theories
and
opinions
14
false feed-
b a c k when sorting authentic suicide notes from
fictitious ones. On the
basis o f
f u t u r e
abil i ty to make such discriminations. A f te r w a r
d the s u b j e c t s were ex -
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Believing for Reasons 21
tensively debr iefed , and each sub jec t acknowledged tha t
h is o r her
" p er f o r m a n c e"
w as
exper imenters ' manipu la -
beliefs
were based , su b jec t s showed m arked belief
persever-
ance. Similar results were achieved
in an
e x p e r i m e n t
in
which subjec t s
were induced to develop theories , on the basis of
false evidence , abou t
the rela t ion between f iref ighters ' professional performance
and the f ire-
fighters ' scores on a test for risk taking.
Once
f o r me d
la ter that the scores were f ic t i t ious , subjects
showed s ignif icant
perseverance
in
is
that the subjects , having developed their beliefs,
searched thei r memo-
ries fo r new suppor t ra ther than abandon them.
1 5
fall ing
moved , sub jec t s
m ay
have appealed
to other
the
feedback
beliefs
were discredited .
A more
com pl ica ted cou n ter fac tua l t est
is
to
call
In belief system
of S
would cause
to be
d ropped
as an
of
R as an
e lement
of S
w o u l d c a u s e s o m e
other
reason
in v o k ed .
This seems to cap ture the sort
o f m echanism hypothes ized in the belief-
perseverance case in which su bjec ts switched fro m one sustainin
g rea-
son to another . We can imagine a ser ies of sustaining rela t
ions; as each
sustaining reason
this raises the
worry
tha t , in p rac t ice , the p r inc ip le i s immune f
rom
falsification.
belief-
perseverance study, in which the sustaining cause is el
iminated and yet
the
to be a
c o u n t e r ex a m p l e
to the
belief -susta ining
an alysis. B ut now the defen de r of the sustaining
analy-
sis can a lways invoke some al ternat ive reason
R ' t h a t m u s t b e there to
sustain the belief, apparent ly securing the analysis f
rom any possib le
c o u n t e r ex a m p l e .
B u t
hy-
pothesizes that there must be an a l ternat ive sustaining rela t
ion , but
no th ing fo l lows abou t the imposs ib i l i ty o f falsif
icat ion. In any par t icu-
la r
b e
ev o k ed ; if there is no evidence that
this occurs , this hypothesis wil l b e
re jec ted .
1 6
On the o ther hand , we may f ind tha t peop le c i t e new
evi-
d e n c e
fo r
thei r
o ld
t h a t w o u l d
not be
if the
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determined, such that
distinguish
the
sustaining
reason from the backup sustainers. B u t
what o f a case o f overdetermi-
nation
in
and the
external cables
would be doing the job
simultaneously. In the belief case, too, more
than
one reason may be holding up
the belief. It will not do
simply to
say
that
of B (or the
r o o f ) an d leave it at that,
as reasons can differ in their
justificatory
force.
Surely
a
belief-perseverance experi-
ment is that the first set of sustaining
reasons were (initially) jus t i f ica-
tory (see sec. 3.1) while the second
set were not—they were not sound
reasons.
18
into
a
basing
relation in inferential justification. Still, w e
c a n begin in the way this
proposal contemplates, by first identifying the
set of al l reasons that
have
a
matter
how widely we characterize this set).
If this set were dropped, it
would
cause to be
rest
is it
possib le
to drop any elements of the
subset and still sustain ? I f we
answer "yes" to the first question and
"no" to the second, we have
ident i f ied a
minimal sustaining subset
dropped f r o m R
{min}
without
sets
2
may be member of more than one
m i n i m a l sustaining subset.) Each subset R
{min}
mentary sustaining reason. Having identified each elementary
sus-
t a in ing reason, we then would be in
a position to distinguish good
sustaining
sound. In analyzing whether is
j u s t i f i e d ,
we might then inquire
whether any of the elementary sustaining reasons a
re good reasons fo r
;B; if any
is too
rough; see sec. 5.3).
I shall not pursue this sustaining analysis
further, though a great deal
more could
b e
a s
genera l issues
a b o u t the analysis o
f counterfactuals. B u t f u r t h e r
levels
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Believing fo r Reasons 23
an d sophistication would not, I think,
make the core idea either clearer
o r more (or for that matter
less)
compelling.
2.3
Bel ief
I believe something very much like the
sustaining ana lysis is correct fo r
just i f ied belief, though I
shall
n o t even attempt to review all
the possi-
ble
objections
to
it.
19
However,
is
particularly
g er m a n e to our concern with moral
beliefs, and so needs to be con-
sidered.
fallacy."
H e writes:
It is easy to imagine the case
of someone who comes to believe
something for
the wrong reason and, consequently, cannot
be said to be jus t i f ied in
the belief,
but
who,
jus t i f ies
his belief. Suppose that a man, M
r. Raco, is racially prejudiced and,
as
a result, believes that the members
of some race are susceptible to
some
disease
to
we may
imagine, is an unshakable conviction. It is
so strong a conviction that no
evi-
dence to the contrary would
weaken his prejudiced conviction and no
evidence
in favor would strengthen
scientific evidence shows that only mem-
bers of the race in question
are susceptible to the disease. We may
imagine as
well that
he has be-
come no less prejudiced as a result
of this. Nevertheless, he understands
and
appreciates the evidence as well as
any medical expert and, as a result,
has
reason for his belief that jus t i f ies
it. He has discovered that his conviction
is
c o n f i r m e d by
scientif ic evidence.
other
race are susceptible to the
disease in question. Yet, the reasons
that j us t i fy him
in
this belief d o n o t causally explain
the belief. T he belief is the
result o f preju-
dice, not reason, but it
is confirmed by reason which provides
the justification
fo r the belief. Prejudice gives M r. Raco
conviction, b u t reason gives h im
justi-
fication.
20
theories maintain that
the grounds o n which w e init ial
ly accept moral principles are not the
g r o u n d s that jus t i fy them. Jean P
iage t and Lawrence K o h l b e rg , for in-
stance,
tell
m o r a l
p r inc ip les
b e c a u s e
they ema-
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stature
21
On
jus t i fy ing those judgments, thus suggesting
that
as the
child develops s h e m a y come to
adopt very d i f fe ren t
jus t i f i ca t ion
for a
belief that w as caused by, for
example, the desire to please parents.
22
However, these cases are not directly
analogous to Lehrer's insofa r as
the original cause for the belief
actually is dropped as the new, perhaps
genuine ly
ysis
constraining the ego are still operative
in adults, despite the
more sophisticated reasons they
much
like the unsavory M r. Raco;
the cause of his moral belief
is some u n -
jus t i f ied
a n d perhaps irrational consideration, though h
e m a y have
other beliefs that show
Lehrer's case is a strong counterexample to
an
eff icient
causal theory
(sec. 2.4) according to which a belief
is just i f ied only if the reasons
that originally caused
ment
is
much
too
strong.
We
reasons;
o f
our current moral beliefs must be tied
to those original causes, we
would have few i f any jus t i f ied moral
beliefs. These problems d o n o t
arise
for a sustaining causal analysis; o n this
view, it is not important
why we originally came to hold a
belief, but why we now do so. But,
it would seem, Mr. Raco and Dr.
Freud still pose a problem for
a
sustaining analysis: Right n ow M r. Raco
holds his belief for bad rea-
sons,
and
Mr.
Raco is jus t i f ied in his medical
beliefs depends on whether they a re
overdetermined. Suppose they are. Employing
the
about
the
disease.
In
this
case we would have no di ff icul ty
agreeing that Mr. Raco's medical be-
liefs
a re actually jus t i f ied, because there
exists a jus t i f ied sustaining rela-
tion.
But
what
becoming a more decent fellow,
the scientific evidence would not
sustain
his
Raco's medical beliefs would
then not be overdetermined; the scientific
evidence would not be able
to sustain them. Is the belief still
jus t i f ied? Lehrer thinks so; for him
jus t i f ica t ion is a
matter
perhaps
ad -
v a n c e , n o t w h y o n e
believes what
does.
24
L e h re r ' s account, however, does n o t
allow us to distinguish rational
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w ho m a n i f e s t
obvious
rationality.
25
Consider Alf, into whose head beliefs pop,
and stay for a variety of
odd
and
fears ,
goes through
e f for t
to a d j u s t them to what is
j us t i f i ed
or sound.
his
are
free
f loat ing and it is a mere happenstance if
they latch onto a "justifying"
basis.
26
Now
A lf
and wishes to raise him
closer to the level of an adequate
believer.
B u t
test on, for example, epidemiology, on which Alf scores
50
percent. She asks Alf the reasons for
his answers, which prove to be as
bizarre as his reasons always are. Subsequently,
she gives Al f a list o f
a ll the correct answers and
the reasons for them,
which Alf memorizes.
He then retakes the test. Because Alf's
beliefs
is
what the benevolent epistemologist says are the correct answers and
the
reasons for them—Alf again scores 50
percent, getting the same half of
the questions
belief , because Alf can now cite,
in addition to
his
own bizarre reasons, the correct reasons for the 50 percent
of the
questions he has always answered correctly. But surely Alf is no
better
a believer than
before; some
of his
floating,
that
good
reasons, but this is mere luck and has no effect
on
A l f ' s
see, increase
the
jus t i f i c a t ion o f those beliefs. Even epistemic
justification is practical in -
sofa r as its outcome impacts on one's belief
system. To divorce the
analysis
of
held
ob-
scures this impacting relation.
2.4 Eff icient Causa t ion and Just if icat
ion
It
in
believing
R
but, additionally, that
R
sustains his belief . Is it also necessary
that R be the e f f ic ien t cause o
f
B, , in the sense that it originally caused
Al f t o believe i t?
It is use f u l to pause br ie f ly a
n d consider w hy f o c u s i n g o n
e f f ic ien t
a s
opposed to s u