Kabulay 11-21-2014

One of the things i've learned from my experience today with the Anticala-Kabulay Tree Farmers Association, Inc. is that, assumed conflict on tenurial instrument does not hold true in the local experience and interaction of local communities. While government instrumentalities sees conflict arising from boundaries, more so with ambiguities, the local community overcomes these boundaries through constant, day-to-day interaction and communication, anchored on long enduring relationship and unequivocal trust. What appears to be a real conflict assumed by the formal regimes of the governtment does not have any bearing at all to local institutions.

The institution has developed overtime a mechanism on how to extract contribution from its members. For instance, during harvest, members are required to appropriate 5% of their net sales to the institutions. According to what type of agricultural products to harvest, the appropriation should be imposed on every harvest for timber products, every after three harvest for abaca, and every after five harvest for fruit trees. Half of the appropriated contribution will form part of the capital build-up (CBU) of the member, while the other half goes to the operational expenses of the institution.

'Pahina' is a common mechanism for every members to contribute to collective action. The Chairman calls a pahina, then members would come to their nursery and do some chores. For those member who cannot personaly come, then can send proxy or give some foods for the group to share after the day-long work. Proxy should be not be less than18 years of age. Household who cannot send even proxy can contribute in monetary form which will be used provide for the food

CBU, in monetary form, is also a mechanism for members to contribute to institution's endeavor. Members regularly pool volutary contribution and invest it on enterprises that the group agreed. Gains shall be deducted with the cost; the net amount shall then be proportionally divided to members according to their CBU contriution.

However, there is little provision for monitoring and sanction. Monitoring is the primary responsibility of sectoral leaders. Each sectoral leader is assigned a particular sitio or purok, with an organization structurally part of the larger institution. Each sectoral leader conducts their own meeting with members assigned to them. Monitoring takes the form of household visitation and informal morning and afternoon chat.

Seldom will the community impose sanction on erring members. The predominant way of resolving conflicts is through 'husay', or the means by which every conflicting parties, or erring individual member, comes to terms consensually agreeable by all members. The have less appreciation for imposing sanction to preserve harmony and makntain good relations amongst members. As few members said, 'istoryahan lang na'.

When it comes to decision making, the Board of Directors decides first as a collegial body. Whatever decisions that may arise from the deliberation, it shall then be passed on to the general assembly. The assembly then decides to approve or deny decisions laid to them. Normally, the whole assembly should opt to consensually decide on the matter before them. A lot of convincing happens here. If however the group failed to arrive at a consensus, voting takes place. During meetings and assembly, DENR's extension offier witness and sometimes participate in the discussion.

There is less incentive to collectively act together because individual's gains are not directly

affected by the group. Although external conditionalities imposed by government agencies forces compliance, it is done so with poor monitoring and sanction sanction.

It is the Chairman that holds most of information. For purposes of relaying information and

ATRICMPCO 11-26-2014

Meeting started at 10:45

The meeting is about membership to the PO. The Chairman started the PMES.

The Chair reported to have 21 members (14 female and 7 male) of the PO.

The chair is knowledgeable of what should be done, possessing some vision on how the coop should run. He has been exposed to numerous programs and projects of the government as well as non-government organizations. And has held various positions in various POs within the watershed.

ATRICMPCO (formerly ATRISA) has been previously organized as a people's organization for community forestry program of DENR. Most of their members are part of other POs as well, especially from the IPO.

When conflict resolution available through the PO or tribal council fails, litigants can seek the help of New People's Army.

The PO collects CBU and membership fee. There is resistance for would-be members to these collections. Individuals become part of the organization all because of the project. They can take part and gain benefits from the project but it is not compulsory to be part of the organization.

They little provision for monitoring and sanction. There has been no recorded incidence where a sanction has been imposed to regular violator. Instead, they would talk to the violator and still the violation persists, the erring member will be asked, or would volunteer to leave the PO.

Despite many years of operation, the PO has yet to institutionalize their rules. Multiple times where defecting and violation to their rules were reported and were not apprehended.

The PO also has yet to become financially self-sufficient. They are heavily dependent on the assistance pf the government. They previously had a sari-sari store business but went down due to mismanagement.

Forest tenure provides cooperative equilibria

Reading the case of Mt. Makiling Forest Forest, security of tenure provides future of cooperation of forest occupants. This is because livelihood and destiny of these individuals would be highly dependent on the forest. It would be to their interest to protect forest, as they would imperatively do to their source of income, community of living, and legacy to their future children's children