Kafka in Cuba - Afghanistan Analysts Network · PDF fileNovember 2016 Kate Clark Kafka in Cuba The Afghan Experience in Guantánamo EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report presents a detailed

November2016

KateClark

KafkainCubaTheAfghanExperienceinGuantánamo

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

Thisreportpresentsadetailedinvestigationintothecasesofeightofthelongest-servingAfghandetaineesinGuantánamo(seeBox1).AllareeitherstillincarceratedinGuantánamoorhaverecentlybeentransferredtotheUnitedArabEmirateswheretheyarebelievedstilltobeinsomeformofdetention.Combined,thesecasesadduptoexactlyonehundredyearsofstate-imposeddetentionwithouttrial,undertheharshestconditions.

ReadingthroughtheUnitedStatesmilitaryandcourtdocumentsoutliningtheallegationsandevidenceagainsttheseeightmen,oneentersaKafkaesqueworldofstrange,vagueaccusations,rifewithhearsay,secretevidence,badtranslations,grosserrorsoffactandtestimonyobtainedunderduressandtorture.Thetenuousnatureoftheallegationsagainsttheeightmenhasbeenfurthercompoundedbyashiftinglegallandscapeandstatesecrecy.

ThereportfindsthattheUSmilitaryhas,innoneoftheeightcases,beenabletosubstantiateitsaccusations.Militaryboards,designedtoensure

onlyenemycombatantswhowereathreattotheUSwereheld,wereunableeventoclearouttheobvious,multiplemistakesfromthedetainees’filesorrecognisethefantasticalnatureofmanyaccusations.America’scourtshavealsorepeatedlyshownthemselvesunableorunwillingtostanduptotheexecutive.Theyhavefailedtoquestionwhatthegovernmenthasassertedorprotectindividualsfromthearbitrarypowerofthestate.

Oftheeightcasesscrutinised,sixmenwerecapturedintheearlyyearsoftheinterventionwhenUSforceswerecarryingoutmassarbitrarydetentionsinAfghanistan.ItwasatimewhenUSforcesweredesperateforintelligenceonthewhereaboutsofOsamabinLaden.Theywerealsointentonhuntingdownthe‘remnants’oftheTalebaneventhough,intermsoffightingforcesofferingresistance,therewerenoremnants.TheyendedupdetaininglargenumbersofinnocentAfghans.Manyhadbeenfalselydenounced,oftenbyAfghanstrongmenwhousedtheirnewUSalliestogetrevengeagainstpersonalorfactionalenemies,orforfinancialreward.

TheauthorwishestothankMichaelSemplefromtheInstitutefortheStudyofConflictTransformationandSocialJusticeatQueen’s

UniversityBelfast,ShelbySullivan-BennisfromReprieveandGeorgetteGagnon,formerdirectorofhumanrightsfortheUnitedNations

AssistanceMissioninAfghanistan(UNAMA)fortheircommentsonearlierversionsofthisreport.TheUnitedStateDepartmentof

Defencewassentanadvancedcopyofthisreport,butchosenottomakeanycomments.

AANThematicReport1/2016

2 KateClark:KafkainCuba:TheAfghanExperienceinGuantánamo

Pakistanalsohandednon-combatantsover,claimingtheywereterrorists–andwaspaidfordoingso.Theresultwasthat,althoughsomeseniorTalebanwerecapturedinthoseearlyyears,almostanyonecouldendupinGuantánamo.ThosedetainedincludedopponentsoftheTaleban,membersofthenew,post-Talebanestablishment,oldmen,childrenandatleastoneShiaMuslim.ThesixAfghansinthisstudywhoweredetainedin2002and2003,farfrombeingthe‘worstoftheworst’astheGuantánamodetaineeshaverepeatedlybeendescribed,aremorelikeflotsamleftstrandedbythehightideofmass,arbitrarydetentions.Twomaypossiblyhavebeenlow-levelinsurgents,althoughnotwithalQaeda;theotherslooktohavebeenentirelyinnocent.

Theothertwomenwhoarepartofthisstudyweredetainedin2007andtheircasesaresomewhatdifferentforthreemainreasons:by2007,therewasanactualinsurgencyandUSintelligencewasbetter,albeitstillfarfromperfect;theUShasalsorevealedfarlessaboutthespecificallegationsandevidenceagainstthesetwomenand;neitherhashadachancetodefendhimselfpublicallyeveninthelimitedwaysopentootherdetainees.One,thelastmantoberenderedandtorturedbytheCIA,hasbeencategorisedasa‘highvalue’detainee,meaningmuchofthedetailoftheallegationsagainsthimisclassified.BothofthesedetaineesareaccusedofbeingfacilitatorsforalQaeda.However,inneithercasehastheUSputforwardevidencetosubstantiateitsclaims.Indeed,whatcanbeseenpointstothesameworryingproblemsasseeninthefirstsixcases,arelianceonunverifiedintelligencereports,hearsayandtheuseoftorture.

Theimpressionthatnoneoftheeightare‘bigfish’isgivenweightbythefactthattheTalebandidnottrytogetanyofthemoutinexchangeforcapturedUSserviceman,BoweBergdahl,in2014.

FailuresofintelligenceNoneoftheeightweredetainedonthebattlefield,soUSjustificationsforthedetentionshavereliedalmostentirelyonintelligence.Thisintelligencehasbeenparlous.USforcesonlycapturedtwooftheeightmendirectly,bothfollowingtip-offsfromunknownsources.TheothersixwerehandedovertotheUSmilitaryorCIAbyPakistanorAfghanforces.Inthreeofthecases,thereareverystrongindicationsthatthedetaineesweredenouncedorhandedoverforpoliticalormonetaryreasons.Intwoothers,thislookslikelyorhasbeenalleged.FiveofthemenhavesaidAmericanforcestorturedthemandintwoofthecasesthereisindependentcorroborationofthis.Anotherwaslikely‘softened

up’byAfghanalliespriortoUSinterrogation.Theremainingtwomenhavenotspokenpublicallyeitherwayabouttheirtreatment.

Wheretherearepublicallyavailabledocuments,i.e.forthefirstsixcases,theyshowmultiple,basicmistakesinAfghangeography,datesandfactionalmembership,aswellasfundamentalmisunderstandings,suchasmistakingnon-belligerentandevenanti-jihadistgroupsforextremists.Ahistoricalallegationsaremade:reachingbackintothe1980s,theUSmilitarydeemsasnefarioussomeoftheassociationsitsharedatthetime,andassertstheexistenceofalQaedabeforebinLadenfoundedit.ItassumesemploymentinitselfcanbecountedasevidenceofsupportfortheideologicalaimsoftheemployerandhishostilitytotheUnitedStates.Meaninglessstringsofassociations–detaineeknewXwhoknewYwhoknewZwhoknewbinLaden–areputforwardasevidenceofwrongdoing.Foralleightdetainees,rawintelligencereportsareroutinelyreliedupon,alongwithhearsay,doublehearsay(XsaidYsaiddetaineewasaterrorist),statementsobtainedunderduressortorture,andsummaries,ratherthantranscripts,ofinterrogations.Resultingallegationshavethenbeenpresentedasuncontestedfact.

Alleightareallegedtohaveheldmultiplemembershipsorassociationswithasmanyasfiveorganisations,includingAfghan,ArabandPakistanigroupsandmutuallyantagonisticornon-belligerentAfghangroups.Thedepictionofindividualsasmembersofmultiple,disparateorganisationsisbewildering.Afghanistanisacountrywheremembershipofanorganisationisalmostalwaysgroundedinasolidaritygrouping–tribe,ethnicity,clanorformercomradeship–evenmoresoduringaninsurgency,wherepersonallinksarecrucialfortrust.Suchallegationsmakenosense,eitherfromanintelligenceperspectivewhereitisprecisechainsofcommandwhichformoneoftheprismsforunderstandinganenemylikealQaedaortheTaleban,orfromalegalperspective,whereagain,chainsofcommandarefundamentalformakingacasethatwarcrimeshavebeenperpetrated.ItsuggestsratherthattheUSmilitarydidnotknowwhotheyhadpickeduporwhyexactlytheymightbedangerousandhadtoformulatecasesagainstdetaineesretroactively,topresentattheCombatantStatusReviewTribunals(setupin2004totrytopreventhabeascasesaftertheSupremeCourthaddeterminedthatdetaineescouldseeklegalredressthroughthefederalcourts).

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3KateClark:KafkainCuba:TheAfghanExperienceinGuantánamo

FailuresofjusticeItissignificantthatnotasingleoneoftheeightisaccusedofcarryingoutaparticularattack.Mostly,theaccusationsagainstthemaremoreinchoate–carryingoutunspecifiedattacks,membershipof,associationwith,planningtoattack,trainingandtranslating.Oneisaccusedoffinancingonly;underInternationalHumanitarianLaw(the‘LawsofWar’),thisisconsideredanon-combat,supportrole.Wherecaseshavereachedthecourts(MilitaryCommissiontrials)andaccusationshadtobefirmedup.Threeofthemenwerecharged,butonlywith‘providingmaterialaidforterrorism’or‘conspiringtocommitterrorism’,notofcommittingactualactsofviolence.Allthreesawthesechargesdropped,or,theirtrialsfoldingaftertheSupremeCourtdeemedMilitaryCommissiontrialswereillegal.

Thevaguenatureoftheallegationshasbeenaggravatedbymurkyandchanginglaws,shiftinginterpretationsofthelawandtheByzantinewayUSgovernments,courtsandmilitaryreviewboardshavedealtwiththedetainees.Themilitaryboardsestablishedbythestate,purportedlytoensuretheUSwasonlyholdingactualcombatantsandonlythosewhoweredangeroustotheUSoritsallies,utterlyfailedtoquestiontheclaimsmadetothem.Eventhoughtheywerenotindependent,itisdifficulttoseehowclearlyfar-fetchedallegationsandcasefilesrifewithcontradictionsandfactualerrorscouldhavestoodscrutiny.Strikinglymanyofthedetaineesembracedthechancetospeakattheirfirstboards,totrytoputmattersstraight,astheysawit,andcorrecterrors.Astheyrealisedthesewerenotforumswheretheywouldgetafairhearing,attendanceatlaterhearingsfellaway.

Astogettingjusticethroughthecourts,atMilitaryCommissiontrials,detaineeswerechargedwithoffencesthatdidnotexistinlawandjudgesdidnotknowwhatsystemoflawtheyhadtoapply.Proceduralmattershaveheldupbothhabeascorpuspetitionsandmilitarytrialsforyears.Thestatehasalsobeentardyinhandingoverdocumentstothedefenceorsoughttointroducenewevidenceascaseswentalong.Ithasalsosoughttokeepevidencesecretfromdefendants,thepublicandevensecurity-clearedcounsel.Delaysonthepartofthestatehavenotbeenpunishedbythecourts.Indeed,onedetaineehadtowaitforalmostthreeyearsforthejudgetomakeuphermindabouthishabeaspetition.

Judgeshave,notalwaysbutoften,acceptedsecretevidence,aswellashearsayandstatementsmadeunderduress;theyhaveevenweighedupwhethertoaccepttestimonyobtainedfromthosewhohavebeentortured.Mostworryingly,judgeshave

shownastrongtendencytoacceptstateevidenceandtheinterpretationthestateputsonitsevidence.Forexample,thepossessionofasatellitephonewasacceptedasadequateevidenceofinvolvementinterrorism.Inthreecases,thestate’sassertionthatthemass,quietist,missionaryorganisation,Jamatal-Tabligh,isafrontforalQaedawasacceptedbyjudgeswithnodelvingintowhetherthiswasareasonableclaimtomake.Intheonehabeascasewhichwenttoappeal,evenasthebulkofthestate’sevidencewasshowntobewrongorhadtobediscarded,thishadnoimpactonhowtheremainingevidencewasassessedbythecourts;thejudgeremainedconvincedthatthestate’sassertionsweretrue.

Thismaynowhavechanged,alittle.Anewbody,thePeriodicReviewBoard,hasbeenreviewingallremainingdetaineecases.Inthelastyear,ithasdecidedthatsixoftheeightAfghansshouldbetransferred,i.e.senttoanothercountrywithsecurityguarantees.Intwoofthesecases,theBoardrecognisedthattheallegationsagainstthemenwerenottrue:onewastoldhisrolewiththeTalebanhadbeen“limited”andthathehadbeen“misidentifiedastheindividualwhohadtiestoal-Qaedaweaponsfacilitation,”ashadbeenhiscontentionallalong.Anotherwastoldtherewasa“lackofclearinformationregardinghisinvolvementwithal-Qa’idaortheTaliban.”Withtheotherfour,theallegationsagainstthemwerejudgedtobetrue,buttheyposednorisktotheUSortheriskcouldbemitigated.InAugust2016,threeofthedetaineesweretransferredtotheUnitedArabEmirates,althoughtheyremaininsomeformofdetentionanditisnotcleariftheywillbeallowedtoreturntoAfghanistan.

ViewingtheUSdetentionregimethroughthelensoftheAfghanexperienceinGuantánamoraisesbroaderquestionsabouttheeffectivenessofUSintelligenceandjustice.Thisstudy’s‘deepdive’intotheAfghanfilesbyacountryexperthasrevealedmultiple,obviousandpersistentflawsintheintelligencewhichleftmendetainedformorethanadecade.Isthisthecasefortheintelligencebehindthedetentionofothernationalitiesalso?

TheAfghanexperienceinGuantánamoinitselfhighlightstheperilofthepowertoarbitrarilydetain.Forindividualsandtheirfamilies,theconsequenceshavebeengrossmiscarriagesofjustice.ForAfghanistan,themassarbitrarydetentionsintheearlyyearsoftheUS-ledinterventionwasamajorfactordrivingsomeAfghanstowardsinsurgency.IthelpedreviveaconflictAfghanshadhopedwasfinallyover,onewhichtheyandtheUnitedStatesarestillenmeshedin.Atatime,also,whenAfghanistanisfacinganactual,terroristthreat,theUnitedStates



isstillploughingtimeandresourcesintokeepingmeninGuantánamoagainstwhomithasyettoput

forwardanyrealevidenceofwrongdoing.

Box1TheEightAfghanDetainees

1.HajiWaliMohammed,ISN560,53yearsoldfromBaghlan,moneychangerattheCentralMoneyMarketinKabul,accusedofbeingalQaedaandTalebanfinancier.DetainedinPakistan,26January2002;handedovertoUSforces,February2002;takentoGuantánamo,30April2002:14yearsindetention.Habeaspetitiondenied.2010TaskForcedecidedtoholdhimindefinitely.ClearedfortransferbyPeriodicReviewBoard,26September2016.StillinGuantánamo.

2.AbdulZahir,ISN753,44,fromLogar,translatorandchokidar(doorman),accusedofbeingalQaedatranslator.DetainedbyUSforces,July2002;takentoGuantánamo,27October2002:14yearsindetention.2010TaskForcedecidedtoreferhimforprosecution;noactiononhiscasesince2008.ClearedfortransferbyPeriodicReviewBoard,11July2016.StillinGuantánamo.

3.Obaidullah,ISN762,mid-30sfromKhost,groceraccusedofbeingmemberofalQaedaIEDcell.DetainedbyUSforcesinJuly2002;takentoGuantánamo,28October2002:14yearsindetention.Habeaspetitiondenied.2010TaskForcereviewdecidedtoreferhimforprosecution;nomovementonhiscasesince2009.ClearedfortransferbyPeriodicReviewBoard,19May2016.TransferredtoUAE,14August2016,wherebelievedstillindetention.

4.BostanKarim,ISN975,46,fromKhost,sellerofplasticflowersandmissionaryaccusedofbeingleaderofalQaedaIEDcell.DetainedbyPakistan,August2002;handedovertoUS,February2003;takentoGuantánamo,6March2003:13yearsindetention.Habeaspetitiondenied.2010TaskForcereviewdecidedtoholdhimindefinitely.ClearedfortransferbyPeriodicReviewBoard,2June2016.StillinGuantánamo.

5.MohammedKamin,ISN1045,38,fromKhost,imamaccusedofbeingterroristwithalQaeda,AfghanCoalitionMilitia,NorthAfricanExtremistNetwork,theTaleban,Harakatul-MujahedinandJaish-eMuhammad.DetainedbyAfghanforces,14May2003andhandedovertoUS;takentoGuantánamo,21November2003:13yearsindetention.2010TaskForcedecidedtoholdhimindefinitely.ClearedfortransferbyPeriodicReviewBoard,28September2015.TransferredtoUAE,14August2016,wherebelievedstillindetention.

6.Hamidullah,ISN1119,53,fromKabul,dealerinpropertyandsecond-handcarsfromprominentHezb-eIslamifamily,accusedofbeingapro-monarchyplotteralliedwithMahaz-eMilli,theTaleban,alQaeda,Hezb-eIslami,IranandvariousJamiatcommanders.Detained(probably)byNDSandhandedovertoUS,August2003;takentoGuantánamo,21November2003:13yearsindetention.2010TaskForcedecidedtoholdhimindefinitely.ClearedfortransferbyPeriodicReviewBoard,11February2016.TransferredtoUAE,14August2016,wherebelievedstillindetention.

7.HarunGul,ISN3148,35,fromNangarhar,possiblyagrocer,accusedofbeingHezb-eIslamicommanderandalQaedacourier.USsaysNDSdetainedhim,4February2007,andhandedhimover(NDSdeniesthis);takentoGuantánamo22June2007:nineyearsindetention.2010TaskForcedecidedtoreferhimforprosecution;nolegalmovementonhiscase.PeriodicReviewBoard,14July2016,recommendedhiscontinuingdetention.

8.MuhammadRahim,ISN10029,51,fromNangarhar,formerusedcarsalesmanandpossiblebuyerandsellerofhoneyandvegetables,accusedofbeingpersonalfacilitatorandtranslatorforOsamabinLaden.DetainedbyPakistan,February2007;renderedtoAfghanistanandtorturedbyCIA;takentoGuantánamo,March2008;nineyearsindetention.Classifiedas‘highvalue’detainee,withextremelylittleinformationabouthimreleased;heldinparticularlystringentsecurity.2010TaskForcedecidedtoholdhimindefinitely.PeriodicReviewBoard,9September2016,recommendedhiscontinuingdetention.


Abbreviations

ACM Anti-CoalitionMilitia(termonlyusedbyUSmilitary,doesnotrefertoaparticulargroup)

ARB AdministrativeReviewBoard

AUMF AuthorisationoftheUseofMilitaryForce

CSRT CombatantStatusReviewTribunals

FOB ForwardOperatingBase

FOIA FreedomofInformationAct

JT Jamatal-Tabligh

HIG Hezb-eIslamiGulbuddin

IMU IslamicMovementofUzbekistan

IIS IntelligenceInformationReport

ISI DirectorateofInter-ServicesIntelligence(Pakistanimilitaryintelligenceagency)

ISN InternmentSerialNumber

NDS NationalDirectorateofSecurity(Afghanintelligenceagency)

NIFAorNIF NationalIslamicFrontofAfghanistan

NAEN NorthAfricanExtremistNetwork(termonlyusedbyUSmilitary,doesnotrefertoanactualgroup)

PDPA People’sDemocraticRepublicofAfghanistan(the1978-1992communistgovernment)

TD TelegraphicDissemination(fromtheCIA)



1.INTRODUCTION

1.1BackgroundInthefirstyearsafter2001,theUnitedStatesmilitaryandtheCIAdetainedAfghansinverylargenumbers.MostneverleftAfghanistan,butabouttwohundredweretakentothecampsetupforWaronTerrordetaineesattheUSnavalbaseatGuantánamoBay,inCuba.Afghanswerebyfarthelargestnationalgrouping,comprisingmorethanaquarter(220)ofthe781menheldthere.1

ThereweresomeseniorTalebanamongtheAfghandetainees,butthevastmajorityofthosetakentoCubahadnothingtodowiththeTalebanmovement,farlessalQaeda.Therewereshepherds,taxidrivers,menwhohadopposedtheTalebanandwelcomedtheirdownfall,oldmen,minorsandatleastoneShiaMuslim.Overtheyears,almostalloftheAfghansheldinGuantánamohavebeenreleased.

ThecasesoftheeightAfghanswhowerestillindetentionatthestartof2016arethefocusofthisstudy.Inrecentweeks,threeofthem(cases3,5and6)havebeentransferredtotheUnitedArabEmirates(wheretheyremaininsomeformofdetention).Thesecaseshavebeenincludedinthisreport,alongwiththefiveAfghansstillbeingheld.Therearemanyquestionssurroundingthesedetentions–whyweretheycapturedinthefirstplaceandwhyhavetheybeenkeptlockedupforsomanyyears?Aretheseeightmen,keptincarceratedwhilealmostalltheircompatriotshavebeenjudgedsafetobefreed,reallythe‘worstoftheworst’,oraretheymerelytheflotsamleftstrandedbythetideofmassdetentions?

ViewingtheUSdetentionregimethroughthelensoftheAfghanexperienceinGuantánamoraisesbroaderquestionsaboutUSintelligenceandjustice.In2001,theBushadministrationbelievedAmericawasfacingauniquelydangerousenemyandtheoldrulescouldnotapply.Thisledhisadministrationtotakeunprecedentedorhighlyunusualmeasures–keepingalldetailsofthedetentionssecret,notapplyingtheGenevaConventions,includingtheminimumprotectionsgivenbycommonarticle3,withholdingfederalprotectionsfromthedetaineesandusingtortureininterrogations.Allthismeantthatthose

1Menfrom49nationalitieshavebeenheldinGuantánamo.ThebiggestcontingentshavebeenAfghans(220),Saudis(135),Yemenis(115)andPakistanis(72).‘CountriesofCitizenship’,‘TheGuantanamoDocket’,TheNewYorkTimes,http://projects.nytimes.com/Guantanamo/detainees/by-country.

capturedinthemassdetentionsinAfghanistan,oftenwithoutanybasisinsoundintelligence,couldfindthemselvesinCuba,unprotectedbyanyoftheusualmeasuressafeguardingindividualsfromarbitrarydetention(whethercriminalormilitary).ThecasesoftheeightAfghansexemplifyhowmencouldthenbeleftinlimboinGuantánamo.

Althoughnotthefocusofthisstudy,itisworthbearinginmindthattherewereotherconsequencesoftheUSdetentionspolicy.ArbitrarydetentionwasoneofthemainfactorsthatdrovesomeAfghanstowardsinsurgency,openingthewaytoanewphaseinAfghanistan’slong,bitterwarwhichAfghansandtheUSarestillwrestlingwith.GiventhatAfghanistanisnowfacinganactual,current,terroristthreat,itisalsotroublingthattimeandresourcesarestillgoingintoholdingmeninGuantánamowhosecasesareeitherthreadbareoragainstwhomtheUnitedStateshasstilltoputforwardevidence.

1.2HistoricalcontextInthewakeofthedevastatingattacksof11September2001,theUSdeclaredwaragainsttheTaleban’s‘IslamicEmirate’whichhadharbouredtheauthorofthoseattacks,OsamabinLaden.TheTalebanwerethenincontrolofasmuchas85percentofAfghanistanandbinLaden’salQaeda,likeotherforeignmilitantgroups,hadfoundarefugethere,aplacetotrainandgetbattlefieldexperienceandsupporttheTaleban’scivilwarfightagainsttheNorthernAlliance.

TheTalebanhademergedinKandaharin1994asanattemptbymullahswhohadfoughttheSovietoccupationinthe1980stobringordertoacityengulfedbyvicious,internecinefighting.InKandahar,asinmostofthecountry,whenthecommunistPDPAgovernmentfellin1992,thevictoriousmujahedinfactionshadturnedtheirgunsoneachotherinacivilwar.Militiasandstrongmennotonlyfoughteachother,butpreyedonthecivilianpopulation:murder,kidnap,robberyandlootingwereallcommonandsexualviolenceagainstwomenandyouthsawell-groundedfear.2Becauseofthis,atleastinitially,manyAfghanswelcomedtheharsh,butclearruleoftheTalebanmullahs.TheareaunderTalebancontrolgrewrapidly.In1996,theTalebancapturedKabulandthefactionswhichhadbeenfightingoverthe

2TheAfghanistanJusticeProject,CastingShadows:WarCrimesandCrimesagainstHumanity:1978-2001DocumentationandanalysisofmajorpatternsofabuseinthewarinAfghanistan,2005,61-114,https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/ajpreport_20050718.pdf.

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capitalmostlyrealignedthemselvesintotheNorthernAlliance.ItbattledonagainsttheTalebanforthenextfiveyears,graduallylosingterritory.Inthenorth,inareasshowingresistance,theTalebanperpetratedanumberofmassacresofciviliansandascorchedearthpolicy.However,evenintheirsouthernheartland,by2001,theywerelosingpopularity,asnoendtothewar–andconscription–appearedinsightandAfghanistan’sisolationintheworldonlydeepened.3

ForeignmilitantsoriginallycametoAfghanistantofighttheSovietoccupationinthe1980sand,bythe1990s,mosthadleft.Someofthoseremainingrantrainingcamps(intheeastandsouth),includingPakistanimilitantgroups,supportedbyIslamabad,preparingtofightinIndian-controlledKashmir.TheSaudijihadist,OsamabinLaden,hadbeeninAfghanistaninthe1980sandreturnedin1996,totheeasternprovinceofNangarharwherehewaswelcomedbythemujahedinthere.WhentheTalebancapturedNangarhar,they‘inherited’himandotherforeignmilitants.

By2001,thenumberofforeignmilitantsinAfghanistanhadgrowntoabout1,500-2,000andtheyhadbecomeimportanttotheTaleban’swarefforts.4Theforeignersmainlyorganisedthemselvesandfoughtseparately,althoughsomeTalebandidhavecloserelationshipswiththem,forexampleSaiful-RahmanMansurwhoheadedtheQarghagarrison,tothewestofKabul,whichhadaforeigncontingent.TheTalebansaidpublicallythatforeignMuslimswerewelcometocomeandjointhe‘jihad’,buttheydidnotneedthem;theydeniedthepresenceoftrainingcamps.5AlongwithalQaeda,therewerevariousPakistanigroups(suchasLashkar-eTayeba,JaishulMuhammad,HarakatulAnsarandSipah-eSahaba),theIslamicUnionofUzbekistan(IMU)and‘unaligned

3TheTaleban’s2000/2001banoncultivatingopiumpoppy,whichruinedthelivelihoodsforfarmers,labourersandtradersandadroughtcontributedtounderminingthepopularityoftheTalebangovernmentinitsheartlands.Authorobservations.SeealsoAlexStrickVanLinschotenAndFelixKuehn,AnEnemyWeCreated:theMythoftheTaliban-AlQaedaMergerinAfghanistan,1970–2010,Hurst,2010,119,185.4Author’sreportingfromthetime.SeealsoKateClark,‘ChechensinAfghanistan3(FlashfromthePast):Diplomats,yes,butfighters?’,AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,12July2016,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/chechens-in-afghanistan-3-flash-from-the-past-diplomats-yes-but-fighters/;andVanLinschotenetal,AnEnemy,[seeFN3],173-179.Foreignmilitantsappearinthewarcrimesreportingofthisperiod.SeeAfghanistanJusticeProject,CastingShadows,[seeFN2],121,141,144.5Authorinsightfromthetime.SeealsoKateClark‘ChechensinAfghanistan3…’,[seeFN4].

militants’,includingArabswhohadnotswornabayat(anoathofloyalty)tobinLaden.RelationshipsbetweentheTalebanandtheir‘guests’,astheforeignfighterswerereferredtoinAfghanistan,betweenMullahOmarandbinLaden,andbetweenAfghansandArabswerenotalwayseasy;notallTalebanwantedtohostbinLaden,andnotalltheinternationally-minded,foreignmilitantsthoughttheconservative,insular,Afghan-focusedmullahsoftheTalebanwere‘Islamicenough’.6

Duringtheseyears,alQaedacarriedoutanumberofattacksonAmericantargets,includingbombingtwoAmericanembassiesineastAfricainAugust1998whichkilledmorethantwohundredpeople(PresidentBillClintonafterwardsbombedtwoofthegroup’strainingcampsinAfghanistanwithcruisemissiles).Inlate1999,afterfailingtopersuadetheTalebantohandoverbinLaden,theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilputTaleban-controlledAfghanistanundersanctions.Inthelastfewyearsofhisrule,however,TalebanleaderMullahOmarbecameincreasinglyreluctanttohandoverhis‘guest’.7BinLaden,meanwhile,usedAfghansoiltoplottheattacksonNewYorkandWashingtoncarriedouton11September2001.

Followingthoseassaultsonitsterritory,theUSissuedanultimatumtotheTaleban:handbinLadenoverorfaceAmerica’smilitarymight.MullahOmarrefusedandon7October2001,theUSwithUKsupportlauncheditsattack.SignificantlyforthefutureofAfghanistan(includingwithregardtodetentions),aswellasanaircampaignagainstTalebanfrontlinesandfacilitiesandforeignmilitants’housesandcamps,8theUSalsochosetouselocalproxiesasitsbootsontheground.ItfundedandarmedtheNorthernAllianceandotheranti-Talebancommanders,supplyingmoneyandweaponsanddeployingsmallnumbersofUSSpecialOperationsForcesandCIAoperativestoadviseandfightalongsidethem.

On13November,fiveweeksafterthebombingcampaignbegan,Kabulfell,andon7December,sodidtheTaleban’slaststrongholdandbirthplace,Kandahar.TheforeignmilitantswhohadsurvivedthebombingfledtoPakistan.TheTalebanlargelywenthome,althoughsomeseniorleadersalsofledacrosstheborder.ThestrongmenwhomAmerica

6BinLadenandhisfollowerswereSalafi.AfghanSunnis,includingTaleban,belongoverwhelminglytotheHanafischoolofIslam.7VanLinschotenetal,AnEnemy,[seeFN3],167.8On12September2001,NATOcommitteditsmemberstocollectiveself-defenceand,on28September2001,theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilpassedtheunprecedentedlyfar-reachingResolution1373obligingstatestotakevariousanti-terrorismmeasures.



hadsupportedwereabletocapturegovernorships,ministriesandotherstateinstitutions.ThecapitalwastakenbytheforcesofthestrongestfactionoftheNorthernAlliance,Shura-yeNizar,anetworkwithinthemujahedinfactionofJamiat-eIslami.9Itsleadersclaimedthedefence,interiorandforeignministriesandtheintelligenceservice,theNationalDirectorateofSecurity(NDS).InBonn,inDecember2001,HamedKarzai,acivilianfromoneofthemujahedinfactionswhichdidnotfightonafter1992,wasselectedasAfghanistan’snewinterimleader.

ThecountrywhichtheUSfounditselfsomewhatinchargeofinDecember2001couldnotbecharacterisedassplitbetweengoodguysandbadguys,Talebananddemocrats.Rather,itwascomplexandmulti-layeredandrivenwithnewlyarmedfactionswhotreatedtheapparatusofstateaswarbooty.ThiswasthecontextinwhichUSforceswouldbedetainingAfghans.

1.3MethodologyandOutlineoftheReportForthisreport,theauthorscrutinisedthepublicallyavailabledocumentsontheAfghandetainees.HerextensiveknowledgeofAfghanistanandpersonalexperienceoflivinginthecountryduringtheTalebaneraandimmediatelyafter10werebroughttobearinassessingthecasesmadeagainsttheeightAfghanswhoarethefocusofthisstudy.ThevariouscourtrulingsandUSgovernmentpolicydocuments,andacademicliteratureondetentionsalsoformedanecessarybackgroundforunderstandingthecomplexandchanginglegalcontextunderpinningthedetentionregimeatGuantánamoBay.Foralistoftheauthor’srelevant,previousresearch,seeAnnex1.

Thereportisorganisedasfollows.

In“Chapter2,EasilyDetained,USPost-2001DetentionPoliciesinAfghanistan,”theauthorlooksathowAmericacametodetainsomany

9Shura-yeNizarwasbuiltupundertheleadershipofJamiatcommanderAhmadShahMassudinthe1980sandbecamethemostcoherentandformidablepartoftheresistanceagainsttheSovietoccupation.Officiallydissolvedin1993,ithasnonethelessremainedasarecognizableandcoherentnetworkofcommandersandpoliticiansfromtheenvironsofKabulandthenorth-east.10TheauthorwastheBBCKabulcorrespondent1999-2002andcontinuedtomakereportingtripstoAfghanistaneveryyearthereafter,includingstintsofuptofourmonths,untilhercurrentworkwithAAN,whichbeganin2010.Seeherbiographyonthefinalpageofthisreport.

peopleinAfghanistan,mostlyindubiouscircumstances.TheTalebanregimehadcollapsedswiftlyandunambiguouslyin2001.YettheUSbelievedtherewerestill‘remnantsoftheTaleban’whomitneededtohuntdown.Inreality,USforcesendedupdetainingnotonlyTaleban,manyofwhomhadsurrendered,butalsohugenumbersofordinarypeople.ThechapteralsolooksathowAfghansandAfghanandPakistanistateagencieswereabletoexploittheUSdesiretohuntdownterroristsbyfalselyinformingformoneyorbecauseofpersonalrivalries.

“Chapter3:SourcesofInformationandtheShiftingLegalLandscape”looksatthesystemfacingdetaineeswhentheyarrivedinCuba:asecretdetentionregimewithoutbasiclegalprotections.Gettinginformationaboutthedetaineeshaslargelybeenboundupwithlegalchallengesandwithdeliberate,unauthoriseddisclosuresofinformation.Thischapterbrieflyoutlinestheevolvinglegalsituationandthesourcesofinformationthathaveemerged,oftenasaresultofthisprocess.Theseinformationsourceshaveformedthebasisforfindinginformationoutaboutthedetainees.

“Chapter4:TheCaseStudies”scrutinisestheevidenceagainsttheeightAfghans,findingthatfarfromthembeingthe‘worstoftheworst’,theUShasfailedtomakeacompellingcaseagainstanyofthem.Itfirstgivessummariesofthecases,andthenpresentsaforensiclookattheallegationsandevidenceagainsteachoftheeight.Nonewerecapturedonthebattlefield,sointelligenceformsthemainorsolebasisofallegations.Casesarerifewithhearsay,factualerrorsandmisunderstandings,testimonyobtainedunderduressortorture,andsecretevidence.Thosewhohavetriedtofindredressthroughthecourtsorfacedtrialinmilitarytribunalshaveencountereduncertaintyaboutthelaw,repeatedproceduraldelaysandjudgeswhohavebelievedassertionsbythegovernmentinthefaceofdeepflawsinitsevidence.

“Chapter5:Conclusion”containssomefinalreflectionsonthefailureoftheUSstateandjusticesystemtodealfairlywiththosethestatedetains,andtheconsequencesofthisfailure.

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2.EASILYDETAINED:USPOST-2001DETENTIONPOLICIESINAFGHANISTAN

2.1CreatinganEnemytoDetainIntheearlyyearsoftheintervention,theUScarriedoutmassdetentionsinAfghanistan.Thiswasdrivenpartlybyagenuinefearthat‘another9/11’mighthappenifplotswerenotuncoveredswiftly,somethingwhichcreatedarisk-averseattitudetoearlyreleases:noonewantedtobethepersonwhoreleasedthedetaineewhoknewthelocationofOsamabinLadenordetailsofthenextplotagainstAmerica.Thedetentionswerealsopushed,however,bythemistakenassumptionthatremnantsoftheTalebantofightdidactuallyexist.Intermsofforcesstillfighting,suchremnantsnolongerexisted.TherewouldbenoTaleban‘resistance’tospeakofuntilearly2003andeventhatwasverypatchyandverylocal;ittookseveralyearsfortheinsurgencytoreallytakeoff.

Inreality,foranyonewhoknewAfghanistanandwasthereinlate2001,theoppositewastrue.TheTaleban’sdefeathadbeentotal.BarelyasingleAfghanhadralliedtotheircauseandthecollapsetheyhadsuffered–military,politicalandpsychological–hadbeenswiftandabsolute.

AlQaedaandotherforeignfighters,wheretheycould,fledtoPakistan.Talebanfootsoldiersandcommanderslargelywenthome,acceptingdefeatandhopingtolivepeacefully.ManyoftheseniorleadersdidcrossintoPakistan,but,atthesametime,reachedouttofigurestheyknewinthenewadministrationtotrytogetsecurityguaranteessothattheycouldgohome;suchguaranteeswerenecessaryasmanyhadenemiesorrivalsamongthevictoriousAfghancommandersandcivilianpoliticians,includingHamedKarzaihimself.

In2001,Afghans,includingTaleban,thoughtpeacehadcomeandthreedecadesofwarwasover.ThisideawascentraltotheBonnAgreementwhichheraldedthepost-Talebaneraandwhichbegan:“DeterminedtoendthetragicconflictinAfghanistanandpromotenationalreconciliation,lastingpeace,stabilityandrespectforhumanrightsinthecountry...”11TheTaleban,however,wereneverviewedaspartofthatnational

11AgreementOnProvisionalArrangementsInAfghanistanPendingTheRe-EstablishmentOfPermanentGovernmentInstitutions,[‘theBonnAgreement’]signed5December2001,http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/AF_011205_AgreementProvisionalArrangementsinAfghanistan%28en%29.pdf.

reconciliation.Somesoughttosurrender,offeringloyaltytothosewhohadcomeoutonthewinningsideintheUSinterventioninreturnforprotection.SuchreconciliationisnormalAfghanpractice,fundamentaltonotionsofstatesmanship,andhowvictorsandvanquishedbehave.Traditionally,surrenderwouldbeginwitheldersapproachingthewinningpartywithguaranteesofgoodbehaviourbythosewhohadbeendefeated.

…thevictoriouspowerrespondsbydemandingthatthefightershandovertheirweaponsandanyothergovernmentpropertythattheymighthavewiththem.Thevictorthenpledgesnottoundertakeanyhostileactagainsttheformerenemies…[T]hefinaloutcomemaybesubjugation(theformercombatantgoeshomeonparole)orco-option(theformercombatantsareintegratedintothevictoriousarmyoritsnewadministration).In2001,manydefeatedTalibaninvokedthisformofreconciliation,handinginweaponsandofficialassetstotheNorthernAllianceorpro-Karzaicommandersandreturningtotheirvillageshopingtobeabletoreintegrate…Theavailabilityofsuchtraditionalmechanismsmeansthatcombatantscanmakeanexitfromtheconflictwithsomedignity.Thistraditionalformofsubjugationandco-optionhasbeenfrequentlyusedsincetheSovietinterventionandhascontributedsignificantlytoconflictmanagementandtorapidstabilizationafteramainconflicthasbeensettled.12

ThemostfamousexampleofsurrendercameinearlyDecember2001;adelegationofTalebanleadersmetHamedKarzai,newlyselectedasAfghanistan’sinterimleaderattheBonnConferenceandthenontheoutskirtsofKandaharwithhisforces.Thedelegation,withMullahOmar’sblessing,hadcometodiscusstermsandincludedtheoldregime’sdefenceminister,Obaidullah,andtwoofitsmostseniormilitaryleaders,AbdulGhaniBaradarandAbdulWahid(knownas‘Rais-eBaghran’).Itdidnotsucceed.ThelettertheydeliveredtoKarzaihasnotsurvived,butbothTalebanandgovernmentofficialshavesaiditacknowledgedtheTaleban’s‘IslamicEmirate’hadnochanceofsurvivingandacceptedKarzaiasthenewinterimleader.

ThemainrequestoftheTalibanofficialsinthisgroupwastobegivenimmunityfromarrestinexchangeforagreeingtoabstainfrompoliticallife.Atthisjuncture,theseleadingTaliban

12MichaelSemple,ReconciliationinAfghanistan,UnitedStatesInstituteforPeace,2009,http://www.usip.org/publications/reconciliation-in-afghanistan,14-15.



members(aswellastherankandfile)didnotappeartoviewthegovernmentanditsforeignbackersasnecessitatinga1980s-typejihad.SomemembersevensawthenewgovernmentasIslamicandlegitimate.13

AfewTalebanmanagedtogetthenecessarysecurityguarantees,14butgenerally,UShostility15andadesiretosettlescoresonthepartofmanyamongtheAfghanvictorspreventedsuchsurrenders.Itwasnotjustthedetentionsinthemselvesthatweresoproblematic,itwashowtheywereconductedandwhomtheyempowered.Alltoooften,arrestsofTalebanandothersweremadebyforcedentryintohomes.This,forAfghans,wasanunforgivablebreachofpersonalhonour.Womenlivinginseclusionweredisturbedandmenwhoweredetainedcouldfindthemselvesstripped,theirbeardsshavenandharassedbymilitarydogswhichareseenasunclean.Somedetaineeswerealsotortured.

DetentionsbyUS-alliedAfghangroupswereoftenaccompaniedbytheextortionofmoneyandlootingofproperty.Theyfrequentlyrespondedtoattemptsatsurrenderwithdisarmamentatgunpointandwithlooting,beatings,rape,andkillings.16BeingalliedtotheUSmilitaryoftengavelocalAfghanforceseffectiveimpunity,amplifyingtheirabilitytobothcommitcrimeandtargetrivals.ThenewlyempoweredAfghancommandersbehavedasifthepresenceofUSforcesontheirsidemeantthattheoldrulesnolongerexistedandthatlong-termpeacecouldgohand-in-handwiththepersecutionofformerenemies.Intheend,however,arbitrarydetentionwouldbeamajorfactorsparkinginsurgencyandrenewedconflict.

13AnandGopal,TheBattleforAfghanistan:MilitancyandConflictinKandahar,NewAmericanFoundation,November2010,https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/4336-the-battle-for-afghanistan/kandahar_0.685663454461452584d08faeae6d538b.pdf.14Thereweresomesuccessfuldefectionsenmasse.SeeThePoliticsOfDisarmamentAndRearmamentInAfghanistan,DeedeeDerksen,May2015,UnitedStatesInstituteforPeace,15.15USSecretaryofDefenceDonaldRumsfeld,hearingofanofferedTalebansurrenderwhichwouldhaveleftMullahOmarliving‘indignity’inKandahar,saidAfghanallieswouldbedroppedifthey“frustratedandopposed”USgoalsandallowedkeyTalebanoralQaedaleadersto“escapejustice.”BrianKnowlton,‘RumsfeldRejectsPlanToAllowMullahOmar‘ToLiveinDignity’:TalibanFightersAgreetoSurrenderKandahar’,TheNewYorkTimes,7December2001,http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/07/news/07iht-attack_ed3__7.html.16Derksen,ThePoliticsofDisarmament,[seeFN14],15.

2.2WhoWastheEnemy?Unlikea‘classic’warwherecombatantswearuniformandareeasilyidentified,TalebanandalQaedawearcivilianclothing.Thismakesmilitarydetentiondifficult.Moreover,intheabsenceofmuchhostileaction,fewdetaineescouldbecapturedonthebattlefield.Instead,intelligencewastherationalebehindmostdetentions.Unfortunately,theUSmilitaryandCIAstillonlyhadasketchyideaofAfghanistanandwerepoorlyequippedtojudgewhomightbeaterrorist.TheyprovedvulnerabletomanipulationbyAfghanswhowantedtogetsomeonedetainedorkilled.Thepracticeofgivingmoneyforintelligencealsoencouragedopportunisticinformerstodenounceothersasterrorists.17JustoverhalfofthosedetainedatGuantánamowerehandedoverbyAfghanallies(40percent)orbyPakistan(about10percent).(36percentoftheAfghandetaineeswerecaptureddirectlybyUSforces.Theremainderwerepickedupinothercountriesortheinformationisnotclear.)18Thenumberofthosedetainedintotalhasneverbeenreleased.ThisisprobablyduenotonlytotheUSdesireforsecrecy,butalsothechaoticnatureofprocedures.Certainly,however,thousandsofAfghansfoundthemselvesinUShandsintheearlyyearsoftheintervention–before,thatis,anysortofinsurgencyhadbegun.

SeniorTalebandetained...AmongthethousandsdetainedwereanumberofseniorTaleban.TheyincludedmenwhohadfoughtagainstUSforces,howeverbriefly,in2001,includingafewwhohadbeenaccusedofwarcrimes;otherTalebandetaineeshadhadpurelycivilianroles.SeveraloftheTalebanwhowerecapturedhadbeenseekingamnestiesorhad 17OneleafletdroppedbyUSforcessaid:“YoucanreceivemillionsofdollarsforhelpingtheAnti-TalibanForcecatchAl-QaidaandTalibanmurderers.Thisisenoughmoneytotakecareofyourfamily,yourvillage,yourtribefortherestofyourlife.Payforlivestockanddoctorsandschoolbooksandhousingforallyourpeople.”‘AfghanistanLeaflets:TF11-RP09-1’(undated),fromthewebsite,‘Psywarrior’,http://www.psywarrior.com/afghanleaf40.html.Seealso,‘GuantánamoInmatessaytheyweresold’,AssociatedPress,31May2005,http://www.nbcnews.com/id/8049868/ns/world_news/#.VyojqmPWPjAandtherevelationbyformerpresident,PervezMusharraf,thatPakistancaptured689‘al-Qaedaterrorsuspects’,andhandedmorethan369toWashington,earningbountiestotallingmillionsofdollars.PervezMusharraf,IntheLineofFire,FreePress(2008).18ResearchbyMatthewRubinandAnandGopal(inprogress),kindlyshowntoauthorbyemail,March2016.

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surrenderedorgonehomehopingtolivepeacefully.KhairullahKhairkhwa,governorofHerat,wasdetainedinPakistanafterhehadmetrepresentativesofthenewAfghanleaderHamedKarzaiinanattempttosecureanamnesty.19AbdulHaqWaseq,deputyheadofintelligence,wascapturedinastingoperationwhilehethoughthewasnegotiatinghissurrender.NurullahNuri,headofthenorthernzone,andFazlMazlum,chiefofstaff,werehandedoverbyGeneralDostumorwereseizedfromhiscustodybyUSSpecialOperationsForcesinMazar-eSharifsoonaftertheyhadnegotiatedthesurrenderofthousandsofTalebaninKunduztoNorthernAllianceforces.20AmongtheTalebanprisonerstakenatKunduzandheldbyDostumwereotherseniorandmid-rankingcommanderswhoendedupatGuantánamo,includingShahzada,AbdulQayumZakerandAbdulRaufKhadem.

ThecivilianambassadortoIslamabad,AbdulSalaamZaeef,wasdetainedbyPakistan,handedtoUSforcesandrenderedtoGuantánamo.HewasreleasedtohousearrestinKabulin2005andeventuallybecameafreeman,amongotherthings,settingupagirlsschoolinKabul.21Shahazada,releasedin2003,joinedthejust-declaredinsurgencyandwaskilledthefollowingyear.ZakerandKhademweretransferredtoPul-eCharkhijailinKabulin2007andreleasedbytheKarzaiadministrationin2008;bothwentontojointheinsurgency,risingthroughtherankstoleadershippositions.

ThereleasesoftenshowedthattheGuantánamosystemwasnotproperlyworkingoutwhodetaineeswere.Humanrightsactivistswerehorrified,forexample,whentheydiscoveredShahazadahadbeenreleased.Detailedtestimonypointingtohisresponsibilityformassacresof

19AnandGopal,NoGoodMenAmongtheLiving:American,theTalibanandtheWarthroughAfghanEyes,NewYork,MetropolitanBooksHenryHoltandCompany,2014,193;BetteDam’sAManandaMotorCycle:HowHamidKarzaicametopower,Utrecht:IpsoFacto,2014.20ThesefourmenwouldlaterbereleasedinexchangeforUSservicemanBoweBergdahl,alongwithNabiOmari,aminorTalebwithgoodconnectionswhowasalsocapturedinastingoperation.SeeKateClark,‘Freeingthe‘GuantanamoFive’2:KafkainCuba,11March2012,AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/freeing-the-guantanamo-five-2-kafka-in-cuba/;and‘ReleasingtheGuantanamoFive?1:BiographiesofthePrisoners(amended)’,9March2012,AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/releasing-the-guantanamo-five-1-biographies-of-the-prisoners-amended/.21AbdulSalaamZaeef,MyLifewiththeTaliban,London,Hurst2011.

Afghancivilianshadbeenavailable,but,in2003,theBushadministrationwasstillkeepingdetainees’identitiessecret.“U.S.officialswereapparentlyunawareofthecommander’spastrecord,”onehumanrightsreportsaid,“whichindicateseitheraseriousintelligencefailureorindifferencetowarcrimesthatdonotfallundertheofficialdesignationof´terroristacts.’”22TheauthorscalledontheUStoindictanotherallegedwarcriminal,Fazl(whowasfamousenoughforhispresenceatGuantánamotobeknown),butthisdidnothappen.

…andtheotherdetaineesTalebandetaineeswere,however,intheminority.Intheearlyyearsoftheintervention,almostanyonecouldbedetained.ThemassdetentionswentfarbeyondactualTalebancommandersandseniorofficials.TheyincludedthoseassociatedwithTalebanfiguresonlybyclanortribe.TherewerealsoAfghanswhohadworkedforthestateduringtheTalebanera,eventhoughmostAfghansinpublicsectorjobsduringtheTalebanerahadbeeninthosejobsbefore1996andafter2001andconsideredthemselvescivilservants.InUSmilitaryminds,however,therewasoftenaconflationbetweentheTalebanandpre-2001civilservants.Wronglydetainedpeopleincludedmenwhohadnopublicprofileandotherswhowerepartofthepost-Talebanestablishment.TheyalsoincludedthosewhohadopposedtheEmirateandwelcomedtheUSinterventionin2001.

Intryingtofathomwhydetaineeswerecaptured,ratherthantryingtofigureouttheirlinkstotheTalebanoralQaeda,itoftenmakesmoresensetolookatthelocalalliesofUSforcesandtheirrelationshipwiththedetainee.Understandingtheparticulartribalandfactionalcontext,andfactoringinanyopportunitiestomakemoney,oftenclarifiesotherwisebizarredetentions.Hereareafewexamples:

• InKunar,theanti-Taleban,Salafistleader,HajiRohullahWakil,hadbeenchosentorepresenttheprovinceinanationalgathering,theEmergencyLoyaJirga,inJune2002.Twomonthslater,inAugust2002,hewasdetainedandtakentoGuantánamo.23Itseemsarival,keentoscoopuploggingbusinessandcontractsforcounter-narcoticsworkandthebuildingofUSbases,hadtoldtheUShewasa

22AfghanistanJusticeProject,CastingShadows,[seeFN2],9.23HajiSahibRohullahWakilAssessment(2005)ISN798,http://projects.nytimes.com/Guantanamo/detainees/798-haji-sahib-rohullah-wakil/documents/11#search/p3/Loya%20Jirga.



terrorist.RohullahWakil’sdetentionwas“widelyseenasatippingpointinturningtheprovinceagainstthenewgovernmentandtheUnitedStates.”24

• Inthesouth,vanBijlertreported,Uruzgan’sfirstpost-Talebangovernor,JanMuhammad,amanwithclose,long-standingtiestotheKarzaifamily,“usedhisrelationswithUSSpecialForcesandhisreputationasaneffectiveTalibanhuntertotargetawiderangeoftriballeadersandformerTalebanofficials,particularlyfromtheGhilzaiandPanjpaitribes.”25

• InKandahar,“entiretribes,liketheIshaqzaiinMaiwand,adistrictwestofKandaharCity…weresystematicallytargetedanddenouncedasTaleban.”26ThetribesinMaiwandhadindeedsupportedtheTalebanwhentheyfirstcametopowerin1994,but“USforceswereunabletorecognizewhenthosesametribesswitchedallegiancesin2001.”27ThiswaspreciselywhatmadeMaiwandsolucrativeintheeyesofthenewUS-alliedgovernor,GulAghaShirzai,andhismen:“Therewereweaponstoberequisitioned,tribalelderstobeshakendown,rewardmoneytobecollected–boundlessprofitstobemade.”28

• InPaktia,aprovincewherepopularrevolthaddriventheTalebanfrompower,29somealQaedafightersheldoutintheShahikotmountainsinZurmatdistrict.InMarch2002,withsomelocalTalebansupport,theyfoughtUSforces.ItmighthaveseemedablackandwhitetasktothenworkwithlocalalliestofindanddetainthefinalTalebanandalQaedasympathisersinZurmat.Inreality,theUSenteredaminefieldofduplicitousalliesandoldconflicts–KhalqicommunistsversusmujahedinandHarakat-eEnqelabversus

24ChristopherDKolenda,RachelReid,ChrisRogersandMarteRetzius,TheStrategicCostsofCivilianHarm:ApplyingLessonsfromAfghanistantoCurrentandFutureConflicts,OpenSocietiesFoundations,June2016,24.SeealsoGopal,NoGoodMen,[seeFN19],139-143.25MartineVanBijlert‘UnrulyCommandersandViolentPowerStruggles:TalibanNetworksinUruzgan’,Chapter7inAntonioGiustozzi(ed)DecodingtheNewTaliban:InsightsfromtheAfghanField(NewYork/Chichester:ColumbiaUniversityPress/Hurst,2009),158.26VanLinschotenetal,AnEnemy,[seeFN3],261.27Gopal,NoGoodMen,[seeFN19],114.28Gopal,NoGoodMen,[seeFN19],114.29Authorobservations.SeealsoKateClark,‘2001TenYearson(3):ThefallofLoyaPaktiaandwhytheUSpreferredwarlords’,AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,24November2011,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/2001-ten-years-on-3-the-fall-of-loya-paktia-and-why-the-us-preferred-warlords/.

Hezb-eIslamiversusJamiat-eIslami,aswellastribalfeuds.

SomeTalebanweredetained,buttherewerealsomembersofthepre-Taleban,local,politicalleadership,opponentsofthe‘IslamicEmirate’,ordinaryfolk,andtwo14-year-oldboys,AsadullahandNaqibullah,whowerebeingkeptandrapedbyapro-Americancommander(hefelloutoffavourwithhisUSalliesandendedupinBagram).Oneofthemaindenouncerswastheprovincialpolicechief,AbdullahMujahed,aJamiatcommander,USallyand,saidpeopleinPaktia,oneofthemainsourcesofcrimeintheprovince;hewashimselfeventuallyalsosenttoGuantánamoalongwithanumberofhisdrivers,cooks,andguards.30PolicemanNurAgha,describedhowhewasdetainedandtorturedonatinyUSbase,spending“days…hangingfromaprisonceiling.”InZurmat,hesaid,“Therewasnooneleftstandingintheend.Itwasasifthewholesystemjustdevouredeveryone.”31

Otheraccusations:alQaedaandHezb-eIslamiTheweaknessinAmericanunderstandingofthecountrywasalsoshownintheirconflationoftheTaleban,Hezb-eIslamiandalQaedaandotherforeignjihadistorganisations.ManyAfghansinGuantánamowereaccusedofbelongingtotheTalebanandalQaeda,ortoawholeofstringorganisations,includingsomethatwerenon-jihadistoranti-jihadist.Foracountrywheremembershipofafightinggroupusuallyhassomebasisinasolidaritygrouping–clan,tribe,ethnicgrouporpastcomradeship–accusationsofmultiple,overlappingmembershipsmakenosense.

Moreover,thechancesofanAfghanbeingamemberofalQaedaatthistimeweresotinythatsuchanaccusationwouldneedmoreexplanationthanthewordofalocalcommander.BinLaden’sgrouphadbeenanoverwhelminglyArabjihadistorganisationinAfghanistanuptill9/11andonewhichnotevenalljihadistArabsinthecountryhadbelongedto.AftertheUSintervention,‘alQaeda’wentfromanentityscarcelyspokenaboutinTaleban-controlledAfghanistan(peoplereferredto‘theArabs’or,inreferencetoalltheforeignersfightinginthecountry,‘theTaleban’sguests’)toa

30Gopal,NoGoodMen,[seeFN19],134-139.SeealsoClark,‘2001TenYearson(3)…’,[seeFN29].31Gopal,NoGoodMen,[seeFN19],138.

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commonclaimandinsulttoflingatone’senemieswithoutneedforevidenceorfurtherexplanation.32

Afghanistanisacountryinwhicheveryforeignorganisation,whetherthemilitary,embassies,mediabureaux,humanrightsorganisations,orindeedalQaeda,needsAfghanstofacilitatetheirwork.Thequestionofwhenajobtranslatesintoadherencetotheideologicalaimsoftheemployerorloyaltytohiscauseisacrucialissuehere.Before2001,Afghanscouldworkforoneof‘theArabs’withoutknowingorcaringabouthisaims.After2001,itwouldbedifficulttoarguesuchassociationswereinnocentorjustbasedonneedingajob;alQaeda’snotorietywasthentoowellentrenched.

MembersoftheAfghanmujahedinfaction,Hezb-eIslami,werealsoatriskofdetention.ItactuallyploughedahighlydistinctivepathimmediatelyafterthefalloftheTalebanandintheyearsthereafter.Itsleader,GulbuddinHekmatyar,madecontradictorystatementsinlate2001/early2002abouttheUS-ledinterventionandthenewgovernment,beforeeventuallycomingoutasimplacablyopposed.33AsectionofHezb-eIslamiwentontoformpartofthepost-2001insurgencyasanexceptionallyjuniorplayerand,inFebruary2003,HekmatyarwasplacedontheUS34andUN35

32Forascholarly,in-depthlookatthisissue,seeVanLinschotenetal,AnEnemy,[seeFN3].33Afterthe9/11attacks,Hekmatyar,speakingfromIranwherehehadlivedsincetheTalebancapturedKabulin1996,threatenedtofightwiththeTalebanagainstanyAmericaninvasion(‘IranReport:November5,2001’,RadioLiberty,5November2001,http://www.rferl.org/a/1342853.html).However,oneofhissons-in-law,HumayunJarir,wasarepresentativeattheBonntalksinDecember2001whichestablishedthenewpost-2001Afghanpolity(IranReport:November26,2001’,RadioLiberty,26November2001,http://www.rferl.org/a/1342856.html).HethencondemnedthenewAfghangovernmentandhishosts,Iran,forsupportingit(‘IranReport:February11,2002,RadioLiberty,http://www.rferl.org/a/1342769.html)andsaidhewouldorganiseforcestofightUStroops;IranexpelledHekmatyarinFebruary2002.‘Iran‘expels’Afghanwarlord’,BBC,26February,2002,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1842427.stm34‘U.S.DesignatesGulbuddinHekmatyaraTerrorist’,StatementbyU.S.DepartmentofState,19February2003,http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2003/02/[email protected]#axzz4LN0w6xor.35NarrativeSummariesOfReasonsForListingQDI.088GulbuddinHekmatyar,SecurityCouncilCommitteePursuanttoResolutions1267(1999)1989(2011)and2253(2015)ConcerningISIL(Da’esh)Al-QaidaandAssociatedIndividualsGroupsUndertakingsandEntities,20February2003,

sanctionslistsas,respectivelyaterroristand“associatedwithAl-Qaida,UsamabinLadenortheTaliban.”NootherHezbifiguresweresanctioned,norwasthefactionitself.36Therewerealsomoves,however,fromtheverybeginningbyseniorpartymemberstoopenlyorganiseasapoliticalpartyinsideAfghanistan.MostseniorHezbiscamebacktoAfghanistanafterthefalloftheTalebanandmanyeventuallymanagedtojointhegovernment,becomingministers,governorsand–currently–oneofthedeputyCEOs.AlegalHezb-eIslamipartywasallowedtoregisterin2005.

FewseniorHezbisweredetainedbytheUS.OneexceptionwasHekmatyar’sson-in-law,GhairatBahir,whowasdetainedinPakistan,alongwithhisdriver,GulRahman,bytheISI.HewashandedovertotheCIAinsidePakistanandrenderedtoablacksiteinAfghanistan.Bothmenweretortured;GulRahmanfrozetodeathincustody.37However,asurprisinglylargenumberofAfghandetaineesatGuantánamowere‘accused’ofbeingHezb-eIslami.Often,themerefactthattheyortheirfamilymembershadfoughtwiththefactionagainsttheSovietarmyinthe1980swascitedasevidenceoftheirbeing‘enemycombatants’.Thisisinexplicable.Inthe1980s,Hezb-eIslamiwasAmerica’smostfavouredallyamongthemujahedinfactionsthenfightingitsColdWarenemy,theUSSRandthelargestrecipientofUSfundingandweapons.38Moreover,whateveranyonemayormaynothavedoneinthe1980s,itsaidnothing,initself,abouttheircombatantstatusinthe2000s.Yet,forthoseintentonmakingfalseaccusationstoUSforcesformoneyorbecauseof

https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/gulbuddin-hekmatyar.36On29September2016,apeaceagreementwassignedbyHekmatyarandPresidentGhani.BorhanOsman,‘PeaceWithHekmatyar:Whatdoesitmeanforbattlefieldandpolitics?’,AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,29September2016,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/peace-with-hekmatyar-what-does-it-mean-for-battlefield-and-politics/.37GlobalizingTorture:CIASecretDetentionandExtraordinaryRendition,OpenSocietyFoundations,February2013,https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/globalizing-torture-cia-secret-detention-and-extraordinary-rendition,33,53.38HumanRightsWatch,BloodStainedHands:PastAtrocitiesinKabulandAfghanistan’sLegacyofImpunity,July2005,http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0605.pdf,15.



personalorfactionalrivalry,itwaseasytotargetsomeoneassociatedwithHezb-eIslami.39

PakistaniinvolvementBahirandGulRahmanwerejusttwoofhundredsofmendetainedbyPakistanandhandedovertotheUSas‘terrorists’.FormerpresidentGeneralPervezMusharrafhasadmittedhiscountrymademillionsofdollarsfromUSbountiesforsuchdetainees.40Therenditionswerepartofawider,years-longpatternofarbitraryarrests,torture,anddisappearancesinPakistan,withthegovernment,asthedirectorattheHumanRightsCommissionofPakistan,I.A.Rehman,describedit,“usingthecoverofthefightagainstterrortodecimateandsuppresspoliticaloppositionwithinthecountry.”41AmongthedetaineeswereAfghans,Pakistanisandmembersofothernationalities;somehadlinkstoalQaedaortheTaleban,whileothershadjustrunafoulofthePakistaniauthorities.

2.3InterrogationandTortureUSinterrogationsinAfghanistanusuallystartedlocallyinwhatwerecalledFieldDetentionSites,asGopalhasdescribed:

InterrogatorstheretypicallywouldhavealimitedgraspofAfghanpolitics,andintelligencewouldbepoorlyshared,soepicconfusionsusuallyensued.Theunitapprehendingyoumighthavearelationshipwithonestrongman,forinstance,whileyouworkedforanotherstrongmantiedtoadifferentwingoftheUSmilitaryortheCIA.Inthisway,hundredsofAfghansworkingforpro-

39OnefactorinthiswasthatHezb-eIslami’soldfactionalenemy,Shura-yeNizar/Jamiat-eIslami,wasinapositionofconsiderablepowerafteritcapturedKabulinNovember2001andgainedcontroloftheministriesofdefenceandinteriorandtheNDS(seepages8-9).Insomecases,itappearstohavedenouncedformerHezbicommandersandfighterstotheAmericans.TheShura-yeNizar-controlledNDSalsomademassarrestsinApril2002ofHezb-eIslamileaders(includingthreefuturegovernors)meetingopenlyinKabul.Author’sradioreport(textonfile,noURL),2April2016andKateClark,‘TalkingtotheTaliban:ABritishperspective’,3July2013,AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/talking-to-the-taliban-a-british-perspective/,whichquotesoriginalreportingbyauthorinApril200240Musharraf,InTheLineofFire.[seeFN17].41Authorinterviewfortelevisionreport,‘OnthetrailofPakistan’s“disappeared”‘,Channel4News,9March2007,videonolongeravailable.

AmericancommanderswoundupensnaredbyoneoftheCoalition’smanytentacles.42

Fromthere,theUSmilitarycommandtransferredsomeofthedetaineestoBagramorKandaharAirfield.

Youwouldthenbequestionedbyanewsetofinterrogators,whomadelittleattempttoreconcileexistingintelligencewithanyfreshinformationthattheyobtained.Yourjourneywouldlikelyendhere,lockedawayformonthsorevenyears—unlessyouwereoneamongthetwohundredAfghansdestinedforGuantánamowhereyouwouldbeassessedbyofficialseverfartherremovedfromthebattlefield,withevenfoggierknowledgeofthecountry’spolitics.AresultofthiscascadeofbureaucraticinefficiencieswasthatonlyahandfulofGuantánamo’sAfghaninmateswouldturnouttobeTalibanmembersofanyimport.43

Torturecouldbepracticedateverystageinthedetentionprocedureandwassystemic(eventhoughnoteveryonewastortured).Thishasbeendocumentedindetail,includingbyhumanrightsorganisations,44theUSgovernment45andtheUSSenateinvariousreportslookingintotheuseoftortureinGuantánamo,AfghanistanandIraqbythemilitary46andtheCIA.47Journalistsalsoreportedontheabuseofdetainees,includingthisauthorwhospoketoformerdetaineesinPaktiaandaformerinterpreterwhohadworkedinvariousinterrogationcentres,includinginPaktia,

42Gopal,NoGoodMen,[seeFN19],144.43Gopal,NoGoodMen,[seeFN19],144.44EnduringFreedomAbusesbyU.S.ForcesinAfghanistan,HumanRightsWatch,March2004,http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0304.pdf.45TheInternationalCenterforTransitionalJustice(ICTJ)haslistedvariousgovernmentinvestigations(uptill2008),ResearchBrief:SelectedexamplesofDefence,IntelligenceandJusticeInvestigativeReportsintodetentionandinterrogationpractices,2November2008,https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-USA-Accountability-AgencyInvestigations-ResearchBrief-Nov08.pdf.46UnitedStatesSenateInquiryintotheTreatmentofDetaineesinU.S.Custody,CommitteeonArmedServices,20November2008,http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Detainee-Report-Final_April-22-2009.pdf.47StudyoftheCentralIntelligenceAgency’sDetentionandInterrogationProgram,TheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence,12December2014,http://gia.guim.co.uk/2014/12/torture-report-doc/torture_report.pdf.

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KunarandKhost.48Detaineeaccountshavealsobeenpublished.49Methodsusedincludedbeingdeprivedofsleepfordays,fooddeprivation,beingcontinuouslyshackled,beingforcedtokneelorstandinpainful‘stresspositions’forextendedperiods,beingbeaten,kicked,soakedincoldwater,beingstrippedandsexuallyhumiliated,andbeingforcedtolistentomusicloudenoughtodeafenforhoursatatime.TheinterpreterinterviewedbythisauthorhadbeensenttothebazaarinKhosttobuyloudspeakersforjustthispurpose.AhandfulofprisonersareknowntohavebeenkilledinUScustodybecauseoftorture,50includingtwobeatentodeathinBagram,adetaineewhodiedinKunarafterbeingdeniedwaterandthebrotherofananti-Talebanmilitiacommander,CommanderParreinZurmat,Paktia,whohadbeendenouncedasaterroristbyUSallyProvincialPoliceChiefAbdullah(seepages15-16)andwasreportedbeatentodeathbyUSforces.51TorturewasalsopracticedbyAfghanforces,includinginstateandprivatedetentionfacilities,and,inPakistan,bytheISI.

2.4‘TheWorstoftheWorst’?Eventuallyandovermanyyears,legalchallengesanddeterminedinvestigationsbyjournalistsandhumanrightsgroupshaverevealedjusthowdisingenuoustheBushadministrationhasbeenincontinuingtosaythedetaineesinCubawerealldangerousmenwhohadbeen“pickedupoffthebattlefield,”hadbeentryingtokillAmericanforcesandwere“terrorists,bombmakersandfacilitatorsofterror,”“trainers…recruiters,financiers,[OsamabinLaden’s]bodyguards,would-besuicide

48InterviewswereforaradiopieceairedontheBBC’s‘TheWorldTonight’.Audionolongeravailable,butcut-downtextversionavailablehere:KateClark‘AfghanstellofUSprisonordeals’,BBC,21July2005,http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4648959.stm.49See,forexample,MoazzamBeggandVictoriaBrittainEnemyCombatant:ABritishMuslim'sJourneyToGuantanamoandBack,London,FreePress,2006andZaeef,MyLife…[seeFN21].50Fordetails,seeHumanRightsWatch,EnduringFreedom:Abuses,[seeFN44].51CraigPyesandKevinSack,‘TwoDeathsWerea“ClueThatSomething’sWrong”‘,TheLosAngelesTimes,25September2006,http://www.latimes.com/news/la-na-torture25sep25-story.html;CraigPyesandKevinSack,‘U.S.ProbingAllegedAbuseofAfghans’,TheLosAngelesTimes,21September2004,http://articles.latimes.com/2004/sep/21/world/fg-detain21.SeealsoGopal,NoGoodMen,138,[seeFN19].

bombers,probablythe20th9/11hijacker.”52ThefirstinklingofhowarbitrarilythedetentionshadcomeaboutwasairedayearafterthecampinGuantánamohadbeensetup,inDecember2002.MilitaryofficersfromGuantánamo,reportedTheLosAngelesTimes,werecomplainingaboutthe‘poorquality’ofdetaineesbeingsent:

Atleast59detainees–nearly10%oftheprisonpopulation…–weredeemedtobeofnointelligencevalueafterrepeatedinterrogationsinAfghanistan….Noneofthe59metU.S.screeningcriteriafordeterminingwhichprisonersshouldbesenttoGuantánamoBay,militarysourcessaid.Butallweretransferredanyway,sourcessaid,forreasonsthatcontinuetobaffleandfrustrateintelligenceofficersnearlyayearafterthefirstgroupofdetaineesarrivedatthefacility.53

ThepapersaidclassifiedintelligencereportsdescribeddozensofAfghanandPakistanidetaineeswhowere“farmers,taxidrivers,cobblersandlabourers.Somewerelow-levelfightersconscriptedbytheTalibanintheweeksbeforethecollapseoftherulingAfghanregime.”54AsmoreinformationaboutthoseheldatGuantánamocameout,thelegalbasisandindeedtherationaleformanyofthedetentionswasunfathomable.

ThosetakentoCubaincludedoldmen,amongthemelderswhothemselvesor,throughtheirsons,werepartofthenew,post-Talebanpoliticalestablishmentandalsomenwithdementiaandosteoarthritis.55Atleastfifteenminorswerealso

52Allquotesinthetextarefrom2005from(inorder)PresidentBush,theWhiteHousepresssecretary,VicePresidentCheneyandSecretaryofDefenceRumsfeld.StuartTaylor,‘FalsehoodsAboutGuantánamo’,TheAtlantic,27June2005,http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/02/falsehoods-about-Guantánamo/304632/.SeealsoKatharineQSeelye‘ThreatsandResponses:TheDetainees;SomeGuantanamoPrisonersWillBeFreed,RumsfeldSays’TheNewYorkTimes,23October2002,http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/23/world/threats-responses-detainees-some-Guantanamo-prisoners-will-be-freed-rumsfeld.htmland‘Obamaadminsettotransferupto24moredetaineesfromGitmo,FoxNewsPolitics,25May2016,http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/05/25/obama-admin-set-to-transfer-up-to-24-more-detainees-from-gitmo.html.53GregMiller,‘ManyHeldatGuantánamoNotLikelyTerrorists’,LosAngelesTimes,22December2002,http://articles.latimes.com/2002/dec/22/nation/la-na-gitmo22dec22.54Miller,‘ManyHeldatGuantánamo…’,[seeFN53].55Forexample,HajiNasratKhan68,astrokevictim,withdiabetes,highbloodpressureandchroniclowerback



takentoGuantánamo,fiveofthemundertheageof16,56includingthetwoboyswhohadbeenkeptandsexuallyabusedbythecommanderinZurmat.57Itcouldtakedetaineesyearstogethome,eveniftheywereclearedforrelease.ThetwoboysfromZurmatwereeventuallyfreedafter20months,buteventhen,despiterealisingthatonehadbeengang-rapedanddescribingtheotherasa“childconscript,”themilitaryfeltithadtojustifytheirtransfer:

Thoughthedetaineemaystillhavesomeremainingintelligence,it’sbeenassessedthatthatinformationdoesnotoutweighthenecessitytoremovethejuvenilefromthiscurrentenvironmentandaffordhimtheopportunityto“growout”oftheradicalextremismhehasbeensubjectto.

Gettingclearedforrelease,however,wasonlythefirsthurdle.WhatmadeitsodifficulttoactuallygetoutofGuantánamoisthesubjectofthenextchapter.

3.SOURCESOFINFORMATIONANDTHESHIFTINGLEGALLANDSCAPE

3.1LegalComplexitiesandObstacles

pain,was“anadmittedretired[Hezb-eIslamiGulbuddin]commander”withsupposedinfluenceovertheHezbileadership“throughhissons”(oneofwhom,Izzat,alsoadetaineeatGuantánamo,wouldlaterbeelectedanMP).WhenNasratKhanwastransferredtoAfghanistanin2006,theauthoritieshadtouseawheelchairtogethimtotheplane.HajiNasratKhan,Assessment,ISN1009,2005,http://projects.nytimes.com/Guantanamo/detainees/1009-haji-nasrat-khan/documents/11).OrMohammedSadiq,89,whohaddementia,majordepression,andosteoarthritisandhadbeenfoundwithaThurayasatellitephonehecouldnotoperate.MohammedSadiqAssessment,ISN349,2002,http://projects.nytimes.com/Guantanamo/detainees/349-mohammed-sadiq.56‘Guantánamo’sChildren:TheWikileakedTestimonies’,CenterfortheStudyofHumanRightsintheAmericas,UniversityofCalifornia,Davis,22March22,2013,http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/reports/Guantánamos-children-the-wikileaked-testimonies/Guantánamos-children-the-wikileaked-testimonies.Otherstudieshavegivenhighernumbers:detailsareinthisreport.57AsadUllah,ISN912,Assessment,2003,http://projects.nytimes.com/Guantanamo/detainees/912-asad-ullah,http://projects.nytimes.com/Guantanamo/detainees/913-naqib-ullah/documents/11;NaqibUllah,ISN913,Assessment,2003,http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/913-naqib-ullah.

ReadingthroughtheUSmilitaryandcourtdocumentsontheeightAfghansleftinGuantánamo,oneentersaKafkaesqueworldrifewithhearsay,secretevidence,badtranslations,grosserrorsoffact,testimonyobtainedunderduressandtorture,andstrange,vagueaccusations.Thetenuousnatureoftheallegationsagainsttheeightmenwhoarethefocusofthisstudyhasbeenfurthercompoundedbyashiftinglegallandscapeandstatesecrecy.TheUSstatehassoughttokeepeverythingatGuantánamosecretandinformationhasonlybeenrevealedgradually,oftenasaresultofdifferentlegalchallengesandthestate’sresponsetothem,butalsoasaresultofFreedomofInformationAct(FOIA)requests,unlawfuldisclosures(leaks)ofdocumentsandinvestigativereporting.ThenextfewpagesoutlinethelegalitiesunderpinningdetentionsatGuantánamo;themajorsourcesofinformationwhicharecitedinthecasestudiesinChapter4,arehighlightedinboldtohelpthereadernavigatethosestudies.

Theprimary,domestic,legalunderpinningforthecontinuingAfghancampaignandallsubsequentmilitaryactions,includingmilitarydetentions,inthe‘GlobalWaronTerror’(includingthecurrentwarontheIslamicStategroup,butnottheinvasionofIraq)istheAuthorisationoftheUseofMilitaryForce(AUMF).ItwaspassedbyCongressoneweekafterthe9/11attacksandauthorisedthepresidentto:

…useallnecessaryandappropriateforceagainstthosenations,organizations,orpersonshedeterminesplanned,authorized,committed,oraidedtheterroristattacksthatoccurredonSeptember11,2001,orharboredsuchorganizationsorpersons,inordertopreventanyfutureactsofinternationalterrorismagainsttheUnitedStatesbysuchnations,organizationsorpersons.58

TheBushadministrationbelievedexistinglegalnormswereinappropriatefordealingwiththeunprecedentedthreatthecountryfaced.Thenatureoftheenemy–thenon-uniformed,non-state,terroristalQaeda–wascertainlyunusual.TheTaleban,althoughlargelyunrecognisedasAfghanistan’sofficialgovernment,weremorerecognisableasatraditionalstateenemy,butallweretreatedaswhattheBushadministrationcalled‘unprivilegedcombatants’.Itdecidedto

58‘JointResolutiontoauthorizetheuseofUnitedStatesArmedForcesagainstthoseresponsiblefortherecentattackslaunchedagainsttheUnitedStates’,115Stat.224Public107-40,18September2001,https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf.

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housedetaineesoffmainlandAmericaatGuantánamoBay,whereitbelievedfederallawwouldnotapply,tousetortureandallowtheCIAtorunaglobalrenditionprogramme,andtotreatdetaineesnotascriminalsuspectstobeputontrial,orasprisonersofwarunderGenevaConventionsrules,ortogivethemtheminimumprotectionsprescribedincommonarticle3oftheGenevaConventions.59Amongotherthings,itbanstorture,“degradingandhumiliatingtreatment”andthepassingofsentencesunless“byaregularlyconstitutedcourtaffordingallthejudicialguaranteeswhicharerecognizedasindispensablebycivilizedpeoples.”

Oneconsequenceofallthishasbeenconstantlegalchurnsince2001.Therehavebeennewlawsandpresidentialorders,repeatedlegalchallenges,andvaryingcourtrulingsbyjudgestryingtoestablishhowallthiswouldandshouldworkinpractice.Thestate’sauthoritytodetainwithouttrial,trydetaineesinmilitarycourts,suspendthewritofhabeascorpusanddecidenottoapplycommonarticle3toWaronTerrordetaineeshasbeenchallenged–andoftenassessedindifferentwaysbydifferentjudgesandwithdifferentcounter-responsesbythestate.

ThegovernmentdidgetSupremeCourtbackingtousemilitarydetentions,60butsawadefeatinJune2004overhabeascorpus(Rasulv.Bush).Oneoftheoldestrights,whichaimstoprotectindividualsfromarbitrarydetention,ahabeaspetitionforcesthestatetojustifythedetentionofanindividualincourtorreleasehimorher.TherulingmeantGuantánamodetaineescouldusefederalcourtstochallengethelegalityoftheirdetentions.Thisalsomeanttheycouldgetaccesstolegalcounselandaconnectionwiththeoutsideworld.Aspateofhabeaspetitionsensued.61Petitionsweresoonsuspended,however,whilecourtsruledonprocedures.

59PresidentialMemorandum‘HumaneTreatmentofal-QaidaandTalibandetainees’,signed7February2002,https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/CIA.pdf.60Hamdiv.Rumsfeld,542U.S.507(2004),https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-6696.ZO.html.61TherighttohabeaswasnevergrantedatBagramandthenamesofthismuchmorechangingdetaineepopulationwerereleasedjustonce,on22September2009,asaresultofaFOIArequest.‘RedactedListofDetaineesHeldatBagramAirBase’AmericanCivilLibertiesUnion(ACLU),15January2010,https://www.aclu.org/redacted-list-detainees-held-bagram-air-base?redirect=national-security/redacted-list-detainees-held-bagram-air-base.

3.2CombatantStatusReviewTribunalsandAdministrativeReviewBoardsMeanwhile,theexecutivebranchandCongresscreatednewbodieswhichtheyhopedwouldbeasubstituteforhabeascasesandtherebypreventdetaineespetitioningthecourts.TheyestablishedCombatantStatusReviewTribunals(CSRTs)inGuantánamoin2004.Thesewereone-offmilitaryboardswhichdeterminedifdetaineeswere‘enemycombatants’ornot.62FromMarch2005,AdministrativeReviewBoards(ARBs),againstaffedbythemilitary,werecreatedtodetermineonayearlybasiswhetherdetaineescontinuedtobeathreattotheUnitedStatesoritsallies.

TheUSgovernmentsoughttomaketheseboardssecretandittookatwo-yearbattlebytheAssociatedPress,usingmultipleFOIArequestsandthreelawsuits,togetdocumentsreleased.ThefirstreleaseofdocumentsbythePentagonin2005washeavilyredacted;namesandotherinformationwereblackedout.63Itwasonlyin2006thatthefulltexts,summariesandtranscriptsoftheproceedingsofbothboards,werereleased.ThiswasalsowhenthenamesofthoseheldinCubawere,forthefirsttime,published.

TheCSRTsandARBswerenotintendedtobetheequivalentofcriminalcourtsorweighevidencetoacriminalstandard.Indeed,militarydetentionis‘preventative’,aimedatkeepingenemycombatantsoffthebattlefield.However,TalebanandalQaedafighterswearcivilianclothesandmostmendetainedinGuantánamowerethereasaresultofintelligenceandtip-offsand/orastransfereesfromalliesallegingtheywereterrorists.Determiningwhetherthesemenwereactuallycombatantsornotshould,therefore,havebeenreasonablytricky.However,fewwerereleasedbytheseboards.64Itwasdifficultfor

62Anenemycombatantwasdefinedas“anindividualwhowaspartoforsupportingtheTalibanoralQaidaforces,orassociatedforcesthatareengagedinhostilitiesagainsttheUnitedStatesoritscoalitionpartners.Thisincludesanypersonwhocommittedabelligerentactorhasdirectlysupportedhostilitiesinaidofenemyarmedforces.”63BenjaminWittesandZaahiraWyne,TheCurrentDetaineePopulationofGuantanamo:AnEmpiricalStudy,Brookings,16December2008,http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2008/12/16-detainees-wittes,4-5.64MarkDenbeauxandJoshuaDenbeaux,No-HearingHearings,CRST:theModernHabeasCorpus?AnAnalysisoftheProceedingsoftheGovernment’sCombatantStatusReviewTribunalsatGuantanamo,SetonHallPublicLawResearchPaperNo.951245,December2006,http://law.shu.edu/publications/GuantanamoReports/final_no_hearing_hearings_report.pdf.



detaineestodefendthemselves.Theydidhaveachancetospeak,butnorighttocallwitnesses.Nordidtheyhaveindependentlegalcounsel.Detaineeswerenottoldtheprecisenatureofallegationsagainstthemorwhohadmadeaccusations.Theyenjoyednopresumptionofinnocenceandmostallegationsweresimplyasserted,ratherthanbeingbackedupbyevidence.TheusefulnessofthesummariesandtranscriptsoftheCSRTsandARBsforfindingoutinformationaboutthedetaineesandtheallegationsagainstthemwaslimitedbythevaguenessofthechargesandfailuretoproperlyquestionwhatwasasserted,asonegroupofacademicspointedout:

CSRTandARBhearingsarenotjudicialproceedings.Governmentallegationslackthespecificity,detail,andsupportingevidencetypicalofcriminaltrials.Allegationsareoftenvagueandkeyterms—suchas,forexample,“jihad,”“guesthouse,”and“training”—goundefined.Moreover,detaineeslackedaccesstocounseltohelpthempreparetheirresponses,whichtherecordsometimesreproducesinsummaryform,notverbatimtranscript.Insomeinstances,moreover,thedetaineechosetogiveastatementthroughhis“personalrepresentative,”thenon-legalmilitaryofficerassignedtoassistdetaineesintheprocess.Thestatementsareoftenlessthancrystallineintheirclarityandsometimesamenabletoarangeofdifferentinterpretations.Theserecordsinsomeinstancescontaintranslationerrors,andlawyersfordetaineeshavearguedaswellthatsomeapparentadmissionsinvolvedetaineesrepeatingstatementsoriginallygivenunderduressortryingtocurryfavorwithauthorities.65

Eventhoughthemilitaryboardswereflawed,theydidreveal,usuallyforthefirsttime,thegovernment’sallegationsagainsteachindividualdetaineeand,fromthetranscriptsofproceedings,wegotto‘hear’thevoicesofthementhemselves.Thedetaineeswerefrequentlybewildered,astheytriedtoworkoutwhatsortof‘court’thiswasandwherethejusticewas:howcouldtheydefendthemselvesagainstanonymousaccusers?Howcouldtheyexplainmatterswhentheboardsdidnotappeartohaveevenabasicunderstandingoftheircountry?Whywerewitnesses(includingotherdetainees)notallowedtoappear?

65Wittes,TheCurrentDetaineePopulation,[seeFN63],6.

3.3MilitaryTrialsAsecondresponsetotheSupremeCourt’sRasuldecisioncamefromCongresswiththeDetaineeTreatmentActof2005whichstated:“Nocourt,justice,orjudgeshallhavejurisdictionto…consider…anapplicationfor…habeascorpusfiledbyoronbehalfofanaliendetained…atGuantánamo.”66TheactalsoprovidedforthecreationofMilitaryCommissionstoputdetaineesontrialinamilitarycourt.67Therewerevariouspre-trialhearings,butbeforeanyactualtrialcouldbeheld,on29June2006,theSupremeCourtruled(Hamdanv.Rumsfeld)thatthetrialswereillegalundertheUSUniformCodeofMilitaryJusticeandGenevaConventions.68TheSupremeCourtsaidthemilitarytribunalsystemdidnotamountto“aregularlyconstitutedcourtaffordingallthejudicialguaranteeswhicharerecognizedasindispensablebycivilizedpeoples,”asrequiredbycommonarticle3.Inresponse,inOctober2006,CongressenactedtheMilitaryCommissionsAct,whichagaintriedtostripfederalcourtsofthejurisdictiontohearthehabeaspetitionsofGuantánamoprisoners.69InJune2008,theSupremeCourtruled(Boumedienev.Bush)70thatMilitaryCommissionActprocedureswerenotanadequatesubstituteforfederalhabeascorpusreviewandthattheMilitaryCommissiontrialshad,infact,amountedtoanunconstitutionalsuspensionofhabeascorpus.71TherewasmediareportingofMilitaryCommissiontrialsheldunderthe2005DetaineeTreatmentActand2006MilitaryCommissionsAct.

3.4PetitionsforHabeasCorpusIn2008,habeaspetitionsrestarted,butprogresshasbeenslow.Proceduralarguments–whetherdetaineesortheirlawyerscouldseeevidenceand

66DetaineeTreatmentActof2005,Pub.L.No.109-148,119Stat.2739(2005).67Apresidentialorderhadauthorisedmilitarytrialson13November2001,thesamedayKabulfell.Detailsweresparse;theSecretaryofDefencewastobeinchargeofthespecifics.SeeDetention,Treatment,andTrialofCertainNon-CitizensintheWarAgainstTerrorism,66Fed.Reg.57831,16November2001),http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/mo-111301.htm.68Hamdanv.Rumsfeld,548U.S.557(2006).69MilitaryCommissionsActof2006,Pub.L.No.109-366,120Stat.2600,(2006),http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/PL-109-366.pdf.70Boumedienev.Bush,553U.S.723(2008).71ThebarforsuspendinghabeascorpusinAmericaissetbytheconstitutionandisveryhigh:“ThePrivilegeoftheWritofHabeasCorpusshallnotbesuspended,unlesswheninCasesofRebellionorInvasionthepublicSafetymayrequireit.”U.S.Const.art.I,§9.

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whetherthestatecouldaddmaterialtoitscase–havetendedtoslowpetitionsdown.“Ithinkthemodusoperandi,”onelawyertoldtheauthor,“wastodragouttheprocedure.Itkeeps[myclient]inprisononewayoranother.”72Habeascourtdocumentstendtobelessusefulthanmightbeexpectedinprovidinginformationaboutdetaineesandthecasesagainstthembecausetheyarefrequentlyredactedandareoftentodowithproceduralmatters.

Astothehearingsthemselves,thecourtshavedeemedthestandardofevidencerequiredtokeepsomeoneinmilitarydetentiontobemuchlowerthanforcriminalconvictions.Thebarwasloweredstillfurtherbyrulingsin2010(Al-Adahiv.Obama)and2011(Latifv.Obama)whichestablishedthatgovernmentevidenceshouldbepresumedtobeaccurate.73“Carefuljudicialfact-finding,”onestudyfound,“wasreplacedbyjudicialdeferencetothegovernment’sallegations,”withthe“governmentwinningeverypetition.”74

WhatthismeantinpracticewillbeseeninthecasestudiesofthoseAfghanswhosoughttochallengethelegalityoftheirdetentionsthroughhabeaspetitions.Judgeshaveoftenacceptedrawintelligenceasevidenceandmultiplepiecesofevidence,eachindividuallytooweaktopassmuster,whichtogetherproduceanactualorapparent‘mosaic’pointingtoculpability.75Thecourtshavebeenopentothestate’sdesiretokeepsomeevidencesecretfromdefendants,thepublic,andevenlawyers,ongroundsofnationalsecurity.Judgeshavealsobeenopentoacceptingtestimony,both‘confessions’andaccusationsagainstotherdetainees,fromthosewhohavebeentortured.Ratherthandismissingsuchtestimonyoutofhand,theyhaveinsteadtriedtoassesshow‘voluntary’itwas:canalapseoftime

72Defencelawyerwhoaskednottobenamed.AuthorinterviewbySkype,26January2015.73Adahiv.Obama,613F.3d1102(D.C.Cir.2010);Latifv.Obama,666F.3d746,748(D.C.Cir.2011).Fordiscussionofhowthischangedjudges’readingofevidence,seeBenjaminWittes,RobertMChesney,LarkinReynoldsandTheHarvardLawSchoolNationalSecurityResearchCommittee,TheEmergingLawofDetention2.0:TheGuantanamoHabeasCasesasLawmaking,Brookings,April2012,http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2011/5/guantanamo-wittes/05_guantanamo_wittes.pdf.74MarkDenbeaux,JonathanHafetz,SaraBen-David,NicholasStratton,andLaurenWinchester,NoHearingHabeas:D.C.CircuitRestrictsMeaningfulReview,SetonHallUniversitySchoolOfLaw,1May2012,Http://Law.Shu.Edu/Programscenters/Publicintgovserv/Policyresearch/Upload/Hearing-Habeas.Pdf.75Wittesetal,TheEmergingLawofDetention,[seeFN73].

betweentortureandconfessionmakeit‘voluntary’and,ifthetorturewascarriedoutbyoneentity(adifferentUSagencyoraforeignagency).Canalaterconfessiongiventoadifferententitybedeemedtohavebeenfreelygiven?76Onedefencelawyer,CarlosWarner,hasdescribedthesituationassobadthat,“[n]olegitimatecourtsoractualdueprocessexistinGuantánamo.”77

3.5TheWikiLeakedAssessmentsInApril2011,asuddenfloodofnewinformationshowedthattheevidencebehindtheaccusationsmadeagainstthedetaineesinthemedia,themilitaryboards,MilitaryCommissionsandhabeascaseswasfrequentlyweakornon-existent.WikiLeakspublishedinternal,hithertosecret,assessmentsofthedetainees,knownasJointTaskForceGuantanamoDetaineeAssessments.78TheAssessmentscontainedbackgroundinformationonthedetaineesandsomethingoftheirversionsofevents,aswellasallegationsagainstthemandthethreattheyweredeemedtopose.Thereisinformationabouteachperson’scaptureandthereasonsforhistransfertoCubaandcontinuingdetention.Detainees’behaviouratGuantánamoandmentalandphysicalhealthisalsodetailed.Theallegationsmadeareusuallyveryserious,buttheAssessmentsarelitteredwithfactualerrors,grossmisunderstandingsandhearsay.Muchofthesourcingisrawintelligence,definedbytheFBIas“unevaluatedintelligenceinformation,generallyfromasinglesource,thathasnotfullybeen...integratedwithotherinformation,orinterpretedandanalysed.”79AnanalysisofthesourcingbyTomLasseterandCarolRosenbergalsorevealeddependenceon‘supergrasses’,i.e.detaineeswhoinformedonmultipleindividuals:

Theallegationsandobservationsofjusteightdetaineeswereusedtohelpbuildcasesagainstsome255menatGuantanamo—roughlya

76Wittesetal,TheEmergingLawofDetention,[seeFN73],92.77‘Navigatinga“LegalBlackHole”:TheViewfromGuantanamoBay’,CarlosWarner,AkronLawReview,31-51,http://www.akronconlawjournal.com/articles/Article%203%20Warner%20Vol%205%20macro%20for%20posting.pdf,37.78FinalReportGuantanamoReviewTaskForce,20January2010,https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/723757-guantanamo-review-final-report.html.79‘FBIIntelligenceInformationReports(IIRs)DisseminationSystemsFIDS’,internalFBIdocument(undated),releasedthroughFOIA,14December2010,http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/rcs/schedules/departments/department-of-justice/rg-0065/n1-065-10-025_sf115.pdf.



thirdofallwhopassedthroughtheprison.YetthetestimonyofsomeoftheeightwaslaterquestionedbyGuantanamoanalyststhemselves,andtheothersweresubjectedtointerrogationtacticsthatdefenseattorneyssayamountedtotortureandcompromisedtheveracityoftheirinformation…Anylingeringdoubtsabouttheeightmenandthequalityoftheirstatementswererarelylistedwhentheirinformationappearedinthecasefilesofotherdetainees.86

Thereportersnotedthatsuchtestimonyfounditswayintogovernmentevidencepresentedincourt.TheAssessments,themselves,however,were

80Formerintelligenceofficer,quotedinTraverseinSupportofPetitionfortheWritofHabeasCorpus,Mousoviv.Obama,InRePetitionOfHajiWaliMohammedMorafaNo.05-1124(RMC)(Redacted),(D.D.C.15Jan.2010),2,9.81WaliMohammedTraverse,quotingformerintelligenceofficer,[seeFN81],28.82WaliMohammedTraverse,quotingformerintelligenceofficer,[seeFN81],28.83WaliMohammedTraverse,quotingformerintelligenceofficer,[seeFN81],28.84PhilLapsely‘HowtoreadanFBIFile’,4September2008,fromwebsite‘TheExplodingPhone’http://www.historyofphonephreaking.org/writings/htraff/.85Appendix1,‘ListofAcronyms’in‘AReviewoftheFBI’sHandlingofIntelligenceInformationPriortotheSeptember11Attacks,SpecialReport’,November2004(releasedpubliclyJune2005),OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,https://www.oig.justice.gov/special/0506/app1.htm.86TomLasseterandCarolRosenberg,‘WikiLeaks:Just8atGitmogaveevidenceagainst255others’,McClatchyNewspapers,25April2001,http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/special-reports/article24626137.html.

unlawfullydisclosed,andcannotbecitedincourtbydefendantsorhabeaspetitioners.87

3.6GuantánamounderObamaAftertakingpower,Obamasetupanewbody,theGuantánamoDetaineeTaskForce,withmilitaryandnon-militarymembers,toreviewalldetaineecases.88In2010,thetaskforcemadesecretdecisionstodetainindefinitely,transfer,i.e.transferthemfromGuantánamototheirownorathirdcountrywithsecurityguarantees,orprosecute.Threeyearslater,inJune2013,aFOIArequestforcedthepublicationofthesedecisions.89

87Thedocumentswereneverdeclassified,despitebeingleaked,soanyonewithsecurityclearancecannotviewthemoutsidesecurefacilities.Theycanbesubmittedincourt,butonlyinsealedfilingsandcannotbeusedbyattorneystocontributetoorinformthepublicdebate.ScottShane,‘Detainees’LawyersCan’tClickonLeakedDocuments’TheNewYorkTimes,26April2011,http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/guantanamo-files-detainees-lawyers-restricted-leaked-documents.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.88ItwasmadeupofrepresentativesoftheDepartmentsofJustice,Defense,StateandHomelandSecurity,theOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence,andJointChiefsofStaff.FinalReportGuantanamoReviewTaskForce,[seeFN78].89‘GuantanamoReviewDispositions:FinalDispositionsasofJanuary222010’,letterfromtheUSOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneraltoCharlesSavage,ofTheNewYorkTimes,inresponsetohisFOIArequestfor“alistofthenameofeachdetaineeatGuantanamoBayandtheirstatusasdeterminedbytheGuantanamoDetaineeTaskForce,”17June2013,http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/714599-savage-final-response.html.

Box2DetaineeAssessmentAbbreviations–PointerstoSources

AbbreviationsusedinAssessmentsandcourtdocumentsareusefulinrevealingthesourcesofevidenceandallegations.OneofthemostcommonisSIR,shortforSummaryIntelligenceReport.Theseare“essentiallyinterrogators’notessummarizingtheuncorroboratedstatementsasubjectmakesduringaninterrogationsession.”80Incourt,suchreports,ratherthantheactualtranscriptsoftheinterrogation–whichmayhavebeenlostornevermade–arealsooftencited.Itiseasytoseehowmistranslations,misunderstandingsandincorrectinferencesoftheinterrogatorcouldcreepin,giventhatthesearesummariesofinterrogations,notverbatimtranscripts.

AnothertypeofsourceistheIIRshortforIntelligenceInformationReport,whichisa“generalizedreportingvehiclethatcollectsunprocessedandunverifiedsummariesofclaimsmadetoU.S.intelligenceagencies,usuallybyforeignsources.”81Theserawintelligencereports,saystheFBI,usuallybearcautionssuchas:“WARNING:THISISANINFORMATIONREPORT,NOTFINALLYEVALUATEDINTELLIGENCE.”

Othertypesofinformationsourceare:FM40,codeforaninterviewreportbythemilitaryCriminalInvestigationTaskForce;82FD-302,aninterviewreportbytheFBI83andFBILHM,aLetterheadMemorandum,i.e.anofficialFBImemorandumthatwasexpectedtobeshowntosomeoneoutsidetheFBI84;andTDorTelegraphicDisseminationfromtheCIA.85

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Obamaalsoreintroducedmilitarycourts,signingintolawtheMilitaryCommissionsActof200990andon,7March2011,orderedthecreationofanewbody,knownasthePeriodicReviewBoard,tomakeassessmentseverythreeyearsastowhethereachGuantánamoinmatestillposedathreattotheUS.UnliketheCSRTsandARBs,thePeriodicReviewBoardisnotentirelymilitary.91Itbeganhearingsthreeyearsbehindschedule,92on11November2013,andmadeitsfirstdecisionon9January2014.93Documentsrelatedtothereviewsarelargelybeingpublished,albeitsomeinredactedform.94

ComparedtoeithertheTaskForceof2010ortheearlierreviewboardsatGuantánamo,thePeriodicReviewBoardhas,sofar,hadahigherrateofdecidingtotransferdetainees.Insomecases,ithasconcededthattheallegationsmadeagainstthemwerewrongoroverblown.Asof29September2016,theboardhasreviewedthecasesof62detaineesanddecidedtotransfer34ofthem(56%).95Theyincludemanywhomthe2010TaskForcehadorderedtoremainincontinuingdetentionwithouttrial,so-called‘forever

90ItamendedtheMilitaryCommissionsActof2006,prohibitingsomeevidenceobtainedthroughtortureorcruel,inhumanordegradingtreatmentandputtingsomelimitsontheuseofhearsay.Defendantsgainedtherighttoattendtheentiretrialandexaminealltheevidence,andprosecutorshavetodisclosetheexistenceofanyevidencethatmightexculpatetheaccusedorraisedoubtsaboutthecredibilityofagovernmentwitness.MilitaryCommissionsActof2009,Pub.L.No.111-84,123Stat.2190(2009),https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/2647/text;officialsummaryhere:https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/2647.91TheBoardscompriseoneseniorofficialfromtheDepartmentsofDefense,HomelandSecurity,JusticeandStateandtheOfficesoftheJointStaffandDirectorofNationalIntelligence.92JenniferKElseaandMichaelJohnGarcia,WartimeDetentionProvisionsinRecentDefenceAuthorizationLegislation,CongressionalResearchServices,23June2014,http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42143.pdf,13.93‘CompletionofFirstGuantanamoPeriodicReviewBoard’USDepartmentofDefencePressReleaseNR-017-14,9January2014,http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16473.94Readdocumentshere:PeriodicReviewSecretariat,PeriodicReviewBoard,http://www.prs.mil/ReviewInformation/InitialReview.aspx.95Foragoodoverview,see‘GuantánamoPeriodicReviewGuide’,MiamiHerald,http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article68333292.html.

prisoners’.AstotheeightAfghanswhosecasesarethefocusofthisstudy,theboardhasdecidedthattwoshouldremainindetentionandclearedtheothersixfortransfer.

On14August2016,threeweresenttotheUnitedArabEmirates(UAE).AANwastoldbyUSandAfghangovernmentofficialsthatthesethreemenwereina‘de-radicalisation’programme,butcouldprovidenoinformationonhowlongthatmightlast,orwhethertheywouldeventuallybeallowedtoreturnhome.96TheWallStreetJournalreportedtheywouldbeheldinarehabilitationfacility“indefinitelyuntilauthoritiesdecidetheycanbereleasedataminimumofrisk.”97

4.THECASESTUDIES

4.1StructureoftheCaseStudiesInpresentingthecasesoftheeightAfghandetaineeswhoarethefocusofthisstudy,AANfeltitimportanttolayoutforreadersalltheinformation,theinsandoutsofeachcase,timelines,accusationsandevidence.Thismeansthatseveralofthecasestudiesarelong,particularlyforthosedetaineeswhohavegonethroughlegalhearings.Thereisalsoasummaryatthestartofeachcasestudy,however,coveringthemostimportantpointsconcerningthecontinuingdetentionofeachman.

Eachcasestudylooksat:

• Thecaptureofthedetainee• Thetreatmentofthedetainee,andany

incidentsoftorture• Allegationsandevidence• Legalproceedings,whetherMilitary

Commissiontrialsorhabeaspetitions• CurrentAmericanplansforthedetainee

SourcingandfootnotesTheNewYorkTimes’“GuantanamoDocket”websitehasgatheredtogetherallthedocumentsfromGuantánamoforeachofthe771detaineesknowntohavebeenheldthere.98Herecanbe

96Authorinterviews,WashingtonD.C.,28October2016.97JessBravinandCarolE.Lee,‘U.S.Transfers15GuantanamoBayDetainees’,15August2016,TheWallStreetJournal,http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-transfers-15-guantanamo-bay-detainees-1471303872.PoojaJhunjhunwala,SpokespersonUSDepartmentofState,toldAANaidcouldnotdiscussthespecificassurancestheyreceivefromforeigngovernments.Email8September2016.98‘TheGuantanamoDocket’,http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo.TheMiami



foundsummarysheetsandtranscriptsfromthemilitaryboardswhichassessedwhetherdetaineeswereenemycombatants,theCombatantStatusReviewTribunalsorCSRTs,andtheboardswhich,everyyear,assessedwhetherdetaineeswerestilladangertotheUnitedStates,theAdministrativeReviewBoardsorARBs.OnthesamewebsitearetheWikiLeakedsecretJointTaskForceGuantanamoDetaineeAssessmentswhichgiveinformationaboutadetainee’scapture,mentalandphysicalhealth,reasonsforhiscontinuingdetention,theallegationsagainsthimandusuallysomethingofthesourcingonwhichtheallegationsarebased.

Toreducethelengthofthefootnotesinthisreport,thegeneralURLforeachdetaineeon‘TheGuantanamoDocket’websiteisgivenatthetopofhiscasestudy.Footnotesthenonlyspecify‘CSRT’,‘ARB’or‘Assessment’,plustheyeartheBoardorTribunalwasheldorAssessmentmade.Otherdocuments,whichhavenotbeencollatedelsewhere,aresourcedasnormalinthefootnotes.Theseincludegovernmentpressreleasesandmediareporting,andsomecourtpapersfrommilitarytrialsandhabeaspetitions.

ForthetwoAfghandetaineeswhowerecapturedin2007,HarunGulandMohammedRahim,therearenopublishedCombatStatusReviewTribunalsorAdministrativeReviewBoards(and,forRahim,noAssessment).Forthesetwomen,itiseven

HeraldhasthebestuptodatenewsonGuantanamo,http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/.

moredifficulttogetinformationaboutwhatexactlytheUSstatethinkstheyhavedoneorwhyitcontinuestoholdthem.

Names,numbersandquotationsThesystemoftransliteratingAfghannamesintoEnglish,aswellasthenamesthemselves,varyacrossUSdocuments.Inthispaper,themostcommonlyusednameandspellingisused,togetherwitheachdetainee’sInternmentSerialNumber,orISN,whichisuniqueanddoesnotvary.ThereisafairlyhighincidenceofgrammaticalmistakesandtyposintheGuantánamodocuments.Thesehavebeenleftaspertheoriginal.Whereextrainformationisneededtoclarify,thisisinsquarebrackets[].Anythinginroundbrackets()isfromtheoriginaltext.

4.2Cases1–6

4.2.1Case1:HajiWaliMohammed(ISN560),14YearsinDetention

Table1SummaryoftheEightCases

Name Capturedby

Detained/denouncedbecauseofpoliticsor

money? Allegedtorture?CurrentLocation

YearsinDetention

WaliM’d

PakistanISI

ISIaccusedofdetaininghimtoprotectagent

Yes,inPakistan,Bagram,Kandahar,Guantánamo

Guantánamo 14

Zahir US No,althoughtip-offwasinaccurate

No Guantánamo 14

Obaid

US Alleged Yes,inKhostandBagram UAE 14

Karim Pakistan Possible Yes,sleepdeprivationBagram

Guantánamo 14

Kamin Afghanforces

Likely,localgrievances Yes,“softenedup” UAE 13

Hamid AfghanNDS Yes,factional No UAE 13

Harun Notknown Yes,atBagramandGuantánamo

Guantánamo 9

Rahim Notknown Notknown Yes,byCIA Guantánamo 9Inallcases,detaineeswerecapturedonthebasisofintelligence,ratherthanonthebattlefield.Nonehasbeenaccusedofanyspecificattack.

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• PlaceofBirth:Wazirabad,Pul-eKhumriDistrict,Baghlan

• DateofBirth:15February1966• DetainedbyPakistaniintelligence,ISI,26

January2002;transferredtoUSforces,February2002;transferredtoGuantánamoonorabout30April2002

• 2010TaskForceorderedhisindefinitedetention.ClearedfortransferbyPeriodicReviewBoard,26September2016.StillinGuantánamo.

• GuantánamoDocuments:http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/560-haji-wali-mohammed

SummaryIntheUSnarrative,WaliMohammedwasa“primaryfinancier”oftheTalebanandalQaeda,smugglinggoldandfacilitatingmoneytransfers,helpingtofinancethebombingofthetwoAmericanEmbassiesinNairobiandDaresSalaamin1998,buyingsurface-to-airmissilesandinvestingonemilliondollarsforMullahOmar.

However,itprovidesnorealevidenceforthis.Theaccusationthathewasanythingotherthanapublicallyknownfigurewithalegalmoneyexchangeandgoldimportingbusinessrestsonhearsay.HewasdetainedbytheISIinJanuary2001inPakistanandhandedovertoUSforces,hebelieves,becausetheISIwantedtoprotectoneofitsagentswhoowedWaliMohammedmoney.AsidefromtheISI’sinitialallegation,othersourcingfortheaccusationsagainsthim,asrevealedbyhisWikiLeakedJointTaskForceGuantanamoDetaineeAssessment,arereportsfromotherforeignintelligenceservicesandonefellowdetaineereportingwhatanotherdetaineehadallegedlytoldhim.99WaliMohammed’sattemptstopetitionforhabeascorpuswereheldupbyproceduralargumentsanddelayandthe

99WaliMohammedAssessment,2008,5.SeealsoWaliMohammed’sTraverse,whichcriticizesthestate’srelianceonthisdoublehearsayinitsdefenceofhisdetention.WaliMohammed’slawyersdescribethispieceofevidenceasan“interrogator’srecollectionofstatementspurportedlymadebyISN562–anAfghandetaineeatGuantánamonamedQariHassanUlla–aboutstatementspurportedlymadebyanotherGuantánamodetainee,ISN532”aboutWaliMohammed.Theinterrogator’sreport,itsaid,“stronglysuggeststhatISN532isanunreliablesource”andthatthe“doublehearsayinformation…isincongruous,plainlyinaccurateandbynatureallbutimpossibletoverify,”69-70(emphasisinoriginal).OneindicationthattheclaimisunreliableisthatISN562questionswhetherAfghanistanhasdollars;heisAfghan,sowouldnothavehadtoasksuchaquestion.[SeeFN81].

statewasallowedtousesecretevidence.Hispetitionwasmadein2005andahearingwasfinallyheldin2013;thejudgemadeherrulingafterthreeyearsofconsideration,onJune2016;sheorderedthatthestatecouldcontinuetodetainhimbecauseofhisassociationswithHezb-eIslami(then,notactuallyapartytotheconflict)andtheTaleban.ShedismissedasnotcredibleitsaccusationsthathehadbeenalQaeda’smoneymanager.ThePeriodicReviewBoardclearedhimfortransferinSeptember2016,noting,thathis“businessconnectionsandassociationswithalQa’idaandtheTalibanpre-date9/11andappeartohaveended.”100

CaptureandallegedtortureMoneychangerWaliMohammedwasdetainedbytheISI,on26January2002,hebelievesbecauseatribaljirgainPakistanwasabouttosettleafinancialdisagreementbetweenhimandtwoothermen,oneanISIinformer,inhisfavour.101HesaidtheISIdemandedmoneyforhisrelease,butashewasheavilyindebt–moreofwhichlater–hewasunabletopay.102Instead,inFebruary2002,theISIhandedhimovertoUSforces.103HesaidUSpersonnelinterrogatedhiminPeshawarforthreedays104andthentheISIboundandblindfoldedhimandputhimonaplanewithtwootherdetainees.Aftera90-minuteflight,theylandedatwhathelaterrealisedwasBagramAirBase,thisaccordingtotestimonyforhishabeaspetition(writteninthethirdperson):

Hewastakenfromtheplaneandthrownontotheground.Itwaswintertimeandverycold.Menstoodonhisbackandre-tiedhisarmsbehindhisbackagainwithabelt.WaliMohammedandthetwootherdetaineesweredraggedtoacementroomandthrownontheground.Thentheywerebeaten,oneatatime.WaliMohammed’sclotheswerestrippedoff,andhewasgivenprisonclothing.Hishandsandfeetwereboundagain,andhewastaken

100WaliMohammadFinalDetermination,PeriodicReviewBoard,26September2016,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN560/160927_U_FOUO_ISN560_FINAL%20DETERMINATION_PUBLIC_v1.pdf101ThedebtwasforaboutonemillionUSDandwasaccruedafterthetwomen,foreigncurrencyexchangersMohammedTahirandAsefCherkrefusedtobuyaquantityofAfghanisastheyhadagreedafterthecurrencyhadappreciatedstronglyfollowingHamedKarzaicomingtopowerinKabul.WaliMohammedTraverse,[seeFN81],11.102WaliMohammedCSRB,transcript,2004,4.103WaliMohammedAssessment,2008,3.104WaliMohammedTraverse,[seeFN81],12.



toacell.Hehadasackoverhisheadforthreedays.105

HesaidhewastorturedatBagram:

Fivedayslater,hishandsandfeetwereuntiedandhishandswerere-tiedinthefront.Theabusebeganagain.Hewasbeaten.Freezingwaterwaspouredonhisneck.Hewaskeptawakeforlongperiodsoftime.Ifhefellasleep,someonebangedabigstickagainstthewallofhiscelltowakehimup.Hewasdraggedarounduntilhisfeetbled.106

After15daysinBagram,hesaidhewastakentoKandahar:

Itwasfreezingcold.Hewastiedtoachairwithhisarmsbehindhisbackandonlyathinshirton.Theinterrogatorsworeheavycoats.Theypunchedhimintheheadsothechairfellover.Hehadasackoverhisheadsohecouldnotseethepunchescoming.Hewasmadetosituprightonhiskneeswithhisarmsstretchedoutoverhisheadforbetween30and60minutes.Hewastoldthathehadtokeephiseyesopen.Ifheclosedhiseyesordroppedhisarms,thetimehehadtoremaininthepositionwasincreased.107

Aftertwomonths,hewastakentoGuantánamowhere,hesaid,theguardspunchedhimintheheadwhenhearrived.108Atthispoint,histestimonyisredacted.

Theallegedmistreatmentisconsistentwithinformationfromotherdetaineesandofficialaccountsofproceduresused(seepages14-15).Despitewhatallegedlyhappenedtohim,itseemsthatWaliMohammedmadenoconfessiontowrong-doing.109Indeed,hisversionofeventshasbeenunswerving–althoughthat,initself,theUSbelieves,isevidencethathewastrainedin“counter-interrogationtechniques.”110

AllegationsandevidenceTheUShasaccusedWaliMohammedoffinancingtheTalebanandalQaedaovermanyyears,usingthelegalcoverofhismoneyexchangebusinesstomakecurrencytransfersandsmugglinggoldintoAfghanistan.HeisaccusedofinvestingmoneyforTalebanleaderMullahOmarandhelpingtobuyweapons.

105WaliMohammedTraverse,[seeFN81],13.106WaliMohammedTraverse,[seeFN81],13.107WaliMohammedTraverse,[seeFN81],14.108WaliMohammedTraverse,[seeFN81],15.109NoconfessionismentionedinhisAssessmentwhichsourcesthestate’sallegations.110WaliMohammedAssessment,2008,4.

WaliMohammedwasamoneychangerinthecentralmoneymarketinKabul,theSarayeShazada.Hesaysthathewasdoingnormalbusiness.HehassaidhewasinvolvedinanarbitrageschemeinNovember1997withtheCentralBank,whosedirectoratthetimewasaTalebandalsoanoldfriend,MullahAbdulRahmanZahid.SuchschemesundertakenbymoneychangersfromthecentralmoneymarketwerenormalinTalebanandpre-Talebantimes.Indeed,moneychangersarestillpowerfulpartnersofthestatewhenitcomestobuyingandsellingcurrencyandkeepingtheAfghancurrency,theafghani,stable.Before2001,Afghanistanhadanon-existentbankingsectorandeventoday,itisweakandhasbeensubjecttostate-linkedcorruption.

ThearbitrageschemewiththeCentralBankfailed,WaliMohammedsaid,becauseofcurrencyshifts,sothatwhatshouldhavenettedaprofitresultedinmassivelossesonmoneyborrowedfromthecentralbank–$500,000lostfrom$1.5million.WaliMohammedsaidtheTalebanarrestedhiscousintoforcehimtogototheirheadquartersinKandahar.Whenhearrived,hesaidhewasalsoarrestedand,underduress,wasforcedtopaybackthelostmoney(eventhoughtheCentralBankhadcarriedthreequartersoftherisk,accordingtotheoriginalagreement).HealreadyowedaconsiderablesumofmoneyfromanearlierfailedenterpriseandwentevenmoreheavilyintodebtashehadtoborrowfromallandsundrytorepaytheCentralBank.Inhisinterrogations,WaliMohammedwroteoutalistofthosehesaidheowedmoneyto.111

OthermoneychangersknewWaliMohammedwasinseriousdebt,althoughtheydidnotknowwhohiscreditorswere:“HewasindebtforabigamountinPakistan,”saidoneoftheveteranmoneychangerswhomAANspoketo(allaskedfortheirnamestobewithheld).“WhateverhemadehesentbacktoPakistantothepeopleheowed.Hedidn’tevenbuyahousehere,onlyashop.Hedidn’tgetsuper-rich.”112Asecondmoneychangersaid:“Hewasnotaveryrichperson.Ifhehadbeenpowerfulandlinkedtothe[Taleban]government,wewouldhaveknownitfromhisbusiness.Hewasn’tinapositiontosupporttheTaleban.Hehad

111TwodocumentsattachedtoWaliMohammedTraverse,bothtranslatedaccountsbyWaliMohammedofhisdebts.Thefirstisundatedanduntitled,Traverse,[seeFN81],425-7;thesecondis‘PocketLitter’,Guantanamo,11December2006,Traverse,437-9.112AuthorInterviewmoneychanger1,20August2015,Kabul.AfghanistanAnalystsNetworkinterviewedthreemoneychangerswhohadhadbusinessesinthecentralmoneymarketduringWaliMohammed’stime.Allspokeonconditionofanonymity.

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nomoney.Hisfamilywassufferingfromcalamities.Hisfortunehadcollapsedfromprevioustimes.Hewasindebt.”113

TheUShasalsoaccusedWaliMohammedof“smugglinggoldforalQaeda.”114Hisworkasanimporterofgoldwasalsocarriedoutquiteopenly.Accordingtothefirstmoneychangerquotedinthepreviousparagraph,hemademoneythroughhavinggoodrelationswiththecustomsdepartmentattheairportwhichlethimoffimportduties.“Weknewhewasbuyinggold,transferringittoKabulforapercentage,”hesaid.“Hedidn’thaveenoughmoneytobuythegoldhimself,butboughtitoncommission.Itwasathreestepdeal:WaliMohammedgotthegoldoutofKabulAirport,thebigmerchantsboughtitandthentheysolditontothejewellers.”

WhenevertheUSputsitsallegationstoWaliMohammed–thathefinancedtheTalebanandalQaeda–hesoundsflabbergasted:howcouldhebeaccusedoffundingtheTalebanwhenhewasuptohisearsindebtandtheTalebanhadputhiminprison?InhisCombatantStatusReviewTribunalin2004–hisfirstchancetospeakpublically–hewasaskedtorespondtotheallegationsmadeagainsthimandreadoutbyhisPersonalRepresentative(anofficerchosento‘represent’him):

PersonalRepresentative:TheDetaineepaidforaseniormemberoftheTalibantotravel.

Detainee:Iwasburiedinlosses;I’dlostlotsofmoney.ShouldIpayformylosses,orpayfortheTaliban’stickets?Thisaccusationisnotlogical.

PersonalRepresentative:TheDetaineepurchasedvehiclesfortheTaliban.

Detainee:Istillhadmyownproblemsandbillstopay;Iwasn’tinshapetobuyvehiclesfortheTaliban.ShouldIpaymyloan,orshouldIbuycarsfortheTalibanwhohadtreatedmebrutally?Thisisnotcorrect;youguysjustthinkaboutit.115

InhisWikiLeakedAssessment,wecanseethebasisfortheUSaccusationsagainsthimandtheylooktobeextremelyweak.AbouthalfofthesourcingforthecaseagainsthimconsistsofactionsWaliMohammedissaidtohave“admittedto,”“claimed”or“stated.”Nonearecriminal.Theyincludechangingmoney,importinggold,havingasistermarriedtoGulbuddinHekmatyar’snephew,knowinganothermoneychangerwhowas

113AuthorInterviewmoneychanger2,20August2015,Kabul.114WaliMohammedCSRB,2004,1.115WaliMohammedCSRB,transcript,2004,5.

detainedbytheUS(andsubsequentlyreleased),andhavinglicenseplatesthatallowedhimtodriveacrosstheAfghan-Pakistanborder.

Theseriousallegations–thathewasclosetoMullahOmarandbinLaden,thathefinancedthebombingsofUSembassiesineastAfricain1988,andboughtmissiles–werelargelymadebyforeignintelligenceagencies,mainlyPakistaniandJordanian.TheISIisalsocitedasaco-perpetratorofsomeofhisallegedcrimes,forexample,thathepurchasedsurface-to-airmissileswithISIhelp.116Othersourcesare:“sensitivereporting,”anFBIsourcenamedas“HajjiZabbi,”a“cooperativesource,”andafellowdetainee,whowassubsequentlyreleased,reportingwhatanotherdetaineehadsupposedlytoldhim(thatWaliMohammedwasbinLaden’sfinancialmanagerandhad“reportedlytravelled”toJapan,Europe,andtheUAEwithbinLaden’smoney).117

Someofthefewconcretedetailsintheaccusations,i.e.somethingthatisnothearsay,arethreemoneyexchangeshemadein2001describedintheAssessmentas“possiblysuspicious”:

“…detaineewasinvolvedinseverallargemoneytransferspossiblyrelatedtoterroristactivities.Accordingtoacooperativesource,thetransfersweresuspiciousbecauseoftheirunusualsizeandconnectionstoindividualspossiblyinvolvedinterroristactivity.”118

Theauthorhasnotbeenabletotrackdownthosenamedinthetransfers,butdidaskthreemoneychangerswhethertheamountswereactuallybigenoughtobesuspicious;allwereabout200,000Emiratidirhams,equivalenttobetween47and69,000USdollars,transferredfromtheUAEtoPeshawar.Theylaughedatthequestion.“Thismustbethemoneyhewassendingthroughhawalathathecouldnotcarryincash,”saidone.“Thisisnotalotofmoney.Moneychangerswouldhavehundredsoftimesmorethanthis.Itdoesn’tseemsuspicious.Itisanormalpartofgoldbusiness.”119

Itisworthpointingoutherethat,underInternationalHumanitarianLaw,thebodyoflaw,includingtheGenevaConventions,whichregulateswarfare,financingisconsideredanon-combat,supportrole.IftheUSallegationsweretrue,financingwouldstillnotamountto‘directparticipationinhostilities’,thelinewhichcivilianshavetocrossbeforetheylosetheirprotection

116WaliMohammedAssessment,2008,8.117WaliMohammedAssessment,2008,5.118WaliMohammedAssessment,2008,7.119Authorinterviews,moneychanger1and2,Kabul,20August2015.



againstattackduringconflict;whetheritmeanstheycanbesubjecttomilitarydetentionhasbeenarguedoverbythecourts,butis,bynomeans,clear-cut.

AmplificationofallegationsWaliMohammedsuspectsthatonewayinwhichhehasbeenmiscastasaterroristfinancierwasthroughtranslationerrorsofhisowninterrogations.Hetriestoexplainthisatthefirstchancehegetstospeakpublically,athisCombatantStatusReviewTribunalin2004.

Detainee:

Yes,I’mready,buttheonlythingIhavetotellyouisthatI’venoticedintheinterviewsthattherearediscrepanciesregardingthedatesandthenatureoftheaccusationstranslatedinadifferentway;hopefullyitwillcomeupduringthishearing.

TribunalPresident:

That’soneofthereasonswe’reheretoday,isforyoutoprovideanoralstatement,andplease,bringupthoseissueswhenwe’reatthatpoint.

Detainee:

Yes,I’msorrythatmycaseisknowntobecomplicated.Hopefully,ifittakesabitlongertoclarify,Iamsorry.Ihavebeentranslatedbytwoorthreedifferentlanguages;Pashtu,FarsiandUrdu,andpeopletookmyevidenceindifferentlanguages,soithasbecomealittlebitcomplicated.120

InWaliMohammed’spetitionforhabeascorpus,hegivesanexampleofhowhebelieveshisinterrogatorscametobelievehewaslying:aproblemwithdifferentcalendars.TheAfghancalendarhasitsnewyearonthespringequinox,sofallsacrosstwowesternyears(thisAfghanyear,1395,runsfrom20March2016to19March2017).Itissomethingthatoftenleadstoconfusion.WaliMohammed’sTraverse(hisformalrebuttalofthestate’scaseforhiscontinuingdetention,theFactualReturn)says:

BasedoninconsistenciesintheirowntranslationandreportingofWaliMohammed’sinterrogations-whichvariouslydatetheCentralBanktransactionin1996,1997or1998–Respondents[theUSgovernment]contendthatWaliMohammedengagedinmultipletransactionswiththe

120WaliMohammedCSRBtranscript,2004,1.

Talibangovernmentoveran18-monthperiodin1996and1997.121

TheUS’sconflationoftheAfghanstatewiththeTalebanalsoleadstomisunderstandings.EverythinggovernmentalinTaleban-controlledAfghanistanwascontrolledbytheTaleban,fromthenationalairlinertoeducationtohealthcaretothecentralbank.EveryAfghanandforeignerlivinginTaleban-controlledAfghanistanhadtodealwiththeTalebanwhenitdealtwiththegovernment.However,WaliMohammed’sdealingswiththestatearecitedassuspicious,forexample,inthisopeningexchangeinWaliMohammed’sfirstAdministrativeReviewBoard(2005):

DesignatedMilitaryOfficer:

(3)Thefollowingprimaryfactorsfavorcontinueddetention:(3.a)Commitment(3.a.1)TheDetaineeadmittedhewasinbusinesswiththeTalibanandworkedwiththeTalibanbecauseofthemoney.

Detainee:

Ididn’tsayIdidbusinesswiththeTaliban.IsaidIdidbusinesswithAfghanistanBank[thecentralbank]…122

Or,withreferencetoWaliMohammed’sflyingonAfghanistan’snationalcarrier,Ariana,hisAssessmentsaysthat“anFBIcontact”hadsaid,“ArabsoftensentmoneytoAfghanistanthroughtheTaliban-controlledArianaAirlines.”123ManypeopleflewonArianaduringtheTalebanregime,astheyhadbeforetheTalebancametopowerandwoulddoagainaftertheylostpower.Inthelate1990s,itwastheonlycommercialairlineflyingintoandoutofAfghanistan.FlyingonArianawas,initself,innowaysuspiciousandsaysnothingaboutWaliMohammed’sactionsorallegiances.

WehavesomeotherpossibleinsightsintoWaliMohammed.Allofthe200moneychangersinthecentralmoneymarketsentapetitiontotheUSambassadorandtotheauthoritiesatGuantánamoBayinabout2007or2008askingforhisreleaseandsayinghehadnospecialorideologicalrelationshipwiththeTaleban.Asthesemoneychangerscomefromalloverthecountryandrepresentallstrandsofethnicityandpoliticalallegiance,thiswassignificant.WaliMohammedwasalsoastrongandwell-knownsupporterofthe

121WaliMohammedTraverse,[seeFN81],79.1997includedpartsofbothAfghanyears,1376and1377.Ifoneofthoseyearshadthenbeenbacktranslated,interrogatorsmightthenhaveendedupwith1997/1998for1376and/or1998/1999for1377.122WaliMohammedARB1transcript,2005,3.123WaliMohammedAssessment,2008,5.

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AfghancricketteamandwasinterviewedbytheBBCinDecember2001,captionedasthenationalteam’s“DevelopmentManager.”HetoldthereporterhewashappywiththechangeofregimeinKabul:“Thedarkperiodisovernow.ThereispeaceandlibertyinAfghanistanandwehopethatcricketwillgainmoreroots.”124

Legalproceedings:WaliMohammed’sattemptstogotocourt

Unlikesomeoftheotherdetainees,WaliMohammedhasrepeatedlytriedtousethetribunalsandcourtsand,fromwhatwecansee,alsohisinterrogationstotellhissideofthestory.Thisincludedfilingapetitionforhabeascorpuson7June2005.Hewaseagertotestify,butthecasehasbeenheldupbyproceduralarguments.(Seepages29-30foratimelineoflegalproceedings.)Likeotherdetainees,hispetitionhadtowaituntil2008forthecourtstodecidehowtoproceedintheGuantánamohabeaspetitions.Then,on25November2008,thestatefiledaclassifiedFactualReturn–itsargumentastowhyWaliMohammed’sdetentionwasjustified.Hislawyersthenfileda‘discoverymotion’tocompelthestatetorevealitsevidence.Thelawyershadtopetition,forexample,forWaliMohammedtoseehisownpassportandthenoteshehimselfhadwrittenforhisinterrogatorsoutlininghisdebts:thestatehadinsistedtheywereclassifieddocuments.Thejudgedidfinallyallowhimtoseepassportandnotes,butonlyinAugust2009.

Then,on1December2009,thegovernmentsoughttoamenditsFactualReturn.WaliMohammedchosenottoopposethis,“[g]ivenhisdesiretoexpeditethisproceeding….”125InJanuary2010,WaliMohammed’scounselfiledaTraverse,hisformalresponsetothestate’sFactualReturn,outliningwhyhebelievedhisdetentionwasunjustified.InMayandJune2010,thecourtfinallyheardhishabeaspetition.Hetestifiedandclosingargumentswereheard.However,on25March2011,thecourtaccededtoarequestbythegovernmenttore-opentherecord,andthestatefiledaSupplementalFactualReturn.ThefightsoverwhetherWaliMohammedandhislawyerscouldseethestate’sevidencebeganagain.

Throughout2011andinto2012,thebackandforthcontinued.On23July2012,thecourtallowedthestatetoaddinformationtoitsSupplementalFactualReturn,whichwas,controversially,‘Top

124‘Hopesforprosperityinpeace’,BBCSportOnline,12December2001,http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/cricket/1706331.stm.125WaliMohammedTraverse,[seeFN81],1.

Secret’.NeitherWaliMohammednorhiscounsel(whohadclearanceonlytosee‘Secret’information)wereallowedtoseethestate’snewevidence.Insomeothercases,thestatehasmanagedtoprovidewhatarecalled‘adequatesubstitutes’whichdescribe,“inlessdetailorwithcertainomissionsorredactions,theclassifiedinformationthatcouldnotbedisclosed.”126Inthiscase,thestatesaiditcouldnotdothis;revealingeven‘adequatesubstitutes’eventoWaliMohammed’scounselwouldriskrevealingitssourcesandmethodsofintelligencegathering.WaliMohammed’scounselarguedthatthestatehadachoice:eitherdisclosetherelevantandmaterialsourceinformationorrefrainfromrelyingonit.Thejudge,whodidhave‘TopSecret’clearanceandhadseentheevidence,agreedwiththestate:

ItistruethatthisrulingwillhaveaminordetrimentalimpactonMr.[WaliMohammed]Morafa’sabilitytocontestthebasisforhisdetention.However,theCourtconcludesthattheincrementalvaluetotheCourtofconsideringthatevidence,intandemwiththe“exceptionallygravedamagetothenationalsecurity”thatcouldresultfromtheunauthorizeddisclosureofTopSecretinformation…outweighsthemarginalimpactofwithholdingtheinformationinquestion.127

Thatthestatewasallowedtousesecretevidenceinthehabeasargumentsisdeeplyproblematic,notonlybecauseitcontravenesnotionsofnaturaljustice,butalsobecauseweknowfromothercasesthatjudgeshaveshownareluctancetoquestionthegovernment’sevidenceandinterpretationofevents.Forexample,inthecasesofObaid(case3)andBostanKarim(case4)wheretheevidenceagainstthemhaslargelybeendiscussedinopencourt,flawswereevident,butthejudgesacceptedtheevidenceanyway.Alsoworryingisthat,eventhoughtheSupremeCourt(in2008)calledfor“prompt”habeasrulings,thecourttookalmostthreeyears,fromSeptember2013toJune2016,todeliveritsruling.Partoftheproblem,itappears,isthat,accordingtothejudge,“TheGovernmentrepeatedlyadjustedtheevidenceonwhichitrelies

126Acourt’sinquirywhenreviewingproposedsubstitutesis,essentially,todetermineifall“relevantandmaterial”informationfromtheTopSecretdocumenthasbeenconveyedintheSecretsubstitute.AlOdahv.UnitedStates,559F.3d539,544(D.C.Cir.2009)(emphasisomitted).127Mousoviv.Obama,916F.Supp.2d67(D.D.C.9January2013)(allowingstatetousesecretevidenceinWaliMohammed’shabeascase).



tojustifyPetitioner’sdetention.”128Asaresult,thecourtrequestedsupplementalbriefingfromthegovernmenton15May2015andresponsesfrombothgovernmentandWaliMohammed’slawyerscontinuedthrough2015.

Intheend,JudgeCollierdeliveredherrulingonJune2016,elevenyearsafterthepetitionwasmade.SheruledthatthestatewasjustifiedindetainingWaliMohammed,thathewas“partof,andsubstantiallysupported,theTalibanandHizb-I-IslamiGulbuddinatthetimeofhisarrestinJanuary2002,”butthattherewas“insufficientevidencethathisactivitiesinsupportofal-Qaidacontinuedtothattime.”129

ThecourtbelievedthatWaliMohammedhadsupportedal-Qaidain1998,althoughthecourt’sheavily-redacted,publically-releasedjudgementdoesnotsaywhatheisallegedtohavedone.However,itdismissedthegovernment’sassertionthatWaliMohammedhad“hobnobbedconstantlywithU.S.enemiesandflewalloverEuropeatbinLaden’scommand”andrevealsthatthegovernmenthadtowithdrawsomeofitsevidenceasmoredocumentationwasdiscovered.130Itfoundit“notcredible”thatWaliMohammedcouldhaveactedasalQaeda’smoneymanagerafterhehadlostandhadtopaybackhalfamilliondollarstotheCentralBank.131

However,thecourtbelievedthat,despitethesefinanciallosses,WaliMohammedhadcontinuedto“haveacloserelationshipwiththeTaliban”andcontinuedtosupportthemafter11September2001(detailsofhowareredacted).132Italsosaysthat“Petitioner’sservicetoGulbuddinHekmatyarinlateDecember2001,”(detailsofwhatthiswasareredacted)“issufficienttoestablishthatPetitionerwasapartof,andpurposefullyandmateriallysupportedHIGatthetimeofhisarrestonJanuary25,2002.”133AtthetimeofWaliMohammed’sdetention,however,HekmatyarhadbeenmakingcontradictorystatementsabouttheUSinterventionandthenewAfghangovernment.ItwouldalsobeanotheryearbeforehewasplacedontheUSorUNsanctionslistasaterroristor

128Mousoviv.Obama,No.05-1124(RMC)(D.D.C.June8,2016)(redacted)(orderdenyingWaliMohammedhabeas),7.129WaliMohammedhabeasdenied,2016,[seeFN128],2.130WaliMohammedhabeasdenied,2016,[seeFN128],21.131WaliMohammedhabeasdenied,2016,[seeFN128],21.132WaliMohammedhabeasdenied,2016,[seeFN128],18.133WaliMohammedhabeasdenied,2016,[seeFN128],20.

associateofalQaidaortheTaliban134andjustadecadeearlier,theUShadbeenoneoftheprimesupportersoftheHezb-eIslamileader.

Muchofthecourt’srulingreferstowhetherornotWaliMohammedwasthemanidentifiedassuchinallegations.Hisisacommonnameandthis,hiscounselhadcontended,mayhavebeenthesourceofmanyoftheaccusationsagainsthim.However,here,therulingisheavilyredacted.AswithObaidandBostanKarim(cases3and4),WaliMohammed’sassociationwiththemass,revivalist,Muslimorganisation,Jamatal-Tablighisalsoheldasevidenceofhismaliciousintent:itwouldnotbesurprising,thejudgecontended,thataTablighiandmember(sic)oftheTalebanwouldsupport“thosewithsimilarviewsandwhomtheTalibanprotected,suchasUsamabinLadenandal-Qaida.”However,Jamatal-Tabligh,anorganisationwithmillionsofSouthAsianmembers,isnotmilitant;itbelievesnowisthetimeforpreaching,notfighting(dawa,notjihad)andtheTalebanopposeditsactivities(seepages43-44formoredetail).Moreover,althoughitmightbeassumedthatTalebanmemberswouldhavesimilarviewstoalQaeda,inreality,theviewsoftherural,insular,conservativePashtunmullahswhomadeuptheTalebanwereveryfarfromtheinternationally-minded,IslamistjihadistsofalQaeda(seepage7).

Allinall,itlooksverythin.ItappearsthattheUSgovernmenthasexpendedenormouseffortsovermanyyearsscrapingthebarrelofitsintelligencereportingtofindsomethingtojustifyWaliMohammed’sdetentiontothecourt.However,ifitsassertion,whichthecourtaccepted,thatWaliMohammed’sactivitieshadamountedtohimbeing“partof,orsubstantiallysupporting”theTalebanandHezb-eIslami,thenthesamecouldbesaidoftensofthousandsofAfghans,possiblymore.Theywouldincludemanyseniorandmid-levelmembersofthecurrentAfghanadministration.ThisisanimmenselybroadreadingoftheUSpresidentialpowertodetain.RatherthanWaliMohammedhavingactuallybeenanythreattoanyone,hewasextremelyunluckytohavebeensenttoGuantánamoandtohaveendedupinlimbotherewhensomanyotherAfghanswithsimilarbackgroundsarefreeandprospering.

USplansforWaliMohammedIn2010,theGuantanamoTaskForcerecommendedWaliMohammedforcontinueddetention.135Aswithotherdecisions,reasonswere 134‘NarrativeSummariesOfReasonsForListingQDI.088GulbuddinHekmatyar…’[seeFN35].135LetterfromUSDepartmentofJusticetoSavage,[seeFN89].

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notpublished.HehadaPeriodicReviewBoardhearingon25August2016.Hisdetaineeprofilesaid:

WeassesswithmoderateconfidencethatAF-560conductedfinancialtransactionsforUsamaBinLadinin1998and1999,eitherdirectlyorthroughhistiestotheTaliban,andwasprobablymotivatedbyfinancialgain.WenoteidentifyingdetailsforAF-560havebeencorroborated,buttherehasbeenminimalreportingonAF-560’stransactionscompletedonbehalfofBinLadin.EffortstolinkAF-560toBinLadinarecomplicatedbyseveralfactors,includingincompletereporting,multipleindividualswithAF-560’sname-HajiWaliMohammad,andlackofpost-capturereflections.136

WaliMohammad’slawyer,pointingtothestate’sadmissionthatthereweremultipleindividualswithhisname,saidhisclienthadbeen“veryunlucky–mostofallinhavinganextremelycommonname.“137Hequotedtwoformergovernmentintelligenceofficialswhotestifiedthat“theidentificationofMr.Mohammedisproblematic.EventhelateTalibanleader,MullahAkhtarMansour,reportedlycarriedapassportbearingthename‘WaliMohammed.’”138Moreover,thelawyersaid,thecatastrophicfailureofhisclient’sarbitrageschemewiththeTaleban-controlledCentralBankandsubsequentharshtreatmentbytheTaleban,“makesitimplausiblethatWaliMohammedconductedfinancialtransactionsforOsamaBinLadinthereafter–leavingasidethatMr.MohammedspeakslittleArabicandbinLadinspokenoPashto.”139

ThePeriodicReviewBoarddecidedon26September2016thathecouldbetransferred,notingbizarrely,sincehehasbeenincarceratedsinceJanuary2002,thathis“businessconnectionsandassociationswithalQa’idaandtheTalibanpre-date9/11andappeartohaveended.”140It

136WaliMohammadGuantanamoDetaineeProfile,PeriodicReviewBoard,31March2016,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN560/20160331_U_ISN_560_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf.137WaliMohammadPrivateCounselStatement,PeriodicReviewBoard,25August2016,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN560/20160825_U_ISN_560_OPENING_STATEMENTS_OF_DETAINEES_REPRESENTATIVES_PUBLIC.pdf,1.138WaliMohammadPrivateCounselStatement,[seeFN137],1.139WaliMohammadPrivateCounselStatement,[seeFN137],1.140WaliMohammadFinalDetermination,PeriodicReviewBoard,[seeFN100].

consideredWaliMohammedstillposed“somelevelofthreat”,despitealsosayinghe“doesnotappeartobemotivatedbyextremistideologies”andhadbeenrelativelycompliantdetainee.141Forthetimebeing,heremainsinGuantánamo.

LegaltimelineforWaliMohammed28June2004.SupremeCourt(Rusulv.Bush)rulesGuantánamodetaineescanpetitionforhabeascorpusinthefederalcourts.

7June2005.WaliMohammedfileshabeaspetition,alongwithothers.

27January2006.CourtordersthecasebeheldinabeyancependingarulingfromtheDCCircuitonwhetherithasjurisdictiontoentertainthepetition.

VariousrulingsfromDCCircuitandSupremeCourtastowhatvehicle,ifany,Guantánamodetaineescanusetochallengetheirdetention.

12June2008.SupremeCourt(Boumedienev.Bush)rulesthattheremovalofthefederalcourts’jurisdictiontohearpetitionsforhabeascorpusbyGuantánamodetaineesundertheMilitaryCommissionActwasanunconstitutionalsuspensionofhabeascorpus.Detaineescanpetitionforhabeasinfederalcourtina“prompt”hearing.

25November2008.GovernmentfilesaclassifiedFactualReturninsupportofWaliMohammed’sindefinitedetention.

January2009.GovernmentnotifiesthecourtthatithasidentifiedadditionaldocumentspossiblyrelevanttoWaliMohammedthatareundergoingclearancereview.

1April2009.WaliMohammedfilesmotiontocompeldiscovery(ofmaterialrelevanttogovernment’sFactualReturnwhichthegovernmentassertsistoosensitivetodisclose).

7April2009.Courthearsoralargumentsonmotiontocompeldiscoveryandgrantsitinpartanddeniesitinpart.

29May2009.GovernmentproducesacopyofWaliMohammed’spassportandacopyofhisownseven-pagehandwrittenstatementofhisdebts.GovernmentmaintainsneitherdocumentcanbeshowntoWaliMohammed.

16June2009.CounselforWaliMohammedfilesamotionforaclassificationreviewofthepassport

141WaliMohammadFinalDetermination,PeriodicReviewBoard,[seeFN100].



andhisnoteofhisdebtsandforleavetoshowbothdocumentstoWaliMohammed.

4August2009.CourtordersthegovernmenttocompletetherequestedclassificationreviewbyAugust312009.Afterclassificationreview,GovernmentagreesthatbothdocumentsareunclassifiedandcanbeshowntoWaliMohammed.

1December2009.GovernmentseekstoamendtheFactualReturn.

7December2009.WaliMohammedconsents.

11December2009.CourtpermitsgovernmenttoamendFactualReturn.

15January2010.WaliMohammedfileshisTraverse.Hesaysthat,“[g]ivenhisdesiretoexpeditethisproceeding,”hehadnotopposedtheUSgovernment’sMotiontoAmenditsFactualReturn.However,indoingso,“heexpresslyreserveshisrighttocontendthattheAmendmentExhibitsbegivennoweight.”

May2010-June2010.Courthearshabeascorpuspetitioninclosedsession.WaliMohammedtestifies.Closingargumentsaremade.

October2010.Governmentmovestore-opentherecordinasubmissionmadeexparte(iewithoutWaliMohammedorhiscounselpresent).

5November2010.Courtagreestoreopentherecord.

25March2011.GovernmentfilesaSupplementalFactualReturn.

18July2011.WaliMohammedfilesamotionforadditionaldiscovery,contendingheisentitledtoseethenewmaterialssubmittedtothecourtbythegovernment.

18Octoberand3November2011.Courtgrantsthemotioninpartanddirectsthegovernmenttoconductfiveadditionalsearches.

23July2012.GovernmentlocatesadditionalinformationallegedlyinculpatingWaliMohammedandfilesamotiontoaddthisinformationtotheSupplementalFactualReturn.

23July2012.Courtgrantsgovernmentrequesttoaddmaterial.However,itisclassifiedas‘TopSecret’.WaliMohammed’scounselisonlyclearedtosee‘Confidential’and‘Secret’documents.Governmentfilesamotionexparteandincamera(iewithoutWaliMohammedorhiscounselorthepublicpresent)foranexceptiontotheirdisclosureduties.

24August2012and18September2012.Oralargumentsheldinclosedhearings.Courtrulesthat

thegovernmentisnotrequiredtodisclosetheTopSecretmaterialsandcanpresentthemincourttothejudge.

September2013.Habeashearing.

3October2013.Closingarguments.

8June2016.Courtdenieshabeascorpus.

4.2.2Case2:AbdulZahir(ISN753),14YearsinDetention

• PlaceofBirth:Hesarak,LogarProvince• DateofBirth:1972• DetainedbyUSforcesinhouseraid,11July

2002;transferredtoBagramimmediately;transferredtoGuantánamo,27October2002

• 2010TaskForceruledheshouldbeprosecuted.PeriodicReviewBoardclearedhimfortransfer,11July2016;stillinGuantánamo.

• Documents:http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/753-abdul-Zahir/documents/9

SummaryZahiradmittedtoworkingasadoorman(chokidar)andtranslatorduringtheTalebaneraforanArabcommander,AbdulHadial-Iraqi(whowasamemberofalQaeda).Beforethe9/11attacks,binLaden’sgroupwasnotahouseholdnameinAfghanistanandunemploymenthigh;takingajobwithanArabcommanderwasnotthenespeciallycontroversial.TheUShasproducednoevidencethatZahir’sroleamountedtohimbeingmorethanjustanemployee,althoughitcontendshewasa“trustedmemberofalQaeda.”InMarch2002,Zahirwasinacarfromwhichagrenadewasthrownintoanothercarwhichbadlyinjuredoneofthepassengers,aforeignjournalist.TheprosecutorinZahir’smilitarycommissiontrial,in2006,acceptedhehadnotthrownthegrenade.Norwasheaccusedofanyotherspecificattacks,onlyof“conspiringtocommitwarcrimes,aidtheenemyandattackcivilians.”(Allthetrialswere

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subsequentlyruledillegalbytheSupremeCourtandstopped.)ZahirwasinthemassofpeoplewhohadbeenonthemarginsoftheTalebanwhentheywereingovernment.Aftertheirdefeat,heassociatedwithpeoplewhowerehostiletoforeigners.Hemayalsohavebeenamemberofagrouptryingtoorganiseattacksinthepre-insurgencyera.However,ifhewas,hewouldhavebeenaveryminorplayerandthereisnoevidencethathewaslinkedtoalQaedaafterthefalloftheTaleban.InJuly2016,thePeriodicReviewBoardsaidhisrolewiththeTalebanhadbeen“limited”andthathehadbeen“misidentified”astheindividualwhohadtiestoalQaedaweaponsfacilitation.

CaptureZahirwasdetainedwhenUSsoldiersraidedhishouseafteratip-offthathehadchemicalorbiologicalweapons.142In2002,thisfearwasreal,althoughnoweaponsofmassdestructionwereeverfoundinAfghanistanandthesuspicioussubstancesfoundathishouseturnedouttobesalt,sugar,andpetroleumjelly.143ThatarrestledtohimbeinginterrogatedatBagramwhere,theUSmilitarysaid,headmittedto“alQaidaactivitiesandassociates,”although,itcontended,“hedownplayshisrole.”144HisAssessmentsaidhewascooperativeandforthcomingwithbackgroundinformationandinformationconcerningotherdetainees.

AllegationsandevidenceZahir’saccountofhislifedoesrevealassociationswithalQaeda.TheUSbelievesthisshowedideologicalcommitmentandaccusedhimofbeing“atrustedmemberofalQaida.”Hehasmaintaineditwasanemployer/employeerelationshipandnothingmore.

PublicallyavailabledocumentsrelatingtoZahiraresparse.TherearedocumentsfromhisCombatantStatusReviewTribunal(statementandtranscript)in2004,andthennothinguntil2008whenthereisatwo-pagesummaryofanAdministrativeReviewBoard(thelackofatranscriptsuggestshedidnotattend).ThereisalsoaWikiLeakedJointTaskForceGuantanamoDetaineeAssessment.Inotherwords,weonly‘hear’hissideofthestoryonce–in2004.

142ZahirAssessment,2008,4.143ZahirGuantanamoDetaineeProfile,PeriodicReviewBoard,3February2015,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN753/20160203_U_ISN_753_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf.144ZahirAssessment,2008,4.

AccordingtothesectionoftheAssessmentwhichissupposedtobethedetainee’saccountofevents,hetoldhisinterrogatorshehadbeenlookingforworkin1997andgotajoblookingaftertheguesthouseofafriendofachildhoodfriendwhowasthenworkingwiththeTalebanmilitary.Theworkwasunsalaried,buttherewasanadjacentbuildingwhereheandhisfamilycouldliveandhewasgivenoccasionalhand-outsfromhisfriend.ThatfriendintroducedhimtoAbdulHadial-Iraqi(analQaedacommander)whotookhimontoworkathisguest-houseintheWazirAkbarKhanareaofKabul.Afterayearworkingthere,hebegantoworkexclusivelyforAbdulHadi.ZahirtoldhisCombatantStatusReviewTribunalin2004that:

“Atthetime,Ididn’tknowthatMr.HadiwasamemberofAlQaida.Iworkedforhimaspeasantoremployee,notamemberofthegroup.Myworkwastosupportfrommyfamilyandchildren.Itwasonlyforemployment.Itwasverysimplyemploymentandhadnopoliticalaffiliations.”145

Healsosaid:“IwasanemployeewhentheTalebanwasthegovernmentofAfghanistan.”146AccordingtoZahir,hedidnotliveattheguest-house,butwhenhewasthere,hewas“usuallysittingwiththedoormanandtheotherAfghanworkers.IcouldnottalktotheArabsbecauseMrHadiwouldnotallowanyonetotalktotheArabs.”147ZahirmovedontotranslatingforAbdulHadi.InhisAssessment,ZahirisreportedassayinghelearnedArabicatschool.148AlthoughnotascommonlyaspokensecondlanguageasUrdu,someAfghansdomasterArabic,eitherlearningitinareligiousschool,orwhileworkingintheGulforelsewhereintheMiddleEast.Zahirsaidhistranslatingjobsinvolved,“basicstuff,relatingtosimplemattersinKabul.They[theArabs]hadtodealwiththegovernment,theTaliban,likepaperworkforcars,thattheyhadtoworkwiththegovernmentfor,onthelowerlevel.”149AbdulHaditoldinterrogatorsZahirhadtranslatedwhenhediscussed“operationalmatterswithTalibancommanders…duringmostofhisoperationalTalibangovernmentmeetingsandfrontlinebattles.”150

ZahiralsosaidhehadreceivedmoneybelongingtoAbdulHadial-IraqiwhenthecommanderfledAfghanistanafterthefalloftheTaleban–aboutfortythousanddollarsinamixtureofcurrencies.This,hesaid,hewasgiventolookafterbyanother

145ZahirCSRT,transcript,2004,1.146ZahirCSRT,transcript,2004,1.147ZahirCSRT,transcript,2004,2.148ZahirAssessment,2008,2.149ZahirCSRT,transcript,2004,4.150ZahirAssessment,2008,5.



person.151TheUShaspublicallydescribedhimasan“alQaedapaymaster.”152

AbdulHadial-Afghanihimself,afterhiscapturein2007(renderedbytheCIA,butnot,accordingtotheSenatereport,tortured)allegedlytoldhisinterrogatorshehadhiredZahirbecauseof:

“…thecomplexityoftheconversationwhendiscussingoperationalmatterswithTalibancommanders.IZ-10026[Hadial-Iraqi]stateddetaineeworkedwithhimfrom1999until2002,andtranslatedforhimduringmostofhisoperationalTalibangovernmentmeetingsandfrontlinebattles.Detaineewaspaidapproximately$35to$40USamonthtotranslate.”153

Fromtheauthor’sexperienceoflivinginAfghanistanduringthoseyears,Zahir’saccountisplausible.Unemploymentwashighandpovertyrife;workingwiththegovernmentorevenwithArabfighterswasnotevidenceofideologicalcommitment.Zahir’stestimonythattheArabskepttheirdistancefromAfghanemployeesalsoringstrue.ThiswasalsothecaseforoneArabmediaorganisationoperatingatthattime,accordingtoAfghancolleagueswhodescribedasegregatedworkplace.AbdulHadipaidZahiraverypoorwage,but,combinedwithhousing,itwouldhavebeenenoughtoliveon.

ItisworthstressingthatArab-Afghanrelations–wheretheyexisted–weremessierandoftenmoreordinarythanhindsightmightimagine.InsideTaleban-controlledAfghanistan,alQaedawasnotreferredtoassuch;peopleusuallyreferredto‘theArabs’or‘theTaleban’sguests’.Mostforeignfighters,includingsomeArabs,werenotpartofbinLaden’sgroup,although,subsequently,allhavetendedtobelumpedtogetheras‘alQaeda’(seepage7).154

AccordingtoHadial-Iraqi,Zahirhadbeenpresentonthebattlefieldtranslatingforhim.Ifthatwastrue,thequestionwouldthenbewhetherZahir’sroleastranslatoramountedto“planning,authorizing,orcommitting,”or“aiding”theterroristattacksthatoccurredonSeptember11,2001,or“harbouringtheorganizationsorpersons” 151ZahirCSRT,transcript,2004,4.152‘PendingcourtrulinghangsoverGuantanamocase’,Reuters,5April2006,http://www.oneindia.com/2006/04/05/pending-court-ruling-hangs-over-guantanamo-case-1144202597.html.153ZahirAssessment,2008,5.154TheauthorknowsthreeAfghanswithArabfriendsoracquaintancesatthistime,drivenbycuriosityortheopportunitytolearnArabic.Allthreewentontobejournalists;onealsoworkedasaninterpreterwithUSSOFandanotherhastaughtatanAmericanuniversity.

[whodidauthorise,commitoraidtheattacks](textfromtheAUMF)orthathegavethem“substantialsupport”(Obama’samendmentofhisauthoritytodetain).Hewascertainlyanemployee,buttheevidencedoesnotbackuptheUScontentionthathewasasignificantperson.

Astohispost-2001actions,hisAssessmentsaidZahiradmittedtobeing“amemberofACM[AntiCoalitionMilitia]groupthatformedattheendofMarch2002,operatinginbothAfghanistanandPakistan,”actingasitsfinancialcourier,responsibleforcollectinganddisbursingfundstothegroup.155Yet,hevehementlydeniedthisathisCombatantStatusReviewHearingin2004,hisfirstchancetospeakpublically.Healsodeniedparticipatingintheonespecificattackhewasaccusedof–beinganaccomplicewhen,inMarch2002,agrenadethrownfromacarhewasridinginintoanothercarleftCanadianjournalistKathleenKennaseriouslywounded.156

“Thisisacompletelie.I’venevertakenpartinanybombattacksoranykindofoperations.IknewthepeoplewhodidthebombattackandhowthisgotaroundisbecauseItoldtheAmericansthenamesofthosewhodidtheattack.Thereisnoproof,andIhavenevertakenpartintheoperation,onlyprovidedinformation[tointerrogators].”157

LegalproceedingsInApril2006,MilitaryCommissiontrialproceedingsbegan;Zahirwaschargedwithconspiringtocommitwarcrimes,aidtheenemyandattackcivilians.TheUSstateallegedhewasanalQaedapaymasterwhoservedasaTalebantranslatorandwasinvolvedintheattackontheforeignjournalists,althoughitacceptedthatZahirhimselfhadnotthrownthegrenade.158

155Theadmissionslook,fromhisAssessment,tohavebeenmadeinaninterrogationmadejustbeforeheleftBagramandpossiblyagainayearafterhearrivedinGuantánamo.Thereisalittleotherdetaineetestimonyonthis.ZahirAssessment,2008,7-8.156‘ANationChallenged:Journalists;ReporterHurtinAfghanAttack’,TheNewYorkTimes,5March2002,http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/05/world/a-nation-challenged-journalists-reporter-hurt-in-afghan-attack.html.157ZahirCSRTtranscript,2004,3.158‘PendingcourtrulinghangsoverGuantanamocase’,Reuters,5April2006,http://www.oneindia.com/2006/04/05/pending-court-ruling-hangs-over-guantanamo-case-1144202597.html,JoelRoberts,‘AllegedQaedaMemberFacesTribunal’,4April2006,AssociatedPress,http://www.cbsnews.com/news/alleged-qaeda-member-faces-tribunal/.

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Inlegalterms,thepre-trialproceedingswerewhollyunsatisfactory.Zahir’smilitarydefencecounselaskedwhichlawswereapplicable,but,reportedtheAssociatedPress,thejudgerefusedtobepinneddown.“‘Obviouslymilitarylawisgoingtohavesomeapplication,”[he]said.“Isupposewewilllookatmilitarycriminallawandfederalcriminallawsandprocedures,”and,whenpressed,headded:“I’mnotgoingtospeculateastowhat[setoflaws]isorwhatisnotcontrolling.”159ThePentagon,althoughproducingcopiesofdocumentsinEnglish,ArabicandPashto,reportedlyfailedtoproducetheminZahir’snativelanguage,Persian.Thejudgealsohadto‘borrow’thedefence’sinterpreterbecausethecourthadfailedtoorganiseaPersiantranslator.160Ashortwayintoproceedings,theSupremeCourtruledthatthepresidentlackedtheconstitutionalauthoritytoholdsuchtribunals.Zahir’strialwasstopped.161

USplansforZahirThe2010TaskForcedecidedZahirshouldbereferredforprosecution.162Therehas,however,neverbeenanymovementonhiscase.On11July2015,thePeriodicReviewBoarddecidedheshouldbetransferred,withsomesortofanadmissionthatmistakeshadbeenmade:

Inmakingthisdetermination,theBoardconsideredthedetainee’scandorindiscussinghistimeinAfghanistanandinvolvementwiththeTaliban,thedetainee’slimitedroleinTalibanstructureandactivities,andtheassessmentthatthedetaineewasprobablymisidentifiedastheindividualwhohadtiestoal-Qaedaweaponsfacilitation.163

159JoelRoberts‘AllegedQaedaMemberFacesTribunal’,AssociatedPress,4April2006,http://www.cbsnews.com/news/alleged-qaeda-member-faces-tribunal/.160‘PendingcourtrulinghangsoverGuantanamocase’,Reuters,5April2006,http://www.oneindia.com/2006/04/05/pending-court-ruling-hangs-over-guantanamo-case-1144202597.html161Seepages18-19fordetailonmilitarycommissiontrials.Thewoundedreporterwroteaboutherverymixedfeelingsaboutthetrialsystemandherlongwaitforjustice.KathleenKenna,‘ThejusticeIwantforCaptive783’,TheStar,27December2009,http://www.thestar.com/news/insight/2009/12/27/the_justice_i_want_for_captive_783.html.162LetterfromUSDepartmentofJusticetoSavage,[SeeFN89].163ZahirFinalDetermination,PeriodicReviewBoard,11July2015,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN753/201

ZahirisstillinGuantánamo.AccordingtohisAssessment,hehas“chroniclowerbackpain,sciatica,”andhasgonethrough“hungerstrikingnotrequiringenteralfeeding,andhasahistoryofmajordepressiveepisodes.”164

4.2.3Case3:Obaidullah(ISN762),14YearsinGuantánamo

• PlaceofBirth:DusarakHaiderkheilVillage,Khost

• YearofBirth:1980-1983(differentdatesgiven)

• DetainedbyUSforcesinhouseraid,21July2002andheldinChapmanForwardOperatingBase(FOB),Khost;transferredtoBagram,2August2002,transferredtoGuantánamo,28October2002

• 2010TaskForceruledheshouldbeprosecuted.ClearedfortransferbyPeriodicReviewBoard,19May2016.TransferredtoUAE,14August2016

• GuantánamoDocuments:http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/762-obaidullah/documents/11

SummaryIn2002,afteratip-offaboutanalQaedabomb-makingcellinKhost,anumberofmenweredetained,allofwhom,exceptObaidullah165andhisformerbusinesspartner,BostonKarim(case4),werereleasedmanyyearsago.ObaidullahhadconfessedtobeingamemberofthecellandalsoimplicatedKarim,butretractedthissoonafterarrivinginGuantánamo,sayinghehadbeentortured.Inlatercourttestimony,therewassomecorroboration,thatObaidullahhadbeensubjecttosleepdeprivationandphysicalabuseatFOB

60203_U_ISN_753_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf.164ZahirAssessment,2008,1.165TheUSusesbothObaidullahandObaydullahinitsdocuments.



ChapmanandaservicememberhadbeenpunishedforhavinganotherservicememberphotographhimashestruckObaydullahintheheadwitharifle.Thestatelaterdroppedevidenceratherthancontesthistortureclaim.

DuringObaidullah’slong-runninghabeaspetition,muchoftheevidenceagainsthimwasshowntobedubious,untrueorobtainedundertorture,yetthejudgecontinuedtobelievestateassertionsandalsoallowedthestatetousesecretevidence.TheevidenceagainstObaidullahpointedtohimhavingpossiblybeenalow-levelinsurgent.Beyondthehearsayevidenceoftheoriginalinformant,whoseidentityisstillunknown,thereisnoproofthateitherObaidullahorKarimhadanalQaedalink.AstoKarim,thereisnoevidencethathewasaninsurgentatall.Theaccusationagainsteachman,however,hasbeenusedtohelp‘prove’theother’sguilt.ThejudgeinObaidullah’scasesaidthathis“long-standingpersonalandbusinessrelationshipwithatleastonealQaidaoperative,”wasonereasonwhyhemustalsohavebeenamember;166thejudgeinKarim’scasequotedhisfellowjudge,sayingthatObaidullahwasmorelikelythannot“amemberofanalQaedabombcellcommittedtothedestructionof[US]andAlliedforces,”asevidenceagainstKarim.167ObaidullahandKarim’scaseshighlighthowhollowthehabeasprocessbecameasjudgesfailedtoscrutinisestateevidenceinanymeaningfulway.

AfterPeriodicReviewBoardhearingsin2016,bothmenwereclearedfortransferandObaidullahwasrecentlysenttotheUAE.

CaptureInJuly2002,theCIA168receivedatip-offfrom‘awalk-insource’,i.e.apreviouslyunknowninformant,thatanalQaedaIEDcellwasoperatingfromthehouseofObaidullah,ashopkeeperaged

166JudgeLeonindenyingObaidullah’smotionforrelief(i.e.denyinghisappealbasedonwhathislawyerssaidwasnew,exculpatoryevidence.Obaydullahv.Obama,No.08-1173(RJL),slip.op.(D.D.C.30January2013).https://lawfare.s3-us-west.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2013/01/ISN-762-60b2-denial.pdf.167Bostanv.Obama,05-883(RBW),(D.C.C12October2011),(habeasdenied),https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv0883-287,15.168Obaidullah’sAssessmentgives‘TD’,i.e.theCIA,asthesourcefordetailsonthetip-offandObaidullah’scaptureandinterrogation.ObaidullahAssessment,2008,3-5.Courtdocumentsdescribedtheraidascarriedoutby“amilitaryunitwhichincludedAmericanSpecialOperationsSoldiers.”BostanKarim,habeasdenied,2011,[seeFN167],3.

19-22.169Theraid“netted23activeanti-tankminesofbothItalianandRussianmanufacture[and]sevenemptymineshells”buriedinthreefeet(aboutonemetre)ofearth.170USforcesalsoobservedtwocars,onewithdriedbloodonthebackseat171(itwascontendedinlatercourthearings,althoughnotathisboardsorinhisAssessment,thatObaidullahhadusedthiscartoferrywoundedmembersofthecelltohospital).Theyalsofound,onObaidullah’sperson,anotebookwith“schematics...forexplosivedevices.”172

Obaidullahwasdetained,alongwithtwocousinswhoalsolivedthere.173

InsomeoftheUSmilitarydocuments,theUSassertedthetip-offhadspecifiedbothObaidullahandBostanKarim.174However,yearslater,in2011,thetestimonyoftheUScolonelinchargeoftheraidwaspresentedincourtandhereferredthroughouttothesecondmanas‘Karim’,i.e.inscarequotes.175TheteamrejectedthepossibilitythatObaidullah’sbrother,FaizelKarim,couldhavebeenthesecondmanandmadetwomoreraidslookingfor‘Karim’,whomtheinformanthadsaidalsohadminesstoredathishome.OneoftheraidswasonBostonKarim’shouse.Itfoundnomines,butUSforcesdiddetainhisnephew,ShamsUllah,whohadshotatthem,thinkinghishomewasunderattackfrompersonalenemies.176

Meanwhile,amonthlater,PakistanipolicedetainedtwoAfghansinthetribalareasastheytravelledbybusfromKhosttoPeshawar:Bostan

169Variousdatesofbirthandagesaregivenindifferentmilitarydocuments.170ObaidullahAssessment,2008,3.171KarimAssessment,2008,6.172Obaidullahreportedlysaidthewritingsanddrawingsinthebookwereforagenerator,butthecolonelrecognisedtheywerefor“explosivedevices”and“[t]helinguistaccompanyingColonel’sunitalsoconfirmedthatthatthenotebookwasabomb-makingmanualbecause“theword[‘]bomb[‘]or[‘]mine[‘]waswrittenonit.”BostanKarim,habeasdenied,2011,[seeFN167],4.173Osman(ISN763)andShirAliKhan(ISN764)weretakentoBagramandlaterreleased.174Forexample,“USforceswereinformedthatdetainee[Obaidullah]wasanAfghanal-Qaidamemberworkingwithasecondal-Qaidamember,AF-975[BostanKarim],andthatthetwowereplanningmineattacksagainstUSforcesoperatingintheKhowstarea.”ObaidullahAssessment,2008,3.175BostanKarim,habeasdenied,[seeFN167],3-8.176ShamsUllah’sCSRTsaidhehad“foughtagainstUSanditscoalitionpartners.”HehadactuallyjustfiredonUSandAfghanforcesraidinghishomeatnightwithhisKalashnikovrifle.ShamsUllahCSRT,ISN783,2004,2,http://projects.nytimes.com//detainees/783-shams-ullah/documents/2.

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Karim,asellerofplasticflowers,whowasalsoObaidullah’sformerbusinesspartner,andAbdullahWazir(ISN976),theownerofatyreandcarbatteryshop,bothfromKhost.Aftersevenmonths,theyhandedthepairovertoUSforces,allegingtheywerealQaedaoperatives.(Formoredetailsonthis,seeKarim’scase,especiallypages42-43.)TheUStookKarimtoBagram(wherehesaidhewaspreventedfromsleepingfor15days)andthentoGuantánamo.Itdecidedhewasthe‘Karim’mentionedinthetip-off.OfthesevendetaineesallsupposedlybelongingtothesameIEDcellandheldateitherGuantánamoorBagram,theotherfivehavelongbeenreleased.ObaidullahandKarim’scasesareintegrallylinked.TheevidenceagainstKarimwasalwaysmeagreandwhatmightlookatfirsttobecompellingpiecesofevidenceagainstObaidullah–themines,thenotebookandtheblood-stainedcar–haveallbeenquestioned,underminedorhadtobediscardedbecauseofsubsequentrevelations.

TortureTheUSmilitarycalledObaidullaha“self-professedmemberofalQaeda”andan“admittedassociateofanalQaedaexplosivescellleader.”177Indetention,hetestifiedagainstbothhimselfandKarim.Yet,atthefirstchancehegottospeakpublically,hisCombatantStatusReviewTribunalin2004,ObaidullahaccusedtheUSofhavingtorturedhiminAfghanistanandforcingbothconfessionandaccusationsfromhim.

TheevidencesaysIadmittedtobeinganassociateofanAl-Qaidaexplosivecellleader,Ineveradmittedtothat.WhentheAmericanscapturedme,theyboundmetotheAmericanarea[sic]andtheybeganpunishingme.Theyputaknifetomythroat,tiedmyhandsandputsandbagsonmyarms.AttheairportinKhostIwaswalkedaroundallnightwiththesandbagsonmyarms.TheytookmetoBagramwheretheinterrogationandpunishmentincreased.Iwasveryyoungatthattime,sowhatevertheysaid,Iagreedto.178

TheUSmilitaryhasinsistedherecantedbecauseoffearofKarim,whoarrivedinGuantánamosixmonthslater.Obaidsaidthat,afterafewmonthswhenheknewhewasn’tgoingtobepunishedinGuantánamo,he“begantellingthetruth.”179Thedatesofhisinterrogationstendtobackuphis

177See,forexample,ObaidullahARB2,2005,2andObaidullahCSRT,2004,1-2.178ObaidullahCSRT,transcript,2004,2.179CSRT,transcript,2004,5.

claim.180ThemilitaryhasdescribedObaidullahasevasive,withanever-changingtestimony,acharacterisationofhimwhichjudgeshearinghishabeaspetitionhaveaccepted(moreofwhichbelow).However,givenwhatweknowofthetortureandproceduresusedbytheUSmilitaryandCIAatthistime,(seepages14-15),Obaidullah’sallegationsofabusearecredible.Moreover,thestatewouldlaterdropthetestimonyithadobtainedfromhimatFOBChapmaninKhost,ratherthancontestitincourt.

AllegationsandevidenceTherearetwoaccusationsagainstObaidullah:thathewasmakingbombsandthathewasdoingthisforalQaeda.IfObaidullahhadbeenmakingIEDsindependentlyorasamemberofasmall,unalignedgroup,theauthoritytodetainhimundertheAuthorisationoftheUseofMilitaryForcewouldnotapply.Thereissomeevidencethathemighthavebeenalow-levelinsurgent,butnonethathewasamemberofalQaeda.

InObaidullah’spublicsessionsathisCombatantStatusReviewTribunalandAdministrativeReviewBoards,hisnarrativewasconsistent.Hebelieveshewassubjecttoamalicioustip-off.181Healsoprovidedwhathesaidwereexplanationsoftheevidenceagainsthim.

Hisfamily,returningrefugeesfromPakistanafterthefallofthecommunists(Khostfellin1991,thegovernmentinKabulin1992),haddiscoveredthelandmineswhentheyreturnedhome;theybelievedtheminesbelongedtoanAfghanarmycommander,AliJan,whohadlivedintheirhouseduringthecommunisteraandalsobuiltwatch-towers,bunkersandabasementinthehouse.Obaidullahsaidthathe,thena7-11yearsoldboy,andhismother,awidow,hadmovedtheminesawayfromthehouseandburiedthem“onauselessareaofourland…about300metersfromourhouse.”182Therewasnoestablishedgovernmentatthetime,only“warlords”,sotheyhadburiedtheminesbecausetheywereafraidtheywouldbepunishedforpossessingthem.

180ObaidullaharrivedinOctober2002andKariminMarch2003.AbouthalfofObaidullah’sallegationsagainstKarimweremadebeforehearrivedatGuantánamoandtherestmainlyonthedayhearrived,orsoonafter.Thelastisdated22September2003,whenKarimwasalreadyinCuba.KarimAssessment,2008.181HenamedtheallegedinformersinhisfirstAdministrativeReviewBoard,transcribedas“AnwharandMidwis”[probablyAnwarandMirwais].ARB1transcript,2005,10.182ObaidullahCSRT,2004,2,7.



Later,they“evenhidthemfromtheTaliban.IfIshowedthemtotheTalibanIwouldhavebeenputinprison.”183In2002,whenObaidullahwasdetained,theUnitedNationsMineActionProgrammeforAfghanistancalledthecountry“oneofthemostmineandunexplodedordnance(UXO)-affectedcountriesintheworld.”184Anestimated850squarekilometreswerecontaminatedbyminesand500squarekilometreswaslitteredwithUXO.Everymonthin2002,150-300peoplewerekilledorinjuredbysteppingonminesorUXO.Movinglandmineswithoutspecialisedtrainingorequipmentwouldbedangerous,butcouldhaveseemedtheonlyoptioniftheywereinthehouse.

Thequestionofwhetherornotthelandmineswereevidenceofbomb-makingorjustleftoverordnanceshouldhavebeenrelativelyeasytoclearup:whatdidthemineslooklike?WeretheyoldanddeterioratedorweretheypackedreadytobecannibalisedforIEDs?Thisquestiondoesnotseemtohavebeenasked.Instead,argumentshavecentredonvariationsinObaidullah’sandthemilitary’stestimony(howmanymines,fromwhichcountry,buriedhowmanymetresfromthehouse?etc.)andwhetherthevariationsshowedevidenceofObaidullah’slyingorwerereasonable.

Astothenotebook,ObaidullahsaidhehadbeenforcedtojointheTalebaninAugust2001and,beingtooyoungforthefrontline,hadbeensenttoa‘technicalschool’tolearnhowtolaylandminesforuseagainsttheNorthernAlliance.Afterjusttwodays,hesaidhismotherforcedhimtoleavethecourse.Therehadbeennobooks,hesaid,sotheywereaskedtotakenoteswhichwouldbeexplainedtothemlaterinmoredetail.185Hestillcarriedthenotebookaroundbecause,hesaid,italsohadnotesandaccountsfromhisshopinit.Lendingsomeweighttohisaccount,Obaidullah’sinterrogatorthoughthedidnotunderstandwhatwasinthenotebook:

Duringasecondinterviewon21September2004,ISN762[Obaidullah]wasaskedaboutseveralreferencesfoundinthesamenotebookthatheldtheschematicsfordetonatinglandmines.Itwasapparenttotheinterviewersthat[Obaidullah]knewlittleofwhatwaswritteninthenotebookandthenotebookprobablybelongedtosomeoneelse.Itappearsthe

183ObaidullahCSRT,2004,2,4.184TheUnitedNationsMineActionProgrammeForAfghanistan2002AnnualReport(emailedtoauthorbyaformerheadoftheagency),7.185ObaidullahCSRT,2004,3-4.

notebookeitherbelongedtodetainee[Wazir]orISN975[Karim].186

Theinterrogator’sconclusionhasneverbeenmentionedinanyofthemilitaryreviewsorcourtcasesinvolvingObaidullah,butappearsintheWikiLeakedAssessmentofoneoftheotherallegedmembersoftheIEDcell,AbdullahWazir,187asevidencethathemighthavewrittenthenotes.Becausetheinterrogator’salternativeassessmentwasmadeinaclassifieddocumentthatwasunlawfullydisclosed,hisdefencelawyercouldnotpresentitincourt.Itwouldalsobeusefultoknowwhatexactlytheschematicsinthenotebookshowed:weretheyfor“detonatinglandmines”(asinthequoteabove)or“wiringdesignsforbuildinglethalimprovisedexplosivedevices”?188BothversionsappearinUSdocuments;thefirstlendsweighttoObaidullah’sstory;thesecondbacksupthestate’saccusations.Thereareproblemswiththisevidence,therefore.Evenso,thenotebookremainsthestrongestproofthatObaidullahhadbeenintentonmakingIEDs.

ThealQaedaaccusationAstothesecondUSaccusation,thatObaidullahwas“amemberofal-Qaida…anexplosivesexpertforanIEDcellinKhowst,[Afghan]subordinatetosenioral-Qaidaoperative,AbuLaythal-Libi(deceased),”189theevidenceisinsubstantial–hisownconfessionplustestimonyfromtwootherdetaineesspeakingunderinterrogationinGuantánamo,muchlater,in2005.190Manyofthedetailsofthisallegedmembershiparefar-fetched,forexamplethat,duringtheTalebanera,whenObaidullahwasateenagerorpossiblyjustintohistwenties,he“helpedcoordinatethemovementandactivitiesofvariousforeignalQaidaoperating

186ThisappearsinWazir’sAssessment,2005,http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/976-abdullah-wazir/documents/11,5.187WazirwastheotherpassengeronthebusalsoquestionedanddetainedbyPakistanipolicewhohadhandedthebrokenThurayasatellitephonetoBostanKarim(casestudy4)andwassubsequentlysenttoandreleasedfromGuantánamo.188Obaydullahv.Obama,No.08-1173(RJL),slipop.8-9(D.D.C.19October2010)(habeasdenied),https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2010/10/2010-10-19-Obaydullah-RJL-Slip.pdf,2.189ObaidullahAssessment,2008,1.190TheywereAdelZamelAbdal-Mahsenal-Zamel(ISN568),subsequentlyreleased,frominterrogationson20,26and30October2005andMohammadKamin(ISN1045),fromaninterrogationon7November2005,ObaidullahAssessment,2008,5,6.

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intheKhowstarea.”191OrthathehidandrelocatedtoPakistan18ArabalQaedamembersatthestartofthealliedbombingcampaignin2001;theforeignmilitantsfledlaterandquiteopenly.192Oneotherassociationisseenbythemilitaryandjudgesasdamning,thatis,theshorttimeObaidullahspentwithamissionaryorganisation,Jamatal-Tabligh(JT)ofwhichBostanKarimwasacommittedmember.TheUSmilitaryhasmiscastJamatal-Tablighasa“terroristsupportentity,”eventhoughmillionsofMuslimsinSouthAsiaaremembersinwhollyuncontroversialways(seepages43-44).Itassessed,therefore,thatObaidullah’s“storyabouttravellingtoPakistanunderJTauspices”was“acoverstory,whichiscommonlyusedtofacilitateIslamicextremistactivitiesandtravelsthroughouttheMiddleEast.”193

Legalproceedings:TheMilitaryCommissiontrial

Obaidullahfiledhispetitionforhabeascorpuson7July2008.(Seepages40-41foratimelineoflegalproceedings.)Thiswasfollowed,however,bytheUSstatefilingchargesforaMilitaryCommissiontrial(10September2008).DespitetheSupremeCourthavingruledthatsuchtrialswerenotanadequatesubstituteforhabeascorpus,legalproceedingsaroundthetrial–whichnevertookplace–causedhishabeaspleatobesuspendedforalmosttwoyears.

Obaidullahwasnotchargedwithanyactualattack,ratherthathe:

…didconspireandagreewithotherindividuals,bothknownandunknown,tocommitoffensestriablebymilitarycommission,towit:intentionallycausingseriousbodilyinjurytooneormorepersonsinviolationofthelawofwar,murderinviolationofthelawofwar,andprovidingmaterialsupporttoterrorism…”194

191ObaidullahARB2,2006,1,andObaidullahARB3summary,2007,1.192ObaidullahARB1,2005,1;repeatedinObaidullahARB2,2006,2andObaidullahARB3,2007,2.ArabandotherforeignfightersfledonmassthroughKhostcitytotheborderinNovember2001afterKabulhadfallen.Authorinterviewswitheye-witnessesforBBCradio,July2002.NoURLavailable.193Obaidullah,Assessment,2008,6.194U.S.v.Obaydullah,ChargeSheet,9September2008),https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2012/03/Obaidullah_Government_Sworn_Charges.pdf.

Thechargesheetcitesonlyhis“concealingandstoring”theminesand“concealing”thenotebook,asthe“overtact[s]”whichhe“knowinglycommitted”to“effecttheconspiracy.”Thereisnomoredetail.Thechargesheetisnotonlyshort,butalsostrange,legally.“Providingmaterialsupporttoterrorism”didnotappearinthe2006MilitaryCommissionAct,soObaidullahwasbeingchargedofsomethingwhichwasnotacriminaloffence.195Moreover,nowherehasitbeenallegedthatObaidullahwaspreparingtoattackanyoneexceptUSforces.Suchanactionwouldnotviolate“thelawofwar”(i.e.InternationalHumanitarianLaw),whichdoesnotbanattacksoncombatants.

ThenewObamaadministration,whichcameintopowerinJanuary2009,wasnotsureifitwantedtocontinuewiththetrialandthejudgeinObaidullah’shabeascase,RichardJLeon,ruleditshouldhavetimetodecidewhattodo.Eventually,theCourtofAppeal,on16June2010,orderedLeontoholdthehearing.(TheMilitaryCommissionchargeswouldlaterbedropped,on7June2011,withoutprejudice,meaningthecasecouldbereopened.)

Obaidullah’shabeaspetitionBeforethehabeashearing,on17August2010,Obaidullah’slawyerssoughttogetthecourttocompelthegovernmenttodiscloseinformationaboutthewalk-insource,andwhetherhewaspaidmoneyfortheintelligencethatledtotheraidonObaidullah’shome.JudgeLeonrefused,acceptingthegovernment’scontentionthattheinformationwastoosensitiveforevenObaidullah’ssecurity-clearedcounseltoread.Thewordsofthissourceremainthelynch-pinforthestate’sassertionthatObaidullahwasamemberofalQaedaandthereforehadtostayindetention.

Thehabeashearingwentahead(30Septemberand1October2010)and,on19October,JudgeLeonfoundthatObaidullah’sdetentionwaslawfulunderCongress’AuthorisationoftheUseofMilitaryForce(AUMF).HewasnotconvincedbyObaidullah’sexplanationsaboutthelandminesorthenotebook.Heagreedwiththegovernment’scontentionthatObaidullahhad“repeatedlygivenfalseandimplausibleexplanationsregardinghisknowledgeof,andinvolvementwith,theseexplosives,thisnotebook,andthisautomobile.”196HealsonotedObaidullah’slong-standingpersonalandbusinessrelationship,includingtheir

195Fordetail,seeTheManualforMilitaryCommissions,18January2007(http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/manual-mil-commissions.pdf)(Section4,18).196Obaidullahhabeasdenied,2010,[seeFN188],8,9.



involvementinJamatal-Tabligh,withBostanKarimwhomhedescribedashaving“allegedtiestoalQaeda.”197

…thecombinationoftheexplosives,thenotebookinstructionsandtheautomobilewithdriedbloodallfittogethertocorroborateintelligencesourcesplacingboththepetitionerandBostonatthesceneaidingfellowbombcellmemberswhohadbeenaccidentallyinjuredwhileconstructinganIED.Combiningalltheevidenceandcorroboratedintelligence,themosaicthatemergesunmistakeablysupportstheconclusionthatitismorelikelythannotthat[he]wasinfactamemberofanalQaidacellcommittedtothedestructionofU.S.andAlliedforces.198

Theterm‘mosaic’isimportant;itisareferencetothetheorythat,evenifindividualpiecesofevidencearequestionable,iftheycombinetoformaconvincingcase,thenjudgescanoverlooktheweaknessoftheindividualpieces.199Theweakestpieceofthis‘mosaic’wasthegovernment’sclaimthatObaidullahwasamemberofalQaeda.Itisalsothemostimplausibleaspectofthecase.ThechancesofanAfghanbeingamemberofalQaedaatthistimearesosmallthatitwouldneedalotmoreexplanationandevidencethanjustatip-offfromawalk-insource(seepage7).

HabeasappealsObaidullahhasmadeseveralattemptstoappeal.TheDistrictCourtdeniedhisinitialrequest,madeon24March2011.HislawyersthenfiledanappealtotheCourtofAppealson17May2011and,on8February2012,basedonnewly-discoveredevidencewhichtheysaidshowedhewasnotguilty,alsofiledtoreopentheDistrictCourt(JudgeLeon’s)decision.

Athree-judgepaneloftheCourtofAppealsheardtheappeal(23-24April2012,200partlyinclosedsession201)and,on3August2012,upheldtheDistrictCourt’srulingthathisdetentionwaslegal.ItrejectedObaidullah’sclaimthat“thepre-raidintelligencereportslinkinghimtoalQaedaarenot

197Obaidullahhabeasdenied,2010,13,[seeFN188]13.198Obaidullahhabeasdenied,2010,[seeFN188],13,14.199Wittes,TheEmergingLawofDetention,[seeFN73],112-121.200BenjaminWittes,RaffaelaWakeman‘OralArgumentPreview:Obaydullahv.Obama’LawfareBlog,23April2012,https://www.lawfareblog.com/oral-argument-preview-obaydullah-v-obama.201BenjaminWittes‘ObaydullahOralArgumentSummary’,LawfareBlog,24April2012,https://www.lawfareblog.com/obaydullah-oral-argument-summary

reliableandhavenotbeensufficientlycorroborated,”sayingthenotebookandminescorroboratedthealQaedaallegation.202ThecourtagreedthattheallegationofferryingIEDcellmemberstohospitalmayhavebeenmischaracterised,butsaidthat,evenifthatevidencewaseliminated,thecaseagainstObaidullahwouldstillstand.ThegovernmentchosetowithdrawthestatementsobtainedfromhimatFOBChapmanandBagram,ratherthancontesthisallegationthathehadbeentortured.However,thecourtrejectedObaidullah’sassertionthathisstatementsduringtheraidhadbeencoercedormistranslatedandrejectedhisobjectionstotheuseofhearsayevidencebysayingthatprecedencehadbeenmadeduringanearlierhabeascase203thatthecourt“mayapplyapreponderanceoftheevidencestandardandmayadmithearsayevidence.”204Thecourt,inrejectingObaidullah’sappeal,said:

…theintelligencelinkingObaydullahtoanalQaidabombcelliscorroboratedbythefactthathehadanotebookwithdiagramsofexplosivesinhispocket.Whileitispossiblethatthebombsandnotebookcanbeexplainedbyothercircumstances,orthatObaydullahwassomesortof“freelance”bomb-makernotlinkedtoal-Qaida–thedistrictcourt’sconclusionthatthesecircumstancessufficientlycorroboratedthepre-raidintelligence[i.e.thewalk-insource’saccusation]fallswellwithintherealmofreasonableness.”205

BeingconsideredamemberofalQaeda,ratherthana‘freelancer’is,ofcourse,crucialhere,asanindependentinsurgentwouldnotbecoveredbythepresidentialauthoritytodetain.206

Newevidenceor‘are-hash’oftheold?

Meanwhile,newrevelationswerebeingmadeaboutthecasebyLieutenantCommanderRichard

202Obaydullahv.U.S.,No.1:08-cv-1173,15(D.C.Cir.3August2012)(rejectinghabeasappeal),15.203AlSabri,2012,WL2895585.204Obaydullahrejectionofhabeasappeal[seeFN202],27.205Obaydullahrejectionofhabeasappeal[seeFN202],17(legalcitationsomittedfromquotation).206TheAUMFauthorisesmilitaryactionagainst“alQaedaanditsassociates.”“Thegovernmentmustdomorethanjustprovethatthedetaineewasan‘independent...freelancer.’”BostanKarimhabeasdenied,[seeFN167]andquotingSulaymanv.Obama,729F.Supp.2d26,33(D.D.C.2010)(alterationinoriginal)),9.

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PandisoftheUSNavalReserve.Obaidullah’smilitarydefencecounselinhisMilitaryCommissiontrialhadtaskedPandiswithinvestigatingtheevidenceagainsthisclientasthecasewasstillofficiallyactive.PandistravelledtoAfghanistanand,afterinvestigatingthevariousstrandsofthestate’scaseagainstObaidullah,cameupwithsomeinterestingnewevidence:

• PeoplefromObaidullah’svillage,wrotePandisinhisdeclarationtothecourt,“identifiedtwomaleswhowerenotoriginallyfromthesamevillage,buthadlivedthereforaperiod,andwhowererumouredtohavesoldfalseinformationtoAmericans.Itwasstatedthatthosetwomenlaterdisappearedanditisnotknownwhethertheyarealive.”207

• Thebloodinthecar,supposedlyfromObaidullah’sinjuredcomrades,wasreportedtohavebeenfromObaidullah’swife.Afewdaysbeforehisarrest,shehadgoneintolabourand,becauseofmultiplecheckpoints,hadbeenforcedtogivebirthinthebackofthecar,ontheroadside,withtheseatsfoldeddown.Obaidullah,itwascontended,hadnotexplainedthistohisinterrogatorsbecauseheconsideredittabootospeakabouthiswife’spregnancyandlabour.208Thecarhadalsoactuallybelongedtosomeoneelse(Pandisinterviewedtheowner).USforceshadeventuallygiventhecartothelocalmilitiawhichguardedtheirbase,saidPandis,andObaidullah´sfamilywereforcedtoselllandtocompensatetheowner.WitnessessaidtheyhadneverseenObaidullahdrivingacarorseenthecarwiththebloodstainsparkedinObaidullah’scompoundbeforethebirthofhisdaughter.209Obaidullahhadonlypreviouslydriventractors.210

• Non-familywitnessesconfirmedthatthecommunistcommander,AliJan,hadlivedinObaidullah’shouseandonewitnesssaidlandmineshadbeenstoredthere.USandAfghanwitnessesledPandistobelievetheywereburiednot30metresfromhouse,asclaimedbytheUSmilitary,but140-160metres.211

• Familyandnon-familywitnessessaidObaidullahhadnotassociatedwiththeTalebanapartfromthefewdayshewasforcedtogototheKhostMechanicalSchool.

207DeclarationofRichardPandis,8February2012,https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/291075/obaydullah-pandis-decl.pdf,3.208Pandis,[seeFN207],6.209Pandis,[seeFN207]6.210Pandis,[seeFN207],6-7.211Pandis,[seeFN207],9.

TheygavedetailaboutTalebanconscription.WitnessesalsosaidhehadonlyspentafewdaysthereandthenhadhidfromtheTaleban.212

• AstoObaidullah’sallegationsoftorture,Pandisconcludedthat“detaineesatBagramduringthisperiodin2002,includingObaydullah,weresubjecttoextraordinarilycoercivemethodswhichcausemetoquestionthereliabilityofresultingstatements.”213Healsoconcluded,“ObaydullahwassubjecttosleepdeprivationandphysicalabusewhileatFOBChapman.”AccordingtoUSwitnesseswithpersonalknowledge,saidPandis,oneservicememberwaspunishedforhavinganotherservicememberphotographhimashestruckObaydullahintheheadwitharifle,andthecamerawasdestroyedbyUSpersonnel.214

TheevidencecollectedbyPandis,althoughgatheredfortheMilitaryCommissiontrial,waspresentedbyObaidullah’slawyerstorequestare-openingoftheDistrictCourt’sdecisiontorejectObaidullah’sappeal.215Yet,JudgeLeonupheldhisearlierdecision.HesaidtheeliminationoftheallegationthatObaidullahhadbeenferryinginsurgentsinhiscarmadenodifferencetothecontentionthatObaidullahwasanalQaedamember.Thejudgecomplainedthatthelawyershadbrought“unidentifiedwitnessreports,somesecondorthird-hand,pertainingtoeventsthatoccurredalmostadecadeearlier.”On28January2013,hedismissedPandis’evidenceas“simplyarehashofevidencethatIalreadyconsideredanddismissedwhendenyinghispetition”andsaid,“Putsimply,[Obaidullah]cannotmakeasilkpurseoutofad’sear!”216

AnattempttogettheSupremeCourtinvolved

On26February2013,Obaidullah’slawyerspetitionedtheSupremeCourtfora‘writofcertiorari’,217,218i.e.arequesttoreviewthelower

212Pandis,[seeFN207],7-8.213Pandis,[seeFN207],9,paras31-32.214Pandis,[seeFN207],9.215UnderRule60(b)(2)oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure.216ObaydullahDenialofMotionforRelief,30January2013,[seeFN146].217TheyalsotriedtogettheCourtofAppealtoreconsiderthecase(petitioned17September2012,refused,29November2012)onproceduralgrounds.218Awritofcertiorariisanorderforajudicialreview,sentbyahighercourttoalowercourttoreviewitsrecordofacase(‘certiorari’means‘tobemorefully



courts’decisions.Thewritwasbasedonthreeissues:Obaidullah’sindefinitedetentionviolatedtheconstitution,InternationalHumanRightsLawandInternationalHumanitarianLawandcouldnotbejustifiedbydeclaringa‘WaronTerror’thathasnoend,especiallywhentherewasnoevidencetosuggestthatObaidullahwasapresentdanger;lowercourtshadpresumedgovernmentintelligencedocumentswereaccuratesohecouldnotdisputethesometimescontradictoryevidenceusedtojustifyhisdetentionand;thesourcelinkingObaidullahtoalQaedahadnotbeendisclosed,wasunknownandcouldnotbeverified.219AstheLawfarewebsitereported,thewritwasa“relativelynon-noteworthydevelopment”:

“…the[Supreme]Courthasturnedawayoveradozendifferentappealsinsuchcasestodate,leavingtheimpressionthatthey’renotatallinterestedinsupervisingthemeritsoftheD.C.Circuit’sjurisprudenceinthisfield…But,ifnothingelse,here’sonemoreopportunityfortheJusticestonotlettheD.C.Circuithavethelastword,especiallyas(1)itlookslessandlesslikelythatGuantánamowilleverbeclosed;and(2)wegetfurtherandfurtherawayfrom9/11andtheAUMF.”220

Indeed,theSupremeCourtdidrefusetoreviewObaidullah’scase.221Hislawyers,however,didnotgiveup.Beforethemaincasehadgonetoappeal(itwasrejectedon3August2012),theyhadalreadyaskedforareconsiderationofJudgeLeon’sdecisiontorejectPandis’newevidenceasa“re-hash”ofoldevidence(28January2013).ThisthreadofthehabeaspetitioncamebeforetheAppealsCourtinJanuary2014222andObaidullah’s

informed’).AdenialofthewritmeanstheSupremeCourtiscontentforthelowercourtdecisiontostand.219CindyPanuco,‘HSRRfilesPetitiontoSupremeCourtforGuantanamoDetainee’,HadsellStormer&RenickLLP,1March2013,http://www.hadsellstormer.com/blog/2013/03/hsrr-files-petition-to-supreme-court-for-guantanamo-detainee.shtml.220SteveVladeck‘TheObaydullahCert.Petition:OneMoreShotfortheSupremeCourt…’1March2013,Lawfare,https://www.lawfareblog.com/obaydullah-cert-petition-one-more-shot-supreme-court.221‘Certiorari–SummaryDispositions’(ORDERLIST:570U.S.)12-8932Obaydullahv.Obama,24June2013,http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/062413zor_n7ip.pdf.222RaffaelaWakeman,‘OralArgumentRecap:Obaydullahv.Obama,RoundTwo’,Lawfare,15January,2014,https://www.lawfareblog.com/oral-argument-recap-obaydullah-v-obama-round-two.

pleathathisdetentionwasunlawfulwasagainrejected.223

WhatObaidullah’sfailedhabeascaseshows

Obaidullah’slongandtortuousattemptstousetheUScourtstoshowthathisdetentionwasnotlegalrevealedthatthejudgeswereunwillingtoquestiontheaccuracyofthestate’sassertionsabouthim.Evenasmoreandmoreelementsofthegovernment’scasefellaway,JudgeLeonandtheappealscourtjudgesstillpresumedthegovernment’sevidenceanditsinterpretationofeventswereaccurate.TherevelationthatObaidullahhadbeentorturedmadenodentintheiracceptanceofthestate’scase.Considerationofthetwosides’evidencewasalsoskewed.JudgeLeon’scomplaintthatPandis’evidencewasbasedonyears-oldsecondandthird-handtestimony,forexample,wasinmarkedcontrasttohisacceptanceofverysimilartestimonyfromthestate,forexample,whatastaffsergeant,whotestifiedin2006and2010,hadsaidherememberedatranslatortoldhimObaidullahhadsaidduringtheraidyearsearlier.Judgesacceptedthegovernment’sviewthatObaidullahwasevasiveandduplicitousbecauseofvariationsinhistestimonyduringdifferentinterrogations,whileoverlookingrathersimilarinconsistenciesinthestate’scase.Elementsofthetip-offthatwerenottruemadenoimpactonthecourt’sacceptanceofitoverall.Mostcrucially,thejudgesfailedentirelytoquestionthealQaedaaccusation.Thiscontentionstillrestsentirelyonthewordsofapersonwhomayhavebeenpaidforhisinformationandwhoseidentitythecourthasensuredwouldbekeptsecret.224

USplansforObaidullahThe2010GuantánamoTaskForcedecidedObaidullahshouldbeprosecuted,althoughno

223RaffaelaWakeman,‘D.C.CircuitonObaydullah:NewEvidenceUnhelpfultoDetainee’sCase’,Lawfare,24January2014,https://www.lawfareblog.com/dc-circuit-obaydullah-new-evidence-unhelpful-detainees-case.224InMarch,2013,theUNWorkingGrouponArbitraryDetentionsruledthatObaidullah’sdetentionwasunlawful.‘UnitedNationsHumanRightsCouncilWorkingGrouponArbitraryDetentions,OpinionsadoptedbytheWorkingGrouponArbitraryDetentionatits66thSession,29April-3March2013’(No10/2013USA),https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2013/07/WGAD-Obaidullah-Opinion-No.-10-2013.pdf.

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chargeswereevermade.225On19April2016,ObaidullahhadhisPeriodicReviewBoardhearingand,despitearepetitionofalltheoldassertionsthathehadreceivedexplosivestraining,foughtforalQaeda,andhadansweredtothelateArabcommander,AbuLeithal-Libbi,226theBoarddecided,on19May2016,toclearhimfortransfer.227On14August2016,hewassenttotheUAE.

TheBoardsaidithad“someconcernwiththedetainee’sfailuretodemonstratesufficientcandorrelatedtoeventspriortodetention,”butwassatisfiedthatanyriskcouldbemitigated,sayingObaidullahhadbeenacompliantdetainee,notexpressedanti-AmericansentimentandtakenadvantageofeducationalopportunitiesinGuantánamo.Hismilitarylawyer,MarineMajorDerekPoteet,saidthat,notonlywasheinnocentofwarcrimes,butObaidullahdidnotspeakArabicbeforehegottoCuba,makinghimanunlikelyalQaidafighter.228

LegaltimelineforObaidullah12June2008.SupremeCourt(Boumedienev.Bush)rulesthattheremovalofthefederalcourts’jurisdictiontohearpetitionsforhabeascorpusbyGuantánamodetainees,underthe2006MilitaryCommissionActwasanunconstitutionalsuspensionofhabeascorpus.Detaineescanpetitionforhabeasinfederalcourtina“prompt”hearing.

7July2008.ObaidullahfileshabeaswritinUSDistrictcourt(JudgeLeon).

9September2008.ChargedwithconspiracyandprovidingmaterialsupportforterrorismfortrialbyMilitaryCommission(underMilitaryCommissionsActof2006).

12November2008.Governmentasksforstayordismissalofhabeasproceedingsuntilaftertrialandanyappeals.

225LetterfromUSDepartmentofJusticetoSavage,[seeFN89].226ObaidullahDetaineeProfile,PeriodicReviewBoard,23November2016,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN762/20151123_U_ISN_762_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf.227ObaidullahFinalDetermination,PeriodicReviewBoard,19May2016,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN762/160519_U_ISN762_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf.228CarolRosenberg,‘GuantánamoparoleboardOKsreleaseofAfghanObaidullah’,TheMiamiHerald,20May2016,http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article78908327.html#storylink=cpy.

2December2008.Courtgrantsastay.

20January2009.NewObamaadministrationasksfora120-daystayinproceedingsofMilitaryCommissiontrials.

24February2009.Obaidullahseekstoresumehabeasproceedings(to‘vacatethestay’);governmentopposes.

22April2009.CourtdeniesObaidullah’srequest,butdemandsthegovernmentsubmitastatusreportonObaidullah’sMilitaryCommissioncaseby17July2009.

9July2009.Obaidullahagainrequestsaresumptionofhabeasproceedings.

17July2009.GovernmenttellsthecourttheReviewPanelhasnotmadeadecisiononObaidullah’sMilitaryCommissiontrial.

6August2009.CourtdeniesObaidullah’srenewedrequesttoresumehabeasproceedings.

10September2009.ObaidullahappealstotheCourtofAppealsforDCCircuittoresumehabeasproceedings.

6January2010.GovernmenttellsCourtofAppealsthatObaidullah’scaseisappropriateformilitarycommissionprosecution.(However,conveningauthorityhadnotreferredthecasefortrial.)

16June2010.CourtofAppealsrulesthereisnoreasontodenyObaidullaha“prompthabeascorpushearing.”

17August2010.LawyersfilemotionofdiscoveryinDistrictCourttocompelthegovernmenttorevealinformationonthesource,credibilityandintelligenceofthe‘walk-in’sourcewhosetip-offledtoObaidullahbeingdetained.

30August2010.Courtrefusestocompelgovernmenttorevealinformationaboutthetip-off.

20September2010.ObaidullahfileshisTraverse–hisformalresponsetothegovernment’sFactualReturn(whichlaysoutitscaseastowhyheshouldremainindetention).

30September-1October2010.Courthearshabeaspetition

30November2010.CourtrulesObaidullah’sdetentionislawfulundertheAuthorisationoftheUseofMilitaryForce(AUMF).

24March2011.CourtdeniesmotiontoreconsiderhisdecisiontodenyObaidullah’shabeascorpuspetition.

17May2011.Obaidullah’slawyersfilenoticeofappealagainstthecourt’sdecisiononhabeasrulingtoCourtofAppeals.



7June2011.MilitaryCommissionchargesdismissedwithoutprejudice.Caseisstillactivesodefenceteamcontinuetoinvestigateandprepareadefence.

8February2012.Obaidullah’slawyersfileamotioninDistrictCourtaskingthecourttoreconsiderObaidullah’spetitioninthelightofnewevidenceobtainedbyRichardPandisoftheNavalReserveoperatingunderguidanceofObaidullah’smilitarydefencecounsel.

23–24April2012.CourtofAppealsconsidersObaidullah’sappealbasedonPandis’investigations,inclosedsession,thenopen.

3August2012.Athree-judgepanelattheCourtofAppealsupholdsthelowercourt’sdecisionthatObaidullahislawfullyheldunderAUMF.Redactedversionofverdictreleasedon8August2012.

17September2012.Obaidullah’slawyerspetitionCourtofAppealtoreconsiderhiscase.

29November2012.CourtofAppealsrefusestoreconsideritsdecision.

26February2013.LawyersappealtoUSSupremeCourttoconsiderthecase.

24June2013.SupremeCourtrefuses.

28January2013.HabeasappealbasedonPandis’newevidenceisdeniedbythecourt;judgecallsita“re-hash”ofoldevidence.

24January2014.CourtofAppealsrulesthatthecourt’srejectionofthenewevidenceanditsupholdingofthedecisiontodenyObaidullah’shabeaspetitionwascorrectandhisdetentionislawful.

4.2.4Case4:BostanKarim(ISN975),14YearsinDetention

• PlaceofBirth:PaktiaProvince• DateofBirth:1970• DetainedbyPakistanisoldiersorpolice

(accountsintheUSdocumentsdiffer)attheKhurgicheckpointinthePakistaniFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas(FATA),13August

2002,andtakentoaprisoninIslamabad;transferredtoUSforces,February2003;transferredtoGuantánamo,6March2003.

• The2010TaskForceorderedhisindefinitedetention.ClearedfortransferbyPeriodicReviewBoard,2June2016;stillinGuantánamo.

• GuantánamoDocuments:http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/975-bostan-karim

SummaryOfalltheeightcases,thatofBostanKarim,asellerofplasticflowersaccusedofleadinganalQaedaIEDcell,containsthemostgarbledaccusationsandfactualmistakes.Hisfileislitteredwithgrossinaccuracies,ahistoricalassertionsandfantasticalconnectionsbetweenhimselfandbinLadenandotherinsurgentleaders.HewasdetainedbyPakistanipolicein2002;theyhandedhimovertotheUS,sayinghematchedadescriptionofanalQaedaterroristandhadpossessedaThurayasatellitephonewhich,theysaid,wasbeingusedasadetonationdeviceforIEDs.Despitesatellitephonesbeinginreasonablycommonusageintheunder-servicedborderareasofAfghanistanandPakistan,neithertheUSmilitaryorjudgeseverquestionedwhyhispossessionofoneautomaticallypointedtoterrorism.TheUSmilitarybelievedhewasthesecondmanmentionedbytheanonymousinformant,whosetip-offledtoObaidullah(case3)beingdetained.Obaidullah,almostcertainlyafterbeingtortured,hadaccusedKarim,hisformerbusinesspartner,ofleadingthecell.Thereisnoevidentiarybasisforthestate’sassertionsthatKarimwasamemberofalQaedaoreventhathewasaninsurgent,apartfromhearsayanddoublehearsayfromotherdetaineesandtheassertion,acceptedbythejudgerulingonhishabeaspetition,thatthequietistmissionaryorganisationtowhichKarimandmillionsofotherSouthAsiansbelong,Jamatal-Tabligh,isafrontforalQaeda.AccusedofbeingamemberofboththeTalebanandalQaeda,hetoldhisCombatantStatusReviewTribunalin2004:

Firstofall,IamnotamemberoftheTalebanandI’mnotamemberofal-Qaida.I’mabusinessman.Ihavetwostores.Inonestore,Isellplasticflowers.Intheotherstore,Irentfurnitureanddishesforspecialoccasions.Iamamissionary;Igohouse-to-house,village-to-village,spreadingmyreligion.229

229KarimCSRTtranscript,20041.

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CaptureandtortureBostonKarimwasdetainedbyPakistanipoliceinthetribalareasashetravelledfromKhosttoPeshawar.230Thepolicehadaskedanotherman,AbdullahWazir,toleavethebusforquestioningandhehadslippedabrokenThurayasatellitephonetoKarim,whomheknewfromthemissionaryorganisation,Jamatel-Tabligh.WazirwouldlatertellhisUSinterrogatorshehadfearedthePakistanipolicewouldstealit.Iftrue,thiswouldhavebeenanentirelyreasonableconcern.Sevenmonthslater,PakistanhandedthetwomenovertoUSforcessayingthatBostanKarimmatchedthedescriptionofanalQaedabomb-maker,231thatthesatellitephonewasadetonatorforlandminesandthatWazirhadhadasuspiciouslylargeamountofmoneyonhim(actuallyonly$2,700).Thiswasatatimewhenbountieswereavailableforsuchhandovers.

Wazirsaidhehadthemoneysohecouldbuystockforhisshopandhadtakenthephonetogetitrepaired.

TheglassofmycellphonewasbrokenandIwasgoingtogetitrepairedwhenIgottoPakistan…Mostshopkeepersorwealthypeoplehaveasatellitephone.Theregularphoneisnotreadilyavailableandmostpeoplehaveasatellitephone.Forcommunication,theymusthaveone.232

Noone,includingthejudgeinKarim’shabeaspetitionyearslater,askedifclaimingtobetakingasatellitephonetobemendedinPakistanwasactuallysoimplausiblethatitamountedtoevidenceofterroristintent.ThephonesmayhavebeencommonlyinusebyalQaedaandotherextremists,asalleged,233butalsobyanyoneelseinAfghanistanwithmoneyandtheneedtocommunicate.MobilephonesdidnotarriveinKhostuntil2005.234NoonehaseverexplainedeitherwhyaThurayaphonemightbeusedasadetonator,orwhyaninsurgentwouldwanttotakeadetonatoroutofAfghanistan.

230Forlinkeddetailstothiscase,seecasestudy3,especiallypages33-35.231KarimAssessment,2008,3.232WazirCSRTtranscript,2004,5.233AnanalystsaidinhisAssessmenttheywere“commoncommunicationdevicesforal-QaidaandextremistorganizationsoperatinginAfghanistan…Astandardployofextremistwastobreakthefrontplatethinkingexploitationofthephoneiscompromisediftheplateisunreadable.”KarimAssessment,2008,3.234Informationfromadirectorofthemobilephonecompanywhichestablishedthefirstcellularnetworkintheprovince.Emailcommunicationwithauthor,10July2016.

TheUSkeptKariminitiallyinBagram,wherehesaidhewaspreventedfromsleepingfor15daysandthentoGuantánamo.IthaddecidedhewastheleaderofanalQaedaIEDcell,the‘Karim’mentionedbytheinformantwhosetip-offledtoObaidullah(case3)beingdetainedinKhost.Fromthispointonwards,insteadofbeinglinkedtoWazir(whowassubsequentlyreleased),Karim’sfatecametobeboundupwithObaidullah’swho,almostcertainlyundertorture,hadconfessedtobeingamemberofthecellandsaidKarimhadledit.(Formoredetailsonthis,seepages33-35.)

AllegationsandevidenceAccordingtoKarim’sJointTaskForceGuantanamoDetaineeAssessment,heis:

…assessedtobeanal-Qaidaoperativeandleaderofanimprovisedexplosivedevices(IED)cellinKhowst,Afghanistan.Detaineeworkeddirectlyforsenioral-Qaidamemberandoperationalplanner…AbuLaythal-Libi.DetaineeplannedIEDattacksagainstUSandCoalitionforcesintheKhowstarea.DetaineeisaveteranextremistwhohasalongassociationwiththeTalibanandotherACM[Anti-CoalitionMilitia]groups.DetaineeisanadmittedmemberoftheJamaatTablighi(JT),throughwhichheprobablymadecontactwithal-Qaida.235

DespitethefactthatObaidullahretractedhistestimonysayingitwasmadeundertorture(seepages34and39),ithasremainedthefoundationofthestate’scaseagainstKarim.Obaidullahhadtestifiedthat,amongotherthings,Karimhadtaughthimhowtomakebombsandshowedhimwheretoplantthem,hadbeenplanningattacksincludinggettingasuicidebombertodrivealargetruckfullofexplosivestoKabul,andhadfoughtinthejihadwith‘Jalaluddin’(assessedtobeJalaluddinHaqqani).Thereislittleinternallogictotheaccusations.236Onlydoublehearsaylinkshimtohissupposedcommander,AbuLeithal-Libbi,237althoughthisisassertedasfactinhisAssessmentandAdministrativeReviewBoards.Finally,Karimhasscarredhands,consistent,saidadoctorwith

235KarimAssessment,2008,1,2.236Forexample,ObaidullahallegedlytoldhisinterrogatorstheTalebanhadforcedhimtoundergotraining(August2001)and,togaintheirtrust,hehadallowedKarimtoburylandminesinhisyard.WhygettingtheTalebanregime’strustwasneededisnotexplained,norwhytheywantedhimtoburylandminesinaprivatecompoundatleastaday’stravelfromanyfrontline.KarimAssessment,2008.237KarimARB4,6.



anexplosiveinjury,or,asKarimsays,withacrawlinginfanttouchingaburninghotstove.238

NowheredoestheUSclaimKarimcarriedoutanyspecificattacks.Theassertionsinthisrespectareparticularlyweakandvague,forexample:

Thedetaineeissaidtohavetoldseveralpeoplethathewaspreparingtoconductcommand-detonatedmineattacksonUSforces.Shortlyafterthisthreat,USForcesdiscoveredanddestroyedinplacetwoapparentlycommand-detonatedprobablyplasticshelled,anti-tankminesthathadbeenplacedinholesonahighwayinAfghanistan.239

Far-fetchedaccusations:Jamatal-Tablighandveteranextremism

Karim’sfilecontainsmultipleinstancesoffactualerrorsandmisunderstandings.ThemostdamningoftheseistheUSmilitary’sinsistencethatthemissionaryorganisation,Jamatal-Tabligh,isafrontforalQaeda,a“priority3terroristsupportentity,”240which“support[s]Islamicterroristorganisation[sic]insouthandSoutheastAsiaunderthecoverofconductingreligiousactivities[and]iscloselyalignedwithotherPakistaniterroristgroupsandtheal-Qaedanetwork.”TheJamatal-Tabligh‘accusation’comesupinseveralfiles,butisthemostdamningforKarim.

AlQaedaandJamatal-TablighareactuallyatpolarextremesofIslamicorganisations.Jamatal-Tablighregularlycomesinforcriticismandevenpersecutionfromjihadistgroupsbecauseofitsquietistoutlook,asArsalanKhan,anacademicandspecialistonthemovement,explains:

Jamat-eTablighieldersoftentakeastanceagainstjihadfromthepulpit:onecaneasilyfindrecordingsofthesespeeches(bayan)atanyTablighicenter.Theirgeneralstanceisthatthisistheageofpreaching(dawat)andnottheageofjihad,andthattheterrorismofAlQaedaetcdoesnotmeetthelegalcriteriaforproperjihadanyway.

Thatsaid,theJamatiTablighisaverylargeandopennetworksotheideathatextremistsmightinfiltrateitisofcourseentirelypossible.Literally,anyonecanparticipateinit.Iimaginethatwhereyouhaveaninsurgencyandwhere

238KarimAssessment,2007,3.239Karim’sresponsewas:“IamnotawareofthisandIdon’tunderstandthis.Ihavenottoldanyoneanything.Itisnotafact;itisnotreal.Iamapoorshopkeeper.Thesethingsaretoofarawayfromme.Ihatethesethings.”KarimARB1Transcript,2005,4.240KarimAssessment,2008,2.

jihadistmilitancyisthriving,theboundariesbetweenTablighisandmilitantscouldbecomemoreblurry.But,still,theideathatparticipationintheJamatiTablighisnecessarilyevidenceformilitantextremismisreallyquiteabsurd...HundredsofthousandsofpeopleparticipateintheJamatiTablighinPakistan.IfindeedacausallinkcouldbemadebetweenJamatiTablighandterrorism,wewouldbeinsomeserioustrouble.241

InSwatin2007,whenthePakistaniTaleban(TTP)tookover,theytargetedtheJamatal-Tablighandbanneditsactivities.ThegroupalsohadadifficultrelationshipwiththeAfghanTalebanwhentheywereingovernment.Itbannedortriedtoclampdownonitsmeetings,242asKarimrecalledfromhisownexperience:

TheTalebancameinandtoredownourtentsandspeakers...TheTalebantolduswewerenotstrongbecauseweweren’tfightingagainstAmericans.ThereforetheTalebangaveusahardtime.TheTalibanwereupsetbecausenooneattendedtheirmeetingandpeoplefromalloverattendedourmissionarymeeting.243

Karimtoldthesamemilitarypanel,that,asfarasheknows,itisnotillegal,evenintheUS,forpeopletopreach–buttonoavail.HavingmiscastJamatal-Tablighasanextremist,alQaeda-linkedorganisation,Karim’smembershipofitis,alone,enoughtoincriminatehim.FurtherevidencethatKarimis“aveteranextremist”getsevenstranger,however,forexample:

Asource,whowasaHezb-e-Islamiccommander,statedtheindividualthedetainee’suncleworkedforwastheleaderofHezb-eIslamiduringtheAfghan-Russianwar,hisunclewaswithHezb-eIslami,oneofthesevenAlQaidaterroristgroupsoperatinginPakistan.244

Comment:Hezb-eIslamiwasoneofthesevenAfghanmujahedingroupsoperatinginAfghanistan,duringtheAfghan-Sovietwar.TheUSbackeditatthetime.ThiswasyearsbeforealQaedawasfounded.245

241Emailcorrespondencewithauthor30September2015.ArsalanKhanisvisitingassistantprofessorinanthropologyatUnionCollege,Schenectady,NewYork,USA.242AuthorinterviewwithformercivilservantintheTalebanforeignministry,Kabul,28September2016.243KarimCSRTTranscript,2004,1.244KarimARBRound3,2007,1.245KarimcorrectstheARBsayinghisunclewasactuallyasmallsub-commanderwithadifferentgroup,Hezb-eIslamiKhales.KarimARB2transcript,2006,6.

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InthesameAdministrativeReviewBoardin2007,themilitaryassertedthefollowing‘connections’:

Thedetaineeadmittedmeetinganindividual[areferencetoJalaluddinHaqqani]duringthetimeoftheTalibanwhenalltheshopsinthebazaarwereclosedforameetingthattheindividualattended.[This]individual...andasecondindividual[areferencetoGulbuddinHekmatyar]wereidentifiedasforminganalliancewithsupport,guidanceandfundingprovidedbyalQaidaandtheJamatUlmaIslami[sic].Thesecondindividual...foundedHezb-eIslamiGulbuddinasafactionoftheHezb-e-Islamipartyin1977.Hezb-eIslamiGulbuddin...hadlongestablishedtieswithUsamaBinLaden.AsourcestatedtheJamiat-Ulmar-Islam[sic]politicalorganizationwasaPakhtoontribe[sic]fromPakistan,whichregularlyrecruitedfromamosqueinAbdabot[sic],Pakistan.AfterFridayprayers,membersoftheorganizationsolicitedforvolunteerstofightinthejihad.[Whichjihad?When?WhatdoesthishavetodowithKarim?]246

Comment:Karim’sattendanceatapresumablyobligatoryshop-keepers’‘townhall’meetinginKhostcitywiththethenparamountcommanderintheprovince,JalaluddinHaqqani,isusedtolinkhimtoHaqqani,Hekmatyar,binLadenandthePakistanijihadis.Alongtheway,themilitarygetsthenameofthePakistanireligiousparty,Jamat-eUlema-yeIslami,wrongtwiceandcallsitatribe,misspellsAbbottabadandcreatesafantasyalliancebetweenHaqqaniandHekmatyar,andfantasytiesbetweenHekmatyarandbinLaden.

Fromthesamereviewboard,wealsohavethissimilarlybizarrestringof‘connections’:

TheJT[Jamatal-Tabligh]isaterrorist,AQalignedgroup[sic].AsourcesaidBostanwasamemberofJT[heisopenaboutbeingamember].AsourceobservedthedetaineetryingtorecruitmentojoinJT.Asourcesaiditwas“commonknowledge”thatJTwasresponsibleforassistingforeignersinAfghanistan.Asourcestatedthaton1January2001...JTmembersprovidedassistancetohimandotherunarmedTalibanArabfighters.TheJamat-el-TablighmemberstransportedTalibanArabfightersacrosstheborderfromZormatAfghanistantoLahorePakistan.Jamat-al-TablighalsoprovidedthesourcehousinginLahore,Pakistan.247

Thedateiswrong.InJanuary2001,theTalebanwerestillinpower.ArabsgenerallyleftKabul 246KarimARB3,2006,3.247KarimARB3,2007,3.

throughKhosttotheborderenmassearound13November2001whenKabulfell.248Anyway,theborderwasthenopen;therewasnoneedtosmuggleanyone.ThereisnobordercrossingatZormatandanywayitisintheneighbouringprovinceofPaktia.TheTalebandidnothaveArabmembers.

Karimrepeatedlytriestousethehearingstogetjustice,answeringquestions,tryingtoclarifymisunderstandingsandrepeatedlydemandingthattheboardsprovideevidencefortheirallegationsandallowhimwitnesses.“Youdon’thaveanyproofthatIwasalQaida,”hesaysinhisfirsthearing,“becauseIwasn’t.”249

TheevaluationofKarim’sintelligencevalueinhis2008Assessmentwasthathecould“provideoperationaldetailsaboutal-Libi,whoiscurrentlyinvolvedinal-Qaidaterroristplanning,andpossiblyotheral-QaidaandACMleaders.”250Notethepresenttenseusedforal-Libbi,whobythispointwasfourmonthsdead,251asindeedhadbeenpointedoutonthefrontpageoftheAssessment.Scrapingthebarrel,surely,theUSalsobelievedKarimcouldbeexploitedforinformationon“ethno-linguisticgroupsinAfghanistan.”252

Legalproceedings:Thehabeaspetition

Karimpetitionedforhabeascorpuson3May2005.ThecasewasheardbyJudgeReggieBWaltonoftheDistrictCourtofColombiaoversixyearslater,on12October2011.HeruledthatKarim’sdetentionhadbeenlawfulundertheAuthorisationoftheUseofArmedForce.253ThejudgeacceptedtheUSstate’sinterpretationofitsevidence,thattheThurayatelephonewasabombdetonatorwithoutquestion.EventhoughObaidullahhasabrothercalledFaizelKarim,andnoIEDswerefoundinBostanKarim’shouse(theoriginaltip-offhadsaidthereweretwoIEDsin“Karim’shouse”),JudgeWaltonsaiditwasimmaterialtothecasewhetherBostanKarimwastheKarimidentifiedbytheanonymoussource.Instead,heruledthatKarimwasdetainablebecauseof“thefollowingfacts,allofwhichareadmittedtobythepetitioner”:

248Eye-witnessesaccountwhodescribedthemassexodusofArabsthroughKhostcityontotheborderinNovember2001afterKabulhadfallen.AuthorinterviewforBBCradio,July2002.NoURLavailable.249KarimCSRTtranscript,2004,2.250KarimAssessment,2008,9.251Al-Libbiwaskilledinan“explosionon29January2008intheFATA”Karim’sAssessment,2008,1.252KarimAssessment,2008,10.253BostanKarim,habeasdenied,2011,[seeFN167].



(1)thatthepetitionerwasamemberoftheJamaatal-Tablighi;

(2)thatthepetitionermetObaidullahandWazirthroughtheJamaatal-Tablighi;

(3)thatimmediatelypriortohisandthepetitioner’scapturebyPakistaniauthorities,WazirwasinpossessionofabrokencellulartelephoneandalargesumofcashwhileridingonabusfromMiramShahtoPeshawar;

(4)thatWazirgavethetelephonetothepetitionerashewasexitingthebustobesearchedbyPakistaniauthorities;

(5)thatthepetitionerattemptedtohidethetelephoneuponreceivingitfromWazir;and

(6)Wazir’sexplanationtothePakistaniauthoritiesthat“hewascarryingabrokenphone”because“thephonecouldonlyberepairedin(Pakistan),sincenoone”inAfghanistancouldrepairthedevice.

AstheCourtexplainsbelow,thesefacts,whenviewedcollectively,demonstratethatthepetitionerwasmorelikelythannota‘partof’al-Qaeda.254

Thejudgesaidheacknowledged“theCircuit’sstatementthattheremaybeindividualsassociatedwiththeJamatal-Tabligh‘whoarenotaffiliatedwithalQaeda,’”butpointedtoKarim’s‘admission’ofmembershipandofhisrelationshipswithObaidullahandWazirhavingresultedfromtheirinvolvementwiththeorganisation.“Thisisnotaninsignificantfact,”saidthejudge,asObaidullahhadbeenfound“byJudgeLeonofthisCourt”tobe,morelikelythannot,“amemberofanalQaedabombcellcommittedtothedestructionof[UnitedStates]andAlliedforces.”GivenKarim’spossessionofapossible“detonationdevice,”thejudgefound“thepetitioner’sinvolvementwiththeJamaatal-Tablighitobehardlyinnocuous.”255

ThecourtdecidedtherecouldbenoreasonforWazirgivinghisphonetoKarimunlessitwasadevicetosetoffbombsandtherecouldbenoreasonforKarimtohideit“fromthePakistaniauthorities,”unlessitwasbeingusedasa“detonatingdevice.”256ThejudgedismissedhisfearthatthePakistanipolicewouldstealit.“Wazir’spossessionofthetelephone,”thejudgesays,“notonlyimplicateshimaspartofalQaeda;italsoinculpatesthepetitioner.”257(Wazir,bythis 254BostanKarim,habeasdenied,2011,[seeFN167],12-13.Omitscourtcitationsofevidence.255BostanKarim,habeasdenied,2011,[seeFN167],14-15.256BostanKarim,habeasdenied,2011,[seeFN167],17.257BostanKarim,habeasdenied,2011,[seeFN167],16.

timehadbeendeemedsafeenoughtobesenthometoAfghanistan.)

Tobesure,itisperhapspossiblethataninnocentreason,orseveralinnocentreasons,mightexplainthepetitioner’sinvolvementwithaTerroristSupportEntity.Hisunexplainedchanceencounterwithanacquaintancefromthatorganizationatabusstop,theotherindividual’spossessionofalargesumofmoneyandaninoperablecellulartelephone,thatindividual’sdecisiontogivepossessionofthetelephonetothepetitionerratherthanhismoneytoavoiditsseizurebygovernmentsecurityofficials,andthepetitioner’sdecisiontoconcealthetelephone.But,[andherethejudgequotesanothercase,Uthmanv.Obama]‘thefarmorelikelyexplanationfor[this]plethoraofdamningcircumstantialevidenceisthat[thepetitioner]waspartofalQaeda.’258

Karim’scaseunderlineshowextremelyeasyitwasin2002foranAfghantobedenouncedasamemberofalQaeda,andtobehandedoverbyPakistanandotherstoUSforces.ItalsoshowshowdifficultitcouldbefortheUSmilitaryandUScourts,tointerrogatethisaccusationinanymeaningfulway.

USplansforKarimThe2010TaskForcedeemeditwasnecessarytocontinuetodetainKarimindefinitely.259Noreasonsweregiven.ThedetaineeprofilepresentedathisPeriodicReviewBoardhearingon3May2016couchedalltheallegationsagainsthimwiththeword‘probably’.260On2June,theBoard,despitebelievinghepresented“somelevelofthreatinlightofhispastactivitiesandassociations,”decidedtotransferhim,notinghehadbeen“highlycompliantwhileindetention,hasnotexpressedanyintenttoreengageinextremistactivityorespousedanyanti-USsentimentthatwouldindicateheviewstheUSasanenemy.”261HeisstillinGuantánamo.

258BostanKarim,habeasdenied,2011,[seeFN167],17-19.259LetterfromUSDepartmentofJusticetoSavage,[seeFN89].260KarimGuantanamoDetaineeProfile,PeriodicReviewBoard,23November2015,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN975/20151123_U_ISN_975_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf.261KarimFinalDetermination,PeriodicReviewBoard,2June2016,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN975/20160602_U_ISN_975_FINAL_DETERMINATION.pdf.

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4.2.5Case5:MohammadKamin(ISN1045),13YearsinDetention

• Dateofbirth:1978• Placeofbirth:PlasaiInzarkaivillage,Khost• DetainedbyAfghanforces,14May2003;

transferredtoGuantánamo,21November2003

• 2010TaskForceorderedhisindefinitedetention;clearedfortransferbyPeriodicReviewBoard,11February2016.TransferredtotheUAE,14August2016

• GuantánamoDocuments:http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/1045-mohammed-kamin/documents/9

SummaryThecaseagainstMohammedKamin,thathewasamilitantwithalQaedaandothergroups,isflimsyintheextreme;itshowshoweasyitwasin2003toendupinGuantánamoandtobeleftlingeringthere.HewasdetainedbyAfghanforcesinKhostcity,allegedlywithaGPSdevicewithsuspiciousgridpointsstoredonit.AstowhetherheactuallypossessedthisGPS,theevidentiarychainismissing.Fromhintsinvariousdocuments,itlookslikelyhewasdetainedbyanAfghanforcewhich,uptothepresentday,isnotoriousforhumanrightsabuses,includingthetortureofdetainees.WhoeverpickedKaminup,theallegationsagainsthimaregarbled.Heisaccusedofbeingamemberof,oraffiliatedtofivedifferentterroristgroups,Afghan,ArabandPakistani,tohaveparticipatedinweapons,explosivesandoperationaltrainingandtohavewornasuspiciousmakeofwatch.Allthedetailoftheallegationscomesfromwhatheallegedlyconfessedto.Someofitisclearlyimpossible,forexample,smugglingmetre-longrocketsthroughcheckpointsunderaburqa.

CaptureKamin,a25-year-oldimam,andallegedalQaedamilitant,chosetostaysilentduringmilitaryboardsanddidnottrytopetitionforhabeascorpus.ThismeansweonlyhavetheUSversionofevents,whichisfullofholes,includingconcerninghis

capture.Hewasreportedlydetainedon3May2003,atacheckpointindowntownKhostwithahandheldGPSdevicewith“storedgridpointsofkeytargetlocationsalongtheAfghan/Pakistanborder.”Ananalystnoted:“ItisrareforanAfghanoralower-levelindividualtopossessaGPSdevice.”Kaminreportedlysaidhewastransportingthedeviceforsomeoneelse,anAbdulManan.TheAssessmentnotes:“Nofurthercaptureinformationisavailable.”262

WedonotknowwhocapturedKamin;hisAssessmentusesthepassivevoice:“…detaineewasstopped…hewasdetained.”263However,frompiecesofinformationinotherdocuments,itlaterbecameapparentthatKaminwaspickedupbyAfghanforceswhohandedhimovertotheUSmilitary.HislaterAdministrativeReviewBoardsclaimedthatKamin“ledanAfghanArmyUnittotheburiedlocation”ofrockets,whichwere“originallyintendedtobeusedintheattackonacoalitionforcecompound.”264Hisdefencelawyeratamilitarycourt,heldyearslaterinGuantánamo,wouldrevealmoreinformationabouthisinitialcapture:

CaptainClayWest,whoactsasco-defensecounsel,raisedyetanotherthornyissue:twoAfghanmenwhoinitiallyinterrogatedKamincannotbefoundbytheU.S.governmentforquestioning.Westsuggestedthatthesemen,whowereontheU.S.payroll,mayhave“softenedup”Kaminandtheyoughttobequestionedbyinvestigatorstodeterminewhatroleanyabusemayhaveplayedinsubsequentstatements.265

In2015,documentsforhisPeriodicReviewBoardsaid“Afghanauthoritiescapturedhim.”266Themostlikelyforcelookstohavebeenthe25thDivisionofthearmywhichwasthenmadeupofformerPDPA(communistregime)soldiers.Therewasanationalschemetogetridofmilitiasintheseyears,butthe25thescapedbeingdisarmed,demobilisedandreintegrated(DDR)becauseofitsstrongtiestoUSforces.Instead,itwasrebrandedastheKhostProtectionForce,oneoftheadhoc

262KaminAssessment,2005,2.263KaminAssessment,2005,2.264KaminARB2,2006,2;KaminARB3,2007,4.265DavidDanzig,‘IfYouBelieveGuantanamoMakesUsSaferYouShouldHaveBeenHereToday’TheHuffingtonPost,18November2009,http://www.dailykos.com/story/2008/10/27/643972/-The-Defendant-Who-Wasn-t-There#.266KaminGuantanamoDetaineeProfile,PeriodicReviewBoard,23April2015,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1045/150423_U_ISN1045_GOVERNMENT’S_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf.



militiasknownas‘campaignforces’whichanswertoUSSpecialOperationsForcesortheCIA,ratherthantoanAfghangovernmentchainofcommand.TheKhostProtectionForcehasbeenthesubjectofnumerousaccusationsofhumanrightsabuses,includingthetortureofdetainees(this,accordingtotheUnitedNations),267uptothepresentday.268Kamin’splaceoforiginappearstobeintheZaziMaidandistrictofKhost,thesamedistrictandtribeofthetwoseniormeninthe25thDivision,KhailBazandHabibNur,anindicationthatlocalrivalriesmayhavebeenbehindhisdetention.

AllegationsandevidenceKaminisaccusedofaffiliationwithamultiplicityofterroristorganisations,notallofwhichhaveexisted.

ItisassesseddetaineeisakeymemberoftheAnti-CoalitionMilitia(ACM)and/ortheAl-QaidaNetwork.Detaineehasparticipatedinweaponstrafficking,explosivestraining,operationalplanning,andattacksagainstUSandCoalitionforcesinsupportoftheAl-Qaidanetwork.DetaineeisaffiliatedwithAl-Qaida,theNorthAfricanExtremistNetwork(NAEN),Taliban,andJayshe-Mohammed(JEM)terroristOrganizationsandleaders;further

267Inits2015reportintothetortureofconflict-relateddetainees,UNAMAsaidit“foundthatfivedetaineeswhohadbeenarrestedbytheKhostProtectionForces(KPF)togetherwithinternationalmilitaryforcesanddetainedattheUSmilitarybaseinKhost(CIABaseCampChapman)weresubjectedtoill-treatmentbytheUS-createdandfundedlocalsecurityforce.”UpdateontheTreatmentofConflict-RelatedDetaineesinAfghanCustody:AccountabilityandImplementationofPresidentialDecree129,UnitedNationsAssistanceMissioninAfghanistanUnitedNationsOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights,February2015,http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/UNAMA_OHCHR_Detention_Report_Feb2015.pdf,72.268ThegroupisstilloperatingunderCIAcommand,reportedTheWashingtonPost,“Thehighlysecretiveparamilitaryunithasbeenimplicatedinciviliankillings,torture,questionabledetentions,arbitraryarrestsanduseofexcessiveforceincontroversialnightraids,abusesthathavemostlynotbeenpreviouslydisclosed.”SudarsanRaghavan,‘CIArunsshadowwarwithAfghanmilitiaimplicatedinciviliankillings’,TheWashingtonPost,3December2015,https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/cia-backed-afghan-militias-fight-a-shadow-war/2015/12/02/fe5a0526-913f-11e5-befa-99ceebcbb272_story.html.SeealsoDavidJolly,‘CivilianDeathsRaiseQuestionsAboutC.I.A.-TrainedForcesinAfghanistan’TheNewYorkTimes,3December2015,http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/world/asia/afghanistan-civilian-casualty-khost.html.

moredetaineehasadmittedtiestotheHarakatul-Mujahidin(HUM).269

SuchalistisnotunusualintheAssessments,yetnowhereisitexplainedwhyorhowonemancouldbeaffiliatedwithsomanygroups.Fromintelligenceandlegalperspectives,suchallegationsofmultiple,overlappingmembershipsofdisparate(Afghan,ArabandPakistani)organisationsmakeabsolutelynosense.Usually,itischainsofcommandwhichformthebasisforbothtryingtounderstandanenemylikealQaedaortheTaleban,andformakingacaseforwarcrimeshavingbeenperpetrated.Particularlyperplexing–andithappensthroughouttheAssessments–istheuseof‘ACM’,Anti-CoalitionMilitia,writtenincapitalsasifitwereanactualgroupratherthanadescriptionofatypeoforganisation,andNAEN,theNorthAfricanExtremistNetwork,whichalsoonlyexistsasaUSintelligenceacronym.

ReadingonthroughthedetailofKamin’sAssessmentandtheotherGuantánamodocuments,however,itbecomesclearthattheevidenceofhisinvolvementinterrorismliesinhisownstatementsmadeunderinterrogation.Itisthiswhichplaceshimas,forexample,havingbeenworkingwithalQaeda,theTaleban,JEM,HUM,NAENandACM,asbuyingandsellingweaponstoandfrom“ACMpersonalities,”learningtomakeIEDs,lookingovermapswithalQaedacommanderAbuLaithal-Libi,andreceivingpaymentforcarryingoutattacks.

ThelackofanycorroboratingevidenceforthedetailoftheallegationsagainstKaminmakethemlook,atbest,flimsyandvague,and,atworst,fantastical.

Curiously,theminutiaeofallegationsmadeagainstKamingrewwhilehewasinGuantánamo.By2006,thesummaryofhisAdministrativeReviewBoardhearing(whichheappearsnottohaveattended)hasallsortsoffreshdetailsabouthim,whicharefar-fetchedenoughtomakeonewonderifhewasdeliberatelymakingthemupasaformofprivateresistance.Forexample:“TheindividualmetwiththeTalibanSupremeLeaderafterthewaragainsttheSoviets…”270Kamin,atthistime,wasagedbetween11and16;MullahOmarwasavillagemullahinSangisar,Kandahar,severaldays’journeyaway,throughawarzone.Kaminalsoapparentlytoldhisinterrogatorsthat,aroundMarch2003,heandfourothersbought“eightBM-12Russian-maderockets”forfivedollarseach(extraordinarilycheap)andthen:“…heandthreeindividualsworewomen’sburqastosmuggletherocketsthrougha

269KaminAssessment,2005,1.270KaminARB3,2007,1.

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checkpointbeforetravelingtoLandarVillage.”271Eachrocketbeingametrelong,itisdifficulttopicturehowaburqacouldhavehelpedconcealthem.

ThefinalpieceofevidenceagainstKaminwashismakeofwatch,aCasiomodelF_91,which“hasbeenusedinbombingsthathavebeenlinkedtoalQaidaandradicalIslamicterroristimprovisedexplosivedevices.”272ThismodelofwatchhasbeencitedasevidenceinthecasesofmorethanfiftyoftheGuantánamodetainees,asitcanbeusedasatimerinbomb-making.Theappealscourtalsodecidedthatpossessingitwasevidence,initself,ofterroristintent.273TheCasioF_91isalsoaglobalbestseller,acheapwatchownedbymillions.274

Legalproceedings:TheMilitaryCommissiontrial

Kamin’sMilitaryCommissiontrial(undertheBushera2006MilitaryCommissionsAct)wasaslipshodaffairlegally,butdidprovidetheoneopportunitywherewecouldhearalittleofhissideofthestory.Forciblyextractedfromhiscelltoattendapre-trialhearingon22May2008,asJamilDakwarfromtheAmericanCivilLibertiesUnion(ACLU)reported,hearrivedinthecourtroomwithminorbruisesacrosshisfaceandneck,cuffedandinshackles;thejudgesaidKaminhadtriedtospitandbiteoneoftheguards.

Throughouttoday’shearing...Kaminassertedinhisnativelanguage,Pashto,thatheisinnocent,thathehasnolinkstoalQaeda,andthatalltheallegationsagainsthimarefalse.KaminsaidathishearingthatbeforehisarrivalinGuantánamohewasheldinBagram,thenotoriousU.S.militaryairbaseinAfghanistan.Healsosaid,surprisingly,thathecametoGuantánamoofhisownfreewill.HeexplainedthathemadethisdecisionafterhewastoldthatpeopleatGuantánamowouldhelphim.SoonafterKamin’sarrivalatGuantánamo,herealizedthathissituationhadgonefrombadtoworse.Hetoldhismilitarylawyerthatitwaslikemovingfromunderthepouringraintobeingplacedunderthegutter.275

271KaminARB2,2006,2.272KaminARB3,2007,3.273AlOdahv.UnitedStates,2009,[seeFN126].274DeniseWinterman,‘CasioF-91W:Thestrangelyubiquitouswatch’,BBCNewsMagazine,26April2011,http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-13194733.275JamilDakwar,Director,ACLUHumanRightsProgram,‘Boycott’,AmericanCivilLibertiesUnionwebsite,22May

Threemonthsearlier,Kaminhadbeencharged:

…thatbetweenJanuaryandMayof2003,[he]providedmaterialsupporttoterrorismbyjoiningtheterroristorganizationalQaedaandreceivingtrainingatalQaedatrainingcampsonmakingremotedetonatorsforimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs),inmodifyingmilitaryammunition,andonuseofsmallarmsforattacksagainstAmericanandCoalitionforces.276

Thechargeof‘providingmaterialsupporttoterrorism’alwayslookedlikeanattempttogetroundthefactthattheUShadnoevidencethatdetaineeslikeKaminhadactuallycarriedoutanyspecificattack,whetherharmingciviliansorUSforces.Thatyearandthenext,pre-trialissuesrumbledonamidcontinuingconfusion,asthecourttriedtosortoutrulesandprocedures.On27October2008,thejudgegavethestatemoretimetoproducethedocuments,saying,“Thisisnotasituationwhereyouhaveaguyinpre-trialconfinementorawaitingchargessohecangetonwithhislife.”Thishighlighted“thebizarrenatureoftheproceedings,”reportedanotherrepresentativefromtheACLU,“inwhichKaminhasbeendetainedformorethanfiveyearsandcanremaindetainedevenifhewerefoundnotguilty.”277Ayearlater,atanotherpre-trialhearingon18November2009,thedefencewasstillwaitingforstateevidence.

Theprosecution,morethan1.5yearsintoformallegalproceedingsagainstKamin,recentlyprovidedaninterrogationlogwhichshowsthathehasbeeninterrogated17times,yetsummariesand/ortranscriptsofwhatwassaidatthosemeetingshaveonlybeenprovidedtothedefenseforfoursessions.“Thisiselementalstuff,”[Kamin’sdefenceattorney,NavyLieutenantCommanderRichard]Federicotoldthecourt.Moreover,asoneobserver,describedit,ruleswereunclearsotherewas,“amaking-it-up-as-we-gofeeltotheseproceedingswhichisinevitablefora

2008,https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/boycott.276‘ChargesSwornAgainstDetaineeMohammedKamin’,NewsReleaseNo:195-08,DepartmentofDefencewebsite,12March2008,http://archive.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11748.277JudyRabinovitz,‘TheDefendantWhoWasn’tThere’27October2008,AmericanCivilLibertiesUnionwebsite,https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/defendant-who-wasnt-there.



systemoftrialsforwhichtheCongress,courtsandexecutivekeepchangingtherules.”278

On11December2009,thechargesweredropped(withoutprejudice,meaningthecasecouldbere-opened).Pentagonofficialssaidtheywouldre-filethecharges,butneverdid.Itisnotknownwhythechargesweredropped,orwhytheywerenotre-filed.279Thechargeof‘providingmaterialsupporttoterrorism’wouldbethrownoutasnon-indictableina2012rulingbyanappealscourtwhichsaiditwasnotawarcrimeandnewlawscouldnotretrospectivelypunishactionsnotillegalatthetime.280

USplansforKaminTheGuantánamoTaskForcedecidedin2010thatKaminshouldbeheldindefinitelyandwithouttrial.281In2015,KaminbecamethefirstAfghantogoinfrontofthePeriodicReviewBoardwhichheardthesameallegationsagainsthim,ofbelongingtoalQaedaandothergroupsandofbeingacellleaderandexplosivesexpert.Therewasasanacknowledgment,finally,that“[i]nformationaboutAF-1045’sactivitybeforedetentionisderivedentirelyfromhisownstatements,someofwhichcontradicteachother.”282Ratherthanchallengethe‘facts’ofhiscase,however,hislawyerstookthetacticofhumanisingKamin,emphasisinghisweaknessandabsenceofthreatandthesupporthehadreceivedfromfamily,AfghanpoliticiansandUSmilitaryofficers.283Thestrategyworked.

…theBoardappreciatedthedetainee’shighdegreeofcandorregardinghispastactivitiesandacknowledgementofmistakesthatledtohisdetention.TheBoardnotedthatthedetaineehasbeenoneofthemorecompliant

278Danzig,‘IfYouBelieve…’,[seeFN265].279CarolRosenberg,‘U.S.OKsone,dismissesanotherwarcrimecase’,MiamiHerald,7January2010,http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article1934621.html280Hamdanv.U.S.,696F.3d1238(D.C.Cir.2012),https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/722A4A4B384D5EC985257A99004D77C0/$file/11-1257-1399811.pdf.281LetterfromUSDepartmentofJusticetoSavage,[seeFN89].282KaminGuantanamoDetaineeProfile,PeriodicReviewBoard,[seeFN266].283ShayanaKadidal,‘ProsecutorsDroppedHisCaseLongAgo.MilitaryOfficersSupportHisRelease.SoWhyIsMohammedKaminStillinGuantanamo?’CenterforConstitutionalRightswebsite,2September2015,http://ccrjustice.org/home/blog/2015/09/02/prosecutors-dropped-his-case-long-ago-military-officers-support-his-release-so.

detaineesatGuantanamoandthereisanabsenceofevidencethatthedetaineehasexpressedextremistviewswhileinthecamps.284

Kaminisamanwho,inthewordsofoneofhisdefenceattorneys,“almostnooneinthewesternworldhaseverheardof.”285Yet,hehasspentmorethanathirdofhislifeinUSincarcerationand,accordingtothestatementofanotherlawyermadetohisPeriodicReviewBoardinAugust,desiresnothingmorethanto“returntolifewithhisextendedfamily,hiselderlyfather,andwifeandyoungsoninAfghanistan.”Hehopes,shesaid,tobecomeagrocer.286On14August2016,KaminwastransferredtotheUAE.

4.2.6Case6:Hamidullah(ISN1119),13YearsinDetention

• Dateofbirth:1963• Placeofbirth:TaraKhelvillage,DehSabz,

Kabul• DetainedbyAfghanNationalArmy,31July

2003;handedovertoNDSandUS(undated);transferredtoGuantánamo,21November2003

• 2010TaskForceorderedhisindefinitedetention;clearedfortransferbyPeriodicReviewBoard,11February2016.TransferredtoUAE,14August2016.

• GuantánamoDocuments:http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/1119-hamidullah/documents/6

284KaminFinalDetermination,PeriodicReviewBoard,28September2015,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1045/20150928_U_ISN1045_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf1.285Danzig,‘IfYouBelieve…’[seeFN265].286KaminPersonalRepresentativeOpeningStatement,PeriodicReviewBoard,18Aug2015,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1045/150818_U_ISN1045_Opening_Statements_of_Detainees_Representatives_PUBLIC.pdf.

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SummaryThecaseagainstHamidullahwasalwaysoneofthestrangest:hewasaccusedofworkingasaterroristwithmultipleAfghanfactions,includingoneswhichareenemiesofeachother,andanotheralwaysdescribedasthemostmoderatearmedfactionever,whichanywayhadputdownitsweaponsin1992.Manyofhisallegedco-conspiratorsarepro-USintervention,establishmentfigures,eitherpro-governmentormembersofthegovernment.Hisdocumentsarelitteredwithfactualerrorsandgrossmisunderstandings.Heisaccusedonlyofplanningattacksormeetingallegedco-conspirators,accusationsneverbackedupbyanyevidence.Hisdetention,madein2003byAfghanforcesthenunderthecontrolofhisfaction’shistoricalrivals,alwayslookedlikeaclearcaseoftheUSbeingdupedintodetainingsomeoneelse’sfactionalenemy.Militaryboardsrepeatedlyfailedtorecognisethattheaccusationsagainsthimwerefantastical.In2016,however,thePeriodicReviewBoardclearedhimfortransfer,notingthatthebulkoftheallegationsagainsthimhadcomefromtheAfghanintelligenceagency,theNDS;hislawyersaidhisrealenemyhadbeen,notAmerica,buttheNorthernAlliance.On14August2016,KaminwastransferredtotheUAE.

CaptureHamidullahtoldhisinterrogatorshewasinitiallydetainedinNovember2001by“theNorthernAlliance.”ItseemshewasusingNorthernAllianceasasynonymforJamiat-eIslami,especiallythenetworkofJamiatcommandersfromtheShomaliPlainsandPanjshirValley,justtothenorthofKabul,knownasShura-yeNizar.IthadcapturedKabulon13November2001anditsleadershadcapturedthedefence,interiorandforeignministriesandtheNDS.Hamidullahsaidtheyobjectedtohisattemptstosupportthereturnoftheformerking,ZahirShah,toAfghanistan(astrangeclaimandonethatwillbereturnedto).Hesaidhemanagedtoescape.287AccordingtohisAssessment,hewasdetainedagain,on31July2003,bythe“AfghanNationalArmy”(justaboutpossible,althoughitbarelyexistedatthattime)andhandedoverto“theNDSandUSforces.”Bythistime,HamedKarzaihadbeeninofficefor18months,buttheShura-yeNizarnetworkwasstillthedominantfactioninthecapital.288Jamiathada

287HamidullahAssessment,2008,4.288Shura-yeNizarformallylosttheMinistryofInteriorwhenYunisQanuniwasreplacedasministerinJune2002,butthefactioncontinuedtodominatesenior

decades-long,murderousrivalrywithHamidullah’sfaction,Hezb-eIslami–hecomesfromaprominentHezbifamilyfromavillageontheoutskirtsofKabul.TherewerearrestsofprominentHezbimembersonspuriousgroundsatthistime.289TheevidencethatHamidullahwasaninsurgentdidnotstackupandtheaccusationsagainsthimwereoutlandish.

AllegationsandevidenceTheUSaccusesHamidullah,alongwithvariousmembersofhisfamily,ofhavingfoughtwithHezb-eIslami,ledbyGulbuddinHekmatyar,againsttheSovietoccupationinthe1980s.Hefreelyadmitstothisandalsopointsout,inhisCombatantStatusReviewBoardin2004,thatinthe1980s,AmericaalsosupportedHezb-eIslami:

IfI’mguilty,ordidthewrongthingtojoinHiG[Hizb-eIslamiGulbuddin],thenthewholeworldwashelpingus,andforthisreason,Americawasguilty,too.290

Still,theHezb-eIslamiconnectionkeepscomingup.AthissecondAdministrativeReviewBoardin2006,heagaintriestoexplaintotheUSmilitaryofficersontheboardthatthingsweredifferentinthe1980s:

DesignatedMilitaryOfficer:

TheHezb-I-IslamiGulbuddinwasfoundedbyGulbuddinHekmatyarasafactionoftheHezb-I-Islamipartyin1977.ItwasoneofthemajormujahedingroupsinthewaragainsttheSovietsandhaslongestablishedtieswithUsamaBinLaden[sic].

Detainee(throughtranslator):

Whatdoesthishavetodowithme?Thishasnothingtodowithme.ThewholeworldknowsthatGulbuddinwastheleaderofHezb-I-IslamionceduringthetimeoftheMujahedin…

PresidingOfficer:

Weunderstand.ThisisastatementmoreaboutHIGthanitisaboutyou.However,becausewepreviouslymentionedthatyouworkedforHIGfortenyears,wearetryingtoshowaconnectionbetweenyou,theHIG,andwhatitstandsfor.


Duringthattimeitwasdifferent.ThepeoplewereusedtoworkingforGulbuddinduringthe

ranks,andinKabul,juniorofficersandpolicemenaswell.289SeeFN9..290KaminARB2,2004,2.



timeofMujahedin.Nowtheyareministersofthecurrentgovernment,thebigknowledgeableminister.Whenhe[Gulbuddin]changedhisdirectionanddidalot[of]badthings,everyonebecameupsetwithhim.291

Somefar-fetchedaccusationsHowever,theUSalsolinksHamidullahwithanothermujahedinfaction–andthisiswheretheallegationsgetverystrangeindeed:

DetaineewasassociatedwithnumerousextremistsinvolvedinACM[Anti-CoalitionMilitia]activities,includingformermembersoftheMahaz-e-Milli,aka(NationalIslamicFront(NIF)[thestandardabbreviationisNIFA,shortfortheNationalIslamicFrontofAfghanistan].292

Thismaywellhavebeenthefirsttimeinhistorythattheword‘extremist’wasassociatedwithMahaz-eMilli(NIFA).Itwasfamouslythemostliberalandsecular-mindedofthemujahedinpartiesofthe1980s,jeeredataswesternised‘Gucciguerrillas’bymorehardlinefactionslikeHezb-eIslami.Itwasledbythewestern-friendlyheadofaSufinetwork,PirGailani,andwasroyalist,advocatingfortheformerking,ZahirShah,toreturntopower.However,thetalegetsevenstranger:

InNovember2001detaineeworkedwithNIFtorecruitandorganizesupportersforKingZahirShahfollowingthefalloftheTaliban.293

TheUSdoesnotexplainwhyorganisingforthereturnoftheformerkingwastheactionofaninsurgent.ZahirShahwouldreturntoAfghanistaninJune2002–tomuchfanfareandthentoaquietlife.ThatHamidullah,withhisHezb-eIslamibackground,shouldhavebeenworkingtobringbacktheformerAfghankingisverystrange.Hezb-eIslamiwasalwaysanti-monarchist(inthelate1980s,inPeshawar,forinstance,thefactionwasaccusedofmurderingthosesupportingZahirShah).294Hamidullahisalsoallegedtohavehadseveralco-conspirators:RahimWardak(whoisaroyalist,pro-AmericanmemberofMahaz-eMilliandwouldgoontobecomeAfghanistan’sdefenceminister),MullahEzatullahandHajiAlmas(nowMPs,bothformercommandersfromJamiat-eIslami,which,likeHezb-eIslami,wasalwaysanti-monarchist)andGeneralTufan(anotherformerJamiatcommander):

291HamidullahARB2,2008,5.292Assessment,2008,2.293HamidullahAssessment,2008,10.294AfghanistanJusticeProject,CastingShadows,[seeFN2],57-59.

DetaineestatedMullahEzatUllah,a(Hizb-eIslamiGulbuddin)operativeanddetainee’sfriend,workedwithdetaineeonaidingthereturnofformerKingShah.On14January2006,Ullah,aka(Izatullah),wasidentifiedasanIranianintelligenceaffiliatedTalibansub-commanderinKabulresponsibleformanyterroristattacksagainstcoalitioninterests.MullahEzatUllahisbelievedtoberesponsibleforthe12October2005rocketattacksontheCanadianAmbassador’sresidenceinKabul.

DetaineeadmittedACMmembersHajiAlmasandGeneralZulmeiToufon,aka(Tufan),assisteddetaineeinperformingdutiesforNIF…HajiAlmasprovidedprotectionforacombinedeffortofal-Qaida,Taliban,andHIGmembersorganizedtodisruptAfghan’sInterimAdministration(AIA).On18January2006,HajiAlmaswasreportedtobeinvolvedinnumerouscriminalactivitiestoincludetheextortionofthird-partynationalsworkingforUSinterestsatBagramAirfield...

DetaineeadmittedNIFleaderRahimWardakgavehimthreeThurayamobilephoneswhenhetaskedhimtogathersupportforKingZahirShah.DetaineegaveonephonetoHajiAlmasandtheothertoMullahEzatUllah.295

LookingatHamidullah’sallegedco-conspirators,thestrangenessofthistalecomessharplyintofocus:

MullahEzatullah(referredtointheAssessmentas‘Ullah’,i.e.‘God’inDariandArabic)hasneverbelongedtoHezb-eIslamiortheTaleban.296HefoughtwithJamiat-eIslamifromtheearliestdaysofthejihadinthe1980s,againsttheSoviets,andlateragainstHezb-eIslami(1992-1996)andtheTaleban(1996-2001).Since2001,hehastransformedhimselfintoabusinessmanwith,amongotherconcerns,settinguptheKabulgolfcourse.HebecameanMPin2005and,generally,hasbecomeapillarofthepost-2001establishment.WhenAANinterviewedhimaboutthiscase,hesaidherememberedHamidullahcomingtoseehimthreeorfourtimeswithhisfather,MullahTarakhel,whomhedescribedas“oneofthetop500ulama[clerics]inthecountry.”TheyhadsoughthisprotectionafterthefalloftheTalebanbecausetheywerelivinginhisarea.He

295HamidullahAssessment,2008,10-11.296Forbiographicalinformation,seeMichaelSempleIntimidating,Assassinating,andLeading:TwoEarlyMujahidinCommandersReflectonBuildingResistanceFronts,19April2012,MiddleEastInstitute,http://www.mei.edu/content/intimidating-assassinating-and-leading-two-early-mujahidin-commanders-reflect-building.

November2016


saidhegaveittothemandtoothers.HewasmystifiedastowhyanyonemightthinkhehadbeenfightingagainsttheKarzaigovernmentandtheAmericansorworkingwiththeTaleban:“IwastheonewhofoughttheTaleban,”hetoldAAN,“tillthelastbullet.”297

EzatsaidhehadbeenaskedbyHamidullah’sbrothertomakeenquiriesafterHamidullah’sarrestand,speakingtoacontactintheNDS,hadbeentoldthatthedetentionwasajointUS-NDSoperation;hesaidhewaswarnedoffpursuingthematterfurther.298

ThetwoothermenallegedtobeHamidullah’sco-conspirators,HajiAlmas(formerlyapolicegeneralandnowanMP)andZalmaiTufan,arealsoformerJamiatcommanderswhohavebenefittedhugelyfromthe2001USintervention.Whyanyofthesethreeveryrichandwell-connectedmenwouldneedtobegivenaThurayaphone–asalleged–isnotclear,norwhytheywouldwanttheformerkingback,beenemiesoftheAmericans,oralliesofRahimWardak.HeisaveteranroyalistandformerMahaz-eMillicommander.ArespectablepoliticianwhostudiedatmilitaryacademiesinAfghanistan,EgyptandtheUS,hewasacolonelintheAfghanarmyatthetimeofthecommunistcoupof1978.AtthetimeofHamidullah’sarrest,hewasthedeputyministerofdefenceandwouldgoontobecometheministerinDecember2004.Thepoliticsofthissupposedconspiracymakenosensewhatsoever.

FactualerrorsOtherfactualmistakesaboutAfghanistaninHamidullah’sfilearelegion.HisAssessmentsaid:

• InSeptember1996,theTalibangaineddefactocontrolofAfghanistan,andexpelledHIG[Hezb-eIslamiGulbuddin]membersfromKabul.AmajorityoftheseHIGmembersjoinedtheNorthernAllianceagainsttheTalibanregime.299

Comment:FewHezb-eIslamifightersjoinedtheNorthernAlliance.AlthoughtheirleaderGulbuddinHekmatyaropposedtheTaleban,manyofhisfighterswereabsorbedintoTalebanranks.

• NIF(Mahaz-eMili),alongwithHarakat-e-InqelabIslami(IslamicRevolutionaryMovement)andtheJebh-e-Milli(NationalLiberationFront)ledbyMuhammadNabiMuhammadiandSibaghatullahMojadeddi,

297MullahEzatinterview,Kabul,31March2016.298MullahEzatinterview,Kabul,2016,[seeFN297].299HamidullahAssessment,2008,3.

respectively,definedtheformativerolesintheresistancemovementagainsttheTaliban.RaheemWardakwastheDefenseMinisterofAfghanistan.ZahirShah’scousinoustedKingShahin1973inabloodlesscoupwhileKingShahwasinEuropeformedicalreasons.300

Comment:Harakat-eEnqelabfightersandcommanders,farfromfightingtheTaleban,formedthenucleusofthenewmovementwhenitemergedinthemid-1990s.Theothertwomujahedinfactionsmentioned,Jebha-yeMilliandMahaz-eMilli,stoppedfightingin1992whenthecommunistregimefell,twoyearsbeforetheTalebanemerged.RahimWardakwouldbecomedefenceministereighteenmonthsafterHamidullah’sarrest,sothisstatementeventuallybecametrue.

• DetaineeidentifiedMullahAbdal-Kabir,formerHIGoperativeandTalibanGovernorofJalalabad,AF.Al-KabirservedforashorttimeintheANAinlate2002.301

Comment:MawlawiKabirwasneverwithHezb-eIslamiGulbuddin,butanothermujahedinfaction.HewaspostedtoJalalabad,butastheTaleban’sheadofsecurityfortheeasternzone.Hewasoneofthemostprominentandbest-knownTalebanleadersanditisscarcelylikelyhecouldhavejoinedtheAfghanNationalArmywithoutanyoneknowing,especiallyastheANAwasonlysetupDecember2002.

• Detainee’sfatherisaHIGleaderandfoundingmemberoftheTaliban.Detaineeadmittedhisfather,MawlawiSayeedAgha,isahighlyrespectedreligiousandpoliticalleaderwithextensivetiestothegovernment.302

Comment:Hamidullah’sfatherwasnotafoundingmemberoftheTaleban.ItisdifficulttoimaginehowaHezb-eIslamileaderfromKabulcouldhavebeenpresentinKandaharin1994tobeamongthefoundingmembers,givenhowverylocallytheTalebanstartedandhowwar-tornanddangeroustheroadswere.Hamidullah’sfatherwas,however,aprominentscholarandHezb-eIslamistalwart,althoughwhythisissomethinganyonewouldhavetoadmittoisnotclear.

NotaccusedofactualattacksLookingthroughtheother‘reasonsforcontinueddetention’inhisAssessment,anotherpattern,

300HamidullahAssessment,2008,3,4.301HamidullahAssessment,2008,9.302HamidullahAssessment,2008,6.



familiarfromotherdetainees’files,emerges.Hamidullahisnotactuallyaccusedofcarryingoutanyspecificattacks,ratherofplanning(mostlyfailed)attacksandmeetingpeople.303HeandhisrelativesareaccusedofhavingfoughtwithHezb-eIslamiinthe1980s(theUS,too,backeditatthistime)andheisaccusedofhavingwelcomedtheTalebaninthe1990s(manyAfghansdid).After9/11,itsaidhehadacloseassociationwithbothfactionsconcurrently(usually,itwouldbeoneortheother).Yet,duringtheEmirate,hesaid,theTalebanarrestedhimbecausehewasHezb-eIslami:

WhentheTalibanwereinpowerIdidnotworkforthem.Nowtheyhavefallenapart[andyousay]Iamhelpingthemnow?ThatisnotrightbecausetheTalibanweremyenemyandtheyputmeinjail...304

Hamidullahisnottheonlydetaineewhostrugglestounderstandthejusticesystemheisfacing.Facedwithassertionsmadebyun-namedsourcesandbasedonmisunderstandings,herepeatedlyaskshiscaptorstoshowhimproofofhiswrong-doing:


Iamaskingyouyourbasisformycapture.Ifyouhaveanydocuments,records,orpaperspleaseletmeknow.Don’tjusttellmethatsomeonetoldyou...IfyoucapturedweaponswithmeandthensaidthatIwasusingitagainstyou,thenthatwouldbeacorrectstatement.IfyouhaveanydocumentedtelephoneconversationsindicatingthatIhaddonecertainthingspleaseshowme.EvenifyoucapturesomeoneorarrestsomeoneandtheyconfessthatIamabadguyandhavedoneanythingagainsttheAmericans,letmeknow.IamsurprisedbecauseyouhaveaskedmequestionsandIhaveansweredthem...YousayIamalQaidaandIsayIamnot.Doyou

303Detaineewassaidtohaveattemptedto“smuggleUS-mademan-portableairdefensesystems(MANPADS)intotheregionsurroundingKabulInternationalAirport,”“recruitaHIGmembertotransportthemissilestotheairportforanattackagainstHamidKarzai’spresidentialaircraft,”plannedattacksagainstUShelicoptersusingmultipleChineseMANPADSacquiredbyHekmatyar,”“plannedacoordinatedattackwithTalibanoperativestoassassinateImamMullahFayaz”[areportedlymoderateimam];reportingnotedthathe“attendedmonthlymeetingsbetweenHIGandTalibanmemberstodiscussfutureoperations”andlinkedhimtoanISI“initiativetocreateanofficeinPeshawarcombiningelementsoftheTaliban,HIG,andal-Qaida.”HamidullahAssessment,2008,6-7.304HamidullahARB2,transcript2006,10.

haveproofofanything?Itisuptoyoutoshowmetheproof.305

USplansforHamidullahThe2010TaskForcedecidedthatHamidullahneededtobedetainedindefinitely.306HisPeriodicReviewBoardtookadifferentline.Finally,after12yearsdetentionandrepeatedscrutinyofhisfile,theBoardsaidtherewas“alackofclearinformationregardinghisinvolvementwithal-Qa’idaortheTaliban.”The“bodyofreporting”whichtiedhimto“extremistsandinvolvementinmilitantactivitiesagainstUSinterests,”itsaid,wasmostlyfromNDSsources.307

Hamidullah’salwaysseemedaclearcaseofdetentionbecauseoflocalenmity,whereonemujahedinfactionhadgainedcontroloftheAfghanintelligenceagencyanduseditandtheUnitedStatestotargetanenemy.ThedearthofanyactualevidentialbasisfortheclaimsagainstHamidullahandtheoutlandishaccusationsinthemselvesshouldhaverungwarningbellsyearsago.TheBoardnotedthatHamidullahdidnotsupporta“jihadistideology,”hadbeena“highlycompliant”prisonerwhohad“soughttomoderatethebehaviourofothers.”308WhyHamidullah,anon-extremistandby2016,sickoldmanshouldneedtobeputintoade-radicalizationprogrammehasnotbeenexplained.

HehasaskedtoberesettledsomewhereotherthanAfghanistanorPakistanwherehecouldlivesafely.“[To]theextentanyoftheseallegationssuggesttherewasanadversaryofMr.Hamdullah,”saidhiscounsel,“hisadversarywastheNorthernAlliance,nottheUnitedStates.”309On14August2016,hewastransferredtotheUAE.

305HamidullahARB2,transcript,2006,8.306LetterfromUSDepartmentofJusticetoSavage,[seeFN89].307Onequestionhere:aretheNDSsourcesherecurrentorhistorical?HamidullahGuantanamoDetaineeProfile,PeriodicReviewBoard,1November2015,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1119/20151112_U_ISN1119_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf.308HamidullahFinalDetermination,PeriodicReviewBoard,11February2016,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1119/160211_U_ISN1119_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf.309HamidullahPersonalRepresentativeStatement,PeriodicReviewBoard,12January2016,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN1119/20160112_U_ISN1119_OPENING_STATEMENTS_OF_DETAINEES_REPRESENTATIVES_PUBLIC.pdf.

November2016


4.3Cases7and8:HarunandRahim,aDifferentTypeofCaseThecasesofthelasttwoAfghans,HarunGul(case7)andMohammedRahim(case8),bothaccusedofbeingalQaedafacilitators,aredifferentfromthefirstsixstudiedinthisreport.Theywerebothdetainedin2007whentherewasarealinsurgencybymilitantswhowereworkingacrossthePakistani/Afghanborder.Moreover,whereasanAfghanworkingfortheArabcommandersofalQaedabeforethefalloftheTalebancouldjustlyclaimhewasonlydoingajobandwasignorantofhisemployer’sideology,aimsandmodusoperandi,thiswasnolongerpossible.

TheUSmilitaryhadalsoreconfigureditsintelligenceoperationsandwaslessgulliblewhenitcametoassessingthreats,andlessdependentontheNDS;thatagency,itself,wasalsosomewhatlessfactionalised.Therearepointers,however,that,althoughitwasbetter,therewerestillproblemswithUSintelligence.AstudybythisauthoroftheUSintelligenceusedasthebasisforonetargetedkillingin2010revealedgrossandpossiblysystemicerrorsinintelligencegathering,especiallyinhumanintelligence.310Allegationscannotbeassumedtobetrueevenforthelaterdetentions.

Finally,thereisfarlesspublicallyavailableinformationaboutthesetwomenthantheearlierdetainees.TherearenopublishedCombatantStatusReviewBoardsorAdministrativeReviewBoardsandaWikiLeakedAssessmentforHarunonly.TheUSstatehasmadeseriousallegationsagainstbothmen,butneitherhashadanopportunitytodefendhimselfpublicallyoransweraccusations,eveninthelimitedwaysopentootherdetainees.Rahimisalsoclassedasa‘highvalue’detaineewhichmeansthesubstanceandmuchofthedetailoftheallegationsagainsthimissecret.RahimwascertainlytorturedandHarunhasallegedhewas.Withtheotherdetainees,itwaspossibletoassesstheevidentiarybasisoftheassertionsmadebytheUSstate.WithRahimand

310TheUSmilitaryassessedthataSIMcardbelongingtoacivilianwasbeingusedbyaTalebancommander;theythentargetedthecivilianandhiscompanions,killingtenciviliansinatargetedkillingwhichreliedonsignalsinformation(SIGINT)only,withoutanyhumanintelligence(HUMINT)checkshavingbeenmade.KateClark,‘TheTakharattack:TargetedkillingsandtheparallelworldsofUSintelligenceandAfghanistan’,AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,10May2011,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/publication/AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork-papers/the-takhar-attack-targeted-killings-and-the-parallel-worlds-of-us-intelligence-and-afghanistan/.

Harun,thisismoredifficult,althoughinRahim’scase,itcanbeseenthattheUSbasesitscaseonconfession,hearsayandunverifiedintelligencereports.

4.3.1Case7:HarunGul(ISN3148),NineYearsinDetention

• PlaceofBirth:Sherzad,NangarharProvince• DateofBirth:1981• Detained:USsaysNDSdetainedHarun,4

February2007andhandedhimover(deniedbythendirectorofNDS);transferredtoGuantánamo,22June2007

• 2010TaskForcedecidedtoreferhimforprosecution(nolegalmovementoncasesince).PeriodicReviewBoardorderedhisindefinitedetention,14July2016

• GuantánamoDocuments:GuantanamoJointTaskForceAssessmentonly311

SummaryHarun312wasdetainedinNangarharin2007andaccusedofbeingaseniorcommanderwithHezb-eIslami,ofassociatingwith“highlevelmilitants,”andashaving“admittedtoactingasacourierforalQaedaSeniorLeadership.”Amongtheeightcasesstudiedinthisreport,informationaboutHarunisthescarcest,butfromhisWikiLeakedAssessment,itcanbeseenthatalltheallegations

311Harun’sAssessment,2007,canbereadatWikiLeaks,https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/pdf/af/us9af-003148dp.pdf,(somepagesmissing)orTheGuardian,http://www.theguardian.com/world/guantanamo-files/US9AF-001348DP,althoughithasredactedsomenamesandidentifyingnumbers.312Harunisnamedinhisdocumentsas‘Harunal-Afghani’.Thisistantamounttosayinghewasworkingwithforeignmilitants.TherewouldbenoneedforanAfghantocallhimorherself‘Afghani’andanyway,thetermisusedbyAfghanstorefertotheircurrency,nottheirnationality(whichis‘Afghan’).Thisreportthereforeuseshisgivenname,assuppliedbyhislawyer.Interview,telephone,14July2016.



againsthimaresourcedtohisowntestimonyorthatofotherdetainees.Inhishabeaspetition,HarunhasallegedhewastorturedinAfghanistanandGuantánamo.ThemethodshedescribedareconsistentwiththoseusedbyUSforcesatthistime.Theinformationavailablesuggeststhat,eveniftheallegationsagainstHarunaretrue,hewouldhavebeenonlyaveryjuniorcommanderand,athislevel,AfghancouriersworkingwithalQaedaaremany.TherationaleforholdinghiminGuantánamoisnotapparent.ThePeriodicReviewBoarddecidedinAugust2016tokeephimindetention.

CaptureHarun’sAssessmentsayshewasdetainedbytheAfghanintelligenceagency,NDS,intheHaddaFarmsarea,ChaparharDistrict,NangarharProvince,on4February2007,alongwithsixothermenalsoallegedlysuspectedofbeingHezb-eIslami,noneofwhom(judgingbytheabsenceofISNnumbers)wereheldateitherBagramorGuantánamo.ThethendirectoroftheNDS,AmrullahSaleh,toldAANthathisagencydidnothandoverHarunoranyotherAfghannationaltotheUSauthorities.313HarunwastransferredtoGuantánamoon22June2007.314

TortureHarunhasallegedthathewastorturedinAfghanistanandCuba:

DuringhiscaptivityinamilitaryfacilityinAfghanistan,Mr.Gul’scaptorsblindfolded,shackled,andhunghimbythearmswhiletheywerestillcuffedbehindhisback,strippedandtorturedhim.Hewaskeptaloneandnakedinacellwithoutevenabucketasatoilet…Duringinterrogations[inGuantánamo]prisonauthoritiesshackledMr.Gulforuptotwelvehourswithoutwaterorfoodinapositionthatallowedhimtoneitherfullystandnorsit,preventinganysleep.Thatsleepdeprivationtorturestillplagueshisnightsnineyearslater.315

Theallegationsareconsistentwithmethodsknowntohavebeenpracticed.

313Emailexchange24February2015.314HarunAssessment,2007,5.315PetitionforHabeasCorpus,Gulv.Obama,No.16-cv-01462,(D.D.C.15July2016),http://www.reprieve.org/wp-content/uploads/14_06_2016-Haroon-Gul-Habeas-Corpus-Petition.pdf,11.

AllegationsandevidenceHarun’scapturewasannouncedinaUSDepartmentofDefencepressreleaseasthedetentionofa“seniorcommanderofHezb-e-Islami/Gulbuddin”:

Harunal-Afghani,whowascapturedasaresultofourongoingeffortsintheGlobalWaronTerror,isknowntobeassociatedwithhigh-levelmilitantsinAfghanistan,andhasadmittedtoservingasacourierforal-QaedaSeniorLeadership(AQSL).[He]commandedmultipleHIGterroristcellsthatconductedimprovisedexplosivedevice(IED)attacksinNangarharProvince.HeisassessedtohavehadregularcontactwithseniorAQandHIGleadership.316

DocumentssuppliedtohisPeriodicReviewBoardhearing,heldon16June2016,givealittlemoredetailtotheallegations:hehadworked,theUSmilitarysaid,asacourierforAbdal-Hadial-Iraqi(ISN10026)until2004or2005and“providedlogisticssupporttofightersalignedwithal-Qa’idaandHIG,andprobablycollaboratedonoperationalmatterswithleadersofotheranti-Coalitiongroups.”317Harun’sAssessmenthasstringsofallegationssourcedalmostentirelytoHarunhimselforotherdetainees.However,untilwehaveheardhissideofthestory,itisimpossibletojudgehowplausibletheymightbe.

OneindicationthattheUSmayhaveplayedupitscaptivecomesintheonlyotherpubliclyavailabledocumentaboutHarun,a90-page‘terroristinterrogationreport’(TIR)whichwaspresentedaspartofthegovernment’srebuttalofahabeaspetitionbyanotherAfghandetainee,MuhammedRahim(case8).318After2001,itsaid,RahimwasinchargeofsixarmedgroupsinNangarharprovince,eachwithjustthreetofivemen,andatotaloperationalbudgetforeachoneforthreemonthsofjust20,000to40,000Pakistanirupees(roughly200-400USdollars).319Thisisthedescriptionnot

316‘TerrorSuspectTransferredToGuantanamo’NewsReleaseNo779-07,USDepartmentofDefence,22June2007,http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-testimonials-project/testimonies/prisoner-testimonies/dod_newsrelease_779-07.pdf.317HarunGuantanamoDetaineeProfile,PeriodicReviewBoard,IMarch2016http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN3148/20160301_U_ISN3148_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf318‘ISN3148TIRRoll-up(Feb.15,2007)’,redacted,presentedasevidenceon1July2010inRahimv.Obama,No.1:09-cv-01385(PLF),6-7(D.D.C.7January2010).AANhasseenacopyofthisdocument,buthasnotlocateditonline.319HarunTIR,[seeFN319],5,12.

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ofaseniorcommander,butsomeoneatthelowestlevelofcommandinAfghanistan.TheTIRalsosaysHarunwasaseniorstudentleaderbeforethe9/11attacks,who,justbeforehisdetention,hadbeenallegedlytaskedwithoverseeingthecreationofamilitantHezb-eIslamistudentorganisation.Italsoallegedhehadacourieringrole,passingonlettersfromtheprovincialHezbicommandertoArabmembersofalQaeda–actuallylow-levelwork.

OneisleftwonderingwhyHarunwastakentoCubaandwhyheisstillthere.Detainingsuchjuniorplayerscanbeofpracticalimportancefordisruptingoperationsorgettingintelligence.However,theUSauthoritieshavenotonlystilltobackuptheircasethattheallegationsagainstHarunaretrue,butalso,iftheyaretrue,thatheissodangerousheneedstobeheldinindefinitemilitarydetentionwithouttrial.

USplansforHarunThe2010TaskForcerecommendedthatHarunbeconsideredfortrial.320Thechargeswerenotspecifiedandtherehasbeennoknownmovementonthis.HarunhadaPeriodicReviewBoardhearingon16June2016.Theboarddecidedtokeephimincustody,citinghis“lackofcredibilityandtruthfulness,aswellashisevasivenessandvagueanswers.”However,italsoencouragedhimto“continuetoworkwithhisfamilyandrepresentativesonhisfutureplansandtobeforthcomingwiththeBoardinfuturereviews,”ahintpossiblythatatafuturehearing,theBoardmightdecidetotransferhim.321

4.3.2Case8:MuhammadRahim(ISN10029),NineYearsinDetention

• DateofBirth:1965• PlaceofBirth:SirkariQalavillage,Chaparhar

District,Nangarhar

320LetterfromUSDepartmentofJusticetoSavage,[seeFN89].321HarunFinalDetermination,PeriodicReviewBoard,14July2016,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN3148/160714_U_ISN3148_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf.

• DetainedbyISI,25June2007;renderedbyCIAtoAfghanistanandtortured;transferredtoGuantánamo,March2008

• Classifiedas‘highvalue’• 2010TaskForceorderedhisindefinite

detention;PeriodicReviewBoardhearing,4August2016,decidedtoindefinitelydetainhim

• NoGuantánamodocuments

SummaryMuhammadRahim,322detainedbythePakistaniISIandhandedovertotheUS,wasthelastknowndetaineeofanynationalitytoberenderedandtorturedbytheCIAandthelastAfghantobetakentoGuantánamoBay.ItseemsPakistanhadtoldtheUShemightknowthewhereaboutsofbinLadenalthough,despiteusingtorture–theCIAforciblyshackledRahiminastandingpositionfordaysatatimetopreventhimsleeping–interrogationsproduced“nodisseminatedintelligencereport.”323Evenso,theUSannouncedithadcapturedaseniorassociateofbinLaden.324Later,itwouldsayRahimwasoneofthefewAfghansinalQaeda’sinnercircle,privytoplansforattacks,includingthoseon9/11.

Oneofthefewpublicallyavailabledocumentsabouthim,thestate’srebuttalofhishabeaspetition,showstheevidentialbasisofthisaccusationasinsubstantial.Rahim‘confessed’onlytoworkingasatranslatorwithArabmilitantsbeforethefalloftheTalebanandonnon-militarymatters.Themoreseriousallegationsfromthisperiod–andallallegationsthereafter–weremadebytwofellowdetainees,oneofwhomhasallegedhewastortured,andunverifiedandunprocessed‘IntelligenceInformationReports’(IIRs)(seeBox2onpage20).Rahimhashadnoopportunitytorebutthegovernment’sclaims.Moreover,hehasbeenclassifiedasa‘highvalue’detaineewhichmeansthedetailandmuchofthesubstanceoftheUScaseissecret.HislawyerhassaidhecannotpublicallysaywhyhebelievesRahimisinnocentbecausetodosowouldrevealclassifiedinformation.InOctober,thePeriodicReviewBoarddecidedtokeephiminindefinitedetention.

322LikeHarun,Rahimiscalled‘RahimalAfghani’inhisUSdocuments.Thiswouldbeaforeigner’snicknameforanAfghan,sousingitmeansacceptingthealQaedaallegationsagainsthim.SeeFN313.323SenateReportonCIAtorture,[seeFN47],167.324‘DefenseDepartmentTakesCustodyofaHigh-ValueDetainee’USDepartmentofDefencepressrelease(number206-08),14March2008,http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11758.



CaptureRahimwasdetainedbytheISIon25June2007325andtransferredtotheCIA,whichrenderedhimtoAfghanistanforinterrogationandthentoGuantánamoinMay2008.ThesmallprintoftheSenatereportontheCIA’suseoftorturerevealedwhytheCIAwasinitiallyinterestedinRahim:

BasedonreportsofdebriefingsofRahiminforeigngovernmentcustodyandotherintelligence,CIApersonnelassessedthatRahimlikelypossessedinformationrelatedtothelocationofUsamabinLadenandotheral-Qa’idaleaders.326

TortureTheCIAheldRahiminwhattheSenatereportreferredtoas“DETENTIONSITEBROWN,”believedtobeoneoftheCIA’sblacksitesinAfghanistan.Thereport,citingCIArecords,saidthatSecretaryofStateCondoleezzaRicepersonallysignedoffonwhatmethodstheCIAcoulduse–shebannedtheuseofnudity,butsignedoffon(1)sleepdeprivation,(2)dietarymanipulation,(3)facialgrasp,(4)facialslap,(5)abdominalslap,and(6)theattentiongrab(whentheinterrogatorforcefullygrabstheshirtfrontoftheprisonerandshakeshim327).328Whilebeingforciblydeprivedofsleep,Rahimwasgivenalmostnosolidstoeat,justwaterandliquidmeals.Thereportsaidthat,asanincentivetocooperate,“CIAinterrogatorswouldprovideRahimwithaclothtofurthercoverhimself.”329

FromtheSenatereport,weknowthattheinformationobtainedbytheCIAthroughtheuseoftorturewasgenerallyunreliableandthattheagencywassloppyinitsworkandduplicitousinitsreporting,withlowstandardsdippingevenfurthertowardstheendofitsrenditionproject–whenit

325“IaskedforUScustody,”hewroteinalettertohislawyer,“becauseIbelievedthattheUSwasacountryoflawandjustice.IthoughttheISI[Pakistanimilitaryintelligence]wouldkillme,IthoughtIcouldprovemyinnocenceintheUS.Iwaswrong.”‘RahimonJustice’,postedonJeniferFenton,‘“Detainedbutreadytomingle”:Gitmo’slonelyheartonTinderandTrump’,alJazeera,11September2015,http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/9/11/gitmo-prisoner-detained-but-ready-to-mingle.html.326SenateReportonCIAtorture,[seeFN47],168.327BrianRossandRichardEsposito‘CIA’sHarshInterrogationTechniquesDescribed’,18November2005,ABCNews,http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Investigation/story?id=1322866.328SenateReportonCIAtorture,[seeFN47],163.329SenateReportonCIAtorture,[seeFN47],165.

heldRahim.TheSenatereportsaidtheCIAemployed“individualswithnoapplicableexperienceortraininginseniordetentionandinterrogationroles,”andthat,furthermore,theseemployeeswere“providedinadequatelinguisticandanalyticalsupporttoconducteffectivequestioning.”330NumerousCIAofficers,itsaid,had“seriousdocumentedpersonalandprofessionalproblems–includinghistoriesofviolenceandrecordsofabusivetreatmentofothers.”331AttheSaltPit,oneoftheagency’sotherfacilitiesinAfghanistan(codenamedCOBALTintheSenatereport),theCIA“keptfewformalrecordsofthedetainees…UntrainedCIAofficersatthefacilityconductedfrequent,unauthorized,andunsupervisedinterrogationsofdetaineesusingharshphysicalinterrogationtechniquesthatwerenot—andneverbecame—partoftheCIA’sformal‘enhanced’interrogationprogram.”332

TheSenatereportsaystheCIAliedtoCongress,theexecutiveandthemediawhenitclaimedtorturewasnecessary.“‘Enhancedinterrogationtechniques,’”itconcluded,werenoteffectivein“acquiringintelligenceorgainingcooperationfromdetainees.”Indeed,itsays,multipleCIAdetainees“fabricatedinformation,resultinginfaultyintelligence.”333

Rahimwasforciblykeptawakebybeingshackledinastandingposition;hewasalsomadetowearadiapersothattoiletbreakswouldnotinterruptthesessionsand,probably,asafurthermeansofhumiliation.Afterafirstsessionof104.5hours–morethanfourdays–withoutsleep,hestartedsufferinghallucinationsandwasallowedtosleepforeighthours.Then,afterapsychiatristdeterminedhehadbeenfakingthehallucinations,hewasforciblypreventedfromsleepingforanothertwoandahalfdays.Inall,hesufferedeightsessionsofsleepdeprivation,includingthreewhichlastedformorethanfourdaysandone,thelast,whichlastedforalmostsix(138.5hours).334

MoredetailonhowRahimwaskeptawakecameinaninternaldocumentreleasedbytheObamaadministrationandreportedonbytheAssociatedPressin2009.Itdescribedasleep-deprivedprisoner,believedtobeRahim,keptawakebybeingforcedtostandwithhisarmschainedaboveheartlevel.

Accordingtothedocuments,theprisonerwasmonitoredbyclosed-circuittelevision.Ifhe

330SenateReportonCIAtorture,[seeFN47],10.331SenateReportonCIAtorture,[seeFN47],11.332SenateReportonCIAtorture,[seeFN47],10.333SenateReportonCIAtorture,[seeFN47],2.334SenateReportonCIAtorture,[seeFN47],165.

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startedtofallasleep,thechainsjerkingonhisarmswouldwakehimup.Ifaprisoner’slegswelled—aconditionknownasedema,whichcancausebloodclotsandstroke—interrogatorscouldchainhimtoalow,unbalancedstooloronthefloorwitharmsoutstretched.335

Theeffectsofsleepdeprivationhavebeenwelldocumented,includingbyUScourts.HernanReyes,aspecialistinthemedicaleffectsofdetentionworkingwiththeInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),writingaboutpsychologicaltorturefortheICRCJournalquoteda1944caseinAmerica(Ashcraftv.Tennessee):

Although[thedefendant]Ashraftwasonlysubjectedto36hoursofsleepdeprivation,thecourtruledittobebothphysicalandmentaltorture.Inarulingnotonlycategorizingsleepdeprivationastorturebutfurtheremphasizingtheunreliabilityofanyinformationobtainedinsuchaway,USJusticeHugoBlackstatedthat‘‘deprivationofsleepisthemosteffectivetorture,andcertaintoproduceanyconfessiondesired.’’336

Aftertwonightswithoutsleep,accordingtoapsychoanalystworkingwithvictimsoftorturewhowasquotedbyReyes,“thehallucinationsstart.”Afterthreenights,peopledreamwhileawake,“aformofpsychosis,”thepsychoanalystsays.“Bytheweek’send,peoplelosetheirorientationinplaceandtime–thepeopleyou’respeakingtobecomepeoplefromyourpast;awindowmightbecomeaviewoftheseaseeninyouryoungerdays.Todeprivesomeoneofsleepistotamperwiththeirequilibriumandtheirsanity.”337

Rahimdidnotjustundergosleepdeprivation,butotherformsofabuseaswell,includingslapping,andthreetechniquesalsomentionedintheICRCreportonpsychologicaltorture–hooding,solitaryconfinementanddietarymanipulation.

335PamelaHessandDevlinBarret,‘Memos:CIApushedlimitsonsleepdeprivation’AssociatedPress,27August2009,http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Fhostednews%2Fap%2Farticle%2FALeqM5iOTk5mUIVTPTRGU5hoR5JJrr38BAD9AB36L00&date=2009-08-27.336HernanReyes‘Theworstscarsareinthemind:psychologicaltorture’,InternationalReviewoftheRedCross,Vol89,No867,591-617,September2007https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-867-reyes.pdf,610.ThepsychoanalystwasworkingwiththeMedicalFoundationfortheVictimsofTortureinLondon.337Reyes,‘Theworstscars…’,[seeFN337],610.

AllegationsandevidenceWhenRahimwastransferredtoGuantánamo,theCIAannouncedthattheyhadcaptured“atough,seasonedjihadist”whohad“boughtchemicalsforoneattackonU.S.forcesinAfghanistan,”amanwhowas“bestknownincounter-terrorcirclesasapersonalfacilitatorandtranslator”forbinLadenandwhohad“helpedprepareToraBoraasahideoutforbinLadeninDecember2001.”338Hiscapture,claimedCIAdirectorGeneralMichaelHayden,was“ablowtoalQaida,theTalebanandotheranti-CoalitionmilitantsinAfghanistan.”339

ItisdifficulttosquaretheseclaimsaboutRahimwithwhatwasrevealedintheSenate’s2012reportontheCIA’suseoftorture.ItsaidtheCIA’sinterrogationofRahimhad,“resultedinnodisseminatedintelligencereport.”340Thequestioningwassuchafailurethatapost-interrogationreviewofCIA´smethodswastriggered,evenbeforeRahimwastransferredtoGuantánamo:

ThesummarydocumentsemphasizedthattheprimaryfactorsthatcontributedtoRahim’sunresponsivenessweretheinterrogationteam’slackofknowledgeofRahim,thedecisiontousetheCIA’senhancedinterrogationtechniquesimmediatelyaftertheshort“neutralprobe”andsubsequentisolationperiod,…theteam’sinabilitytoconfrontRahimwithincriminatingevidence,andtheuseofmultipleimprovisedinterrogationapproachesdespitethelackofanyindicationthattheseapproachesmightbeeffective.ThesummarydocumentsrecommendedthatfutureCIAinterrogationsshouldincorporaterapport-buildingtechniques,socialinteraction,lossofpredictability,anddeceptiontoagreaterextent[emphasesadded].341

Thus,beforestartingitsinterrogation,theCIAteamhadlackedinformationaboutRahimandheldno“incriminatingevidence.”Indeed,itlookspossiblethattheonlyinformationithadabouthimweretheISI’sallegations.

Thestate’scaseagainstRahimnow(asseeninitsresponsetohispetitionforhabeascorpus,the

338JonathanKarl,‘CIA:WegotBinLadenTranslator’,ABCNews,14March2008,http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=4453407&page=1.339JonathanKarl,‘CIA:WegotBinLaden...’,[seeFN340].340SenateReportonCIAtorture,[seeFN47],167.341SenateReportonCIAtorture,[seeFN47],167.



FactualReturn)342restsonwhatlookstobeweaksourcing.ThereisRahim’sconfessionthathetranslatedforArabcommandersfrom1996toNovember2001.Becauseofthefactofthetorture,eventhoughhisstatementswereeventuallymadetotheFBIafterhearrivedinGuantánamo,theycannotbeconsideredsafe.Morethanthat,however,allseriousallegationsagainstRahimfromthatperiod,aswellastheallegationthathecontinuedworkingforalQaedaafter2001aresourcednottohim,buttotwofellowdetaineesand,especiallyforthepost-2001period,toIntelligenceInformationReports(IIRs)–thesearea“generalizedreportingvehicle[s]thatcollectunprocessedandunverifiedsummariesofclaimsmadetoU.S.intelligenceagencies,usuallybyforeignsources.”343

ThecaseagainstRahimRahimwasbornin1965inChaparharvillageinNangarharandfledwithhisfamilyoverthebordertoPakistanwhentheSovietUnioninvadedAfghanistanin1979.Rahimsaidhereturnedonceortwicetofighttheinvaders,awarthatkilledtwoofhisbrothers;hemovedbackpermanentlytoAfghanistanoncetheSovietswithdrewin1989(uptohere,theUSaccountprettywellaccordswiththatofhisfamily,moreonwhichbelow).

TheUSstateallegesRahimthen“beganworkingforthemujahedeeninJalalabadandlatertravelledtoKandahartohelptheTalebanmovementwhenitaroseinthemid-1990s.”344BinLadenandhisArabcomradesfledfromSudantoRahim’shomeprovinceofNangarharinMay1996andwerewelcomedinitiallybymujahedin,i.e.non-Talebancommandersfromthemulti-factionalEasternShura.AmongthemwereRahim’sjihad-eracommander,EngineerMahmud,345alsofromtheHezb-eIslamiKhalesgroup.AccordingtoRahim’sFactualReturn,hetoldtheFBI(inaninterviewinGuantánamoinMay2008)thatitwasduringthisperiodthathebeganworkingfor‘theArabs’,first

342FactualReturn,Rahimv.Obama,No.1:09-cv-01385(PLF),6-7(D.D.C.7January2010),redacted.343WaliMohammedTraverse,28,[seeFN81],quotingformerintelligenceofficer.344RahimFactualReturn,[seeFN343],6,7.345Rahim’sbrother,JanMuhammad,saidRahimhadfoughtwithEngineerMahmoudduringtheanti-Sovietjihadofthe1980s.Authorinterview,17January2016,viaSkype.ForanaccountofmujahedinsupportforbinLaden,seeKevinBell,UsamaBinLadin’s“FatherSheikh”:YunusKhalisandTheReturnOfAl-Qa`Ida’sLeadershipToAfghanistan,TheCombatingTerrorismCenterAtWestPoint,14May2013,https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/CTC_Yunus-Khalis-Report-Final1.pdf.

part-time,thenfull-time.HetoldtheFBIitwas“arespectablejobandheneededthemoney”andthathe“spoketohospitalsanddoctorsonbehalfoftheArabs,”toAfghanworkersattheircompoundinJalalabad346andtranslatedforbinLadenon“severaloccasions.”347Heisreportedastellinghisinterrogatorsthat“itwasarespectablejobandheneededthemoney.”348

TheTalebancapturedJalalabadinSeptember1996,‘inheriting’binLadenandotherforeignjihadists,andinMarch1997askedbinLadenandhisgrouptorelocatetoKandahar.TheUSsaidRahimmovedwiththem,livingoutsidetheircompound.Hereportedlysaidhethathe“performedavarietyof…tasksfortheArabs,suchasgroceryshopping,maintenance,takingthemtoanearbyclinic,andfacilitatingtheleasingoftheirhomes.”349In1998,accordingtotheUS,RahimleftforhishomevillageinChaparharand,thefollowingyear,wenttoKabultolookafterhissickfather;itsaidthat,inbothlocations,heworkedasatranslatoranddriverfortheArabs.

TheUS,largelycitingtwootherdetaineesatGuantánamo,includingHarunGul(case7)whohassaidhewastortured(seepage55)and“otherwitnesses,”allegesthatRahimwastrustedbybinLaden,thatheworkedashisdriverand“financialadvisor”andthathewasanarmsdealerforalQaeda.ItsaidhevisitedEgypt,IranandPakistan(althoughwhyanAfghanwouldneedtogotoIranorEgypttopurchaseweaponsisnotexplained;AfghanistanandPakistanarefullofweaponsdealersandIran,atthistime,wassupplyingarmstotheNorthernAlliance).

InlateSeptember2001afterthe9/11attacks,accordingtotheUS,RahimsaidhewenttohishomevillageandwasapproachedbyacontactwhoaskedhimtoguideagroupofArabstoToraBora;hethen,reportedly,saidhespentsometimethere,translatingfortheArabs,andbeingpaidforthis.HealsoreportedlynegotiatedaceasefirewithAmerica’slocalAfghanforceswhichallowedmanyoftheArabstoescapetoPakistan.350Afterthis,Rahimallegedlytoldhisinterrogators,heslippedintoPakistanandhadnofurthercontactwithalQaeda;hesaidhelivedfirstinPeshawarandtheninLahore,runningabusinessbuyingandsellinghoneyandvegetables.

TheUSallegesthatRahimremainedactivewithalQaeda.Heretheallegationsaresourcedto

346RahimFactualReturn,[seeFN343],8.347RahimFactualReturn,[seeFN343],8.348RahimFactualReturn,[seeFN343],9. 349RahimFactualReturn,[seeFN343],9.350RahimFactualReturn,[seeFN343],14-18.

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unverifiedandunprocessedintelligenceinformationreports(IIRs)and,tosomedegree,tootherdetainees.TheUSsaysthatRahimwasanalQaedacourierwhopersonallytransported“tensofthousandsofdollars”forthe9/11mastermindKhalidSheikhMuhammad,travelledtoIrantohelpGulbuddinHekmatyarre-enterAfghanistan(strangebecausehebelongedtoadifferentmujahedinfaction),coordinated“themovementofbinLaden’swivesandfamilies”andorderedalQaedasupporterstoassassinatetheUSambassadorinAfghanistan.351

ByMarch2016whentheUSgovernmentsummedupitscaseagainstRahimforhisPeriodicReviewBoardhearing,theallegationshadfilledoutandincludedsomenewaccusationswhichwedonotknowthesourcingfor.ItsaidRahimwas“oneofasmallnumberofAfghanstobecometrustedmembersofal-Qa’ida…atranslator,courier,facilitator,andoperativeforthegroup’sseniorleadership,includingUsamaBinLadin,”hadfacilitatedthemovementofal-Qa’idaleadersandrankandfilebetweenAfghanistanandPakistan,particularlyafterthearrivalofUSforces,had“advanceknowledge”ofmanyofal-Qa’ida’smajorattacks,including9/lI,andpaidforplannedandparticipatedinattacksinAfghanistanagainstUSandCoalitiontargetsbyal-Qa’ida,theTaliban,andotheranti-Coalitionmilitantgroups.352

Thebrother’sversionofeventsInordertotrytogetasenseofwhatRahim’ssideofthestorymightbe,theauthorspoketoRahim’sbrother,JanMuhammad,whonowlivesinLondon.353Hegavesomemorebiographicaldetails:RahimhadfoughtagainstthePDPAcommunistregimeuntilitfellin1992andhadthen

351RahimFactualReturn,[seeFN343],19-21.BenFox‘MohammedRahim,GuantanamoBayPrisoner,SendsQuirkyLetters’,AssociatedPress,31December2012,http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/31/mohammed-rahim-al-afghani_n_2389243.html.352RahimGuantanamoDetaineeProfile,PeriodicReviewBoard,28March2016,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN10029/160428_U_ISN10029_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf.353InterviewJanMuhammad[seeFN346].Thebrotheralsofilledinafewmorebiographicaldetails.ThefamilyisfromthevillageofSirkariQala.Theiroldestbrother,whofoughtwithHezb-eIslami,Gulbuddin,wascapturedbySovietforcesin1983anddisappeared.Theotherbrothers(includinganotherwhowaskilled)allfoughtwiththeKhalesfactionunderEngineerMahmud.JanMohammadsaidthefamilystayedinAfghanistanapartfromthreeorfourmonthsin1980whentheywererefugeesinPakistan.

workedwiththeUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC)inJalalabad(1993-5).HisbrothersaidhelosthisjobwhentheTalebantookoverandwanted‘theirpeople’workingthere.Afterthat,hisbrothersetuphisownbusinesssellingcars,import-export,inJalalabad.

Theirfather,MuhammadJamal,wasa“verybusytribalelder”intheirhomedistrictofChaparhar,whodonatedacresoflandforprimaryandhighschools,ahealthclinic,aveterinaryclinicandadistrictoffice.Whenhediedin2000,Rahimtookhisplace.HealsosaidRahimspokesixorsevenlanguages:Persian,Pashto,Urdu,English,ArabicandRussianandhadstartedlearningFrench.

After2001andtheinfluxintotheprovinceofcommanderswhohadalliedthemselveswiththeUS,hesaidRahimrefusedtojointhe“Americancoalition.”Healsofaced“jealousies”fromothermujahedincommanderswhichdatedbacktothe1980sjihad;hisbrotherbelievesitwastheywhodenouncedRahimtotheAmericanmilitarywhoputhimontheirwantedlist.HesaidRahimwasforcedtofleetoPakistanandallegedthatitwastheUSwhich“pushedtheISItofindhim.”JanMuhammadwasalsoarrested,in2005,andtakentoBagramwherehesaidhewasquestionedabouthisbrotherduring45daysatTorJail(theBlackJail),whichwasrunbytheJointSpecialOperationsCommand(JSOC)andtheCIAandwhereabuseswereallegeduptill2013.354

JanMuhammadsaidhehassignaturesfromleadersofallthetribesandfromall29districts,ofNangarharaskingforhisbrothertobereleased.“Ididthisintwodays,”hesaid.“Triballeaderscametomeandsaid,‘Wewanttosignthis.’”

Defendinga‘highvalue’detaineeRahim,isoneof17detaineesatGuantánamoclassifiedas‘highvalue’;allwererenderedbytheCIAandalmostall–14–weretorturedduringtheirinterrogation.Toputthesenumbersintocontext:theSenateReportlists119menwhowererenderedbytheCIAandsaysthat39ofthemweretortured.355ThismeansthatbetweenaquarterandathirdofallthosewhoareknowntohavebeentorturedbytheCIAareatGuantánamo,classifiedas‘highvalue’detainees.356Rahim

354KateClark,The‘OtherGuantanamo’6:AfghansstillstrugglingforsovereigntyatBagram,25July2013,AAN,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-other-guantanamo-6-afghans-still-struggling-for-sovereignty-at-bagram/.355Fornames,seeSenateReportonCIAtorture,[seeFN47],458-461.356OtherswhoweretorturedbytheCIAinclude:RahmatGulwhodiedinthe‘SaltPit’(seepage13),twoTunisians



believesthistortureistherealreasonforhisclassification,i.e.notwhathedid,butwhatwasdonetohimandwhathemightspeakabout:“Iamnothighvalue,”hesaidinalettertohislawyer.“TheycallmehighvaluebecausetheCIAtorturedme.”357

Becauseofhisclassification,thedetailandmuchofthesubstanceofUSallegations–evenmoresothanforordinarydetainees–issecretfromRahimandthepublic.Rahimhashadnoopportunityofgettinghisvoiceheard,eveninthelimitedwaysotherdetaineeshavehad.Hislawyer,CarlosWarner,whorepresentsvariousdetaineesatGuantánamo,isnotallowed,becauseofsecurityrestrictions,tospeakaboutthedetailsofRahim’scase.Hecannotpublicallysaywhyhebelieveshisclientisinnocent,eventhoughthegovernmentcansaywhattheywantabouthim.Warnerhaswrittenextensivelyaboutwhathecallstheunconstitutionalabyssthatdefencelawyersfindthemselvesin,whentryingtorepresentdetaineesinGuantánamo.

…thisisasystemwhereascounselIusuallycannotsharetheGovernment’sallegationswithmyownclient.IcannotinvestigatethechargebecauseIcannotsharetheallegationswiththesubjectoftheinvestigation.Imaginetryingtogettothebottomofabarfightthatresultedinadeath.Ican’ttellmyclientwhowaskilledorwhytheGovernmentsayshe’sinvolved.Ican’teventellhimwhentheassaultoccurredorinwhatbartheassaulttookplace.Icertainlycannotintervieworcross-examinehisaccusers.Moreover,Ican’tvisitthebarortalktoanyotherwitnesstothefight.Iamalsoprohibitedfromspeakingwiththecoroneroranyoftheinvestigatingofficers.Sometimes,theGovernmentwillsay“wehaveimportantevidenceaboutyourclientregardingourallegation,butwecan’ttellyouwhatthatevidenceis.”Sometimes,theGovernmentjusttellsthejudgewithouttellingornotifyingmeatall.Allofmycommunicationswithmyclientareobservedandrecorded.AllofmylegalcorrespondenceisreadandinspectedbytheGovernment.Guantanamohasbeenreferredtoas“Kafka-esque,”andthatreferenceisright.“Catch-22”alsoaptlydescribesthelegal

heldatBagramuntil2015whentheywerefreedafterbeinghandedovertotheAfghanauthorities;non‘high-value’detaineesstillatGuantánamo,includingmenclearedforrelease,butstillthere;menwhohavebeenreleasedand;twomenwhoweredetaineddespiteworkingforfriendlyforeignspyagencies.357RahimtoWarner,letter‘Rahimonjustice’21January2015,postedwithFenton‘Detainedbutreadytomingle…’,[seeFN326].

malaisethatiscurrentlycalledGuantanamohabeascorpus.Nothinginmylegaltrainingpreparedmeforthisendeavor.358

WarnerpetitionedforhabeascorpusonRahim’sbehalf(presumablytogetattorneyaccess)on27July2009.ThestatereleaseditsFactualReturnon2December2009andtherewerethenagoodnumberoffilings(144),asthedefenceteamsoughtandfailedtoseestateevidence(motionsto‘compeldiscovery’).InFebruary2016,thehabeaspetitionwasstayed.

Havingseenthewayhabeaspetitionshavebeendealtwithbyjudges,Warnercametotheconclusionthattheywerepointless:theycurrentlyprovide,hehassaid,no“meaningfuljudicialreview.”359InacontextwheretheBushadministration’sdescriptionofthoseatGuantánamoas‘theworstoftheworst’360hasstuck,Warnerdecidedto“adapthisstrategy”andpublishsomeofRahim’sletters.ItwasanattempttohumanisehisclientfortheAmericanpublic.

Rahim’slettersBearinginmindthatthesentimentsexpressedintheselettershavealsonotbeensubjecttotherigourofacourtroom,theyappeartoshowamanwithaquirkysenseofhumourwhosoundshuman,despitehistortureandlong,indefiniteincarcerationinthemaximumsecurityfacilityatGuantánamo(Camp7).HejokesaboutthelocalwildlifeanddiscussespopcultureandAmericanTVstations,forexample,expressinghissupportforthetransgenderrealityTVstar,CaitlynJenner:“Iamhappyforherbecausepeoplearebornhowtheyare.”361HecallsJohnMcCaina“warhero,”DonaldTrumpanidiotanda“warzero”andthinksHilary(Clinton)“hasachance.”362Rahimtalksabouthavingregisteredwiththeonlinedatingsite,Match.com,andcommentsontheonlineinfidelitypromotionsite,AshleyMaddison,beinghacked

358Warner,‘Navigatinga“LegalBlackHole”…’,[seeFN77].359Warner,‘Navigatinga“LegalBlackHole”…’,[seeFN77].360See,forexample,‘Obamaadminsettotransferupto24moredetaineesfromGitmo,FoxNewsPolitics,25May2016,http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/05/25/obama-admin-set-to-transfer-up-to-24-more-detainees-from-gitmo.html.361RahimtoWarner,letter‘RahimonCaitlynJenner’21June2015,postedwithFenton‘Detainedbutreadytomingle…’,[seeFN326].362RahimtoWarner,letter‘RahimonDonaldTrump’21June2015,postedwithFenton‘Detainedbutreadytomingle…’,[seeFN326].

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into.363Intheletters,healsoreflectsonhistimeindetention:

In9monthstheCIAtreatedmelikeananimal–onlyanimalsweretreatedbetter,theydidnotletmeshowerorusethetoiletformonths,theyfedmeanimalfood.TheywouldnotletmeprayunlessIconfessedtountruths–andIwasprayingformylife.Doctorsandpsychiatristsgotrichoffmyblood.Aretheystillharmingpeople?Ihavedignity.Thosewhohumiliatedandhurtmedonot.Iprayforthemnow.364

Rahimsayshewantshisdayincourt:

Iaminnocent.IwashungfromtheceilinguntilIwasdead…Howcanweundothisinjustice?Givemeatrial.Letmebefree.Iamnotyourenemyandneverhavebeen.365

ThecaseagainstRahimRahim’sistheonlyoneoftheeightcaseswheretheaccusationssomewhatcoherentlypointtoanAfghanworkingwiththealQaedaleadershipbeforethefalloftheTaleban.366Proofthatheplayedaroleafterthisisfarlessevident.Rahim’snarrative,thathewasanancillarywithalQaeda,i.e.atranslator,courieranddriver,whohappened(accordingtotheUSaccusation)todosomeofhisworkfortheseniorsisarolewhichhasbeenplayedbymanyAfghans.Alltheseriousallegationsagainsthimbothpreandpost-2001aretiedtootherdetainees,includingonewhohassaidhewastortured,andincludesomesecondaryhearsay.ThemostseriousallegationsarelargelycitedtounverifiedintelligencereportswhichmayincludetheoriginalclaimbytheISI.TheallegationthathehadadvancedknowledgeofalQaedaattacks,including9/11,onlyappearsinhisPeriodicReviewBoardProfile.Thereisnothing,therefore,inthepublicdomaintohelpassesswhethertheUSaccusationsagainstRahimareactuallytrue,ratherthanjustsomewhatcoherent.Thesourcingofthe

363“Trappedinlegallimbo,detaineesatGuantánamoBayfindawaytocommunicatewiththeoutsideworld,”reportedCNN.“ThewritingsprovideafascinatingwindowintotheirgraspofAmericanculture(completewithreferencestoCharlieSheenandmatch.com!).”‘StoriesfromGitmo’,CNN,5July2013http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/05/stories-from-gitmo/.364RahimtoWarner,letter‘RahimonDignity’,21June2015,postedwith‘Detainedbutreadytomingle…’,[seeFN326].365RahimtoWarner,letter‘Rahimonjustice’21January2015,postedwithFenton‘Detainedbutreadytomingle…’,[seeFN326].366Zahir(case2)couldalsobeincludedhere.

allegationsintheperioduptothefalloftheTalebanisinadequate;after2001,itisparlous.Mostsignificantly,Rahimwastortured.Hisconfessionisunsafe.Subsequently,hehasbeengivennochancetoanswertheaccusationsthathavelefthiminindefinitedetention.

USplansforRahimTheGuantánamoTaskForcedecidedin2010thatRahimshouldbekeptinindefinitedetention.367ThePeriodicReviewBoarddecidedon19September2016thathewasatrustedmemberofal-Qa'idawhoworkeddirectlyforseniormembers”andthatafter2001,hehad“progressedtopayingfor,planning,andparticipatingintheattacksinAfghanistanagainstU.S.andCoalitiontargets.”368“[His]lackofcandorandcredibilityregardingthespecificsofhisactivitiespriortodetention,”itsaid,“makehiscurrentmindsetandintentionsdifficulttoassess.”369Itmadenomentionofthetorturehesuffered.Theboardruledheshouldremainincarcerated.

5.CONCLUSION

TheintelligenceonwhichthecasesoftheeightAfghansresthasbeenshowntobeseriouslyflawed.TheBushadministration’sdecisionnottogiveGuantánamodetaineestheminimumprotectionsallowedforundereithercriminalormilitarylawmeanttherewasneverameaningfulreviewoftheircases.Thisistroublinginitself.However,whentherewasapossibilityforthecourtstoholdtheexecutivetoaccountthroughhabeascorpuspetitions,thecourtswerefoundentirelylackingaswell.

ThelegalprocessesunderpinningGuantánamoresemblenotonlyKafka,butalsoCharlesDickens’BleakHouseandthe“monstrousmaze”ofthatnovel’slegalcase,whichlasteddecadesandateuplivesandwhere“thelawyersmistilyengagedinoneofthetenthousandstagesofanendlesscause,trippingoneanotheruponslipperyprecedents,gropingknee-deepintechnicalities…makingapretenceofequitywithseriousfaces.”AtGuantánamo,itisnotthelawyerswhohaveactedwrongly.Whethercivilianormilitary,theyhave 367LetterfromUSDepartmentofJusticetoSavage,[seeFN89].368 RahimFinalDetermination,PeriodicReviewBoard,9September2016,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN10029/20160919_U_ISN10029_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PUBLIC.pdf. 369 RahimFinalDetermination,PeriodicReviewBoard,[seeFN369].



struggledimmenselytorepresenttheirclients.Rather,ithasbeentheUSexecutive,particularlyunderPresidentBush,butalsounderPresidentObama,andthejudgeswhohavebeenatfault.Atpresent,thecourtsoftheDistrictofColombiaarenotrulinginfavourofdetaineesinhabeascases,despite,asthisstudyhasshown,systemicproblemswithgovernmentcases.Rather,America’scourtshaveshownthemselvesrepeatedlyunableorunwillingtostanduptotheexecutive.Theyhavefailedbothtoquestionwhatthegovernmentassertsandtoprotectindividualsagainstthearbitrarypowerofthestate.Fortheretobe“meaningfuljudicialreview”ascalledforbytheSupremeCourtin2008,theSupremeCourtitself,saidRahim’slawyer,CarlosWarner,wouldhavetochangetherulesofthehabeasproceedings:

Theaccusedshouldhavetherighttoconfrontandchallengeevidence.Unreliableevidenceshouldnotberelieduponbythefact-finder.TheGovernmentshouldcarrysomeburdenofproofwhenaperson’slibertyisatstake.Whenthecourtdeclaresthatsomeoneshouldbereleased,theyshouldbereleased.370

LeavingasidetheoverarchingissueofwhethermilitarydetentionwithouttrialshouldbeusedatallforWaronTerrordetaineeswhoarenotuniformedandareallegedcombatantsinawarwithnoendinsight,therearetwocriticalissuesconcerningthedetentionofthelasteightAfghanstobeheldatGuantánamo(includingthoserecentlytransferredtoand,forthemoment,stillbelievedtobeindetentionintheUAE):

• Doestheevidencebackuptheallegationsagainstthem?

• DotheypassthethresholdforbeingheldatGuantánamo?IsCubaanappropriateplacetoholdminororevenmid-rankinginsurgents?

ThepublicallyavailableevidenceagainstthefirstsixAfghansdoesnotbackuptheviewthattheyareguiltyofwhathasbeenassertedagainstthem–fourlooktobeinnocent,whileObaidullahandZahirmayhavebeenveryjuniorinsurgents.ThereisnoevidencelinkinganyofthemtoalQaeda,exceptZahir’semployeestatusduringtheTalebanera.Inrecentweeksandmonths,thePeriodicReviewBoardhasreachedsimilarconclusionsaboutthesesixmen,thatthecasesagainstthemwereflawedor,atleast,theriskinvolvedintransferwasnotgreat.

Asforthelasttwodetainees,HarunandRahim,whatwecanseeoftheevidenceagainstthem 370Warner,‘Navigatinga“LegalBlackHole”…’,46[seeFN77].

pointstothesameworryingpatternsasinthefirstsixcases:arelianceonunverifiedintelligencereports,confessionsanddetaineetestimony,coupledwiththeuseoftortureandexcessivesecrecy.Neithermanhashadtheopportunitytodefendhimselfand,inRahim’scasemuchofthedetailevenoftheallegationsagainsthimaresecret.

EveniftheallegationsagainstHarunaretrue,helookstohavebeenplayingaveryjuniorroleinthepost-2001insurgency;indefinitedetentioninGuantánamowouldnotseemtobemerited.ThecasethatRahimfacilitatedalQaedaactivity,includingwiththeseniorleadership,before9/11issomewhatplausible,butnotproperlysubstantiated.Astotheperiodafter2001,thesourcingoftheallegationsagainsthimisparlous.Yetbothremainincontinuingdetention.

TheviewthatnoneoftheeightarelikelytohavebeenmajorplayersintheinsurgencyisgivencredencebythefactthattheTalebanleadershipdidnottrytogetanyofthemoutinexchangeforcapturedUSserviceman,BoweBergdahl,concentratinginsteadonitsfourleaderswhowerestillinGuantánamoandafifthindividualwhoappearedtohavegoodtiestotheHaqqanifamily(whichwasholdingBergdahl).IftheallegationsagainsttheeightweretrueandtheirstatuswasaspertheUSallegationsagainstthem,itisdifficulttobelievethattheTalebanwouldnothavepushedfortheirreleaseaswell.Thesemenlooktobesmallfish,if,indeed,theyare‘fish’atall.

Evenifalleightarefinallyreleased,thevictorymaybehollow.Hamidullahhasrequestedresettlementinanothercountry,believingheisstillatriskfromtheNorthernAllianceifhegoeshome.Zahir’slife,hislawyerhassaid,is“irretrievablydamaged.”371“Prisonusuallydamagespeople,”saidShayanaKadial,thelawyerforKamin.“[M]ostofourclientsleavenotangrybutratherbrokenanddepressed.”372ThethreeAfghanswhorecentlyleftGuantánamoareintheUAEarenotyetfreemen;noraretheyhome.

371ZahirPersonalRepresentativeStatement,PeriodicReviewBoard,9June2016,http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN753/20160609_U_ISN_753_OPENING_STATEMENTS_OF_DETAINEES_REPRESENTATIVES_PUBLIC.pdf.372ShayanaKadidal,‘ProsecutorsDroppedHisCaseLongAgo.MilitaryOfficersSupportHisRelease.SoWhyIsMohammedKaminStillinGuantanamo?’CenterforConstitutionalRightswebsite,2September2015,http://ccrjustice.org/home/blog/2015/09/02/prosecutors-dropped-his-case-long-ago-military-officers-support-his-release-so.

November2016


ThecasestudiesoftheseeightAfghans,andtheAfghanexperienceinGuantánamogenerally,demonstratetheperilousnessofthepowertoarbitrarilydetain.InAfghanistan,ithasledtomiscarriagesofjusticeforindividualsanddireconsequencesfortheirfamilies.IthaslefttheUSstatestillstruggling,fourteenyearson,withthequestionofwhattodowithitslegacyofWaronTerrordetainees.MassarbitrarydetentionsintheearlyyearsoftheUS-ledinterventionwasamajorfactordrivingsomeAfghanstowardsrebellion.IthelpedreviveaconflictAfghanshadhopedwasfinallyover,onewhichtheyandtheUnitedStatesarestillensnaredin.



AnnexI:Theauthor´searlierworkonrelevantsubjects

AllarticlespublishedbytheAfghanistanAnalystsNetworkunlessspecified.

‘The‘OtherGuantanamo’(13):WhatshouldAfghanistandowithAmerica’sforeigndetainees?’2March2015,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-other-guantanamo-13-what-should-afghanistan-do-with-americas-foreign-detainees/.

‘The‘OtherGuantanamo’(12):Bagramcloses,CIAtorturerevealed,UStobeheldtoaccount?‘AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,12December2014,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-other-guantanamo-11-bagram-closes-cia-torture-revealed-us-to-be-held-to-account/.

‘The‘OtherGuantanamo’(11):Moretransfers,acourt’sscrutinyandpossibleredress’,28November2014,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/publication/AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork-thematic-dossier/thematic-dossier-vii-detentions-in-afghanistan-bagram-transfer-and-torture/.

‘The‘OtherGuantanamo’(10):BagramClosing:Lawyersworriedabout‘ghostdetainees’(anupdate)’,14October2014,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/bagram-closing-lawyers-worried-about-ghost-detainees-an-update/.

‘TheOtherGuantanamo’(9):BagramprisontoclosewithBSA,13foreigndetaineesleft–whattodowiththerest?’2October2014,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/bagram-to-close-according-to-bsa-13-foreign-detainees-left-what-to-do-with-the-rest/.

‘Karzaistrugglesagainstforeigndetentions–statereleasesTaleban?’,25September2014,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/karzai-struggles-against-foreign-detentions-state-releases-taleban/.

‘The‘OtherGuantanamo’(8):AfulllistofforeigndetaineesatBagram?’28August2014,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-other-guantanamo-8-a-full-list-of-foreign-detainees-at-bagram/.

‘‘‘SecretNATOJails”thatAren’tSecret:Ambushanddramaoverdetainees’,6May2014,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/secret-nato-jails-that-arent-secret-ambush-and-drama-over-detainees/.

‘65“Innocent”/“Dangerous”DetaineesReleasedFromBagram:Whatsecretdocumentssayabout

AfghanandUSclaims’,13February2014,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/65-innocent-or-dangerous-detainees-released-from-bagram-secret-documents-and-afghan-and-us-claims/.

‘The‘OtherGuantanamo’(7):ForeignersinlimboatBagram,3October2013,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-other-guantanamo-7-foreigners-in-limbo-at-bagram/.

‘The‘OtherGuantanamo’(6):AfghansstillstrugglingforsovereigntyatBagram’,25July2013,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-other-guantanamo-6-afghans-still-struggling-for-sovereignty-at-bagram/.

‘The‘OtherGuantanamo’(5):ANewMoUforBagramand,Finally,aHandover?’,24March2013,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-other-guantanamo-5-a-new-mou-for-bagram-and-finally-a-handover/.

‘The‘OtherGuantanamo’(4):TheFinalHandoverofBagraminSight?’,2March2013,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-other-guantanamo-4-the-final-handover-of-bagram-in-sight/.

‘‘TheOtherGuantanamo’(3):BagramandtheStruggleforSovereignty’,10September2012,http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-other-guantanamo-bagram-and-the-struggle-for-sovereignty/.

‘The‘OtherGuantanamo’(2):TheAfghanStatebeginsInternment’,23May2012,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-other-guantanamo-2-the-afghan-state-begins-internment/

‘HandingoverNightRaids’,9April2012,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/publication/AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork-thematic-dossier/thematic-dossier-vii-detentions-in-afghanistan-bagram-transfer-and-torture/.

‘The‘OtherBagram’(1):AMemorandumforhandover’,21March2012,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/publication/AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork-thematic-dossier/thematic-dossier-vii-detentions-in-afghanistan-bagram-transfer-and-torture/.

‘Freeingthe‘GuantanamoFive’2:KafkainCuba,11March2012,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/freeing-the-guantanamo-five-2-kafka-in-cuba/.

‘ReleasingtheGuantanamoFive?1:BiographiesofthePrisoners(amended)’,9March2012,

November2016


http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/releasing-the-guantanamo-five-1-biographies-of-the-prisoners-amended/.

TheTakharattack:TargetedkillingsandtheparallelworldsofUSintelligenceandAfghanistan,AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,10May2011,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/publication/AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork-papers/the-takhar-attack-targeted-killings-and-the-parallel-worlds-of-us-intelligence-and-afghanistan/.

WithStephenCarter,NoShortcuttoStability:Justice,PoliticsandInsurgencyinAfghanistan,December2010,ChathamHouse,

https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Asia/1210pr_afghanjustice.pdf.

‘OnthetrailofPakistan’s“disappeared”’,Channel4News,9March2007,videonolongeravailable.

‘AfghanstellofUSprisonordeals’,BBC,21July2005,http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4648959.stm,cut-downtextversionofradiopieceairedonBBC‘TheWorldTonight’.


AbouttheAfghanistanAnalystsNetwork(AAN)

TheAfghanistanAnalystsNetwork(AAN)isanon-profit,independentpolicyresearchorganisation.ItaimstobringtogethertheknowledgeandexperienceofalargenumberofexpertstoinformpolicyandincreasetheunderstandingofAfghanrealities.

TheinstitutionalstructureofAANincludesateamofanalystsandanetworkofregularcontributorswithexpertiseinthefieldsofAfghanpolitics,governance,ruleoflawandsecurity.AANwillpublishregularin-depththematicreports,policybriefingsandcomments.

ThemainchannelfordisseminationofthereportsistheAANwebsite.Forfurtherinformation,pleasevisithttp://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/.

QUALITYCONTROLOFAAN’SPUBLICATIONSTheopinionsexpressedinpublicationsbytheAfghanistanAnalystsNetwork(AAN)donotnecessarilyreflectthoseofAAN.PublicationsbyAANare,however,subjectedtoacademicstylereviewandpeerreviewtoensurethequalityoftheresearchandthereliabilityoftheanalysis.AANthematicreportsandbriefingpapersarereadbyatleasttwointernalandtwoexternalreviewers,discussionpapersbyatleasttwointernalreviewersanddispatchesbyatleastoneinternalreviewer.ForfurtherinformationaboutthequalitycontrolandthereviewprocessofAAN’spublications,[email protected].

AUTHORBIOKateClarkhasworkedfortheAfghanistanAnalystsNetworksince2010assenioranalystandcountrydirector.ShewastheBBCcorrespondentinAfghanistan,1999-2002andbeforethe9/11attacks,wastheonlywesternjournalistbasedinthecountry.ShereportedfirsthandontheTalebanregimeandtheforeignmilitantswhoenjoyeditsprotection,aswellastheUSmilitaryinterventionandthenewpost-2001Afghanpolity.Between2002and2010,KatewasbasedinLondon,butcontinuedtoreturntoAfghanistantoreportonthecountry,makingradioandtelevisiondocumentariesabouttheinsurgency,thepoliticaleconomyofweaponssmugglingandopium,andwarcrimes.KatehasanMAinMiddleEasternPoliticsfromExeterUniversityinBritainandpreviouslyworkedattheBBCArabicService.Shehasalsolived,studiedandworkedintheMiddleEast.

©AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork2016.

Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystemortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recordingorotherwisewithoutfullattribution.