Kant and German Idealism

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British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11(2) 2003: 323329

REVIEW ARTICLE

KANT AND GERMAN IDEALISMS

Gary Banham

Anthony J. La Vopa. Fichte: The Self and the Calling of Philosophy,17621799. Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press,2001. ix + 449 pp. 56.00 ISBN 0521791456

Immanuel Kant. Critique of the Power of Judgment , trans. by PaulGuyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge and New York, CambridgeUniversity Press, 2000. ix + 423 pp. 40.00 ISBN: 0521344476

Sally Sedgwick (ed.). The Reception of Kants Critical Philosophy:Fichte, Schelling, & Hegel . Cambridge and New York, CambridgeUniversity Press, 2000. vii + 338 pp. 37.50 ISBN: 0521772370

The relationship of Kant to German Idealism is a topic that has always beenproductive of dispute. Whether Kants project is to be regarded as open tocorrection and modification by the next generation of German philosophersor to be thought of as complete in itself is the basic ground of discussion.Sally Sedgwicks invaluable collection of essays by a number of leadingwriters in this area substantially contributes to this debate.

Sedgwicks collection contains fourteen essays and there are a number of pieces that are engaged with each other on distinct sets of topics. Paul Guyerfor example crosses swords with Jeffrey Edwards concerning the reading of the Opus Postumum and the place of Spinoza within it whilst Allen Wood,Karl Ameriks and Robert Pippin sustain a three-cornered debate about thevalue of Fichtes response to Kant and the question of whether this neces-sitates a commitment to a form of practical foundationalism. Perhaps themost important debate concerns the understanding of Hegels appeal to anotion of intellectual intuition, a question that produces quite differentresponses from Batrice Longuenesse and Ken Westphal.

Taking these debates in turn, the argument of Paul Guyers piece concen-trates on the unity of nature and freedom in Kants system of philosophy,arguing that there is no more than a shift of emphasis between the positionof the Opus Postumum and that of Kants critical works. Guyers argument


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works, Guyer consistently tries to suggest that the postulate of the immor-tality of the soul is not integral to this doctrine, as there is some sense inwhich the postulate of God works to make it clear that the unity of happi-ness and virtue is possible within nature. This claim appears subsequently

to be moderated when treating the Critique of Teleological Judgment whereGuyer confesses that the force of what he is arguing for amounts to no morethan the statement that only happiness produced through virtue will beharmonized with virtue on earth, a statement that is perhaps obviousenough to make one wonder why Guyer had earlier given it a paradoxicalsense. The key conclusions of the piece however are more germane to thecollection as a whole, as Guyers point is that, in the Critique of Teleological

Judgment , Kant objects to Spinozism on the grounds that it eliminatescontingency from nature and choice from ethics, two positions from which

he is said not to draw back in the Opus Postumum , and Guyer claims thatthe treatment of God there is broadly consistent with that in the criticalworks.

In presenting a different picture of the role of Spinoza in the OpusPostumum , Edwards does not deny that it is within the context of transcen-dental idealism that the response to Spinoza is presented. However, unlikeGuyer, Edwards focuses on the central question of the Opus Postumum , theproblem of formulating a special transitional science intended to mediatebetween the propositions of the Metaphysical Foundations and those of

empirical physics. This leads Kant to formulate a theory of matter on thebasis of a notion of a cosmic aether and to present a deduction of the notionof this aether. Since the notion of this aether is an objective material condition of cognition, the effect of the proof is to render problematicKants suggestion in the Prolegomena that transcendental idealism is easiestgrasped as a formal idealism. Formulations in which Kant appears also torelate subjectivity (presented here in the vocabulary of self-positing) toSpinozistic notions of God further seem to suggest moves in this torso of awork towards the positions of German Idealism. Whilst Edwardss articletakes the central concerns of the Opus Postumum much more seriously thanGuyers, it is open to the clear riposte that, as an interpretation, it createsreal problems for the understanding of the issue that Guyer rightly presentsas key for critical philosophy, viz., the unity of nature and freedom.

Whilst Sedgwicks collection contains in total five articles on Fichte, thedebate between the three earlier mentioned involves key questions aboutthe relationship of Kant and Fichte. Allen Wood stresses Fichtes attemptto unify theoretical and practical principles in the original positing of the I.However, whilst arguing for this view, Wood is also clear that the notion of the I is primarily practical in Fichtes work and, indeed, increasinglypresented as so in the development of it. In replying to this piece, KarlAmeriks reminds us of the reception of Kant that prepared the way for


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to skepticism inaugurated the still-widespread view of it as primarily acontribution to epistemology, albeit one seen as having a peculiar commit-ment to freedom, from a practical point of view, at its core. In rejectingthis view, Ameriks denies the need for a practical foundationalism to

supplement Kant on the grounds that foundationalism as a philosophicalstrategy is in principle rejected by Kant. Rejecting the suggestion that thenotion of positing succeeds in providing a demonstration of freedom,Ameriks argues for rescuing a coherent notion of the Kantian project fromthe amendments of German Idealism, although one weakness of hisargument concerns the suggestion that the Groundwork provided anattempt to prove freedom that is given up in the Critique of Practical Reason , whilst in fact the deduction of freedom rejected in the latter workis not equivalent to that presented in the former.

Robert Pippin, in response to Ameriks, differentiates Fichtes positionfrom that of Reinhold and denies that the philosophy of self-positing isfundamentally a practical foundationalism. Pippin distinguishes Fichte fromReinhold in pointing to the fact that, whilst the latter position rested on arepresentationalist view of psychology, the former presents by contrast anormative view that is presented here as a superior version of Sellars concep-tion of the space of reasons. In so doing Pippin suggests that, if there isfoundationalism here, it is so only in the sense of an appeal to an irreducibleexperience of reason at the heart of consciousness itself, an appeal that cannot

be demonstrated but, once conceded, places one within a spontaneous self-understanding. In aligning Fichte so clearly with Sellars, Pippin presents himas an early critic of the Myth of the Given rather than, pace Ameriks, havinghis place within a series of ill-fated short arguments to idealism. Whilst thisview of Fichte makes him a more interesting figure than Ameriks readingwould have us believe, it does leave a number of problems concerning therelationship between self-positing and determinate concepts that Pippinconfessedly does not address save by way of a coda.

Batrice Longuenesses article concentrates on the reading of Kantprovided by Hegel in the early essay Faith and Knowledge . Tracing thetransformation of Kants terms by Hegel Longuenesse revisits the interpre-tation of the Critique of Teleological Judgment undertaken by Hegel and,in so doing, relates the conception of the intuitive intellect presented thereto the Transcendental Ideal discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason . Shealso demonstrates that resolution of the antimony of aesthetic judgment inthe conception of the supersensible substrate points, for Hegel, to a reasonfor thinking that we experience the intuitive intellect. Longuenesse effec-tively concedes this point to Hegel and agrees substantially with theHegelian account of the Kantian system but, after doing so, suggests aresponse which will retrieve the Kantian project, the response of aban-doning the Ideals articulated in the Dialectics of the critiques in order to


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Ken Westphals contribution confessedly began as a response to Longue-nesse and departs from her argument in downplaying the early writings of Hegel, suggesting that in them there are commitments that were subse-quently rejected in the mature philosophy. In presenting this view of Hegel,

Westphal argues for a notion of absolute knowledge that sees it as asuccessor to the notion of intellectual intuition. Like Edwards, Westphalargues that Kant is committed to a transcendental material condition of possibility in the shape of the notion of the affinity of experiences. Resur-recting the notion that there is a neglected alternative to Kants view of space and time, Westphal presents this in terms of receptivity being acondition of relationship to a really existent space and time. This leadsWestphal to propose understanding Hegels development as one in whichthis view of space and time is connected to a reshaped understanding of

intellectual intuition in an attempt to avoid the circularity of appeal endemicin German Idealism. Whilst Westphals paper is a much more thoroughaccount of Hegel than is given in Longuenesse, however, the notion of arealist view of space and time is in direct conflict with the simplest of Kantsarguments for ideality: the notion that space cannot emerge from exter-nality as all externality presupposes space and hence for there to be exter-nality perceived at all, there must be an a priori intuition.

Sedgwicks collection is rich and contains further articles on Schelling,Hegel (including a key article on substance by Stephen Houlgate) and the

relationship between Kant and Hegel on the problem of metaphysics andmorality (by Sedgwick herself) although it is slightly marred by a conten-tious editorial that presents the whole problem of the relationship betweenKant and German Idealism within the lenses of Hegels early writings, apresentation that is much less rich than given within the range of articlesgathered together in the collection. The collection as a whole is indispen-sable for any one seriously engaged with the relationship between Kant andGerman Idealism.

The work of Kants that was referred to most frequently by the GermanIdealists is Kants third critique and Paul Guyers and Eric Matthews newtranslation of it has emerged to challenge the pre-eminence given to that of Werner Pluhar in recent years. It has a number of novel features, not leastof which is a title that is intended to reflect more accurately the GermanUrteilskraft as the general rendering of this as judgment misses the refer-ence to activity that is unmistakable in kraft . Whilst this rendering hasmuch to commend it, there are disadvantages. Due to this original decisionthe two component parts of the work also have to be given new translationsand this produces such lumbering formulations as the Critique of theAesthetic Power of Judgment and the Critique of the Teleological Powerof Judgment both of which are considerably less elegant in English thanthe previous renderings that ignored the notion of kraft . In addition to the


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reflectirend not as reflective as has been customary but instead asreflecting. This decision is coupled by the new translation of bestimmendas determining rather than determinant. Whilst the argument that thecommon form of the two terns should be respected and that this has failed

in previous translations to be observed is a good one, the turning of bothinto terms that suggest ceaseless activity has about it a tendency that mightdisquiet some readers. It also conflicts with the translators treatment of Zweck and Zwekmgkeit where the connection is clear but broken here asthe former is retained as end whilst the latter is purposiveness.

The effect of the translation of the whole is certainly smooth though and,unlike Pluhar, avoids the temptation of reconstruct sentences aroundinserted additions in square brackets intended to fill out sense, a tendencythat has produced general complaint. There are however other features to

look for in a translation, such as supporting apparatus. Here Pluhar isclearly superior as his introduction was philosophical and raised issues of substantial interest. Further, Pluhars secondary bibliography is extensiveand very useful. By contrast, Guyers introduction to this volume is an oddmishmash of historical information and contentious textual commentary.The outline of the work given in this introduction raises a number of problems with Kants arguments without indicating the substantial disa-greement there would be with these statements from a number of otherauthorities on Kant. The treatment of the notion of formalism in Kants

aesthetics is a striking case in point with no clear distinction made betweenthe treatment of pure judgments of taste, the Ideal of Beauty and theaccount of works of art. The discussion of the sublime also includes areference to a generation of European writers that ridiculously suggests thatthe treatment of the sublime is taken by them to be a sign that the world isincomprehensible, a view that certainly is not that presented by Lyotardet al . The bibliography provided is also stringently limited to the works of Guyer himself and some of his close associates, a limitation that is drasticin scope. Despite these problems with it, however, it is likely that thistranslation will, as a translation, seriously challenge Pluhars and becomeone that is generally used.

Anthony J. La Vopas extended treatment of Fichtes youthful period isan intellectual biography of the man, as presented by a cultural historian.There is no comparable work in English, not least because of the generalneglect of Fichte in Anglo-American philosophy. La Vopa paints in vividdetail Fichtes background, showing how he was lifted from a weavingfamily by the capricious philanthropy of a Baron whose family subsequentlycut him off. Since this plunged Fichte into dependence on an income as ahome tutor and into circumstances where he was treated as a marked socialinferior, La Vopa provides some psychosocial rationales for the famousarrogance presented by the young thinker. By contrast to circumstances


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revelation of Kants practical defence of the notion of freedom that revealedto Fichte the possibility of his vocation as a practical thinker.

La Vopa downplays the appearance of the Attempts at A Critique of All Revelation in preference to extended discussions of the Reclamation of the

Freedom of Thought From the Princes of Europe and the Contributiontoward Correcting the Judgment of the Public about the French Revolution .Whilst the latter was far from a Jacobin work and effectively defended therevolutionary settlement of 1789, it brought down on Fichte the first of aseries of reasons for suspicion. La Vopa analyses with sensitivity the casualanti-Semitism of one of the paragraphs of this work and demonstrates itsconnection with the isolation of the radical post-Kantian. Less successful isLa Vopas lengthy treatment of gender matters. Whilst demonstratingFichtes commitment to patriarchal premises and connecting this to the love

he had for Johanna, La Vopa tends to the prolix on this theme, a theme thathe fails to develop in terms of its connection to practical philosophy in anyreal detail.

Similarly disappointing are the treatments given of Fichtes major works,the Wissenschaftlehre and its prefaces. Acknowledging the weight of philo-sophical commentary, La Vopa neglects here to do much more than repeatthe well-known story of the Aenesidemus review leading to the formulationof the primacy of the practical rather than adhering to Reinholds represen-tationalism. More interesting is the portrayal of Fichtes relationship with

Schilller and the contrasting temperaments of the two men is well drawn asis the story of Goethes attempts to retain Fichte at Jena whilst taming hiswilder outbursts.

Of greater philosophical interest is the account given of Fichtes politicalwritings such as the Naturrecht . The difficulty of relating the moral law topolitical power led Fichte to the postulation of a notion of general egotismand to a view of the state that was excessively paternalistic. That this wouldnot be revealed in its full consequences until the writings of The ClosedCommercial State in 1800 does not prevent one from seeing a nascentauthoritarianism in the writings of the young Fichte. La Vopas concludingtreatment of the atheism conflict brings out many manifestations of theaffair that led to Fichtes departure from Jena, not least the degree to whichit was a self-induced difficulty.

There are many commendable features to La Vopas book. It is wide-ranging, serious and includes in-depth discussions of some writings that arenot widely available. However, the failure to discuss at any length the worksof Fichte that are generally regarded as his key works is an odd one giventhe lack of attention to Fichte in English-speaking countries. The narrow-ness of focus of this biography is also surprising since it ensures that thesubsequent development of Fichtes work is not discussed at all and notablyimportant writings such as the Address are hence left outside its remit.


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number of places despite the author attempting to guard against this beingoverly intrusive. Fundamentally this book is best at describing the milieu inwhich Fichtes work developed and in providing some convincing andintriguing accounts of his personality. Still, this is no mean achievement and

this work will doubtless be an important reference for all those who havean interest in the formation of the German university and in intellectual lifeat the close of the eighteenth century. That there is still a need for such workis clear enough and it is to be hoped that another volume will attempt totrace it in even greater intellectual detail than La Vopa has attempted.

Manchester Metropolitan University


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Kant and German Idealism