Kant's Philosophy of Mind

Kant’sPhilosophyofMindColinMcLearUniversityofNebraska–[email protected]

September16, 2015

Introduction

ImmanuelKant (1724-1804)wasoneof themost important philosophers of the “Enlighten-ment”period(ca. 1650-1800)inwesternEuropeanhistory. BorninKönigsberg, Prussia(nowKaliningrad, Russia)topoorandreligiouslydevoutparents, Kant’sintellectualpromisewasap-parentatanearlyage. HeattendedcollegeattheUniversityofKönigsberg(Albertus-UniversitätKönigsberg)andeventuallytaughtasaprofessorthere(1770-1796).

Kantwrotehismostsignificantphilosophicalworksrelativelylateinhisprofessionallife,havingonlyachievedapositionasfullprofessorin1770, attheageofforty-six. From1781to1798Kantpublishedaseriesoftremendouslyinfluentialwritings, includingthe CritiqueofPureReason (1781/7), the GroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMorals (1785), theMetaphysicalFoundationsofNaturalScience (1786), the CritiqueofPracticalReason (1788), andthe CritiqueofthePowerofJudgment (1790). Thisbodyofworkhadatransformativeimpactonvirtuallyallpartsofphilosophyincludingaesthetics, epistemology, ethics, logic, metaphysics, philosophyofreligion, andphilosophyofscience. ThisencyclopediaentryfocusesonKant’sviewsinthephilosophyofmind, whichundergirdmuchofhisepistemologyandmetaphysics. Inparticular,we’llbe focusingonmetaphysicalandepistemologicaldoctrines forming thecoreofKant’smaturephilosophy, aspresentedinthe CritiqueofPureReason (CPR) of1781/87andelsewhere.

TherearecertainaspectsofKant’sprojectinthe CPR thatshouldbeveryfamiliartoanyoneversedinthedebatesofseventeenthcenturyEuropeanphilosophy. Forexample, Kantargues,like Locke and Hume beforehim, thattheboundariesofsubstantivehumanknowledgestopatexperience, andthusthatwemustbeextraordinarilycircumspectconcerninganyclaimmadeaboutwhatrealityislikeindependentofallpossiblehumanexperience. But, like Descartes andLeibniz, Kantthinksthatcentralpartsofhumanknowledgeneverthelessexhibitcharacteristicsofnecessityanduniversality, andthat, contrarytoHume’sskepticalarguments, wecanhavegoodreasontothinkthattheydo.

Kantcarriesouta‘critique’ofpurereasoninordertoshowitsnatureandlimits, andtherebycurb thepretensionsofvariousmetaphysical systemsarticulatedon thebasisofafirm faiththatreasonaloneallowsustoscrutinizetheverydepthsofreality. ButKantalsoarguesthatthelegitimatedomainofreasonismoreextensiveandmoresubstantivethanpreviousempiri-cistcritiqueshadallowed. InthiswayKantsalvages(orattemptsto)muchoftheprevailingEnlightenmentconceptionofreasonasanorganforknowledgeoftheworld.

BelowI discussKant’stheoryofcognition, includinghisviewsofthevariousmentalfacultiesthatmakecognitionpossible. I distinguishbetweendifferentconceptionsofconsciousnessatthebasisofthistheoryofcognitionandexplainanddiscussKant’scriticismsoftheprevailingrationalistconceptionofmind, popularinGermanyatthetime.

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mailto:[email protected]

http://www.iep.utm.edu/locke/

http://www.iep.utm.edu/hume/

http://www.iep.utm.edu/descarte/

http://www.iep.utm.edu/leib-ove/

Contents

Introduction 1

1. Kant’sTheoryofCognition 3

a. MentalFaculties&MentalRepresentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3i. Sensibility, Understanding, andReason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3ii. ImaginationandJudgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

b. MentalProcessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2. Consciousness 9

a. PhenomenalConsciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9b. Discrimination&Differentiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10c. Self-Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

i. InnerSense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11ii. Apperception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

d. UnityofConsciousness&theCategories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3. Concepts&Perception 16

a. Content&Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16b. ConceptualContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17c. Conceptualism&Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18d. ObjectionstoConceptualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

4. RationalPsychology&Self-Knowledge 21

a. Substantiality(A348-51/B410-11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21b. Simplicity(A351-61/B407-8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23c. NumericalIdentity(A361-66/B408) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24d. RelationtoObjectsinSpace(A366-80/B409) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

i. TheImmediacyArgument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25ii. TheArgumentfromImagination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

e. LessonsoftheParalogisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

5. Summary 28

6. ReferencesandFurtherReading 28

a. Kant’sWorksinEnglish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28b. SecondarySources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

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Kant’sPhilosophyofMind ColinMcLear

1. Kant’sTheoryofCognition

Kantisprimarilyinterestedininvestigatingthemindforepistemologicalreasons. Oneofthegoalsofhismature“critical”philosophyisarticulatingtheconditionsunderwhichourscien-tificknowledge, includingmathematicsandnaturalscience, ispossible. Achievingthisgoalre-quires, inKant’sestimation, a critique ofthemannerinwhichrationalbeingslikeourselvesgainsuchknowledge, sothatwemightdistinguishthoseformsofinquiry(suchasnaturalscience),whicharelegitimate, fromthose(suchasrationalistmetaphysics), whichareillegitimate. Thiscritiqueproceedsviaanexaminationofthosefeaturesofthemindrelevanttotheacquisitionofknowledge. Thisamountstoanexaminationoftheconditionsfor“cognition”[Erkenntnis],orthemind’srelationtoanobject(thereissomecontroversyaboutthebestwaytounderstandKant’suseofthisterm, butherewe’llunderstanditasinvolvingrelationtoapossibleobjectofexperience, andasbeinganecessaryconditionforpositivesubstantiveknowledge[Wissen]).ThustounderstandKant’scriticalphilosophyweneedtounderstandhisconceptionofthemind.

a. MentalFaculties&MentalRepresentation

Kantcharacterizesthemindalongtwofundamentalaxes–first, thevariouskindsofpowerswhichitpossesses; second, theresultsofexercisingthosepowers. We’lltaketheseinturn.

Atthemostbasicexplanatorylevel, Kantconceivesofthemindasconstitutedbytwofun-damentalcapacities[Fähigkeiten], orpowers, whichhelabels“receptivity”[Receptivität]and“spontaneity”[Spontaneität]. Receptivity, asthenamesuggests, constitutesthemind’scapacitytobeaffectedbysomething, whetheritselforsomethingelse. Kant’sbasicideahereisthatthemind’sreceptivepoweressentiallyrequiressomeexternalpromptinginordertoengageintheproductionofrepresentations. Incontrast, thepowerofspontaneityneedsnosuchprompting.Itisabletoinitiateitsactivityfromitself, withoutanyexternaltrigger.

Thesetwocapacitiesofthemindarethebasisforall(human)mentalbehavior. Kantthusconstruesallmentalactivityeitherintermsofitsresultingfromaffection(receptivity)orfromthemind’s self-promptedactivity (spontaneity). From these twovery general aspects of themindKantthenderivesthreefurtherbasicfacultiesor“powers”[Vermögen], termedbyKant“sensibility”[Sinnlichkeit], “understanding”[Verstand], and“reason”[Vernunft]. Thesefacultiescharacterizespecificcognitivepowers, noneofwhichisreducibletoanyoftheothers, andtoeachofwhichisassignedaparticularcognitivetask. We’lldiscusstheseinturn.

i. Sensibility, Understanding, andReason

Kantdistinguishesthethreefundamentalmentalfacultiesfromoneanotherintwoways. First,heconstruessensibilityasthespecificmannerinwhichhumanbeings, aswellasotheranimals,are receptive. This is incontrastwith the facultiesofunderstandingand reason, whichareformsofhuman(orofallrationalbeings, shouldthatclassextendmorewidely)spontaneity.Second, Kantdistinguishes the facultiesby theiroutput. Allof themental facultiesproduce“representations”[Vorstellungen], whicharebestthoughtofasdiscretementaleventsorstates,ofwhichthemindisaware, or invirtueofwhichthemindisawareofsomethingelse(it issomewhatcontroversialwhetherrepresentationsaretheultimateobjectsofawarenessormerelythevehiclesofsuchawareness). Wecanseethesedistinctionsatworkinwhatisgenerallycalled

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the“stepladder”[Stufenleiter]passagefromtheTranscendentalDialecticofKant’smajorwork,the CritiqueofPureReason (1781/7). ThisisoneofthefewplacesintheentireKantiancorpuswhereKantexplicitlydiscussesthemeaningsofandrelationsbetweenhistechnicalterms, anddefinesandclassifiesvarietiesofrepresentation.

Thegenusisrepresentation(representatio)ingeneral. Underitstandrepresenta-tionswithconsciousness(perceptio). A perception[Wahrnehmung], thatrelatessolelytoasubjectasamodificationofitsstate, issensation(sensatio). Anobjec-tiveperceptioniscognition(cognitio). Thisiseitherintuitionorconcept(intuitusvelconceptus). Thefirstrelatesimmediatelytotheobjectandissingular; thesec-ondismediate, conveyedbyamark, whichcanbecommontomanythings. Aconceptiseitheranempiricalorapureconcept, andthepureconcept, insofarasithasitsoriginsolelyintheunderstanding(notinapureimageofsensibility), iscalled notio. A conceptmadeupofnotions, whichgoesbeyondthepossibilityofexperience, isanideaoraconceptofreason. (A320/B376–7).

AsKant’sdiscussionhereindicates, thecategoryofrepresentationcontainssensations[Empfind-ungen], intuitions[Anschauungen], andconcepts[Begriffe]. Sensibilityisthefacultythatpro-vides sensory representations. Sensibility generates representationsbasedonbeingaffectedeitherbyentitiesdistinctfromthesubjectorbythesubjectherself. Thisisincontrasttothefac-ultyofunderstanding, whichgeneratesconceptualrepresentationsspontaneously–i.e. withoutadvertencetoaffection. Reasonisthatspontaneousfacultybywhichspecialsortsofconcepts,whichKantcalls“ideas”or“notions”, maybegenerated, andwhoseobjectscouldneverbemetwithinexperience. SuchideasincludethoseconcerningGodandthesoul.

Kantclaimsthatalltherepresentationsgeneratedviasensibilityarestructuredbytwo“forms”ofintuition—spaceandtime—andthatallsensoryaspectsofourexperiencearetheir“matter”(A20/B34). ThesimplestwayofunderstandingwhatKantmeansby“form”hereisthatanythingofwhichonemighthaveexperiencewillbesuchastoeitherhavespatialfeatures(e.g. extension,shape, location), ortemporalfeatures(e.g. beingsuccessiveorsimultaneous). Sotheformalelementofanempiricalintuition, orsenseperception, willalwaysbeeitherspatialortemporal,whilethematerialelementisalwayssensory(inthesenseofdeterminingthephenomenalor“whatitislike”characterofexperience), andtiedeithertooneormoreofthefivesenses, orthefeelingsofpleasureanddispleasure.

Kanttiesthetwoformsofintuitiontotwodistinctspheresordomains, the“inner”andthe“outer”. Thedomainofouter intuitionconcerns the spatialworldofmaterialobjectswhilethedomainofinnerintuitionconcernstemporallyorderedstatesofmind. Spaceisthustheformof“outersense”whiletimeistheformof“innersense”(A22/B37; cf. An7:154). IntheTranscendentalAesthetic, Kantisprimarilyconcernedwith“pure”[rein]intuition, orintuitionabsentanysensation, andoftenonlyspeaksinpassingofthesenseperceptionofphysicalbodies(e.g. A20–1/B35). However, Kantmoreclearlylinksthefivesenseswithintuitioninhis1798work AnthropologyfromaPragmaticPointofView, inthesectionentitled“OntheFiveSenses”.

Sensibility inthecognitivefaculty(thefacultyofintuitiverepresentations)containstwoparts: sense andthe imagination…Butthesenses, ontheotherhand, aredi-videdinto outer and inner sense(sensusinternus); thefirstiswherethehumanbodyisaffectedbyphysicalthings, thesecondiswherethehumanbodyisaffectedbythemind(An7:153).

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Kantcharacterizesintuitiongenerallyintermsoftwocharacteristics—viz. immediacy [Unmit-telbarkeit]and particularity [Einzelheit](cf. A19/B33, A68/B93; JL 9:91). Thisisincontrasttothemediacyandgenerality[Allgemeinheit]characteristicofconceptualrepresentation(A68/B93;JL 9:91).

Kantcontraststheparticularityofintuitionwiththegeneralityofconceptsinthe“stepladder”passage(seethefirstquoteabove). Butthespecificremarkhemakesisthataconceptisrelatedtoitsobjectvia“amark, whichcanbecommontomanythings”(A320/B377)andthissuggeststhatintuition, incontrasttoconcepts, putsasubjectincognitivecontactwithfeaturesofanobjectthatareuniquetoparticularobjectsandarenothadbyotherobjects(thereissomedebateastowhether the immediacyof intuitioniscompatiblewithanintuition’srelatingtoanobjectbymeansofmarksorwhetherrelationbymeansofmarksentailsmediacy, andthusthatonlyconceptsrelatetoobjectsbymeansofmarks. SeeSmit(2000)fordiscussion.) Spatio-temporalpropertiesseemlikeexcellentcandidatesforsuchfeatures, asnotwoobjectsofexperiencecanhavetheverysamespatio-temporallocation(B327-8). Butperhapsanynon-repeatable, non-universalfeatureofaperceivedobjectwilldo(forrelevantdiscussionseeSmit(2000); Grüne(2009), 50, 66-70).

ThoughKant’sdiscussionof intuition suggests that it is a formofperceptual experience,thismightseemtoclashwithhisdistinctionbetween“experience”[Erfahrung]and“intuition”[Anschauung]. Inpart, thisisaterminologicalissue. Kant’snotionofan“experience”istypicallyquiteabitnarrowerthanourcontemporaryEnglishusageoftheterm. Kantactuallyequates, atseveralpoints, “experience”with“empiricalcognition”(B166, A176/B218, A189/B234), whichis incompatiblewithexperiencebeing falsidical inanyway. Healsogives indications thatexperience, inhissense, isnotsomethinghadbyasinglesubject. See, forexample, hisclaimthatthereisonlyoneexperience(A230/B282-3).

Kantalsodistinguishesintuitionfrom“perception”[Wahrnehmung], whichhecharacterizesastheconsciousapprehensionofthecontentofanintuition(Pr4:300; cf. A99, A119-20, B162,andB202-3). “Experience”, inKant’ssense, isthenconstruedasasetofperceptionsthatareconnectedviafundamentalconceptsthatKantentitlesthe“categories”. Asheputsit, “Experi-enceiscognitionthroughconnectedperceptions[durchverknüpfteWahrnehmungen]”(B161;cf. B218; Pr4:300).

Empiricalintuition, perception, andexperience, inKant’susageoftheseterms, alldenotekindsof“experience”asweusethetermincontemporaryEnglish. Atitsmostprimitivelevel,empiricalintuitionpresents, inasensorymanner, somefeatureoftheworldtothemind, andinsuchawaythatthesubjectoftheintuitionistherebyinapositiontodistinguishthatfeaturefromothers. A perception, inKant’ssense, involvestheawarenessofthebasisorgroundbywhichthefeatureoftheworldthatoneisawareofinanintuitionissuchastobedifferentfromotherthings(Kanttendstousethisterminavarietyofways, however—e.g. JL 9:64-5—sothereissomecontroversysurroundingtheproperunderstandingofthisterm). Soonehasaperception,inKant’ssense, whenoneisinapositiontonotonlydiscriminateonethingfromanother(orbetweenthepartsofasinglething)basedonasensoryapprehensionofit, butalsocanarticulateexactlywhatfeaturesofone’ssensoryapprehensionoftheobjectorobjectsthatdistinguishitfromothers(e.g. thatitisgreenratherthanred, orthatitoccupiesthisspatiallocationratherthanthatone). Intuitionthusallowsforthediscriminationofdistinctobjects, viaanawarenessoftheirfeatures, whileperceptionallowsforanawarenessofwhatitisspecificallyaboutthefeaturesofanobject thatdistinguishesit fromothers. “Experience”, inKant’ssense, iseven

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furtherupthecognitiveladder(cf. JL 9:64-5), insofarasitindicatesanawarenessoffeaturessuchasthesubstantialityofathing, itcausalrelationswithotherbeings, anditsmereologicalfeatures(i.e. part-wholedependencerelations).

Kantthusbelievesthatthecapacitytocognitivelyascendfrommerediscriminatoryaware-nessofone’senvironment(intuition), toanawarenessofthosefeaturesbymeansofwhichonediscriminates(perception), andfinallytoanawarenessoftheobjectswhichgroundthesefea-tures(experience), dependsonthekindsofmentalprocessesofwhichthesubjectiscapable.

Beforeweturntotheissueofmentalprocessing, whichfigurescentrallyinKant’soverallcriticalproject, therearetwofurtherfacultiesofthemindthatareworthdiscussion—viz. thefacultyofjudgmentandthefacultyofimagination. Thesefacultiesarenotobviouslyasfun-damentalasthefacultiesofsensibility, understanding, andreason, buttheyneverthelessplayacentral role inKant’s thinkingabout thestructureof themindand itscontributions toourexperienceoftheworld.

ii. ImaginationandJudgment

Kantlinksthefacultyofimaginationcloselytosensibility. Forexample, inhis Anthropology hesays,

Sensibility inthecognitivefaculty(thefacultyofintuitiverepresentations)containstwoparts: sense andthe powerofimagination. -Thefirstisthefacultyofintuitioninthepresenceofanobject, thesecondisintuitioneven without thepresenceofanobject. (An7:153; cf. 7:167; B151; LM 29:881; LM 28:449, 673)

ThecontrastKantmakeshereisnotentirelyobvious, butmustincludeatleastthedifferencebetweencasesofoccurrentsensoryexperienceofaperceivedobject—e.g. seeing thebrowntablebeforeyou—andcasesofsensoryrecollectionofapreviouslyperceivedobject—e.g. vi-suallyimagining thebrowntablethatwasonceinfrontofyou. Kantmakesthisclearerintheprocessoffurtherdistinguishingbetweendifferentkindsofimagination.

Thepowerofimagination(facultasimaginandi), asafacultyofintuitionwithoutthepresenceof theobject, iseitherproductive, that is, a facultyof theoriginalpresentation[Darstellung]oftheobject(exhibitio originaria), whichthusprecedesexperience; orreproductive, afacultyofthederivativepresentationoftheobject(exhibitioderivativa), whichbringsbacktomindanempiricalintuitionthatithadpreviously(An7:167).

So, intheoperationofproductiveimagination, onebringstomindasensoryexperiencethatisnotitselfbasedonanyobjectpreviouslysoexperienced. Thisisnottosaytheproductiveimaginationistotally creative. Kantexplicitlydenies(An7:167)thattheproductiveimaginationhasthepowertogeneratewhollynovelsensoryexperience(e.g. itcouldnot, inapersonbornblind, producethephenomenalqualityassociatedwiththeexperienceofseeingaredobject).If theproductive imagination is instrumental inproducingsensoryfictions, the reproductiveimaginationisinstrumentalinproducingsensoryexperiencesofpreviouslyperceivedobjects.

Theimaginationthusplaysacentralroleinempiricalcognitionbyservingasthebasisforbothmemoryand thecreativearts (for furtherdiscussionseeMatherne). Inaddition italso

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playsakindofmediating rolebetween the facultiesof sensibilityandunderstanding. Kantcallsthismediatingrolea“transcendentalfunction”oftheimagination(A124). Itaccomplishesthisbybeingtiedinitsfunctioningtobothfaculties. Ontheonehand, itproducessensiblerepresentations, andisthusconnectedtosensibility. Ontheotherhand, itisnotapurelypassivefacultybutratherengagesintheactivityofbringingtogethervariousrepresentations(memoryisacentralexamplehere)andthiskindofactivementalprocessingKantexplicitlyconnectswiththeunderstanding.

Kantalsogoessofarastoclaimthattheactivityoftheimaginationisanecessarypartofwhatmakesperception(inhistechnicalsenseofastringofconnectedandconscioussensoryexperiences)possible(A120, note). ThoughKant’sviewconcerningtheexactroleofimagina-tioninsensoryexperienceiscontested, twopointsemergeascentral. First, Kantregardstheimaginationasplayingacrucialroleinthegenerationofcomplexsensoryrepresentationsofanobject(seeSellars(1978)forainfluentialexampleofthisinterpretation). Itistheimaginationthatmakesitpossibleto, e.g. haveasensoryexperience(inone’s“mind’seye”asitwere)ofacomplex, three-dimensional, geometricfigurewhoseidentityremainsconstantasitissubjecttotranslationsandrotationsinspace. Second, Kantregardstheimagination’smediatingrolebetweensensibilityandunderstandingascrucialforatleastsomekindsofconceptapplication(seeGuyer(1987)andPendlebury(1995)forfurtherdiscussion). ThismediatingroleinvolveswhatKantcalls the“schematization”ofaconceptandanadditionalmental faculty, thatofjudgment, towhichwe’llnowturn.

Kantdefinesthefacultyofjudgmentas“thecapacitytosubsumeunderrules, thatis, todis-tinguishwhethersomethingfallsunderagivenrule”(A132/B171). However, hespendscom-parativelylittletimediscussingthisfacultyinthefirst Critique. There, itseemstobediscussedasanextensionoftheactivityoftheunderstandinginapplyingconceptstoempiricalobjects(orourintuitiverepresentationsthereof). Itisnotuntilthethird Critique—Kant’s1790 CritiqueofJudgment—thatKantdistinguishesitasanindependentfacultywithaspecialrole. ThereKantspecifiestwodifferentwaysthefacultymightfunction(CJ 5:179; cf. CJ (FirstIntroduction)20:211)

Accordingtothefirst, judgmentsubsumesgivenobjectsunderconcepts, whicharethem-selvesalreadygiven. Thisroleappearsidenticaltotheroleheassignstothefacultyofjudgmentinthe CritiqueofPureReason. Thebasicideaisthatjudgmentfunctionstoassigntosomeintu-itedobject—e.g. aparticulardog—thecorrectconcept(e.g. <dog>). Thisconceptispresumedtobeone already possessedbythesubject. InthisactivitythefacultyoverlapswiththeroleKantsinglesoutfortheimaginationinthesectionofthefirst Critique entitled“OntheSchematismofthePureConceptsoftheUnderstanding”. Bothareconceivedofhereintermsoftheultimatefunctioningoftheunderstanding, sinceitistheunderstandingthatgeneratesconcepts.

Thesecondroleforthefacultyofjudgment, andwhatseemstomakeitadistinctivefacultyinitsownright, isthatof finding aconceptunderwhichto“subsume”someexperiencedobject.This iscalled judgment’s “reflecting” role (CJ 5:179). Here the subject ismeant toexercisethefacultyofjudgmentin generating anappropriateconceptforwhatisgiveninintuition(CJ(FirstIntroduction)20:211-13; JL 9:94–95; fordiscussionseeLonguenesse(1998), 163–166and195–197; Ginsborg(2006)).

Inadditiontothegenerationof(empirical)concepts, Kantalsodescribesreflectivejudgmentas responsible for scientific inquiry, in that itmust sortandclassifyobjects innature intoahierarchicaltaxonomyofgenus/speciesrelationships. Kantalsoutilizesthenotionofreflective

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judgmenttounifytheotherwiseseeminglyunrelatedtopicsofthe CritiqueofJudgment—viz.aestheticjudgmentsandteleologicaljudgmentsconcerningtheorderofnature.

Thusfar, thediscussionofKant’sviewofthemindhasfocusedprimarilyonthevariousmen-talfacultiesandtheircorrespondingrepresentationaloutput. Boththefacultyofimaginationandthatofjudgmentoperateonrepresentationsgivenfromsensibilityandtheunderstanding.Ingeneral, Kantconceivesoftheactivityofthemindintermsofkindsof“processing”ofrepre-sentations. Inthenextsub-sectionwe’llexaminethisnotionofmentalprocessingmoreclosely.

b. MentalProcessing

Kant’stermformentalprocessingis“combination”[Verbindung], andtheformofcombinationwithwhichheisprimarilyconcernediswhathecalls“synthesis”. Kantcharacterizessynthesisasthatactivitybywhichtheunderstanding“runsthrough”and“gatherstogether”representationsgiventoitbysensibilityinordertoformconcepts, judgments, andultimately, foranycognitiontotakeplaceatall(A77-8/B102-3). Synthesisisnotsomethingwearetypicallyawareofdoing.AsKantsays, itisa“ablindthoughindispensablefunctionofthesoul…ofwhichweareonlyseldomevenconscious(A78/B103)”.

Synthesisiscarriedoutbytheunitarysubjectofrepresentationonrepresentationsthatareeithergiven to it in sensibility (i.e. intuition)orproducedby it in thought (e.g. inanactofstipulativeconceptualdefinition). Whensynthesis iscarriedouton representations formingthecontentofaconceptorjudgment, itiscalled“intellectual”synthesis; whencarriedoutbytheimaginationonmaterialprovidedbysensibility(i.e. onintuitionandsensation), itiscalled“figurative”synthesis(B150-1). Inthe CritiqueofPureReason Kantisprimarilyconcernedwithsynthesisperformedonrepresentationsprovidedbysensibility, anddiscussesthreecentralkindsofsynthesis–viz. apprehension, reproduction(orimagination), andrecognition(orconceptu-alization)(A98-110/B159-61). ThoughKantdiscussestheseformsofsynthesisasiftheywerediscretetypesofmentalacts, itseemsthatatleastthefirsttwoformsmustalwaysoccurtogether,whilethethirdmayormaynotalwaysoccuraswell(cf. Brook(1997); Allais(2009)).

Oneof thecentral topicsofdebate in theinterpretationofKant’sviewsonsynthesishasbeenwhetherKant endorses a position concerning thenatureof sensory experience called“conceptualism.” Roughly, conceptualismaboutexperienceistheclaimthatthecapacityforconscioussensoryexperienceoftheobjectiveworlddepends, atleastinpart, ontherepertoireofconceptspossessedbytheexperiencingsubject, insofarasthoseconceptsareexercisedinactsofsynthesisbytheunderstanding. I discussthisfurtherbelow, insection3.

Kanttypicallycontrastssynthesiswithotherwaysinwhichrepresentationsmightberelated,mostimportantly, byassociation(e.g. B139-40). Associationisprimarilya passive processbywhichthemindcomestoconnectrepresentationsduetotherepeatedexposureofthesubjecttocertainkindsofregularities. Onemightcome, forexampletoassociatethoughtsofchickensoupwiththoughtsofbeingill, becauseoneonlyeverhadchickensoupwhenonewasill. Incontrast, synthesisisafundamentally active process, dependentuponthemind’sspontaneity,andisthemeansbywhichgenuinejudgmentispossible.

Consider, forexample, thedifferencebetween themerelyassociative transitionbetweenholdingastoneandthefeelingofitsweight, ascomparedtothejudgmentthatthestoneisheavy(B142). Theassociationoftheholdingofthestonewithafeelingofweightisnotyetajudgmentaboutthestone, butmerelyakindofinvoluntaryconnectionbetweentwostatesofoneself. In

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contrast, inthinkingofthestone, thatitisheavy, onemovesbeyondmerelyassociatingtwofeelingstoathoughtabouthowthingsareobjectively, i.e. independentlyofone’sownmentalstates(Pereboom(1995), Pereboom(2006)). OneofKant’smostimportantpointsconcerningmentalprocessingisthatassociationcannotexplainthepossibilityofobjectivejudgment, andthatwhatisrequiredisatheoryofmentalprocessingbyanactive(or“spontaneous”)subjectcapableofactsofsynthesis.

Wecansummarizeseveraloftheimportantdifferencesbetweensynthesisandassociationasfollows(Pereboom(1995), 4-7):

1. Thesourceofsynthesis is tobefoundinasubjectandthissubject isdistinct fromitsstates.

2. Synthesiscanemployaprioriconceptsasmodesofprocessingrepresentations, whereasassociationneverdoes.

3. Synthesisistheproductofacausallyactivesubject-itisproducedbyacausethatisrealizedinafacultyofthesubject(eithertheimaginationortheunderstanding).

Kant’sconceptionofsynthesisandjudgmentistiedupwithhisconceptionof“consciousness”[Bewußtsein]and“self-consciousness”[Selbstbewußtsein]. However, thesetwonotionsrequiresomesignificantunpacking, sowe’lllookattheminthenextsection.

2. Consciousness

Thenotionofconsciousness[Bewußtsein]playsanimportantroleinKant’sphilosophy. Thereare, however, severaldifferentsensesof“consciousness”inplayinKant’swork, notallofwhichlineupwith contemporaryphilosophicalusage. BelowI detailseveralofKant’smostcentralnotionsandtheirdifferencesfromandrelationstocontemporaryusage.

a. PhenomenalConsciousness

Contemporaryphilosophicaldiscussionsofconsciousnesstypicallyfocusonphenomenalcon-sciousness, or“whatitislike”tohaveaconsciousexperienceofaparticularkind(e.gseeingthecolorred, smellingarose, etc.). Such qualitativefeaturesofconsciousness havebeenofmajorconcerntophilosophersinthelastseveraldecades. However, themetaphysicalissueofphe-nomenalconsciousnessisalmostentirelyignoredbyKant, perhapsbecauseheisunconcernedwithproblemsstemmingfromcommitmentstonaturalismorphysicalism. Heseemstoattributeallqualitativecharacteristicsofconsciousnesstosensationandwhathecalls“feeling”[Gefühl](CJ 5:206). Kantdistinguishesbetweensensationandfeelingintermsofanobjective/subjectivedistinction. Sensationsindicateorpresentfeaturesofobjects, distinctfromthesubjectofexpe-rience. Feelings, incontrast, presentonlystatesofthesubjecttoconsciousness. Kant’stypicalexamplesofsuchfeelingsincludepainandpleasure(B66-7; CJ 5:189, 203-6).

Thus, whileKantclearlyassignsacognitiveroletosensation, andallowsthatitis“throughsensation”thatwecognitivelyrelatetoobjectsgiveninsensibility(A20/B34), hedoesnotfocusinanysubstantiveorsystematicwayonthephenomenalaspectsofsensoryconsciousness, orhowitisexactlythattheyaidincognitionoftheempiricalworld.

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b. Discrimination&Differentiation

Thecentralnotionof“consciousness”withwhichKantisconcernedisthatofdiscriminationordifferentiation. ThisistheconceptionofconsciousnessthatwasmostlyinuseinKant’stime,particularlybyhismajorpredecessors GottfriedWilhelmLeibniz (1646–1716)andChristianWolff(1679-1754), andhegiveslittleindicationthathedepartsfromtheirgeneralpractice.

AccordingtoKant, anythingwhichasubjectcandiscriminatefromotherthingsisathingofwhichasubjectisorcanbeconscious(An7:136-8). Representationswhichallowfordis-criminationanddifferentiationare“clear”[klar]. Representationswhichallownotonlyforthedifferentiationofonethingfromothers(e.g. differentiatingoneperson’sfacefromanother’s),butalsothedifferentiationofpartsofthethingsodiscriminated(e.g. differentiatingthedifferentpartsofaperson’sface)arecalled“distinct”[deutlich].

Kantdoesseemtodeny, asagainsttheLeibniz-Wolfftradition, thatclaritycansimplybeequated withconsciousness(B414-15, note). Hisprimarymotivationforthispositionseemstobethatheallowsthatone’sdiscriminatorycapacitiesmayoutrunone’scapacityformemoryoreventheexplicitarticulationofwhatissodiscriminated. Insuchcasesonedoesnothaveafullyclearrepresentation.

Kant’sconceptionof“obscure”[dunkel]representationasthatwhichallowsthesubjectofthe representation todiscriminatedifferentiallybetweenaspectsofherenvironmentwithoutanyexplicitawarenessofthebasisbywhichsheisdoingso, connectshimwiththeLeibniz-Wolfftraditionofrecognizingtheexistenceof unconscious representations(An7:135-7). Kantconceivesofthemajorityofrepresentationsthatweappealtoinordertoexplainthecomplexdiscriminatorybehaviorsoflivingorganismsasbeing“obscure”inhistechnicalsense. LikeningthemindtoamapKantgoessofarastosaythat

Thefieldof sensuous intuitionsand sensationsofwhichwearenot conscious,eventhoughwecanundoubtedlyconcludethatwehavethem; thatis, obscurerepresentationsinthehumanbeing(andthusalsoinanimals), isimmense. Clearrepresentations, ontheotherhand, containonlyinfinitelyfewpointsofthisfieldwhichlieopentoconsciousness; sothatasitwereonlyafewplacesonthevastmapofourmindare illuminated. (An7:135)

Thus, obscurerepresentations, i.e. representationsofwhichwehavenodirectornon-inferentialawareness, butwhichmustbeposited toexplainour (and thoseofother livingbeings)finegraineddifferentialdiscriminatorycapacities, constitutethemajorityofthementalrepresenta-tionswithwhichthemindbusiesitself.

ThoughKantdoesnotmakethispointexplicitinhisdiscussionofdiscriminationandcon-sciousness, itisclearthathetakesourcapacitytodiscriminatebetweenobjectsandpartsofobjectstobeultimatelybasedonoursensoryrepresentationofthoseobjects. Thismeansthathisviewsonconsciousnessasdifferentialdiscriminationintersectwithhisviewsonphenom-enalconsciousnessinthefollowingmanner. Sincewearereceptivebeings, andtheformofourreceptivityissensibility, theultimatebasisonwhichwedifferentiallydiscriminatebetweenobjectsmustbesensory, andhenceonwhatitisliketoperceivethoseobjects. Thus, thoughKantseemstotakeforgrantedthefactthatconsciousbeingsareinstateswithaparticularphe-nomenalcharacter, itmustbetheclarityanddistinctnessofthisphenomenalcharacterwhichallowsaconscioussubjecttodifferentiallydiscriminatebetweenthevariouselementsofherenvironment(seeKant’sdiscussionofaestheticperfectioninthe1801 JäscheLogic, 9:33-9forrelevantdiscussion).

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c. Self-Consciousness

Asthediscussionofunconsciousrepresentationindicates, Kantbelievesthatmostofourrepre-sentationsareonesofwhichwearenotdirectlyaware. Theyareneverthelesstosomedegreeconscious, sincetheyallowdifferentialdiscriminationofelementsofthesubject’senvironment.Kantseemstothinkthattheprocessofmakingarepresentationclear, orfullyconscious, requiresahigher-orderrepresentationoftherelevantrepresentation. AsKantsays, “consciousnessisre-allytherepresentationthatanotherrepresentationisinme”(JL 9:33). Sincethishigher-orderrepresentationisoneofanotherrepresentation inme, Kant’spositionheresuggeststhatcon-sciousnessrequiresatleastthecapacityforself-consciousness. ThispositionisreinforcedbyKant’sfamousclaimintheTranscendentalDeductionofthe CritiqueofPureReason that

The I thinkmust beable toaccompanyallmyrepresentations; forotherwisesome-thingwouldberepresented inmethatcouldnotbe thoughtatall, which isasmuchastosaythattherepresentationwouldeitherbeimpossibleorelseatleastwouldbenothingforme. (B131-2; emphasisintheoriginal)

Kantmightgivetheimpressionhereofsayingthatforrepresentationtobepossibleforasubject,thatsubjectmustpossessthecapacityforself-ascribingherrepresentations. IfKantreallydidendorsethisself-ascriptioncondition, thenrepresentation, andthusthecapacityforconsciousrepresentation, ineitherofthephenomenalordiscriminatorysensesoutlinedabove, wouldde-pendonthecapacityforself-consciousness. SinceKanttiesthecapacityforself-consciousnesstospontaneity(B132, 137, 423), andrestrictsspontaneitytotheclassofrationalbeings, thedemandforself-ascriptionwouldseemtodenythatanynon-rationalanimal(e.g. dogs, cats,birds, etc.), atleastaccordingtoKant’sconceptionofsuchanimalsaslackingunderstandingandreason, couldhavephenomenalordiscriminatoryconsciousness!

However, thereislittleevidencetoshowthatKantendorsestheself-ascriptioncondition.Instead, hedistinguishesbetweentwodistinctmodesinwhichoneisawareofoneselfandone’srepresentations, via“inner sense”andvia“apperception” (SeeAmeriks (2000) forextensivediscussion). Onlythelatterformofawarenessseemstodemandacapacityforself-ascription.We’lltakethesetwonotionsinturn.

i. InnerSense

Innersenseis, accordingtoKant, themeansbywhichweareawareofalterationsinourownstate. Henceallsensations, includingsuchbasicalterationsaspleasureandpain, aswellasmoodsandfeelings, areallthepropersubjectmatterofinnersense. Ultimately, Kantarguesthatnotonlyallsensationsandfeelings, butallrepresentationsattributabletoasubjectwhatsoevermustultimatelyoccurininnersenseandconformtoitsform, time(A22-3/B37; A34/B51).

Thus, tobeawareofsomethingininnersenseisminimally, atleastinthecaseoftheaware-nessofsensationsandfeelings, tobephenomenallyconscious. Tosaythatasubjectisawareofherownstatesviainnersenseistosaythatshehas(atleast)atemporallyorderedseriesofmentalstates, eachofwhichsheisphenomenallyconscious, thoughshemaynotbeconsciousoftheseriesasawhole. Thiscouldstillcountasakindofself-awareness, aswhenananimalsisawareofbeinginpain. Butitisnotanawarenessofsubjectasa self. KanthimselfindicatessuchapositioninalettertohisfriendandformerstudentMarcusHerzin1789.

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[representations]couldstill(I considermyselfasananimal)carryontheirplayinanorderlyfashion, asconnectedaccordingtoempiricallawsofassociation, andthustheycouldevenhaveinfluenceonmyfeelinganddesire, withoutmybeingawareofmyownexistence[meinesDaseinsunbewußt](assumingthatI amevenconsciousofeachindividualrepresentation, butnotoftheirrelationtotheunityofrepresentationoftheirobject, bymeansofthesyntheticunityoftheirapperception).Thismightbesowithoutmycognizingtheslightestthingthereby, notevenwhatmyownconditionis(C 11:52, May26, 1789).

Hence, accordingtoKant, onemaybeawareofone’srepresentationsviainnersense, butoneisnotandcannotviainnersensealoneawareofoneselfasthe subject ofthoserepresentations.ThatrequireswhatKant, followingLeibniz(1996)calls“apperception”.

ii. Apperception

Kantusestheterm“apperception”todenotethecapacityfortheawarenessofsomestateormodificationofone’sselfasjustsuchastate. Forabeingcapableofapperception, thereisadifferencebetweenfeelingapain, andthusbeingawareofitininnersense, andapperceivingthatoneisinpain, andthusascribing, orbeinginapositiontoascribe, acertainpropertyorstateofmindtoone’sself. Intheexampleabove, ofanon-apperceptiveanimalasbeingawareofitsownpain, whilethereissomething(inthiscaseratherunpleasant)itisliketobetheanimal,andtheanimalisitselfawareofthis–thepain, anditsawarenessispartiallyexplanatoryofitsbehavior(e.g. avoidance), Kantconstruestheanimalasincapableofmakinganyself-attributionofitspain. Kantseemstothinkofsuchamindasincapableofconstruingitselfasasubjectofstates, andthusasunabletoconstrueitselfaspersistingthroughchangesofthosestates. Thisisnotnecessarilytosaythatananimalincapableofapperceptionlacksanysubjectorself. But,attheveryleast, suchananimalwouldbeincapableofconceivingorrepresentingitselfinthisway(SeeNaragon(1990); McLear(2011)).

Kantconsidersthecapacityforapperceptionasimportantlytiedtothecapacitytorepresentobjectsascomplexesofpropertiesattributabletoasingleunderlyingentity(e.g. anappleasasubjectofthecomplexoftheproperties red and round). Kant’sargumentforthisconnectionisnotoriousbothforitscomplexityandforitsobscurity. Inthenextsub-sectionI giveanoverview,thoughnotanexhaustivediscussion, ofsomeofKant’smostimportantpointsconcerningthesematters, astheyrelatetotheissueofapperception.

d. UnityofConsciousness&theCategories

InorderthatwemaybetterunderstandKant’sviewsonapperceptionandunityofconsciousness,weneedtostepbackandlookatthewidercontextoftheargumentinwhichhesituatestheseviews. OneofthecoreprojectsofKant’smostfamouswork, the CritiqueofPureReason, istoprovideanargumentforthelegitimacyofaprioriknowledgeofthenaturalworld. ThoughKant’sconceptionof theapriori iscomplex, onecentralaspectofhisview, sharedwithhisGermanrationalistpredecessors(e.g. Leibniz(1996), preface), isthatwehaveknowledgeofuniversalandnecessarytruthsconcerningaspectsoftheempiricalworld(B4-5), including, e.g.,thateveryeventintheempiricalworldhasacause(B231). Thistraditiontendedtoexplainthe

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possessionofknowledgeofsuchuniversalandnecessarytruthsbyappealtoinnateconceptswhosecontentcouldbeanalyzedtoyieldtherelevantknowledge. Kantimportantlydepartsfromtherationalisttraditionbyarguingthatnotallknowledgeofuniversalandnecessarytruthsisacquiredviatheanalysisofconcepts(B14-18). Therearesome“synthetic”aprioritruthsthatareknownonthebasisofsomethingotherthanconceptualanalysis. Thus, accordingtoKant,theactivityofpurereasonachievesrelativelylittleonitsown. AllofourampliativeknowledgethatisalsonecessaryanduniversalconsistsinwhatKantcalls“syntheticapriori”judgmentsorpropositions. Thecentralquestionhethenpursuesconcernshowknowledgeofsuchsyntheticaprioripropositionsispossible.

Kant’sbasicanswertothequestionofsyntheticaprioriknowledgeinvolveswhathecallsthe“CopernicanTurn”, accordingtowhichtheobjectsofhumanknowledgemust“conform”tothebasicfacultiesofhumanknowledge–viz. theformsofintuition(spaceandtime)andtheformsofthought(thecategories).

Kantthusengagesinatwo-partstrategyforexplainingthepossibilityofsuchsyntheticaprioriknowledge. Thefirstpartconsistsinarguingthatthepureformsofintuitionprovidethebasisforoursyntheticaprioriknowledgeofmathematicaltruths. Mathematicalknowledgeissyntheticbecauseitgoesbeyondmereconceptualanalysistodealwiththestructureof(ourrepresentationof)spaceitself. Itisaprioribecausethestructureof(ourrepresentationof)spaceisaprioriaccessibletous, beingmerelytheformofourintuitionandnotarealmind-independentthing(a“thinginitself”asKantwouldcallit).

However, inadditiontotherepresentationofspaceandtime, Kantalsothinksthatpossessionofaparticularprivilegedsetofaprioriconceptsisnecessaryforknowledgeoftheempiricalworld. Butthisraisesaproblem. Howcouldanaprioriconcept, whichisnotitselfderivedfromanyparticularexperience, beneverthelesslegitimatelyapplicabletoobjectsofexperience?Tomakethingsevenmoredifficult, itisnotthemerepossibilityoftheapplicationofaprioriconceptstoobjectsofexperiencethatworriesKant, forthiscouldjustbeamatterofpureluck.Kantwantsevenmorethanmerepossibility, forhewantstoshowthatwithregardtoaprivilegedsetofaprioriconcepts, theyapplynecessarilyanduniversallytoallobjectsofexperienceanddosoinawaythatweareinapositiontoknowindependentlyofexperience.

ThisbringsustothesecondpartofKant’sargument, whichisdirectlyrelevantforunder-standingKant’sviewsontheimportanceofapperception. Notonlymustobjectsofknowledgeconformtotheformsofintuition, theyalsomustconformtothemostbasicconcepts(or“cate-gories”)governingourcapacityforthought. Kant’sstrategyisthustoshowhowaprioriconceptslegitimatelyapplytotheirobjectsinvirtueofbeingpartlyconstitutiveoftheobjectsofrepresen-tation, ratherthanthetraditionalviewaccordingtowhichtheobjectsofrepresentationwerethesourceorexplanatorygroundofourconcepts(Bxvii-xix). Now, exactlywhatthismeansisdeeplycontested, inpartbecause it is ratherunclearwhatKant intendsus tounderstandbyhisdoctrineofTranscendentalIdealism. Forexample, doesKantintendthattheobjectsofrepresentationare themselves nothingotherthanrepresentations? Thiswouldbeaformofphe-nomenalismsimilar to thatofferedby Berkeley. Kant, however, seems towant todeny thathisviewissimilartoBerkeley’s, assertinginsteadthattheobjectsofrepresentationreallyexistindependentlyofthemind, andthatitisonlythe way thattheyarerepresentedthatismind-dependent(A92/B125; cf. Pr4:288-94).

WhatmakesKant’s“CopernicanTurn”relevantforourdiscussionisthathisstrategyforvali-datingthelegitimacyoftheaprioricategoriesproceedsbywayofa“transcendentalargument”

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tyingtogethertheconditionsnecessaryforconsciousnessoftheidentityofoneselfasthesub-jectofdifferentself-attributedmentalstateswiththosenecessaryforgroundingthepossibilityofrepresentinganobjectdistinctfromoneself, ofwhichvariouspropertiesmaybepredicated.Inthissense, Kantarguesthattheintellectualrepresentationofsubjectandobjectstandandfalltogether. Kantthusdeniesthepossibilityofaself-conscioussubject, whocouldconceptu-alizeandself-ascribeherrepresentations, butwhoserepresentationscouldnotrepresentlaw-governedobjectsinspace, andthusthematerialworldor“nature”asthesubjectconceivesofit.

ThoughKant’sviewsregardingtheunityofthesubjectarecontested, thereareseveralpointswhichcanbemadefairlyclearly. First, Kantconceivesofallspecificallyintellectualactivity,includingthemostbasicinstancesofdiscursivethought, asrequiringwhathecallsthe“originalunityofapperception”(B132). Thisunity, asoriginal, isnotitselfbroughtaboutbysomementalactofcombiningrepresentations, butasKantsays, is“whatmakestheconceptofcombinationpossible”(B131), anditisitselfthegroundofthe“possibilityoftheunderstanding”(B131).

Second, theoriginalunityofapperceptionrequireswhateverformofself-consciousnesschar-acteristicallyrelatestothe“I think”. AsKantfamouslysays, “the I think mustbeabletoaccom-panyallmyrepresentations”(B131). Moreover, the“I think”essentiallyinvolvesactivityonthepartofthesubject–itisanexpressionofthesubject’sfreeactivityor“spontaneity”(B132). Thismeansthat, accordingtoKant, onlybeingscapableofspontaneousactivity–i.e. self-initiatedactivitythatisultimatelytracedtocausesoutsidethereachofnaturalcausallaws–aregoingtobecapableof thought inthesensewithwhichKantisconcerned.

Third, andrelatedtothepreviouspoint, Kantseemstodenythatasubjectcouldattainthekindofrepresentationalunitycharacteristicofthoughtifheronlyresourceswereaggregativemethods. Kantmakesthispointlaterinthe Critique whenhesays, “representationsthataredistributedamongdifferentbeings(forinstance, theindividualwordsofaverse)neverconstituteawholethought(averse)”(A 352). Inanoften-citedpassage, WilliamJamesprovidesavividarticulationoftheidea: “Takeasentenceofadozenwords, andtaketwelvemenandtelltoeachoneword. Thenstandthemeninaroworjamtheminabunch, andleteachthinkofhiswordasintentlyashewill; nowherewilltherebeaconsciousnessofthewholesentence”(James(1890), 160). Kantthusconstruesconsciousnessasthe“holding-together”ofthevariouscomponentsofathoughtinamannerthatseemsradicallyopposedtoanyconceptionofunitarythoughtwhichtriestoexplainitintermsofsometrainorsuccessionofitscomponents(Pr4:304;seeKitcher(2010); Engstrom(2013)forcontrastingtreatmentsofthisissue).

TheexactcontentofKant’sargumentfortheconnectionbetweensubjectandobjectintheTranscendentalDeductionishighlydisputed, anditislikelythatnosinglereconstructionoftheargumentcanitselfcaptureallofthepointsforwhichKantarguesintheDeduction. BelowI presentatleastonestrandofKant’sargumentasitappearsinthefirsthalfoftheDeduction.HereI focusonKant’sdenialthattheunityofthesubjectanditspowersofrepresentationalcombinationcouldbeaccountedforbyamerelyassociationist (i.e. Humean)conceptionofmentalcombination, sometimes termedhis “argument fromabove” (seeA119; Carl (1989);Pereboom(1995)). I takeKant’sargumenthereasfollows(seePereboom(2009)):

1. I amconsciousof the identityofmyselfas thesubjectofdifferentself-attributionsofmentalstates.

2. I amnotdirectlyconsciousoftheidentityofthissubjectofdifferentself-attributionsofmentalstates.

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3. If(1)and(2)aretrue, thenthisconsciousnessofidentityisaccountedforindirectlybymyconsciousnessofaparticularkindofunityofmymentalstates.

4. ∴ Thisconsciousnessof identity isaccountedfor indirectlybymyconsciousnessofaparticularkindofunityofmymentalstates. (1, 2, 3)

5. If(4)istrue, thenmymentalstatesindeedhavethisparticularkindofunity.6. Thisparticularkindofunityofmymentalstatescannotbeaccountedforbyassociation.

(5)7. If (6) is true, thenthisparticularkindofunityofmymentalstatesisaccountedforby

synthesisbyaprioriconcepts.8. ∴ Thisparticularkindofunityofmymentalstatesisaccountedforbysynthesisbyapriori

concepts. (6, 7)

Premise(1)saysthatI amawareofmyself(oratleastinapositiontobesoaware)asthesubjectofdifferentstates. Forexample, rightnowI mightbehungryaswellassleepy. PreviouslyI wassleepyandslightlybored. Premise(2)claimsthatI havenoimmediateordirectawarenessofthebeingwhichhasallofthesestates. InKant’sterms, I lackany intuition ofthesubjectofsuchself-ascribedstates, insteadhavingintuitiononlyofthestatesthemselves. Nevertheless,I amawareofallofthesestatesasrelatedtoasubject(itis I whoambored, hungry, sleepy),anditisinvirtueoftheseconnectionsthatI cancalloneandallofthesestates mine. Hence,aspremise(3)argues, theremustbesomeunity tomymentalstateswhichaccounts formy(indirect)awareness(ormybeinginapositiontobesoaware)oftheirunity. Myrepresentationsmusthavesomebasis forwhich theygo together, and it is thebasis for their“togetherness”thatexplainshowI canconsiderthem, oneandall, tobemine. Premises(4)and(5)unpackthispoint, andpremise(6)arguesthatassociationcouldnotaccountforsuchunity(thetheoryofassociationwasarticulatedinaparticularlyinfluentialformby DavidHume (1888, Hume(2007))andthereadershouldlooktothatentryforrelevantbackgrounddiscussion).

Kant’spoint, inpremise(6)oftheaboveargument, isthatforcesofassociationactingonmentalrepresentations(whetherimpressionsorideas)cannotaccountforeithertheexperienceofatrainofrepresentationsas mine, orforthe“togetherness”ofthoserepresentations, bothinasinglethoughtorinaseriesofinferences. Humearguesthatwehavenoimpression(andthusnoensuingidea)ofanempiricalself(Hume(1888), I.iv.6). Kantalsoacceptsthispointwhenhesaysthat“theempiricalconsciousnessthataccompaniesdifferentrepresentationsisbyitselfdispersedandwithoutrelationtotheidentityofthesubject”(B133). BythisKantmeansthatwhenweintrospectininnersense, allweevergetareparticularmentalstates(e.g. boredom,happiness, particularthoughts, etc.). Welackanyintuitionofasubjectofthosementalstates.Humeconcludesthattheideaofapersistingselfwhichgroundsallofthesementalstatesasitssubjectmustbeafiction. Kantdisagrees. Kant’scontrastingviewtakestheminenessandtogethernessofone’sintrospectiblementalstatesasadatumneedingexplanation, andsinceanassociativepsychologicaltheorylikethatofHume’scannotexplainthesefeaturesoffirst-personconsciousness(Humehimselfwasawareofthisproblem, seeHume(1888), III.Appendix), weneedtofindanothertheory–viz. Kant’stheoryofmentalsynthesis.

Recallthat, priortotheargumentoftheTranscendentalDeduction, Kantlinkstheoperationsofsynthesistopossessionofasetofaprioriconcepts(conceptswhosecontentisnotderivedfromexperience)–viz. thecategories. Hence, inarguingthatsynthesisisrequiredtoexplain

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theminenessandtogethernessofone’smentalstates, andbylinkingsynthesistotheapplica-tionofthecategories, Kantarguesthatwecouldnothavetheexperienceoftheminenessandtogethernessofourmentalstateswithoutapplyingthecategories.

WhilethisargumentisonlyhalfofKant’sargumentinthefirstpartoftheDeduction(theotherhalfconsistingofan“argument frombelow”, concerning theconditionsnecessary fortherepresentationofunitaryobjects, seePereboom(1995), (2009)), itshowshowtightlyKanttooktheconnectiontobebetweenthecapacitiesforspontaneity, synthesisandapperception,andthelegitimacyofthecategories. AccordingtoKant, theonlypossibleexplanationofone’sapperceptiveawarenessofone’spsychological statesasone’sownandasall related tooneanotheristhat, asthesubjectofsuchstates, onepossessesaspontaneouspowerforsynthesizingone’srepresentationsaccordingtogeneralprinciplesorrules, thecontentofwhichisgivenbypureaprioriconcepts–thecategories. Thefactthatthecategoriesplaysuchafundamentalrole in thegenerationof self-consciouspsychological states is thusapowerfulargument fordemonstrationoftheirlegitimacy.

Given thatKant leveragescertainaspectsofourcapacity for self-knowledge inhisargu-mentforthelegitimacyofthecategories, theextenttowhichhearguesforradicallimitsonourcapacityforself-knowledgemaysurpriseone. InthefinalsectionI discussKant’sargumentsconcerningourcapacityforaprioriknowledgeoftheselfanditsfundamentalfeatures. How-ever, inthenextsectionI lookatoneofthecentraldebatesinKantinterpretationconcerningtheroleofconceptsinperceptualexperience.

3. Concepts&Perception

DuringthediscussionofsynthesisaboveI characterizedconceptualismasclaimingthatthereisadependencerelationbetweenasubject’shavingconscioussensoryexperienceofanobjectiveworld, and the repertoireofconceptspossessedby thesubjectandexercised inactsbyherfacultyofunderstanding.

Asafirstpassatsharpeningthisformulation, wemayunderstandconceptualismasathe-sisconsistingoftwoclaims: (i)senseexperiencehascorrectnessconditionsdeterminedbythe“content”oftheexperience; (ii)thecontentofanexperienceisastructuredentitywhosecom-ponentsareconcepts. Let’staketheseinturn.

a. Content&Correctness

Animportantbackgroundassumptiongoverning theconceptualismdebateconstruesmentalstatesas related to theworldcognitively (asopposed tomerelycausally) ifandonly if theypossesscorrectnessconditions. Thatwhichdeterminesthecorrectnessconditionforastateisthatstate’s“content”(seeSiegel(2010), (2011); Schellenberg(2011)).

Suppose, forexample, thatanexperienceE hasthefollowingcontentC:

C:Thatcupiswhite.

ThiscontentdeterminesacorrectnessconditionV:

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V:S’sexperienceE iscorrectiffthecupvisuallypresentedtothesubjectasthecontentofthedemonstrativeiswhiteandthecontentC correspondstohowthingsseemtothesubjecttobevisuallypresented.

Herethecontentoftheexperientialstatefunctionsmuchlikethecontentofabeliefstatetodeterminewhethertheexperience, likethebelief, isorisnotcorrect.

A state’spossessionofcontentthusdeterminesacorrectnesscondition, invirtueofwhichwecanconstruethestateasmapping, mirroring, orotherwisetrackingaspectsofthesubject’senvironment.

Thereare reasons forquestioningwhetherKant endorses thecontent assumptionas I’vearticulateditabove(seeMcLear(2015a)). Kantseemstodenyseveralclaimswhichareintegraltoit. First, invariousplacesheexplicitlydeniesthatintuition, orthedeliverancesofthesensesmoregenerally, arethekindofthingwhichcouldbecorrectorincorrect(A293–4/B350; An§117:146; cf. LL 24:83ff, 103, 720ff, 825ff). Second, Kant’sconceptionofrepresentationalcontentrequiresanactofmentalunification(Pr4:304; cf. JL §179:101; LL 24:928), somethingwhichKantexplicitlydeniesispresentinanintuition(B129-30; cf. B176-7). ThisisnottodenythatKantusesanotionof“content”insomeothersense, butratheronlythathefailstouseinthesenserequiredbyinterpretationsendorsingthecontentassumption(seeTolley(2014), (2013)).Finally, Kant’s“modal”conditiononcognition, thatitprovideademonstrationofwhatisreallyactualratherthanmerelylogicallypossible, seemstoprecludeanendorsementofthecontentassumption(Bxxvii, note; cf. Chignell(2014)). However, forthepurposesofunderstandingtheconceptualismdebate, wewillassumethatKantdoesendorsethecontentassumption. Thequestionthenishowtounderstandthenatureofthecontentsounderstood.

b. ConceptualContent

Inadditiontothecontentassumption, I definedconceptualismascommittedtoaconceptionof thecontentof intuitionasbeingcompletelycomposedofconcepts. Against this, ClintonTolley(Tolley(2013), Tolley(2014))hasarguedthattheimmediacy/mediacydistinctionbetweenintuitionandconceptentailsadifferenceinthecontentofintuitionandconcept.

if we understand by “content”…a representation’s particular relation to an ob-ject…thenitisclearthatweshouldconcludethatKantacceptsnon-conceptualcontent. ThisisbecauseKantacceptsthatintuitionsputusinarepresentationalrelationtoobjectsthatisdistinctinkindfromtherelationthatpertainstoconcepts.I argued, furthermore, thatthisisthemeaningthatKanthimselfassignstotheterm“content”. (Tolley(2013), 128)

InsofarasKantoftenspeaksofthe“content”[Inhalt]ofarepresentationasconsistinginapartic-ularkindofrelationtoanobject(Tolley(2013), 112; cf. B83, B87)Tolley’sproposalthusgivesusgroundforasimpleandstraightforwardargumentforanon-conceptualistreadingofKant.HoweveritdoesnotnecessarilyprovethatthecontentofwhatKantcallsanintuitionisnotsomethingthat we wouldconstrueasconceptual, inawidersenseofthatterm. Forexample,bothpure(e.g. that, this)andcomplexdemonstrativeexpressions(e.g. thatcolor, thisperson)haveconceptualform, andhavebeenproposedasappropriateforcapturingthecontentofex-perience(e.g. McDowell(1996), ch. 3; fordiscussionseeHeck(2000)). Demonstrativesarenot,inKant’sterms, “conceptual”sincetheydonotexhibittherequisitegeneralitywhich, accordingtoKant, allconceptualrepresentationmust.

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c. Conceptualism&Synthesis

Ifitisn’ttextuallyplausibletounderstandthecontentofanintuitioninconceptualterms(atleastasKantunderstandsthenotionofaconcept)thenwhatwoulditmeantosaythatKantendorsesconceptualismwith regard toexperience? Themostplausible interpretation, endorsedbyawidevarietyofinterpreters, readsKantasarguingthatthegenerationofanintuition, whetherpureorsensory, dependsatleastinpartontheactivityoftheunderstanding. Onthiswayofcarvingthings, conceptualismdoes not consistinthenarrowclaimthatintuitionshaveconceptsascontentsorcomponents, butratherconsistsinthebroaderclaimthattheoccurrenceofanintuitiondependsatleastinpartonthediscursiveactivityoftheunderstanding. Thespecificactivityof theunderstanding is thatwhichKantcalls“synthesis”, the“running through, andgatheringtogether”ofrepresentations(A99).

The conceptualist further argues that taking intuitions as generated via acts of synthesis,whicharedirectedbyorotherwisedependentuponconceptualcapacities, providessomebasisfortheclaimthatwhatevercorrectnessconditionsmightbehadbyintuitionmustbeinaccordwiththeconceptualsynthesiswhichgeneratedthem. ThisarguablyfitswellwithKant’smuchquotedclaim,

Thesamefunctionthatgivesunitytothedifferentrepresentationsin ajudgmentalso gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intu-ition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding.(A79/B104-5)

Thelinkbetweenintuition, synthesisinaccordancewithconcepts, andrelationtoanobjectismadeevenclearerbyKant’sclaimin§17oftheB-editionTranscendentalDeductionthat,

Understanding is, generallyspeaking, thefacultyof cognitions. Theseconsistinthedeterminaterelationofgivenrepresentationstoanobject. An object, however,isthatintheconceptofwhichthemanifoldofagivenintuitionis united. (B137;emphasisintheoriginal)

Howeverelsewearetounderstandthispassage, Kanthereindicatesthattheunityofanintuitionnecessaryforittostandasacognitionofanobjectrequiresasynthesisbytheconcept<object>.Inotherwords, cognitionofanobjectrequiresthatintuitionbeunifiedbyanactoractsoftheunderstanding.

Accordingtotheconceptualistinterpretationwemustunderstandthenotionofarepresen-tation’scontentasa relation toanobject, which in turndependsonaconceptuallyguidedsynthesis. Sowecanreviseourinitialdefinitionofconceptualismtoreaditasclaimingthat(i)thecontentof anintuitionisakindofrelationtoanobject; (ii)therelationtoanobjectdependsonasynthesisdirectedinaccordancewithconcepts; (iii)synthesisinaccordancewithconceptssetscorrectnessconditionsfortheintuition’srepresentationofamind-independentobject.

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d. ObjectionstoConceptualism

Attheheartofnon-conceptualistreadingsofKantstandsthedenialthatmentalactsofsynthesiscarriedoutbytheunderstandingarenecessaryfortheoccurrenceofcognitivementalstatesofthetypewhichKantdesignatesbytheterm“intuition”[Anschauung]. Thoughitiscontroversialastowhatmightbeconsideredthe“natural”or“default”readingofKant’smaturecriticalphi-losophy, thereareatleastfourconsiderationswhichlendstrongsupporttoanon-conceptualistinterpretationofKant’smaturework.

First, Kantrepeatedlyandforcefullystatesthatinourcognitionthereisastrictdivisionofcognitivelabor—objectsaregivenbysensibilityandthoughtviatheunderstanding.

Objectsaregiventousbymeansofsensibility, anditaloneyieldsusintuitions; theyarethoughtthroughtheunderstanding, andfromtheunderstandingariseconcepts(A19/B33; cf. A50/B74, A51/B75–6, A271/B327).

AsRobertHannahasargued, whenKantdiscussesthedependenceofintuitiononconceptualjudgmentintheAnalyticofConcepts, heisspecificallytalkingabout cognition ratherthanwhatwewouldconsidertobeperceptualexperience(Hanna(2005), 265-7).

Second, Kant characterizes the representational capacities characteristic of sensibility asmoreprimitivethanthosecharacteristicoftheunderstanding(orreason), andasplausiblypartofwhathumanssharewiththerestoftheanimalkingdom(Kantconnectsthepossessionofafacultyofsensibilitytoanimalnatureinvariousplaces, e.g. A546/B574, A802/B830; An7:196.)Forexample, Kant’sdistinctionbetweenthefacultiesofsensibilityandunderstandingasseemsintendedtocapturethedifferencebetweenthe“sub-rational”powersofthemindthatwesharewithnon-humananimals, andthe“rationalorhigher-levelcognitivepowers”thatarespecialtohumanbeings. (Hanna(2005), 249; cf. Allais(2009); McLear(2011))

Ifoneweretodenythat, accordingtoKant, sensibilityaloneiscapableofproducingmentalstatesthatwerecognitiveincharacterthen, aswaspointedoutinthesectiononconsciousness,itwouldseemthatanyanimalwhichlacksafacultyofunderstanding, andthusthecapacityforconceptualsynthesis, wouldtherebylackanycapacityforgenuinely perceptual experience.Thementallivesofnon-rationalanimalswouldthus, atbest, consistofnon-cognitivesensorystateswhichcausallycorrelatewithchangesintheanimal’senvironment. Asidefromanun-appealingandimplausiblecharacterizationofthecognitivecapacitiesofanimals(forrelevantdiscussionofsomeoftheissuesincontemporarycognitiveethologyseeBermúdez(2003); Lurz(2009); Andrews(2014), aswellasthepapersinLurz(2011)), thisreadingalsofacestextualhur-dles. Kantisonrecordinvariousplacesassayingthatanimalshavesensoryrepresentationsoftheirenvironment(CPJ 5:464; LM 28:449; cf. An7:212), thattheyhaveintuitions(LL 24:702),andthattheyareacquaintedwithobjectsthoughtheydonotcognizethem(JL 9:64–5)(seeNaragon(1990); Allais(2009); McLear(2011)).

Hence, ifKant’spositionisthatsyntheticactscarriedoutbytheunderstandingarenecessaryforthecognitivestandingofamentalstate, thenKantiscontradictingfundamentalelementsofhisownpositionincreditingintuitions(ortheirpossibility)tonon-rationalanimals.

Third, anypositionwhichregardsperceptualexperienceasdependentuponactsofsynthesiscarriedoutbytheunderstandingwouldpresumablyalsoconstruethe“pure”intuitionsofspaceandtimeasdependentuponactsofsynthesis(seeLonguenesse(1998), ch. 9; Griffith(2012)).

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However, Kant’sdiscussionofspace(andanalogously, time)inthethirdandfourtharguments(fourthandfifthinthecaseoftime)oftheMetaphysicalExpositionofSpaceintheTranscendentalAestheticseemsincompatiblewithsuchaproposedrelationofdependence.

Kant’spointinthethirdandfourthargumentsoftheMetaphysicalExpositionofspace(andsimilarlyoftime)isthatnofiniteintellectcouldgrasptheextentandnatureofspaceasaninfinitewholeviaasyntheticprocessinvolvingmovementfromrepresentationofaparttorepresenta-tionofthewhole. Iftheunityoftheformsofintuitionwereitselfsomethingdependentuponintellectualactivity, thenthisunitywouldnecessarilyinvolvethediscursive(thoughnotneces-sarilyconceptual)runningthroughandgatheringtogetherofagivenmultiplicity(presumablyofdifferentlocationsormoments)intoacombinedwhole, whichKantbelievesischaracteristicofsynthesisgenerally(A99).

ButKant’sarguments in theMetaphysicalExpositionsof spaceand time require that thefundamentalbasisofourrepresentationofspaceandtimedoesnotproceedfromagraspofthemultiplicityoffeaturesofanintuitedparticulartothewholethathasthosefeatures. Insteadtheformofpureintuitionconstitutesarepresentationalwholethatis prior tothatofitscomponentparts(cf. CJ 5:407-8, 409).

Hence, Kant’spositionisthatthepureintuitionsofspaceandtimepossessaunitywhollydifferentfromthatgivenbythediscursiveunityoftheunderstanding(whetheritbeinconcep-tualjudgmentortheintellectual cum imaginativesynthesisofintuitedobjectsmoregenerally).Theunityofaesthetic representation—characterizedby the formsof spaceand time—hasastructure inwhich the representationalpartsdependon thewhole. Theunityofdiscursiverepresentation—representationwheretheactivityoftheunderstandingisinvolved—hasastruc-tureinwhichtherepresentationalwholedependsonitsparts(seeMcLear(2015b)).

Finally, therehasbeenextensivediscussionofthenon-conceptualityofintuitioninthesec-ondary literatureonKant’sphilosophyofmathematics. Forexample, MichaelFriedmanhasarguedthattheexpressivelimitationsoftheprevailinglogicinKant’stimerequiredthepostula-tionofintuitionasaformofsingular, non-conceptualrepresentation(Friedman(1992), ch. 2;Anderson(2005); Sutherland(2008)). IncontrasttoFriedman’sview, CharlesParsonsandEmilyCarsonhavearguedthattheimmediacyofintuition, bothpureandempirical, shouldbecon-struedina“phenomenological”manner. Spaceinparticularisunderstoodontheirinterpre-tationasanoriginal, non-conceptualrepresentation, whichKanttakestobenecessaryforthedemonstrationoftherealpossibilityofconstructedmathematicalobjectsasrequiredforgeo-metricknowledge(Parsons(1964); Parsons(1992); Carson(1997); Carson(1999); cf. Hanna(2002). ForageneraloverviewofrelatedissuesinKant’sphilosophyofmathematicsseeShabel(2006)andtheworkscitedthereinatp. 107, note29.)

Ultimately, however, therearedifficultiesinassessingwhetherKant’sphilosophyofmath-ematicscanhaverelevancefortheconceptualismdebate, sincethesenseinwhichintuitionmustbenon-conceptualinaccountingformathematicalknowledgeisnotobviouslyincompat-iblewithclaimingthatintuitionsthemselves(includingpureintuition)aredependentuponaconceptually-guidedsynthesis.

Thenon-conceptualistreadingisthusclearlycommittedtoallowingthatsensibilityaloneprovides, inaperhapsveryprimitivemanner, objectiverepresentationoftheempiricalworld.Sensibility isconstruedasanindependentcognitivefaculty, whichhumanssharewithothernon-rationalanimals, andwhich is the jumping-offpoint formore sophisticatedconceptualrepresentationofempiricalreality.

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Inthenextandfinalsection, I lookatKant’sviewsregardingthenatureandlimitsofself-knowledgeandtheramificationsofthisfortraditionalrationalistviewsoftheself.

4. RationalPsychology&Self-Knowledge

Kantdiscussesthenatureandlimitsofourself-knowledgemostextensivelyinthefirst Critique,inasectionofthe TranscendentalDialectic calledthe“ParalogismsofPureReason”. HereKantisconcernedtocriticizetheclaimsofwhathecalls“rationalpsychology”, andspecifically, theclaimthatwecanhavesubstantivemetaphysicalknowledgeofthenatureofthesubject, basedpurelyonananalysisof theconceptof thethinkingself, orasKant typicallyputs it, the <Ithink>.

I think isthusthesoletextofrationalpsychology, fromwhichitistodevelopitsentirewisdom…becausetheleastempiricalpredicatewouldcorrupttherationalpurityandindependenceofthesciencefromallexperience. (A343/B401)

Therearefour“Paralogisms”. Eachargumentispresentedasa syllogism, whichconsistsoftwopremisesandaconclusion. AccordingtoKant, eachargumentisguiltyofanequivocationonatermcommontothepremises, suchthattheargumentisinvalid. Kant’saim, inhisdiscussionofeachParalogism, istodiagnosetheequivocation, andexplainwhytherationalpsychologist’sargumentultimatelyfails. InsodoingKantprovidesagreatdealofinformationabouthisownviewsconcerningthemind(SeeAmeriks(2000)forextensivediscussion). TheargumentofthefirstParalogismconcernsourknowledgeoftheselfassubstance; thesecond, thesimplicityoftheself; thethird, thenumericalidentityoftheself; thefourth, knowledgeoftheselfversusknowledgeofthingsinspace. We’lltaketheseargumentsinturn.

a. Substantiality(A348-51/B410-11)

Kantpresentstherationalist’sargumentintheFirstParalogismasfollows:

1. Whatcannotbethoughtotherwisethanassubjectdoesnotexistotherwisethanassubject,andisthereforesubstance.

2. Nowathinkingbeing, consideredmerelyassuch, cannotbethoughtotherwisethanassubject.

3. ∴ A thinkingbeingalsoexistsonlyassuchathing, i.e., assubstance.

Kant’spresentationoftheargumentisrathercompressed. Inmoreexplicitformwecanputitasfollows(seeProops(2010)):

1. Allentitiesthatcannotbethoughtotherwisethanassubjectsareentitiesthatcannotexistotherwisethanassubjects, andtherefore(bydefinition)aresubstances. (AllM areP)

2. Allentitiesthatarethinkingbeings(consideredmerelyassuch)areentitiesthatcannotbethoughtotherwisethanassubjects. (AllS areM)

3. ∴ Allentitiesthatarethinkingbeings(consideredmerelyassuch)areentitiesthatcannotexistotherwisethanassubjects, andthereforearesubstances(AllS areP)

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Therelevantequivocationisinthetermthatoccupiesthe“M” placeintheargument–viz. “en-titiesthatcannotbethoughtotherwisethanassubjects”. Kantspecificallylocatestheambiguityintheuseoftheterm“thought”[DasDenken], whichheclaimsistakeninthefirstpremisetoconcernanobjectingeneral, andthussomethingthatcouldbegiveninapossibleintuition. Inthesecondpremisetheuseof“thought”issupposedtoapplyonlytoafeatureofthoughtand,thus, nottoanobjectofapossibleintuition(B411-12).

Whileitisn’tobviouswhatKantmeansbythisclaim, somethinglikethefollowingseemsapt. Kanttakesthefirstpremisetobemakingaclaimabouttheobjectsofthought–viz. thatanobjectwhichexistsasanindependentsubjectorbearerofpropertiescannotbeconceivedofasanythingelse(e.g. itselfbeapropertyofafurthersubject). Thisisthusametaphysicalclaimaboutwhatkindsofobjectscouldreallyexist, whichexplainsKant’sreferencetoan“objectingeneral”thatcouldbegiveninintuition.

Incontrast, premise(2)makesamerely logical claimconcerningtheroleoftherepresenta-tion inapossiblejudgment. Kant’spointhereisthatwecannotusetherepresentation inanyplaceotherthanthesubjectplaceofajudgment. Forexample, whileI canmaketheclaim“I amtall”, I cannotmaketheclaim(itwouldmakenosense)“thetallisI”.

Againsttherationalpsychologist, Kantarguesthatwecannotmakeanylegitimateinferencefromtheconditionsunderwhich the representation maybe thought, oremployed inajudgment, tothestatusofthe“I” asametaphysicalsubjectofproperties. Kantmakesthispointexplicitwhenhesays,

thefirstsyllogismoftranscendentalpsychologyimposesonusanonlyallegedlynewinsightwhenitpassesofftheconstantlogicalsubjectofthinkingasthecogni-tionofarealsubjectofinherence, withwhichwedonotandcannothavetheleastacquaintance, becauseconsciousnessistheonesinglethingthatmakesallrepre-sentationsintothoughts, andinwhich, therefore, asinthetranscendentalsubject,ourperceptionsmustbeencountered; andapartfromthislogicalsignificanceoftheI,wehavenoacquaintancewiththesubjectinitselfthatgroundsthisI asasubstratum, justasitgroundsallthoughts. (A350)

Kantthusarguesthatweshoulddifferentiatebetweendifferentconceptionsof“substance”andtheroletheyplayinourthoughtconcerningtheworld.

Substance0: x isa substance0 iff the representationofxcannotbeusedasapredicate inacategoricaljudgment

Substance1: xisasubstance1 iffitsexistenceissuchthatitcannever inhere inanythingelse(B288, 407)

Thefirstconceptionof substance ismerely logicalorgrammatical. The secondconceptionisexplicitlymetaphysical. Finally, thereisanevenmoremetaphysicallydemandingusageof“substance”thatKantemploys.

(Empirical)Substance2: x isa substance2 iff it isa substance1 thatpersistsateverymoment(A144/B183, A182)

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AccordingtoKant, therationalpsychologistattemptstomovefromclaimsaboutsubstance0tothemorerobustlymetaphysicalclaimscharacteristicofourconceptionanduseofsubstance1andsubstance2. However, withoutfurthersubstantiveassumptions, whichgobeyondanythinggiveninananalysisoftheconcept , wecanmakenolegitimateinferencefromournotionofasubstance0 toeitheroftheotherconceptionsofsubstance.

Since, aswesawinthediscussionoftheunityofconsciousnessabove, Kantdeniesthatwehaveanyintuition, empiricalorotherwise, ofourselvesassubjects, wecannot, merelyinreflectionon theconditionsof thinkingofourselvesusing thefirst-personconcept, come tohaveanyknowledgeconcerningwhatweare(e.g. intermsofbeingseitherasubstance1 orasubstance2). Noamountofintrospectionorreflectiononthecontentofthefirst-personconcept willyieldsuchknowledge.

b. Simplicity(A351-61/B407-8)

Kant’sdiscussionof theproposedmetaphysical simplicityof the subject largelydependsonpointshemadeinthepreviousParalogismconcerningitsproposedsubstantiality. KantarticulatetheSecondParalogismasfollows:

1. Thesubjectwhoseactioncanneverberegardedastheconcurrenceofmanyactingthings,issimple. (AllA isB)

2. Theselfissuchasubject. (C isA)3. ∴ Theselfissimple. (C isB)

Heretheequivocationconcernsthenotionofa“subject”. Kant’spoint, aswiththepreviousParalogism, isthat, fromthefactthatone’sfirst-personrepresentationoftheselfisalwaysagram-maticalorlogicalsubject, nothingfollowsconcerningthemetaphysicalstatusofthereferentofthatrepresentation.

OfperhapsgreaterinterestinthisdiscussionoftheParalogismofsimplicityisKant’sanalysisofwhathecallsthe“Achillesofalldialecticalinferences”(A351). AccordingtotheAchillesargument, the soulormind is know tobe a simpleunitary substancebecauseonly suchasubstancecouldthinkunitarythoughts. Callthisthe“unityclaim”(seeBrook(1997)):

(UC): ifamultiplicityofrepresentationsaretoformasinglerepresentation, theymustbecon-tainedintheabsoluteunityofthethinkingsubstance. (A352)

AgainstUC,Kantarguesthatwehavenoreasontothinkthatthestructureofathought, asacomplexofrepresentations, isn’tmirroredinthecomplexstructureofanentitywhichthinksthethought. UC isnotanalytic, whichistosaythatthereisnocontradictionentailedbyitsnegation. UC alsofailstobeasyntheticaprioriclaim, sinceitfollowsneitherfromthenatureoftheformsofintuition, norfromthecategories. HenceUC couldonlybeshowntobetrueempirically, andsincewedonothaveanyempiricalintuitionoftheself, wehavenobasisforthinkingthatUC mustbetrue(A353).

Kant heremakes apoint familiar fromcontemporary functionalist accounts of themind(seeMeerbote(1991); Brook(1997)). Ourmentalfunctions, includingtheunityofconsciousthought, areconsistentwithavarietyofdifferentpossiblemedia inwhich the functionsarerealized. Kant’spointisthatthereisnocontradictioninthinkingthatapluralityofsubstancesmightsucceedingeneratingasingleunifiedthought. Hencewecannotknowthatthemindissuchthatitmustbesimpleinnature.

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c. NumericalIdentity(A361-66/B408)

KantarticulatestheThirdParalogismasfollows:

1. WhatisconsciousofthenumericalidentityofitsSelfindifferenttimes, istothatextentaperson. (AllC isP)

2. NowthesoulisconsciousofthenumericalidentityofitsSelfindifferenttimes. (S isC)3. ∴ Thesoulisaperson. (S isP)

Theinteresttakeninestablishingthepersonalityofthesoulormindbytherationalpsychologists,stemsfromtheimportanceofprovingthatnotonlywouldthemindpersistafterthedestructionofitsbody, butalsothatthismindwouldbethesameperson, andnotjustsomesortofbareconsciousnessorworse(e.g. existingonlyasa“baremonad”).

Kantheremakestwomainpoints. First, therationalpsychologistcannotinferfromthesame-nessofthefirst-personrepresentation(the“I think”), acrossapplicationsofitinjudgment, toanyconclusionconcerningthesamenessof themetaphysicalsubjectreferredtobythatrep-resentation. Kantisthusonceagainmakingafunctionalistpointthatthemediuminwhichaseriesofrepresentationalstatesinheresmaychangeovertime, andthereisnocontradictioninconceivingofaseriesofrepresentationsasbeingtransferredfromonesubstancetoanother(A363-4, note).

Second, Kantarguesthatwecanbeconfidentofthesoul’spossessionof personality invirtueofthepersistenceofapperception. Therelevantnotionof“personality”hereisoneconcerningthecontrastbetweenarationalbeingandananimal. Whilethepersistenceofapperception(i.e. thepersistenceofthe“I think”asbeingabletoattachtoallofone’srepresentations)doesnotprovideanapperceivingsubjectwithanyinsightintothetruemetaphysical nature ofthemind,itdoesprovideevidenceofthesoul’spossessionofanunderstanding. Animals, bycontrast, donotpossessanunderstandingbut, atbest(accordingtoKant), onlyananaloguethereof. AsKantsaysinthe Anthropology,

ThatmancanhavetheI amonghisrepresentationselevateshiminfinitelyaboveallotherlivingbeingsonearth. Heistherebyaperson[…]thatis, byrankandworthacompletelydistinctbeingfromthingsthatarethesameasreason-lessanimalswithwhichonecandoasonepleases. (An7:127, §1)

Hence, solongasasoulpossessesthecapacityforapperception, itwillsignalthepossessionofanunderstanding, andthusservestodistinguishthehumansoulfromthatofananimal(seeDyck(2010), 120).

d. RelationtoObjectsinSpace(A366-80/B409)

Finally, theFourthParalogismconcernstherelationbetweenourawarenessofourownmindsandourawarenessofotherobjectsdistinctfromourselves, andthusaslocatedinspace. KantdescribestheFourthParalogismasfollows:

1. Whatcanbeonlycausallyinferredisnevercertain. (AllI isnotC)2. Theexistenceouterobjectscanonlybecausallyinferred, notimmediatelyperceivedby

us. (O isI)

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3. ∴Wecanneverbecertainoftheexistenceofouterobjects. (O isnotC)

Kant locates thedamagingambiguity in theconceptionof“outer”objects. This ispuzzlingsinceitdoesn’tplaytherelevantroleasmiddleterminthesyllogism. ButKantisquiteclearthatthisiswheretheambiguityliesanddistinguishesbetweentwodistinctsensesofthe“outer”or“external”:

TrancendentallyOuter/External: aseperateexistence, inandofitselfEmpiricallyOuter/External: anexistenceinspace

Kant’spointhereisthatallappearancesinspaceareempiricallyexternaltothesubjectwhoperceivesorthinksaboutthem, whileneverthelessbeingtranscendentallyinternal, inthatsuchspatialappearancesdonothaveanentirelyindependentmetaphysicalnature, sincetheirspatialfeaturesdependatleastinpartonourformsofintuition.

Kantthenusesthisdistinctionnotonlytoargueagainsttheassumptionoftherationalpsy-chologistthatthemindisbetterknownthananyobjectinspace(thisaclaimfamouslyarguedbyDescartes), butalsoagainstthoseformsofexternalworldskepticismchampionedby Descartesand Berkeley. KantidentifiesBerkeleywithwhathecalls“dogmaticidealism”andDescarteswithwhathecalls“problematicidealism”(A377).

ProblematicIdealism: wecannotbecertainoftheexistenceofanymaterialbodyDogmaticIdealism: wecanbecertainthatnomaterialbodyexists–thenotionofabodyis

self-contradictory

Kantbringstwoargumentstobearagainsttherationalpsychologist’sassumptionabouttheim-mediacyofourself-knowledge, aswellasthesetwoformsofskepticism, withmixedresults.Thetwoargumentsare(whatI amcalling)theargumentsfrom“immediacy”and“imagination”.We’lltaketheseinturn.

i. TheImmediacyArgument

InanextendedpassageintheFourthParalogism(A370-1)Kantmakesthefollowingargument:

externalobjects(bodies)aremerelyappearances, hencealsonothingotherthanaspeciesofmyrepresentations, whoseobjectsaresomethingonlythroughtheserepresentations, but arenothing separated from them. Thusexternal thingsex-istaswellasmyself, andindeedbothexistontheimmediatetestimonyofmyself-consciousness, onlywiththisdifference: therepresentationofmySelf, asthethinkingsubject, isrelatedmerelytoinnersense, buttherepresentationsthatdes-ignateextendedbeingsarealsorelatedtooutersense. I amnomorenecessitatedtodrawinferencesinrespectoftherealityofexternalobjectsthanI aminregardtotherealityoftheobjectsofmyinnersense(mythoughts), forinbothcasestheyarenothingbutrepresentations, theimmediateperception(consciousness)ofwhichisatthesametimeasufficientproofoftheirreality. (A370-1)

I taketheargumentheretobeasfollows:

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1. RationalPsychology(RP) privilegesawarenessofthesubjectanditsstatesoverawarenessofnon-subjectivestates.

2. Buttranscendentalidealismentailsthatweareawareofbothsubjectiveandobjectivestates, astheyappear, inthesameway –viz. viaaformof intuition.

3. Soeitherbothkindsofawarenessareimmediateortheyarebothmediate.4. Sinceawarenessofsubjectivestatesisobviouslyimmediatethenawarenessofobjective

statesmustalsobeimmediate.5. ∴Weareimmediatelyawareofthestatesorpropertiesofphysicalobjects.

HereKantdisplayswhathe takes tobeanadvantageofhis Transcendental Idealism. Sincebothinnerandoutersensedependonintuition, thereisnothingspecialaboutinnerintuitionthatprivilegesitoverouterintuition. Bothare, asintuitions, immediatepresentationsofobjects(at leastastheyappear). Unfortunately, Kantnevermakesclearwhathemeansbytheterm“immediate”[unmittelbar]. Thisissueismuchcontested(seeSmit(2000)). Attheveryleast,hemeanstosignalthatourawarenessinintuitionisnotmediatedbyanyexplicitorconsciousinference, aswhenhesaysthatthetranscendentalidealist“grantstomatter, asappearance, arealitywhichneednotbeinferred, butisimmediatelyperceived”(A371).

Itisnotobviousthatanexternalworldskepticwouldfindthisargumentconvincing, sincepartofthegripofsuchskepticismonusreliesonthe(atleastinitially)convincingpointthatthingscould seem toonejustastheycurrentlyare, evenif therereallyisnoexternalworldcausingone’sexperiences. ThismayjustbegthequestionagainstKant(particularlypremise(2)oftheaboveargument). AndcertainlyKantseemstothinkthathisargumentsfortheexistenceofthepureintuitionsofspaceandtimeintheTranscendentalAestheticlendsomeweighttohispositionhere. ThusKantisnotsomucharguing for TranscendentalIdealismhereasexplain-ingsomeofthefurtherbenefitsthatcomewhenthepositionisadopted. Hedoes, however,presentatleastonefurtherargumentagainsttheskepticalobjectionarticulatedabove–viz. theargumentfromimagination, towhichwe’llnowturn.

ii. TheArgumentfromImagination

Kant’sattempttorespondtotheskepticalworrythatthingsmightappeartobeoutsideuswhilenotactually existing outsideusappealstotherolethatimaginationwouldhavetoplaytomakesuchapossibilityplausible(A373-4; cf. Anthropology, 7:167-8).

Thismaterialorrealentity, however, thisSomethingthatistobeintuitedinspace,necessarilypresupposesperception, anditcannotbeinventedbyanypowerofimaginationorproducedindependentlyofperception, whichindicatestherealityofsomethinginspace. Thussensationisthatwhichdesignatesarealityinspaceandtime, accordingtowhetheritisrelatedtotheoneortheothermodeofsensibleintuition.

Whatfollowsismyreconstructionofthisargument.

1. Ifproblematicidealismiscorrectthenitispossibleforonetohaveneverperceivedanyspatialobjectbutonlytohaveimagineddoingso.

2. Butimaginationcannotfabricate–itcanonly re-fabricate.

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3. So, ifonehassensoryexperienceofouterspatialobjects, thenonemusthavehadatleastonesuccessfulperceptionofanexternalspatialobject.

4. ∴ Itiscertainthatanextendedspatialworldexists.

Kant’sideahereisthattheimaginationistoolimitedtogeneratethevariousqualitiesthatweexperienceasinstantiatedinexternalphysicalobjects. Hence, itwouldnotbepossibletosimplyimagine an external physicalworldwithout havingbeenoriginally exposed to thequalitiesinstantiatedinthephysicalworld, ergo thephysicalworldmustexist. EvenDescartesseemstoagreewiththis, notingin MeditationI that“[certainsimplekindsofqualities]areasitweretherealcoloursfromwhichweformalltheimagesofthings, whethertrueorfalse, thatoccurinourthought”(Descartes(1984), 13-14). ThoughDescartesgoesontodoubtourcapacitytoknowevensuchbasicqualitiesgiventhepossibleexistenceofanevildeceiver, itisnotablethatthedeceivermustbesomethingotherthanourselves, inordertoaccountforalltherichnessandvarietyofwhatweexperience(however, see MeditationVI (Descartes(1984), 54), whereDescarteswonderswhethertherecouldbesomehiddenfacultyinourselvesproducingallofourideas).

Unfortunately, itisn’tclearthattheargumentfromimaginationgetsKantaconclusionofthedesiredstrength, forallthatitshows(ifitshowsanything)isthattherewas atonetime aphysicalworld, whichaffectedone’ssensesandprovidedthematerialforone’ssenseexperiences. Thismightbeenoughtoshowthatonehasnotalwaysbeenradicallydeceived, butitisnotenoughtoshowthatoneisnot currently beingradicallydeceived. Evenworse, itisn’tevenclearthatweneeda physical worldtogeneratetherequisitematerialfortheimagination. Perhapsallthatisneededis something distinctfromthesubject, whichiscapableofgeneratinginittherequisitesensoryexperiences, whetherornot theyareveridical. This conclusion is thus compatiblewith that“something”beingDescartes’sevildemon, or incontemporaryepistemology, withthesubject’sbeinga braininavat. Hence, itisnotobviousthatKant’sargumentsucceedsinrefutingtheskeptic, ortotheextentthatitdoes, thatitshowsthatweknowthereisa physicalworld, asopposedmerelytotheexistenceofsomethingdistinctfromthesubject.

e. LessonsoftheParalogisms

BeyondthespecificargumentsoftheParalogismsandtheirconclusions, theypresentuswithtwocentraltenetsofKant’sconceptionofthemind. First, thatwecannotmovefromclaimsconcerningthecharacterorroleofthefirst-personrepresentation toclaimsconcerningthenatureofthereferentofthatrepresentation. Thisisakeypartofhiscriticismofrationalpsychol-ogy. Second, thatwedonothaveprivilegedaccesstoourselfascomparedwiththingsoutsideus. Boththeself(oritsstates)andexternalobjectsareonparwithrespecttointuition. Thisalsomeansthatweonlyhaveaccesstoourselvesaswe appear, andnotaswefundamentally,metaphysically, are (cf. B157). Hence, accordingtoKant, ourself-awareness, justasmuchasourawarenessofanythingdistinctfromourselves, isconditionedbyoursensibility. Ourintel-lectualaccesstoourselvesinapperception, Kantargues, doesnotrevealanythingaboutourmetaphysicalnature, inthesenseofthekindof thing thatmustexisttorealizethevariouscog-nitivepowersthatKantdescribesascharacteristicofabeingcapableofapperception(e.g. aspontaneousunderstandingorintellect).

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5. Summary

Kant’sconceptionofthemind, hisdistinctionbetweensensoryandintellectualfaculties, hisfunctionalism, hisconceptionofmentalcontent, andhisworkonthenatureofthesubject/objectdistinction, wereallhugelyinfluential. Hisworkwasimmediatelyinspirationaltothe GermanIdealist movementandalsobecamecentral toemerging ideasconcerning theepistemologyofscienceinthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies, inwhatbecameknownasthe“Neo-Kantian”movement incentralandsouthernGermany. ThoughAnglophone interest inKantebbedsomewhatintheearlytwentiethcentury, hisconceptionofthemindandcriticismsofrationalistpsychologywereagaininfluentialmid-centuryviatheworkof“analytic”KantianssuchasP.F.Strawson, JonathanBennett, andWilfridSellars. Intheearlytwenty-firstcenturyKant’sworkonthemindremainsatouchstoneforphilosophicalinvestigation, especiallyintheworkofthoseinfluencedbyStrawsonorSellars, suchasQuassimCassam, JohnMcDowell, andChristopherPeacocke.

6. ReferencesandFurtherReading

a. Kant’sWorksinEnglish

QuotationsfromKant’sworkarefromtheGermaneditionofKant’sworks, the AkademieAus-gabe, withthefirst Critique citedbythestandardA/B editionpagination, andtheotherworksbyvolumeandpage. Englishtranslationsaremyown, thoughI haveregularlyconsulted, andinmostcasesclosely followed, translations from theCambridgeEditions. Specific textsareabbreviatedasfollows:

• An: AnthropologyfromaPragmaticPointofView• C: Correspondence• CPR: CritiqueofPureReason• CJ: CritiqueofJudgment• JL: JäscheLogic• LA: LecturesonAnthropology• LL: LectursonLogic• LM: LecturesonMetaphysics• Pr: ProlegomenatoanyFutureMetaphysics

Themostused scholarlyEnglish translationsofKant’sworkarepublishedbyCambridgeUniversityPressasthe CambridgeEditionsoftheWorksofImmanuelKant. ThefollowingarefromthatcollectionandcontainsomeofKant’smostimportantandinfluentialwritings.

• Correspondence, ed. ArnulfZweig. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1999.• CritiqueofPureReason, trans. PaulGuyerandAllenWood. Cambridge: Cambridge

UniversityPress, 1998.• CritiqueofthePowerofJudgment, trans. PaulGuyerandEricMatthews. Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversityPress, 2000.• History, Anthropology, andEducation, eds. GünterZöllerandRobertLouden. Cam-

bridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 2007.

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http://www.iep.utm.edu/germidea/#SH7f

http://www.iep.utm.edu/neo-kant/


• LecturesonAnthropology, ed. andtrans. AllenW.WoodandRobertB.Louden. Cam-bridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 2012.

• LecturesonLogic, trans. J.MichaelYoung. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1992.

• LecturesonMetaphysics, ed. andtrans. KarlAmeriksandSteveNaragon. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 2001.

• PracticalPhilosophy, ed. MaryGregor. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1996.• TheoreticalPhilosophy1755-1770, ed. DavidWalford. Cambridge: CambridgeUniver-

sityPress, 2002.• Theoretical Philosophyafter 1781, eds. HenryAllison andPeterHeath. Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversityPress, 2002

b. SecondarySources

Allais, Lucy. 2009. “Kant, Non-ConceptualContentandtheRepresentationofSpace.” JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy 47(3): 383–413.

Allison, HenryE.2004. Kant’sTranscendental Idealism: RevisedandEnlarged. NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.

Ameriks, Karl. 2000. KantandtheFateofAutonomy: ProblemsintheAppropriationoftheCriticalPhilosophy. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.

Anderson, R Lanier. 2005. “Neo-Kantianism and theRoots ofAnti-Psychologism.” BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy 13(2): 287–323.

Andrews, Kristin. 2014. TheAnimalMind: AnIntroductiontothePhilosophyofAnimalCog-nition. London: Routledge.

Bennett, Jonathan. 1966. Kant’sAnalytic. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.

———. 1974. Kant’sDialectic. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.

Bermúdez, JoséLuis. 2003. “AscribingThoughtstoNon-LinguisticCreatures.” FactaPhilosoph-ica 5(2): 313–34.

Brook, Andrew. 1997. KantandtheMind. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.

Buroker, JillVance. 2006. Kant’s CritiqueofPureReason: AnIntroduction. Cambridge: Cam-bridgeUniversityPress.

Carl, Wolfgang. 1989. “Kant’sFirstDraftsoftheDeductionoftheCategories.” In Kant’sTran-scendentalDeductions, editedbyEckartFörster, 3–20. Stanford: StanfordUniversityPress.

Carson, Emily. 1997. “KantonIntuitionandGeometry.” CJPhil 27(4): 489–512.

———. 1999. “KantontheMethodofMathematics.” JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy 37(4): 629–52.

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Caygill, Howard. 1995. A KantDictionary. Vol. 121. London: Blackwell.

Chignell, Andrew. 2014. “ModalMotivationsforNoumenalIgnorance: Knowledge, Cognition,andCoherence.” Kant-Studien 105(4): 573–97.

Descartes, Rene. 1984. ThePhilosophicalWritingsofDescartes. EditedbyJohnCottingham,RobertStoothoff, andDugaldMurdoch. Vol. 2. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.

Dicker, Georges. 2004. Kant’sTheoryofKnowledge : AnAnalytical Introduction. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Dyck, CoreyW.2010. “TheAeneasArgument: Personality and Immortality inKant’sThirdParalogism.” In KantYearbook, editedbyDietmarHeidemann, 95–122.

Engstrom, Stephen. 2013. “UnityofApperception.” StudiKantiani 26: 37–54.

Friedman, Michael. 1992. KantandtheExactSciences. Cambridge, MA:HarvardUniversityPress.

Gardner, Sebastian. 1999. KantandtheCritiqueofPureReason. London: Routledge.

Ginsborg, Hannah. 2006. “Kantand theProblemofExperience.” PhilosophicalTopics 34(1&2): 59–106.

Griffith, AaronM.2012. “PerceptionandtheCategories: A ConceptualistReadingofKant’sCritiqueofPureReason.” EuropeanJournalofPhilosophy 20(2): 193–222.

Grüne, Stefanie. 2009. BlindeAnschauung. VittorioKlostermann.

Guyer, Paul. 1987. KantandtheClaimsofKnowledge. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.

———. 2014. Kant. London: Routledge.

Hanna, Robert. 2002. “MathematicsforHumans: Kant’sPhilosophyofArithmeticRevisited.”EuropeanJournalofPhilosophy 10(3): 328–52.

———. 2005. “KantandNonconceptualContent.” EuropeanJournalofPhilosophy 13(2):247–90.

Heck, RichardG.2000. “NonconceptualContentandthe‘SpaceofReasons’.” ThePhilosoph-icalReview 109(4): 483–523.

Hume, David. 1888. A TreatiseofHumanNature. EditedbyL A Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Claren-donPress.

———. 2007. AnEnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstanding. EditedbyPeterMillican. Ox-ford: OxfordUniversityPress.

James, William. 1890. ThePrinciplesofPsychology. NewYork: Holt.

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Keller, Pierre. 1998. KantandtheDemandsofSelf-Consciousness. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.

Kitcher, Patricia. 1993. Kant’sTranscendentalPsychology. NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress.

———. 2010. Kant’sThinker. NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress.

Leibniz, GottfriedWilhelmFreiherr. 1996. NewEssaysonHumanUnderstanding. EditedbyJonathanBennettandPeterRemnant. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.

Longuenesse, Béatrice. 1998. KantandtheCapacitytoJudge. Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress.

Lurz, RobertW.2011. MindreadingAnimals: TheDebateoverWhatAnimalsKnowAboutOtherMinds. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press.

———, ed. 2009. ThePhilosophyofAnimalMinds. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.

Matherne, Samantha. “Kant’sTheoryofImagination.” In RoutledgeHandbookofthePhiloso-phyofImagination, editedbyAmyKind. NewYork: Routledge.

McDowell, John. 1996. MindandWorld: WithaNewIntroduction. Cambridge, MA:HarvardUniversityPress.

McLear, Colin. 2011. “KantonAnimalConsciousness.” Philosophers’Imprint 11(15): 1–16.

———. 2015a. “KantonPerceptualContent.” Mind.

———. 2015b. “TwoKindsofUnityinthe CritiqueofPureReason.” JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy 53(1): 79–110.

Meerbote, Ralf. 1991. “Kant’sFunctionalism.” In HistoricalFoundationsofCognitiveScience,editedbyJ-C Smith, 161–87. Dordrecht: KluwerAcademicPublishers.

Naragon, Steve. 1990. “KantonDescartesandtheBrutes.” Kant-Studien 81(1): 1–23.

Parsons, Charles. 1964. “InfinityandKant’sConceptionofthe‘PossibilityofExperience’.” ThePhilosophicalReview 73(2): 182–97.

———. 1992. “TheTranscendentalAesthetic.” In TheCambridgeCompaniontoKant, editedbyPaulGuyer, 62–100. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.

Paton, H J.1936. Kant’sMetaphysicofExperience. Vol. 1&2. London: G.Allen&Unwin, Ltd.

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———. 2009. “Kant’sTranscendentalArguments.” StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.

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Sellars, Wilfrid. 1956. “EmpiricismandthePhilosophyofMind.” MinnesotaStudies inthePhilosophyofScience 1: 253–329.

———. 1968. ScienceandMetaphysics: VariationsonKantianThemes. London: Routledge& KeeganPaul.

———. 1978. “BerkeleyandDescartes: ReflectionsontheTheoryofIdeas.” In StudiesinPer-ception, editedbyP K MachamerandR G Turnbull, 259–311. Columbus: OhioUniversityPress.

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———. 2011. TheContentsofVisualExperience. Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress.

Smit, Houston. 2000. “KantonMarksand the Immediacyof Intuition.” ThePhilosophicalReview 109(2): 235–66.

Strawson, PeterFrederick. 1966. TheBoundsofSense. London: Routledge.

———. 1970. “ImaginationandPerception.” In ExperienceandTheory, editedbyLawrenceFosterandJoeWilliamSwanson. Amherst: UniversityofMassachusetsPress.

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———. 2014. “KantontheContentofCognition.” EuropeanJournalofPhilosophy 22(2):200–228.

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Kant's Philosophy of Mind