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Helphand-Parvus and his Impact on TurkishIntellectual Life
M. ASIM KARAOMERLIOGLU
The role of the individual has been one of the most hotly-debated topics in
historiography. Until the twentieth century, a certain kind of history writing
focusing on the achievements of ‘great men’ with an overemphasis on the
history of the states, elites and mainstream politics had dominated
historiography. The rise of the Annales in the 1920s and later of the ‘history
from below’ approach, especially as was carried out by British Marxist
historians, in some ways reversed this historiographical tendency and led to a
new form of history writing that questioned the state-centred and elite
perceptions of history. Theirs was an attempt to direct attention to structures,
economic transformations, social classes and mass politics. Then, beginning
in 1968 with a series of great upheavals and mass movements, the impact of
voluntarism and human agency in the making of history came to be
emphasized more often, although this emphasis was different from the
nineteenth century historical style based on the history of ‘great men’. This
was, so to speak, a revival of the role of the individual and therefore of an
interest in biographical studies. This revival, however, was not simply a
return to the old style biographies of ‘great men,’ but, instead, was a call for
the inclusion of cultural impacts, socio-economic conditions, systems of
thought, psychological factors and the like. This article aims to be a modest
contribution to such a historiographical trend by focusing on the life of
Alexander Israel Helphand, generally known by his nickname, Parvus, or
Parvus Efendi, as his Turkish friends called him.
Helphand-Parvus, no doubt, is one of the most extraordinary political
figures of the twentieth century. He played an influential role in the political
and intellectual life of three countries: Russia, Germany and Turkey. He was
one of the leading Marxist theoreticians and revolutionaries in the Russian
Revolution of 1905, a prominent German Social Democrat in Germany, one
of the eminent figures of the Second International,1 and for a while an adviser
on economic issues to the Young Turks2 between 1910 and 1914 in Istanbul
where he also became a merchant millionaire. Furthermore, during the last
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.40, No.6, November 2004, pp.145 – 165ISSN 0026-3206 print/1743-7881 onlineDOI: 10.1080/0026320042000282928 # 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.
decade of his life, he was influential not only in contributing to the making of
the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia, but also in the formation of post-
war Germany as an adviser to the Weimar Republic.3
Parvus’s life story in Russia and Germany is well known, thanks especially
to Zeman and Scharlau’s brilliant biography entitled The Merchant of
Revolution, The Life of Israel Alexander Helphand Parvus.4 The four years of
his life that he spent in Turkey, however, to a great extent, remain a mystery.
Although some information written in Turkish is available, this information
falls short of being a systematic and comprehensive analysis of his life and
intellectual ventures in Istanbul.5 The situation is even worse as far as western
sources are concerned, and with the exception of Paul Dumont’s article on
Parvus’s life in Turkey,6 almost no study exists. Parvus’s four years of
residence in Istanbul, however, had a formative impact both on his
personality and his political orientation. Faced with the lack of scholarly
studies about these formative years of Parvus, whom I regard as one of the
twentieth century’s leading intellectual and political figures, I would like to
conduct a systematic, historiographic and personal study of his life in Istanbul
and his impact on Turkish intellectual life.
Before focusing on his Turkish experience, it is important to mention
briefly his life in Russia and Germany. This is essential because scholars of
Middle Eastern history, by and large, have not heard of his influential and
colourful life in those countries. Parvus was born into a middle-class Jewish
family in Russia in 1867. Early in his life in the mid-1880s, he was influenced
by Russian Marxists such as Plekhanov, Akselrod and Zasulic.7 He was never
directly involved in the internal struggles of the Russian Social Democracy;
although he was closer to the Mensheviks for he never believed in the
historical role of the vanguard party envisioned by Lenin.8 In the 1890s, as a
political exile in Switzerland, he received a Ph.D. degree from the University
of Basle.9 Frustrated with academia, however, he joined the German Social
Democratic circles where he developed close friendships with people such as
Karl Kautsky, Clara Zetkin, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Radek and he soon
became one of the most distinguished theoreticians of this party. Interest-
ingly, during the late 1890s, he was the first person in the party to make a
systematic critique of Eduard Bernstein’s revisionist theses which, in a
nutshell, emphasized spontaneity and political reform as opposed to radical
revolution.10 Rosa Luxembourg11 and Parvus were ‘regarded as hotheads and
firebrands by the party hierarchy’.12 In the 1890s and early 1900s, he was not
only engaged in political matters of German and Russian Marxism, but also
extensively wrote on matters such as imperialism, the agrarian question,
finance capital and capitalism, in general.13 For instance, in the 1890s he was
the first to observe and speculate about the long waves of capitalism, a
phenomenon that was later attributed to Kondratieff in the 1920s.14
146 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
In the early 1900s, Parvus’s house in Munich became one of the focal
points of many Russian exiles such as Lenin and Trotsky.15 When the
Revolution of 1905 broke out in Russia, Parvus withdrew into the country,
actively participated in the revolution, and, together with Trotsky, became
one of the most important political figures of the St. Petersburg Soviet.16 His
political and intellectual impact on Trotsky, especially between 1904 and
1909,17 was remarkable and was later acknowledged with appreciation by
Trotsky. According to Trotsky:
Parvus was unquestionably one of the most important of the Marxists at
the turn of the century. He used the Marxian methods in a competent
way, was possessed of wide vision, and kept a keen eye on everything
of importance in world events. This, coupled with his fearless thinking
and his virile, muscular style, made him a remarkable writer. His early
studies brought me closer to the problems of the Social Revolution,
and, for me, definitely transformed the conquest of power by the
proletariat from an astronomical ‘final’ goal to a practical task for our
own day.18
Years later, Trotsky wrote that ‘there is no doubt that he [Parvus] exerted
considerable influence on my personal development, especially with respect
to the social–revolutionary understanding of our epoch.’19 Indeed, the famous
theory of permanent revolution that is generally attributed to Trotsky was
originally formulated by Parvus.20 As early as 1905, he developed his theory
on the peculiarities of the semi-Asiatic character of pre-capitalist Russia. He
argued that cities constituted only administrative centres and were ‘purely
official and bureaucratic in character.’ He claimed that ‘the Russian middle
class was weak, and the workers could and should take the lead in the
revolution, ultimately establishing, ‘‘a workers’’’ democracy.’21 The theory of
permanent revolution, which rejected the overwhelmingly dominant revolu-
tionary paradigm that was popular among the Marxists at the time, was based
on the necessity of a ‘bourgeois democratic’ stage on the way to socialism in
Russia. Indeed, this outstanding contribution of Parvus was vindicated by the
actual historical path that the Russian Revolution took. According to him, the
Russian Social Democrats alone supported by the Russian working class
could assume the political power in Russia and this was the perspective Lenin
adopted only as late as April 1917.
Parvus was an acute observer and a brilliant theoretician. Many of the
theories attributed to Trotsky, such as the worldwide development of
capitalism,22 the decline of the economic and political roles of the nation-
states, capitalism as an ever growing universal system, the significance of the
mass strike as the initiator of political revolution, the Soviet as the role model
HELPHAND-PARVUS 147
for revolutionary political organization, and the ‘actuality of revolution’ were
in fact, initially and brilliantly, put forward by Parvus.23 He was one of the
first and early revolutionary theoreticians who characterized Russia as the
‘weakest link’ of the imperialist system.24 As early as 1904, he talked about
the inevitability of a world war between industrial nations that would result in
world revolution.25 Long before Lenin, Parvus developed a theory of
imperialism which, unlike Marx’s, pointed out that imperialism in the
colonies did not necessarily lead to economic development or capitalism.26
Distancing himself from the eurocentric theories of imperialism, Parvus
pointed out hindrances to as well as the advance of capitalism in the colonies,
a theory similar to the one widely popular in the 1960s and 1970s, especially
in Latin America.
When the revolutionary waves faded away in 1906, Parvus, Trotsky and
many other revolutionaries were imprisoned, and later sent to exile in Siberia,
from where they were able to escape. Parvus returned to Germany, and
continued contributing to political and theoretical discussions in the party.
However, his political and personal life in Germany created several
problems. The hostility felt towards him by the leaders of the German
Social Democrat Party escalated as the Russian Marxists accused him of
embezzling the money coming from the European copyright revenues of the
Bolshevik writer Maxim Gorky.27 Tired of the suffocating atmosphere in the
party circles,28 and convinced that a socialist revolution, far from being
possible through working class activities, could come about only as a result of
an inter-imperialist world war likely to start in the Balkans.29 Parvus, in 1910,
came to Istanbul to work as a quite poor press correspondent of a German
Social Democratic newspaper.30 This marked the beginning of Parvus’s
almost five years of residence in Istanbul, the story of which I will return to
later in this article.
During the First World War, Parvus openly carried out pro-German
propaganda activities, and, for this reason, was severely criticized by many of
his former socialist comrades.31 He even encouraged the Ottoman authorities
to enter the War on the side of the Germans, and published two pamphlets to
propagate this goal.32 He believed that such a nationalist attitude did not
contradict his Marxist principles, because what was crucial was the withering
away of Tsarist Russia, the heart of European reactionism and backwardness.
According to him, ‘Only a Russian defeat by the Germans could make the
revolution possible since Germans were the carriers of high culture.’33
Therefore, supporting Germany did not create a problem for him, because
the eventual result would be a socialist revolution.34 What is more, he
believed, if Tsarist Russia actually won the war, this would harm the
democratic nature of the political regimes both in the Entente and the Allied
countries.35 Whether Germany could benefit from this situation was not the
148 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
crux of the matter. After all, he was the ‘merchant of revolution’ and perhaps,
this was the first time that the Germans found in Parvus an adviser who knew
Russia so well.36
In the last year of his residence in Istanbul, Parvus contacted the German
Ambassador, Wangenheim, and proposed a grand and impressive plan to
undermine Russia’s standing in the war. The German Ambassador’s telegram
to the German Foreign Ministry about Parvus stated:
The well-known Russian Socialist and publicist, Dr Helphand, one of
the main leaders of the last Russian Revolution, who was exiled from
Russia and has, on several occasions, been expelled from Germany, has
for some time been active here as a writer, concerning himself chiefly
with questions of Turkish economics. Since the beginning of the war,
Parvus’s attitude has been definitely pro-German. He is helping Dr
Zimmer in his support of the Ukrainian movement and he also rendered
useful services in the founding of Batsarias’s newspaper in Bucharest.
In a conversation with me, which he had requested through Zimmer,
Parvus said that the Russian Democrats could only achieve their aim by
the total destruction of Czarism and the division of Russia into smaller
states. On the other hand, Germany would not be completely successful
if it were not possible to kindle a major revolution in Russia. However,
there would still be a danger to Germany from Russia, even after the
war, if the Russian Empire were not divided into a number of separate
parts. The interests of the German government were therefore identical
with those of the Russian revolutionaries, who were already at work.
However, there was as yet a lack of cohesion between the various
factions. The Mensheviks had not yet joined forces with the
Bolsheviks, who had already gone into action. He saw it as his task
to create a unity and to organize the rising on a broad basis. To achieve
this, a congress of the leaders would first of all be needed – possibly in
Geneva. He was prepared to take the necessary first step to this end, but
would need considerable sums of money for the purpose. He therefore
requested an opportunity of presenting his plans in Berlin. He
confidently expected an Imperial Circular holding out to the [German]
Social Democrats the prospect of an immediate improvement in
primary schools and in average working hours, as a reward for their
patriotic attitude, to have a considerable effect not only on German
Socialists serving in the Army, but also on Russians sharing his own
political opinions. Parvus has today travelled via Sofia and Bucharest to
Vienna, where he will have discussions with Russian revolutionaries.
Dr. Zimmer will arrive in Berlin at the same time as Parvus, and will be
available to arrange meetings with him. In Parvus’s opinion, action
HELPHAND-PARVUS 149
must be taken quickly, so that the new Russian recruits will arrive at the
front already contaminated.
Wangenheim.37
In a memorandum entitled ‘The Plan for the Russian Revolution’ written
for this purpose, Parvus states that local economic strikes should gradually
evolve into a general strike with political demands (based on the slogan
‘peace and freedom’) that would then result in the fall of the Tsarist regime.
This could only be led by Russian socialists, and Parvus suggested that
Germany help organize a conference of Russian socialist leaders in a neutral
country such as Switzerland.38 His plan was based on Germany’s active
financial and political support of the revolutionary and nationalist movements
in Russia, especially of the radical wing, the Bolsheviks. These efforts were
aimed at making Russia focus on internal dissident movements, thus
weakening its war efforts.39 Interestingly, Parvus was soon invited to Berlin to
present his plan to the higher echelons of the foreign ministry which he
finally managed to convince. It was due to his plan that huge amounts of
money were pumped into the dissident movements40 inside and outside of
Russia, through a firm founded by Parvus in Copenhagen. The famed
adventurous Bolshevik revolutionary Hanecki (Kuba), who was known as
Lenin’s ‘bodyguard’ and known for providing the Bolsheviks with financial
resources, was involved in speculative and lucrative businesses with Parvus41
despite Lenin’s later denial of any relations whatsoever between the
Bolsheviks and Parvus.42 In fact, it was Parvus who convinced the German
authorities to arrange the famous sealed train by which the emigre Russian
Bolshevik leaders, including Lenin, entered Russia in April of 1917 just after
the February Revolution broke out.43
Seen as such, Parvus’s extraordinary impact on the Russian Revolution is
undeniable. Kerensky, the prime minister of Russia during the days of the
Revolution of 1917, accused the Bolsheviks, particularly their leader Lenin,
of spying for Germany. Indeed, during the famous ‘July Days’ of the Russian
Revolution when the Bolsheviks were declared illegal and went underground,
it was their relationship with Parvus that put them into this difficult
situation.44 Moreover, decades after the revolution, the conservative
historiographical interpretation of the events of 1917 simply as a Bolshevik
coup rather than a genuine political revolution in which German spying
activity sponsored by Parvus has occupied the centre stage has been widely
accepted in academic circles.45 Although such interpretations are certainly
exaggerated, reducing the seminal role of the social and economic discontent
Russia faced in 1917 to a simple conspiracy,46 conservative and influential
Russian historians, such as Richard Pipes, have generally interpreted the
Revolution in this light.47
150 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
Despite his contributions, the Bolsheviks did not let Parvus enter Russia
after the Revolution. ‘The cause of the revolution should not be touched by
dirty hands’, Lenin replied to Parvus’s desire to return to his homeland.48 He
thus stayed in Germany and became an adviser to the Weimar Republic. He
was, without a doubt, an important figure in the formation and shaping of the
Weimar Republic. When he died of a heart attack in 1924 in Germany, this
famous Marxist revolutionary theorist and adventurer was one of Germany’s
richest men. To understand how this happened, we need to return to 1910, the
year he first came to Istanbul.
Parvus’s activities in the late Ottoman Empire between 1910 and 1914
should be investigated under three headings: his intellectual impact on
Young Turk thinking, his political activities and, last but not least, his
speculative business transactions. Just as he was involved in German
politics as if Germany were his own country,49 Parvus involved himself
deeply in Turkish politics, developing relationships with the Young Turk
leaders and devising policies especially concerning economic issues in the
Ottoman Empire. According to Georgeon, Parvus had a deep intellectual
impact on the Young Turks.50 Although we do not know exactly when and
how Parvus developed close relations with the Young Turks,51 he became a
popular figure in the Young Turk press and focused extensively on
economic issues.52 He was made an honorary member of Turkish nationalist
associations such as Turk Bilgi Dernegi53 and wrote continuously in Turkish
journals and newspapers such as Bilgi Mecmuası, Jeune Turc, Turk Yurdu,
Azadamard, Ictihad and Tasvir-i Efkar. He even wrote a book on the
foreign debts of Turkey entitled Turkiye’nin Can Damarı: Devlet-i
Osmaniye’nin Borcları ve Islahı (Turkey’s Vital Interest: The Debts of
the Ottoman State and its Reform).54 Parvus’s impact on Young Turk
thinking in economic matters can be best seen in his writings published
between 1912 and 1914 in the influential journal Turk Yurdu, which was a
pan-Turkist journal, first published in 1911, whose contributors consisted
primarily of emigre Tatar intellectuals, especially the prominent Yusuf
Akcura, who played a leading role in this endeavour, as well as the leading
Turkish intelligentsia of the time.55 In his introduction of Parvus to the Turk
Yurdu readers, Akcura pointed out that Parvus was a well-known Social
Democrat (Marxist) in Europe, who was going to contribute to the pages of
the journal on economic issues. Despite the difference in ideological
orientation between Parvus and the Turk Yurdu circle, a difference between
Social Democracy and nationalism, Akcura wrote that in terms of being a
populist (halkseven) they shared the same concerns.56
Parvus urged the Young Turk intelligentsia to pay more attention to the
economic necessities of the country. As a matter of fact, he saw the decline of
the Ottomans as a result of the deterioration of the Ottoman economy rather
HELPHAND-PARVUS 151
than of cultural, religious, and political factors, a perspective quite
widespread among many European Orientalists of the time.57 According to
him, the Ottomans were concerned only with state finances, but not with the
economy at large. They had either ignored the economy completely or wasted
all the available sources that could be used for economic development.58
Unlike European states, which also had foreign debts, Parvus argued, the
Ottoman bureaucracy irrationally and wastefully consumed its foreign loans
which then became a big financial burden for the country.59 He also carefully
distinguished the state from the people and the nation arguing that, thanks to
economic dynamism, nations can survive even if they lose their political
independence as was the case in Poland.60
In many of his writings on the Ottoman Empire in general and on the
Ottoman economy in particular, Parvus emphasized the peculiarities of the
development of capitalism in the non-western world such as the Ottoman
Empire that was completely different from that of West European
experience. This view stemmed from Parvus’s understanding of imperi-
alism, a theme that ran through the heart of his writings. In this sense, he
differed from the classical Marxist interpretation of imperialism that
expected capitalist development also in the economically backward
countries and the colonies. In other words, like Karl Kautsky, Parvus
emphasized that rather than development, in places such as the Ottoman
Empire, the impact of European imperialism could only lead to the
hindrance of development and to the destruction of domestic economic
life.61 He therefore continuously criticized the imperialist dominance of
Europe over the Ottoman Empire. In this vein, he claimed, for instance,
that German imperialism, by using its railroad construction undertakings in
the region, was colonizing Anatolia for its own interests and expanding its
sphere of influence.62 It was European financial power that in reality
controlled the destiny of the country, not the Ottoman state, not the
nation, not the Muslims nor the Christians.63 The financial domination of
the Europeans was made possible not only by the ever-increasing debt of
the Ottomans, but also by lucrative businesses such as railroad
construction in the Empire.64 According to Parvus, the Ottoman state,
far from serving the interests of the Ottoman people, had simply become a
puppet of European finance capital.65
To make his point, Parvus harshly attacked the Public Debt Organization
(Duyun-i Umumiye) which was founded in 1881 as a multi-national European
institution with the aim of directly collecting taxes and revenues of many
major Ottoman goods.66 This organization, in fact, was so powerful that it was
able to control and manipulate the Ottoman economy.67 Parvus pointed out
that the Organization prospered while the Ottoman state finances deteriorated
and emphasized that it functioned like a parasite and for the sole interests of
152 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
the Europeans. A case in point was the Organization’s huge investment in
Italian state bonds while the Ottomans were at war with the Italians!68
Similarly, Parvus relentlessly criticized the capitulations and argued that
overall the financial and economic dependence of the Ottomans made them
politically vulnerable vis-a-vis the Europeans.69 As Berkes points out, ‘it was
with Parvus that anti-liberal and anti-imperialistic economic ideas along
Marxian lines began to appear in the Turkish press’.70 The solution Parvus
offered was an economic policy of creating a ‘National Economy’ based on
an anti-liberal idea.71 The policy of ‘National Economy’, first and foremost,
implied getting rid of the non-Muslim and foreign merchants and
industrialists and founding an industrial base to foster independent economic
development.72 In this sense, two of his points deserve special attention.
Parvus argued that the liberal theories of which the Ottomans had been
mistakenly quite fond of for decades, led to the destruction of the domestic
economy, a resulting lack of industry and increased Ottoman dependence on
the Europeans.73 Secondly, although as a Marxist he was aware of the
possible class differentiation that industrialization could bring about, Parvus
argued that a national economy and industry were the sine qua non of
liberating the Ottoman Empire from European yoke.74
Despite his harsh critique of European imperialism, Parvus cautioned
Ottoman intellectuals not to develop hatred towards Europe. In this sense, he
touched upon a very delicate discussion which is still unabated in Turkey
today. According to him, there were two Europes, one of them being the
imperialistic, military and official Europe, and the other being the
‘democratic’ one. Historically, Turkey only knew and imitated the former.
However, the other Europe, the ‘democratic’ one, was the Europe struggling
against its own speculators, exploiters and dictators, and not the Europe of the
diplomats, bankers and capitalists. In their struggle against the imperialistic
Europe, the Turks should learn and cooperate with the democratic one.75 For
instance, the other Europe, he stressed, could exemplify a democratic
tradition for the Turks.
Another recurring theme in Parvus’s writings is the lack of democracy
in Turkey. He severely criticized the Unionists for their unwillingness to
have a democratic government and argued that public opinion and
consciousness are required for the development of democracy.76 Because
there was no effective public pressure on the Ottoman government,
arbitrariness and the abuse of state power could often be the rule in the
Empire.77 Furthermore, public pressure was necessary not only for the
control of domestic affairs, but for putting pressure on European
governments as well. For Parvus, a government which did not respect
the public opinion of the nation should not expect to be taken seriously by
the Europeans.78
HELPHAND-PARVUS 153
One of the most important and interesting topics that Parvus dealt with in
the Ottoman press was related to the question of the peasantry. He can
certainly be considered one of the first social critics in Turkey who raised the
issue of the importance of improving the social and economic conditions of
the Ottoman peasants for the well-being of the Empire as a whole and of the
state in particular.79 According to him, the intelligentsia ignored the Turkish
peasants, to a large extent, despite the fact that they not only made up of the
majority of the population, but also constituted the financial and military
strength of the Ottoman state. In this sense, his critiques anticipated those of
Omer Lutfi Barkan of the 1930s who complained about the ignorance of the
Turkish intelligentsia with regard to the question of peasantry and
landlessness.80
Economic and financial expert that he was, Parvus elaborated on the
systematic discrimination of the Ottoman Turkish peasantry. According to
him, the peasants in Anatolia and Syria paid almost twice as much tax to
the state than, for example, the peasants in the European provinces of the
Empire.81 He quoted Anatolian peasants who complained that even the
Turkish/Muslim peasants in Bulgaria were living under relatively much
better conditions. Parvus further pointed out that city dwellers, especially
the non-Muslims and the rich, together with the well-to-do farmers of the
countryside, could avoid being drafted into the army by paying a certain
amount of cash.82 Ironically, though, it was in fact the poor peasants who
provided the necessary manpower and were needed for agricultural
production given the primitive level of technology of the time. Parvus
often described the terrible conditions prevailing among the Anatolian
peasants. Many of his writings are full of observations about disease,
famine and poverty in the Anatolian countryside.83 After the Crimean War,
he wrote, the economic misery of the Anatolian peasantry worsened
because of the impact of European economic penetration and the rising
level of state spending.84
The peasant question, in Parvus’s mind, was directly related to the question
of the state. He raised the question of the real duty of the state and argued that
the state, first and foremost, should take into account the necessities of the
peasants since they made up the majority of the population.85 Although the
military and economic basis of the Ottoman state had been the peasants for
centuries, the state had never helped them.86 The only time the state thought
of them was when it needed to recruit soldiers and collect taxes. What he
suggested was offering credit facilities to the peasants and delivering titles to
land which the peasants desperately lacked. Even the government’s railroad
project had to be pursued based on the necessities of the peasants.87 This was,
of course, a very harsh critique of the Unionists who were then in power. He
also related the declining power of the Unionists to their increasing distance
154 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
from the peasants. In his opinion, the Unionists did not fulfil any of the
promises of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, such as alleviating taxes
paid by the peasants.88 According to him
One of the reasons behind the decline of the CUP influence is that
nothing was done for the prosperity of the peasants for the last four
years under the Constitutional administration. The peasants until now
have been in an extraordinarily miserable situation. But, it is the
peasants who make up the Ottoman army. . .. The question of
alleviating the tax burden of the peasants arose just after the revolution.
This issue, however, was always postponed and finally nothing was
done. This, however, was a fatal mistake.
The intelligentsia’s ignorance of the peasants, Parvus wrote, led to the
failure of Turkish nationalism. Based on historical examples, he argued that
the Armenian, Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek intellectuals and politicians
had taken care of their peasants, but the Turkish intelligentsia did not.89
They even avoided their peasants. In so doing, Parvus continued, the
Turkish intelligentsia not only left the Turks out of politics, but also made
themselves into aimless and disoriented intellectuals.90 Parvus stressed that
the peasants were necessary for the intelligentsia in its nationalist project,
yet the intelligentsia was not really doing what was necessary. For this
reason, he harshly criticized the Unionist government and the Turkish
intelligentsia:
You accepted the Constitutional way; however, you did not uncover the
desires of the people. You, the intelligentsia, distance yourselves from
the nation and you do not get to know your own people. You either
idolize them like heroes in your dreams or disapprove of their
ignorance and conservatism. There is no common point between your
feelings and the life of the people. . .When you think that you are
dealing with the issues of people’s prosperity, in fact, you deal with
your own dreams, not with their realities.91
Parvus’s standpoint on the question of the peasantry is very interesting
in the sense that he perceived the peasant question in the Ottoman Empire
directly as a question of ethnicity and, therefore, nationalism. This, he
wrote, was inevitable given the disintegrating multi-ethnic structure of the
Ottoman Empire.92 In other words, the Turkish intelligentsia had to ‘go to
the people’ to win their hearts and minds and only then would be able to
implement their nationalistic project with the mass support won from the
Turkish peasants. Likewise, in a letter to the Turkish youth, Parvus
HELPHAND-PARVUS 155
contended that the power the youth was seeking should be found in the
people only.93
Parvus’s remarks point to the paradox between the discourse and the
practice of the Young Turks. Although the Turkish intelligentsia started
talking about the people and the peasants, they had indeed achieved little, if
anything, for the prosperity of the peasants. The great hopes and expectations
of the peasants aroused by the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 were not
fulfilled at all.94 According to a journalist, Ahmed Serif, who toured Anatolia
a year after the revolution, the peasants were frustrated by the revolution, as
nothing significant had changed for them. As many observers of the time
noted, the taxes were unjust and not collected peacefully; murders and theft
in villages continued, and life in the countryside became even worse and
more chaotic than before.95
One of Parvus’s most important attempts to influence the Young Turks can
be seen in his conviction that the Ottoman Empire should side with Germany
in the First World War. Though we do not know to what extent his pro-
German attitudes and writings had an impact on the Young Turks,96 we know
that his pamphlets and articles on this question were widely read by the
leading statesmen and intellectuals of the time.97 His pamphlets were broadly
discussed in the Ottoman media and newspapers such as Ikdam, Tasvir-i
Efkar and Tercuman-ı Hakikat and articles were published concerning
Parvus’s pamphlets. In the two pamphlets he wrote a month after the outbreak
of the war, he seems to speculate on the probable outcome of the war on the
world; however, a close look at the pamphlets makes it clear that his real
intention was to convince the Unionists that they should side with the
Germans.
One of the reasons why he felt the government should side with Germany
was Britain’s hostile attitude toward the Ottomans. Parvus noted that in
recent decades the British were hardly concerned with the Ottoman Empire,
but rather focused on Egypt and India.98 With the decline of British
imperialism vis-a-vis Germany, the British attitude towards the under-
developed world relied on the retardation of any possible development in
these countries.99 Furthermore, the British were increasingly occupied with
controlling the oilfields in the Ottoman Empire,100 and such an attitude left no
options for the Ottomans, other than collaboration with Germany.
One of the most important standpoints that can be found in Parvus’s
pamphlets is his hostility towards Russia.101 According to him, Germany and
the Ottoman Empire shared common interests against Russia and Britain.102
The Russians, he argued, had their eye on the straits, but, he continued,
Russia’s main interest in the region was not the straits, but the vast area of the
Middle East that the Ottomans controlled.103 This standpoint, of course,
coincides with Parvus’s discussion of the general context of Europe. His main
156 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
concern was the defeat of Russia at any cost and this explains why he
sounded like a German patriot. According to him, a Russian defeat in the War
would fuel the revolutionary and nationalistic movements in Russia, and then
political power could change hands. Even in his first pamphlets, Parvus talks
about a possible socialist revolution due to the war, and goes further and
prophetically states that a peace treaty could even be signed by a
‘revolutionary’ government.104
Just after the War broke out in Europe, Parvus wrote an article in the
influential newspaper Tasvir-i Efkar in which he outlined the measures the
Ottoman government should take. Parvus pointed out that the war could last
longer than expected, that a socialist revolution could take place because of
war, and therefore Turkey should prepare herself for long-lasting troubled
times. The first and the most crucial measure was to abolish the capitulations
as soon as possible and indeed the government did so soon after.105 In addition
to this, he proposed measures for the government such as the nationalization
of the railroads, the prohibition of the export of gold, the taxation of foreign
residents, and the raising of customs duties.106
In Istanbul, Parvus did not simply limit his activities to the intellectual
sphere. He was deeply concerned with and involved in socialist and dissident
movements in the Ottoman Empire,107 the Balkans, and Russia. He carefully
observed such movements, advised those intellectuals and activists on several
crucial topics and developed relations with them. As soon as he came to
Istanbul, he contacted the famous Romanian Marxist, Rakovsky,108 a former
friend of his who was also then in Istanbul and who provided the necessary
connections in socialist circles. In 1910, with Rakovsky and others, he
celebrated May Day in Istanbul.109 He had close relations with the Socialist
Worker Federation that was founded in the Ottoman Empire. His special
attention, though, was directed towards the socialist and nationalist move-
ments in the Balkans.110 He often went to the Balkan countries and attempted
to organize a federalist, democratic organization throughout the area (he also
had business relations there).111 According to the German Ambassador
mentioning Parvus’s political activities in the Balkans, in January 1915,
‘there exists in Sofia and Bucharest an organization of Russian revolution-
aries, and these elements seem now to have gone to work.’112 Parvus, together
with Vlahof and Rakovsky, wrote a political manifesto in an effort to prevent
the coming Balkan War.113 His main concern, there, was to form an anti-
Russian political bloc, and for this reason, he saw the nationalist dissident
movements as very important to weaken Russia.114 For example, he tacitly
supported the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine in its cause for the
independence of the Ukraine.115 Likewise, he had good relations with the
Armenian and Georgian revolutionaries.116 At one time, he made considerable
efforts in reconciling the competing Armenian revolutionary organizations,
HELPHAND-PARVUS 157
the Dasnaks and the Hincaks.117 It has often been argued that Parvus offered
‘useful strategical information’ to the Young Turk governments about the
state of things in the Balkans and, in turn, was rewarded, perhaps monetarily,
for his secretive activities.118
In addition to Parvus’s intellectual and political activities in the Ottoman
Empire, his business ventures turn out to be a very interesting topic of study
as well. In fact, it was his business transactions, that made it possible for him
to contact the German authorities at the outbreak of war, thus ensuring his
immense role during the Russian Revolution in 1917.
As pointed out above, Parvus came to Istanbul as a poor journalist. The
income he got from news correspondence to the German and Austrian
newspapers was not significant.119 Initially, he led a quite modest life. For
instance, he often ate in cheap restaurants. But, he immediately realized with
his seismographic talents that Istanbul was the best place for him to convert
his intellectual abilities into money and wealth. After all, he had worked on
theories of imperialism, financial flows, commercial activities and stock
markets for a long time. Ironically, then, his Marxist background would offer
him the personal wealth with which he could make his own revolution and
publish his own journal. His Turkish experience taught him something that he
could hardly learn anywhere else: if you have close relations with the
government, you can make an incredible fortune very easily in a short period!
He was therefore able to make huge financial gains by the synthesis of his
brilliant financial abilities with his closeness to the Young Turks.120
However, one cannot trace Parvus’s business transactions in exact detail,
since he himself burnt many of his documents before he died.121 Still, there is
enough information and widespread rumours that may be revealing in this
respect. According to one such rumour, Parvus, while in an Istanbul coffee-
house, passed some insider information that he had secretly got from
government officials to a businessman and within moments had made an
incredible fortune.122 During the Balkan Wars and after, he imported railway
equipment for the Ottoman army and spare parts for the milling industry;
founded a publishing house in Istanbul,123 and became a business agent for
several European businesses, including the Krupp and perhaps Sir Basil
Zaharoff, ‘the mystery man of Europe’.124 He also established businesses in
neighbouring countries such as Bulgaria and was actively involved in trade.125
With the outbreak of the First World War, he made his first million by
delivering bread to Istanbul.126 Later in his notebooks, he commented on this
speculative business as something that had saved the Young Turk regime
from disaster.127 Not surprisingly, after he moved out of Istanbul, he
continued to run his businesses during the war and was mostly involved in
provisioning ammunition to different European armies.128 It has been
suggested that he had ‘dabbled in smuggling obsolete German arms, for
158 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
which there was a great demand in the Balkans, and made a considerable
fortune out of these deals.’129
The once poor and revolutionary Marxist turned out to be a millionaire
merchant and speculator, and for this reason, his old friends such as Trotsky
condemned him harshly and their destinies parted irreversibly.130 In Trotsky’s
eyes, Parvus changed so much that he considered him to have died and even
wrote an ‘obituary’ for Parvus.131 Despite the many different evaluations
written about Parvus, I think he still should be seen as an extraordinary
cosmopolitan intellectual of the turn of the twentieth century whose influence
on the political and intellectual life of at least three countries was
considerable. He did not learn socialism from books, nor did notions such
as freedom or equality inspire him in this regard. He rather found a meaning
in socialism because of his adventurous nature. As an eminent Russian
historian said, he was ‘a character from a Balzac novel’. He was a gambler
and an ‘adventurer in politics, in socialist thought, in high finance, in high
diplomacy, and in love (perhaps the word should be sex) – a free-thinker, a
free-actor, and a freebooter in all of them.’132 Not all of his predictions came
true; not all the risks he took turned out to be successful; not all of his
undertakings were worthy of esteem, but, as Trotsky noted, he ‘did
everything on a large scale.’133 In a world of mediocrity and a time of
decadence, he was colourful, ambitious, theoretical, prophetic, extraordinary,
– a man of incredible intuition and intelligence.
NOTES
I would like to thank Bogazici University Research Fund (project no 01HZ103) for funding thisresearch.
1. K. Haenisch, Parvus; ein Blatt der Erinnerung (Berlin: Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaft,1925), p.5.
2. See S. Aksin, Jon Turkler ve Ittihat ve Terakki (Istanbul: Gercek Yayınları,1980), p.278.Parvus later on openly denied that he was any adviser whatsoever to the Young Turks in theface of harsh criticisms from European socialists. See Parvus’s ‘Ein Verleumdungswerk’,Die Glocke, No.3, (Oct. 1915), pp.129–130.
3. B.D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution (New York: Dial Press, 1964), p.300; HeinzSchurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus – Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’,Russian Review, Vol.18, No.4 (1959), p.330.
4. As Professor Mete Tuncay reminded me, in the original German edition, instead of‘merchant of revolution’, ‘freebooter’ is used. I think in the case of Parvus, ‘merchant’ ismore appropriate. (Freibeuter der Revolution Parvus/ Helphand. Eine politischeBiographie (Koln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1964). Wolfe, however, argues that‘freebooter’ is a better term than ‘merchant’ to characterize Parvus. See Wolfe’s review onZeman and Scharlau’s English edition in Slavic Review, Vol.25, No.4 (1966), p.697.
5. Many Turkish sources give incredibly false information about Parvus’s life. One example isA. Sayılgan’s Turkiye’de Sol Hareketler (1871–1972) (Istanbul: Hareket,1972), pp.55–9.See also F. Tevetoglu, Turkiye’de Sosyalist ve Komunist Faaliyetler (Ankara: Ayyıldız,1967), pp.477–8.
HELPHAND-PARVUS 159
6. P.Dumont, ‘Un economiste social-democrate au service de la Jeune Turquie’, in MemorialOmer Lutfi Barkan, (Paris:Librairie d’Amerique et d’Orient Adrien Maisonneuve,1980),pp.75–86.
7. C. Zetkin, ‘Helphand Parvus’, Die Kommunisticshe Internationale; Organ Des Execu-tivkomitees der Kommunistischen Internationale, Imprint, (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1967),originally published in 1925, p.78.
8. G. Katkov, Russia 1917, The February Revolution (New York: Harper & Row Publishers,1967), p.78.
9. Whether Parvus got the degree is a point of controversy, however. According to Heresch,Parvus ‘had not earned his academic title, but awarded it to himself to help create arespectable image’. See Elisabeth Heresch, The Empire of the Tsars, the Splendour and theFall (Stroitel, 1993), p.184.
10. M. Donald, Marxism and Revolution, Karl Kautsky and the Russian Marxists 1900–1924(London: Yale University Press, 1993), p.10; Schurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus –Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’, p.314.
11. Parvus and Rosa Luxembourg were lovers for some time. See Z.A.B. Zeman and WinfriedB. Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution; the Life of Alexander Israel Helpland (Parvus)1867–1924, (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p.106.
12. Schurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus – Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’, p.315.13. Some of Parvus’s works include Mezhdunarodnyi zhandarm (Geneva, 1904); K. soldatam
(Geneva, 1904); V chem my raskhodimsia? (Geneva, 1905); Nastoiashchee politicheskoepolozhenie i vidy budushchago (St. Petersburg, 1906); Die Kolonialpolitik und derZusammenbruch (Leipzig, 1907); Rossiia i revoliutsiia (St. Petersburg, 1907); DieReichstagwahlen und die Arbetierschaft (Leipzig, 1907); Der gewerkschaftliche Kampf(Berlin, 1908); Die Sozialdemokratie und der Parlamentarismus (Berlin, 1908); Diekapitalistische Produktion und das Proletariat (Berlin, 1908); Der Ideenkampf gegen denSozialismus (Berlin, 1910); Das soziale problem unserer Zeit (Dresden, 1910); Die Banken,der Staat und die Industrie (Dresden, 1910); Der Sozialismus und die soziale Revolution(Berlin, 1910); Der Klassenkampf des Proletariats (Berlin, 1911); Die Soziale Bilanz desKrieges (Berlin, 1917); Der Arbeitersozialismus und die Weltrevolution (Berlin, 1919); DerStaat, die Industrie und der Sozialismus (Berlin, 1919); Germany’s Economic Remedy(Berlin, 1921).
14. H.A. Goldstein and Michael I. Luger, ‘Theory and Practise in High-Tech EconomicDevelopment’, in R.D. Bingham and Robert Mier (ed.) Theories of Local EconomicDevelopment, Perspectives From Across the Disciplines (Newbury Park: Sage, 1993),p.152; Jacob van Duijn, ‘Kondratieff’, The Economist, June 9, 1979, p.6.
15. ‘. . .. Helphand’s flat in Schwabing was a focal point for the Russian exile. Rosa Luxemburgmet Lenin there for the first time; Lev Trotsky stayed there with his wife.’ Zeman andScharlau, The Merchant of Revolution, p.57; Schurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus –Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’, pp.314–15.
16. Trotsky, My Life (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), p.177.17. Schurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus – Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’, p.317.18. Trotsky, My Life, p.167.19. Leon Trotsky, Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1941), pp.429–30.20. N. Geras, The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg (London :New Left Books, 1976), p.47.21. K.A. Wittfogel, ‘The Marxist View of Russian Society and Revolution’, World Politics,
Vol.2, No.4 (1960), p.502.22. In 1898 Lenin praised Parvus’s book on the development of world market. See Lenin’s
review ‘Parvus. The World Market and the Agricultural Crisis. Economic Essays, CollectedWorks, Vol.4 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1960), pp.65–6. Lenin with his own initiativewas involved in 1908 for the translation of Die Kolonialpolitik und der Zusammenbruch(1907) into Russian. See O.F. Solov’ev, ‘Parvus: Politicheskii Portret’, Novaia i NoveishaiaIstoriia, No.1 (1991), p.170.
23. Zeman and Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution , p.76.
160 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
24. I. Berlin, ‘The Origins of Bolshevism: The Intellectual Evolution of Young Lenin’ in R.Pipes (ed.), Revolutionary Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p.58.
25. Donald,Marxism and Revolution, Karl Kautsky and the Russian Marxists 1900–1924, p.69;A. Solzhenitsyn, Lenin in Zurich (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1976), p.120.
26. M. Michielsen, ‘The Missing Link: The Views of the Second International School ofThought on Development, Underdevelopment and Dependency’, Itinerario [Netherlands],Vol.14, No.2 (1990), pp.62–3.
27. Solov’ev, ‘Parvus: Politicheskii Portret’, p.170; Zeman and Scharlau, The Merchant ofRevolution, p.70; Solzhenitsyn, Lenin in Zurich, p.119.
28. Zetkin, ‘Helphand Parvus’, p.89.29. Haenisch, Parvus; ein Blatt der Erinnerung, p.29; Parvus, ‘Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie’,
Die Glocke, No.1 (1915), p.36; O.N. Akbayar, ‘Bir Sosyalist Tip’, Turkiye Defteri, No.19(1975), pp.6–7.
30. Zeman and Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution, pp.124–8.31. Parvus, ‘Meine Stellungnahme zum Krieg’, Die Glocke, No.3 (1915), p.160. Rose
Luxembourg harshly criticizes Parvus for his attitudes during the war: ‘Since Parvus presseshimself on everyone’s notice with his (revolutionary personality) we will say this to him:whoever regards war against Russia as the sacred duty of the proletariat would be takenseriously if he were in the trenches. But first to make a fortune during a war in which manythousand German and Russian proletarians are being killed, and then to sit in the safety ofKlampenborg in Denmark and run from there a limited company for the exploitation of theconnection between these two national proletariats – for this superior revolutionary role wehave little understanding.’ See J.P. Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, Vol.2, (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1966), p.634.
32. Parvus, Umumi Harb Neticelerinden: Almanya Galip Gelirse (Istanbul, Turk YurduKutuphanesi, 1330) and Parvus, Umumi Harb Neticelerinden: Ingiltere Galip Gelirse(Istanbul; Turk Yurdu Kutuphanesi, 1330). It has been claimed that Parvus even went to theSublime Porte to convince the Ottoman authorities for this purpose. See Haenisch, Parvus;ein Blatt der Erinnerung, p.35.
33. Parvus quoted in Solov’ev, ‘Parvus: Politicheskii Portret’, p.172.34. ‘No one, or hardly anyone, in Europe could lift himself far enough out of his rut to see that
the destruction of Russia now held the key to the future history of the world! All else wassecondary.’ Solzhenitsyn, Lenin in Zurich, p.142.
35. As early as October 1914, he wrote a comprehensive article about this subject while he wasstill in Istanbul. See Parvus’s ‘Fur die Demokratie – gegen den Zarismus’, Die Glocke, No.2(1915), pp.77–85.
36. Solzhenitsyn, Lenin in Zurich, p.139.37. Z.A.B. Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915–1918 (Documents from the
Archives of the German Foreign Ministry), (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp.1–2.
38. See ‘The Plan for the Russian Revolution, – Alexander Parvus’s Memorandum’, inHeresch, The Empire of the Tsars, the Splendour and the Fall, p.257.
39. Ibid., p.259.40. See Ibid., p.187. About Parvus’s service to Germany, The Minister in Copenhagen to the
German Under State Secretary, Brockdorff-Rantzau sent a telegram to the ForeignMinistery saying ‘. . . I think that there can be no question that he is an extraordinarilyimportant man whose unusual powers I feel we must employ for the duration of the war andshould, if at all possible, continue to use later on.’ See Z.A.B. Zeman, Germany and theRevolution in Russia, p.4.
41. Schurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus – Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’, p.324.42. V. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th English Edition (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964),
pp.219–220. See also H. Stone, ‘Another Look at the Sisson Forgeries and TheirBackground’, Soviet Studies, Vol.37, No.1 (1985), p.92; A.E. Senn, ‘The Myth of GermanMoney During the First World War’, Soviet Studies, Vol.28, No.1 (1976), p.83.
43. For a detailed presentation of the role Parvus played in arranging the sealed train see M.Pearson, The Sealed Train. Journey to Revolution Lenin – 1917 (London: Macmillan,
HELPHAND-PARVUS 161
1975). See also D.S. Anin, ‘Lenin, Trotsky and Parvus’, Survey, Vol.24, No.1 (1979),p.208.
44. A recent study on the role of the German money indeed shows that the funnelling ofGerman money through Parvus’s networks is not easy to prove. See S. Lyandres, TheBolsheviks’ ‘German Gold’ Revisited: An Inquiry into the 1917 Accusations, The Carl BeckPapers of Russian and East European Studies, No.1106. (Pittsburg: Center for Russian andEast European Studies, 1995).
45. See, for instance, G. Katkov, ‘German Political Intervention in Russia During theFirstWorld War’, in Pipes (ed.), Revolutionary Russia, pp.63–88.
46. A. Dallin ‘Comment on Katkov’s – German Political Intervention in Russia During the FirstWorld War’, in R. Pipes (ed.), Revolutionary Russia, pp.91–3.
47. See, for example, R. Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990).48. Zeman and Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution, p.246.49. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution, p.298.50. F. Georgeon, Turk Milliyetciliginin Kokenleri, Yusuf Akcura, 1876–1935 (Ankara: Yurt
Yayınları, 1986), p.60.51. Dumont, ‘Un economiste social-democrate au service de la Jeune Turquie’, p.78.52. The annual, Nevsal-i Millimentions Parvus’s name. See Akbayar, ‘Bir Sosyalist Tip’, pp.8–
9.53. Ibid., p.8.54. This book aroused great interest among the Turkish intelligentsia. Interestingly in 1923, the
second edition was published, and furthermore, the book was translated into French. SeeDumont, ‘Un economiste social-democrate au service de la Jeune Turquie’, p.79.
55. Especially after the Young Turk Revolution, the number of Tatars migrating to Istanbulincreased significantly. See N. Devlet, Ismail Bey Gaspıralı, 1851–1914 (Ankara: Kultur veTurizm Bakanlıgı, 1988), p.125. In his article in Turk Yurdu, Ismail Bey Gasprinskycomplained about the massive flow of Tatar intellectuals into the Ottoman Empire whoended up living mentally in-between the two empires. Ismail Gaspıralı, ‘Muhaceret-iMuntazama’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.2, No.11 (1912), p.707. Turk Yurdu was even financed by theTatar bourgeoisie. See Georgeon, Turk Milliyetciliginin Kokenleri, Yusuf Akcura, 1876–1935, pp.59–60.
56. Yusuf Akcura, ‘Iktisad,’ Turk Yurdu, Vol.1, No.9, 1327/1912, p.262.57. Parvus, ‘Turkiye’de Ziraatin Istikbali’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.5, No.1 (1329/1913), pp.859–60.58. Parvus, ‘1327 Senesinin Ahval-i Maliyesine Bir Nazar’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.2, No.1 (1328/
1912), pp.398.59. Ibid., p.396.60. Parvus, ‘Is Isten Gecmeden Gozunuzu Acınız’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.3, No.12 (1329/1913),
pp.361–2.61. Michielsen, ‘The Missing Link’, pp.62–3, 67.62. Parvus, ‘Turklerin Odunc Almaya En Haklı Oldukları Bir Akce’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.3, No.1
(1329/1912), pp.1617.63. Parvus, ‘Mali Tehlikeler’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.3, No.5 (1329/1913), p.148.64. Parvus, ‘Turkiye Avrupa’nın Maliye Boyundurugu Altındadır II’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.2, No.5
(1328/1912), pp.528–9; Parvus, ‘1327 Senesinin Ahval-i Maliyesine Bir Nazar’, pp.398.65. Parvus, ‘Turk Ili, Maliyeni Gozet!’ Turk Yurdu, Vol.4, No.3 (1329/1913), pp.486.66. Parvus, ‘Turklerin Odunc Almaya En Haklı Oldukları bir Akce’, pp.23–4; Parvus,
Turkiye’nin Can Damarı: Devlet-i Osmaniye’nin Borcları ve Islahı (Istanbul: Turk YurduKitaphanesi), 1330 (1914), translated by Emin Rasid, p.17.
67. Ibid., p.17, 42.68. Parvus, ‘Turkiye Avrupa’nın Maliye Boyundurugu Altındadır II’, pp.526–7.69. Parvus, ‘Koyluler ve Devlet’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.1, No.9 (1327/1912), p.263.70. N. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press,
1964), p.335.71. See Zafer Toprak, Turkiye’de ‘Milli Iktisat’ (19081918) (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982),
p.170.72. For a comprehensive analysis of the policy of ‘National Economics’ see Ibid.
162 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
73. Parvus, ‘Turk Genclerine Mektup II’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.4, No.9 (1329/1913), p.727.74. Parvus, ‘Is Isten Gecmeden Gozunuzu Acınız’, pp.364–6.75. Parvus, ‘Turkiye Avrupa’nın Maliye Boyundurugu Altındadır II’, p.530; Parvus, ‘Turklerin
Odunc Almaya En Haklı Oldukları Bir Akce’, pp.17–19; Parvus, ‘Devlet ve Millet’, TurkYurdu, Vol.3, No.3 (1329/1912), pp.83–86.
76. When many European socialists later accused him of collaborating with the ‘reactionary’and ‘anti-democratic’ Unionist regime, he defended himself in his journal Die Glocke onthe grounds that he already criticized in his writings the Unionists for not being democraticenough. See Parvus, ‘Meine Stellungnahme zum Krieg’, p.160.
77. ‘Parvus Efendi Namına Gelen Mektuba Cevap’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.2, No.6, pp.564–5;Parvus, ‘Is Isten Gecmeden Gozunuzu Acınız’, pp.366–7.
78. Parvus, ‘Turk Ili, Maliyeni Gozet!’ Turk Yurdu, V.4, No.3 (1329/1913), pp.490.79. He himself later on in his journal points out this fact. See Parvus, ‘Meine Stellungnahme
zum Krieg’, p.160.80. M. A. Karaomerlioglu, ‘Elite Perceptions of Land Reform in Turkey’, The Journal of
Peasant Studies, Vol.27, No.3 (April 2000), p.119.81. Parvus, ‘Devlet ve Millet’, pp.83–6.82. Parvus, ‘Koyluler ve Devlet’, p.266.83. Parvus, ‘Devlet ve Millet’, pp.83–4.84. Ibid.85. Parvus, ‘Koyluler ve Devlet’, pp.262–8. See also his ‘Koylu ve Devlet I,’ Turk Yurdu,
Vol.4, No.9, 1329, pp.1125–6 for similar comments on peasantry.86. ‘Although the peasants were the ones who fed the whole state, the state never thought of
helping them and it did not help them. In the end, the financial and spiritual conditions ofthe peasantry deteriorated.’ Parvus, ‘Devlet ve Millet’, p.85.
87. ‘Parvus, ‘Koylu ve Devlet II,’ Turk Yurdu, V. 5, No.10 (1329/1913), p.1161.88. Parvus, ‘Esaret-i Maliyeden Kurtulmanın Yolu’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.2, No.7 (1328/1912),
p.587.89. Parvus, ‘Koyluler ve Devlet’, p.265.90. Ibid., p.265.91. Parvus, ‘Is Isten Gecmeden Gozunuzu Acınız’, pp.363–4.92. Parvus, ‘Koyluler ve Devlet’, p.264.93. Parvus, ‘Turk Genclerine Mektup I’ , Turk Yurdu, Vol..4, No.5 1329, p.571.94. A.D. Novichev, Krestianstvo Turtsii v noveishee vremia (Moscow: Izd-vo vostochnoi litry,
1959), p.10.95. ‘But so far nothing has happened. In the past, some things used to function even better;
today everything is in a mess. . ..We go to the state office and the court but we cannotexplain our problem. They only think of collecting taxes. . .We work all year round and wepay our taxes annually; if we don’t they take them by force, even selling our pots andbedding. Thus we are always in debt. During the past few years there have been manypeasants in the village who have not had seed to sow. Since there is no help from anywhereelse we have had to buy seed from the aga (landholders) at either 100–25 kurus a kile [abushel] or return him three kile for one. Those agas are a menace; they can have the peasantbeaten by their toughs, have him jailed, or sometimes have him bullied by state officials. Inthis way they collect their debt from those who cannot pay. As a matter of fact theAgricultural Bank is giving loans but that does not help us. The money runs out before itreaches our village.’ A. Serif quoted in F. Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London:Routledge, 1993), pp.41–2. Things more or less remained the same even 20 years after therevolution. A peasant talking to Mehmed Emin, the so-called ‘national poet’, in 1928:‘During the reign of Abdulhamit, the pashas said ‘give’, so we gave. They said ‘die’, so wedied. They vanished and instead other pashas came and they also said ‘give’, so we gave.They said ‘die’, so we died. They also vanished, and then you came. You also said ‘give’, sowe gave. You said ‘die’, so we died. We are now curiously waiting. When will you guysever say ‘take’?’ Quoted in H. Tuncer, Turk Yurdu Uzerine Bir Inceleme (Ankara: KulturBakanlıgı Yayınları, 1990), p.483.
96. Akbayar, ‘Bir Sosyalist Tip’, p.9.
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97. P. Dumont, Mustafa Kemal (Ankara: Kultur Bakanlıgı Yayınları, 1993), p.3.98. Parvus, Umumi Harp Neticelerinden: Ingiltere Galip Gelirse, pp.9–10.99. Ibid., p.11.100. Ibid., pp.22–3.101. Parvus’s position towards the war in general and his hostility towards Russia can be read in
his article ‘Meine Stellungnahme zum Krieg’, pp.148–62.102. Parvus, Umumi Harb Neticelerinden: Almanya Galip Gelirse, p.19.103. Ibid., p.21.104. Ibid., pp.5–6.105. Parvus himself wrote in the journal, Die Glocke, which was his own journal published in
1915, that he was the first person who publicly advised the Turkish administration to lift thecapitulations. (‘Als der europaische Krieg ausbrach, war ich der erste, der turkischenRegierung offentlich den Rat gab, sofort die Kapitulationen aufzuheben.’ See Parvus, ‘Diedeutsche Sozialdemokratie’, p.36. published in Munich and subsequently in Berlin between1915–25.
106. This was an interview with Parvus. The original document can be found in Toprak,Turkiye’de ‘Milli Iktisat’ (1908–1918), pp.390–2.
107. G. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War,Revolution and Peace, 1967), p.26.
108. Rakovsky was killed during Stalin’s 1938 trials because he was accused of transferringmoney given by Parvus to the Romanian socialists. See Schurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus – Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’, p.322.
109. K.T. Eidus, Ocherki Rabochego Dvizheniia v Stranakh Vostoka (Moscow: Gosudarstven-noe Izdatel’ctva, 1922), p.75. For Parvus’s letter about his observations about the May Dayactivities see M. Schreiner, ‘Parvus’un 1910 Bir Mayıs Bayramı Uzerine Mektubu’, Tarihve Toplum, Vol.17, No.101 (1992), p.21.
110. Schurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus- Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’, p.321.111. Dumont, ‘Un economiste social-democrate au service de la Jeune Turquie’, pp.77–8.112. Katkov, ‘German Political Intervention in Russia During World War I’, p.77.113. M. Tuncay, Turkiye’ de Sol Akımlar, 1908–1925 (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1978), p.53.114. Katkov, ‘German Political Intervention in Russia During the First World War’, p.77.115. Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, founded in 1914, was a nationalist organization aiming
at the independence of Ukraine. Its representative to the Ottoman Empire, Mariyan Basok-Melenevs’kyi, first met with Parvus when he came to Istanbul. The two knew each otherand Parvus helped him ‘organize his propaganda activities’. See H. Kırımlı, ‘The Activitiesof the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine in the Ottoman Empire during the First WorldWar’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.4 (Oct. 1998), p.182.
116. See Parvus, ‘Ein Verleumdungswerk’, pp.125–30.117. P. Dumont and George Haupt, Osmanlı Imparatorlugu’nda Sosyalist Hareketler (Istanbul:
Gozlem Yayınları, 1977), translated by Tugrul Artunkal, p.148; Dumont, ‘Un economistesocial-democrate au service de la Jeune Turquie’, p.84.
118. Solov’ev, ‘Parvus: Politicheskii Portret’, p.171.119. Dumont, ‘Un economiste social-democrate au service de la Jeune Turquie’, p.75.120. Zetkin, ‘Helphand Parvus’, p.89.121. Stone, ‘Another Look at the Sisson Forgeries and Their Background’, p.100.122. Akbayar, ‘Bir Sosyalist Tip’, p.10; Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution, p.299.123. Akbayar, ‘Bir Sosyalist Tip’, p.10; Dumont, ‘Un economiste social-democrate au service de
la Jeune Turquie’, p.78; R. Fisher, Stalin and German Communism (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1948), p.9.
124. Dumont, ‘Un economiste social-democrate au service de la Jeune Turquie’, p.78.125. Solzhenitsyn, Lenin in Zurich, p.176; R. Olson, Imperial Meanderings and Republican By-
Ways. Essays on Eighteenth Century Ottoman and Twentieth Century History of Turkey(Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996), p.109.
126. ‘At the start of war, he made his first million by the delivery of bread to Constantinople.’ K.Radek, ‘Parvus’, Pravda, (14 Dec.1924). Radek wrote this news item in Pravda as anobituary.
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127. Katkov, Russia 1917, The February Revolution, p.78.128. ‘From Germany he moved to Vienna, and from there to Constantinople, where eventually
the World War found him. During the war he achieved wealth immediately through militarycommercial enterprises.’ Trotsky, My Life, p.167. See also Solzhenitsyn, Lenin in Zurich,p.134.
129. Katkov, Russia 1917, The February Revolution, p.78.130. ‘At the same time, he came out publicly as a defender of the progressive mission of German
militarism, broke definitely with the revolutionaries, and became one of the intellectualleaders of the right wing of the German Social Democracy. It goes without saying that sincethe war I have not had any political or personal contact with him.’ Trotsky, My Life, p.167.
131. Donald, Marxism and Revolution, Karl Kautsky and the Russian Marxists 1900–1924,p.195; Zeman and Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution, p.155; Solov’ev, ‘Parvus:Politicheskii Portret’, p.173.
132. See Wolfe’s review of The Merchant of Revolution, p.697.133. Trotsky, My Life, p.179.
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