KAREN GOLINSKI, Plaintiff-Appellee,cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2012/07/18/12-15409_Answer... · Nos. 12-15388 & 12-15409 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 12-15388 & 12-15409

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KAREN GOLINSKI, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; JOHN BERRY, Director of the United States Office of

Personnel Management, in his official capacity, Defendants,

and

BIPARTISAN LEGAL ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant.

KAREN GOLINSKI, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; JOHN BERRY, Director of the United States Office of

Personnel Management, in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellants,

and

BIPARTISAN LEGAL ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Intervenor-Defendant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California

ANSWER BRIEF OF THE BIPARTISAN LEGAL ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN NO. 12-15409

Case: 12-15388 07/17/2012 ID: 8253159 DktEntry: 132 Page: 1 of 28

Paul D. Clement H. Christopher Bartolomucci Conor B. Dugan Nicholas J. Nelson BANCROFT PLLC 1919 M Street, N.W. Suite 470 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 234-0090 Counsel for the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives

Of Counsel Kerry W. Kircher, General Counsel William Pittard, Deputy General Counsel Christine Davenport, Senior Assistant Counsel Todd B. Tatelman, Assistant Counsel Mary Beth Walker, Assistant Counsel OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 219 Cannon House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515 (202) 225-9700 July 17, 2012


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................. ii INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1 BACKGROUND ...................................................................................... 1

DOJ Carries Out Its Constitutional Responsibility ......................... 2 DOJ Abandons Its Constitutional Responsibility ............................ 3 This Case Works Its Way Through the District Court and to This Court ............................................................................. 6

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................ 9

I. DOJ’s Appeal Is Superfluous and Cannot Be Supported by Interests DOJ Has Disowned and Is Working to Frustrate ............................................................. 9

II. After Prevailing Below, DOJ Lacks Standing

to Appeal ............................................................................... 15 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 18 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986) ............................................................ 13

Barnes v. Carmen, 582 F. Supp. 163 (D.D.C. 1984) ...................................................... 13

Bishop v. United States, No. 4:04-cv-00848 (N.D. Okla.)...................................................... 3, 7

Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ......................................................... 13

Bowen v. Kendrick, 483 U.S. 1304 (1987) ...................................................................... 10

Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980)......................................................................... 13

Chadha v. INS, No. 77-1702 (9th Cir.) ..................................................................... 12

Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968)......................................................................... 11

Christian Sci. Reading Room Jointly Maintained v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 784 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1986) ......................................................... 15, 16

Cozen O’Connor, P.C. v. Tobits, 2:11-cv-00045 (E.D. Pa.) ................................................................. 7

Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980)......................................................................... 9, 15, 16

Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986) ........................................................................... 13, 15

Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 4:10-cv-01564 (N.D. Cal.) ........................................................ 3, 7


iii

Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266 (1998)......................................................................... 9, 15

Golinski v. OPM, 781 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ............................................. 6

Golinski v. OPM, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ............................................. 7, 8

Golinski v. OPM, No. 3:10-cv-0257 (N.D. Cal.) .......................................................... 3

High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) ........................................................... 4, 8

Hunt v. Ake, No. 8:04-cv-1852 (M.D. Fla.) .......................................................... 2-3

In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) ........................................ 3

In re Koerner, 800 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1986) ......................................................... 13

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)......................................................................... passim

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)......................................................................... 4

Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988) ......................................................... 14

Lui v. Holder, No. 2:11-cv-01267 (C.D. Cal.) ........................................................ 7

Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of HHS, Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, & 10-2214 (1st Cir.) ................................. 3, 7

Native Vill. of Tyonek v. Puckett, 957 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1992) ........................................................... 15


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New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345 (1977) ...................................................................... 10

Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 2002) ........................................................... 13, 14

NL Indus., Inc. v. Sec’y of Interior, 777 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1985) ........................................................... 8, 13

North v. Walsh, 656 F. Supp. 414 (D.D.C. 1987) ......................................................

Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513 (1956)......................................................................... 9, 15

Pedersen v. OPM, 3:10-cv-01750 (D. Conn.) ............................................................... 7

Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. Fed. Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2002) ........................................................... 15

Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) ......................................................... 4, 13

Pub. Serv. Co. of Mo. v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., 306 U.S. 204 (1939)......................................................................... 9, 15

Revelis v. Napolitano, No. 1:11-cv-01991 (N.D. Ill.) .......................................................... 7

Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ............................................. 2

Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987)......................................................................... 8

Sullivan v. Bush, No. 1:04-cv-21118 (S.D. Fla.) ......................................................... 2

Torres-Barragan v. Holder, No. 10-55768 (9th Cir.) ................................................................... 5


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Torres-Barragan v. Holder, No. 2:09-cv-08564 (C.D. Cal.) ........................................................ 3

United States v. Good Samaritan Church, 29 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1994) ............................................................. 15, 16

United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)......................................................................... 10, 11

Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 468 U.S. 1323 (1984) ...................................................................... 10

Whaley v. Rydman, 887 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1989) ........................................................... 15

Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005) .......................................... 2

Windsor v. United States, No. 1:10-cv-8435 (S.D.N.Y.) .......................................................... 7

Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008) ........................................................... 4, 8

Constitution and Statutes

1 U.S.C. § 7 ................................................................................................ 2

28 U.S.C. § 1252 ........................................................................................ 16

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ........................................................................................ 17

U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 ................................................................................ 1

Other Authorities

142 Cong. Rec. (1996) ............................................................................... 2

32 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. (1996) ......................................................... 2


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U.S. House of Representatives v. INS, Nos. 80-2170 & 80-2171, 1981 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1423 (Aug. 28, 1981) .................... 12

Lois J. Scali, Prediction-Making in the Supreme Court: The Granting of Stays by Individual Justices, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1020 (1985) ...................................................................................... 11

Press Release, Speaker of the House John Boehner, House Will Ensure DOMA Constitutionality Is Determined by the Court (Mar. 9, 2011) ........................................................................ 5


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INTRODUCTION

The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives

(“House”) previously moved this Court to dismiss the appeal of the federal

Executive Branch defendants. See Appellant [the House’s] . . . Mot. to Dismiss

No. 12-15409, No. 12-15409 (Apr. 5, 2012) (ECF No. 15-1) (“House Mot. to

Dismiss”). This Court denied the House’s motion to dismiss “without prejudice to

its raising the issue in its brief in that appeal.” Order at 2 (Apr. 11, 2012) (ECF

No. 22). This Court authorized the House to file a reply brief in the House’s own

appeal, No. 12-5388, “and an answering brief in no. 12-15409.” Id. at 3. As

explained below, the Executive Branch defendants’ appeal (No. 12-15409) should

be dismissed because they fully prevailed below and, therefore, they are not

aggrieved and their appeal is not necessary to enable the House to prosecute its

earlier-filed appeal (No. 12-15388). Thus, the House has standing to appeal, and

the Executive Branch defendants do not.

BACKGROUND

As the Court is aware, it is the constitutional responsibility of the President

to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, and of

the Justice Department (“DOJ”) – in furtherance of that responsibility – to defend

the constitutionality of duly-enacted federal laws when they are challenged in

court. This case, brought by Karen Golinski, a staff attorney employed by this


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Court, concerns the constitutionality of one such duly-enacted federal statute:

Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419

(1996) (“DOMA”), codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, which defines “marriage” and

“spouse” for purposes of federal law. DOMA was enacted in 1996 by substantial

bipartisan majorities in both houses of Congress, and signed into law by President

Clinton. See 142 Cong. Rec. H7505-06 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (House vote 342-

67 on H.R. 3396); 142 Cong. Rec. S10129 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (Senate vote

85-14 on S. 1999); 32 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1891 (Sept. 30, 1996) (bill signed

on Sept. 21, 1996).

DOJ Carries Out Its Constitutional Responsibility. Prior to 2004, there were

no constitutional challenges to DOMA Section 3. However, from 2004-2011, DOJ

repeatedly defended the constitutionality of Section 3 against all constitutional

challenges. For example:

BUSH ADMINISTRATION – Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861

(C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir.)

(plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge DOMA Section 3), cert. denied, 549 U.S.

959 (2006); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (constitutional

challenges to DOMA dismissed for failure to state claim); Order, Sullivan v. Bush,

No. 1:04-cv-21118 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2005) (ECF No. 68) (granting plaintiff’s

motion for voluntary dismissal after defendants moved to dismiss); Order, Hunt v.


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Ake, No. 8:04-cv-1852 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2005) (ECF No. 35) (constitutional

challenges to DOMA Section 3 dismissed for failure to state claim); In re Kandu,

315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding that DOMA Section 3 does not

violate Fifth Amendment).

OBAMA ADMINISTRATION – Corrected Br. for the U.S. Dep’t of Health and

Human Servs., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of HHS, Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, & 10-

2214 (1st Cir. Jan. 19, 2011) (ECF No. 5520069); Fed. Defs.’ . . . Mot. to Dismiss,

Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 4:10-cv-01564 (N.D. Cal. July 2,

2010) (ECF No. 25); Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s First Am.

Compl., Golinski v. OPM, No. 3:10-cv-0257 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2010) (ECF No.

49); Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss . . . , Bishop v. United States, No. 4:04-cv-

00848 (N.D. Okla. Oct 13, 2009) (ECF No. 138); Defs.’ . . . Mot. to Dismiss,

Torres-Barragan v. Holder, No. 2:09-cv-08564 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2010) (ECF No.

7).

DOJ Abandons Its Constitutional Responsibility. In February 2011, DOJ

abruptly reversed course. The Attorney General publicly notified Congress of the

President’s and his conclusion that DOMA Section 3, “as applied to same-sex

couples who are legally married under state law, violates the equal protection

component of the Fifth Amendment,” and their decision that, as a result, DOJ no

longer would defend Section 3 in court against equal protection challenges. Letter


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from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to the Honorable John A. Boehner, Speaker,

U.S. House of Representatives at 1, 5 (Feb. 23, 2011) (“Holder Letter”), attached

as Ex. 1 to House Mot. to Dismiss.

In so deciding, the Attorney General acknowledged, correctly, that (i) DOJ

“has a longstanding practice of defending the constitutionality of duly-enacted

statutes if reasonable arguments can be made in their defense,” id. at 5; (ii) binding

precedents of ten U.S. circuit Courts of Appeals [actually eleven] – including this

Court1 – reject his conclusion that sexual orientation classifications are subject to a

heightened standard of scrutiny, and instead hold that rational-basis scrutiny is

appropriate for such classifications, id. at 3-4 nn.4-6; and (iii) “reasonable

argument[s] for Section 3’s constitutionality may be proffered under th[e] [rational

basis] standard,” id. at 6. In short, the Attorney General’s own letter conceded that

his decision to abandon the defense of DOMA Section 3 is a sharp departure from

1 See Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir.) (even after

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), sexual orientation classifications challenged as violative of equal protection properly analyzed under rational basis standard), reh’g en banc denied, 548 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2008); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.) (“rational basis review” proper for classifications based on sexual orientation ), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1990). DOJ has acknowledged in this case that these precedents are “binding.” Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Mots. to Dismiss at 4, No. 3:10-cv-00257 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011) (ECF No. 145) (“Defs.’ Opp’n to Mots. to Dismiss”); see also Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying rational basis review).


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past precedent and is not predicated primarily on constitutional or other legal

considerations.2 While DOJ, on a few occasions, has refused to defend the

constitutionality of Acts of Congress that, in its view, unconstitutionally restricted

or infringed the powers of the Executive Branch or could not be supported by any

reasonable argument, DOMA Section 3 plainly is not such a statute, making DOJ’s

actions here, to our knowledge, wholly unprecedented. See Amici Curiae Br. of . .

. Edwin Meese III and John Ashcroft [ . . . ] (June 11, 2012) (ECF No. 44-1).

In response, the House determined on March 9, 2011, to defend DOMA

Section 3 in civil actions in which the statute’s constitutionality has been

challenged. See Press Release, Speaker of the House John Boehner, House Will

Ensure DOMA Constitutionality Is Determined by the Court (Mar. 9, 2011)

(“House General Counsel has been directed to initiate a legal defense of [DOMA

Section 3]”), available at

http://www.speaker.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=228539.

2 In his February 2011 public announcement, the Attorney General also said

that “the President has instructed Executive agencies to continue to comply with Section 3 of DOMA . . . unless and until Congress repeals Section 3 or the judicial branch renders a definitive verdict against the law’s constitutionality.” Holder Letter at 5. The Executive Branch recently has begun backing away from the promise of continued enforcement, particularly in the immigration context. See Proposed Intervenor’s Reply to Executive Branch Defs.’ Opp’n to Mot. for Denial of Voluntary Dismissal of Appeal at 3-4, Torres-Barragan v. Holder, No. 10-55768 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2012) (ECF No. 54-1).


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This Case Works Its Way Through the District Court and to This Court. Ms.

Golinski initially sought benefits for her same-sex spouse through non-

constitutional mandamus relief, but the district court dismissed that claim shortly

after DOJ abandoned its defense of DOMA. See Golinski v. OPM, 781 F. Supp. 2d

967 (N.D. Cal. 2011). In so ruling, the district court said that it “would, if it could,

address the constitutionality of . . . the legislative decision to enact Section 3 of

DOMA to unfairly restrict benefits and privileges to state-sanctioned same-sex

marriages,” but that it was “not able to reach these constitutional issues due to the

unique procedural posture of this matter.” Id. at 975. In light of this extraordinary

judicial invitation, Ms. Golinski, not surprisingly, amended her complaint to

challenge Section 3 on equal protection grounds. The House then sought, and was

granted, leave to intervene. See Order Granting the Mot. of the [House] to

Intervene . . . , No. 3:10-cv-00257 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2011) (ECF No. 116).3

Notwithstanding that the Holder Letter said only that DOJ would not defend

DOMA Section 3, beginning with Golinski, DOJ pivoted from that position to the

even more extraordinary and constitutionally problematic position of aligning itself

with DOMA plaintiffs to affirmatively attack Section 3 in court and to accuse the

3 At present, the House is defending DOMA Section 3 in 13 cases around

the country (including this case) – four in the federal Circuit Courts (including one in which a decision already has been rendered), eight in federal district courts, and one in the Court of Veterans Appeals.


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Congress that enacted DOMA – many of whose Members still serve – of doing so

out of “animus.” See Defs.’ Opp’n to Mots. to Dismiss at 3-23 (arguing that

Section 3 is subject to heightened scrutiny and is unconstitutional under that

standard).4

Ultimately, the district court – not surprisingly in light of its unmistakable

earlier signal – agreed with DOJ, holding that Section 3 is subject to heightened

scrutiny and is unconstitutional under that standard. Golinski v. OPM, 824 F.

Supp. 2d 968, 995, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2012). It did so notwithstanding binding Ninth

4 That would be the very same statute (i) which DOJ had defended a few

short months before, see supra pp. 2-4, and (ii) which DOJ acknowledges is constitutional under the equal protection standard that applies in this Circuit (rational basis review). See Defs.’ Opp’n to Mots. to Dismiss at 18 n.14.

To date, DOJ has filed substantive briefs in eight other DOMA cases making this same argument. See, e.g., Superseding Br. for the U.S. Dep’t of HHS, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of HHS, Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, & 10-2214 (1st Cir. Sept. 22, 2011) (ECF No. 5582082); Fed Defs.’ Br. in Partial Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 4:10-cv-01564 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2012) (ECF No. 108); Br. of [DOJ] Regarding the Constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA, Cozen O’Connor, P.C. v. Tobits, 2:11-cv-00045 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2011) (ECF No. 97); Resp. of Defs. [DOJ] to [House]’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., Bishop v. United States, 4:04-cv-00848 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2011) (ECF No. 225); Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. & [House’s] Mot. to Dismiss, Pedersen v. OPM, 3:10-cv-01750 (D. Conn. Sept. 14, 2011) (ECF No. 98); Defs.’ Opp’n to [House]’s Mot. to Dismiss, Lui v. Holder, No. 2:11-cv-01267 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2011) (ECF No. 28); Def. [DOJ]’s Mem. of Law in Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. & [House]’s Mot. to Dismiss, Windsor v. United States, No. 1:10-cv-8435 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2011) (ECF No. 71); Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss by [House] at 23 n.12, Revelis v. Napolitano, No. 1:11-cv-01991 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2012) (ECF No. 54).


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Circuit precedent holding that sexual orientation classifications, like DOMA

Section 3, are subject to rational basis review. See Witt, 527 F.3d at 821; High

Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574.5

The House appealed that judgment on February 24, 2012, see [House’s]

Notice of Appeal, No. 3:10-cv-00257 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012) (ECF No. 188)

(“House Notice of Appeal”), as it was entitled to do by virtue of its status as an

intervenor-defendant. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action,

480 U.S. 370, 375-76 (1987) (“An intervenor, whether by right or by permission,

normally has the right to appeal an adverse final judgment by a trial court.”); NL

Indus., Inc. v. Sec’y of Interior, 777 F.2d 433, 436 (9th Cir. 1985) (same). The

House appeal is No. 12-15388. Since then, Ms. Golinski’s spouse has been

permitted to enroll in the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program. See Letter

from Shirley Patterson, Ass’t Dir., Fed. Employee Ins. Ops., OPM, to William

Breskin, V.P., Gov’t Programs, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n (Mar. 9, 2012),

attached as Ex. 2 to House Mot. to Dismiss.

Four days later, despite having fully prevailed below, DOJ filed a separate

Notice of Appeal. See Notice of Appeal of Defs., No. 3:10-cv-00257 (N.D. Cal.

Feb. 28, 2012) (ECF No. 192). That appeal was docketed as No. 12-15409. DOJ

5 DOJ also prevailed in its defense of a statutory claim asserted by Ms.

Golinski. See Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 981 n.3.


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made clear it was appealing the very same issue the House had appealed.

Compare [Dep’t] Mediation Questionnaire, No. 12-15409 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 2012)

(ECF No. 5), with House Notice of Appeal. Ms. Golinski has not appealed the

district court’s denial of her statutory claim. See supra p. 8 n.5.

ARGUMENT

Wholly apart from the separation of powers principles that make clear that

the House, and not DOJ, is the proper party to file and pursue this appeal, it is well

established in the Supreme Court’s cases that “[a] party who receives all that he

has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and

cannot appeal from it.” Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333

(1980); accord Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266, 271 (1998); see also Parr v. United

States, 351 U.S. 513, 516 (1956) (Petitioner’s appeal “will not lie because

petitioner has not been aggrieved. Only one injured by the judgment sought to be

reviewed can appeal . . . .”); Pub. Serv. Co. of Mo. v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc.,

306 U.S. 204, 206 (1939) (“the successful party below has no standing to appeal”).

I. DOJ’s Appeal Is Superfluous and Cannot Be Supported by Interests DOJ Has Disowned and Is Working to Frustrate.

The defendants in this case obviously have assumed markedly different

postures: while the House has defended DOMA’s constitutionality, DOJ has

disowned the statute and asked the courts to strike it down. When the court below

agreed with DOJ and rejected the House’s contentions, the House therefore quite


10

unremarkably noticed an appeal. What was remarkable was DOJ’s noticing of a

shadow appeal, identifying the very same issue. This serves no purpose other than

to confuse the matters.

DOJ has offered two justifications for its behavior. First, it says “the interim

invalidation of a statute itself causes recognized injury to the interests of the United

States.” Mot. to Consolidate and Expedite Appeals at 6-7, No. 12-15388 (9th Cir.

Mar. 26, 2012) (ECF No. 19) (“DOJ Motion”) (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 483 U.S.

1304, 1304 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of

Radiation Survivors, 468 U.S. 1323, 1324 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers);

New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977)

(Rehnquist, J., in chambers)). But to the extent that the Executive Branch

defendants suffer any affront from the invalidation of a federal statute, they hardly

can invoke that as a reason for appeal when, as here, they requested the

invalidation themselves. Because the House and not DOJ is defending DOMA’s

constitutionality, it is the House and not DOJ that represents the interests of the

United States with respect to any harm arising from DOMA’s “interim

invalidation.”

None of the cases cited by DOJ presented this dynamic, as each of them

involved Executive defendants that were defending the statute in question – and in

fact were seeking a stay of an injunction against its enforcement, which DOJ has


11

failed to do here.6 DOJ clearly is not aggrieved here in any reasonable sense of

that word, having secured everything it sought below – indeed, it acknowledges

that it “intend[s] to file briefs [with this Court as an appellee] supporting plaintiff’s

claims,” DOJ Motion at 9, and, as an appellee in No. 12-15388, it will have ample

opportunity to do so (and indeed already has done so).

Second, DOJ suggests that its appeal is necessary to enable the House to

litigate in this Court. See DOJ Motion at 4 (Department appealed “in order to

ensure the existence of a justiciable case or controversy for this Court to resolve on

appeal”). That plainly is wrong. Where, as here, DOJ abandons its constitutional

responsibility to defend a federal statute, the Legislative Branch has Article III

standing to intervene to defend the law at all stages of the litigation. The Supreme

Court “ha[s] long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a

statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the

statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983) (citing Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S.

206, 210 n.9 (1968), and United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)).

In Chadha, a private party challenged the constitutionality of a federal

6 In any event, these decisions, entered by a single justice, lack precedential

value. E.g., Lois J. Scali, Prediction-Making in the Supreme Court: The Granting of Stays by Individual Justices, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1020, 1046 (1985) (“In-chambers opinions on stays have no precedential effect on either the lower courts or the Supreme Court.”).


12

statute DOJ declined to defend. After this Court ruled for the plaintiff, the House,

through the Speaker, and the Senate moved to intervene for the purpose of

petitioning for certiorari. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 930 n.5. This Court granted that

motion. See Order, Chadha v. INS, No. 77-1702 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 1981), attached

as Ex. 3 to House Mot. to Dismiss (granting House’s motion to intervene for

purpose of obtaining standing to petition for rehearing and seeking certiorari from

Supreme Court).

Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted the House and Senate petitions for

certiorari, holding – over DOJ’s suggestion otherwise, see Mem. for the Fed.

Resp’t, U.S. House of Representatives v. INS, Nos. 80-2170 & 80-2171, 1981 U.S.

S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1423, at *4 (Aug. 28, 1981) – that “Congress is both a proper

party to defend the constitutionality of [the statute at issue] and a proper petitioner

under [the statute governing petitions for writs of certiorari].” Chadha, 462 U.S. at

939. In so holding, the Supreme Court made crystal clear that the House and

Senate had Article III standing: “[A]n appeal must present a justiciable case or

controversy under Art. III. Such a controversy clearly exists . . . because of the

presence of the two Houses of Congress as adverse parties.” Id. at 931 n.6

(emphasis added). Therefore, when DOJ defaults on its constitutional

responsibilities to defend the constitutionality of a statute, as it has here, the House

may intervene and, when it does, it has Article III standing, regardless of what DOJ


13

does or does not do.7

In light of Chadha, the two cases DOJ cites – Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S.

54 (1986), and Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 2002) – are

inapposite. Diamond, which held only that “a private party whose own conduct is

neither implicated nor threatened by a criminal statute has no judicially cognizable

interest in the statute’s defense,” 476 U.S. at 56, is not relevant because the House

is not a private party, DOMA Section 3 is not a criminal statute, and DOJ did not

decline to defend an Act of Congress in that case.

Newdow is equally inapposite. In Newdow, this Court denied the Senate’s

request to intervene in an Establishment Clause case that challenged, among other

7 See also Perry, 671 F.3d at 1064 (upholding intervention and subsequent

appeal of sponsors of California constitutional ballot initiative to defend initiative where State itself would neither defend nor appeal); NL Indus. Inc., 777 F.2d at 436 (appeal by intervenor neither impermissible nor moot when Executive Branch co-defendant declined to appeal); Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366-68 (1980) (failure of government to appeal does not deprive intervenor of right to appeal adverse decision).

In keeping with Chadha’s holding, congressional entities – including

specifically the House through its Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group – repeatedly have intervened to defend the constitutionality of legislation DOJ has refused to defend. See, e.g., In re Koerner, 800 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1986); Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986). None of these cases suggests that the House lacked standing, and several were decided by federal courts in the District of Columbia – e.g., North v. Walsh, 656 F. Supp. 414, 415 n.1 (D.D.C. 1987); Barnes v. Carmen, 582 F. Supp. 163 (D.D.C. 1984) – where circuit precedent requires would-be intervenors to demonstrate Article III standing. See, e.g., Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1994).


14

things, a federal statute inserting the words “under God” into the Pledge of

Allegiance, where DOJ actively was defending the constitutionality of the statute

in the litigation. In so holding, this Court distinguished a number of cases in

which, unlike in Newdow (but exactly as here), a congressional body successfully

intervened to defend the constitutionality of a statute that DOJ had refused to

defend. Newdow, 313 F.3d at 498.

The disturbing legal implication of DOJ’s position – that the House cannot

pursue its appeal unless DOJ permits it to – is that DOJ has the power effectively

to preclude judicial determination of the constitutionality of an Act of Congress by

(i) first refusing to defend the Act’s constitutionality, and (ii) then withholding or

withdrawing its commitment to “provid[e] Congress a full and fair opportunity to

participate in the litigation.” Holder Letter at 6. Tying the House’s ability to

defend the constitutionality of an Act of Congress that DOJ refuses to defend to the

existence of a separate Department appeal (which it may choose to file or not file),

would be tantamount to providing the Executive Branch with an extra-

constitutional, post-enactment veto over federal statutes to which it objects. The

Executive simply does not possess that kind of unilateral authority under our

system of government. See, e.g., Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102,

1122 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated in part on other grounds, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir.

1989) (law does not “permit the executive branch to interpret the Constitution so as


15

to assume additional powers or thwart the constitutional functions of a coordinate

branch”).

II. After Prevailing Below, DOJ Lacks Standing to Appeal.

As the Supreme Court has made clear, a party has no standing to appeal

when the lower court has granted all the relief the party has requested. Roper, 445

U.S. at 333; Forney, 524 U.S. at 271; Parr, 351 U.S. at 516; Pub. Serv. Co. of Mo.,

306 U.S. at 206. This Court’s cases are, of course, to the same effect. This Court

has said that the rule of Roper – that a party “not aggrieved” by a court’s order

“has no standing to appeal from that order” – is one of the “elementary rules of

appellate procedure.” Christian Sci. Reading Room Jointly Maintained v. City &

Cnty. of S.F., 784 F.2d 1010, 1017 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Pension Trust Fund for

Operating Eng’rs v. Fed. Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 944, 947 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Federal

does not have standing to maintain its cross-appeal. . . . Federal was not the

aggrieved party in this judgment.”); United States v. Good Samaritan Church, 29

F.3d 487, 488 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We dismiss this appeal because the appellants won

the case below.”); Native Vill. of Tyonek v. Puckett, 957 F.2d 631, 633-34 (9th Cir.

1992) (same); Whaley v. Rydman, 887 F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1989) (same).

In this case, the Executive Branch defendants plainly lack standing to appeal

the judgment entered below because, far from being aggrieved by it, they wanted

it. The Executive Branch defendants affirmatively requested, and obtained, the


16

judgment that the district court entered striking down DOMA. “A party who

receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording

the relief and cannot appeal from it.” Roper, 445 U.S. at 333. The Executive

Branch defendants “won the case below,” Good Samaritan Church, 29 F.3d at 488;

as district court winners, they are not proper appellants in this Court. Accordingly,

their appeal should be dismissed as a matter of “elementary” appellate procedure.

Christian Sci. Reading Room, 784 F.2d at 1017.

Chadha is not to the contrary. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the

INS was “sufficiently aggrieved” to appeal a judgment striking down a legislative

veto of the INS’s suspension of a deportation, even though the INS had attacked

the statute in the courts below. 462 U.S. at 930. But the Chadha Court expressly

limited its holding to an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1252, the since-repealed

statute providing for mandatory Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, which had

provided that “[a]ny party” could appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment

holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional. The Chadha Court’s conclusion

therefore was carefully, and narrowly, circumscribed: “At least for purposes of

deciding whether the INS is ‘any party’ within the grant of appellate jurisdiction in

§ 1252, we hold that the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of Appeals

decision prohibiting it from taking action it would otherwise take.” 462 U.S. at

930. Unlike § 1252, the statute conferring jurisdiction on this Court in this case,


17

28 U.S.C. § 1291, does not allow “any party” to appeal.

Additionally, the Supreme Court in Chadha held only that “an agency of the

United States” could appeal when “the Act of Congress it administers is held

unconstitutional.” 462 U.S. at 931. The legislative veto invalidated in Chadha

was entirely a part of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which the INS

administered. See id. at 924 n.1. This case, however, does not fall within the

parameters of Chadha’s holding because the statute the district court invalidated,

DOMA Section 3, applies broadly to hundreds of different federal statutes and is

not “administered” by any particular federal agency. OPM and the other Executive

Branch defendants cannot be said to be “aggrieved” by DOMA’s invalidation in

the same way that the INS was in Chadha.

* * *

In short, given that (i) DOJ is seeking to invalidate a duly-enacted statute of

the United States which it simply does not like; (ii) DOJ has not identified, because

it cannot, a single independent basis for its appeal; and (iii) the House is entitled to

pursue its appeal entirely separate and apart from DOJ – and is in fact doing so –

DOJ’s appeal (No. 12-15409) is entirely superfluous. More than that, because the

judgment of the court below gave the Executive Branch defendants absolutely

everything they sought – right down to the adoption of exactly the legal theory

DOJ advocated and an injunction against the enforcement of the statute DOJ


18

claimed was unconstitutional – the Executive Branch defendants do not even have

standing to appeal that judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, appeal No. 12-15409 should be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Paul D. Clement Paul D. Clement H. Christopher Bartolomucci Conor B. Dugan Nicholas J. Nelson BANCROFT PLLC 1919 M Street, N.W., Suite 470 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 234-0090 Counsel for the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives

Of Counsel Kerry W. Kircher, General Counsel William Pittard, Deputy General Counsel Christine Davenport, Senior Assistant Counsel Todd B. Tatelman, Assistant Counsel Mary Beth Walker, Assistant Counsel OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 219 Cannon House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515 (202) 225-9700 July 17, 2012


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/s/ Paul D. Clement Paul D. Clement BANCROFT PLLC 1919 M Street, N.W., Suite 470 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 234-0090

Attorney for the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives


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Documents

KAREN GOLINSKI, Plaintiff-Appellee,cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2012/07/18/12-15409_Answer... · Nos. 12-15388 & 12-15409 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT