Katharina CrepazPhD Candidate, University of Innsbruck (Austria)

katharina.crepaz@gmail.com

Collaboration with National Parties as a Prerequisite for Actual Political

Representation: The Case of the SVP in the Italian Parliament1

Abstract: In Italy, article 6 of the constitution guarantees the protection of minorities within its boundaries; regionalist parties usually represent the political arm of one of these minorities. The SVP (Südtiroler Volkspartei – South Tyrolean People's Party) represents the Germany-speaking minority in the province of Bozen/Bolzano. As it is build around the cleavage of minority-majority, it does not take left-right diversions into account, but encompasses representatives of both spectrums within its officials. In the past, the SVP sided with the more minority friendly left-centre coalition, but before the last legislature, the party chose a policy of non-alignment, hoping to gain more options for negotiation regardless of the most recent elections' outcome. This did not prove to be a fruitful policy: not having a partner at the national level made the exertion of influence very difficult, and Mario Monti's technical government did not even consult party members when regional interests were directly affected or at stake. This paper therefore argues that protection measures for the political representation of minorities (such as a favorable quota system) may be enough to enter the national level, but they do not guarantee actual political representation – unless an important position in the giving or taking of majorities can be achieved, a powerful partner interested in the promotion of minority rights is the only way to exert influence. Situations of crisis as the one experienced in Italy and other European countries right now tend to be additionally disadvantageous for minorities, as no new competences can be gained and achieved privileges may be reduced or taken away entirely.

1. Introduction

Minority Parties, especially if they are numerically small complained to the rest of the

territory, usually do not possess enough strength to represent a significant political force on

the national parliamentary level. As they are not strong enough to form a majority or a

1 Paper prepared for the ECPR General Conference in Bordeaux, September 2013. Work in progress, please do not cite or circulate without permission.

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government on their own, they need to form coalitions with other – stronger - parties

which are active on the whole national level, in order to be able to make their voices heard

in parliament. Thus, the Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP), representative of the German- and

Ladin-speaking minorities in the Bolzano/Bozen province, was forced to form alliances on

the national level since its first entry into Parliament in 1948. While these alliances were of

less strong and concrete nature in the First Italian Republic, a changed electoral system

(and another change in the first decade of the new century) made it necessary to

collaborate more closely with a trustworthy national partner. The SVP's prime goal in the

national parliament was to gain new competences and foster the region's autonomy, and its

success in doing so can at least partially be measured in the amount of regulations

(“Durchführungsbestimmungen”) putting the Autonomy Statute into practice it was able to

secure during a certain legislature.

This paper aims to show that although ideologically the SVP is closer to conservative

parties like the DC, it was with center-left governments that the most amount of

regulations could be achieved, and that the “Centro Sinistra” represented the strongest and

most reliable party for further autonomy and minority protection. However, as an ethnic

catch-all party operating across classes and left-right spheres, not all SVP groups were

pleased with a close collaboration in a coalition with left parties, and therefore called for a

non-alignment strategy in 2008, the so-called “Blockfreiheit” (“block-freedom”). This

meant that the SVP ran on its own, relying solely on the typical exchange of vote of

confidence for new regulations to happen later on in the newly elected parliament.

However, this did not prove to be a fruitful strategy: Only few new competences were

achieved, the party lost voters who chose the Partito Democratico because their main goal

was to prevent another Berlusconi government, and the worst SVP election outcome since

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1948 became a reality. Under the following Monti technical government, the SVP suffered

from financial cutbacks and complained about the government's lack of communication

with the region's representatives. In temporary expert government specifically installed to

combat the country's economic decline and the signs of the financial crisis, a party

lobbying for particular regional interests did not have a strong stance. This, and the failure

of the “Blockfreiheit” were among the reasons why the SVP shifted back to searching a

strong national partner in 2013, and signed an agreement with Bersani's PD. I hope to show

in this paper that a minority or ethnoregionalist party can ideally exert both coalition and

blackmail potential, especially in close majorities; however, if one of these factors is

lacking, a trustworthy partner in the national parliament is the only way to achieve further

political goals.

First, I will provide an overview over the SVP's roots and history, and its classification as

an ethnoregionalist party: In recent years, a transition occurred, and though it still

represents a certain ethnic group, the SVP now also represents the whole region. The main

part of my analysis will consist in looking at the SVP's voting behavior and alignment or

non-alignment strategies in the national parliament, in a historic recollection from 1948

until the present. Speeches given before votes of confidence are a particularly interesting

source of information, as SVP representatives usually give reasons for their trust or

mistrust in the new government. Another indicator for the degree of collaboration and

understanding between the SVP and a government is the number of regulations on the

Statute passed, as already mentioned above. Both the speeches and the regulation data

show that center-left governments were more open to minority issues, and passed

significantly more “Durchführungsbestimmungen” than their center-right counterparts.

Combining these findings with the current Italian electoral system, I will then conclude

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that a strong ally on the national level is the best strategy for an ethnoregionalist party to

exert influence.

2. History and Classification of the SVP

History – Granting National Representation to the Bolzano/Bozen Province Minorities

The SVP was founded as a party representing the German-speaking minority in South

Tyrol (Italy); the territory had been with the Austro-Hungarian empire until the end of

World War I and now found itself under Italian rule. While the Republican post-war

government was to a certain extent respectful of the region's cultural and linguistic

particularities, the fascist Mussolini regime followed an “Italianization” and assimilation

policy, outlawing German from being used and Italianizing place denominations as well as

names. In the first post-war Parliament, elected in 1921, four representatives from the

South Tyrol region were already present (under the name Deutscher Verband – DV),

however, they were not able to exert much influence, due to their small numeric size and

relative political irrelevance. Italy had at this time already gained full sovereignty over the

territory, and the initial promises to protect language and culture were no longer met with

serious dedication (Peterlini 2012: 29-32). In 1923, Ettore Tolomei proclaimed his

“Provvedimenti per l'Alto Adige” in Bolzano/Bozen, a program consisting of 32 points that

should make South Tyrol a completely Italian region within two generations. Among the

measures were the ban of German in schools and public institutions, communal councils

were dissolved and fascist Podestà implemented instead of democratically elected mayors,

making Italian the only language for all public correspondence, and mass migration of

Italians to newly built industrial areas in the territory. The first parliamentary elections

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after Mussolini had come into power were held in 1924, and due to the new electoral

system, the Deutscher Verband had to collaborate with Friulians, Croatians and Slovenes

in a minority representative coalition in order to have any chance of being elected. Despite

brutality against party representatives from the fasci di combattimento (candidates were

abducted from their homes and brutally beaten), the DV still received 83% of the South

Tyrolean vote (Peterlini 2012: 42-52).

The rise of Hitler in Germany strengthened nationalist feelings in South Tyrol, leading

many inhabitants to believe that like other German-speaking areas in what are now the

Czech Republic and Poland they would also be “freed” by the new Nazi regime. The

Völkischer Kampfring Südtirols began with promoting national socialism as the road to

freedom from the Italian rule, and soon found a large amount of followers, especially

among the young population. After Hitler had occupied Austria in 1938, rumors that South

Tyrol would be next became increasingly strong, and Mussolini had to react. In 1939 a

treaty between Hitler and Mussolini was signed, forcing the South Tyrolean population to

choose between leaving their home and remaining “German” or staying and following the

path of Italianization; the so-called “Option”. The new German territories in Eastern

Europe were the designated new home for the emigrants; however, they had to be 'cleared'

of their original (often Jewish) population first. While the Völkischer Kampfring Südtirols

(VKS) strongly promoted leaving for the Reich, the Deutscher Verband advocated for

staying; the VKS was in the dominant positions, possibly also due to rumors that people

staying would be deported to southern Italian provinces by the fascist regime. The need to

make a decision deeply divided society, and the two groups accused each other of being

traitors, respectively for leaving their homeland or for siding with the Italians. Between 85-

90% of the population opted to leave for Germany; however, only 60,000 of these 200,000

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people really left the country; Italy's entry into the war in 1940 marked the end of the

“Option” period (Peterlini 2012: 76-88).

After the post-Mussolini government's decision to side with the Allied Forces, Germany

occupied Italy in 1943. Many former political leaders who had opted for staying were

deported to the concentration camp Dachau. The Jewish population suffered an even worse

fate; all remaining Jews were arrested and deported via the newly established Lager in

Bolzano/Bozen (Peterlini 2012: 95-98). After the end of World War II, the divide brought

upon by the “Option” was still very obvious, and the political class agreed that a new party

should be one to bridge this gap, and not further enforce this cleavage. On May 8 th, 1945

the Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP) was founded in Bolzano/Bozen, with the intent of being a

catch-all party for all German- and Ladin-speaking South Tyroleans (Peterlini 2012: 114).

The fact that the party was immediately approved by the American Military Government

underlines the good contacts Erich Amonn, founder and first leader of the SVP, had held

with the Allied Forces already in the last days of the war, as well as previously with the

Wehrmacht. The political rebuilding process could therefore start immediately (Holzer

1991: 61). In their work on mass political parties, Eliassen and Svaasand (1975) argue that

parties come into existence either through penetration (a center from which peripheral

party structures are then developed) or through diffusion (locally organized entities then

come together for a common center). The SVP constituted a case of penetration, as it partly

installed new structures in the periphery, and partly relied on the ones that had been

established previously by the Deutscher Verband. Already by summer 1945, local party

representations had been established in most major villages (Holzner 1991: 66).

The Paris Peace Treaty of 1946 determined that South Tyrol would be staying with Italy,

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and destroyed the SVP campaign's hopes for a return to Austria, or the often proclaimed

right of self-determination. On September 5th, 1946 the Gruber – De Gasperi Agreement

was signed, granting protection of language and culture to the German- and Ladin-

speaking minorities in the provinces of Bolzano/Bozen and Trento, now connected in the

region of Trentino-Alto Adige, which meant that the most important decisions could be

made at the regional level by the Italian majority. In the immediate aftermath of these

developments, the SVP ran a campaign to boycott the national election, which was

followed by almost all its electorate. However, when it came to translating the Gruber – De

Gasperi Agreement into concrete measures, compromises had to be made, especially in

order to grant citizenship to the people left stateless during the “Option” period. In 1948,

the first Autonomy Statute was signed and came into force. The SVP also participated in

parliamentary for the first time in the same year, reaching 62% of the votes for the

Chamber and 82% for the Senate and therefore firmly underlining its approach as an ethnic

catch-all party (Peterlini 2012: 145-155). In negotiating the Statute and due to its electoral

success, the SVP had also established itself as Rome's primary partner for negotiations

regarding the Bolzano/Bozen province and the minority issue. In Parliament, the SVP

closely collaborated with the also catholic Democrazia Cristiana (DC), who immediately

presented itself as a more natural ally than leftist working class parties (Holzer 1991: 68).

However, this attitude would change in later years, when left or center-left governments

began to be seen as better partners for negotiations, especially regarding furthering of

provincial powers and autonomy measures.

Despite democratic developments in the newly constituted Italian Republic, the South

Tyrolean minority was not in a good state; financial means to exert powers given by the

Statute were lacking, and Italian officials still promoted the movement of Italians to the

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province – known as the “51% solution”, minority issues were expected to no longer play a

role once ethnic Italians were the majority in the Bolzano/Bozen province. This situation

also led to changes in the SVP leadership: the urban-liberal founding fathers, such as Erich

Amonn, were replaced by a new generation of more conservative and working class

politicians like Silvius Magnago, who would considerably shape the history of the party as

well as of the whole region. The Statute had remained unsatisfactory, and in 1957 35,000

people gathered at Sigmundskron Castle to demand an own provincial autonomy,

independent from the Italian-ruled Trentino Alto Adige region (“Los von Trient”)(Peterlini

2012: 155-158). The change of party elite also made for a more radical point of view on

certain issues, and the close DC – SVP collaboration began to fall apart (Holzer 1991: 82-

83).

In 1958, a proposal for a new Statute was brought forward in the Chamber by the SVP

representatives; and even though it was never formally discussed, it constituted the first

step towards provincial autonomy, on the basis of which Austria would taken action as

well. In 1960, the Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky brought the problem to the U.N.

General Assembly, which then issued a resolution demanding negotiations on the matter

between Austria and Italy. After further negotiations with the Italian delegation failed,

political terrorism carried out by the BAS (Befreiungsauschuss Südtirol) came into focus,

and in 1961, detonations on electricity poles caused major power outages in northern Italy.

The SVP distanced itself from the attacks, clearly condemning all acts of violence; a stance

that was criticized considerably by parts of the electorate. The culprits for the attacks were

soon arrested, and some of them suffered from torture in Italian prisons. In 1961, a second

hearing before the U.N. was held, in which Kreisky discussed the torturing, which had by

then led to a first dead casualty; the U.S. increased its pressure, and a second resolution for

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addressing the South Tyrol issue was passed (Peterlini 2012: 178-191). After the first

attacks, the 19-Commission had been given the call to develop a new Autonomy Statute,

replacing the 1948 solution. In 1969, after various negotiations between members of the

SVP and the Aldo Moro DC government, the new “package” was presented – it clearly

defined an autonomy and not self-determination as the best solution, and was therefore

highly contested among party members. The SVP was deeply divided on the issue whether

to accept this solution or not, and prominent representatives were found on both sides of

the debate. On November 22nd, 1969 the SVP General Assembly voted on the new

Autonomy document: 583 members were in favor of its adoption, while 492 were against,

and 15 abstained; this result shows how internally torn the party was on the issue (Peterlini

2012: 212-216). In the aftermath of finding a stable solution, followed by the second

Autonomy Statute in 1972, the political landscape in South Tyrol broadened, allowing for

other parties to be established next to the catch-all party SVP. However, all these political

movements have so far only remained successful on the provincial level, and the SVP

representatives are still the only party representing the territory as well as the ethnic

minorities on it in the national parliament. In 1992, the dispute between Italy and Austria

was officially settled before the U.N. (“Streitbeilegung”), and the last hurdle on Austria's

way into the EU was cleared. Since then, the SVP has often invoked Austria as its kin-state

if problems with Italy arise, or if a government is instigating measures hostile to the

autonomy.

Classification – the SVP as an Ethnoregionalist Party

While the SVP likes to generally underline its stance as a minority party, recent years and

changes in the political system have also seen changes in the party's direction. After the

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breakdown of the First Republic, party and political structures that had been determining

Italy for decades started to crumble, leaving way for new cleavages. While the traditional

ones (religion and social class) as mentioned by Rokkan became less important, a new

layer was added; one of the cleavages that parties would now organize around was territory

(Maraffi, Schadee et. al. 2008: 171). According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 42), territorial

political organizations are likely to develop under a certain set of conditions: “heavy

concentration of the counter-culture within one clear cut territory; few ties of

communication, alliance and bargaining experience toward the national center and more

toward external centers of cultural or economic influence; minimal economic dependence

on the political metropolis”. The territorial confinement of the minority in one region, the

SVP's strong alignment to Austria and Vienna for help as well as political negotiations, and

the region's (especially in the last two decades) strong financial position make the SVP a

good example of all the characteristics outlined by Lipset and Rokkan.

During the First Republic, the most strongly rooted parties had been among those that were

organized along the largest political traditions in the country: Catholic and Socialist

(Farneti 1985). The SVP's collaboration with the DC as well as its clear anti-communist

stance clearly collocated it to the Catholic section. Following Farneti's classification, the

SVP could be seen as a party with high coalition potential, especially in recent years (Prodi

II government), where it has been decisive to make or break a government. In the Second

Republic, society's shifting focus (along with the settled U.N. dispute) also brought about a

new constellation to the SVP; it was no longer merely a party representing the German-

and Ladin-speaking minorities, but it had also become an ethnoregionalist party,

representing the territory and thus also being more open and attractive to the Italian-

speaking vote. According to Türsan (1998: 5), ethnoregionalist parties are built around an

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exclusive group identity, and a subnational territorial border; however, they do not only

serve ethnic, but also regional interests. Holzer and Schwegler (1998: 158) argue that after

the settling of the U.N. dispute, the SVP lost the German-Italian conflict as its main reason

for existence, and this marked a turning point in its existence. This point is also made by

Schmidtke (1996), who notes that the more successful the SVP is in increasing the region's

autonomy, “the less its own political identity is defined by an overwhelmingly strong

enemy from outside (the Italian nation-state), and the less attractive is a political program

essentially based on ethnic features” (Schmidtke 1996: 295). In trying to escape a mere

ethnic representation that might become obsolete due to a declining enemy, the SVP has

begun to strongly support regional and federalist notions in the Italian parliament (as will

be explained in greater detail in the following analysis), and it has also opened itself to the

idea of European Integration, propagating a “Europe of the Regions”.

3. The SVP in the Italian Parliament – Behavior, Alliances, Influence

Due to the very fast-changing and fluctuating nature of the Italian party system, even small

groups like the SVP can be of importance in order to make or break a government, and

therefore possess coalition as well as blackmail potential. The Italian Parliament consists

of Chamber and Senate, and a proposal must be passed in both houses in order to be

accepted. The government therefore needs party majorities in order to gain the vote of

confidence as described by the Constitution. Parliamentary debates held before the vote of

confidence therefore presented a welcome way for smaller parties like the SVP to make

their demands heard, and to gain further help from the government if the SVP members of

Parliament agreed to vote in favor of it. After 1948, the first period (lasting until 1960) can

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be identified as a centrist government (“Centrismo”), who had a strong leader in the DC's

De Gasperi. Other parties included were PRI, PLI and PSDI. From 1962 until 1976 a

center-left government coalition (“Centro sinistra”) came into power, as the liberal party

(PLI) left the coalition and the socialists (PSI) joined. From 1976-1979 Giulio Andreotti

led two DC governments, introducing the phase of national solidarity (“Solidarietà

nazionale”). The next period was marked by a 5 party coalition (the “Pentapartito”)

consisting of PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI (1981-1991). In 1991, the Republican party (PRI) left

the coalition, reducing it to four remaining members (“Quadripartito”). The end of the first

republic and the scandals connected to it (e.g. Tangentopoli) also deeply changed the party

system, and in 1994 the Polo (Forza Italia, Lega Nord, Alleanza Nazionale, CCD and

UDC) won the election, making Silvio Berlusconi prime minister for the first time.

However, the Berlusconi I government only lasted until December 1994, and a technical

government under Dini made way for a new center-left government led by Romano Prodi,

the so-called “Ulivo” consisting of the democratic left (DS), the people's party (PPI), the

Green party and various small centrist movements (Sleiter 2000: 11-13). After Prodi

narrowly lost a vote of confidence by three votes, center-left governments led by Massimo

D'Alema and Giuliano Amato followed. The elections of 2001 saw Silvio Berlusconi back

in power, leading a coalition of Forza Italian, Lega Nord, Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and the

UDC. In 2006, Romano Prodi won the election, but had to resign due to a no confidence

vote in 2008, and another Berlusconi government ensued, with the Popolo Della Libertà

(PDL) and the Lega Nord as the two main parties; Berlusconi resigned in 2011, leading the

way for Mario Monti's technical government. Monti stayed in power for 18 months, until

the 2013 elections, which saw Beppe Grillo's Movimento 5 Stelle as the big winner;

however, Grillo refused to collaborate with the Partito Democratico (PD), and a grand

coalition government between PD and PDL was finally formed after two months of

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negotiations.

The SVP's Voting Behavior and Strategy in the National Parliament

In classifying the Italian first Republic's (which lasted from 1948 until the Tangentopoli

scandals and the rise of Berlusconi in 1994), four main phases of governmental

predominance can be distinguished:

1. “Centrismo” (1948-1959): The government coalitions were formed of center parties,

such as the Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (PSDI), the Partito Repubblicano

Italiano (PRI), the DC, and the Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI).

2. “Centro-Sinistra” (1962-1976): After the liberals had left the government, a phase of

center-left governments followed, composed of PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano), PSDI,

PRI, DC.

3. “Solidarietà Nazionale” (1976-1979): Due to the abstaining voters from other parties

and the “historic compromise” built with the Communist Party (PCI), the DC was able to

form an own minority government.

4. “Pentapartito” (1981-1991): As the name suggests, the “Pentapartito” was a five party

coalition composed of centrist and center-left parties: PSI, PSDI, PRI, DC, PLI. When the

PRI left in 1991, a four party coalition was left, constituting the “Quadripartito”.

The DC clearly played the dominant role in the Italian First Republic's party system; in the

45 governments in power between 1948 and 1992 the Prime Minister was always a DC

politician, with the exception of merely four governments (Spadolini of the PRI and Craxi

of the PSI each presided two governments). In the early 1980s, regional movements (like

the Lega Nord) and the Green Party were formed, but the main political players stayed the

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same. While all parties could potentially be involved in governing, the PCI was excluded

until the “compromesso storico”, and the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI, successor of

the fascist party) and the Monarchists were viewed to be out of the constitutional arc, and

therefore not suitable partners for negotiation. Considering the large success in

governmental coalitions, it is not surprising that the SVP's primary party ally in Rome has

often been the DC. In the years until the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Italian was

deeply divided between two types of Leitkultur; a deeply catholic, conservative one

(represented by the DC) and a communist, revolutionary approach (represented by the

PCI). As the SVP is itself a Christian conservative party, and has always had a deeply anti-

communist profile, collaborating with the DC as the strongest anti-communist force made

sense from a left-right axis cleavage as well (Massl 2010: 36-37).

The SVP – DC Collaboration: A Conflict-Ridden Relationship

In the years of the “Centrismo”, the SVP and the DC collaborated closely, united by their

catholic background, their anti-communist stance and their strong commitment to

capitalism and economic growth. In 1948, SVP leader Erich Amonn proclaimed that the

Volkspartei would only fight against the government in cases where regional or ethnic

interests where in danger, but that they would fight with Rome in the “Christian and

European spirit” (quoted in Holzer 1991: 72). The “Centrismo” period from 1948-1959

was established by the DC, whose leader De Gasperi fronted a coalition of DC, PLI, PRI

and PSDI; Paolo Farneti (1985: 32) refers to this time also as “Centrismo degasperiano”.

The De Gasperi government could rely on the SVP's support in the national parliament,

and both parties collaborated in the regional government and Council as well.

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In the 1950s, an opposition section within the SVP (the above mentioned “new generation”

of leaders) partially changed the party's direction into a more conflictual position towards

the government, also challenging the close collaboration on the regional level (Holzer

1991: 76). The new elite was also more skeptical towards the course of close alliance to

the DC that is predecessors had been following; the DC government in Rome remained

hostile towards a province instead of region-based autonomy, and the regional government

in Trento was constantly blocking the SVP's attempts to gain more rights. In the May 1958

parliamentary elections, the SVP therefore no longer reached a coalition agreement with

the DC, but ran on its own; it also left the regional government in 1959, which marked the

beginning of an opposition period that lasted until 1970 (Holzer 1991: 83). In the

provincial government, SVP and DC continued to work together closely, a collaboration

that was to continue for many years.

During the DC coalition years, the SVP addressed a number of important issues in the

debates preceding the votes of confidence, such as the citizenship problem (people who

had chosen Germany during the “Option” now often remained stateless individuals), the

recognition of academic degrees received in Austria, the installment of German as a second

official language as laid out in the Paris Treaty, knowledge of German as a prerequisite for

public service positions, etc. (Sleiter 2000: 28-40). Siding with the DC, and being a

necessary partner for the continued success of the government proved to be a beneficial

decision on many occasions. However, the tension between the two parties especially on

the regional level rendered collaboration on the national level increasingly difficult as well.

Interestingly, the SVP and the DC still maintained their coalition in the regional

government. In their voting behavior, the SVP representatives always remained in-line

with what had been decided as the general party point of view, with only very few

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exceptions.

SVP and Center-Left Collaboration in the First and Second Republic: the “Centro-Sinistra”

as a Partner for More Autonomy

The strong alignment between DC and SVP eroded to a certain extent after the

“Centrismo” years, as center-left forces came into power. While the SVP representatives in

Rome also were not satisfied with governmental progress on autonomy negotiations, the

main reason for the split between the two parties lied at the regional level, where the DC

refused to grant shifting of powers from the region to the province (as envisioned in the

1948 First Autonomy Statute). With a new center-left government in power, the SVP now

also had a new addressee for their lobbying, which proved to be more a more open

negotiating partner than the DC. However, this might also be due to the terrorist attacks,

and the international attention granted to the minority issue because of the U.N. hearings

and resolutions. Again, the SVP expressed its concerns in the debates preceding votes of

confidence, often granting the government their trust in advance if South Tyrol relevant

matters were then to be negotiated. Looking at confidence votes from 1948-1998, Sleiter

(2000: 130) finds that the center-left governments were able to secure the most “yes” votes

by the SVP, which coincides with the general perception of “Centro-Sinistra” coalitions as

being more open to minority issues and more accepting in giving more competences to the

autonomous provinces. By granting its confidence, the SVP expected to receive more

competences, as well as the necessary regulations (“Durchführungsbestimmung”) to be

able to carry out already acquired competences. The “Pentapartito” and the “Centro

Sinistra” governments were the most autonomy-friendly, where most regulations regarding

the Autonomy Statute were passed. The “Pentapartito” saw 24 regulations being

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established, while the “Centro Sinistra” governments counted 41 until 2000. With centrist

governments at 11 and center-right governments at 6, it is clear to see that center-left

governments were generally more favorable to autonomy issues. In almost all cases where

the SVP voted “yes” to a confidence vote, a regulation followed (Sleiter 2000: 134-140).

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the dichotomy of DC and PCI as catholic and communist

poles was no longer relevant, which became clear in the split of the PCI into Partito

Democratico della Sinistra (PDS) and Rifondazione Communista (RC) in 1991 as well as

by significant losses for both PDS, RC and DC in the 1992 elections. The dominant

cleavage of Italian post-war politics had therefore significantly lost its aligning force. In

implementing the Maastricht Treaty regulations, the majority of the Italian population was

confronted for the first time with the country's desolate public finances, and the corruption

scandals of Mani Pulite and Tangentopoli further destroyed the population's trust in its

political class (Massl 2010: 37-38). In the following erosion of the political system, all

parties present in the “Pentapartito” changed their name and structure in at least one kind

of way, and new parties like the Lega Nord and Berlusconi's Forza Italia entered the

political scene. In 1994, Berlusconi was elected to be the first Prime Minister of the

Second Republic, leading a coalition of FI, Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and the Lega Nord

called “Polo Della Libertà”.

In 1992, the dispute between Italy and Austria was settled at the U.N.; this also meant a

change of directions from being an autonomist party to a ethnoregional party. It too marks

the beginning of the so-called “dynamic autonomy”, meaning that even though the Statute

provisions have for the most part been reached, there are still further goals to be achieved.

This development was supported by the new mixed majoritarian and proportional voting

Crepaz 17

system, which forced the SVP into a coalition with a national party, in order to foster their

chances in the majoritarian vote, and in order to overcome the newly introduced 4%

hurdle. In 1996, the SVP therefore entered a coalition with Romano Prodi's center-left

“Ulivo” coalition. In exchange for the votes added to the coalition total by SVP voters, the

party was allowed to nominate the candidate for the regional electoral district, and

therefore had the chance to win another seat also in the proportional vote. While the SVP

did not do well in the elections, the coalition with Prodi proved to be very beneficial: the

minority-friendly government authorized important regulations for the furthering of South

Tyrol's autonomy, one of the main ones was the delegation of competences in the school

sector, the authorization for founding a university, and control over the provincial road

system (Massl 2010: 58-61). Besides campaigning for more competences as it had always

done, the SVP fulfilled its new role of regional and federalist party by also supporting the

introduction of a more federalist political model in Italy. In the 1990s, the claim for a

federalist Republic was made in almost all speeches held in the vote of confidence

procedures. During the D'Alema governments (1998 and 1999) nine new regulations

(“Durchführungsbestimmungen”) were passed, again underlining the character of the

center-left governments as particularly autonomy and minority friendly. The newly

acquired competences included libraries, cultural instutions, museums, radio and TV, as

well public water supplies. The left parties, as well as the center-left, proved to be vital in

achieving further autonomy. The Amato government, which followed after D'Alema's

resignation in 2000 passed a record number of eleven new regulations in fourteen months,

touching upon subjects such as bilingualism in court, schools, roads, and assignment of

public service positions according to the strength of the language groups (“Proporz”).

Crepaz 18

Between Opposition, Coalition and Non-Alignment (“Blockfreiheit”): The Party's Role in

the New Century

Before the 2001 parliamentary elections, the SVP intensified its coalition strategy with the

center-left “Ulivo”, now made up of the Democratici di Sinistra (DS), the Communisti

Italiani (PdCI), Girasole (Green Party & Socialisti Democratici Italiani), Margherita (PPI,

RI, Unione Democratici per l'Europa, Democratici). Berlusconi ran again with his Casa

Delle Libertà, now composed of FI, AN, Nuovo PSI, Lega Nord, and Biancofiore (CCD

and CDU). The Coalition with the “Ulivo” proved to be very successful for the SVP, as it

now had five “own” SVP representatives, and eight further “Ulivo” members who could all

lobby for the province's interests in Rome. However, the parliamentary election saw

Berlusconi's coalition as the winner, which did not help the SVP's causes (Massl 2010: 76-

80). In his programmatic speech, Berlusconi made no mention of autonomy or minorities

(similar to 1994), which caused SVP MP Karl Zeller to note that there could be no

confidence in this government. Berlusconi then revised his stance, saying that he would

respect minorities and the special situation of the autonomous regions (Parliamentary

Document, 21.06.2001). The SVP reacted by reassuring that it would enter a constructive

dialogue with the new government; however, they voted with “no”, denying their

confidence to Berlusconi's government.

The Berlusconi government implemented sixteen regulations in five years, which is not

much compared to what the center-left governments before (and especially the Amato

government with eleven new regulations in only little over a year) had achieved. SVP MP

Siegfried Brugger expressed his frustration in 2005, noting that the local autonomies had

only been in a position of safeguarding already made achievements, and that the

government's strong centralism had also been detrimental to the furthering of the “dynamic

autonomy” (quoted in Massl 2010: 83). In the speech for the new (again center-left)

Crepaz 19

government elected in 2006, the SVP expressed its wishes that another period of more

sensitivity towards minority issues would now follow.

The above mentioned exchange of votes of confidence for new regulations (Sleiter 2000)

continued in the last decade; the “Centro Sinistra” governments therefore remained the

SVP's main points of reference and preferred coalition partners in Rome. However,

Siegfried Brugger said at the party's General Assembly in 2000 that the SVP did not have a

pro-center-left and anti-center-right bias, and, as a catch-all centrist party, it did not belong

to either of the blocks. But, he also noted that experience showed that the SVP collaborates

much better with center-left governments regarding minority issues (quoted in Massl 2010:

89). In 2005, a new electoral law was introduced, a proportional system with a majority

bonus in order to ensure governability. The majority bonus grants the winning party or

coalition in the Chamber 55% of the seats, even if those were not reached by the vote

alone; a similar system of 55% is at work in the Senate. While seats are assigned according

to coalitions and the respective amount of party votes, a party needs to reach at least 2% of

the nation-wide vote to be considered in the distribution of seats; a very discriminatory

system for a minority party like the SVP, which typically ranges around 0.5-0.6%

nationally. A special regulation for parties representing linguistic minorities was reached:

the 2% hurdle was abolished, but the respective party must reach at least 20% in their

electoral district (Massl 2010: 91-92). The new electoral system also meant that running by

itself would be increasingly difficult for the SVP, as it would diminish its chances. While

still arguing for its independence, the SVP justified its alignment to the center-left Prodi

coalition with better chances of achieving further competences and autonomy. The SVP

therefore ended up in Romano Prodi's coalition “Union”, together with L'Ulivo,

Rifondazione Comunista, La Rosa nel Pugno, Comunisti Italiani, Italia dei Valori, Verdi,

Crepaz 20

UDEUR, Partito Pensionati, Socialisti, Lista Consumatori, Lombardia Autonoma, Liga

Fronte Veneto. Berlusconi's “Casa Delle Libertà” united FI, AN, UDC, Lega Nord,

Democrazia Cristiana – Nuovo PSI, Alternative Sociale Mussolini, Fiamma Tricolore, No

Euro, Pensionati Uniti, Ambienta-Lista, Partito Liberale Italiano, SOS Italia. The election

outcome was very close, with only 3 seats (Prodi 159, Berlusconi 156) difference in the

Senate, which granted a very important position to the three SVP Senators. The SVP had

considerable coalition potential under the new electoral law, as its amount of additional

votes granted the election to Romano Prodi. If it would have withdrawn its support in the

Senate, it could also have brought about the downfall of the government. The typical

exchange – vote of confidence for new competences – was now working in a new way:

The SVP was granted more new regulations, and ones that had been hard to achieve before

(e.g. energy), but being decisive for the government coalition also meant that the Senators

could not vote independently on a case-to-case basis, as this would have meant the

breakdown of the government. In a coalition that included a very diverse party spectrum,

the SVP's conservative values and economic policies were often challenged. Finally, after

the UDEUR left the government in 2008, the Prodi government was history and new

elections had to be held.

After the date for the elections had been set, the economy lobby in the SVP began to

campaign for ending the coalition with the center-left parties, especially since all polls

pointed in the direction of center-right as the election's winner. In a rather unfortunate

terminology decision, the SVP began to talk about “Blockfreiheit” (“block freedom”, the

term typically used to describe Yugoslavia during the Cold War years – not being a Soviet

satellite state, but not a Western state either), denoting a strategy of non-alignment to either

of the two big political blocks. The center-left coalition consisted of the newly formed

Crepaz 21

Partito Democratico (PD), which had been created through a fusion of DS and Margherita,

and also included Italia dei Valori, under the leadership of Walter Vetroni, while Berlusconi

proposed his “Popolo Della Libertà” composed of FI, AN, and the Movimenti per

l'Autonomia per il Sud. Berlusconi won the election, and the SVP only reached two seats

in the Chamber, its worst election result in the history of parliamentary elections. Many

voters turned their backs on the SVP and chose one of the other running right-wing parties

(Freiheitliche and Union für Südtirol), while a large number (7,600 votes) also voted PD

instead of SVP this time, in order to prevent another Berlusconi win (Massl 2010: 115).

Internal tensions in the SVP preceded the vote of confidence to the Berlusconi government,

and finally the party decided to vote “no”. However, the party did not give any speeches

prior to the vote, a protest sign from the MPs that had wanted to grant trust to the

government. In a rare case of withdrawal from party discipline, Senator Helga Thaler-

Außerhofer abstained from the vote. This vote led the SVP into a deep crisis, which

culminated in the resigning of party leader Pichler-Rolle. Also, the expectations of the

“Blockfreiheit” were not really met, despite the “Milan Agreement” being signed in 2009.

The Agreement included a provision that the province would get 9/10 of the taxes paid on

its territory back, as well as more money for newly acquired competences (e.g. school

system, labor market).

In the technical Monti government installed after the downfall of Berlusconi IV in 2011,

the situation did not become much better for the SVP. As one of the richer regions, South

Tyrol was expected to pay larger sums of money to save the country's precarious financial

situation, which of course did not side well with SVP representatives and their electorate.

In the attempt to foster Italy's declining economy, decisions were often made in a centralist

way, without first consulting representatives from the autonomous regions. The new

Crepaz 22

finance model also saw elevated contributions to the state budget, and did not bring the

desired new regulations (e.g. getting mail services as a provincial competences. Monti also

violated the 9/10 tax regulation given in the “Milan Agreement”, as the newly installed tax

revenues would not go back to the province. The model of vote of confidence in exchange

for more autonomy did not prove to be followed with the Monti government, which had

saving the country's economy as well as its international reputation as its primary goal, and

could therefore not be interested in the concerns of minorities, especially from relatively

rich “paying” regions.

The “Blockfreiheit” no longer seemed to be an issue when the SVP negotiated the so-

called “Autonomy Pact” with PD leader Pierluigi Bersani before the 2013 parliamentary

elections. The “Pact” underlined that the PD recognizes the international basis for the

autonomy, and it makes a commitment to foster and further develop it in the future. The

agreement also included a reference to new regulations that should be addressed, such as

national parks, highways, and one of the never tackled highly contested issues, namely the

establishment of rules regarding place names (“Toponomastik”). The elections led to a

situation of ingovernability, as Beppe Grillo's Movimento 5 Stelle refused to collaborate

with both the winning PD coalition and the Berlusconi center-right camp. The solution was

a very rare grand coalition between PD and PDL, led by Prime Minister Enrico Letta. In

their declarations before the vote of confidence, the SVP representatives mentioned Letta's

strong focus on social policy, and expressed their conviction that the new government

would be responsive to the special needs of the minority (Südtirol News 29.04.2013). In

early August 2013, Letta came to Bolzano/Bozen and the “Bolzano/Bozen Agreement” was

signed; it confirmed the 9/10 tax rule outlined in the “Milan Agreement”, and made way

for competences that had been withdrawn by the Monti government, as well as new ones

Crepaz 23

that had previously been outlined in the “Autonomy Pact” with Bersani. SVP Senator

Zeller commented that the coalition with the PD had been a good decision, which would

bring many advantages for South Tyrol (SVP press release, 07.08.2013). The Letta

government therefore seems to have proven to be a trustworthy ally for the SVP so far.

4. Conclusions

The SVP is an ethnoregionalist catch-all party which unites different classes and layers of

society around the ethnic center-periphery cleavage. In doing so, it encompasses people

and groups that would usually not be working together politically, as their values and goals

seem to be quite different. The internal divisions inside the party have become more and

more visible over the last years, culminating in the scandal around the vote of confidence

for the Berlusconi IV government. In its early years, the SVP chose to collaborate with the

DC; a union that seemed logical due to both parties' anti-communist stance and their

common Catholic background. However, regional developments in Trento and

unwillingness to transfer competences to the provinces made working together increasingly

difficult, until the collaboration came to an end. Even though both parties had common

goals, the over-riding ethnic cleavage proved to be more important than alignment along

the left-right sphere or religion.

In contrast, the SVP is a conservative party, and does not (or, at least, did not in the past)

have too many points of congruence with the center-left. This situation is intensified when

talking about coalitions that encompass parties further to the left end of the spectrum, such

as the Prodi II government. However, despite their lack of shared political goals, their

Crepaz 24

agreement on the ethnic cleavage again seems to overcome left-right and religious

divisions. As the above analysis has shown, center-left governments provide the best

record in advancing the autonomy, and in providing a strong and trustworthy partner for

minorities at the national level. The SVP is organized mainly along the center-periphery

and majority-minority cleavage, which presides over other potential cleavages; as minority

and regional issues are therefore the most relevant to both the party and the electorate,

siding with the coalition most open to these problems is the logical choice of alignment.

The “Blockfreiheit” experiment has shown that a non-alignment strategy could only be

successful if the party has blackmail potential, and also that it could bring parts of the

electorate to vote for the opposite coalition, if voting against a political “enemy” is seen as

more important than voting for the SVP. The diversification of the ethnic party system that

is under way in South Tyrol could further these developments, especially if another party

can gain enough strength to surpass the 20% at regional level. The SVP would no longer be

the only feasible political representative, and it would have to chose another strategy of

alignment over the until now dominant ethnic cleavage.

Crepaz 25

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