ISSN 1347-9156

The Conflict-Sensitive Approach of JBIC’s Development Assistance

in Sri Lanka

Keiju Mitsuhashi

JBICI

Working Paper

NO. 31

August 2008

JBIC Institute (JBICI)

The JBICI Working Papers are based on the research done by staffs of Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and published by the JBIC Institute. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of JBIC.

The Conflict-Sensitive Approach of JBIC’s Development Assistance in Sri Lanka

August 2008

Keiju Mitsuhashi, Ph.D.

Representative Office in Colombo

Japan Bank for International Cooperation

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ABSTRACT This paper aims to define and operationalize the conflict-sensitive approach (CSA) to be undertaken by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) in the context of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The CSA is a necessary condition for the development partners operating in Sri Lanka where conflict—having long been the most dominant economic, social, and political issue—invariably impinges upon development. The key conflict elements that need to be considered include the ethnic and regional balances, causes and consequences of the conflict, politics of the conflict, global and local context of the conflict in Sri Lanka, interactions between development intervention and the context and dynamics of the conflict, and the risks associated with the conflict. Considering the limited roles of development aid in addressing the conflict, the CSA principles encompass: (1) mainstreaming the development agenda as the overlapping objectives of conflict resolution and peace-building, (2) continued engagement in development and peace-building, (3) focus on the competent areas, and (4) emphasis on risk management. This paper also examines the regional balance of JBIC’s development assistance portfolio in Sri Lanka. It shows that JBIC’s loan portfolio can be considered to be generally regionally balanced, but more efforts are required to promote regionally balanced development. The paper concludes with practical suggestions for the operationalization of the CSA.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... i

Table of contents ......................................................................................................................... ii

Acronyms.................................................................................................................................... iii

1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................... 4

2. The Need for CSA in Sri Lanka........................................................................................... 6

3. CSA Framework for JBIC .................................................................................................... 8

3.1. General approach .......................................................................................................... 8 3.2. Other development partners .......................................................................................... 9 3.3. Current attempts toward CSA ...................................................................................... 10 3.4. Key elements to be considered for CSA ...................................................................... 10 3.5. Basic principles of JBIC’s CSA in Sri Lanka ................................................................ 18

4. Analysis of JBIC’s Operations from the viewpoint of CSA ........................................... 22

4.1. Introduction................................................................................................................... 22 4.2. Portfolio review by regional distribution ....................................................................... 23 4.3. Analysis based on conflict sensitivity typology............................................................. 29

5. Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 32

Appendix A................................................................................................................................. 34

Basic Strategy of Japan’s ODA Loan....................................................................................... 34

Appendix B................................................................................................................................. 35

CSA of Some of the Development Partners ............................................................................ 35

Appendix C................................................................................................................................. 37

JBIC’s ODA Loans in Sri Lanka: By Sector ............................................................................. 37

Appendix D................................................................................................................................. 38

Conflict Screening for JBIC financed projects (Sample Form)................................................ 38

Appendix E................................................................................................................................. 40

List of Organizations for CSA Partners.................................................................................... 40

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ACRONYMS ADB Asian Development Bank

APRC All Party Representative Committee

CFA Ceasefire Agreement

CSA Conflict-sensitive approach

DAC Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)

G2G Government to Government

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GoJ Government of Japan

GoSL Government of Sri Lanka

GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

IIGEP International Independent Group of Eminent Persons

JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation

JHU Jathka Hela Urumaya

JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

NGO Non-government organisation

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

ODA Official Development Assistance

OHCHR UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights

SLMC Sri Lanka Muslim Congress

SLMM Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

TMVP Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal

TNA Tamil National Alliance

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNP United National Party

UPFA United People’s Freedom Alliance

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

WB World Bank

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THE CONFLICT-SENSITIVE APPROACH OF JBIC’S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN SRI LANKA 1

1. INTRODUCTION This paper attempts to define the conflict-sensitive approach (CSA) of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) development assistance operation in Sri Lanka. A CSA tries to recognize conflict as an important context and issue, rather than ignore it, and considers incorporating measures to ensure minimum negative impacts and maximum positive impacts with respect to the conflict. A CSA is the necessary condition for development partners operating in Sri Lanka where conflict—having long been the most dominant economic, social, and political issue—invariably impinges upon development. It presumes that development aid does not necessarily contribute to peace-building efforts. Aid may improve or aggravate the context and dynamics of the conflict and may support or undermine the peace process. Due consideration should be given to conflict, and the appropriate measures sensitive to conflict should be undertaken. The important question is how to operationalize aid delivery and programs that are sufficiently sensitive to conflict. A deliberate and systematic introduction of a CSA is thus of interest to this paper.

Peace-building, in a broad sense, forms an important element in JBIC’s development assistance to Sri Lanka. Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter of 2003 highlights peace-building as one of the four priority issues for the Japanese ODA.2 Consolidation of peace and reconstruction is identified as a priority issue under Japan’s country assistance program for Sri Lanka.3 JBIC, which provides ODA loans on concessionary terms to meet development objectives, also recognizes peace-building as one of the priority areas in the Medium-Term Strategy for Overseas Economic Cooperation Operations.4 JBIC’s current assistance strategy to Sri Lanka includes “assistance for peace-building, assistance for restoration, mainly in the northern and eastern regions with consideration given to regional and ethnic balances.” It is clear

1 This paper was written by Keiju Mitsuhashi, Representative, Colombo Office, Japan Bank for International Cooperation. The author would like to thank Kaori Honda, for her dedicated and efficient assistance. The author also appreciates the assistance of Atsushi Kaneko, Austin Fernando, Masaki Kudo, Katzuhiko Masaki, Prashan Thalayasingam, and Danura Miriyagalla, in providing insightful and useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 2 Other priority issues include poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and addressing global issues. See < http://www.mofa.go.jp/ policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf > for Japan’s ODA Charter. 3 Japan’s country assistance program for Sri Lanka formulated in 2004 covers the direction of assistance until 2009. See< http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/sw_asia/srilanka.pdf >. 4 See Appendix A.

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that establishing a practical CSA framework in order to operationalize these policies in the context of Sri Lanka is, therefore, necessary.

“Conflict” in this context here primarily concerns the ethnic conflict that has escalated to human right abuse, including the widespread abductions, assassinations, and massacre of civilians. It refers to a conflict that has impacts on the entire Sri Lankan nation at every level of society, economy, and government institutions for a prolonged period of time. The current context of conflict comprises two interrelated dimensions: the armed conflict comprising military operations between the GoSL and LTTE and the grievances of ethnic minority communities over their rights. This type of conflict is beyond the conventional scope of social consideration practice that deals with issues related to the project-level resettlement and compensation, gender, and the most vulnerable, and hence, requires a different set of approach and framework in order to ensure that the aid operation is sensitive to conflict.

This paper first clarifies the need for adopting a CSA in JBIC’s development assistance operation in Sri Lanka. It briefly provides an overview of the current context of the conflict in the new post cease fire agreement (CFA) era, and argues for the deliberation of a CSA, the concept of which had already been incorporated in the 2003 Tokyo Declaration on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka. The paper further discusses a general CSA framework for JBIC’s development assistance operation in Sri Lanka. In doing so, it briefly reviews the CSAs of other development partners. Subsequently, the key elements and principles of a CSA are presented. This is followed by an analysis of the current JBIC operations in Sri Lanka from a conflict sensitivity point of view. It looks into the current on-going projects from the perspective of a portfolio, as well as with a focus on the types of projects. The paper concludes with practical suggestions for the introduction of a CSA for JBIC’s development assistance operation in Sri Lanka.

It is important to note that JBIC is a Japanese government financial institution, with the mandate to execute the Japanese ODA loan. JBIC’s ODA operation is done on a government-to-government (G2G) basis, and requires sovereign guarantee on the concessionary loan. It presently focuses on financing large-scale infrastructure projects in the power, transport, and water sectors in Sri Lanka. It should be noted that general policy matters with regard to the provision of JBIC’s development assistance rest with the Government of Japan (GoJ). This paper focuses on the CSA that is important for the operational aspect of development financing in the context of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict.

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2. THE NEED FOR CSA IN SRI LANKA Sri Lanka officially entered into the post-CFA era on January 16, 2008.5 The termination of the CFA constitutes an important turning point in the history of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. It was the CFA of 2002 that was instrumental for reducing the fully armed civil conflict that had escalated since 1983; however, in the later years, CFA was criticized as being almost defunct following the deadlock in the peace negotiations and increased violations of the agreement, particularly post-August 2006.6 It was also the CFA that became the ground for the international donor community to support the efforts of Sri Lanka toward a negotiated settlement, and raised over 4.5 billion dollars as development assistance for Sri Lanka at the 2003 Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka.

One of the important ramifications of the abrogation of the CFA is the increased concern over the conflict and its associated issues including the violation of human rights, rising military spending, and aid fungibility. Immediately after the GoSL’s decision to abrogate the CFA, the GoJ stated the following: “… The Government of Japan is deeply concerned that the decision taken by the Government of Sri Lanka may lead to the escalation of the conflict by way of increased level of violence and greater civilian casualties, and leave the peace process at a standstill. …”7 Other members of the international community followed suit, raising similar concerns and urged on a negotiated settlement through political means. The withdrawal of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), as well as the departure of IIGEP, accelerated the much contentious United Nations proposal to set up an Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Sri Lanka, to which the GoSL has strongly opposed. The minorities in Sri Lanka are also upset with the GoSL’s decision to withdraw from the CFA. Tamils in the North and East feel that there is no formal arrangement to ensure their safety and security. Irrespective of whether a CFA is adopted, Muslims generally feel neglected due to the continued bilateralized view on the ethnic conflict. These increased concerns over the abrogation of the CFA imply that development partners active in Sri Lanka should engage in development with greater sensitivity to conflict.

5 Statement by Rohitha Bogollagama, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Diplomatic Briefing head at the Foreign Ministry on January 4, 2008. 6 It is reported that there were over 1,000 violations of the CFA, which started as early as July 2002. See the SCOPP Web site at < http://www.peaceinsrilanka.com/peace2005/Insidepage/PressRelease/SLMM/July/6006.asp >. 7 Statement by Masahiko Koumura, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, in “The Government of Sri Lanka’s withdrawal from the Ceasefire Agreement” dated January 4, 2008; source: < http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/1/1177042_924.html >.

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The termination of the CFA brought Sri Lanka into a new phase of conflict and peace process. The abrogation of the CFA raised expectations among many with respect to APRC reactivating the devolution process, but the APRC proposal fell short of producing any real impact. The expectation on activating Constitutional Councils is high, but an impasse prevails. The local election in Batticaloa and the provincial election in the Eastern Province produced democratically elected leaders in the East; however, an insurgence of sporadic armed conflicts between TMVP and SLMC raises concerns as to whether the East is ready for reconstruction and development. The interim administration in the Northern Province was nominated by President Mahinda Rajapaksa, but the appointments of MPs active in the central government as members of the Interim Administration may go against the very spirit of devolution in the North. Meanwhile, intense military operations continue, especially in the North, resulting in an increasing number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Indiscriminatory bomb attacks, continued abductions, and assaults in Colombo and other areas continue to be a violent threat to civilians and foreign visitors. All these issues necessitate the “war against terror” to be on top of the political agenda. That the conflict dominates politics implies that everything can be politicized and misused for conflict, and development assistance is no exception to this.

Conflict remains the most important development issue in Sri Lanka irrespective of the outcomes of the abrogation of the CFA. The expectation on aid for post-conflict reconstruction, prevention of conflict, and peace-building, is high. Development aid requires stable conditions for effective implementation, while development aid is expected to be useful in addressing the causes and consequences of conflict. Development assistance to Sri Lanka needs to be continuously conflict-sensitive.

Indeed, the 2003 Tokyo Declaration on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka, the hallmark of the international commitment to support reconstruction and development of Sri Lanka, has encouraged the peace process with due consideration to conflict sensitivity.8 Some of the key CSA concepts noted in the Tokyo Declaration include “the importance of bringing tangible dividends of peace to all the people of Sri Lanka,” “the importance of urgent humanitarian assistance as well as medium to long-term assistance to rebuild the conflict-affected areas in the North and East, and to assist in the development of the entire country,” and “the importance of taking full account of the delicate ethnic and geographical balance in providing assistance.”

8 See < www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/srilanka/conf0306/declaration/html >

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It is also important to note that the JBIC 2003 paper now needs to be reviewed that the CFA ceased to exist.9 The JBIC 2003 paper was written when the trend was toward peace as indicated by the signing of the CFA; now, however, the context of the development and conflict has significantly changed. This paper—the premise of which lay on the presumption that Sri Lanka was heading toward a negotiated settlement under the CFA—was an appropriate paper at the time. However, the context has changed since the CFA became defunct and was formally terminated as of January 2008; the termination was followed by the provincial election held in the Eastern Province in May 2008. It is, therefore, important for JBIC to review the current situation and its positioning in the conflict-development nexus in Sri Lanka.

3. CSA FRAMEWORK FOR JBIC 3.1. General approach One of the useful references with regard to the CSA is the “Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peace-building.”10 The CSA adopts a framework that identifies the context of a conflict along with its profile, causes, actors, and dynamics; considers how intervention, throughout its project cycle, interacts with the context and dynamics of conflict; and ensures intervention to avoid the pitfalls and maximize the positive impacts with respect to the conflict.

Conflict analysis is considered a key element to understand the context of conflict, and it is important to apply an appropriate conflict analysis. Analysis on the interaction between conflict and intervention is required at all stages of the project cycle. The ways in which a project interacts with a conflict varies depending on whether the project is at the planning, implementation, or evaluation stage. It is important to bear in mind that the purpose of adopting a CSA is to “do no harm” to the context of conflict and/or to have a positive impact with respect to conflict.

Furthermore, it is important to recognize that not only should a CSA be applied at the project level, but also at the program and portfolio levels. Interactions between conflict and intervention may take place at the local level as well as at the national level.11

The interaction between conflict and intervention needs to be defined further. Goodhand

9 JBICI “Conflict and Development: Roles of JBIC – Development Assistance Strategy for Peace Building and Reconstruction in Sri Lanka” JBICI Research Paper No.24, Tokyo, August 2003. 10 This resource pack was jointly produced by APFO, CECORE, CHA, FEWER, International Alert, Saferworld. 11 In the case of Sri Lanka, the conflict dimension extends even at the global level as the international community as well as Sri Lankan diasporas, though differently, play important roles in the conflict.

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(2002) discusses that intervention can be categorized into three types: projects that work “on” the conflict, “in” the conflict, and “around” the conflict.12 This suggests that there is a need for a different approach with regard to the CSA’s operationalization.

3.2. Other development partners Other development partners active in Sri Lanka have attempted to apply a CSA to their operations. Some development partners have already introduced a rigorous CSA framework while others are in the process of adopting a CSA as part of their key strategy in their aid delivery operations. Their experiences and progress can be useful in formulating JBIC’s CSA; these are summarized in Appendix B.13

A brief review of the experience of other development partners provides some important insights and issues. First, a CSA can be introduced at different levels of operation. At the policy level, it is found that it is useful to set a CSA policy at both the headquarters and at the country level. While the headquarters can set an overall CSA policy for the organization, a CSA should be developed at the country policy level, taking country specificity into account. At the project level, some find the screening procedure useful in ensuring the systematic application of the CSA, whereas others focus on developing a mechanism for applying a CSA within individual projects while giving consideration to the specificities of each individual project.

Second, most development partners have generally adopted a CSA as an in-built mechanism in the so-called peace building projects at the project level. Due flexibility is incorporated to meet the changing local circumstances, and consideration is given to critical conflict elements so as to contribute to conflict prevention and peace building.

Third, different development partners have implemented the CSA to varying degrees. In particular, those development partners that implement projects themselves and have intervention tools at the grass-root level tend to have introduced CSA policies earlier, and adopted more rigorous CSA tools. The other type of development partners is funding agencies; these seem to be lagging behind the former in openly introducing a CSA into their operations. This may be because as funding agencies, their position is, in principle, that of a financier, either in the form of grants or loans, and they are not the contractual parties involved in the implementation of the development projects. Another important reason may be due to the fact that their primary mandate rests with development rather

12 Jonathan Goodhand, “Conflict Assessments” Centre for Defence Studies, 2001. 13 There have also been concerted efforts to agree on the “guiding principles” for humanitarian and development assistance in Sri Lanka mainly among bilateral development partners and with the GoSL, which is expected to be a platform for effective aid delivery in the current context of conflict, and entails some elements of conflict sensitivity.

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than conflict transformation.

However, the experiences of other development partners indicate the importance of formulating a country specific practical framework, which is easy to understand and can be utilized by those engaged in JBIC’s development assistance operation and projects, and other relevant stakeholders.

3.3. Current attempt toward CSA At JBIC, the Representative Office in Colombo is mainly in-charge of the supervision of on-going projects. Efforts are underway at the Colombo Office to make the CSA a part of daily operations. Weekly analysis of the current conflict and political and economic status in Sri Lanka is systematically carried out by a senior security advisor, and it is reviewed and discussed at a weekly office staff meeting, where all the staff members, including non-project related staff, are present. This also helps increase awareness of the conflict within the organization.

Security analysis is carried to ensure the safety of the staff going for outstation trips in areas considered risky. Additional equipment, including a noticeable organization flag on vehicles, wireless communication systems, and satellite phones are supplied to staff going on outstation trips. Frequent security information-sharing and coordination with relevant security authorities and others, both informal and formal, ensures that JBIC has updated information on the conflict and security matters.

As far as the project operation is concerned, at the portfolio level, consideration is given to a regional balanced island-wide approach, with particular focus on the conflict. The country strategy is annually reviewed and takes the context of peace and conflict into consideration while formulating a new strategy. Nevertheless, a more explicit and structured approach to conflict sensitivity is sought. Similarly, at the project level, projects that explicitly interact with conflict and peace-building efforts, are formulated with due consideration of the conflict.14 Yet, a deliberate and systematic introduction of the CSA into project operation is immediately required.

3.4. Key elements to be considered for CSA Ethnic and regional balance Ethnic and regional balance is central to a CSA. The Sri Lankan conflict revolves

14 A further discussion on the JBIC operations at the project level is made in Section 4.

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around ethnic-minority rights. Intervention that disproportionately and exclusively benefits one ethnic group—whether intentionally or unintentionally—further aggravates the conflict by being construed as favoring one group over another. Despite the bilateral nature of the conflict between the GoSL and LTTE as has been symbolized by the CFA 2002, the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is not a simple bipolar issue. It is a conflict involving multi-ethnic confrontations among the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils and Muslims and others. Each ethnic group is further fractured along the lines of religion, caste, class, and regional affiliations, making it difficult to reach a consensus even within a particular community.15

In addition, regional balance is an important aspect that needs to be taken into consideration. More than half of the GDP is concentrated in the Western Province, while only 2.9 and 4.7 per cent of the GDP came from the Northern and Eastern Provinces in 2006,16 respectively, where the ethnic minorities are the majority. However, there are a number of poverty pockets outside the North and East.17 It is also important to note that conflict-affected areas are not confined to the North and East; the residents of the so-called “border areas” have also suffered substantially owing to the conflict. Moreover, others in the south live under continued threats of bombs, brutal assaults, abductions, etc. When available tools and schemes restrict flexibility to address and react to local specificities at the grass-root level, an island-wide engagement giving consideration to the ethnical and regional distributions is one of the preferred approaches to address the conflict.

Causes of conflict The causes of conflict require particular consideration, especially when a development project has implications on conflict, directly or indirectly, even if one does not work directly on conflict. Reacting to the context and dynamics of conflict does not necessarily have positive impacts with respect to it; in fact, it may support the continuity of the conflict.

One of the root causes of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, before 1983, can be traced to the discriminatory policy that made Sinhalese the official language, resulting in grievances among the Tamil-speaking communities.18 There were policy interventions that resulted in increasing the imbalance and inequality across ethnic communities and regions.

15 Crisis Group “Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process” November 2006. 16 Central Bank of Sri Lanka “Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka 2008” March 2008. 17 Department of Census and Statistics identified 119 Division Secretariat (DS) districts in its poverty mapping analysis. See also World Bank “Sri Lanka Poverty Assessment: Engendering Growth with Equity: Opportunities and Challenges” January 2007. 18 JBICI “Conflict and Development: Roles of JBIC – Development Assistance Strategy for Peace Building and Reconstruction in Sri Lanka” JBICI Research Paper No.24, Tokyo, August 2003.

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Many argue that settlement projects favored the Sinhalese over Tamil communities, thus changing the ethnic balance in many localities. Investment projects focused mainly in the Sinhalese-majority south-western regions, neglecting other regions including the Tamil-dominant North and East. The institutions remained centralized with limited autonomy in the periphery. Further, although Tamil was given official recognition, Sinhala remained the primarily used administrative language. Further, there was another attribute behind the conflict: the sense of deprivation across the communities. Lack of employment opportunities led to an increase in the participation in the army and guerrilla organizations. Wage decreases among Indian Tamils led to collective actions to address their concerns. Disillusion of the Tamil youth that was caused by the failure of the old Tamil politicians who were negotiating with the Sinhala-dominant government to address their grievances is considered another cause of conflict. The shift in economic policy toward a free market economy without adequate safety-nets exacerbated the conditions of the poor.

Factors that have sustained and aggravated the conflict also need to be taken into consideration. One of the factors that have sustained the conflict in Sri Lanka is the financial mechanism. While the overseas remittance from the Tamil diaspora and forced contributions by means of threats, abductions, etc., supported the LTTE, the GoSL increased and maintained a high level of military expenditure with a high level of public debt. Another factor that prolonged the conflict is the complex structure of the conflict. The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is not a simple bipolar tension between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils. There are other minorities including Muslims, Malays, etc. Furthermore, there are divides within each ethnic group, and the presence of intra-ethnic conflicts makes it difficult to address inter-ethnic conflicts. The complexity of the conflict is further exacerbated with the politicization of the conflict in Sri Lanka. The politicization of conflict raises extreme views on the conflict, making it difficult to bridge the many parties’ respective positions. The instability of the Sri Lankan politics results in further weakening of the ground that holds the potential to spew a resolution. Moreover, the economic development that Sri Lanka has experienced is associated with the increasing inequalities in the income level and opportunities, generating disparities among the communities, and hence, dissatisfaction among the minorities who have felt being deprived and neglected by the government.

Factors that have prevented the resolution of conflict include the grievances, disappointment, and distrust that are deep-rooted in the minorities who have felt neglected by the government, and the helplessness that emerged not only within the

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island but also among the international community, whose interventions proved to be ineffective, or in some cases, aggravated the dynamics of conflict.

It is important to note, however, that despite the importance of understanding the causes of conflict, addressing or solving the causes of conflict does not necessary translate into the resolution of the current conflict in Sri Lanka. Addressing the causes of conflict would mainly help prevent the recurrence of conflict in the future. However, the current armed conflict driven by the military activities of the GoSL and LTTE needs to be addressed and resolved through political negotiations. Although donors may be able to use aid to influence the willingness of the conflict parties to engage in political negotiations toward the settlement of the conflict, development assistance cannot directly address such willingness, especially at the operational level. The challenge facing the development assistance is the appropriate formulation of the objectives and delivery mechanisms of the programs and projects, taking into consideration the causes of the conflict, which can be attributed to the institutions, politics, and economic inequality.

Consequences of the conflict The prolonged conflict in Sri Lanka has significantly affected the lives of the people across the island. The death toll in the 25-year long conflict has reached around 70,000. The conflict has generated a large number of injured persons and bereaved dependents, as well as abducted persons, across the nation. The number of IDPs, which, at times, reached one million, remains high. Even those who were subsequently resettled faced great difficulties in sustaining their livelihoods. Malnutrition, access to public services such as schools and hospitals, and access to finance, as well as employment opportunities, remain major challenges in the conflict-affected areas in the North and East.

The aftermath of the conflict is not limited to the North and East, but is felt throughout the entire nation. The number of refugees displaced due to conflict both inside and outside the island is substantial. The brain drain of skilled labor is a significant problem that further weakens the economy.

Limited and foregone economic opportunities are of serious concern. The conflict has prevented the flow of foreign direct investment, foreign visitors, and export development, which would have otherwise boosted regionally balanced economic growth in Sri Lanka.

The resources allocated for the security of the citizens and to continue the military operations are substantial. The opportunity costs of such resources are high, especially when considering the dire need for the reconstruction and development of the country. Moreover, the high level of defense and security expenditure has put pressure on the

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country’s fiscal situation, thereby causing macroeconomic instability, which in turn, undermines the efforts to create a facilitative environment for private sector development.

Politics of the conflict The conflict is the most dominant issue in Sri Lankan politics. This is natural given the extent to which it has affected the economy and the social life of the Sri Lankan nation. Each political party has its own position, albeit overlapping with others to some extent, on the conflict. However, despite the on-going military operations, there is a consensus that the only way to ultimately end the conflict is through a political settlement, be it devolution, or adopting policy reforms that address the neglect of the minorities’ rights. This, in turn, implies the expectations from the politics with regard to the resolution of the conflict. Under such circumstances, any development assistance, especially that is directly concerned with the context of the conflict, may induce reactions in the domain of politics. Indeed, politics is sensitive to development assistance, and each political party has its own stance on international aid.

For example, UPFA places priority on infrastructure development with mobilization of the external funds to accelerate the developmental process under central control; following the Eastern Provincial Election, the party is, however, becoming increasingly lenient toward provincial government participation. UNP, being more devolution-oriented and the ruling party when the CFA was signed, has believed in the greater participation of the provincial government and also seeks to involve the LTTE in the aid delivery mechanism. Recently, with the CFA being abrogated, the UNP raises concerns over governance in order to undermine the current government. JVP and JHU, both being pro-Sinhalese parties, stress the importance of the need to support the lagging regions in the South, in light of their belief that the international community tends to focus on the North and East. TNA is highly critical of most foreign aid projects, as they seem to support the current government. JBIC’s development assistance, which is provided through the government can be viewed by some as supporting the GoSL vis-à-vis the LTTE. Indeed, at the operational level, it is important to bear in mind that development aid is susceptible to politicization. The announcement of aid commitment and project-opening ceremonies are often used for the public-politicization of aid.

Global and local context of the conflict A broad and long-term perspective on the conflict is important. The context of the conflict is extremely complex in Sri Lanka. It is an intra-island conflict, but not simply an ethnic conflict within the country. It has an international dimension, where international community as well as the Sri Lankan diaspora is a part of the complexity of

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the conflict. The conflict officially entered the international arena when Norway was invited to be the peace negotiator between the GoSL and LTTE around 2000. International interests have increased, and concerns have been raised not only by Norwegian peace negotiators, but also by bilateral donor countries and multi-lateral aid and human rights organizations, shareholders of which are often the same bilateral donor countries. There is a dimension of geopolitics and arms sale, where India, Pakistan and China are sensitive to each other’s distance with GoSL. India, in particular, is sensitive to the conflict situations in Sri Lanka due to its close proximity, its historical ties with the Tamil community, its past involvement through the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987, and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. International NGOs are also engaged in the conflict by lobbying with both the international community and both the conflicting parties, and working on peace-building and humanitarian issues and projects in the conflict-affected areas. How development assistance and the change in the context of conflict affect the views and thinking of these stakeholders requires careful consideration.

Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that armed conflict has persisted for more than 25 years, and much of the young generation has never experienced conflict-free lives. The implication of the prolonged nature of the conflict is that owing to the fact that it is deeply embedded in the lives of the nation, it is too ambitious to expect it to end in a short period of time or even a peace-building intervention to make significant, quick, positive, and visible impacts with respect to conflict. It is important to be sensitive to short term fluctuations in the intensity of violence, the level of security, and the assurance of human rights. However, it is simultaneously more important to take a broader and longer-term perspective and remain engaged, if one is to ensure positive impacts with respect to the conflict. The continued engagement of development partners in the conflict-development nexus would give the parties the confidence to resolve the conflict, provided that the parties in the conflict share the will to resolve the same.

Interaction between development intervention and the conflict Interactions between the conflict and intervention require thorough consideration. Even project intervention that does not primarily aim at producing a positive impact with respect to conflict has implications on the resource allocation; this concerns the conflict, and hence, such an intervention cannot be totally indifferent to the conflict.

For example, institutional reforms that entail significant social changes may face resistance from those with vested interest in the status quo. The prevalence of relatively strong trade unions with affiliations to political groups makes the institutional reforms contentious political issues, which in turn is (mis)used to influence the process of political

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settlement of the conflict. The theoretical possibility of fungibility in aid delivery invariably exists. Moreover, the abrupt suspension of aid may produce a negative chain reaction and undermine the peace process. Identifying how the intervention interacts with conflict requires an in-depth analysis that ensures the minimization of the negative impacts and the maximization of the positive impacts with respect to the conflicts throughout the project cycle.

In particular, it is important to understand how a development aid agency engages in development matters. On the one hand, the continued engagement in development by development partners may help sustain, if not uplift, the hopes of those affected by conflict especially when the context of the conflict is not favorable to them. Setting a high standard of efficiency and accountability in the delivery of aid is instrumental for increasing the confidence in the role of development aid in uplifting the economy. The withdrawal of aid may lead many to believe that the international community has lost interest in supporting conflict resolution and peace building, and this sense of desertion and isolation may induce them to give up hope, which may eventually tempt them to resort to unnecessary extreme and desperate measures. Moreover, there is a school of thought that pro-growth development raises the opportunity costs of economic activities, and thus, growth is associated with a lower frequency of conflict insurgence, implying the need for development aid in the context of conflict.19

On the other hand, inflated expectations, both on the part of the donors and recipients, on the role of development aid to address the causes and consequences of conflict may inadvertently result in worsening the context and dynamics of the conflict.20 There is no consensus as to the mechanism through which development aid contributes to conflict resolution and peace-building.21 Indeed, development aid itself cannot resolve conflict and make peace, and donors should not overly raise their expectations regarding the impact of their aid projects and programs on conflict resolution and peace-building. It is mainly through conflict-sensitive development that development aid can indirectly and hopefully contribute to conflict resolution and peace-building.

Explicitly stating and mainstreaming conflict resolution and peace-building as the primary objectives of a development project may require utmost caution. The role that

19 Collier, Paul “The Bottom Billion” Oxford University Press, London, 2007. 20 See Goodhand, Johathan, and Bart Klem “Aid, Conflict and Peace Building in Sri Lanka 2000–2005” The Asian Foundation, Sri Lanka, 2005. 21 The DAC Network on Conflict, Peace, and Development-Cooperation and Network on Development Evaluation are in the process of setting evaluation guidance on conflict prevention and peace-building. Against this background , there has been a prolonged discussion at the OECD DAC on the relationship between development and peace-building. For details, see http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3343,en_21571361_34047972_35263575_1_1_1_1,00.html .

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aid can play in conflict resolution and peace building is substantially limited if the parties involved in the conflict do not have the genuine and respected will to achieve them. Setting reliable and measurable target outputs and outcomes of such projects is thus challenging, thereby making it difficult to ensure the accountability of the projects. Moreover, conflict transformation through a reconciliation program is more effective when such peace-building efforts are considered one of the means for economic development, as people may lose interest in the reconciliation process in the absence of clear economic benefits to them. The second-best approach is to set the expected outputs and outcomes of the project with manageable development indicators, while creating a mechanism within the project that incorporates conflict sensitivity as a strategy to achieve the primary development objectives. In other words, a development aid agency should not divert their focus from the development agenda, but give due consideration to the sensitivity of the conflict, and ensure that the expected development outputs and outcomes of the development projects are achieved as planned.

Excessively raising the expectations of the recipients with regard to the peace dividends through development aid projects may be risky. Despite the good intentions and efforts by development aid agencies, resource mobilization and reaching out to those needing relief and enhancing the economic opportunities often pose enormous challenges in generating timely and substantial impacts at the ground. The inadvertently induced disappointments of those with high expectations may deter the confidence placed in the process of peace-building that is supposedly associated with peace dividends and may thus negatively affect the context and dynamics of the conflict.

It is also important to recognize that aid agencies have a varying level of competencies when it comes to dealing with the conflict. Some have in-depth knowledge and networks in certain conflict-affected areas. Others have resources and schemes that are suitable in providing certain kinds of intervention. The presence of comparative advantages in aid delivery suggests that it is useful to focus on the areas where one has competencies in order to ensure that aid intervention remains valid and effective, while coordinating with other development partners in other areas in a complementary manner.

Risks in conflict The intensity and context of the conflict are dynamic in nature, and fluctuations herein can be both long-term and short-term. Development assistance that directly interacts with the conflict needs to take this into consideration; it also must be ensured that the objectives, methods, safety measures, and expected outcomes of the programs and projects remain valid and effective by adapting to the changes. A quick and efficient

18

decision-making mechanism based on reliable information, sufficient resources and capacity to deal with uncertainties and sudden adverse conditions, and effective cooperation networks with relevant authorities, are the key elements in ensuring the safety of the personnel engaged in aid delivery.

3.5. Basic principles of JBIC’s CSA in Sri Lanka Mainstreaming the development agenda vis-à-vis the overlapping issues of conflict and peace-building Development remains central to the operation of JBIC’s development assistance, and conflict resolution and peace-building should be perceived as overlapping issues with development objectives. Putting development as one of the key principles for a CSA may appear idiosyncratic. However, not only it is unrealistic to consider conflict resolution and peace-building as the primary objectives of a development project, but it could also be detrimental to conflict resolution and the peace-building process. The role that development aid can play in the conflict is limited, and the conflict and peace-building process are subject to so many other factors, not to mention the willingness of the parties involved in the conflict to make peace. A naïve engagement “on” the conflict should be avoided by all means, and an explicit and direct engagement on the conflict resolution and peace-building process as a development agency requires utmost caution. What the development aid can do is what it is supposed to do; and that is, to deliver the development outputs and outcomes that are expected.

To a large extent, the elements of development and conflict resolution and peace-building do overlap. This overlap makes it difficult to distinguish between development objectives and conflict resolution; however, adherence to development objectives with due consideration given to the conflict is critical in building predictability and confidence in what aid can deliver.

While mainstreaming the development agenda is central, the conventional rule of development assistance is to “do no harm” to the conflict. Aid can both harm and help peace efforts. A strategic interaction management is important in inducing positive linkages between development and conflict resolution. Hence, consideration should be given to minimizing the negative impacts and maximizing the positive impacts with respect to the conflict. In order to implement this, the conflict sensitivity screening of all new and on-going projects and programs is desirable. Projects and programs that work “around” the conflict may also be subject to screening and implementation such that these become reasonably sensitive to conflict.

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Conflict impact assessment is required for those projects and programs that substantially deal with conflict issues. These projects may include those specifically working in the conflict-affected areas, those projects with strong and direct impacts on the context, causes, and prevention of the conflict. The conflict impact assessment is expected to identify the possible interactions between development assistance and conflict. A conflict impact assessment aims at providing insights necessary to ensure minimum negative impacts and maximum positive impacts on the conflict. The results of conflict impact assessment should be incorporated in the implementation of the projects and programs.

A balanced approach is important to ensure minimum negative impacts and maximum positive impacts with respect to the conflict. Projects and programs that specifically target one community group should be avoided. Regional distribution requires particular consideration. The North and East are heavily affected by the armed conflict but a large number of poverty pockets also exist in other regions. This is not to suggest aiming at parity in geographical and ethnic representation. A balanced approach is required particularly at the portfolio level, although it can be applied at the project and program level, if deemed appropriate. It should be noted that the mere location of projects should not be simply interpreted to exclusively benefit the particular regions and communities. This is because the development assistance of JBIC’s ODA loan projects, such as power plants that are linked to the national power grid or highways that link the network between the center and the peripherals, often target beneficiaries at the national level, even when the project sites are confined to one or a few regions.

Inclusiveness is also a key element that goes hand in hand with the balance aspect. Exclusive support for one supposedly discriminated ethnic group may inflict reverse discrimination sentiments among other groups, and hence, should be avoided. Such intervention may also change the balance of power between the ethnic groups, adding further complication to the context of the conflict. During beneficiary targeting, one needs to pay particular attention to inclusiveness. Language is also a sensitive issue in ensuring inclusiveness in the delivery of intervention. Considerations should be given to the most vulnerable groups within the community.

Particular attention must be given to minimizing the politicization of development assistance. JBIC’s development assistance channels through the GoSL and is therefore often viewed as though it purposefully and exclusively supports the GoSL. The core G2G structure cannot be changed, but efforts should be made to minimize politicization of development assistance, if not totally ensure impartiality to politics. It is important to

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be sensitive to the project/program milestones, such as tenders, contract awards, and project completion. In project opening ceremonies, the political representation needs to be considered in addition to the security aspect, as many politicians are often invited to take part in these ceremonies.

A CSA is important at all stages of the project cycle. The project formulation period requires a conflict-sensitive analysis to identify the potential impacts and implications on the conflict. A thorough conflict impact assessment may be necessary if the project or program is deemed highly sensitive to the conflict. During the implementation stage, due consideration should be given to the employment of labor, use of language, training of those engaged in the project on conflict sensitivity, etc. The CSA should be carried out throughout the “aid value chain.” Executing agencies should have a sense of ownership with regard to the CSA applied in the development projects. Contractors and consultants engaged in a highly conflict-sensitive project should prepare plans to ensure that their own CSA is in line with the results of the conflict impact assessment. Post-evaluation should assess the impacts of the project and program on the conflict in order to build a stock of knowledge on the conflict-aid project nexus for future improvements.

Continued engagement in development and peace-building Aid is no panacea to peace-building, but if used properly, it can be useful in supporting peace efforts and preventing the recurrence of conflict. Development assistance can help reduce poverty and inequality across the nation, induce growth and stability, and raise living standards, all of which may address some of the key elements of conflict; this, in turn, supports conflict resolution and peace-building. Aid that directly aims at supporting peace-building may, among other things, be able to quickly materialize “peace dividends,” and effectively promote reconciliation among the different ethnic groups.

Such development assistance requires a broad and long-term commitment to the development and peace-building process. At the same time, it is important to recognize that, for aid to work properly, the context of conflict needs to be conducive to the effectiveness of aid. Aside from some emergency and relief aid, a certain level of stability, governance, and security is a prerequisite for the effective delivery of development aid. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the withdrawal of aid might induce a negative chain-reaction, and further undermine both the development and peace-efforts. The political decision to provide or withdraw JBIC’s ODA loan rests with the GoJ, but provided the conflicting parties are motivated toward peace and the general direction for peace is maintained and not denounced, continued involvement in and

21

supporting the development and peace-building efforts should be pursued.

Particular emphasis should be given to maintaining high standards on efficiency and accountability, giving no tolerance to corruptive behavior and misuse of funds. Such an effort by the development partners is important for maintaining confidence and hope for a brighter future among those affected by the conflict, without overtly inflating expectations. In other words, expectation management that constructively deals with expectations is the core aspect of a CSA.

Safety assurance of the personnel involved in JBIC’s ODA operations is also a critical decisive factor for continued assistance. The adoption of a broad and long-term perspective does not simply mean that short-term disturbances and deviations from the peace process do not matter. In fact, in order to enable continued engagement in development and peace-building efforts, it is important to be sensitive to and monitor important conflict events and perceptions of the relevant stakeholders on the conflict. Indeed, quick impact orientation, visible and tangible development, and materializing of peace dividends are effective in supporting the peace-building efforts. Moreover, the continued engagement in development and peace-building requires a dynamic approach, ensuring flexibility in adapting to the changing context of conflict while maintaining consistency in the fundamental positioning for supporting development and peace-building. In particular, it is important to ensure that JBIC is prepared to take the opportunity to mobilize sufficient resources in the event that such a need arises. Building capacity is also another critical aspect of development and peace-building that requires a further resource and a long-term approach. These perspectives are important as JBIC continues to work on the development and peace-building efforts in Sri Lanka.

Focus on competent areas JBIC’s CSA builds upon its areas of competencies and core business. These include the financing of large-scale infrastructure development projects through the mobilization of external resources and the provision of effective solutions for development. It is not efficient nor is there a mandate for JBIC to substantially engage, for example, in grass-root level development or peace-building projects in areas where the security risks are high. It is important to recognize that neither does JBIC have sufficient resources nor the capacity to address every issue regarding development and peace building. Indeed, there is little room for a development agency like JBIC when it comes to the peace process, which is largely an issue to be resolved by the conflicting parties. When it becomes necessary to work on issues beyond its level of competence, coordination and complementarity with other development partners should be explored. Indeed, there are

22

a number of development partners, including multilateral aid agencies, bilateral aid agencies, NGOs, and CBOs, which are operating in Sri Lanka toward development and peace-building, that possess useful and complementary competencies to address conflict issues and peace-building.

Risk management Given the change in the peace scenario in the region, the political and security context toward “no war, no peace,” and the uncertainty with regard to the conflict scenario and macroeconomic outlooks, there is a need to adjust JBIC’s development cooperation strategy to the evolving circumstances such that it remains valid and effective. Therefore, risk management in project implementation is crucial for the JBIC’s ODA loan operations. Contracts financed by JBIC should include effective special risks clauses pertaining to the conflict. Further, JBIC works closely in a coordinated manner with the GoSL and the Embassy of Japan to ensure that a high priority is accorded to the safety of the personnel engaged in the projects. Moreover, it is important to analyze the impact of the conflict on the aid projects and programs, since the context of the conflict and peace process change over time. This requires a consideration of risk during project formulation as well as continuous monitoring of projects during their implementation stage. Security analysis and monitoring are also regularly required at the macro level. The fungibility issue requires careful analysis and monitoring. Contingency plans should be developed if risks of conflict rise beyond the level that is permissible for JBIC’s ODA loan operations.

4. ANALYSIS OF JBIC’S OPERATIONS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF CSA 4.1. Introduction The present JBIC development assistance strategy toward Sri Lanka supports the development efforts in the area of poverty reduction through economic growth, and peace building through the reduction of regional disparities. The focus is given to the large-scale infrastructure project development in the power, transport, and water sectors. The overall ODA Loan profile by sector is summarized in Appendix B.

JBIC provides concessionary development loans to Sri Lanka on an annual basis. The amount of loans varies year to year, depending on the size of the projects, and is subject to the approval of the GoJ. Between 2003 and 2007, the average annual loan amount was approximately 26.5 billion yen. The terms of yen loans are concessionary; the standard interest rate applied to Sri Lanka is 1.4 per cent with a repayment period of 30 years

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including a 10-year grace period for untied loans as of May 2008.

This section examines JBIC’s development assistance operation in Sri Lanka from a conflict sensitivity viewpoint. It first focuses on the regional distribution of JBIC’s projects at the portfolio level. This is followed by an analysis by distinguishing the projects according to conflict sensitivity, in order to better understand JBIC’s operations from a CSA viewpoint.

4.2. Portfolio review by regional distribution A portfolio review is conducted from a CSA perspective based on the on-going projects. On-going projects refer to the projects that are under implementation, and for which the loan disbursements are active. There were 28 on-going project loans as of late 2007. Most of these projects were approved for financing between 2001 and 2007, save for a few projects that commenced in the 1990s.

The analysis focuses on the regional distribution of these projects. The analysis on the regional distribution may indicate the extent to which JBIC’s development assistance is regionally balanced. Regional balance is an important and sensitive element in the Sri Lankan conflict, at least, at the macro portfolio level. It is important to note that regional balance is not, however, a sufficient condition in terms of conflict sensitivity, hence, cautions are necessary for the interpretation of the result. Province is chosen as the unit of analysis, considering that the number of projects is small and JBIC’s assistance focus is largely limited for the District and Local Government levels.

The projects are categorized by the Province of the project sites. Projects extending across more than one Province are counted more than once. The actual allocation of value is examined whenever possible; however, the disbursed amount and estimates are used otherwise. This is considered sufficient, since the number of those projects where it was difficult to obtain the actual figure is limited. Further, what is important in the analysis is not the exact amount, but the relative allocation of the loan amount across the Provinces.

The regional distribution is examined through four different analyses in order to provide better insights. First, the projects are simply identified by the Province of the project sites. The second analysis examines the allocation of the loan amount by Province. The third analysis looks into the loan amount allocation relative to the gross domestic product (GDP) by Province. The last analysis investigates the loan amount allocation

24

per capita in each Province. The last two comparisons are useful since the income generated by the Provinces and the population of the Provinces varies significantly.

Result: Distribution of on-going project loans The first analysis examines the number of JBIC’s project loans that directly target the respective Provinces and/or projects that are located in the respective Provinces. In other words, one project loan can be counted more than once. The result is summarized in Figure 1 below. It shows that out of the 28 on-going project loans, 18 project loans target the Western Province, 16 the Central Province, etc. There are differences in the numbers across Provinces, but there is no one Province in particular that does not benefit from JBIC’s project loans substantially less than the others. Of the 28 project loans, 12 and 13 loans aim at directly benefiting the Northern and Eastern Provinces, respectively. It can be said that the Sabaragamuwa Province, which gains the least, still receives nine of the total project loans or about a third of JBIC’s on-going loan portfolio.

The relatively balanced regional allocation of loans reflects the presence of a number of project loans that are designed with an island-wide approach. Fortunately, the amount of JBIC’s loans is often large enough to target multiple regions without compromising the effectiveness of the projects. It should be noted that contribution also comes from a deliberate strategy in recent years to reduce regional inequality and support development in the so-called lagging regions.

Result: Distribution of on-going loan amount A contrasting result is found when the loan distribution is weighted by the amount of loans. Figure 2 below shows the distribution of the on-going loan amount by Province. It is found that 44 per cent of the on-going loan amount is allocated to the Western Province. Approximately 90 per cent is allocated to the Western, Central, and Southern Provinces, while around 10 per cent is shared among the remaining six Provinces.

The concentration in the three Provinces can be attributed to the fact that these three Provinces in particular tend to implement large-scale infrastructure projects. However, it is important to know that even though many of these large-scale infrastructure projects are geographically concentrated in these three regions, the expected project benefits are, in many cases, island-wide or extend to multiple regions. For example, the Upper Kotmale Hydro Power Project in the Central Province is a power generation project that is expected to increase the power supply capacity at a cheap cost. The power station will be connected to the national grid system through which island-wide benefits can be

25

accrued.22 Highway projects in these three Provinces undoubtedly benefit the same regions; however, the neighboring regions and those beyond these Provinces may also benefit from the highways, which contribute to increasing inter-region accessibility and improving the links between the peripheries and centers. The Blood Bank Project23—under which a national blood bank system with multiple regional centers across the country was established—required a large investment at the national transfusion center in Colombo to ensure the appropriate quality and safety management of the blood products and services through the integrated national system. On the other hand, the benefits tend to be exclusively local under projects in other Provinces without apparent nationwide impacts. The strategy of JBIC to support “national projects” with island-wide benefits suggests that the regional distribution of loan amounts may overemphasize the bias toward certain Provinces.

The different pictures presented by the results revealed by the analysis of the number of project loans and that of the amount of project loans may also be a reflection of the severe reality of the conflict. Large-scale infrastructure projects are generally difficult to implement when the safety of personnel and expensive machinery cannot be reasonably predictable and assured. Project loans supporting the Northern and Eastern Provinces tend to comprise small-scale infrastructure and private sector on-lending loan schemes.

Result: Distribution of on-going loan allocation relative to GDP It is important to consider that there is a significant regional inequality in the GDP distribution in Sri Lanka. This is one of the impending issues of the country as the gap between the regions has continued to widen as reported in a recent World Bank Report.24 The increasing regional inequality is also the reason for JBIC’s development assistance strategy in supporting regionally balanced growth. Below, Figure 3 presents the regional distribution of the GDP in each Province for 2006. Half of the GDP is generated in the Western Province. The share of the other Provinces ranges between 3 and 9 per cent.

It is, therefore, useful to examine the distribution of JBIC’s on-going project loan amount relative to the GDP of the respective Provinces. An interpretation of this examination, however, should entail some caution. If the regional aid distribution is proportionate to the GDP, it possibly suggests that aid is unbiased relative to regional income and may therefore be considered to supporting regional equality. On the other hand, if the

22 There are, however, areas where power cannot be supplied through the national grid, which requires further investment in extending transmission lines. The Vaunia-Kilinocchi Transmission Line Project, signed in 2005, is one example. 23 The formal project name is “The Improvement of National Blood Transfusion Services Project.” 24 See World Bank “Sri Lanka Poverty Assessment: Engendering Growth with Equity: Opportunities and Challenges” January 2007.

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regional aid distribution is disproportionate to the GDP with bias toward high-GDP regions, it can be said that aid may be accelerating the increasing regional inequality by favoring those with greater income, and vice versa. The absence of a trend implies impartiality to the size of the GDP.

The result of the distribution of JBIC’s on-going project loan amount relative to the GDP is shown below in Figure 4. The absolute value of the ratios by themselves may not be important. The relative size of the percentages across the regions is of main interest. It shows that the Central and Southern Provinces receive a rather high amount of project loans relative to the size of the GDP: 24 and 17 per cent, respectively. Others range between 2.7 per cent and 9 per cent. This could be explained by the relatively small contribution of the Central and Southern Provinces to the national GDP, while there are large-scale “national projects” in the areas. The amount of project loans is relatively small for the Western Province, which has a high GDP. There are two important findings. First, even taking GDP into consideration, the Uva, Sabaragamuwa, and North Western Provinces, all of which are known to have a number of poverty pockets, are allocated less aid. Despite the conflict in the North and East, the Eastern and Northern Provinces are not necessarily marginalized relative to the size of their GDP. Second, the pattern shows no particular bias toward Provinces with a high or low GDP. In particular, JBIC’s support does not seem to be accelerating or supporting the concentration of GDP in the Western Province.

Result: Distribution of on-going loan allocation per capita It is also useful to examine the amount of loan allocation per capita for each Province. At the same time, the allocation is compared with the per capita income of each Province. Such a comparison may show whether those with high per capita income are associated with a high or low allocation of development assistance. A positive relationship may indicate a bias toward the rich that ultimately widens the gap between the rich and poor, whereas a negative relationship may indicate a reduction of the inequality in income levels between the Provinces. Nevertheless, the absolute amount of loan allocation per capita is not important. This is simply derived by dividing the commitment amount of on-going project loans as of late 2007 by the population of the respective Provinces. The committed amount of the on-going project loans varies every year, and the amount should not be interpreted literally with the implication that each person should receive the calculated amount of loan. What is important is to see whether there is any pattern of variation across the Provinces.

The population distribution, by Province, for the year 2006 is shown in Figure 5. The

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largest Province in terms of population is the Western Province, comprising 29 per cent of the population, followed by the Central and Southern Provinces (13 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively). The three Provinces together comprise over half of the national population. The result of the analysis of the regional distribution of the on-going loan allocation per capita is shown in Figure 6. The three Provinces—the Central, Southern, and Western Provinces—account for relatively greater loan allocation than the rest. Since the per capita income by Province is more or less the same across all the Provinces, with the exception of the Western Province, it seems that there is no correlation between the loan allocation and the per capita income. The relatively high allocation per capita in the three Provinces is largely attributed to the fact that large-scale projects with island-wide benefits are concentrated in these regions. It is also important to note that the Uva, North-Western, and Sabaragamuwa Provinces—the three Provinces associated with the least allocation relative to the size of the GDP—account for a small loan allocation per capita.

Summary In sum, it can be inferred from the above analysis that while JBIC’s loan portfolio can be considered to be generally regionally balanced, additional efforts should be made to promote regionally balanced development. Targeting low per capita income regions should be given sufficient priority. There is no clear tendency to prioritize regions with low per capita income. In particular, the Uva, North-Western, and Sabaragamuwa Provinces seem to be relatively neglected in terms of loan allocation, while the Northern and the Eastern Provinces require further resource allocation if greater impacts are expected on conflict resolution and peace-building.

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Figure 1 Figure 2

Figure 3 Figure 4

Figure 5 Figure 6

PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF JBIC'S ON-GOINGLOAN AMOUNT RELATIVE TO GDP

23.7%

17.2%

7.6% 7.2%4.9% 4.3%

2.7% 2.1% 2.3%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Central

Southern

Eastern

Western

North-Central

Northern

Uva

North-Western

Sabaragamuwa

JBIC'S ON-GOING PROJECTS

Sabaragamuwa9 Projects

Central16 Projects

Southern15 Projects

Western18 Projects

Northern12 Projects

Eastern13 Projects

North-Western10 Projects

North-Central10 Projects

Uva10 Projects

PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OFJBIC'S ON-GOING LOAN AMOUNT

Western44%

Central25%

Northern1%

North-Western2%

Eastern4%

North-Central2% Sabaragamuwa

2%

Southern19%

Uva1%

PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF GDP (2006)

Western50%

Southern9%

Northern3%

Eastern5%

North-Western9%

North-Central4%

Uva5%

Sabaragamuwa6%

Central9%

PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION(2006)

Western29%

Central13%

Northern6%

Eastern8%

North-Western11%

North-Central6%

Uva6%

Southern12%

Sabaragamuwa9%

Source: "Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka 2008", CBSL

Source: "Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka 2008", CBSL

PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF JBIC'S ON-GOINGLOAN AMOUNT PER CAPITA AND INCOME PER CAPITA

8697

75

88

64

93104

83

223

20 17 16 6 4 3 2 2 20

20

40

60

80

100

120

Central

Southern

Western

Eastern

North-Central

Northern

Uva

North-Western

Sabaragamuwa

Rupees (in Thousand)

Income per capita Allocation per capita

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4.3. Analysis based on conflict sensitivity typology This section examines JBIC’s development assistance operation in Sri Lanka by distinguishing the types of projects from the conflict perspective, adopting the typology introduced by Goodhand (2001), given below:25

Figure 7

Working around conflict treats conflict as an impediment or negative externality that is to be avoided.

Working in conflict recognizes the links between the programs and conflict and attempts to minimize conflict—related risks, such that aid does “no harm”.

Working on conflicts constitutes conscious attempts to design programs in such that they are beneficial.

The analysis examines the 28 JBIC on-going project loans in Sri Lanka. These project loans include large-scale infrastructure projects with island-wide impacts, small-scale infrastructure projects targeting multiple regions, as well as two-step loans through the banking sector with island-wide financial network. The findings of the analysis are depicted in Figure 7.

Working around conflict Projects that work around conflict are generally located in target regions that are not directly affected by the armed conflict. Under these projects, conflict may be considered a given possible risk in project implementation with, if any, built-in risk management measures to minimize the adverse impact of the conflict on the aid projects.

A large number of JBIC’s development assistance projects in the past, especially those that started before the CFA of 2002, fall under this category. Of the 28 on-going projects, 11 projects are considered to work around conflict. This is likely to be associated with the former policy of neutrality to domestic political affairs in recipient countries of the GoJ, which presumed that conflict issues were independent from development issues.26

25 For further details, see Jonathan Goodhand, “Conflict Assessments” Centre for Defence Studies, July 2001. 26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan’s country assistance program for Sri Lanka” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2004. < http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/sw_asia/srilanka.pdf >.

Project Types by Conflict Sensitivity

Work AroundConflict

11 Projects

Work OnConflict

5 Projects

Work In Conflict12 Projects

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For example, projects that target the areas around Colombo may be considered as working around conflict. Under the analysis, highway projects and regional ports projects in the Western and Southern Provinces are identified as working around conflict despite their expected impacts on regional connectivity and the enhancement of economic opportunities in the conflict-affected areas.

It should be emphasized, however, that these projects that work around conflict may not be necessarily “bad” or inappropriate. Despite the importance of the conflict in Sri Lanka, there are important development challenges that need to be addressed, and which can be reasonably addressed independent of the conflict. There is nothing inappropriate with implementing projects that work around conflict as part of the portfolio, as long as there are sufficient “conflict-sensitive” projects in the portfolio.

Working in conflict: Projects that work in conflict adopt the principle of “do no harm.” Projects that target regions outside the conflict-affected areas may fall into this category. Rather than ignoring the existence of the conflict, projects that work in conflict presume possible interactions between the development projects and conflict; however, minute and necessary measures are considered and implemented to minimize the adverse impacts on the conflict. Projects that work in conflict differ from those working around conflict in that the former are formulated and implemented with due consideration given to the possible interactions with conflict and conscious efforts are made to refrain from doing harm to conflict, while the latter takes conflict as a potential risk, if at all, that undermines the project implementation and impacts.

In the context of the conflict in Sri Lanka, given the extent of the impacts of conflict across the country, and difficulties in implementing development projects in the conflict-affected areas for a prolonged period, it is expected that the majority of projects fall into this category. The result of the analysis on the 28 on-going projects shows that 12 project loans are identified as projects that work in conflict. The concept of “do no harm” may not be explicitly built-in these projects at their inception; however, the principle to minimize negative impacts on conflict is taken into consideration during the project formulation and implementation. Projects with the island-wide target concept, aiming at increasing the regional balance are considered working in conflict.

It should be noted that JBIC is currently cautious about supporting grand and dramatic institutional and policy reforms in Sri Lanka, while it proactively supports them in other countries. The conflict is extremely complex to the extent that any reforms may be

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subject to politicization and may negatively affect the politics of the conflict when political settlement is the top agenda. There are great needs for institutional and policy reforms that may inflict strong oppositions from certain groups and political parties, which are considered capable of destabilizing the government, which in turn, would have adverse implications on the conflict. Grand institutional and policy reforms that would substantially affect the political context were avoided given the possible negative impacts on the conflict, unless enabling political and social environment, where reforms can be implemented under the do no harm principle, is created.

Working on conflict: Projects that work on conflict aim at generating positive impacts on conflict, in addition to the “do no harm” principle. These projects include those that primarily target regions that are directly affected by the armed conflict. Project that work on conflict attempt to address at least one of the aspects of the causes and consequences of conflict and peace-building. One may argue that projects cannot be termed working “on” conflict unless the prime objective is conflict resolution and/or peace-building. Note that all the projects categorized to be working “on” conflict do not have conflict resolution and/or peace-building as the primary objective and are therefore arguably working “in” conflict. However, there is a fine line between those projects with the “do no harm” concept and those with implicit expectations on conflict resolution and peace-building. Accordingly, this analysis attempts to capture this subtle difference.

The analysis on the 28 JBIC on-going projects shows that there are five project loans that fall under this category. Projects that aim at uplifting the economic opportunities in the North and East are counted. Some projects are designed to generate quick impacts in the conflict-affected areas, as the project implementation requires labor inputs at the project site, which is expected to create employment opportunities. Additional consideration was made to provide capacity building and labor training to ensure that benefits can be immediately derived by those in the conflict-affected areas even during the project implementation period. Working on conflict also includes projects that increased the loan allocation to the North and East following the CFA of 2002, to capture an opportunity to work on conflict. Special arrangements and mechanisms were made to ensure the realization of quick impacts on the conflict-affected areas.

While five project loans are found as working on conflict, more efforts are desirable to make these projects more conflict-sensitive. A more deliberate and systematic application of conflict impact assessment may improve the project design and implementation of these projects. Furthermore, despite the challenges faced when

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working on conflict, especially under the limited instruments available for JBIC’s development assistance operation, continued efforts are expected to give priority to projects that work on conflict as an important part of JBIC’s development assistance operation portfolio.

Summary The analysis of JBIC’s on-going projects from the conflict sensitivity perspective shows that 60 per cent of the portfolio comprises projects with some degrees of conflict sensitivity. The remaining 40 per cent consists of conventional development projects. This reflects the need of Sri Lanka which requires both conflict-sensitive projects and conventional development projects for sustainable growth with regional balance and poverty reduction.

It is also important to note that the extent of conflict sensitivity varies among projects across the three different categories and within each category. Each project can improve the “quality” of conflict sensitivity and minimize adverse negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on conflict. In some cases, a project considered to be working “in” conflict can be transformed into one working “on” conflict if positive elements on conflict can be created. Continued efforts to increase the conflict sensitivity are therefore sought.

5. CONCLUSIONS This paper explains the CSA of JBIC’s development assistance operation in Sri Lanka. It defines the elements to be considered in CSA, and the CSA principles to be adopted. In order to provide useful insights to JBIC’s development assistance operation in Sri Lanka, it examines JBIC’s on-going project loan portfolio, and shows a balanced approach to conflict and regional distribution, although efforts are needed to improve its regional balance and sensitivity to the conflict.

Building on the previous sections, this section summarizes some of the suggestions for the practical operationalization of the CSA.

Portfolio level CSA is to be incorporated in the portfolio management of JBIC’s development assistance operation. Regional balance and the portfolio of conflict-sensitive projects as well as overall impacts at the macro level are to be taken into consideration. Efforts should be made to retain the ability to ensure the flexible and effective mobilization of resources

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and expertise in order to capture opportunities for conflict resolution and peace-building when such needs arise. Continued conflict, political, and security analyses are important.

Conflict sensitivity screening and impact assessment Conflict sensitivity screening that reflects the key CSA elements and principles is to be adopted at the project formulation stage, when deemed appropriate. A sample screening form is attached in Appendix D. This exercise is to examine the extent of conflict sensitivity of each individual project. A more rigorous and in-depth conflict impact assessment is required for projects that are identified as being highly sensitive to conflict.

Individual project level In order to ensure the principles of the CSA under individual projects, it is important that the actors engaged in the projects through the “aid value chain” develop their respective plan with the CSA, since different actors have different roles and responsibilities in project implementation and the manner in which their activities interact with conflict vary. In this regard, it is important that the actors engaged in the projects develop and implement the plan for the CSA based on the guidance by JBIC and the relevant executing agencies of the projects. It is suggested that the executing agency prepare a management plan, similar to an environmental management plan for environmental consideration. Regular monitoring on the CSA measures would be effective in ensuring that the projects are implemented with due consideration given to conflict.

The role of JBIC is to provide guidance and supports for those actors in implementing the CSA. An NGO list for CSA partners is prepared for those actors who may need support in executing the CSA, and attached in Appendix E.

Risk management measures Security assurance is of high priority in engaging in development projects, especially in the conflict-affected areas and when the armed conflict intensifies. Continued monitoring and analysis on conflict, political, and security developments is required. At the same time, maintaining and developing practical and effective networks for security information and measures is important.

Finally, this paper should be shared among the relevant stakeholders in JBIC’s development assistance operation to foster an understanding of the concept and approach to be adopted toward conflict sensitivity.

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APPENDIX A

Basic Strategy of Japan’s ODA Loan Medium-Term Strategy for Overseas Economic Cooperation Operations

April 2005

Japan Bank for International Cooperation (Extract on Sri Lanka)

In Sri Lanka, a pact was reached in 2002 to end an ethnic conflict that had gone on for roughly 20 years. Ensuring lasting peace, restoration of the northern and eastern regions that had been destroyed by the conflict, sustained economic growth and poverty reductions are the top priority tasks. Our focus will therefore be on assistance for peace-building, assistance for restoration, mainly in the northern and eastern regions with consideration given to regional and ethnic balances, economic infrastructure improvement that is aimed at private sector-led sustained economic growth, industrial development and assistance to the poor. In so doing, we will cooperate with other donors for assistance, promote participation by residents through stepped-up alliance with NGOs, and utilize local functions. Through this process we will strive to further improve the efficiency and sustainability of our assistance.

Additionally, we will energetically press forward with policy and institutional reforms through project-based and program-based aids, mainly in the core sectors, such as electric power and transportation, and policy system reforms by way of intellectual cooperation and technical assistance. In the areas that were hit by the Sumatran offshore earthquake and the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, we will aggressively take on measures to recover and restore public infrastructure. At the same time, we will provide assistance to the construction of infrastructure that can withstand disasters in an effort to prevent recurrence of disasters.

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APPENDIX B

CSA of Some of the Development Partners

In order to review the positions of other development partners in terms of the adoption of the CSA to their respective operations, a semi-structured questionnaire was prepared for the interviews. Interviews were conducted with key staff in charge of conflict issues at the Sri Lankan offices of each development partner in early 2008.27

Asian Development Bank (ADB) ADB is the second largest donor in Sri Lanka, supporting pro-poor economic growth, social development, and improved governance in the form of loans and technical and grant assistance. ADB remains engaged in Sri Lanka’s development efforts in a conflict-sensitive manner, and a separate CSA strategy is being formulated. ADB designs all post-CFA ADB-financed projects in the North and East with “do-no-harm” principles that include accountability, participation, predictability, and transparency. ADB formulates projects, ensuring the balance and equitable distribution among various communities, ethnic groups, and geographic areas without applying explicit and specific tools or methods at the operational level.

World Bank (WB) WB is one of the three major funding development partners in Sri Lanka, supporting peace, growth, equity, and tsunami recovery through its loans and technical and grant assistance. WB’s approach to CSA is to improve development effectiveness and to help address the causes and consequences of conflict. It is currently in the process of including a CSA as an explicit key strategy in the next Country Assistance Strategy. WB plans to allocate additional resources to the North and East in response to the larger needs, not to shift the committed amount from the North and East to the South, even when risks rise in the former regions, and to enhance stakeholder consultations at the project planning stage. WB plans to apply a “conflict filter” or checklist to all the proposed activities.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) UNDP Sri Lanka assists the GoSL to achieve sustainable human development, poverty

27 The interview survey was undertaken by and summarized in Kaori Honda “Strategies and Practices of Other Development Partners in Conflict Sensitivity Approach in Sri Lanka”, IC-Net, Mimeo prepared for JBIC, 2008.

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reduction, and democratic governance. Peace is at the center of the development efforts, embodied through direct and indirect interventions. The direct assistance includes policy-level interventions and project activities for public dialogue on peace, media campaigns, private sector initiatives, and so on. The indirect assistance supports community and area-based development programs for the socioeconomic rehabilitation of the conflict-affected districts. Projects in the North and East adopt an inbuilt, flexible CSA with risk analysis in order to respond to the changing needs of its operational environment.

Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GTZ supports programs and projects in Sri Lanka in the areas of conflict transformation/peace-building, poverty reduction, and tsunami reconstruction. The key focus of GTZ’s Sri Lankan Office is the implementation of “Conflict Transformation and Risk Management,” an integrated CSA guideline specifically developed to meet the needs of the Sri Lankan conflict. GTZ engages in conflict transformation in order to effect changes and to address the conflict at the macro level. GTZ Sri Lanka developed a four-dimensional framework to guide all management decision processes at the project and portfolio levels, with an emphasis on (1) people, (2) strategy, (3) threat management, and (4) operative management. The checklist, prepared to analyze the conflict sensitivity for GTZ projects/programs and offices, focuses both on internal and external action for enhancing conflict-sensitivity.

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) USAID conducts programs in four priority areas: (1) economic growth, (2) tsunami reconstruction, (3) democracy and governance, and (4) humanitarian assistance & transition initiatives. The programs address economic disparities by expanding economic and good governance activities in and around the conflict-affected areas in Sri Lanka’s North-Central and Eastern Provinces and in the poorest districts on the border of conflict areas. At the project design stage and during the day-to-day functions of the center, the program managers and the implementing partners respond to the changing circumstances and opportunities in a conflict-sensitive manner. Technical offices perform periodic program assessments, which evaluate the effectiveness of program implementation and current conflict situation.

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APPENDIX C

JBIC’s ODA Loans to Sri Lanka: By Sector

（Unit; Billion Yen）

SECTORNUMBEROF LOAN

AMOUNT （％）

Transport 28 222.95 32.1%Airport 2 22.58 3.3%Port 12 99.55 14.4%Road/Highway 10 74.73 10.8%Others 4 26.09 3.8%

Irrigation/Flood Control 10 44.78 6.5%Industry 7 35.16 5.1%Social Services 20 116.64 16.8%Water/Sanitary 7 44.91 6.5%Urban/RuralInfrastructure 9 45.83 6.6%Others 4 25.89 3.7%

Commodity Loans 15 73.47 10.6%Telecommunication 6 56.77 8.2%Power/Gas 18 139.82 20.2%Transmission 9 32.43 4.7%Generation 9 107.40 15.5%

Agriculture 1 4.08 0.6%TOTAL 105 693.67 100.0%Note: As of 31 March, 2008

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APPENDIX D

Conflict Screening for JBIC financed projects (Sample Form) Key Screening Questions YES/

NO Notes

1 Project Objective 1.1 Is the objective of the primary project to address conflict resolution and/or peace-building?

If YES, 1.1.1 Is the objective vulnerable to factors exogenous to the project?

1.1.2 Is the mechanism through which the project contributes to conflict resolution and/or peace-building clearly identified?

1.1.3 Is conflict impact assessment necessary?

2 Project Design

2.1 Is the context of conflict analyzed with its national and local profiles, causes, actors, and dynamics?

2.2 Are the potential development impacts of the project on economic, social, and political aspects, identified?

2.3 Are the expected beneficiaries selected with due conflict sensitivity?

2.4 Are the potential interactions identified?

2.5 Does the project negatively affect the context and dynamics of conflict? If YES,

2.5.1 Are there necessary and sufficient measures built in to the project design to minimize the negative impacts?

2.6 Does the project foresee any substantial interaction with the conflict?

If YES, 2.6.1 Is conflict impact assessment necessary?

2.7 Is the project design sufficiently conflict-sensitive?

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Key Screening Questions YES/NO Notes

3 Project Execution 3.1 Are the project management and administration sufficiently sensitive to inter-ethnic issues?

3.2 Is there any mechanism to utilize all three languages (i.e., English, Sinhalese, and Tamil), as per the requirement? (i.e., as per the needs of the Project, Contractors/Consultants, and beneficiaries)

3.3 Is there sufficient capacity to ensure the adoption of a CSA by each actor (i.e., Project, Contractors/Consultants, and beneficiaries)?

3.4 Is there any mechanism whereby each actor involved with the project can adopt a CSA throughout the project?

3.5 Is there any monitoring mechanism built-in the project to ensure the conflict sensitivity of the project?

3.6 Is the execution mechanism sufficiently conflict-sensitive?

4 Risk Management

4.1 Are there sufficient measures to ensure the security of the project staff, including contractors and consultants?

4.2 Does the project embody a mechanism whereby appropriate and effective adjustments to the changing context of the conflict can be done and sensitivity to conflict can be sufficiently ensured, thus maintaining its validity and effectiveness?

5 Overall

5.1 Is the project sufficiently sensitive to the conflict?

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APPENDIX E

List of Organizations for CSA Partners Name of Organization: Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) Address: 29 Gregory's Road, Colombo 7 Tel: 011-2676955 Fax: 011-2676959 Email: prashan@cepa.lk Website: www.cepa.lk Contact person: Mr. Prashan Thalayasingam, Team Leader- Poverty and Conflict (PAC) program A list of potential activities:

Conflict analysis: Analysis of project context and potential conflicts, analysis of the wider conflict for input at the portfolio (strategic) level, conflict analysis studies (short intensive research studies on a particular project or area for potential project)

In process consultancy: Ongoing periodic consultancy over the project cycle—from assisting and monitoring the framework design to integrating conflict and poverty impact areas to providing periodic reviews and strategic guidance toward the project.

Conflict sensitivity trainings: Short, one-day training programs presenting the introduction to conflict sensitivity; intensive 4-day training programs on conflict sensitivity for projects.

Name of Organization: Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA) Address: 30/81, 1/1, Langdon Place, Colombo 7 Tel: 011-2598413 Fax: 011-2506855 Email: spo1@cha.lk Website: www.humanitarian-srilanka.org Contact person: Mr. Indrasiri Weganthalawatte, Senior Program Officer A list of potential activities:

Rapid Context Assessment (RCA): CHA will be using one of the conflict analysis tools provided in the CHA Resource Pack on Conflict Sensitivity. The RCA will analyze structures, actors, and dynamics, and draw scenarios providing very contemporary information on the situation in selected districts (context analysis).

Conflict Sensitivity (CS) Training: CHA strengthens agencies’ staff through CS training. One/two/four-day or customized training programs available.

Conflict Sensitivity Advisory Service: CHA will offer assistance to agencies in actually assessing the impact of their interventions in the project planning phase, the mid-term phase, and the post-completion phase of their projects, adopting the Do-no-harm, Local Capacities for Peace, or Peace and Conflict Assessment approach.