Kenya after Kenyatta || The Politics of Succession in Africa: Kenya after Kenyatta

The Politics of Succession in Africa: Kenya after KenyattaAuthor(s): Vincent B. KhapoyaSource: Africa Today, Vol. 26, No. 3, Kenya after Kenyatta (3rd Qtr., 1979), pp. 7-20Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185873 .

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The Polities of Succe.sion in Africa:

Kenya after Kenyatta

Vincent B. Khapoya

The majority of African governments have secured their political independence only in the last two decades. All of them have faced many problems of one kind or another normally expected of new states emerging from a colonial period of either oppressive experience or "benign neglect." Some have survived well and even thrived, many have not and continue to grope for solutions. One of the most tenacious of these problems has been the problem of peaceful and orderly transition from one regime or leadership to another.

This paper will begin wuiih a capitulatiosi of the most frequently adduced explanations for the phenomenon of conflictual and haphazard succession. The experience of Kenya in this context is an interesting and important one, not only because of the remarkable achievement represented in the recent relatively peaceful leadership transition the country had experienced after the death of President Kenyatta, but also because Kenya, like many African countries, suppressed public discussion of the succession issue and dealt with political dissent rather harshly. This experience will be discussed as well as the emergence and acceptability of Mr. Daniel T. arap Mol as the new president and whether this peaceful leadership change portends any significant changes in the domestic policies and foreign policy posture of the last fifteen years or so.

The Phenomenon of Violent Political Succession

One way to measure the extent of the problem of nonpeaceful leadership successions is to look at how succession has been effected by the African states. According to one study of succession and regime change in forty African countries from the time of independence to 1972,

Vincent B. Khapoya is Assistant Professor Political Science at Oakland University. Rochester. Michigan. He is a Keniyan citizeni and taught at the University of Nairobi. 1976-78.

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there had been 114 leadership successions (or regime changes.) 1 Thirty-six of these (32 percent) had taken place through coups d'etat and assassinations. (Of the 53 (46.5 percent) that had taken place according to constitutional procedures, 31 (28 percent) had involved intra-regime succession, mostly in one-party systems with no visible indication of fair and genuine electoral contests.) Of the current fifty independent sovereign African states, nearly one-half have experienced successful coups d'etat, a number of them like Benin, Nigeria, and Ghana having gone through the experience several times over.

Explanations of Violent Political Succession

The Colonial Legacy. Some scholars have laid the blame for violent leadership transitions on the legacy of colonial rule.2 They have suggested that the struggle for independence waged by movements which ultimately became the ruling parties was a struggle to wrest all political power from the colonial authorities rather than to share it. That struggle was a zero- sum game - the winner taking all. In pluralistic politics of independent countries, electoral contests are variable-sum games, in which even losers share some of the power. In any case, according to this view, when independence was won and the nationalist movement assumed power, political dissent over policy was not tolerated and opposition parties which often arose to organize that dissent were banned. The parties in power made sure that there was no alternative to themselves as a base for government formation. Even mere mention of political succession or transition became an undertaking involving grave risk.

Ethnic Fragmentation. Some scholars have argued simply that, given the highly fragmented politics one finds in Africa, with the majority of people professing loyalty to their ethnic groups rather than to the new states, many leaders felt that permitting dissent and free discussion of issues such as political succession would exacerbate ethnic rivalries and undermine nation-building efforts of the newly installed governments.3

External Factors. Still other observers have held external forces responsible for the inability of most African countries to change governments peacefully. The external forces frequently mentioned include former colonial powers interested in maintaining in power certain

1. Ladun Anise, "Trends in Leadership Succession and Regime Change in African Politics Since Independence." African Studies Review, 17, no. 3 (December 1974). pp. 507-524.

2. Claude Ake. "Explaining Political Instability in New States," Journal of Modern African Studies, 11. no. 3 (September 1973). pp. 358-359. See also Samuel Decalo, "Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa," a review article. Journal of Modern African Studies, 11. no. 1 (March 1973), pp. 105-128.

3. Ake, "Explaining Political Instability," pp. 347-348.

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individuals friendly to them or protective of their economic and strategic interests; and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency whose exploits in Africa and elsewhere have been abundantly exposed in recent years.4

Aggrandizement or Class Interests. A minority of analysts have suggested that one needs to look at the behavior and class interests of the leaders in Africa for a clue to the problem of succession.5 That is, the leaders who took over the reins of power following the departure of colonial authorities were unwilling to share the "fruits of independence" with other members of the elite, notably the military elite, some of whom distinguished themselves during colonial service and enjoyed a proud tradition. In order for these neglected elites to have access to the money and other luxurious trappings of leadership to which they felt entitled, this argument runs, they had to resort to extra-constitutional means of capturing the top leadership posts.

Kenya has, of course, a lot in common with other African countries, particularly with regard to the destabilizing forces just discussed. The reluctance to allow free discussion of the succession issue may be understandable. And even though the country had enjoyed relative peace since 1963, except for a few transitory events which will be discussed later in the paper, the issue could no longer be ducked when President Kenyatta died in his sleep on August 22, 1978, in his late eighties.

Kenya During the Kenyatta Era

For many years to come, the late President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya will be remembered as the man who not only fought for and won the independence of Kenya from the British, but also - perhaps more importantly - as one who brought peace and prosperity to Kenya. During his fifteen-year tenure, first as Prime Minister then as President of Kenya, the country enjoyed a measure of economic prosperity envied by most African countries, and a considerable amount of peace and stability which was interrupted only briefly and on few occasions: once in 1964 by an army mutiny whose main grievance seems to have been poor pay;6 and

4. See Rene Lemarchand. "The C.I.A. in Africa." Journal of Modern African Studies, 14. no. 3 (September 1976), pp. 401-426.

5. The most representative of those works which subscribe to this view include Michael F. Lofchie. "The Uganda Coup - Class Action by the Military," Journal of Modern African Studies, 10. no. 2 (May 1972). pp. 19-35. Elements of this view are also contained in Aidal Southal. "General Amin and the Coup," Journal of Modern African Studies, 13. no. 1 (March 1975). pp. 88. 104. See also Decalo, "Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa," especially pp. 108- 115.

6. The account of that mutiny is given by A. A. Mazrui and D. Rothchild. "The Soldier and State in East Africa: Some Theoretical Conclusions on the Army Mutinies of 1964," in A.A. Mazrui, Violence and Thought: Essays on Social Tensions In Africa (London: Longmans, 1969), pp. 3-23.

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again in 1970 when a plot to overthrow the government was discovered and immediately quashed and its ringleaders convicted and jailed. In the sedition trial that followed in June 1971, the Kenyan - and so far the only African - Chief Justice of the High Court, whose name was linked to the plot, was forced to resign and immediately replaced by an expatriate judge from England whom the Kenyatta government could trust.' In 1969, several months after the assassination of Tom Mboya, Minister for Economic Planning and Development, riots broke out in Westem Kenya when President Kenyatta went to dedicate a new hospital in Kisumu. Presidential bodyguards fired into hostile crowds, killing eleven people and wounding more than forty.8 Until his death lasit year, Kenyatta never ventured into Western Kenya again. These incidents notwithstanding, Kenya continued to be regarded as stable and peaceful, an image that led to the growth of a lucrative tourist industry, attracted considerable international capital, and induced the United Nations to build the headquarters of two of its agencies in Nairobi.'

Kenyatta: The President and the Nationalist. There is a high degree of consistency between Kenyatta's orientation as President of Kenya and his earlier orientation as a nationalist. Most people outside Africa have continued to associate him with the bloody uprising in Kenya, known as the Mau Mau, for the alleged leadership of which Kenyatta was tried and sentenced to a long prison term by the British. Most historians now believe that Kenyatta really had nothing directly to do with the Mau Mau, and that throughout the independence struggle he was the moderate, nonviolent nationalist that he has affirmed over and over again since assuming the reins of power in Kenya."' As a good politician who correctly sensed that a majority of Kenyans credited the Mau Mau with winning the independence struggle, he named a few streets after well-known Mau Mau generals and tried to maintain cordial relations with ex-Mau Mau freedom fighters'" who surrendered their guns and came out of the forests when they leamed that Kenyatta had become the leader of Kenya.

The Politics of Stability

One may want to ask, How did Kenyatta manage to bring peace to

7. See Colin Leys. Underdevelopment In Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Cokoalm (Berkeley: University of California Press, 19751. pp. 234-243. For a further account of the plo and the tril. see AJba Contemporay Record (hereafter ACR), Annual Survey and Documents. 1971-72. (London: Rex Collings. 1972). pp. B131-B132.

8. ACR, 1969-70, p. B126.

9. The two UN agency headquarters are the United Nations Environmental Program and the Human Habitat Program.

10. Atieno Odhiambo. "Mzee: A Full Biography." Viva: A Tribute to Our Preakdent, (Nairobi: Viva Magazine. 1977). pp. vii-xix.

11. B. E. Kipkorir. "Facing Mount Kenya." VIva: A Tribute to Our Preakdent, p. xli.

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Kenya when so many other African leaders had failed to do so in their countries? After all, Kenyatta became the leader of his country in much the same way as African leaders such as Nkrumah, Ben Bella, and others who eventually fell from power. The first thing Kenyatta had going for him was that he was involved in politics early; in 1929 the Kikuyu Central Association (K.C.A), looking for someone to go to England to present the Kikuyu land grievances before a Royal Commission, chose Kenyatta for the job because of his fluent English."2 The other leaders of the K.C.A., though able and more experienced, did not believe they were sufficiently fluent to make an eloquent and convincing presentation. It was this involvement prior to 1952 when the Mau Mau rebellion broke out which eamed Kenyatta a prison term and made him a national hero acceptable to all the ethnic groups of Kenya.

Second, Kenyatta, once in power, astutely used the instruments of that power to keep disgruntled elements in line. Under the Preservation of Public Security Act passed in 1966, the President of Kenya had wide powers to detain indefinitely anyone deemed a threat to the security and public order of the country.'3 In 1969 this act was invoked to detain Mr. Oginga Odinga, once the country's Vice-President, who broke with Kenyatta largely over the land issue and formed an opposition party, the Kenya People's Union (K.P.U.). ' Mr. Odinga's detention and that of his colleagues and the banning of the party came after months of unrest following Tom Mboya's assassination in July 1969.

Early in 1975 a Member of Parliament, Mr. J. M. Kariuki, who had been a strident crific of the government's economic policies, was assassinated under mysterious circumstances. His sudden disappearance followed a series of bombings by a self-styled Maskini (Poor People) Liberation Organization with which, it was established, he had no links at all.15 An investigatory parliamentary committee report implicating the government and the head of the paramilitary General Service Unit in Kariuki's murder was later rejected by the government. A cabinet minister and two junior ministers who voted for the report were dismissed from their jobs. In October 1975 two Members of Parliament, one a Deputy Speaker of the House and the other a former junior minister who had lost his position due to the Kariuki affair, found themselves behind bars without trial for suggesting that KANU as a political party was dead."

12. Odhiambo, "Mzee: A Full Biography," p. xi. 13. For a detailed discussion of Kenya's security legislation, see Y. P. Ghai and J. P. W. B. McAuslan. Publk Law and Politial Change In Kenya (Nairobi: Oxford University Press. 1970). pp. 254-258 and 430-440.

14. Leys, Underdeveopment In Kenya. p. 226.

15. See ACR. 1975-76. p. B221.

16. Ibid., pp. B218-B219.

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In May 1977 the Preservation of Public Security Act was again invoked when a young, brilliant and energetic Member of Parliament, George Anyona, who had disagreed with the government on a number of issues, was detained without trial.17 It appeared as if the last straw that prompted action against Anyona was his probing of the government handling of tenders for the improvement of the country's railroads. The tenders, which had been awarded to Japan and Canada for the supply of railroad cars and locomotive engines, were suddenly withdrawn and awarded to a British contractor even though British terms were clearly less favorable than either the Canadian or Japanese terms.

Order in the university was also maintained with a firm hand. The police, who were located in a police station literally a stone's throw away from the University of Nairobi campus (no implications intended) were utilized readily at any sign of trouble."8 On December 13, 1977, an internationally known Kenya novelist, Ngugi wa Thiong'o (formerly James Ngugi), a professor at the University of Nairobi and the head of the Department of Literature, was picked up and detained. The arrest of Ngugi followed the withdrawal of a license to stage a play considered politically provocative by the authorities.19

Two more laws exist on the statute books to strictly regulate public meetings and to give the police wide discretionary powers in interfering with suspected political activists.20 Under these statutes, meetings can be held only with the issuance of a license or permit, without which one is liable to arrest. Even a meeting which is licensed can be broken up at the discretion of the police. In the last few years, Mr. Oginga Odinga, Kenya's first Vice-President, detained for a year and a half, was continually harassed when he addressed fund-raising meetings (referred to in Kenya as Harambee meetings) in his bid to return to active political life.21 The system of requiring licenses for public meetings has been very effective indeed in denying those individuals who might disagree with government policy the opportunity to speak out.

17. For a detailed account of the Anyona detention, see Weekly Review (Nairobi), no. 118 (May 16. 1977). pp. 3-7. Anyona's brief but outstanding career in Kenya Parliament is covered in "George Anyona. the One-man Kenya Back Bench," Weekly Review (Nairobi), no. 97 (December 20, 1976). pp. 13-16.

18. For descriptions of student disturbances and the government's response to them, see ACR, 1974-75. pp. B205-B206 and ACR, 1975-76. p. B221. During 1976-78, when this writer was teaching at the University of Nairobi. he knew of studerits and colleagues who were picked up and interrogated by the Special Branch (a domestic intelligence bureau) on suspicion of having written antigovernment letters to the local press or of being subversive. Government interference in academic discussion on campus is not uncommon either, as demonstrated by the case discussed in Weekly Review (Nairobi), no. 206 (January 26, 1979), p. 9.

19. See Weekly Review (Nairobi). no. 151 (January 19, 1978), pp. 5-13.

20. The two laws are the Public Order Act and the Police Act discussed extensively in Ghai and McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya, pp. 447-454.

21. For more details on some of Oginga's problems with the police, see Weekly Review (Nairobi), no. 148 (December 12. 1977). pp. 5-7; no. 149 (December 19, 1977), pp. 5-8; and no. 150 (December 26, 1977), p. 8.

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The final method which the Kenyatta government used to maintain order in the country was an elaborate patronage system. A prominent person or politician who toed the line and sang the praises of the government could be certain not only to attract government development funds in his area, but also to get a prominent Cabinet Minister to come to his area to raise funds.22 In accepting an invitation to attend such a meeting, the Cabinet Minister invariably brought with him large sums of money for a donation "from himself and his friends." This fund-raising syndrome had developed to the extent that any claim to political leadership was based on how much money one could raise or had raised at Harambee meetings. As a result, the traditional role of Parliament as the main legislative body of the nation with a clear say in how the public taxpayers' funds were allocated had diminished considerably.

The Politics of Succession in Kenya

While Kenya certainly deserves to be commended for having been orderly during the Kenyatta era, the country shared with other African countries a certain political phenomenon - now usually referred to as neo-presidentialism, a near autocratic system represented by an all- powerful head of state.23 In a neo-presidential system, officials exercised whatever power they constitutionally had only at the personal sufferance of the President, who in practice was the executive, the legislature and the judiciary all rolled into one. In Kenya, according to the Attorney-General, the President was above the law. In practice, no one was allowed or dared to upstage the President. By law, the title "President" was reserved only for the Head of State. It was illegal for any organization or company to name its chief executive "president." Any public discussion of succession was outlawed because it amounted to wishing or imagining the death of the President, a very heinous crime indeed. During an energetic public debate between those politicians who favored leaving intact the constitutional provisions permitting the Vice-President to succeed the President upon the latter's death and those who wanted to change them so that Kenyatta's Vice-President, Mr. Moi, could not automatically succeed to the presidency, the Attorney-General issued the following statement:

In view of the recent sudden wave of statements at public rallies about the alleged need for amendment of our constitution, I would like to bring to the

22. George Anyona had difficulty because of his criticisms in Parliament in getting licenses to hold fund-raising meetings in his own constituency. See Weekly Review (Nairobi), no. 118 (May 16, 1977), p. 5.

23. A colorful exposition of this view is given by Ali A. Mazrui. "The Monarchical Tendency in African Political Culture," in A. A. Mazrui, Violence and Thought: Essays on Social Tensions in Africa (London: Longmans, 1969). pp. 206-230.

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attention of those few who are being used to advocate the amendment, that it is a criminal offence for any person to compass, imagine, devise, or intend the death or the deposition of the president. Furthermore, it is also an offence to express, utter, or declare such compassings, imaginations, devices or intentions by publishing them in print or writing. The mandatory sentence for any such offence by a citizen is death, and any person who aids in any such offence by being an accessory after the fact of it is liable to imprisonment for life. Anyone who raises such matters at public meetings or who publishes such matters does so at his own peril.24

This tough statement effectively quashed any further discussion of who or what kind of person would succeed Kenyatta, when and under what circumstances.

Nevertheless, from the very beginning, this attempt literally to immortalize the President by avoiding the issue of succession altogether was doomed to failure. On August 22, 1978, President Kenyatta died and the nation reluctantly faced the task of choosing his successor. Under the existing legislation, the Vice-President, Mr. Daniel arap Moi was sworn in as President to act for a period not exceeding ninety days.

Mr. Moi's Emergence as Permanent Successor

It needs to be mentioned that the Kenyan system is a mixture of a parliamentary and presidential system. The President of the Republic is a member of Parliament representing a constituency. He is also the head of government and presides over a cabinet of ministers. He is not elected by popular vote. He comes into Parliament after having been elected by his constituency. After which, Parliament, sitting as an electoral college, votes for President, who also must be the head of the ruling party.25

President Kenyatta died at a time when the ruling party was in shambles. The situation was not helped at all by the pervasive uncertainty as to who was the most likely successor.26 The last national party elections were held in 1966. That was when Mr. Oginga Odinga was stripped of his post of Vice-President and instead eight vice-presidents were created - one for each province of Kenya. Since Tom Mboya's assassination in 1969, Mr. Robert Matano, Minister for Local Government, had been acting secretary-general of the party. Late in 1976, local party elections were held. These were to be followed by party elections at the national level in 1977. The day before those elections were to be held, Mr. Matano

24. Weekly Review (Nairobi), no. 87 (October 11, 1976). p. 3.

25. For a full account of the procedure of electing a president, see Ghai and McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya. pp. 221-225.

26. For ordinary citizens' immediate reactions to Kenyatta's death, see "The Day President Jomo Kenyatta Died," Weekly Review (Nairobi). no. 185 (September 1, 1978), pp. 8-16. Personal letters received by the writer from friends and relatives show that streets were deserted in Nairobi as people, fearful of what might happen, stayed home to await developments.

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suddenly cancelled them, stranding hundreds of stunned delegates who had already arrived in Nairobi to take part. At the time, the cancellation was attributed to the unwelcome prospects of divisive discussions on succession, and to the apparently poor prospects of the candidates the President personally favored."

Kenya, like most other African countries, has had to contend with the problem of ethnicity - referred to in Kenya simply as tribalism. Since independence in 1963, the Kikuyu, who constitute the largest ethnic grouping (about 20 percent of the population), have dominated the country both politically and economically. At the time of Kenyatta's death, it was widely believed that, despite internal regional schisms, they were determined to keep political power (read: the presidency) to themselves. As a matter of fact, the change-the-constitution debate of late 1976 was seen by some observers as an attempt to prevent Mr. Moi, a non-Kikuyu, from succeeding Kenyatta even temporarily.28 For some time now, the coalition between the Kalenjin people - Moi's ethnic group - and the Kikuyu people has been a political marriage of convenience. The Kalenjin feel strong resentment toward the wealthier Kikuyu, many of whom have acquired large tracts of Kalenjin land in the former White Highlands.29 A physical showdown between the two groups had most probably been averted because of Moi's high position in the Kenyatta government.

The only other ethnic group which would have been expected to provide leadership of the country, the Luo, has been too fragmented. With Oginga Odinga first in detention and later relegated to a sort of political limbo, the other Luo politicians such as Odongo Omamo, Matthew Ogutu and Omolo Okero who benefited directly from, and are believed to perhaps have contributed to, Odinga's political difficulties have never really succeeded in rallying Luo people around them or in filling the vacuum they believed was created by Odinga's ouster from the ruling party and from the political scene altogether. Politics in Luo country have since revolved around Odinga and support for his leadership of the Luo community. Government attempts to bar Odinga from seeking a parliamentary seat in the elections to be held later this year (1979) have forced the other Luo politicians, especially those holding ministerial positions in the government, into defensive politics. Whether or not the Luo people become a major force in Kenyan politics as they once were, commensurate with their numerical strength which is second only to that

27. See Wekly Revlew (Nairobi), no. 112 (April 4, 1977), pp. 7-10; and no. 113 (April 11. 1977). pp. 4-7.

28. For details of the debate and the main protagonists, see Weekly Review (Nairobi), no. 86 (October 4, 1976). p. 3; no. 87 (October 11, 1976), p. 3; and no. 88 (October 18. 1976). pp. 3-13.

29. See Leys, Underdevelopment In Kenya. pp. 228-230.

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of the Kikuyu, will depend largely on how the issue of Odinga is resolved. The Luhya people, the third largest group, have really never carried

very much political clout. Except for the brief period preceding independence and shortly after when they exerted their influence and solidarity in the opposition but multiethnic Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), they too have remained a fragmented lot. Mr. Masinde Muliro, a veteran politician whose career goes back to preindependence days was once regarded as the leader of the Luhya people.

But unlike his former colleagues in KADU like Daniel arap Moi (the current president but from the Kalenjin ethnic group) and the late Ronald Ngala (from the coastal Giriama people), he never became an insider after KADU was dissolved. Four years ago, he was even unceremoniously dismissed from his cabinet position after he voted for an investigatory parliamentary committee report implicating the government in the murder of J.M. Kariuki, a popular member of Parliament and frequent critic of the government. Muliro has since maintained a low profile both within and outside parliament. He failed to win a national post in the party elections held late 1978 and is currently being challenged for the seat he holds by a relative unknown in the coming elections.

In spite of these problems and many others, it was evident to this writer that the trade union leadership, the merchants and the civil servants were basically happy with the system the Kenyatta government had established. The elite had prospered; some through hard work, others through corruption and other shady means. As Kenyatta himself reportedly used to say to some of his detractors, under his government he had never stopped anyone from eating matunda ya uhuru (fruits of independence).30 The debate among the country's elite has revolved primarily around the issue of distributing the economic benefits of independence to more people, rather than tampering with the economic system inherited from the British. When, at a meeting of Kenyan economists, the Finance Minister declared that social justice could not be sought at the expense of individual freedom in Kenya, not a single economist present took him to task or contradicted him.3" Also, problems that the neighboring countries, principally Tanzania, have experienced in experimenting with socialist systems have apparently convinced the elite in Kenya that the capitalist approach is the best strategy for development.32

30. Witness the public humiliation he meted out to Bildad Kaggia, calling him lazy for not having availed himself of opportunities to succeed in business, as had other people who, along with Kenyatta and Kaggia, had been imprisoned by the British. Ibid., p. 225.

31. Implicit in the statement was that the freedom to acquire private property could not be interfered with. At another time. the Attorney-General of Kenya has been quoted as being opposed to the idea of limiting the amount of land that a Kenya could own. For a fuller account of the statement of Kibaki, the Finance Minister. see Weekly Review (Nairobi). no. 148 (December 12, 1977), pp. 9-12.

32. Hilary Ng'weno, "Tanzanians Cannot Live on Political Slogans Alone," Weekly Review (Nairobi), no. 97 (December 20, 1976), pp. 3-4.

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The local media have tried to reinforce this feeling as much as possible, as have the praise and the massive foreign aid that Kenya has, over the years, received from essentially capitalist countries and the World Bank.33

Daniel T. arap Moi was really the front runner to succeed Kenyatta from the very beginning. With unswerving loyalty, he had served as Kenyatta's Vice-President longer than anyone else. He was the most peripatetic of all Kenyan politicians, logging thousands of miles a year dedicating projects, making speeches, raising funds in all parts of the country. He was the most important link between Kenyatta and the people.34 His political and legislative experience went back to preindependence days. And when he was sworn in as the constitution required as the country's interim President, his edge over other presidential aspirants widened considerably. Theoretically at least, he had the opportunity to mend fences with those who might have opposed him.

After Moi was sworn in, events moved swiftly - to the surprise of many observers. The cabinet issued a statement, read by a man many considered a possible presidential rival, Mr. Mwai Kibaki, the Finance Minister, declaring full support for Moi to succeed Mzee Kenyatta.3s Soon, word went out to the press to stop referring to Mr. Moi as the acting president.36 The stampede to the Moi bandwagon had begun. The trade unions, welfare organizations, various quasi-political interest groups began issuing statements calling for the election of Moi as President and pledging their loyalty to him.3" Individuals who had been mentioned as being interested in the presidency, such as Dr. Njoroge Mungai, former Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, and personal physician to the late President, and Mr. Mbiyu Koinange, Minister of State and former inseparable confidant and companion of Kenyatta, took pains to deny in public and to chide the press for even suggesting that they were interested in challenging Moi for the presidency.38 Again, in the tradition established by Kenyatta, individuals and groups journeyed to State House to pledge loyalty to Mr. Moi. In the party elections in October 1978, Mr. Moi was elected unopposed as the President of KANU, the ruling and only party; and Mr. Kibaki became the Vice-President.39

33. Ibid.

34. See Washington Post, August 27. 1978. p. A24.

35. His Excellency the Second President of the Republic of Kenya, Mr. Daniel Arap Moi, Viva Revised Reprint (Nairobi: Viva Magazine, 1978).

36.Washington Post, August 27. 1978, p. A24.

37. See Daily Nation (Nairobi). September 4. 1978. p. 1: The Standard (Nairobi), September 4. 1978. p. 1, and September 6, p. 1.

38. The Standard (Nairobi). September 5. 1978.

39. Moi's election to the presidency of the party meant in effect that he was also President of Kenya under Kenya's electoral system. See His Excellency the Second President of Kenya, pp. 5-9. 32 ff.

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President Moi: Continuity or Change?

Even though President Moi has been in power for a relatively short period of time, his actions to date do give us a reasonably good idea of whether the Moi era is going to be a new one or simply a continuation of the old era. As a seasoned politician, Moi has ably used the political canonization of Kenyatta as a unifying force. That the first President is buried in an expensive mausoleum on parliament grounds is much more than simply a symbol of honor and respect for a man correctly dubbed the Father of the Nation. It is a reminder and an inspiration for Moi and his colleagues to continue his policies to consolidate an economic and political system begun by him - to continue to implement the government's "African socialism" as seen by Kenyatta and his advisers who put together the Sessional Paper No. 10: African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya. What is being referred to here as political canonization is nothing new. Other countries in their infancy have done the same thing. The United States, for example, used the name of George Washington to rally her people together by stressing his virtues and strengths and by suggesting that people emulate him. The Soviet Union still reveres the name of V.I. Lenin in much the same way. It is therefore to be expected, and probably fitting that, having led his country for fifteen years in a continent not particularly renowned for good and mature political sense, Kenyatta should be remembered in this manner.

Moi has been quick to commit himself publicly to the policies begun by Mzee Kenyatta. In fact, he has even coined a slogan to be remembered by: Nyayo (Swahili for footsteps or footprints), to show that he is following in the footsteps of Kenyatta. Whereas Kenyatta will be remembered by his slogan of Harambee! ("Let us pull together!"), Moi will be remembered by Nyayo.40

Second, Moi continues to govern the country with virtually the same team that he inherited from Kenyatta. The minor cabinet shuffle does not reflect any new direction.4'

Third, recognizing that one of the most explosive problems in Kenya is the shortage of land, Mr. Moi decreed, barely a month after being sworn in as President, the suspension of all land allocation.42 The move was

40. For further discussion of the slogan (or motto) of nyayo and the subsequent government decision to "protect" the term. see - 'Nyayo' Resticted," Weekly Review (Nairobi), no. 216 (April 6, 1979). pp. 8-9.

41. He abolished the position of Minister of State and moved Mbiyu Koinange to the Natural Resources ministry. Stanley Oloitiptip, formerly Minister of Natural Resources, was moved to the very powerful Home Affairs ministry. Oloitiptip was perhaps the most eloquent defender of the constitutional provision under which Moi succeeded to the presidency. He is personally close to Moi. Changes in the cabinet are expected after the general elections later this year, but they will not reflect a departure of ideology but rather a move to consolidate his own control of the govemment with people he can trust and rely on. (For a somewhat different interpretation of these shifts, see the comments by M. Tanarkin, this issue, p. 36.- Ed.),

42. Africa News (U.S.), 11, no. 14 (October 2, 1978), p. 4; and Hls Excellency the Second President of Kenya, p. 36.

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applauded by the public, but so far it has not been followed by any attempt to initiate a redistribution of land, including that owned by people who already have too much land. The decree only promised that future allocations would be fair. Given the amount of land already acquired by ambitious and corrupt Kenyans, the net impact of the Moi decree on the landless is going to be minimal.

Fourth, the freeing of political prisoners was received with great jubilation. After all, Moi, holding the Home Affairs portfolio, had been the man responsible for signing detention papers.43 The amnesty was therefore a sound move, a conciliatory gesture, which has won him very strong support, especially in the university community. It remains to be seen how he is going to treat those who may become impatient and begin to criticize his government as the problems of the country persist.

Fifth, the signing of a new defense treaty with Ethiopia is a continuation of the old policy under Kenyatta and is widely supported by Kenyans. Here, Kenya's immediate national interest of deterring Somalia's irredentist claims on Kenyan territory has clearly triumphed over ideological scruples of dealing with an avowed Marxist government in Addis Ababa.

Moi has also instituted severe import and travel restrictions in order to ameliorate the poor foreign reserves situation. The war against corruption, especially in the country's parastatal organizations is also under way, but preliminary results of that campaign are not decisive and perhaps won't be in view of the fact that corruption is extremely entrenched and has persisted unchecked for so long.44

Conclusions

Kenya's reputation has certainly been enhanced by the spectacularly smooth transition to the new regime under President Moi. Kenyans and others who were contented with the previous regime will find much to rejoice about with Moi's regime. Those who expected significant changes

43. As a matter of fact, some of the younger members of Parliament who had joined the constitutional debate in late 1976 in favor of altering the succession clause to bar Moi had done so on the basis of their antagonism toward Moi's role in detaining political prisoners.

44. See Quarterly Economic Review of Kenya, no. 1 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.. 1979). pp. 2-3. According to one authoritative source, the campaign against corruption is actually one way that Njonjo is trying to dislodge anti-Moi elements from the government. See Africa Confidential. 19. no. 25 (December 15. 1978). p. 8. It is for the same reason that the Attorney General has kept in the public mind the reported plot to assassinate Moi. the Vice-President and the Attorney General. The Commissioner of Police, Bernard Hinga. resigned along with his personal assistant and an Assistant Commissioner of the Rift Valley Province. Four additional provincial chiefs of police were relieved of their posts. See the summary of all these actions in Quarterly Economic Review on Kenya, no. 1, pp. 4-5.

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in terms of narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor and in terms of Kenya's being more assertive in world affairs in defense of her interests will be a bit disappointed. As mentioned earlier, Moi has the same team advising him as Mzee Kenyatta did. In some important ways, the team working with Moi is more conservative politically and ideologically than President Kenyatta's was and are making their presence felt more. The equivocation that was evident in the final days of Idi Amin's rule in Uganda is a case in point.45 Equally significant is the fact that, after the Commissioner of Police resigned last year, the man chosen to replace him, Mr. Ben Gethii, former head of the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU) was implicated by name in the disappearance and murder of J. M. Kariuki. According to the parliamentary committee investigating Mr. Kariuki's murder, Mr. Gethii was "the last person seen by witnesses in the company of Mr. Kariuki," and recommended then that he be fired."

After the general elections scheduled this year, the new Parliament and Mr. Moi's new cabinet, which can be expected to exclude those who campaigned against his succession, should reveal a bit more as to where he intends to lead the nation. For now, the slogan Nyayo (footsteps) accurately describes Mr. Moi's political plan for the future, and with Mzee Kenyatta's memory still fresh in the people's minds, Kenyans and their allies in the West remain hopeful about the future and proud of the country's major achievement in Africa in managing the politics of succession after Mzee Kenyatta without bloodshed or violence.

45. There were repeated allegations in the international press that Kenya allowed Libyan arms to pass through the country. destined for Idi Amin's troops in Uganda. and that Libyan aircraft even refueled at Nairobi airport. The Attorney General of Kenya was quoted as saying that he preferred Amin to Obote (the former President of Uganda who was overthrown by Amin). If true - at least some of the important Ugandan exiles in Nairobi believe this to be true - this stance represents a noficeable movement towards the right. There is some fence-mending going on at present with Uganda officials visiting Nairobi for talks and the Kenyan Foreign Minister congratulating the new leaders for having overthrown Amin. but official recognition has been very tardy. See The Economist, April 7. 1979. pp. 64-65.

46. See ACR, 1975-76, p. B217.

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