Kern (2012) the Struggle of Serbdom - Serbian Foreign Policy During the Great Eastern Crisis 1868-1881

7/23/2019 Kern (2012) the Struggle of Serbdom - Serbian Foreign Policy During the Great Eastern Crisis 1868-1881

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THE STRUGGLE OF SERBDOM

SERBIAN FOREIGN POLICYDURING THE GREAT EASTERN CRISIS

1868 - 1881

H. R. K ERN

studentnumber: 0830615

e-mail: [email protected]

Universiteit Leiden06 - 28 - 2012

Bachelor thesis in Modern Historyunder the supervision of

Prof. Mag. Dr. Marija Wakounigand Dr. Patrick Dassen

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TH E ST R U G G L E O F SE R B D O M

S E R B I A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y

D U R I N G T H E G R E A T E A S T E R N C R I S I S

1 8 6 8 – 1 8 8 1

B A C H E L O R T H E S I S B Y

H A R M R U D O L F K E R N

0830615

[email protected]

Van Vollenhovenplein 75

2313 ED Leiden

U N D E R S U P E R V I S I O N O F

P R O F . M A G . D R . M A R I J A W A K O U N I G

A N D

D R . P A T R I C K D A S S E N

0 6 - 2 8 - 2 0 1 2 L E I D E N U N I V E R S I T Y



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Special thanks to

PROF . MAG . DR . MARIJA WAKOUNIG

for introducing me to the world of diplomatic games in the Balkans

DR . PATRICK DASSEN

for guiding me in the process of historical research

DRS . R ADOVAN LU! I"

for teaching me Serbian

STUDENTSKI K ULTURNI CENTAR N I#

for providing me with original Serbian sources and documents from 1878

MY MOTHER AND FATHER

for supporting me at the home front



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T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

I NTRODUCTION 3

1. SERBIA’S R OAD TO WAR 1868-1875 7

Domestic political crisis 10

International isolation 14

Bosnian turmoil 20

On the brink of war 25

2. SERBIA AT WAR 1875-1878 26

Failure of international mediation 29

Serbian military disaster 33

Serbian diplomatic disaster 40

3 . SERBIA AND THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN 1878-1881 47

The Serbian memorandum 50 The Berlin settlement of the Serbian question 52

The integration of the new territories 56

The commercial treaty with Austria-Hungary 57

The secret political convention with Austria-Hungary 60

The creation of the powder keg of Europe 61

CONCLUSION 65

BIBLIOGRAPHY 68



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I N T R O D U C T I O N

The Great Eastern Crisis was a peripheral conflict in Southeastern Europe that disrupted

European diplomacy between 1875 and 1878. Rebellious disturbances in the Balkans

had great repercussions on the geopolitical balance between the European Great Powers.

Balkan turmoil threatened the strategic interests of several Great Powers and thus was

an obscure dispute in Southeastern Europe inclined to provoke international crisis. The

most interested Great Powers sought exclusive influence in Southeastern Europe and

their governments were prepared to use force whenever rival states threatened to

predominate the Balkan region. During the nineteenth century this intense rivalry was

especially apparent between Russia, Austria-Hungary and Great Britain. Their mutual

jealousy and distrust in Balkan affairs complicated incidents in the southeast. Such wasthe case with the Bosnian uprising in 1875. Through the armed intervention of the

neighboring Serbian principality did a local agrarian rebellion in Bosnia assume

international proportions. Russia interfered in 1877 and thereafter warfare in the

Balkans destabilized the European balance of power to such an extent that general war

seemed imminent. Balkan controversies aroused enormous tension in Europe.

The diplomatic history of the rivalries between the European Great Powers during

the Great Eastern Crisis has become a well-researched theme in the science of history.The international crisis between 1875 and 1878 is unanimously considered as a most

significant prelude to the World War of 1914.1 The international struggle for supremacy

in the Balkans raised the question of European predominance at the end of the

nineteenth century. This fateful period of disruption in European diplomacy drove the

Great Powers to seek international alignments that divided Europe into two hostile

camps. The Great Eastern Crisis thus shaped many central issues that defined the tense

plight of Europe on the eve of the Great War. In current research on the Great Eastern

Crisis general emphasis has therefore been placed on the disruptive divergence between

the Great Powers in Balkan affairs.2 A broad academic consensus has been drawn on the

main questions of European conflict and realignment between 1875 and 1878. The

1 Immanuel Geiss, ‘The Congress of Berlin 1878: an Assessment of its Place in History’ in: Bela Kiraly

and Gale Stokes ed., Insurrection, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870’s (New York 1985) 343-357.2 W. N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After: a diplomatic history of the Near Eastern Settlement

1878-1880 (London 1963); Mihailo D. Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878(Cambridge 1939); Benedict H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880(Oxford 1937).



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research for this essay has not been undertaken in the illusion that the general consensus

on these main issues should be changed. That would have been troublesome vanity

since in fact no new conclusions are to be expected in this field of historical science.

This essay does aim to shed new light on the established historical understanding of the

Great Eastern Crisis by raising a new question.

Historical research on the Great Eastern Crisis did not reserve as much attention for

internal developments in the Balkans as it did for the external role of the Great Powers.

Historians have dealt with the Balkans as an arena of European diplomatic games where

regional states and peoples played a subordinate role to the achievements of the Great

Powers. This traditional approach is understandable since it adequately reflects the

unequal reality of past relations between the Great Powers and the Balkan states. At the

same time this approach is extremely liable to produce historical misunderstanding of

Southeastern Europe due to the simplification of complexities in this region. The

historiographical marginalization of Balkan developments in the Great Eastern Crisis

does in a way repeat the detrimental chauvinist attitudes of the Great Powers in the past

event that is subject to present research. The historian has the duty to stand above the

bias of any party involved in historical conflicts. It should thus be prevented that

historical research on the Great Eastern Crisis commits the same flaws as did the Great

Powers that produced the conflict. This essay therefore studies the development of the

Great Eastern Crisis in the Balkans from the perspective of one of the Balkan

participants in the conflict. The principality of Serbia has been chosen as the subject for

this historical quest because of the central role that Serbian foreign policy played in the

Great Eastern Crisis. Serbia stood at the heart of the Balkan disturbances that disrupted

European diplomacy between 1875 and 1878. It can thus become a fascinating exercise

to explain the role of Serbia in the Great Eastern Crisis. This essay seeks to provide an

answer to the following question. What was the conduct of Serbian foreign policy

during the Great Eastern Crisis and how can this conduct be explained?

This essay thus covers an analytical history of Serbian objectives and diplomatic

strategies in the Great Eastern Crisis. The interpretation of Serbian foreign policy serves

to explain the dynamics behind the Serbian role within this significant event in modern

European history. The first chapter will explain how, from 1868 onwards, a dangerous

interplay of domestic crisis and international isolation involved Serbia into a military

conflict. In this context there will be paid considerable attention to the influence ofSerbian nationalism on the Bosnian uprising of 1875. The elaboration of Serbian



5

nationalism thereafter provides an insight in the Serbian war aims. The second chapter

concerns itself with the performance of Serbia at war. Serbian strategic endeavors on the

battlefields compose the factual core of this chapter but these military events are

provided within a broad context of detailed diplomatic analysis. This method reveals the

international scope of the Great Eastern Crisis from the Balkan point of view. The

chapter ends in military and diplomatic disaster for Serbia. The ensuing third chapter

thereafter discusses a postwar peak in Serbian diplomatic activity. In 1878 international

intervention ended warfare in the Balkans. At the Congress of Berlin the European

Great Powers sought to enforce a peace settlement on Southeastern Europe. Serbia was

excluded from participation and Serbian statesmen thus sought other ways to defend the

interests of the Serbs. The third chapter explains this difficult diplomatic struggle in the

final phase of the Great Eastern Crisis. The final conclusion of this essay interprets the

true meaning of Serbian foreign policy in the Great Eastern Crisis. This historical

approach reveals how the conduct of Serbian foreign policy affected the international

position of Serbia and significantly influenced the spirit of Serbian nationalism.

This academic effort is the fruit of fascination. Travels through the present Balkans

have seduced me to commence a journey into the turbulent history of this region. The

deepening of our insight in the history of Southeastern Europe can open original

perspectives on events in modern and contemporary European history. The study of

Serbian foreign policy in the Great Eastern Crisis without doubt opens a new

perspective on the diplomatic struggles of this period. An original focus runs through

this essay to reveal the Serbian experience of the Great Eastern Crisis. That Serbian

perspective allowed me to use Serbian sources and materials that have been excluded

from consideration in current research on the Great Eastern Crisis. The most interesting

document to be considered in this essay is the memorandum that the Serbs addressed to

the Congress of Berlin as their only formal representation.3 Through the pursuit of the

Serbian experience it will become furthermore evident that the Great Eastern Crisis has

a special place in the modern history of Serbia. The events between 1875 and 1878

changed Serbia and its Balkan surroundings beyond recognition. Some of our present

problems in Southeastern Europe surfaced in this turbulent period. The historical study

of the Balkan complexities in the Great Eastern Crisis may reveal the roots of certain

questions that are yet to be faced in the present Balkans.

3 Slobodanka Stoji%i$ and Neboj&a Ran'elovi$ ed., Berlinski Kongres i Srpsko Pitanje (Ni& 1998).



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Southeastern Europe between 1868 and 1881



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1 . S E R B I A ’ S R O A D T O W A R 1 8 6 8 - 1 8 7 5

During the first half of the nineteenth century Serbia emerged as a small autonomous

principality in the Balkan borderlands of the Ottoman Empire. Decades of armed

struggle and diplomatic negotiation gained Serbia the right to manage its own affairs

under a native prince. The Serbian Obrenovi$ dynasty obtained absolutist control of the

principality and dominated the process of organizing the administration of the country.

Political concepts form Western and Central Europe heavily influenced the development

of Serbian government. The greater part of Serbia’s political elite was educated abroad

and through foreign educated statesmen, European ideas were imported into the Serbian

principality. Especially the progressive notion of popular sovereignty posed important

new challenges to the Serbian state-building process. The idea that the Serbian peoplecomposed the supreme source of political legitimacy was to determine the course of

Serbia’s domestic and foreign policy during the second half of the nineteenth century.4

In domestic affairs the notion of popular sovereignty tended to drastically alter the

political balance within the Serbian principality. The supreme sovereignty of the

Serbian people stood in contradiction to the absolutist ways of the Serbian Obrenovi$

princes. Princely powers were in no way bound to a modern constitution and not any

Obrenovi$ had allowed the establishment of a representative assembly to check hisauthorities. Among Serbia’s foreign educated statesmen a growing group of political

dissidents demanded wider political participation and constitutional government. The

Obrenovi$ princes excluded these progressive dissidents from power and thereby

created a dissatisfied intelligentsia of educated men without real influence. In response

to the absolutist repression of progressive thought, the Serbian intelligentsia

transformed into an oppositional movement with a mature political agenda. Their ideas

originated from modern liberalism and their movement formed the rudiment of the

Serbian liberal political fraction. Until 1868 the conflict between Serbia’s absolutist

princes and the liberal intelligentsia lingered on without resulting in fundamental

changes. The Obrenovi$ princes innitialy neutralised demands for representative

government and opposed any changes to the domestic political balance. After 1868 the

liberal movement, however, would become the cataclyst of change in Serbia.5

4 Holm Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens 19.-21. Jahrhundert(Vienna 2007) 65-126. 5

Gale Stokes, Politics as Development: the Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth-Century Serbia(Durham 1990) 1-10 and 177-179.



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In foreign affairs the impact of the idea of popular sovereignty was more immediate

than in domestic affairs. While the Obrenovi$ princes fought the implementation of

popular sovereignty in domestic politics, they on the contrary embraced the idea in

foreign affairs. The princely interpretation of popular sovereignty avoided the liberal

connotations of the idea and centered on its nationalist dimension. Nationalism and

liberalism were both based on the same concept of popular sovereignty but while liberal

thought focused on the legitimacy of rule, nationalism was concerned with the territorial

integrity of the people. The nationalist dimension of popular sovereignty was thus an

issue of foreign affairs. It called for strong leadership in defense of the nation abroad

instead of fair representation of the nation at home. The Obrenovi$ princes preferred

this nationalist interpretation of popular sovereignty. They perceived it was in the

national interest of the sovereign Serbian people that their princes firmly led and

defended the Serbian nation as a whole. The birth of this Serbian nationalism

immediately involved irredentist aspirations. The Serbian principality contained only a

minority of the Serbian people and the liberation of Serbs in surrounding regions

became the nationalist objective for future expansion. The Obrenovi$ princes were

convinced that they were the best representatives of the Serbian people since they would

most effectively lead the struggle of Serbdom. To the greater part of Serbia’s patriarchal

peasant society this thought was fully natural. The Obrenovi$ princes embodied popular

sovereignty as the fatherly defenders of Serbdom and legitimized this patriarchal role

with a nationalist course in Serbian foreign policy.6

During the short reign of Serbian prince Mihailo Obrenovi$ between 1860 and 1868

the territorial expansion of the Serbian principality enjoyed the greatest priority of the

Serbian government. Mihailo intentionally exalted unification of all Serbs as the historic

mission of Serbia to distract the Serbian society from the question of domestic political

balance. He fiercely repressed the liberal intelligentsia and ruled the Serbian principality

as an enlightened despot. The Serbian state was centralized and strengthened to prepare

Serbia for a military conflict that would expand Serbia into Serb-inhabited regions.

Prince Mihailo, however, failed to conquer any new territories for Serbia. His greatest

victory was the removal of Ottoman garrisons from the Serbian principality. The

domestic opposition to Mihailo’s absolutism steadily grew and the repression of

6

John K. Cox, The History of Serbia (Westport 2002) 39-47; Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920(London 1977) 53-67.



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liberalism demanded more and more efforts from the Serbian government. During his

lifetime prince Mihailo succeeded in neutralizing liberal demands for political reform

by propagating glorious nationalist expansion under a strong prince. His sudden death in

1868, however, disrupted the uneasy separation between nationalist popular sovereignty

in foreign affairs and the domestic political sovereignty of the Serbian people.7

It was during the summer of 1868 that the Serbian principality was struck by great

confusion. On June 10 two conspirators ambushed and brutally assassinated prince

Mihailo near his suburban residence in Belgrade. Since Mihailo died childless, the

matter of succession caused a great deal of uncertainty. Confusion erupted furthermore

because Mihailo’s death roughly interrupted the princely nationalist foreign policy and

immediately brought the question of domestic political balance to the fore. With the

throne temporarily vacant, the dynasty’s firm hold on Serbia’s political structure

lessened. The political tide turned in favor of the liberal intelligentsia and reform

became unavoidable. Under these circumstances the very survival of the Obrenovi$

dynasty was at risk.8 An immediate overthrow of the dynasty was prevented by

Mihailo’s conservative minister of war, Milivoje Blaznavac (1824-1873). As soon as he

received word of the assassination he took matters into his own hands. Supported by the

Belgrade garrison, Blaznavac carried out a military coup in which he proclaimed

Mihailo’s fourteen-year-old cousin, Milan Obrenovi$ (1854-1901) as the legitimate heir

to the Serbian throne. The Serbian intelligentsia was confronted with a fait accompli.

Blaznavac had saved the Obrenovi$ dynasty from downfall and was in control of the

Serbian government. Nevertheless Blaznavac thereafter had to consider cooperate with

the eager liberals in order avoid the escalation of unrest in the principality.9

Due to prince Milan’s minority a regency had to be appointed. Though Blaznavac

was temporarily in full control of the principality, he did not possess the political

standing to effectively rule Serbia as the sole regent of the boy prince. The Serbian

intelligentsia was eager to use the opportunity of the assassination to finally introduce

the reforms that reflected their liberal ideas. Blaznavac was unpopular among the

intelligentsia because of his conservative attitude. Furthermore, he was too

inexperienced in the diplomatic field to represent the principality abroad. The only man

7 Michael Boro Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia 1804-1918(New York 1976) 295-330.8

Vladimir "orovi$, Istorija Srba (Belgrade 2009) 621-626.9 Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 361-372.



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able to provide the regency with the needed political standing was the moderate liberal

Jovan Risti$ (1831-1899). During his career in Serbian administration Risti$ had

become a renowned and respected diplomat abroad. Of even greater importance was his

broad base of support among the Serbian intelligentsia. Conceding to the pressure of

Serbia’s ambitious liberal movement Blaznavac had no choice but to appoint the liberal

Risti$ as his second man in the regency. As this regency took over control of the

principality, Serbia was ready to embark on thorough domestic reform.10

With Risti$ coordinating domestic policy and Blaznavac watching over a

conservative and passive foreign policy, the regency carried a promise of rest and peace

to the Balkan Peninsula. Serbia was expected to abandon the princely nationalist

expansionism of Mihailo and focus on domestic reform. These expectations would

prove to be far from the eventual course of Serbian history during the 1870s. Domestic

reform had a thorough impact on Serbian foreign policy. As this chapter will show, after

1868 the question of foreign policy became deeply embedded in the domestic political

balance. Continuous political crisis blended with the international isolation of Serbia

into a dual process that heavily harmed the Serbian principality. In 1875 the eventual

eruption of revolt among Serbs in neighboring regions pushed this dual process to a

climax and brought the Serbian principality on the brink of war with the Ottoman

Empire in 1875.11 The interplay of domestic crisis, international isolation and revolt in

the period before the outbreak of war in 1876 will be discussed in this chapter.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL CRISIS

After the regency obtained control of Serbian state affairs in 1868 it convened an

advisory committee to formulate a constitution for the principality. Within the

committee Jovan Risti$ acted as the main author of constitutional clauses. Risti$ forced

restraint upon the ambitious liberal reformers. Though the constitution in many ways

realized their progressive objectives, it was essentially moderate in its liberalization. At

its core, the new constitution declared Serbia a hereditary constitutional monarchy with

popular representation. Serbia was provided with a legislative National Assembly that

would convene in annual sessions. Three-fourths of the Assembly was elected by

10 Slobodan Jovanovi$, Vlada Milana Obrenovi!a I (Belgrade 1934) 1-51; Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Serbia:

the History behind the Name (London 2002) 56-59.11 Pavlowitch, Serbia, 56-64; Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 141-142.



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suffrage restricted to taxpaying male citizens. The other fourth of the Assembly was

appointed by the prince, who retained a strong position in the state. The prince shared

the right of legislative initiative with the Assembly and enjoyed the opportunity of

vetoing the Assembly in budgetary matters. However, the strongest position was

ascribed to the constitutional government. Outfitted with superior authorities, the

Serbian government was enabled to convene and dismiss the Assembly at will and in

case of emergency a cabinet could govern for a year without Assembly’s consent. Risti$

defended his moderation with the patriarchal argument that the underdeveloped agrarian

Serbian society was not yet ready for a truly parliamentary regime. The government was

to keep a firm grip on the Assembly and would gradually allow further liberalization.12

The promulgation of the new constitution in 1869 had a profound impact on Serbian

state and society. By establishing the elected Assembly as a true constitutional factor,

the constitution offered Serbia’s immature political fractions an arena in which they

could compete. This initiated the development of political life in Serbia. Thus far,

political deliberations had been confined to a rather small circle of men around the

prince. The diverse liberal intelligentsia entered Serbian politics and new fractions

emerged. Though politics still did not become a matter of mass concern it gradually

involved a bigger portion of the Serbian population. Political fractions energetically

plunged into heated discussions, which initially focused on internal political

controversies and would later involve the issues of foreign policy. Constant

confrontation between different political fractions was to destabilize the principality

during the decade following 1869, pushing Serbia into domestic political crisis.13

During the regency’s rule political strife centered on the issue of the constitution

itself. Some liberals were disappointed by its moderate nature while the conservatives

opposed it for being too radical. Initially, none of these political fractions was able to

develop active opposition to the government. The liberal majority of the Assembly

remained supportive of the regency and the conservatives enjoyed too little support to

effectively address their objections. Furthermore, interior minister and regent Jovan

Risti$ firmly maintained domestic order. Assembly elections were controlled by police

repression and Serbian press was strictly censored. Risti$’s repressive policies however

alienated his liberal supporters. At the end of the regency a major portion of the liberal

12

Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 126-131.13 Stokes, Politics as development, 10-13 and 41; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 369-375.



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fraction had turned away from Risti$. This severely weakened his political position in

the face of events to come. As the regency came to an end with the coming of age of

prince Milan, disunity among the liberals allowed a conservative take-over.14

In August 1872 prince Milan reached majority. The prince had developed a strong

personal animosity towards his haughty regents. He cherished absolutist ambitions and

despised Risti$’s constitution as an unlawful document forced upon him during his

youth. He wished to reestablish the absolutism of his Obrenovi$ predecessors and was

therefore inclined to cooperate with the conservatives. Following his official accession

in 1872 Milan sought to install a conservative cabinet. After securing international

support for his plans on a tour to the main European capitals prince Milan in October

1873 ousted Risti$ and called upon his favorite Jovan Marinovi$ (1821-1893) to form a

conservative government. During the following three years a succession of conservative

cabinets depending on strong princely support tried to govern against the will of the

Assembly that was dominated by a liberal majority.15

Jovan Marinovi$ rightly appreciated the difficulty of ruling Serbia without control of

the Assembly and tried to induce the liberal fraction to support his government by

introducing popular progressive measures. Freedom of speech was granted, education

was improved and peasants’ rural property became protected by a homestead law. These

measures however didn’t strengthen the conservatives’ political position. The

conservative fraction had only a small base of support among rich merchants and

landowners while the liberals enjoyed much wider support among Serbia’s peasants,

lesser merchants, professionals and bureaucrats. Freedom of speech encouraged liberal

opposition and Marinovi$’s lack of political temperament allowed the liberal-dominated

Assembly to obstruct governmental policies as if it had truly parliamentary authorities.

Active liberal opposition frustrated Marinovi$’s attempts to push political rivalry to the

background. In 1874 the liberals won the Assembly elections with a crushing victory

over the conservatives. Marinovi$ resigned and refused Milan’s request to form another

conservative minority government.16 Prince Milan would under no circumstances allow

14 Vladimir Stojan%evi$ ed., Istorija Srpskog Naroda, volume V: Od Prvog Ustanka do Berlinskog

Kongresa (Belgrade 2000) 332-340. 15 !edomir Popov, ‘Knez/Kralj Milan i Jovan Risti$’ in: Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju 75-76 (Novi

Sad 2007) 157-166.16

David MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Marinovi$, Serbia’s Outstanding European Diplomat, 1821-93’ in: Journalof the North American Society for Serbian Studies20:1 (Bloomington 2006) 15-31.



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a liberal cabinet to take over. Marinovi$’s former interior minister A$im !umi$ headed

the next conservative cabinet and tried to shut the opposition up with violent speeches

before the Assembly. !umi$’s reactionary performances deepened the political impasse

in Serbia. Despite Milan’s support, the conservative cabinets could not maintain

domestic order without solid Assembly backing. The Assembly did not evolve into a

forum of orderly deliberation on state affairs but instead became a gladiator arena of

destabilizing political strife. The new constitutional system functioned badly.17

After Marinovi$’s resignation, domestic political ciris further deepened. In December

1874 A$im !umi$ for the first time since the promulgation of the constitution appealed

to the government’s constitutional right to dissolve the Assembly. For a month !umi$

seemed to obtain control of the principality but new elections in 1875 again confronted

the government with a liberal victory. Management of Serbian state affaires came to a

complete standstill and prince Milan decided to appoint a nonpolitical caretaker regime

of technocrats until the next Assembly elections in august 1875. It was during the

preparations for these elections that events outside Serbia caused a radical shift in the

main subjects of political strife between liberals and conservatives in Serbia.18

In the summer of 1875 Serbian peasants in Bosnia and Herzegovina rose in revolt

against their Ottoman oppressors as a result of dreadful socioeconomic conditions,

which will be analyzed later on in this chapter. The uprising in Bosnia placed Serbian

leadership before the dilemma of either supporting Serbia’s fighting brethren, or

remaining neutral. The conservatives considered Serbia to be both diplomatically and

militarily unprepared for a full-scale war with the Ottoman Empire. Although they

stressed their sympathies for the Bosnian insurgents, they perceived involvement into

the conflict inimical to Serbian national interests. The liberal opposition on the other

hand attacked conservative passivity and urged support of the insurgents. Risti$

succeeded in reuniting the divided liberal fraction behind a highly nationalist agenda of

Serbian intervention in the insurgent provinces. The nationalist dimension of popular

sovereignty once again surfaced in Serbian politics. Liberals realized the risks that

Serbia would run in a war with the Ottoman Empire but considered the Bosnian

insurrection as a decisive historic moment that the Serbian nation had to exploit. As the

rival political fractions commenced campaigning in the Serbian countryside and main

17

David MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875-1878(New York 1967) 15-25.18 Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 341-343; Stokes, Politics as Development, 62-66.



14

towns, the issue of intervention in Bosnia became fully entangled in the domestic

political crisis. This started a dangerous process of fusion between domestic and foreign

problems. Serbia’s domestic crisis was paralleled by difficulties in Serbia’s international

position. This dual developments was extremely disruptive to the Serbian principality.19

I NTERNATIONAL ISOLATION

Until 1878 Serbia’s legal international position was determined by articles 28 and 29 of

the Treaty of Paris of 1856. These articles declared Serbia a vassal state under Ottoman

suzerainty with certain autonomy in internal affairs and trade. Serbia’s vassal status

denied the principality the right to any official dealings with other states. Formally

Serbia was neither allowed to open diplomatic representation in foreign capitals nor to

conclude any treaties or alliances with other states. The Serbian prince was even

explicitly forbidden to declare war. The signatory Great Powers had jointly assumed the

duty of guardians over the Serbian principality. This implied that any future adjustment

of the Serbian status or boundaries was formally subject to Great Power agreement.20

Though Serbia’s legal position left little room for an assertive foreign policy, other

circumstances allowed Serbia to circumvent some of its formal limitations. Regardless

of its size and status, the small principality of Serbia often played a crucial role in

Balkan events during the nineteenth century. Serbia had inspired other Balkan

Christians as a forerunner in the struggle for national liberation and cultivated an

important relationship with the Serbs in regions outside the principality. Furthermore,

small Serbia covered a territory of great strategic importance. On its northern frontier

Serbia enjoyed the potential of controlling the Danube and in the south it controlled the

Morava valley, which was of crucial importance to contacts with the Macedonian lands

and the Aegean coast. These geopolitical factors made Serbia a central element in Great

Power rivalry for predominance in Southeastern Europe. Especially Russia, Austria-

Hungary and Great Britain were intensely jealous of each other, not allowing any of

them to establish a predominant position in the Balkans. During the nineteenth century

their jealousy greatly affected the course of Balkan history and their struggle for control

19 Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States,67 and 141-144; MacKenzie, The Serbs and

Russian Pan-Slavism, 32 and 43-50.20

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 343; Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan NationalStates, 25, 107-108 and 142.



15

of the peninsula became known as the Eastern Question. It was through the Eastern

Question that the principality of Serbia could play a role in European diplomacy that

was disproportionate to its size and legal position. The rivalry among Great Powers and

the special interest they took in Serbian affairs allowed Serbia more diplomatic latitude

than international treaties had provided for.21

Serbian diplomacy was fully adapted to exploitation of the opportunities offered by

mutual distrust and competition between Great Powers. Serbian foreign ministers

between 1868 and 1875 all favored successes by diplomatic means. Diplomatic

missions to Vienna and St. Petersburg tried to play Austria and Russia off against one

another in order to advance Serbian interests. Serbian diplomats were inclined to link

Serbian goals with the objectives of Austria or Russia and thereby sought to win Great

Power support for the principality. This diplomatic strategy however carried the risk of

making Serbia a mere pawn on the chessboard of international politics. Rapprochement

to the Great Powers often placed heavy obligations on the principality while these Great

Powers could sacrifice Serbian interests without much problems. This unequal reality

complicated Serbia’s diplomatic dealings. The Great Powers were usually ambiguous

towards the Serbs and made agreements with Serbian leadership that were often

contradictory to the powers’ policies in Western Europe. Especially during the decades

before the outbreak of the Bosnian insurrection in 1875 Austrian and Russian ambiguity

was in full swing. Western European détente between Vienna and St. Petersburg

coexisted with covert rivalry and entanglement in the Balkans. Which of these policies

would gain the upper hand was left to last-minute consideration. The constant ambiguity

of the Great Powers in Balkan affairs made it difficult for Serbian statesmen to form a

stable and secure foreign policy.22

During the 1860s Serbo-Russian relations had been more intimate than at any other

moment in Serbia’s modern history. After Russia’s disastrous defeat in the Crimean

War (1853-1856) Russia had withdrawn from European affairs and focused on internal

reforms. In contrast to this policy of withdrawal from Western and Central Europe,

Russia increased its activities in the Balkans. The Russian ministry of foreign affairs

was anxious to restore Russian influence in Southeastern Europe. Serbia became the

center of Russian Balkan policy. Prince Mihailo received strong diplomatic support and

21

Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 131-136; Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 343-344.22 Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, vii-x.



16

Russian military supplies poured into the principality.23 Serbo-Russian intimacy came to

an end as Mihailo was assassinated in 1868. Already before Mihailo’s death Russian

dissatisfaction with Serbia had increased. In 1867 a Russian military mission to Serbia

had been disillusioned by the weakness of the Serbian militia and later that year Russia

was alienated by the unannounced dismissal of a Russophile foreign minister. The

major cause for the deterioration of relations between Russia and Serbia was not

Mihailo’s death but the improvement of Serbo-Austrian relations.24

The official policy of the Austria-Hungary towards Serbia during the nineteenth

century was governed by distrust and suspicion. The Habsburg Monarchy feared

Serbian attraction of the South-Slav people of Habsburg lands, as well as Serbia’s

potential as an outpost of Russian influence. Both the Habsburg emperor Franz Joseph

(1830-1916) and his military advisors perceived the Serbian nationalist aspirations in

Serb-inhabited regions outside the principality threatening to the very existence of

Austria-Hungary. Aggrandizement of the Serbian principality could only be carried out

at the expense of its Ottoman and Habsburg neighbors. The emperor and his military

staff therefore wished to keep Serbia and other Balkan states small, divided and

depended. They favored a hardline policy of active opposition to Serbia.25

Parallel to this official policy, the Hungarian statesman Gyula Andrássy (1823-1890)

initially applied a rather different strategy to the Serbian question after his accession to

Hungarian premiership in 1867. Alarmed by Serbo-Russian intimacy, Andrássy sought

to increase Habsburg control over the Serbian government by making friendly

diplomatic overtures to the Serbs. In 1869 the Hungarian premier actively supported

Serbia in securing Ottoman approval of the new Serbian constitution. Andrássy hoped

this move would induce Austrophile sentiments among the Serbian regents and

furthermore anticipated that domestic reform in Serbia would distract the regency from

programs of territorial expansion.26 In unofficial contacts with the regency Andrássy

even offered to Serbia the administration of Ottoman Bosnia in exchange for

23 Barabara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914(Cambridge 1991) 143-154; Stojanovi$,

The Great Powers and the Balkans,6-8.24 MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 7-17; David MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Risti$ and Russia,

1868-1880, I’ in: East European Quarterly 36:4 (2003) 385-415, there 387-388.25 Horst Haselsteiner, Bosnien-Hercegovina: Orientkrise und Südslavische Frage(Vienna 1996) 15-30.26

Ian D. Armour, ‘Killing Nationalism with Liberalism? Austria-Hungary and the Serbian Constitution of1869’ in: Diplomacy and Statecraft 21 (2010) 343-367.



17

unequivocal adherence of Serbia to the Monarchy’s wishes. This unorthodox scheme for

the partition of Ottoman territory between Serbia and the Monarchy required Serbian

leadership to renounce its nationalist aspirations and its affinity with Habsburg Serbs.

Andrássy was prepared to support Serbian annexation of Bosnia because he believed

this would bind Serbia to Austria-Hungary and counter Russian influence. Deliberations

on this ‘Bosnian scheme’ between Andrássy and the Serbian regency continued into late

1870 but failed to result in any solid agreement. The main reason for this failure was

that key figures in Vienna opposed the plan. Without the official support of the emperor,

the military and the foreign ministry in Vienna, Andrássy’s overtures were nothing but

empty promises. These dealings of Andrássy do reveal the persistent intention of

Habsburg statesmen to suppress Serbian nationalism in the nineteenth century.27

After Andrássy in 1871 was promoted foreign minister of Austria-Hungary a

substantial change occurred in his policy towards Serbia. Andrássy abandoned his

policy of rapprochement with the Serbian government and swung back to a more

conservative and more Habsburg foreign policy. As the Monarchy’s official foreign

minister, Andrássy enjoyed a lot more authority in his diplomatic dealings but he was

also more bound to the wishes of the emperor and his clique of military advisors.

Austria-Hungary fully returned to its traditional policy of obstructing any Serbian

nationalist advances. Andrássy now stated the Monarchy would never tolerate Serbian

presence in Bosnia and under the influence of the military elite he started considering

the strategic and political benefits of a Habsburg annexation these Bosnian territories.

Serbo-Austrian relations thereafter quickly deteriorated.28

The sudden deterioration of Serbo-Austrian relations after 1871 had severe

consequences for the Serbian principality. The hardening of the Austrian attitude was

especially troublesome since Serbia was already opposed by Russia. Serbian

negotiations with Andrássy during the late 1860s had alienated the Russians from

Serbia. Former intimacy had made place for outright Russian animosity towards

Belgrade. Russian foreign minister Gor %akov (1798-1883) shifted his support to

Montenegro and provided financial aid to the political opposition of the Serbian

regency. The rift between Russia and Serbia became fully apparent when in 1871 Russia

27 Ian D. Armour, ‘Apple of Discord: Austria-Hungary, Serbia and the Bosnian Question 1867-1871’ in:

The Slavonic and East European Review87:4 (2009) 629-680.28 Haselsteiner, Bosnien-Hercegovina, 10-20; Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 358-360.



18

supported Bulgarian aspirations for a separate ecclesiastical exarchate that included

Serb-claimed territories. As in that same year Austria-Hungary also reverted to a policy

of opposing Serbia, the principality plunged into international isolation. The regency’s

policy of balancing between Russia and Austria-Hungary had failed completely. In this

situation of international isolation the Serbian principality lost any perspective on

advances in foreign affairs.29

Serbia’s relations with the Great Powers were allowed to normalize somewhat after

the regency was replaced with the conservative Marinovi$ cabinet in 1873. The

conservative take-over of Serbian government caused a notable change in Serbian

foreign policy. Whereas the regents had assertively entered negotiations with the Great

Powers, the conservatives now favored a more modest policy of passive compliance to

the Great Powers’ wishes. Premier and foreign minister Jovan Marinovi$ showed a

readiness to follow advice from Vienna and St. Petersburg and he even reassured

Serbia’s loyalty to the Ottoman suzerain. Although tensions between Serbia and the

Great Powers immediately eased as a result of this new policy, Marinovi$ could not end

the international isolation of Serbia.30

Developments in European diplomacy made the improvement of Serbia’s

international position impossible. In 1873 Austria-Hungary and Russia came to a

mutual understanding to put down their rivalry in the Balkans and abandon unilateral

dealings with Serbia and other Balkan states. Both empires joined together with

Germany in the Dreikaiserbund and within this association they agreed to freeze the

status quo on the Balkans. For the sake of the European balance of power the

Dreikaiserbund would not allow any changes to the present constellation of boundaries

in Southeastern Europe. Diplomatic contacts with Serbia were reduced to a minimum

and became fully subordinated to the maintenance of the Austro-Russian détente. Until

1875 the Serbian conservative governments saw no other option than to accept the

isolation of Serbia. Serbian diplomacy came to a complete standstill as the

conservatives committed themselves to the status quo on the Balkans in correspondence

with the policies of the Dreikaiserbund .31

29 MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism,16-20; MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Risti$ and Russia, I’, 388.30 Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 345-348 and 365-368; David MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Marinovi$,

Serbia’s Outstanding European Diplomat’, 24-31.31

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 10-11; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 380;MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism,16, 20 and 29.



19

Serbia’s international isolation and diplomatic impasse had an undermining effect on

Serbia’s central position in Balkan affairs. Serbia traditionally stood at the head of

national liberation movements in the Balkans and aspired to become the center for the

unification of all Serbs in one state. Thereby the principality assumed a role among the

Serbs like Piedmont had fulfilled among the Italians during the Italian unification.

Contemporary proponents of Serbia’s central role in the unification of Serbdom often

referred to Serbia as ‘the Piedmont of the Balkans’. 32 The acceptance of Serbia’s

Piedmontese standing among Serbs and other Balkan peoples depended on the success

of Serbian leadership in guiding the struggle for national liberation. The Great Powers’

hostility towards the Serbian principality therefore reduced Serbia’s potential as the

Piedmont of the Balkans. Locked in international isolation, Serbia had no perspective on

advances in Balkan affairs. Balkan states turned away from Serbia and were often

supported to do so by the Great Powers that wished to obstruct Serbian irredentist

aspirations. Isolated Serbia seemed unable to provide ambitious national leadership.33

The decline of Serbia’s Piedmontese standing was intensely regretted by the Serbian

public. Serbian politicians, journalists and students grew increasingly dissatisfied with

Serbia’s international position and feared Serbian future would be lost as a result of its

government’s inactivity. Although these educated Serbs were only a minority within

Serbian society, their speeches, newspapers and pamphlets defined the public opinion of

the principality. The conservative governments that ruled Serbia between 1873 and

1875 were reproached for their obedient policy towards the Great Powers. Serbian

public opinion blamed prince Milan for neglecting Serbian contacts with other Balkan

states and portrayed Jovan Marinovi$ and A$im !umi$ as traitors of Serbia’s historic

national mission.34 In 1875 these public concerns escalated into widespread popular

anxiety as a result of the outbreak of revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The uprising of

Bosnian Serbs aroused nationalist sentiments and imposed additional urgency on the

matter of Serbia’s eroded international standing. The Serbian public became inflamed

with the thought that Serbia would forever sacrifice its national future if it remained a

passive spectator of the events in Bosnia. Newspapers and pamphlets stated it was

32 David MacKenzie, ‘Serbia as Piedmont and the Yugoslav Idea, 1804-1914’ in: East European

Quarterly, 28:2 (1994) 153-182, there 155-165; Dimitrije Djordjevi$ and Stephen Fischer-Galati, The

Balkan Revolutionary Tradition (New York 1981) 113-141.33

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 348-354; MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism , 16-25. 34 MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 25 and 31-35.



20

Serbia’s duty to come to the aid of its Bosnian brethren. Patriotic demonstrations took

the streets of Belgrade, urging the Serbian government to reclaim Serbia’s leadership in

the struggle national liberation. Serbia was set aflame with a popular desire to recover

Serbia’s lost prestige by intervention in Bosnia. In the face of these passions the

conservatives’ foreign policy of commitment to the status quo was untenable.35

It will be remembered that Serbian domestic politics were in a state of permanent

crisis when the Serbian government received word of the Bosnian revolt. Political strife

between the liberal-dominated Assembly and the conservative minority governments

had paralyzed the orderly administration of the country. It has been shown that the

question of intervention in Bosnia became entangled in this domestic political crisis

during the elections of a new Serbian Assembly in august 1875. Popular enthusiasm for

the insurrection in Bosnia blended with the liberal opposition against the conservative

government. In their election campaign the liberals benefitted form the nationalist

sentiments and obtained a massive Assembly majority that prince Milan could no longer

ignore. The prince grudgingly approved a liberal cabinet dominated by Jovan Risti$ as

its minister of foreign affairs. This bellicose cabinet became known as the ‘action

ministry’. The return of Jovan Risti$ channeled Serbia’s dual problems in domestic and

foreign affairs into one single direction. The action ministry promised to break Serbia’s

domestic and diplomatic impasse by undertaking action for the sake of Serbdom. Under

the assertive leadership of Jovan Risti$, Serbia would come to the aid of its Bosnian

brethren and prepare for a war of national liberation.36

BOSNIAN TURMOIL

The outbreak of the Bosnian revolt in 1875 was preceded by several decades of intimate

contacts between the Serbian principality and Bosnian Serbs. Of Bosnia’s total

population of 1.2 million, some 500.000 Bosnians were Orthodox by religion and Serb

by nationality. The remainder of Bosnia’s population consisted of approximately

450.000 Muslims and 210.000 Catholics.37 The liberation of Bosnian Serbs was among

the main objectives of Serbian nationalism. Serbian annexation of Bosnia would unify

35 Stokes, Politics as Development , 32-33 and 75-80; MacKenzie, ‘Serbia as Piedmont’ 165-166;

Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 381-386.36

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 369-373.37 Lásló Bencze, The Occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878(New York 2005) 77.



21

Bosnian Serbs with their brethren in Serbia and would at the same time double Serbia’s

size and resources. Serbia therefore took special interest in the developments among its

fellow nationals in Bosnia. Agents in service of the Serbian government were active on

Bosnian soil since halfway the nineteenth century. They spread Serbian nationalist

propaganda, established ties with local leaders and gathered military intelligence on the

Ottoman forces in the region. The aim of these highly secretive activities was to prepare

Bosnia for a popular insurrection and eventual liberation by the Serbian principality.38

The question of Serbian influence upon the events in Bosnia between 1875 and 1878

remains highly complicated. Although Serbia was not immediately involved in the

outbreak of disturbances in 1875, the legacy of Serbian contacts with Bosnia became of

crucial importance in a later stage of the insurrection. The activities of Serbia in Bosnia

prior to the revolt therefore demand particular attention. Under the regency, Serbia’s

network of agents in Bosnia was directed by Jovan Risti$. He was in charge of several

conspiratorial cells located in towns throughout Bosnia. This organization functioned

chiefly through Bosnian Serb merchants that received financial compensation in return

for their activities in service of the Serbian government. Bosnian Serb merchants were

ideal agents because of their great mobility, their frequent business visits to Belgrade

and their solid familiarity with Serbian nationalism. In Serbia the agents were trained to

lead guerrilla bands and back in Bosnia they recruited a loyal retinue among Bosnian

peasants. Risti$ maintained firm personal contact with the personnel of his organization

in order to assure that every agent would follow Belgrade’s directions in the event of

war with the Ottoman Empire.39 This organization, however, failed to survive until the

1875 insurrection. When the conservative leader Jovan Marinovi$ took over Serbian

government in 1873, he closed down Serbia’s secret network in Bosnia. The agents

were no longer paid and the nationalist organization was permitted to collapse in

conformity with the conservatives’ passive foreign policy. This means the Serbian

government did not operate any agents in Bosnia at the time that the insurrection

erupted. Although the revival of Serbian contacts with Bosnia would play a crucial role

in a later stage of the insurrection, it should be explicitly noted that they had no active

part in the outbreak of disturbances.40

38 David MacKenzie, ‘Serbian Nationalist and Military Oranisations and the Piedmont Idea 1844-1914’

in: East European Quarterly 16:3 (1982) 323-344; David MacKenzie, Serbs and Russians (1996) 87-110.39

Milorad Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni 1875-1878 (Sarajevo 1973) 40-51.40 Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni, 52-54; MacKenzie, ‘Serbian Nationalist and Military Oranisations’, 332.



22

The insurrection in Bosnia started as a genuine agrarian rebellion of Bosnian

Christian peasants against extortionate feudal exploitation. Bosnian society had

remained agrarian and backward under Ottoman rule. The absolute majority of Bosnia’s

Christians worked as peasant sharecroppers on the estates of a Muslim landowning elite.

Bosnia’s landowners were of the same national background as the peasants that worked

their lands but formed a separate privileged class that had fully assimilated into the

Ottoman ruling strata. The grievous burden that these Muslim landowners placed on

Bosnian peasants had troubled the agrarian relations in Bosnia for centuries. Peasants

were obliged to pay one third to one half of their crop to the landowner and sometimes

also performed labor obligations on his private estate. The Bosnian peasantry was

furthermore injured by the state taxes that usually rose far above the formal 10 percent

as a result of abusive tax farming.41 During the second half of the nineteenth century

peasant conditions deteriorated to an unbearable level as a result of increased tensions

between the Ottoman authorities and Bosnian landowners. The Ottoman government

attempted to impose a more centralized administration on Bosnia and thereby infringed

on the privileges of Bosnia’s landowning elite. Bosnian landowners fiercely resisted

Ottoman reforming measures. They clung to their power over the Bosnian peasantry and

abused their feudal privileges to preserve their position within Bosnian society. The

misery of Bosnian peasants increased as the embittered landlords tried to squeeze as

much as possible out of the already impoverished peasantry. The intensification of the

socioeconomic antagonism between Muslim landowners and Christian peasants led to

an uprising across the entire province of Bosnia in 1875.42

The immediate cause of the Bosnian uprising was the arbitrary collection of taxes

during the summer of 1875. Muslim tax farmers took no account of the peasants’

increased misery and confiscated their demands without mercy. After several villages

resisted to deliver the extortionate tax rates, the Ottoman authorities and Bosnian

landowners provided armed support to the collection of taxes. Soon entire villages left

their lands on the run from violent outrages by gendarmes and armed landlords. Peasant

unrest spread from the southern region of Herzegovina to the north. In the Bosnian

interior, peasants fled into the mountains while along Bosnia’s borders they sought

refuge on Austrian or Serbian territory. Especially in Bosnia’s northern borderlands the

41

L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (London 1958) 396-399.42 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York 1996) 119-135.



23

flight of the peasantry was accompanied by armed resistance. Bands of rebellious

peasants ambushed tax collectors, erected barricades and ravaged the manors of their

landlords. The Ottoman governor of Bosnia deployed all regular troops to Herzegovina

and left the repression of disturbances in northern Bosnia to local landlords and

irregulars. The use of extreme violence was especially common among the latter. They

plundered farms, molested peasant families and burned down entire villages. These

atrocities only encouraged flight and embittered the armed resistance. The number of

insurgents rapidly increased over ten thousand. The main grievances of the rebels

remained the dreadful feudal exploitation and the uprising bore the characteristics of a

classical uncoordinated peasant rebellion.43

The spontaneous agrarian rebellion of Bosnian Serb peasants caught the Serbian

principality by surprise. While former covert activities of Serbia in Bosnia had always

aimed to carefully coordinate an eventual Bosnian revolt, it now seemed that Serbia did

not govern the events in Bosnia but was rather governed by them. Only after Jovan

Risti$ took over Serbian government at the end of August, Serbia attempted to reclaim

leadership over the events in the region. In Belgrade the Committee to Aid the

Insurgents was established with governmental funds. It sought to provide direction to

the insurgents and sent money, arms and volunteers into Bosnia.44 Through the Belgrade

Committee, foreign minister Jovan Risti$ reestablished contacts with the former agents

of Serbia’s collapsed nationalist organization in Bosnia. Risti$ encouraged them to take

the lead over the insurgent operations. Thereafter the control over the rebellious

peasants gradually moved into the hands of these former agents. They provided the

rebellion with a centralized command that stood in close contact with the Serbian

government. This drastically changed the nature of the Bosnian revolt. The rebellion

lost its uncoordinated appearance and acquired the characteristics of an organized

movement.45

The emergence of former agents as the leaders of the rebellion also fundamentally

changed the objectives of the Bosnian revolt. While the improvement of agrarian

conditions was the main concern of the rebellious peasants, their leadership of former

agents now supplemented these economic grievances with a strong political dimension.

43 Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni, 74-88 and 331-332; "orovi$, Istorija Srba, 633.44

Djordjevi$ and Fischer-Galati, The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition, 141-154.45 MacKenzie, ‘Serbian Nationalist and Military Oranisations’, 332.



24

The agents were fiercely nationalistic and through them Serbian nationalist ideology

infiltrated into the insurrectionary movement. The unification of Bosnia and Serbia soon

emerged as the main objective of the Bosnian revolt. In this development lies the

historical importance of Serbia’s former nationalist organization in Bosnia. The legacy

of Serbia’s earlier involvement in Bosnia allowed Serbia in 1875 to reclaim leadership

over the events in the region and transform the localized agrarian rebellion into a wider

nationalist revolution.46

Serbian entanglement in the Bosnian revolt had a significant impact on the Serbian

principality itself. The Serbian government assumed control over a revolution in

neighboring Ottoman lands while Serbia officially was not yet at war with the Ottoman

Empire. This situation required the government’s outmost caution since Serbia was still

largely unprepared for a military conflict. To avoid the premature outbreak of war, the

Serbian coordination of Bosnian rebel forces was exercised in complete secrecy. The

main line of communication and supply ran through the river Sava from Belgrade to the

center of the rebellion in northern Bosnia. In the night of September 6 1875 the Bosnian

Serb former agent Vaso Vidovi$ arrived from Belgrade on the Bosnian banks of the

river Sava with a boat full of arms and ammunition. There he established the main

headquarters for the direction of guerilla operations in northern and western Bosnia. The

Serbian government maintained intimate contacts with Vaso Vidovi$ but made serious

efforts not to reveal these ties to the Ottoman authorities. Rebellious endeavors in

eastern Bosnia were coordinated directly from the adjacent Serbian territory along the

river Drina. Serbian General Ranko Alimpi$ was sent to the Drina valley to organize

bands of volunteers from Bosnia and Serbia. The volunteers were armed with Serbian

weapons and deployed across the Drina into Bosnia under the supervision of General

Alimpi$. In this way Serbia was covertly in charge at two fronts in the Bosnian conflict

without operating its own armed forces against the Ottomans. It was, however, obvious

that the success of the nationalist revolution in Bosnia fully depended on the eventual

mobilization of Serbia’s own militia. The unification of Bosnia and Serbia could only

be carried out if Serbian troops would intervene. By entangling Serbia into the Bosnian

turmoil, the Risti$ government had made war between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire

inevitable. In 1875 the Serbian principality balanced on the brink of war.47

46

Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni, 88-95.47 MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 30-60; Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni, 74-109.



25

O N THE BRINK OF WAR

The dual process of parallel stagnation in domestic and foreign affairs between 1868

and 1875 made Serbia vulnerable for the disruption of unrest in the Balkans. In 1875 the

Serbian principality was in no way prepared for war. Serbian domestic politics were in a permanent state of crisis. Such an unstable situation at the home front would be hardly

favorable in the event of war with the Ottoman Empire. The international isolation of

Serbia further diminished Serbia’s chances of victory in a military conflict. All the

Great Powers would oppose Serbian aggressive moves against the Ottoman Empire.

Paradoxically it were exactly these shortcomings that brought Serbia on the brink of

war. The outbreak of revolt in Bosnia caused the entanglement of Serbia’s domestic

crisis and international decay. Nationalist sentiments resurfaced and popular anxiety

could be easily manipulated by an assertive leader. Jovan Risti$ and his liberal fraction

presented a successful war for Serbian aggrandizement as the ideal solution for Serbia’s

domestic and diplomatic problems. They promised that a Serbian victory would unite

Serbia’s divided political life and liberate the country out of its diplomatic isolation. The

integration of popular sovereignty into Serbian domestic politics displayed its

mobilizing potential in a nationalist discourse. Since the Serbian people were more

involved with Serbian politics the country’s goals could more effectively be expressed

in nationalist terms. Jovan Risti$ embraced a fiercely nationalist programme of Serbian

intervention in Bosnia for the sake of Serbdom. The liberals reclaimed leadership within

Serbia and would in turn allow Serbia to reclaim leadership over the Serbian nation as a

whole. Serbia was prepared to embark on war of national liberation in order to restore

the prestige of Serbia as the Piedmont of the Balkans.48

48 MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Risti$ and Russia, I’, 393-396.



26

2 . S E R B I A A T W A R 1 8 7 5 - 1 8 7 8

By the autumn of 1875 the Serbian government had taken full control of the rebellious

movement in Bosnia. Serbian agents led bands of armed peasants in skirmishes against

the Ottoman forces and the Serbian delivery of arms and money kept the Bosnian

revolution alive. At this moment Serbia itself, however, was officially not at war with

the Ottoman Empire. The vital decision on the mobilization of the Serbian militia had

still to be made by the Serbian government in Belgrade. Serbian foreign minister Jovan

Risti$ was determined to start a Serbian war against the Ottoman Empire, but delayed

immediate aggressive action to win time for necessary diplomatic and military

preparations. Before Serbia would commence the war of national liberation, Risti$

sought to resolve Serbia’s most urgent shortcomings. The international isolation of the principality had to be broken and Serbia’s domestic political disunity had to be

appeased. At the same time Serbia’s primitive armed forces were to be rapidly prepared

for a large-scale offensive against the modernized Ottoman army. In short, the Serbian

government faced a tremendous challenge as it attempted to embark on a war for which

the small Serbian principality was largely unprepared.49

The Serbian national militia was more a group of armed peasants than a modern

standing army. In 1875 Serbia could field about 125.000 conscripts that had beentrained in communal drills on Sundays and holidays. There was no organized supply of

the troops and many soldiers had to provide their own clothing, food and weapons. With

only about nineteen educated doctors the medical support of the Serbian militia could

impossibly take care of the wounded in an average offensive. Another persistent

weakness of the militia was the lack of officers. By 1875 the Serbian military academy

had delivered only 460 graduated officers to cover the enormous organizational

structure of the Serbian peasant army.50 These remarkable shortcomings of the Serbian

armed forces on the eve of war with the Ottoman Empire reflect the conscious core of

Serbia’s nineteenth-century military doctrine. This doctrine held that the Serbian

peasant possessed a strong warrior tradition of spontaneous fighting against the

Ottoman oppressors. The Serbian military strategy was therefore based on the myth that

49 Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 382; MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 43-50.50 Milorad Ekme%i$, ‘The Serbian Army in the Wars of 1876-78: National Liability or National Asset?’

in: Bela Kiraly and Gale Stokes ed., Insurrection, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870’s(New York1985) 276-304, there 276-284.



27

armed Serbian peasants held military capabilities that could bring about a Serbian

victory over the Ottoman forces. According to Serbia’s military thinkers the loosely

organized peasant militia offered the best deployment of the Serbian warrior spirit. They

saw no need for a fully organized professional Serbian army. Spontaneous peasant

uprisings in the Balkans would be turned into a victorious war for the unification of

Serbdom as a result of the mobilization of the Serbian peasant militia.51

The preparation of the Serbian militia for war with the Ottoman Empire was a costly

effort. During the autumn of 1875 it became clear to the Serbian government that it was

impossible to expect the Serbian troops to arm themselves. Lack of weaponry was

therefore perceived a major problem for which no epic mythology could compensate.

The Serbian Assembly permitted a large state loan for the rapid rearmament of Serbian

troops and measures were taken to secure the supply of the battlefronts. The

government’s military advisor Colonel Ore&kovi$ believed that the Serbian militia could

not be ready for action before December. The Serbian government thereafter decided

that war would be postponed until spring 1876. In the mean time the Bosnian insurgents

would be supported through the winter with money and supplies.52

Foreign minister Jovan Risti$ recognized that Serbia’s military preparations had to be

accompanied by an improvement of Serbia’s diplomatic situation before the principality

could commence a war. Completely isolated Serbia could stand no chance against the

Ottoman Empire that enjoyed a certain level of protection from the Great Powers. Jovan

Risti$ sought to win Austrian and Russian support for his government, but failed to get

through the Dreikaiserbund’ s agreed-upon isolation of the Serbian principality. The

Great Powers were quickly getting anxious about the increasing tensions on the Balkans

and were careful not to encourage Serbia into war. Risti$ also had a little success in

reviving traditional loyalties on the Balkans. Both Greece and Romania refused to enter

a war at the side of the Serbs. Their interests were not directly involved in Bosnia and

they actually feared that a successful Serbian war could be harmful to their own plans of

expansion. The only Balkan state that was interested in cooperation with the Serbs was

Serbia’s closest neighbor, Montenegro.53

51 Gale Stokes, ‘Serbian Military Doctrine and the Crisis of 1875-78’ in: Bela Kiraly and Gale Stokes ed.,

Insurrection, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870’s(New York 1985) 261-273.52 MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 50-53; Ekme%i$, ‘The Serbian Army in the Wars of

1876-78’ 266, 268 and 282.53 Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 371-376; Stavrianos, The Balkans, 402-403.



28

Serbo-Montenegrin relations were traditionally close because of their common

Serbian nationality and mutual interest in liberating the Serbs. Prince Nikola Petrovi$ of

Montenegro (1841-1921) was heavily involved in the Bosnian uprising and held

preeminence over the insurgents the southern region of Herzegovina. Soon after the

Risti$ government had resolved on war preperations, Serbia and Montenegro entered

diplomatic negotiations. From autumn 1875 until spring 1876 Serbian diplomats were in

permanent contact with Montenegrin prince Nikola to conclude an official treaty of

alliance and a military convention between the two Serbian states. These negotiations

took about half a year because a great deal of latent rivalry existed between the two

states. After it had been clarified that Montenegro wished to annex Herzegovina and

that Serbia reserved Bosnia as its main objective, the bases were laid for an alliance.

The Montenegrins’ commitment to wage war at the side of the Serbs was essential to

Serbia from a military point of view. Without the support of Montenegro it would have

been doubtful if Serbia could survive a war against the huge Ottoman army.54

The Ottoman war office reacted fiercely to the Serbian military and diplomatic

preparations for war. The Ottoman minister of war started massing troops at the Serbian

frontier and the Ottoman government pressured Serbia to stop its assistance to the

Bosnian insurgents. From the outset, the Ottoman government blamed Serbian agitation

for the uprising in Bosnia. The Ottoman war office considered that the real danger of the

Bosnian uprising came from Serbia. Its priority was therefore not the suppression of

disturbances in Bosnia but the mobilization of Ottoman troops at the Serbian borders.

According to the Ottoman minister of war the Bosnian uprising could be most

effectively brought to an end by destroying the Serbian militia and ending the hated

Serbian autonomy. These Ottoman reactions caused anxiety in Serbia. The Serbian

government began accelerating its military preparations and also started positioning

equipped Serbian troops at the borders. During this escalating military buildup at the

Serbo-Ottoman borders, the tension between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire ran high.

Frequent violations of the frontier from both sides led to mutual accusations of

offensive aggression. Both Serbia and the Ottoman Empire presented their own

measures as preventive and defensive while in fact both sides were waiting for the right

moment to commence an offensive.55

54

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 35-37, 47-48, 64 and 79-81.55 Jovanovi$, Vlada Milana Obrenovi!a I, 442-443; Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans,20.



29

FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

The increasing concentrations of Serbian and Ottoman troops at each side of the border

caused a great deal of distress among the Great Powers. Balkan disturbances could

easily lead to a European crisis of much greater proportions since many of the GreatPowers had contradicting aspirations on the Balkan Peninsula. Especially the entente

between Austria-Hungary and Russia was vulnerable to the re-opening of the Eastern

Question. For this reason the Dreikaiserbund had strictly agreed to maintain the status

quo on the Balkans. During the autumn of 1875 danger of conflict between Serbia and

the Ottoman Empire induced the Dreikaiserbund to intervene in Balkan affairs. A

consular mission was sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina to investigate the situation and

calm the insurgents. This attempt to accommodate with the Bosnian insurgents was

accompanied by collective pressure on the Ottoman Sultan to carry through progressive

reforms. The insurgents were to be informed about the Ottoman promises of reform

through the consular mission and thereby the Balkan Crisis would be resolved at its

roots. This first initiative of the Dreikaiserbund to mediate collectively in Balkan

affairs, nevertheless failed because Austria-Hungary and Russia could not agree on the

amount of pressure to be exerted on the Ottoman Empire. Without clear signals from

Constantinople the consular commission in Bosnia was not able to formulate a clear

agenda towards the insurgents. The effectiveness of collective mediation was reduced

by divergence between its main participants.56

The divergence between Austria-Hungary and Russia was best portrayed in the

personal feud between the two of their main diplomats at the time. The Austrian

minister of foreign affairs Gyula Andrássy supported the collective pacificatory

endeavors of the Dreikaiserbund but suspected every Russian proposal in this direction.

Andrássy feared that Russia wished to restore its traditional role as the sole protector of

all Christians under Ottoman rule. Such a Russian protectorate would be extremely

harmful to the Austrian interests in the Balkans and Andrássy therefore sought to

control every initiative of the Dreikaiserbund.57 His effort to establish Vienna as the

center of action for the Dreikaiserbund was, however, opposed by Count Nikolaj

Ignat’ev (1832-1908), the Russian ambassador in Constantinople. Count Ignat’ev

56 Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans,21-27.57

Franz-Josef Kos, Die Politik Österreich-Ungarns Während der Orientkrise 1874/75-1879: ZumVerhältnis von politischer und militärischer Führung(Vienna 1984) 93-97.



30

considered it contrary to Russian interests to follow Austria-Hungary in its designs on

the Balkans and therefore attempted to use his personal influence in Constantinople to

conclude a separate understanding with the Ottoman ministers. Ignat’ev calculated that

the Ottoman Empire could be made dependent on Russia if Russia succeeded in

unilaterally forcing reform upon the Ottoman government. In fact, both Andrássy and

Ignat’ev were trying to draw the initiative in the international mediation exclusively

towards themselves for the purpose of dominating the eventual solution of the Eastern

Question. This rivalry continued to be present in the background of the

Dreikaiserbund ’s dealings and undermined the Great Powers’ attempts to come to a

peaceful settlement of the Balkan Crisis.58

In December 1875 Andrássy found support for his pacificatory designs within the

Russian foreign office. Russian foreign minister Gor %akov had returned from a lengthy

summer retreat in Switzerland and redirected Russian diplomacy to a more

accommodative course in concert with Austria-Hungary and Germany. Gor %akov

ignored Ignat’ev’s proposals for unilateral dealings with the Ottoman government and

was determined not to let the Balkan Crisis disrupt the Russian alliance with Vienna and

Berlin. According to Gor %akov the coming winter was to be fully utilized for joint

action in concert with Andrássy since otherwise it would be impossible to restrain

Serbia and Montenegro from war in spring.59 On December 30 the Dreikaiserbund

presented the Andrássy Note to the Ottoman Empire. The note contained a reform

program that the Ottoman government accepted with some minor reservations. The

Ottoman promise of certain liberties and land reforms was then publicly proclaimed in

Bosnia and Herzegovina but dramatically failed to calm the population. The Andrássy

Note was void of guarantees and the empty promises of the Ottoman government no

longer made any impression upon the insurgents. The public proclamation of reforms

only worsened the situation in Bosnia since the conservative Muslim population

opposed the reforms with violent reprisals upon the Bosnian Serbs. Also within

Constantinople the imposed reforms of the Andrássy Note provoked great discontent

and fanaticism among Muslim patriots.60 This internal unrest brought the Ottoman

58 Marija Wakounig, ‘Dissens versus Konsens: das Österreichbild in Russland während der Franzisko-

Josephinischen Ära’ in: Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch ed., Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-

1918 VI (Vienna 1993) 436-490, there 463; Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans,37-40.59

Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 148-155.60 Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans,51-55.



31

Empire only closer to war since the government was now passionately pressured to

undertake action against the rebellious Christians and their dangerous European

protectors. The massing of Ottoman troops at the Serbian borders continued and the

Andrássy Note did not improve the situation in Bosnia. Though the Andrássy Note

reunited the Russian and Austrian Balkan policies it failed to address the most urgent

issues of the escalating Balkan Crisis.61

Apart from their mediation between the Bosnian insurgents and Constantinople, the

Great Powers also put the strongest pressure on Serbia to restrain the principality from

war. Both Austria-Hungary and Russia intensely disapproved of the bellicose Serbian

government and their consuls in Belgrade encouraged prince Milan to remove Risti$

and his liberal entourage from power. The Dreikaiserbund collectively anounced that

any passage of armed bands from Serbia into Ottoman territory would be considered as

an act of agression. No further violations of the Serbo-Ottoman frontier would be

allowed. The Russian tsar Alexander II even personally warned prince Milan that Serbia

would enjoy no protection from Russia if it comenced a war against the Ottoman

Empire. It was made clear to the Serbs that neither Russia nor Austria-Hungary would

prevent an Ottoman occupation of Serbia if the outbreak of war resulted from Serbian

agression against the Ottoman Empire.62

The Dreikaiserbund' s strong collective stand against Serbian aggression was

seriously weakened by a dangerous duality in Russian foreign policy. Within the

Russian foreign ministry secret feelings of sympathy for the Serbian cause undermined

the official message of Russian opposition to war. These feelings of sympathy

originated from a populist ideology that was called Pan-Slavism. A considerable

proportion of Russia’s diplomatic staff embraced Pan-Slavism as a program that could

revive the Russian Empire’s leading position in the Slav world. Pan-Slavism called for

active intervention in Balkan affairs and aimed at the liberation of Balkan Slavs under

superior Russian guidance. Pan-Slavs considered a Serbian war against the Ottoman

Empire as an ideal opportunity for the realization these aims.63 The most influential

Pan-Slav diplomat was none other than Ignat’ev. From his embassy in Constantinople

he instructed the Russian consuls throughout the Balkans to apply a policy in the Balkan

61 Stavrianos, The Balkans, 400-401.62 MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 34, 49, 55-60.63

Wakounig, ‘Dissens versus Konsens: das Österreichbild in Russland’, 439-444, 454-456 and 461-463;Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 157-159.



32

Crisis that contradicted the official Russian policy of neutral cooperation with Austria

and Germany. At crucial moments during the Dreikaiserbund’ s pacifying efforts,

Ignat’ev encouraged Serbia into war through official Russian diplomats that stood in

contact with the Belgrade government. As a result, Serbian prince Milan and foreign

minister Risti$ received inconsistent and contradictory messages from the Russian

consulate in Belgrade. Russian consul Kartsov combined every official warning that

Serbia would enjoy no support in the event of war with semi-official encouragement of

military and diplomatic preparations for war. These bellicose encouragements severely

undermined the authority of Russia’s official pressure for peace.64 Foreign minister

Gor %akov failed to counter the Pan-Slav agitation among his subordinates with clear

official instructions and thereby allowed the Serbian leadership to speculate about

Russia’s real objectives in the Balkan Crisis. Jovan Risti$ and his ministers doubted the

sincerity of Russia’s opposition to war and hoped that they could trust the Pan-Slav

promise of eventual Russian support in case of an armed conflict. The Dreikaiserbund' s

pressure on Serbia did not halt Serbia’s drift towards conflict because Pan-Slav agitation

from within the Russian foreign ministry encouraged Serbia into war.65

During the early spring of 1876 the Dreikaiserbund made its final attempt to enforce

peace upon the Balkans. This last mediatory effort again failed. Pan-Slav agitation had

done a lot to undermine pacification in the Balkans and the final breakdown of the

international mediation was caused by diplomatic divergence between the European

Great Powers. Russian foreign minister Gor %akov considered it of crucial importance to

provide the Bosnian insurgents with solid guarantees for the improvement of their

situation. He therefore proposed to Andrássy to put more pressure on the Ottoman

government and involve the other European Great Powers in taking measures to pacify

the Balkans.66 As usual, Andrássy resisted these Russian proposals. He continued to

consider the uprising as an internal matter of the Ottoman Empire and refused to allow a

broader European interference in the Balkan Crisis. Andrássy was, of course, most

concerned that the involvement of other European powers would undermine his leading

position in the crisis management. His alternative memorandum was again void of

guarantees for the insurgents and merely consisted of suggesting an improbable

64 Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 383-384; MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Risti$ and Russia, I’, 393-396.65

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 49-55 and 66-73.66 Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans,58-60.



33

armistice between the Ottoman forces and the insurgent bands. Andrássy opposed

pressuring the Ottoman Empire more and instead made strong threats against Serbia for

continuing its war preparations. To preserve the Dreikaiserbund , Gor %akov grudgingly

supported Andrássy’s designs.67

Austria-Hungary thus again succeeded in dictating the international mediation but

this highhanded policy proved to be a grave misstep for two reasons. First, the

enforcement of Andrássy’s designs upon the Dreikaiserbund caused great reluctance

within the Russian foreign ministry. Even Russian diplomats that had no Pan-Slav

sympathies disapproved of the measures taken. This dissatisfaction was felt in Serbia

and increased Serbian doubts about Russia’s commitment to peace. Second, Andrássy’s

refusal to involve other European Great Powers caused Great Britain to oppose the

Dreikaiserbund’ s last mediatory effort. The British government objected the exclusive

Dreikaiserbund dealings in Southeastern Europe without prior consultation with the

other Great Powers. The rejection of international mediation on the part of Great Britain

ended the possibility of an early peaceful settlement. This was a decisive turning point

in the escalation of the Great Eastern Crisis. The divergence between the Great Powers

in Balkan affairs prevented strong successful pacification. International mediation had

failed and actual events in the Balkans overtook the diplomatic talks in Europe.68

SERBIAN MILITARY DISASTER

While the diplomatic quarrel between Austria, Russia and Britain dragged on without

any results, the situation on the Balkans changed far beyond the control of the Great

Powers. As soon as the first snow melted down in the Bosnian mountains, the

insurgents resumed their guerilla fight with full fury. Ottoman reprisals became more

savage and by March 1876, approximately 156.000 refugees from Bosnia and

Herzegovina had crossed the borders into Serbia and Austria-Hungary.69 The failure of

international mediation encouraged other Balkan Christians to join the resistance against

the Ottoman oppressor. In April a Bulgarian uprising broke out and unrest spread into

Macedonia and Albania. These events were followed by a coup d’état in Constantinople

during the last days of May. Under these circumstances the Serbian principality

67 MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 87-100.68

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans,61-73; Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 180-184.69 Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 132; Stavrianos, The Balkans, 400.



34

accelerated its war preparations and quickly concluded the military convention with

Montenegro. The intervention of the Serbian states was to escalate the regional Balkan

disturbances into an enormous international crisis. The Great Eastern Crisis assumed its

true scope and began to transform the Balkans beyond recognition.70

The continuation of the Bosnian rising and the spread of revolt into Bulgaria

increased the pressure upon Serbia to support the insurgents and exploit the apparent

weakness of the Ottoman Empire. The Serbian military leadership favored an offensive

strike before summer and pressured prince Milan to support the bellicose determination

of his people. The Serbian prince was opposed to war and had tried to preserve Serbian

neutrality in concert with the Great Powers’ efforts for pacification. This peaceful

course clashed with the warlike enthusiasm of both the Serbian people and the Risti$

government. Milan stood alone and feared his dynasty would be overthrown if he

continued to resist the Serbian national aspirations. Furthermore, he proved to be very

susceptible to the pressure from the military and during the spring of 1876 the Serbian

prince gradually shifted into the war party.71

While within Serbia the last obstacles to warlike action disappeared, the Russian

Pan-Slav movement launched an initiative that deeply affected Serbia’s determination to

proclaim war against the Ottoman Empire. Pan-Slav excitement in Russia had reached

unprecedented levels and the recruitment of volunteers resulted in the creation of a

complete volunteer army that was ready to be deployed in the upcoming war for the

liberation of the Balkan Slavs. The Moscow Slav Committee placed the famous Russian

general Mihail !ernjajev (1828-1898) at the head of this volunteer venture and

dispatched him to Belgrade in late April. 72 For the Serbs, the arrival of general

!ernjajev in the Serbian capital was an irresistible impulse for war. !ernjajev offered

his services to the Serbian prince and made courageous statements calling for Serbian

political independence. The Russian general immediately received Serbian citizenship

and was placed in command of the main section of Serbia’s militia. The Serbian

government mistakenly perceived !ernjajev’s commitment to the Serbian cause as a

sign that Russia secretly supported Serbian war preparations. General !ernjajev

confirmed this erroneous belief by boasting about his intimate ties with the Russian

70 Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999(New York 1999) 73,

105-110 and 126-131; Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 377-378.71

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 22, 62 and 66.72 David MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent : The Career of General M . G. Cherniaev (Georgia 1974) 122-131.



35

tsarist court. As a result of the arrival of !ernjajev and other Russian Pan-Slav

volunteers in Serbia, the Serbian leadership became confident that official Russia would

support the Serbian principality in the upcoming war.73

The Pan-Slav suggestion that official Russia would eventually side with Serbia was

of vital importance to the Serbian decision to start an offensive in June 1876. Serbian

foreign minister Risti$ was fully aware of the real possibility of defeat against the strong

Ottoman forces and therefore sought the guarantee that an Ottoman occupation of

Serbia would be prevented in case of military disaster. Risti$ heavily relied on Pan-Slav

promises in concluding that the combination of pro-Serbian sympathies and Russian

strategic interests in the Balkans would eventually force the tsar to wage war on the

Ottoman Empire if the survival of Serbia would be at stake. The open reluctance of

Gor %akov in certain Dreikaiserbund dealings and the absence of clear instructions from

the Russian consulate in Belgrade confirmed Risti$ in his assessment of the military and

political situation. Risti$ was actually right in calculating that Russia would not allow

the Ottomans to recapture Serbia but he fully overlooked the diplomatic difficulties that

Russia would have to face before being allowed to take up arms against the Ottoman

Empire. As we will see a Serbian military disaster was inextricably bound up with a

Serbian diplomatic disaster. This insight, however, was not apparent to the Serbian

leadership in 1876. At that time, the combination of Pan-Slav agitation and ambiguities

in Russia’s official policy provided enough confidence for bellicose optimism.74 It

should be clear that without the Serbian leadership’s belief in Russia’s secret support,

the outbreak of the First Serbo-Ottoman War would probably not have occurred.

At the end of June 1876, the Serbian principality finally declared war on the Ottoman

Empire. Serbia’s primary strategic objective was to destroy the main Ottoman army in

the well-fortified Ni& region to the south of Serbia. This objective was set in accordance

to the European military conviction that the complete elimination of the enemy’s main

force would consequently lead to the victorious enforcement of all other territorial and

political objectives. The Serbian proclamation of war clarified as its political war aim

the annexation of Serb-inhabited territories to accomplish the unification and liberation

of the Serbian people on the Balkan Peninsula.75 These military considerations split the

73 David MacKenzie, ‘Panslavism in Practice: Cherniaev in Serbia (1876)’ in: The Journal of Modern

History 36:3 (Chicago 1964) 279-297.74

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans,86-87; MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Risti$ and Russia’ 391-396.75 Stokes, ‘Serbian Military Doctrine and the Crisis of 1875-78’, 266; Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni, 217-218.



36

Serbian war effort into two separate fronts. The greater part of the Serbian militia was

deployed in a southeastward offensive under the command of general Mihail !ernjajev.

With an army of 68.000 troops !ernjajev planned to attack towards Ni& through the

Morava valley and capture the important citadel there. This southern front had to be

permanently secured against Ottoman counter-attacks, since an Ottoman breakthrough

in the Morava valley could leave the road to Belgrade open for conquest. The strategic

preoccupation with the southeastward offensive, however, did not alter Serbia’s strong

engagement with Bosnia as its main political objective. The Serbian main offensive

towards the southeast was combined with a smaller advance into Bosnia.76

The Serbian proclamation of war immediately intensified the Bosnian rising. Under

the command of General Ranko Alimpi$ an army of 20.000 troops crossed the Drina

into Bosnia. The Serbian army reinforced the insurgents in Eastern Bosnia and

attempted to unite the scattered fronts of the rebellion. The intervention of the Serbian

militia in Bosnia created the necessary atmosphere for the declaration of union between

Bosnia and Serbia. Under the supervision of several Serbian agents this declaration was

carefully formulated and signed by most insurgent leaders on July 2 1876:

‘We, as the only lawful representatives of the Serbian lands of Bosnia, afterso much waiting without hope for any help, from now on and forever

resolve to break with the unchristian Ottoman government. We wish toshare our fate with our Serbian brothers, whatever this fate may be.’77

Exactly as this declaration desired, the fate of the Bosnian insurgents became entangled

with that of their Serbian brothers. The first Serbian advance into Bosnia collapsed

within two days. The Serbian militia was greatly outnumbered by the Ottoman forces on

the Bosnian front and the military cooperation with Montenegro failed to support the

Serbian efforts. The Montenegrin offensive into Herzegovina was faced with little

Ottoman resistance since the Ottoman army was fully concentrated in Bosnia. After

marching into Herzegovina, Montenegrin prince Nikola refused to advance further in

concert with the Serbian operations and instead focused on securing the achieved

territorial gains. Recurrent rivalry between the Serbia and Montenegro during the war

frustrated a successful joint offensive into Bosnia and Herzegovina. After a brief

advance toward Sarajevo, the Serbian militia withdrew in haste and disorder.78

76 Ekme%i$, ‘The Serbian Army in the Wars of 1876-78’, 287-28877

Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni, 213.78 Stavrianos, The Balkans, 403; Ekme%i$, ‘The Serbian Army in the Wars of 1876-78’, 285 and 294.



37

After these initial Serbian military setbacks in Bosnia, the Serbian ministry of war

sought to strategically integrate the Bosnian uprising into the Serbian war effort. This

undertaking was not directed at the immediate conquest of Bosnia but merely at placing

Serbian military leadership in control of the Bosnian rebels. In August 1876 the Serbian

ministry of war sent Colonel Mileta Despotovi$ to Bosnia with the task of obtaining the

supreme command of the insurgent movement. Despotovi$ forced discipline upon the

insurgent leaders and established a firm chain of command to coordinate combined

assaults. These military improvements were an absolute necessity to compose one

serious military undertaking out of the scattered rebellious units. The arrival of Mileta

Despotovi$ furthermore significantly reinforced the proclamation of union between

Bosnia and Serbia since the Colonel was invested with the title of official deputy of the

Serbian prince in Bosnia. Among the Bosnian insurgents the unification was celebrated

as a natural result of their struggle for emancipation. The implementation of military

discipline and obedience upon the insurgents, however, also led to friction with the

peasant fighters. The insurgents were devoted to their local loyalties and could not

always recognize their own interests in the orders of the Serbian supreme command.

Another major disadvantage of the strategic integration of the Bosnian uprising into the

greater Serbian war effort was that the fate of the insurgents became depended upon the

Serbian fortunes at the faraway southeastern front in the Ni& region.79

The Serbian southeastward offensive commenced with a successful attack on the first

fortified Ottoman camp on the road to Ni&. The defeated Ottoman garrison retreated to

Pirot but another Ottoman unit infringed the Serbian eastern border. Hesitation and

indecision on the part of General !ernjajev prevented the Serbian militia from

exploiting its initial success. The initial operations of the militia moreover exposed the

weaknesses of the Serbian peasant fighters. Inexperience and frequent disobedience

made the militia hard to manage. The Serbian armed forces proved unable to implement

the offensive strategy. The Ottoman army deeply penetrated eastern Serbia and the

Serbian offensive went in reverse after only two weeks.80 Several frontier towns were

lost to the powerful Ottoman counter-offensive but General !ernjajev quickly

established a new line of defense before the town of Aleksinac. The Serbian staff

introduced daily drills at the front and restored order among disobedient troops. Forced

79

Ekme%i$, Ustanak u Bosni, 212-223, 238-250 and 335.80 MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent , 132-139.



38

into the defense of their own homes, the Serbian peasant fighters performed a lot better.

Under firm leadership the Serbian militia could sustain defensive operations. Fierce

Serbian resistance around the town of Aleksinac prevented an Ottoman breakthrough.

Aleksinac became the most crucial position in the defense of the Morava valley that led

to the Serbian interior. The Ottoman counter-offensive was brought to a standstill and

the Serbian militia adequately protected Serbia from an invasion.81

After the Serbian line of defense in the Morava valley was secured in August 1876, a

perilous period began for the Serbian war effort. The Ottomans reinforced their Morava

front with about 25.000 reserves from Thrace and gradually built up a numerical

superiority over the Serbian forces. Villages around Aleksinac fell prey to outrageous

Ottoman reprisals and thousands of homeless Serbs fled from the invaded territories to

the Serbian interior. These developments caused great distress within Serbia. Foreign

minister Jovan Risti$ feared that Serbia did not have enough resources to endure another

Ottoman offensive. He considered negotiating an armistice with the Ottomans while the

Serbian militia still held the crucial Morava positions. According to Risti$ continuation

of war would probably bring defeat while timely negotiation could restore Serbia’s

prewar status and territories.82 General !ernjajev protested against an armistice and

intrigued with Prince Milan to undermine the Risti$ government. The General attempted

to enhance his personal influence in Serbia and caused a serious crisis by engineering a

military coup in September 1876. Although he publicly claimed to act in the interest of

Serbia, personally he telegraphed to the Slav Committee in Moscow that his real

intentions were to make Serbia a de facto province of Russia under his dictatorship.

This curious incident provides many clues to the true nature of Russian Pan-Slavism.

The Pan-Slav sympathies always camouflaged the aggressive aim of expanding Russian

influence. Prince Milan prevented General !ernjajev from becoming the dictator of

Serbia but permitted !ernjajev’s assessments of the military situation to prevail over the

advise of the Serbian government. !ernjajev overestimated Serbia’s military might and

persuaded Prince Milan and the government to continue the fight. According to

historian David MacKenzie this manipulation to pursue a hopeless war made General

!ernjajev largely responsible for Serbia’s crushing defeat in October 1876.83

81 Stokes, ‘Serbian Military Doctrine and the Crisis of 1875-78’, 267-269; MacKenzie, The Lion of

Tashkent , 139-145; Ekme%i$, ‘The Serbian Army in the Wars of 1876-78’, 284 and 293-294.82

MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Risti$ and Russia, I’, 394-404.83 MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent , 146-155; MacKenzie, ‘Cherniaev in Serbia’, 285-297.



39

While General !ernjajev was occupied with his machinations in Serbia’s internal

affairs the Ottoman army made an unexpected move. The Ottoman offensive positions

before Aleksinac on the east bank of the Morava were evacuated. The Ottoman troops

retreated and then regrouped on the west bank of the river to prepare an assault on the

fortified Serbian position at (unis. The Serbian supreme command had neglected its

troops on this well-fortified west flank. After ten days of October rain in the trenches

without any reinforcement, the (unis garrison could not hold a single day against the

thirty-five battalions of Ottoman regulars that advanced upon the flank. On October 29

the Ottomans broke through the last Serbian line of defense. The Serbian front collapsed

and the road to Belgrade lay open for Ottoman conquest. The peasant militia reacted to

this final defeat with massive flight in complete panic. Crowds of uprooted people,

whose houses were set afire by the Ottoman troops, joined the Serbian soldiers in

retreat.84 Military failure increased the mutual distrust and friction between the Serbs

and the Russian volunteers. During the last battles, General !ernjajev removed his staff

from the front and ordered all Russian officers to abandon the Serbian troops to their

fate. These orders completely crushed what little morale was left among the ranks of the

militia. In the face of military disaster Pan-Slavism abandoned the Serbian cause. After

the Serbian defeat at (unis on October 29, only the intervention of official Russia could

save the Serbian principality from complete destruction.85

The Serbian peasant militia had been clearly incapable of conducting a serious war

against the better-organized, better-equipped and better-led forces of the Ottoman army.

Serbia’s resources were completely exhausted by the maintenance of the positions in the

Morava valley and one powerful Ottoman assault at (unis had crushed the Serbian

defense at once. The Russian government was immediately warned about the imminent

disaster in the Balkans and anxiously intervened to prevent the Ottoman conquest of the

unfortunate Serbian principality. Within two days after the Serbian defeat, Russia issued

an ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire to halt the hostilities against Serbia. The Ottoman

Sultan directly accepted a two-month armistice and thereafter signed a peace treaty with

the Serbian principality. The ultimatum reasserted official Russia’s leadership in Balkan

affairs and relegated the Pan-Slav movement to relative obscurity. 86 The Serbian

84 Dimitrije Djordjevi$, ‘The Serbian Peasant in the 1876 War’ in: Bela Kiraly and Gale Stokes ed.,

Insurrection, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870’s(New York 1985) 305-316.85

Ekme%i$, ‘The Serbian Army in the Wars of 1876-78’, MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent , 165-166.86 MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Risti$ and Russia I’, 405-411; MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 153.



40

principality was saved from destruction by the intervention of official Russia. Thanks to

diplomatic pressure from St. Petersburg, the peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire

restored Serbia’s prewar borders and status. The Serbian situation at the end of 1876

was, however, hardly favorable. The invaded regions in southeastern Serbia were

devastated and the Serbian militia had suffered heavy losses. The principality was

economically exhausted and could hardly provide enough support for the 200.000

homeless refuges that had fled to the Serbian interior. After the First Serbo-Ottoman

War of 1876, the demoralized Serbian principality literally lay in shambles.87

SERBIAN DIPLOMATIC DISASTER

The Russian ultimatum ended the fighting between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire but

left the Great Eastern Crisis largely unsolved. The fighting in Bosnia continued and the

relieved Ottoman forces at the Serbian front were repositioned against Montenegro.

Russia partly mobilized its army to enforce a ceasefire upon the Ottomans but these

unilateral Russian actions in Balkan affairs caused great suspicion among the other

European Great Powers. Especially Great Britain and Austria-Hungary feared that

Russian pressure upon the Ottoman Empire camouflaged Russian imperialist intentions

to capture Ottoman territories. In order to avoid an anti-Russian coalition, Russia agreed

to assemble a European Conference in Constantinople to negotiate a peaceful settlement

of the Great Eastern Crisis. These negotiations dragged on until January 1877 and then

failed due to intense rivalry between Russia and Great Britain. 88 The Russian

government had anticipated the failure of the Constantinople Conference and entered

separate negotiations with Austria-Hungary in Budapest to prepare the way for action

against the Ottoman Empire. Russia required Austrian neutrality in the Russo-Ottoman

conflict because otherwise Vienna could inflict a disastrous defeat upon the Russians by

siding with the Ottomans. Austria-Hungary and Russia gradually compromised their

differences to provide a Balkan settlement that would satisfy both Austrian and Russian

interests. The Budapest Convention of January 1877 divided the Balkans in separate

spheres of influence. The two Great Powers agreed upon a territorial division that took

no account of the aspirations of the people who actually inhabited the region.89

87 Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 389; MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 159.88

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 95-144; Stavrianos, The Balkans, 403-406.89 Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers,127-132.



41

The complete exhaustion of Serbia after the disastrous war of 1876 reduced the

principality’s diplomatic leverage to nihility during this significant phase of the Great

Eastern Crisis. The domestic recovery of the principality consumed all energies and

funds of the Serbian government. It therefore was impossible for Serbia to effectively

address its aspirations and interests to the Great Powers. Serbia could only remain a

passive spectator to the Austro-Russian dealings that determined the future of the

Serbian nation.90 The Budapest Convention proved most fatal to Serbia’s main political

aspiration of union with Bosnia. Austria-Hungary was anxiously opposed to any big

Slavic state at its southern borders and succeeded in obstructing the union between

Serbia and Bosnia during the negotiations with Russia in Budapest. Russia was forced

to agree to the eventual Austrian occupation Bosnia and Herzegovina in return for the

necessary Austrian neutrality in the Russo-Ottoman War. While Russia would do the

fighting, Austria-Hungary would receive Bosnia and thereby prevent the creation of a

large Serbia. Russia secured for itself the permission of Vienna to establish a

predominant position in Romania and Bulgaria during the offensive against the Ottoman

Empire. The Russo-Ottoman War would thus enforce a certain balance of power on the

Balkans in which the western regions were to succumb to Austrian influence while the

eastern half of the peninsula came under Russian control. The Austro-Russian

agreement placed both Bosnia and Serbia outside Russia’s future sphere of influence

and thus made the Serbian question a secondary matter to Russia.91

On April 24 1877 Russia began its war against the Ottoman Empire. The Russian

forces invaded Romania and made spectacular progress across the Danube into

Bulgaria. The Serbian government reacted with eager enthusiasm to the Russian

invasion of the Balkans. Foreign minister Jovan Risti$ hoped that Serbian assistance to

the Russian war effort could secure some territorial gains for Serbia. In June minister

Risti$ and prince Milan met with the Russian tsar at his headquarters in Romania to

state that the Serbian militia was ready to enter the Russo-Ottoman War if Russia would

financially support Serbia. The tsar initially showed little interest in the Serbian offer. A

Russian military mission to Serbia had estimated that the demoralized Serbian militia

could make little contributions on the battlefield. The Russian tsar furthermore feared

that military cooperation with the Serbs would antagonize Austria-Hungary. Serbian

90

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 159-179 and 184-187.91 "orovi$, Istorija Srba, 639; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 390-391.





43

The Second Serbo-Ottoman War (1877-1878) was thus fought as a sideshow to an

overwhelming Russian breakthrough in Bulgaria. A few days after the Russians finally

captured Plevna in early December, Serbia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. While

the Russian army advanced towards Constantinople, the Serbian militia again invaded

the Ni& region and secured a Serbian victory against the weakened Ottoman flanks. The

Serbian militia functioned a lot better in this war. Within a month of campaigning the

Serbs seized the city of Ni& and captured the two southern towns of Pirot and Vranje.

The main reason for the Serbian success was the depletion of the Ottoman forces in this

region. The Serbian militia was not facing the complete regular army but instead

confronted the irregular reserves that consisted mainly of local Albanians. The

Albanians, nevertheless, offered hard village-to-village resistance and often resorted to

savage reprisals upon local Serb civilians. This violence complicated the interethnic

relations in the new regions that Serbia conquered.95 The Serbian success in the second

war was also due to a much better organization of the offensive operations. This time

the Serbian officer corps did not rely on Russian volunteers and it adequately

commanded the troops with a purely Serbian staff. Although the Serbian offensive was

only a sideshow to the much larger Russian advance, the historian David MacKenzie

notes that the Serbian operations contributed significantly to the Russian successes. The

Serbian offensive drew off a considerable number of Ottoman troops and succeeded in

breaking the communications between the Ottoman forces in the western Balkans and

Bulgaria. The most important result of the Second Serbo-Ottoman War was that Serbia

liberated the region between Ni&, Pirot and Vranje. These actual territorial gains were

vital in the face of Russian machinations for a peace settlement.96

On January 31 1878 a Russian armistice with the Ottoman Empire enforced an

immediate ceasefire upon the Serbian front. The preliminary terms of the armistice

foreshadowed Russian intentions in the Balkans and caused great concern among the

Serbian ministers. Provisions concerning the settlement of the Serbian question were

purposefully vague. The armistice agreement stated that Serbia would merely receive a

correction of frontiers while the creation of a great Bulgarian state would be at the heart

of the Russian peace program. The Russian preference for Bulgaria antagonized Serbia.

95 Milo& Jagodi$, ‘The Emigration of Muslims from the New Serbian Regions, 1871-1878’ in:

Balkanologie 2 (1998) 99-122.96

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 235-247; Stokes, ‘Serbian Military Doctrine and theCrisis of 1875-78’, 270-271.



44

It was clear to Belgrade that Russia threatened to compromise Serbian objectives in

order to establish a large Russian puppet state in Bulgaria. The government protested

against the unequal treatment of the Serbs but this was to no avail. Serbia was excluded

from participation in the peace negotiations that were to conclude a settlement between

Russia and the Ottoman Empire. In 1878 Serbian diplomatic disaster was inevitable,

regardless of the Serbian sacrifices and achievements on the battlefield.97

The entire Russian peace program was dictated upon the Ottomans during the peace

negotiations in San Stefano just outside Constantinople. The Ottoman Empire was

forced to agree to the creation of an autonomous Bulgarian state that by its size and

situation would dominate the entire Balkans. The Russians ensured themselves of

superior control over the Bulgarian state. Russian officials were to supervise the

organization of a Bulgarian administration and the Russian army would remain in

Bulgaria for a period of two years.98 The Serbian question was treated as a secondary

matter at the negotiation table. Serbia and Montenegro would receive independence but

their territorial aspirations were largely ignored. Russian disregard for Serbian interests

resulted from Austria-Hungary’s strong objections to Serbian aggrandizement. During

this particular phase of the Great Eastern Crisis, Austrian benevolence was vital to

Russia since international relations quickly deteriorated as a result of the San Stefano

negotiations. Great Britain undertook warlike moves to protect Constantinople and the

Turkish Straits and Austria-Hungary anxiously pressured Russia to honor the Budapest

Convention. Russia made concessions to Vienna in order to achieve its main aims in the

Balkans.99 Serbian territorial increases were reduced to provide for a large Bulgaria. The

proximity of Bulgaria to the Aegean and the Black Sea made Bulgaria a strategic

priority to Russia. The Russians moreover favored the Bulgarians over the Serbs out of

resentment for the independent and liberal tendencies within Serbia. It was calculated

that an autonomous Bulgaria under Russian occupation would be easier to control than

an enlarged independent Serbia. Russian interest had shifted to Bulgaria out of necessity

to compromise Austria-Hungary in a way that would not eradicate Russian influence in

the Balkans. Bulgaria was regarded as the key to achievement of Russian aims and

therefore the Russians made concessions in San Stefano at the expense of Serbdom.100

97 MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Risti$ and Russia, II’, 11-18.98 Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 175.99

MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 248-263.100 Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 209-233; ; "orovi$, Istorija Srba, 640-641.



45

The Treaty of San Stefano was announced on March 3 1878 and immediately

provoked immense indignation among the Serbian public. For Serbia the Treaty of San

Stefano was an unmatched diplomatic disaster. Almost all territories that Serbian forces

had liberated during the war were ascribed to Bulgaria. To the great astonishment of the

Serbian government, the Russians demanded the Serbian militia to withdraw from the

entire conquered region between Pirot and Vranje. This area was inhabited by Serbs but

would become an integral part of large Bulgaria according to Russian designs.101 After

receiving the stipulations of the treaty, prince Milan addressed a letter to the Russian

tsar with his complaints about the great injustice that was done to the Serbian nation:

‘Bosnia and Herzegovina are separated from their motherland. Old Serbia[the Ni& region] is mutilated and even our status quo militaire in Old

Serbia is destined to serve Bulgarian interests. That, Your Excellency, isthe sad prospect that opens before the Serbian nation despite its heroicstruggle, despite unparalleled sacrifices.’102

The Serbian government decided to preserve the status quo militaire at all costs. The

Serbian militia would not evacuate Pirot and Vranje and prince Milan stated that the

liberated Serbian regions would be defended even against a Russian attack. The

conquered area was perceived indispensable to the Serbian southeastern defenses and its

annexation was required for the economical development of the principality. Serbia

sought to prevent the implementation of the Treaty of San Stefano.103

The provisions of San Stefano began the alienation of Serbia from Russia during the

final phase of the Great Eastern Crisis. Serbian foreign minister Jovan Risti$ started

considering a rapprochement with Austria-Hungary to secure for Serbia at least the

regions that were already in hands of the militia. Vienna was equally dismayed at the

San Stefano Treaty and made a strong voice for international revision of the Balkan

settlement. Jovan Risti$ calculated that Austrian dissatisfaction with the treaty could

provide Serbia with a chance to escape complete diplomatic disaster. Alignment with

Austria against Russian Balkan policy seemed unnatural but in fact it was the only real

alternative for the Serbs after the Russians had abandoned Serbia for Bulgaria.104 The

troublesome interaction between Serbia and Russia during the Great Eastern Crisis

101 Hristo Hristov, ‘Retrospect and Analysis of the San Stefano Treaty’ in: Bela Kiraly and Gale Stokes

ed., Insurrection, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870’s(New York 1985) 330-342.102 Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 118.103

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 408; Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 137.104 MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Risti$ and Russia, II’, 18-22.



46

paved the way for a radical divorce in 1878. The independent behavior of Serbia during

the crisis had antagonized Russia and the Russian intervention thereafter produced a

settlement that was injurious to Serbian interests. Serbia contemplated a tactical

maneuver towards Austria-Hungary while Austrian pressure had been primarily

responsible for the Russian reduction of Serbian territorial increases. During the spring

months of 1878, the Serbian principality prepared for serious diplomatic reorientation

towards Austria-Hungary as a result of deep disappointment with Russia’s betrayal of

Serbian interests during the final phase of the Great Eastern Crisis.105

105

Slobodan Jovanovi$, Vlada Milana Obrenovi!a II (Belgrade 1934) 207-210; Stojan%evi$, IstorijaSrpskog Naroda V, 409-410.



47

3 . S E R B I A A N D T H E C O N G R E S S O F B E R L I N 1 8 7 8 - 1 8 8 1

The Russian occupation of the eastern half of the Balkan Peninsula caused immediate

international conflict between the European Great Powers. The interests of several states

were threatened by the presence of Russian troops in Bulgaria on the shores of the

Turkish Straits. If the Russians were permitted to consolidate their position in this

critical region the Russian Empire would at once establish exclusive dominance over the

Ottoman capital, the Black Sea and the eastern Balkans. The Russian sphere of

influence would be expanded beyond Constantinople and Russia would emerge as a

mighty Mediterranean power. The naval consequences of these serious eventualities

were unacceptable to Great Britain. The British position as superior sea power would be

undermined and Russia would pose a threat to the Suez Canal that was vital to Britain’scolonial trade. Great Britain therefore heavily opposed the Treaty of San Stefano and

sent British warships into the Straits to enforce revision of the treaty upon the Russians.

A large-scale European war seemed a real possibility since the British warlike pressure

was supported by Austria-Hungary.106 The Russian treaty had thoroughly violated the

Budapest Convention of 1877 by establishing exclusive Russian dominance on the

Balkans instead of a balanced division in spheres of influence between Austria and

Russia. The creation of a large Bulgaria and the denial of Austrian rights in Bosniainfuriated Vienna. Great Britain and Austria-Hungary pressured for a European

conference to revise the settlement of the Great Eastern Crisis in concert with the

European Great Powers. Russia refused to negotiate revisions in Vienna but accepted

the offer of German Chancellor Bismarck to convene a European congress in Berlin.

The European Great Powers were to provide a collective settlement to the Great Eastern

Crisis at the Congress of Berlin in June and July 1878.107

Each of the seven European delegations in Berlin assumed another attitude towards

the Serbian question but certainly none of them considered the fate of Serbia a priority.

The main aim of the Congress of Berlin was to ease the extreme international tension

with the establishment of a stable balance of power on the Balkan Peninsula. For the

success of the Congress the interests of the involved Great Powers would thus weigh a

lot more than the aspirations of the individual Balkan nations. The German first delegate

106 Immanuel Geiss ed., Der Berliner Kongreß 1878: Protokolle und Matrialien(Boppard 1978) xi-xvii.107

Friedrich Benninghoven and Iselin Gundermann, Der Berliner Kongreß 1878: Ausstellung des GeheimenStaatsarchivs Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin 1978) 35-42.



48

Chancellor Bismarck most explicitly stated that his country did not have any affinity

with the small Balkan peoples that came from ‘places of which no one ever heard before

this war’. The Congress of Berlin would enforce a territorial settlement on the Balkans

regardless of the complicated ethnic composition of the region. Bismarck functioned as

the Chairman of the Congress and he was determined not to allow secondary matters as

the Serbian question slow down the progress towards a durable European peace. The

balanced advancement of Great Power interests served as the only one immutable

principle of the Congress. The settlement of the Serbian question consequently

depended on diplomatic bargains between the European Great Powers.108

The Serbian government showed deep concern for the unfavorable diplomatic

situation of Serbia in the face of arbitrary Great Power dealings in Berlin. In San

Stefano the Serbs had learned that the Russians were prepared to sacrifice Serbian

territory in order to secure Russian interests in the eastern Balkans. Serbian reliance on

the Russian delegation was therefore impossible. Great Britain generally opposed

territorial expansion of Serbia out of concern for the Ottoman integrity. The British

delegation sought to reduce the size of the Bulgarian state and supported the Austrian

claims on the western Balkans in order to counter the Russian position in the east.

Austria-Hungary had put together an unusually capable delegation under the leadership

of foreign minister Andrássy. The Austrian delegation primarily aimed at the extension

and consolidation of Austrian influence in the western Balkans. Andrássy pleaded for

international approval of an Austrian occupation of Bosnia and sought additional

military presence in the Sand)ak region between Serbia and Montenegro. The Austrian

preoccupation with the western Balkans assured that Austria-Hungary was the

predominant power in the affairs that were vital to the Serbian question. The Austrian

attitude towards the Serbs would thus be decisive to the political future of Serbia. 109

The Serbian foreign ministry recognized its dependence on Austria before the

Congress and drew its conclusions in favor of serious diplomatic reorientation.

Rapprochement to Vienna in order to improve the Austrian attitude towards Serbia at

the Congress of Berlin was perceived the most reasonable strategy. Serbian foreign

minister Jovan Risti$ undertook a crucial diplomatic mission to Vienna. He met with his

Austrian counterpart Andrássy and presented to him a letter from the Serbian prince that

108

Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers,135-144.109 MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 299-305.



49

exposed the Austrophile reorientation of the Serbian principality. The princely letter

stressed Serbia’s desire for good relations with Austria-Hungary and expressed hope for

Austrian support at the Congress. Andrássy replied favorably to Serbia’s diplomatic

overture and immediately proposed to negotiate a general agreement with Serbia.

Within two hours of intensive negotiation, Risti$ and Andrássy established the

foundations for the Serbo-Austrian cooperation during the final phase of the Great

Eastern Crisis. The Austrian delegation would support Serbian independence and

territorial increase at the Congress of Berlin in exchange for Serbian adherence to

several Austrian conditions of economic and geopolitical nature.110

The obvious intent of the Austrian benevolence towards Serbia in 1878 was to

include Serbia into the Austrian sphere of influence on the Balkans. Austria-Hungary

supported Serbian independence in Berlin but at the same time established mechanisms

to control independent Serbia. The Austrian conditions for cooperation at the Congress

required Serbia to conclude a commercial agreement with Austria-Hungary. This

agreement would integrate the Serbian market into the Austrian economic sphere by

establishing favorable custom regulations. The economic integration was to be further

facilitated by the obligation for Serbia to construct railway connections between the

Austrian borders and the Serbian interior. These conditions could benefit the Serbian

economy to a certain extend but economic integration camouflaged the establishment of

Serbian economic dependence upon Austria-Hungary. Jovan Risti$ was aware of these

intentions but reported to the Serbian government that Serbia had no choice:

‘If we agree to Austria-Hungary’s proposals, we’ll have its support with prospects of territorial increases beyond San Stefano’s frontiers. If wedon’t agree, then everything comes into question, even San Stefano’sfrontiers and Ni&. I was clearly informed of that.’111

Serbia needed the support of Austria-Hungary in the face of the diplomatic complexities

of the Congress. Risti$ thus concluded a general agreement in Vienna and proposed to

negotiate the more detailed conditions for Austrian support later on in Berlin. He sought

to postpone Serbian commitment to Austrian demands until the most favorable moment.

Risti$ pursued a thoughtful diplomatic strategy that could soften the Austrian conditions

and secure the interests of Serbia without fully succumbing to the Austrian sphere.112

110 Jovanovi$, Vlada Milana Obrenovi!a II, 208-211; Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 173-180.111

Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 180-181.112 MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Risti$ and Russia, II’, 22-27.



50

THE SERBIAN MEMORANDUM

Serbia was excluded from any form of representation in the plenary sessions of the

Congress of Berlin. The Serbian foreign ministry therefore recognized that the interests

of Serbia had to be defended outside the formal sessions in the corridors of theCongress. On June 11 1878, Jovan Risti$ traveled to Berlin with the delicate task of

representing Serbia through unofficial consultations with the individual delegates of the

Great Powers. This mission to Berlin required sophisticated diplomatic skill and modest

patience. Risti$ gently encountered the different delegations and eloquently told each

delegate what he whished to hear. Some delegates were passionately informed about the

brave struggle of Serbdom while others received a more rational analysis of the Serbian

question. The general tendency of the Serbian plea claimed that a reasonable settlement

of the Serbian question was essential to the pacification of the Balkans. The Serbian

government demanded a settlement that would guarantee Serbian independence and

considerable territorial increase of Serbia in the liberated region between Ni&, Pirot and

Vranje. Jovan Risti$ avoided extreme territorial demands but remained stubborn in his

assessment that the Great Eastern Crisis could be solved only if the Serbian principality

obtained a satisfying political and territorial settlement.113

The clearest manifestation of Serbia’s diplomatic strategy at the Congress of Berlin

is the memorandum that Risti$ submitted to the Congress on June 24. This document

contained a written proclamation of the Serbian interests and was in fact the only formal

representation that the Serbs were allowed to make at the Congress. The Serbian

memorandum provides the historian with a rare insight in the diplomatic considerations

of Serbia during the final phase of the Great Eastern Crisis. Jovan Risti$ opens the

memorandum with a historical account of the suffering of Serbs under Ottoman rule.

Ottoman misrule justified the Serbian demand for independence. The memorandum

thereafter continues with an interesting justification of the Serbian territorial claims:

‘With her actions the principality has liberated almost the entire territory ofOld Serbia. How could it retreat without abandoning the inhabitants of thisregion to the revenge of the Muslims and bringing the country in a violent position that nobody could bear? The best remedy is to secure the blessingsof permanent peace in this region by satisfying the legitimate whishes ofthe population for liberation and union with the motherland.’114

113 Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 138-139; MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 306;

MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Risti$ and Russia, II’, 12 and 33.114 ‘Srpski Memorandum’ in: Stoji%i$ and Ran'elovi$, Berlinski Kongres i Srpsko Pitanje, 107.



51

The Serbian memorandum appealed to principles of European political theory in order

to defend the Serbian interests before the concert of European Great Powers. According

to this fragment the population of the liberated regions had the legitimate right to whish

for union with the Serbian motherland because they were part of the Serbian nation. The

memorandum thereby appealed to the European principle of national self-determination

that accredited every nation with the right to decide its own sovereignty without

external compulsion. The opening of the memorandum referred to the right of resistance

to tyrannical oppression in order to justify the Serbian struggle for independence. This

right of resistance had played a fundamental role in the French revolution and was

integrated into British political thought as the social contract. The sophisticated appeals

reveal the rational and European character of Serbian diplomacy in 1878.115

The Italian and the French delegations reacted favorably to the Serbian appeals. Italy

recognized the similarities with the Italian national unification and adopted a friendly

attitude towards the Serbs at the Congress. The French delegates also sympathized with

the Serbian national revolution and supported the Serbian appeal to progressive political

doctrines. France and Italy, however, occupied secondary positions at the Congress and

were thus limited in their possibilities to support Serbian interests. The French

delegation advised Risti$ to secure immediate Austrian support. Austria-Hungary

occupied the strongest position at the Congress and every delegation avoided opposing

Austrian interests. The French envoy warned Risti$ that ‘Serbia can only succeed to the

extent it agrees with Austria.’116 Jovan Risti$ recognized the essential position of the

Habsburg Monarchy at the Congress and negotiated with the Austrian delegates on the

basis of the general agreement he had concluded before the Congress in Vienna. The

Austrian delegation could not be impressed with enlightened political appeals but

demanded definite geopolitical and economic commitments from the Serbs.117

Careful reading of the Serbian memorandum reveals that Jovan Risti$ yielded to the

Austrian geopolitical demands out of concern for the attitude of Austria-Hungary. The

memorandum defends the Serbian claims on the southern liberated regions into the

greatest detail but on the other hand makes a rather nuanced statement about Bosnia.

The Serbian government was aware of the Austrian plans for the occupation of Bosnia

115 ‘Srpski Memorandum’, Stoji%i$ and Ran'elovi$, Berlinski Kongres i Srpsko Pitanje, 103-109; Stokes,

Politics as development, 136.116

Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 188. 117 Geiss, Der Berliner Kongreß 1878, xiv.



52

and sought to avoid displeasing the Austrian delegation by expressing the Serbian

interests in Bosnia. Risti$ refused to renounce Serbian claims on Bosnia but did assume

a very passive stance towards the Bosnian question in the Serbian memorandum:

‘Regarding the regions on the other side of the Drina, we dare to claim that peace cannot be established there without radical changes. But the Serbiangovernment doesn’t think that it is up to her to decide in advance about thesettlement of a question that the Great Powers have already taken into theirhands. Serbia restricts herself to a expression of confidence that the Powersin their wisdom will find a solution that will end the unfortunate cries ofour brethren that live on the other side of the Drina.’118

The Serbian memorandum spoke of Bosnia without even mentioning its Slavic

provincial name and literally stated that the Serbian government would agree to any

settlement that the Great Powers perceived to be adequate. Union between Bosnia andSerbia had been the main political objective during the Serbian campaign but after the

war the Serbian government had to acknowledge that Bosnia was lost. Austria-Hungary

would occupy Bosnia to secure Austrian hegemony in the western Balkans. The Serbian

memorandum accepted the unavoidable prospect of losing Bosnia without resistance in

order to secure the other political and territorial Serbian aims with Austrian support.119

THE BERLIN SETTLEMENT OF THE SERBIAN QUESTION The Serbian question came before the Congress on June 28 during the eighth plenary

session in the official residence of Chancellor Bismarck on the Wilhelmstraße in central

Berlin. Bismarck himself led the negotiations as the chairman and dominated the entire

session with his authoritarian diplomatic style. One particular feature of this style was

that delegates were forbidden to slow down the Congress with unnecessary details.

Matters of detail were immediately entrusted to special commissions outside the plenary

sessions. Bismarck furthermore ensured that the most controversial issues were handled

first. The difficult Bulgarian question had thus been provided with a solution in the

seven sessions before the session that decided the fate of the Serbs.120 The settlement of

the Serbian question began with revision of the San Stefano stipulations on Bosnia and

Herzegovina. The Austrian foreign minister Andrássy read a long paper emphasizing

that the special interests of the Habsburg Monarchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina gave it

118 ‘Srpski Memorandum’, Stoji%i$ and Ran'elovi$, Berlinski Kongres i Srpsko Pitanje, 107.119

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 410-415; Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 188-194.120 Geiss, Der Berliner Kongreß 1878, xx-xxi.



53

the right to demand an adequate solution for the grave problems in these Ottoman

provinces. According to Andrássy autonomy could not restore order among the divided

Bosnian population and he called for another proposal. Great Britain reacted to this hint

and suggested that the Congress should decide that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be

occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary. These diplomatic moves were carefully

prepared before the Congress and with British support the Austrian occupation of

Bosnia was swiftly ratified in article 25 of the official peace treaty.121

After the fate of Bosnia had been decided, the Congress centered on the Serbian

principality. The French delegate Monsieur Waddington made a firm statement in favor

of granting Serbia independence, under the sole condition that Serbia would guarantee

the liberty and equality to all religions in the principality. Waddington referred to the

enlightened desires of the Serbian memorandum in his speech before the Congress:

‘Monsieur Waddington believes that it is important for the Europeandelegates to observe this grand moment to reaffirm the principle ofreligious freedom. Serbia desires to entre the European community on anequal basis with all other states and therefore must from the outsetrecognize the principles that constitute the foundations of society in allEuropean states. This is a necessary condition in return for the favors thatSerbia desires.’122

Russian foreign minister Gor %akov made some anti-Semitic objections to the French

proposal but soon thereafter yielded to the conditional linkage of Serbian independence

to the religious guarantees. The other European delegations supported the French

proposal without opposition. Chancellor Bismarck concluded that the Congress granted

Serbia independence under the condition that she would guarantee religious liberty and

equality to all citizens of the Serbian principality.123

The Congress of Berlin encountered the greatest difficulties in formulating a

straightforward delimitation of the new Serbian boundaries. The Ottoman Empire and

Great Britain were opposed to Serbian aggrandizement and Russia claimed part of the

Serbian territorial aspirations for Bulgaria. Serbian appeals to the principle of national

self-determination did impress Russian diplomats and consequently the second Russian

delegate #uvalov decided to cede Vranje to Serbia before the eighth session convened.

121 Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, 82-86; Benninghoven and Gundermann, Der Berliner

Kongreß 1878, 60-61; ‘Protokoll Nr. 8’, Geiss, Der Berliner Kongreß 1878, 238-249.122

‘Protokoll Nr. 8’, Geiss, Der Berliner Kongreß 1878, 238-258.123 Serge Maiwald, Der Berliner Kongreß 1878 und das Völkerrecht (Stuttgart 1948) 60-63.



54

The Russian delegation, however, refused to support Serbia’s claim on Pirot. The

surroundings of Pirot featured a strategic line of natural defenses and the Russians

therefore ascribed the town to Bulgaria. Chancellor Bismarck prevented a long and

complex argument about these issues and resolutely banned further discussion of the

Serbian frontiers from the plenary session. A special boundary commission was

composed of representatives from each delegation. Austria-Hungary was prepared to

support the Serbian position within this boundary commission after the prompt

conclusion of a definite agreement with Serbia.124

For Jovan Risti$ the most favorable moment arrived to agree with the Austrian

conditions in return for immediate approval of clearly defined territorial gains. The

boundary commission convened on a daily basis between June 29 and July 8. During

these crucial days the formal agreement between Austria-Hungary and Serbia came into

existence. Andrássy appointed the trade specialist of his foreign office to inform Jovan

Risti$ about the exact Austrian conditions. The first provision compelled Serbia to

construct a railway from Belgrade into the new southeastern territories within three

years. The Serbian railway would be integrated in a large and strategic trajectory that

connected Vienna to the Aegean port of Salonika. Serbian commitment was required

right away and the railway obligation was included in article 38 of the Berlin treaty. The

second provision obliged the Serbian government to conclude a commercial treaty with

Austria-Hungary immediately after the Congress. This obligation left Serbia some

latitude for further negotiation but nevertheless secured the Austrian aim of establishing

economic influence in Serbia. The agreement furthermore ensured the de facto consent

of Serbia to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Austrian

obligations were onerous but offered Serbia reasonable benefits. The loss of Bosnia had

been inevitable anyway and the economic integration of Serbia on an equal basis could

generate an impulse for the Serbian market. The most important reason for concluding

the Austrian agreement was of course that it was the only chance for Serbia to assure a

favorable settlement of the Serbian frontiers at the Congress of Berlin.125

On July 8, the boundary commission ascribed considerably more territory to Serbia

than had been promised to her at San Stefano. The proposed delimitation of frontiers

124 ‘Protokoll Nr. 8’, Geiss, Der Berliner Kongreß 1878, 238-258; MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian

Pan-Slavism, 308-311; Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 212-218.125

Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, 78-79, 94-95 and 100-101; Stojanovi$, The Great Powersand the Balkans, 276-280; Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 218-231.



55

allowed Serbia to annex the entire liberated region between Ni&, Pirot and Vranje. These

territorial increases were largely due to the strong support of Austria-Hungary within

the commission. The conclusion of the agreement between Austria and Serbia enabled

the Austrian delegates to defend the interests of Serbia at the Congress. Andrássy

assured general support for Serbia’s claim to Vranje and his proposal to leave Pirot to

Serbia blocked the pro-Bulgarian designs of the Russian delegation. The alignment of

Serbia to Austria occurred against a background of deteriorating relations between

Serbia and Russia. The compromising attitude of Russia towards the Serbs so took its

toll during the final phase of the Great Eastern Crisis.126 Jovan Risti$ aligned Serbia to

the Austrian sphere of influence in order to secure at least some territorial

aggrandizement. This diplomatic strategy worked out relatively well for the Serbian

foreign minister. His mission to Berlin achieved unanticipated success without formal

participation at the Congress. After a full month of intensive negotiations the Great

Powers ratified the final peace treaty on July 13 1878. The treaty brought Serbia

independence and territorial expansion beyond the delimitations of San Stefano. The

achievement of these significant Serbian aspirations at the Congress of Berlin resulted

from the alignment of Serbia to Austria-Hungary in the corridors of the Congress.127

The effects of the Congress of Berlin on the Serbian principality went far beyond the

sole articles and stipulations that formally dealt with the Serbian question. The Serbian

government could implement these formalities without much effort. Within a month

after the Congress prince Milan proclaimed Serbian independence in a festive ceremony

and religious liberty was guaranteed to all Serbian citizens. The real challenge for

Serbia was thereafter to substantialize its position as an independent state in the new

international environment of the Balkans. The Congress of Berlin transformed the

constellation of states in the Balkans beyond recognition and the Serbian position within

the settlement was to be consolidated. An autonomous Bulgarian principality arose at

the eastern borders of Serbia. Bulgaria was reduced in size at the Congress and

Bulgarian resentment about this reduction poisoned its relations with Serbia from the

outset. Potential rivalry in the eastern territories negatively affected the Serbian

position.128 To the west of Serbia developments were even worse. Austria-Hungary

126 Du&ko M. Kova%evi$, Srbija i Rusija 1878-1889: od Berlinskog kongresa do abdikacije kralja Milana

(Beograd 2003) 47-58 and 71-76; MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Risti$ and Russia, II’, 29-36.127

Stojan%evi$, Istorija Srpskog Naroda V, 415-421; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 398-400.128 Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers,145-151.



56

advanced into Bosnia and Herzegovina and crushed the armed resistance of Bosnian

Serb peasants. The Serbian principality was forced into passive nonintervention as a

consequence of its advantageous alignment to Vienna.129 Both the Austrian pressure

from the west and the Bulgarian hostility from the east had a destabilizing effect on

Serbia. The Serbian government opposed these pressures with a foreign policy that

sought to consolidate a strong Serbian position in the new settlement. The results of the

Congress of Berlin were to be secured against foreign threats. The new territories in the

southeast were integrated and Serbian statesmen sought to conclude an agreement with

the Austrians that would preserve the precious independence of Serbia. These

developments during the aftermath of the Congress of Berlin would define the true

historical meaning of the struggle of Serbdom in the Great Eastern Crisis.130

THE INTEGRATION OF THE NEW TERRITORIES

The first challenge that the independent Serbian government faced after the Congress

was the integration of the new southeastern territories into the Serbian state. The right to

annex these territories had been the most important material result of the Congress.

Serbian statesmen urged the immediate establishment of orderly administration in the

liberated regions to safeguard the Serbian territorial gains from possible revisionist

incursions by the Bulgarians or the Ottomans. The new territories were politically

backward and the enforcement of law and order was a great effort. The city of Ni& was

the strategic and economic stronghold of the region and became the base for the

administrative integration of its direct surroundings. Additional administrative centers

were established in the towns of Pirot and Vranje. The Serbian government appointed

judges and a police apparatus to the region with the instructions to respect traditional

customs at first before gradually introducing the Serbian state law. The project of

integration was felt as a civilizing mission that would bring national enlightenment to

the liberated Serbs after 500 years of primitive Ottoman despotism.131

The Serbian civilizing mission in the southeast consisted an aggressive component

that would chronically trouble the interethnic relations in the southern border zone of

Serbia. During the integration of the new territories, Serbian militia and government

129 Bencze, The Occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 293-302.130

Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After,xiii-xxii and 126-136; Stavrianos, The Balkans, 410-412.131 Stokes, Politics as development, 165-169; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 402-403.



57

officials encountered a large Muslim minority of about 70.000 peasants, townspeople

and landlords. The Muslim peasants were mainly Albanians that had violently resisted

the advance of Serbian troops as Ottoman irregulars during the last war. With harsh

reprisals the Serbian authorities now encouraged these Albanians to leave. In the

immediate postwar wilderness the Serbian militia plundered Muslim property in the

countryside and tore down mosques in the liberated towns.132 Serbia was bound by the

Congress of Berlin to respect the property rights of the local Muslims and the Serbian

government intervened on the issue in order to prevent international interference. The

ministry of finance institutionalized the dispossession and expulsion of Muslims.

Landlords were forced to sell their estates to Serbs for inflated prices that were often not

paid at all. The dispossessed lands and farms were ascribed to local peasants and

Serbian refugees from the regions in eastern Serbia that had been ravaged by the

Ottomans in 1876. The aftermath of the Congress of Berlin hereby provided Balkan

history with a dangerous precedent for forced ethnic resettlement and commenced a

tradition of mutual ethnic intolerance between Serbs and Albanians.133

THE COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Before Serbia concluded the obligatory commercial treaty with Austria-Hungary an

attempt was made to remedy the depressed Serbian economy. Serbian state finances

were depleted after the expensive wars. The Serbian state debt was enormous and the

economy had stagnated as a result of wartime requisitions in the countryside. The

mobilization of all able-bodied men to the battlefronts had furthermore reduced the

Serbian agricultural production. These economic problems were hardly favorable at a

time that the government seemed to need more funds than ever. The transition to

independence was costly and a lot of funds were invested in the integration of the south.

To make things worse the Serbian government was obliged to construct an extensive

railway for the Austrians. The Serbian government raised new taxes in an attempt to

cover these expenditures. Fiscal measures placed the main burden on the Serbian middle

class of merchants and professionals. Peasants were spared intentionally because they

132 Jagodi$, ‘The Emigration of Muslims from the New Serbian Regions, 1871-1878’, 99-122.133 ( jor 'e Stefanovi$ ‘Seeing the Albanians through Serbian Eyes: the Inventors of the Tradition of

Intolerance and Their Critics, 1804-1939’ in: European History Quarterly 35 (Toronto 2005) 465-492;Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 141-142.



58

had suffered most during the war. This unequal taxation of the Serbian middle class

struck the most influential segment of Serbian society and was thus bound to provoke

strong opposition. The war had temporarily forced domestic political disunity into the

background but in 1879 Serbian political life revived around the economic issues that

plagued Serbia. The liberal government of Jovan Risti$ was faced with strong

opposition from moderate conservatives that organized themselves as the progressive

movement. The progressives criticized the economic policies of the Risti$ government

and advocated an alternative strategy in closer cooperation with Austria-Hungary.134

The Austrian government meanwhile pressured Serbia to conclude the commercial

treaty as had been agreed upon in Berlin. Jovan Risti$ met with several Austrian

officials but the negotiations went badly. The Austrians sought to enforce unequal terms

upon the Serbian principality. The conditions that were offered would ensure

overwhelming economic advantages for Austria while the Serbian economy would be

reduced to subservience. The Austrian ministry of finance insisted on a fixed tariff

privilege for Austrian manufactured products in order to dominate the Serbian market

and cripple the development of an indigenous Serbian industry. The draft treaty

reserved the exclusive right for Austria-Hungary to limit imports from Serbia whenever

it wanted. These unequal terms sought to lock Serbia into total economic dependence on

Austria-Hungary.135 The Serbian foreign ministry refused to accept these conditions for

their negative effects on the economy and even more because they posed a serious threat

to the precious independence of Serbia. Jovan Risti$ recognized that the de facto

meaning of Serbian independence depended on the future arrangement with Austria.

The Serbian government insisted on equal treatment and tried to resist the apparent

intention of Austria-Hungary to undermine the Serbian independence.136

The Serbian principality did neither have the economic strength nor the diplomatic

latitude to defend its independence against the Austrian imperialist aspirations. The

Austrian foreign ministry was furious at the reluctance of Serbia to honor the Berlin

obligations and imposed a trade embargo on Serbian pigs and cattle. The embargo

immediately dealt a devastating blow to the weak Serbian economy since the export of

livestock to Austria was a vital component of Serbian commerce. Jovan Risti$ wished to

134 Stokes, Politics as development, 139-143; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 403 and 406-408.135

Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 185-186.136 Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 405-406.



59

defend the independence of Serbia at all costs and called for a tariff war against Austria.

Economic warfare could assert Serbian sovereignty but would most certainly cause deep

economic disaster in Serbia. The bellicose course of the Serbian government therefore

found no support among the Serbian public. Serbian peasants and merchants

experienced the disastrous consequences of the problems with Vienna and demanded an

immediate solution. The Serbian prince also insisted on appeasement to Vienna. In the

face of both popular and princely opposition Jovan Risti$ and his government resigned

in October 1880. Prince Milan called upon the progressive opposition to form a new

government and conclude an immediate agreement with Austria-Hungary.137

The fall of Jovan Risti$ in 1880 caused a major shift in Serbian foreign policy. The

new progressive government fully abandoned the cautious approach of Risti$ towards

Austria-Hungary and assumed a more Austrophile foreign policy. The progressives

were convinced that Serbia could stand no chance in a conflict with Austria-Hungary

and they maintained that harmonious relations with Vienna were in the best interest of

the Serbs. !edomilj Mijatovi$ (1848-1932) was appointed to the combined position of

foreign minister and minister of finance in order to facilitate the swift conclusion of the

commercial treaty with Austria-Hungary. The new minister resumed negotiations with

the Habsburg Monarchy and in April 1881 the commercial treaty was signed. The

Austrian terms had remained the same. The treaty secured tariff privileges for Austrian

manufactured products on the Serbian market and acknowledged similar but unequal

advantages for Serbian livestock and agricultural produce in Austria. At short term, the

Austrophile policy of the progressives was economically reasonable. The advantages for

Serbian goods on the Austrian market generated a direct impulse for Serbian

agriculture. Considering the desperate economic situation of Serbia these effects

adequately responded to the immediate needs of the Serbian economy. However, in the

longer term, the commercial treaty encouraged Serbia to become an agrarian colony for

Austrian foodstuffs. The privileges for Austrian manufactured products blocked the

development of domestic industries in Serbia. Vienna furthermore enjoyed the unequal

freedom of action to limit imports from Serbia at will. The Austrophile foreign policy of

the progressive government thus led to the signature of a commercial treaty that

established the economic dependence of Serbia on Austria-Hungary.138

137

Jovanovi$, Vlada Milana Obrenovi!a II, 294-300; Stokes, Politics as development, 155 and 169-176.138 "orovi$, Istorija Srba, 643-644; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 411-412.



60

THE SECRET POLITICAL CONVENTION WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Serbian foreign policy culminated into further relinquishment of Serbian independence

after the conclusion of the commercial treaty. This was largely the result of the personal

interference of prince Milan with Serbian foreign affairs. Milan extended his princelyinfluence over the foreign office through his friendship with minister Mijatovi$. Both

men were ardent advocates of Serbian Austrophilism. Prince Milan sought to establish

intimate personal relations with the Habsburg court. The Serbian prince made regular

visits to Vienna and spent three subsequent summers in Austrian spas. At the Habsburg

court prince Milan was received with great splendor and these visits induced the prince

to pursue his personal ambitions as the ruler of Serbia. With great jealousy Milan had

received the news from Bucharest that Romania was declared a kingdom with prince

Charles as its king. The Serbian prince envied the title of king and the flattery of his

contacts in Austria-Hungary encouraged him to arrange Habsburg support for his own

coronation. Foreign minister Mijatovi$ embraced the dealings of prince Milan since he

perceived that Serbia needed Austrian protection to counter the Russian support of

Bulgaria. Mijatovi$ calculated that the occupation of Bosnia forced the future expansion

of Serbia in a southeastward direction towards Macedonia. In these southeastern regions

the Serbs had to face Bulgarian rivalry and Serbia thus needed a strong protector. Prince

Milan and minister Mijatovi$ agreed to negotiate a convention with Austria-Hungary

that would arrange permanent cooperation between Belgrade and Vienna.139

Austria-Hungary was eagerly prepared to conclude a political convention with Serbia

because such an arrangement would serve the Habsburg aim of extending Austrian

influence in the western Balkans. The commercial treaty had established economic ties

with Serbia and a political agreement could strengthen the dimension of Serbian

dependence upon Vienna. The Austrian government furthermore calculated that a

political agreement with Serbia could facilitate the consolidation of the occupational

regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The official abandonment nationalism in Serbian

foreign policy was sought to pacify the reluctant Bosnian Serb population. Milan and

the Austrian negotiators concluded the general outlines of the agreement with

exceptional ease in Vienna. The Serbian foreign minister and the Austrian ambassador

thereafter signed the secret political convention in Belgrade on June 28 1881.140

139

Stokes, Politics as development, 174 and 190-191; Jovanovi$, Vlada Milana Obrenovi!a II, 334-343.140 Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 412-413; "orovi$, Istorija Srba, 643-645.



61

The secret political convention of June 1881 provided Serbia with Habsburg support

for both the coronation of prince Milan and the future expansion of Serbia into

Macedonia. The Austrian government promised to use its influence among the Great

Powers to achieve international recognition of Serbia as a kingdom. Serbia obtained a

similar promise of diplomatic support for eventual military endeavors in the southeast.

In return for these conditional gains prince Milan and minister Mijatovi$ simply agreed

to everything that Austria-Hungary demanded. The Serbian government would no

longer allow Serbian citizens to intrigue among the Serbs of Bosnia and political

agitation against the Habsburg Monarchy was forbidden within Serbia. The most

injurious stipulation of the secret convention obliged the Serbian government to neither

negotiate nor conclude any future agreements with other governments without the

previous consent of Austria-Hungary.141 The nature of this agreement nullified the

meaning of Serbian independence and made Serbia a satellite kingdom under Austrian

supremacy. The progressive government had completely failed to preserve Serbian

independence against Austrian pressure. The Habsburg government obtained full

control over Serbian foreign affairs and Serbia was deprived of the sovereign right to

conduct its own foreign policy. The course of Serbian foreign policy was no longer

decided in Belgrade but became subjected to the hegemony of Vienna. Thereby history

itself terminated the subject of this essay. Serbian Austrophilism in the aftermath of the

Congress of Berlin brought an end to the genuine foreign policy of Serbia.142

THE CREATION OF THE POWDER KEG OF EUROPE

In March 1882, Serbia was proclaimed a kingdom and the Habsburg emperor Franz

Joseph was the first to congratulate his Royal Highness king Milan Obrenovi$. The

royal proclamation did not arouse much national enthusiasm among the Serbian public.

It was obvious that the formal establishment of the Serbian kingdom disguised the

actual degeneration of national independence. The Serbian government had abandoned

Serbian nationalism and Serbian sovereignty had been surrendered to the hegemony of

Austria-Hungary.143 The abandonment of Serbian nationalism marked a significant

break with the nationalist conduct of Serbian foreign policy between 1875 and 1878.

141 Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 199-200.142

Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 414-415; Stavrianos, The Balkans, 515-516.143 "orovi$, Istorija Srba, 645-648.



62

That eventful period in Serbian history had witnessed an unprecedented peak in Serbian

nationalist activity. The outbreak of the Bosnian uprising in 1875 had provoked an

upsurge of nationalism that affected the foreign policy of Serbia. The nationalist

statesman Jovan Risti$ had assumed control over the foreign ministry and throughout

his time in office Serbian nationalism was the basis of Serbian foreign policy. The

Serbian principality had embarked on a war of national liberation and unification that

came to an end after the intervention of the Great Powers. Jovan Risti$ thereafter

secured some Serbian aspirations at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.144 After 1878 the

pursuit of nationalism brought Serbia in conflict with Vienna. Both the Serbian state

and Serbian nationalism were still too underdeveloped to endure this conflict. The

nationalist regime of Jovan Risti$ resigned and a new Serbian government abandoned

nationalism. Austrophilism replaced Serbian nationalism as the guiding principle of

Serbian foreign policy. The aftermath of the Congress of Berlin revealed that Serbian

nationalism was incompatible with the actual inferior position of the Serbian kingdom

as a docile satellite of Austria-Hungary.145

The postwar abandonment of nationalism in Serbian foreign affairs stood in stark

contrast to a simultaneous development within Serbian society. The Serbian population

had been deeply affected by the hardships of war throughout the Great Eastern Crisis.

Serbia had sustained enormous sacrifices in both men and materials at various

battlefronts in the conflict. One-sixth of the Serbian population had fought in the

national militia and every peasant family in Serbia had experienced the financial

burdens of war.146 These efforts composed an important collective experience for

Serbian society. The engagement of entire Serbian nation in the struggle of Serbdom

between 1875 and 1878 intensified the development of national consciousness among

ordinary Serbs. Through the bitter experience of warfare at the battlefront, the Serbian

peasantry became intimately acquainted with the true scope of Serbian nationalism.

Intellectual nationalist ideology transcended its urban milieu and nationalism became a

general cause to fight for.147 The full accomplishment of Serbian nationalism as a mass

phenomenon continued after the Great Eastern Crisis in a process of further warfare and

conflict but it should be noted that the intervention of Serbia in 1876 marked a turning

144 MacKenzie, ‘Jovan Risti$ and Russia, II’, 36-38; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 406 and 414.145 MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 335-339.146

Stojanovi$, The Great Powers and the Balkans,93-94.147 Ekme%i$, ‘The Serbian Army in the Wars of 1876-78’, 299-300.



63

point in the development of Serbian national consciousness. The growth of national

spirit among Serbs between 1875 and 1878 ironically coincided with the contrary

suppression of nationalism in Serbian foreign affairs. These opponent developments

were bound to cause disruptive problems. The spirit of Serbian nationalism resented the

outcome of the Congress of Berlin and most Serbs were dissatisfied with the docile

foreign policy of Serbia. These nationalist grievances prepared the grounds for future

conflicts. The Berlin settlement suppressed Serbian nationalism but that suppression

would become untenable in the face of rising national consciousness among Serbs.148

The nationalist antagonism that Serbian society experienced in the aftermath of the

Congress of Berlin was characteristic for the other Balkan states as well. The Congress

had secured certain advantages for each of the Balkan states but the greater part of their

aspirations had been frustrated out of consideration for the divergent designs of the

Great Powers.149 The imposed fragmentation of the Balkans ignored the territorial

concerns of the population that inhabited the region. The Great Powers considered the

complicated ethnographic composition of the Balkans irrelevant to their objective of

geopolitical balance in Europe. The Berlin settlement thus satisfied the ambitions of

certain Great Powers but certainly did not contribute to peace and stability in the

Balkans. Complete disregard of ethnic and nationalist considerations exacerbated

dissension and strife among the Balkan peoples.150 The Bulgarians were embittered by

the partition of their country and feuded with the Serbs for Macedonia. The relation

between Romania and the Bulgarian state was also troubled by territorial rivalry. The

Romanians furthermore resented the loss of Bessarabia to the Russians. The Greeks did

not receive anything and the Montenegrins were separated from Serbia by the Austrian

occupation of the Sand)ak region. The Congress of Berlin in other words gave birth to a

complex entanglement of competitive nationalisms in the Balkans. The Balkans became

an irritable wasp’s nest of nationalist rivalry.151

The most dangerous element in the maze of disruptive Balkan entanglements was the

continuous involvement of Great Powers in Balkan affairs after 1878. The Congress of

Berlin prevented general war and established European peace for over three decades.

This relative success led to the incorrect presumption among the Great Powers that joint

148 Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens, 132-136 and 205.149 Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After,133-136.150

Djordjevi$ and Fischer-Galati, The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition, 159-160.151 Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 143-146; Stavrianos, The Balkans, 412.



64

European intervention in Balkan disputes could preserve European stability in the future

without reference to the interests of the Balkan states. This significant legacy of the

Congress of Berlin provoked a series of Great Power interventions in the numerous

Balkan conflicts and crises between 1878 and 1914.152 The Congress of Berlin had

sowed the seeds for these conflicts and the Great Powers had there created the

mechanisms by which they were drawn into these conflicts. Continuous intervention

gave birth to a disruptive linkage between the imperial interests of the Great Powers and

the aspirations of emerging Balkan states. Henceforth, obscure disputes between the

Balkan states could easily escalate into a larger conflict between the Great Powers. This

disruptive element in Balkan entanglements provided the grounds for calling the

Balkans the powder keg of Europe.153

The Serbian kingdom was the undisputed top candidate to provide the spark for the

explosion of the powder keg. Serbia stood at the heart of the Balkan maze and had a part

in almost all regional rivalries. To the south a tradition of ethnic intolerance developed

between Serbs and Albanians. To the east Bulgaria threatened Serbian aspirations in

Macedonia. One of the unfortunate results of the Serbian agreements with the Austrians

was that the Serbs were pressured to turn precisely to these southeastern regions for

future expansion. National strife with Albanians and Bulgarians was thus an inevitable

consequence. To the west Serbia did not enjoy much brighter perspectives. The Serbian

kingdom looked on in helpless embarrassment while an Austrian occupational regime

was enforced upon Bosnian Serbs and other Bosnian Slavs. The Habsburg government

treated Bosnia and Herzegovina as integral parts of Austria-Hungary and thereby

aggrieved Serbian nationalism. The Habsburg submission of Serbia to certain economic

and political controls could nullify the effects of Serbian nationalism but it could not

quench its spirit. The tense interaction of Habsburg imperialist designs and suppressed

Serbian nationalism foreshadowed the Serbo-Austrian clash in 1914 that would lead up

to the World War of 1914.154

152 John R. Lampe, Balkans into Southeastern Europe (New York 2006)15-19.153 Vladien N. Vinogradov, 'The Berlin Congress of 1878 and the History of the Balkans' in: Bela Kiraly

and Gale Stokes ed., Insurrection, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870’s (New York 1985) 319-329.154 Geiss, ‘The Congress of Berlin 1878: an Assessment of its Place in History’ 343-357.



65

C O N C L U S I O N

What freedom is to the individual,

that is independence to the state.

Jovan Risti$

155

Throughout the Great Eastern Crisis the significant role of Serbian foreign policy was

disproportionate to the small size and moderate might of the Serbian principality. Serbia

stood at the heart of the Balkan complexities that disrupted European diplomacy

between 1875 and 1878. Trouble in the Balkans started with the Serbian interference in

Bosnia and came to an end in the arbitrary intervention of the European Great Powers at

the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Serbia’s road to war had commenced a decade earlier in

1868 with the constitutional introduction of certain progressive European ideas. The

Serbian liberal intelligentsia had taken control of the country and elevated the idea of

popular sovereignty to the core principle of Serbian politics. The embrace of popular

sovereignty in Serbia sparked liberalism in domestic affairs and made nationalism the

basis of Serbian foreign policy. The liberalization of Serbian political life provoked a

destabilizing crisis in Serbian domestic affairs. Domestic stagnation was paralleled by

the international isolation of Serbia. Russia resented Serbia’s liberal tendencies and the

Habsburg Monarchy opposed Serbia out of intense fear for Serbian nationalist

aspirations. The uprising of Bosnian Serbs in 1875 inflamed the Serbian public opinion

with ardent nationalism. As a result, the international problems of Serbia became

entangled in the domestic political crisis. The Serbian public called for the reassertion of

Serbian leadership in the struggle for national liberation and unification of all Serbs.

Under the assertive leadership Jovan Risti$, Serbia commenced a burdensome war

against the Ottoman Empire in 1876. The struggle of Serbdom had begun.

The Serbian declaration of war caused distress among the Great Powers and gave theBalkan disturbances international proportions. Austria-Hungary and Russia attempted

collective mediation in Bosnia but their pacificatory efforts failed as a result of jealous

divergence in their Balkan designs. Serbian foreign policy sought to benefit form the

competition between the Great Powers but this diplomatic strategy risked making Serbia

a mere pawn on the chessboard of European diplomacy. Serbian dealings with the Great

Powers were consistently unequal and ambiguous throughout the Great Eastern Crisis.

155 Risti$, Diplomatska Istorije Srbije, 206.



66

The Great Powers placed heavy obligations on Serbia while Serbian interests would be

sacrificed whenever needed. Such was the case in Serbo-Russian relations during the

wars of 1876 and 1877. Serbian military strategy relied on the ambiguous support of

Russian Pan-Slavism but foreign minister Jovan Risti$ lacked any official agreements

with Russia. This resulted in a diplomatic disaster for Serbia when Balkan warfare was

brought to a conclusion by the military intervention of official Russia. For Russian

diplomats the Serbian question was a secondary matter since Bulgaria was regarded as a

strategic priority. In the subsequent Treaty of San Stefano, Serbian interests were

sacrificed to serve the establishment of a large Russian puppet state in Bulgaria. The

Serbian diplomatic disaster of San Stefano began the alienation of Serbia from Russia.

The Congress of Berlin in 1878 marked a peak in Serbian diplomatic activity. Serbia

was excluded from participation and the Great Powers sought to enforce a settlement in

Southeastern Europe that completely disregarded the territorial concerns of the Balkan

peoples. Jovan Risti$ represented Serbia in Berlin and there pursued a thoughtful

diplomatic strategy to esnure a maximal territorial increase for Serbia. The Serbian

foreign minister sought international support through unofficial consultations with the

signatory delegations. The clearest manifestation of the Serbian diplomatic strategy was

the memorandum that Jovan Risti$ submitted to the Congress. The memorandum

apealed to several rational principles of European political thought in order to make the

Serbian plea recognizable and irresistable to the Great Powers. The most effective and

most controversial element in Serbian foreign policy at the Congress was the

rapprochement to Austria-Hungary. Serbian alignment to the Habsburg Monarchy

produced a relatively favorable formal settlement of the Serbian question. The Congress

of Berlin granted Serbia independence and unanticipated territorial aggrandizement.

The aftermath of the Congress of Berlin revealed the true historical meaning of

Serbian foreign policy during the Great Eastern Crisis. Serbia entered its formal

existence as a sovereign kingdom but Serbian independence was severely compromised

by dependence on Austria-Hungary. Submission to the Habsburg Monarchy deprived

Serbia of the sovereign right to conduct a genuine foreign policy. Serbian nationalism

was abandoned as the basis of Serbian foreign policy since nationalism was

irreconcilable with the interests of the multinational Austria-Hungary. The selfish

predominance Vienna in Serbian economic and political affairs aggrieved the spirit of

Serbian nationalism. The troublesome settlement of the Serbian question prepared thegrounds for future disturbances on the Balkans that would endanger European peace.



67

The conclusion of this essay contributes the Serbian perspective to the established

historical consensus that considers the Great Eastern Crisis as a significant prelude to

the Great War of 1914. Inherent antagonism between Serbian nationalism and Habsburg

supremacy over the western Balkans made Serbia the perilous fuse in the powder keg of

Europe after 1878. One morning in Sarajevo, the ultimate clash between Serbia and

Austria would be unleashed by two fatal shots from the gun of a Serbian nationalist

fired at the Habsburg heir to the throne. The struggle of Serbdom would be continued.



68

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Documents

Kern (2012) the Struggle of Serbdom - Serbian Foreign Policy During the Great Eastern Crisis 1868-1881