View
216
Download
0
Tags:
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Knockdown and Capsizing of theSail Training Yacht Concordia
off the coast of Brazil
17 February 2010
Jonathan Seymour, Member of the Board
Paulo Ekkebus, Investigator-in-Charge
Abigail Fyfe, Naval Architect & Senior Investigator
Pierre Murray, Manager of Marine Investigations, Atlantic Region
Sail Training Yacht Concordia
Occurrence Voyage
• Cold front forecast
• 300 nm SSE off Rio de Janeiro
4
Sail Plan
5
Handover of the Watch
• Sail plan good to 40 knots
• Bear off and run before any squalls
• Call master if weather posed a risk
6
Animation
7
8
Difficulties During Abandon Ship
• Launching liferafts
• Exiting vessel on its side
• Unable to transmit distress alert
• Accounting for complement
9
Post abandonment
• Emergency beacon located and verified
• Difficult conditions in raft:– seasickness– high winds and waves overnight– water in the bottom of the rafts
10
Search and Rescue
11
TimeTime after knockdown
Event
1525:54 17 Feb
+1 hour Beacon’s position confirmed
0806 18 Feb
+17 hoursJRCC Halifax receives fax from MRCC Brazil
090018 Feb
+18 hoursJRCC Halifax contacts Class Afloat and attempts beacon’s contact number
193018 Feb
+29 hours Rafts spotted by SAR plane
Search and Rescue
• All survivors were rescued some 41 hours following knockdown
12
Weather Analysis
13
Squall Defined
14
Probable Wind Speed
• No observed wind speeds in excess of 50 knots
• No observed air temperature change
• Weather system weaker than a microburst (Environment Canada)
15
Stability Assessment
• Initially – no obvious cause for knockdown
• Required – detailed stability assessment
• Good data available – ship’s plans, stability book and a video
• Assessment – computer model, calculations performed & validated
• Details of assessment in occurrence report
16
Vessel Stability Limits
• All vessels have stability limits– Examples:
• Too much cargo• Cargo stowed too high
17
Sailing Vessel Limitations
Wind 27-37 knotsHeel 70 degrees
Guidance Information
19
• “Stability book” provides guidance for crew
• Sailing vessels require safe operating limits while under sail
Concordia’s Stability Limits
• Concordia had guidance information on board
• Maximum safe heel angle in gusting conditions 24 degrees
• Minutes prior to knockdown Concordia was sailing at 23 degrees
20
Squall Curves-Margin of Safety
21
• Concordia’s “squall curves” provide safe wind speed information
• Concordia’s margin of safety decreased as squall approached
• Vessel was at risk and action was required
• Officer of the watch not aware of this information
Findings as to Cause
• Concordia was vulnerable to a knockdown• The officer of the watch was unaware,
unfamiliar, and untrained with squall curves• Risk not recognized and no timely mitigating
action taken to:– Reduce sail and/or change course– Make the vessel watertight
22
Findings as to Risk
• Knockdown preparedness
• Equipment familiarization
• EPIRB registration
• Search and rescue issues
• Safety management systems
23
Safety Issues Identified
• Many flag states do not require squall curves (or equivalent) on sail training vessels
• Officers are not required to be knowledgeable in the use of squall curves
24
Recommendation 1 - Canada
• The Department of Transport ensure those officers to whom it issues sailing vessel endorsements are trained to use the stability guidance information that it requires to be on board sailing vessels.
25
Recommendation 2 - International
• The Department of Transport undertake initiatives leading to the adoption of international standards for sail training vessels on the provision of stability guidance to assist officers in assessing the risk of a knockdown and capsize, and for the training of officers in the use of this information.
26
Action Required
• Squall curves (or equivalent) should be available on all sail training vessels
• All officers should be trained in their use
27
Knockdown and Capsizing of theSail Training Yacht Concordia
Off the coast of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
17 February 2010