Knott-A Relationship of Convenience

TRACEY KNOTT

49 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

A Relationship of Convenience: Examining the Connection Between Latin American Drug

Traffickers and Hizballah

Tracey Knott Tracey Knott is a Masters candidate in Security Policy Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. She specializes in transnational organized crime, particularly in Latin America and Africa. She received her B.A. in history from Oberlin College.

Recent reports of growing Hezbollah involvement in Latin America have the sparked concern of some American security analysts and policy makers. In particular, some fear that Hezbollah is working with local drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to threaten American national security. This article explores the extent of the Latin American DTO- Hezbollah collaboration by answering the following questions: Who is involved? Where does the collaboration take place? How do the organizations cooperate? What are the threats such collaboration poses? Finally, what is being done and what more can be done to tackle these threats? In order to address these questions, this paper will examine several related case studies. The evidence provided by such cases suggests that there is an illicit connection between Latin American DTOs and Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. Although these relationships may not pose a direct security threat to the U.S., they nevertheless result in dangerous regional destabilization and the financing of terrorist groups.

In recent years, newspaper articles and United States House committee meetings alike have been filled with rumors about nefarious dealings between Iranian officials, Hizballah agents, and Latin American drug cartels. On January 31, 2012, former DEA Chief of Operations and Intelligence Michael Braun testified at a House Foreign Affairs

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Committee hearing, warning that if something was not done about the growing collaboration between Latin American drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and terrorist organizations like Quds Force and Hizballah, theres gonna be hell to pay at some date in the probably not too distant future.1 Revelations surrounding the bizarre 2011 arrest of Mansour Arbabsiar raised fears about such illicit connections. Arbabsiar, a used-car salesman from Texas, was accused of working on behalf of Irans Quds Force to hire a Zetas operative to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States. 2 Such assertions have led congressional representatives like Henry Cuellar and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen to claim that Iran will soon be using Americas backyard as a launching point for attacks against the United States.3 There is significant evidence suggesting that Hizballah is using Latin American criminals to help finance its operations. These criminals are not terrorists bent on U.S. destruction, but rather profit-seeking opportunists with Hizballah connections. Nevertheless, it would be imprudent for security agencies to ignore the regions strategic importance for Hizballah. Middle Eastern terrorist organizations like Hizballah can harness Latin Americas illicit finances and burgeoning immigrant populations to strengthen their operations, leading to regional destabilization by increased terrorist attacks and criminal activity. This paper will evaluate the extent of the Latin American DTO-Middle Eastern terrorist collaboration by answering the following questions: Who is involved? Where does the collaboration take place? How do the organizations cooperate? What, if any, are the threats such collaboration poses? If threats exist, what is being done and what more can be done to tackle these threats? In order to address these questions, this paper will examine several related cases. These include: the Joumaa drug trafficking and money laundering network and its use of the Lebanese-Canadian Bank; the Cheaitelly/El Khansa laundering network; and two other Hizballah financers, Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kanan. The evidence provided by such cases suggests that there is an established connection between Latin American DTOs and Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. Although these relationships may not pose a direct threat to the United

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States, they nevertheless result in dangerous regional destabilization and terrorist financing. Debating the Threat Various organizations and scholars disagree on the level of threat posed by the collaboration between Latin American criminals and Hizballah. Although it is generally accepted that there are Hizballah sympathizers in South America, especially among the Lebanese diaspora, the extent of this relationship is highly contested.4 For example, the United States State Department insists:

There were no known operational cells of either al-Qa'ida or Hizballah in the hemisphere, although ideological sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and ideological support to those and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia. The Tri-Border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay continued to be an important regional nexus of arms, narcotics, and human smuggling, counterfeiting, pirated goods, and money laundering all potential funding sources for terrorist organizations.5

Admiral Jim Stavridis, former commander of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) appears to straddle the fence on the issue. He argues that Hizballah appears to be the most prominent group active in the region, and while much of their activity is currently linked to revenue generation, there are indications of an operational presence and the potential for attacks.6 Hizballahs intentions, some scholars claim, involve more than just revenue generation. Matt Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, for example, notes that Hizballah has recently sought to weaken the West. In a 2012 article, Levitt warns that beginning in 2010, the Quds Force (a unit of Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) allied with Hizballah to initiate a shadow war against the West.7 Despite the lack of current attacks, Levitt argues that these threats are quite real.8 Bearing



such threats in mind, Douglas Farah claimed at a 2011 Congressional hearing that Hizballahs presence in the Western Hemisphere poses a significant and growing threat to U.S. security.9 Background The idea that groups such as Hizballah pose a danger in Latin America is not new; Iranian-sponsored terrorism has threatened the region before. Iran is believed to have been behind the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, as well as an attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992. Although it is generally believed that Hizballahs actions in the region are largely driven by a need for resources rather than a desire for localized violence, Ilan Berman, vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council, warns that Hizballah has considered attacks on U.S. and Jewish targets in the area, such as the Embassy of the United States in Paraguay.10 Traditional studies of terrorist organizations often tend to overlook their connections to drug traffickers. Historically, however, many terrorist organizations have turned to drug traffickingeither through collaboration with pre-existing organizations or independentlyin order to be financially autonomous.11 For example, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and the Taliban have traded in heroin, while the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has long relied on cocaine to fund its operations.12 There is evidence that Hizballah engages in similar actions. According to Farah, Hizballah became increasingly active in Latin America in 2006, when the organization had a significant fallout with Iran over funding. 13 Moreover, Farah argued that Hizballah is more involved in the cocaine trade than ever before, in large part due to Irans diplomatic ties to countries like Venezuela and Bolivia.14 Latin America is not only a source of drug revenue for Hizballah, but also a fundraising and recruiting center for new operatives. Hizballah has reportedly relied heavily on funds from the Lebanese Shia diaspora, especially those who live in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) in between

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Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. 15 Venezuela also has a significant population of Lebanese and Syrian immigrants. 16 In certain cases, Hizballah has been able to draw upon this diaspora for new operatives.17 Immigrant communities play a key role in the illicit economies of their adopted countries; migrants typically maintain contacts with their birth country, facilitating the establishment of illicit networks.18 The TBA is a particular source of worry for security experts. Formed by the intersection between Ciudad del Este, Paraguay; Foz do Iguau, Brazil, and Puerto Iguazu, Argentina,19 the region is known as an historical center for illicit activities like drug and human trafficking.20 The TBA was also the starting point for Hizballah activities in the mid-1980s.21 Hizballah has been able to bring in significant revenues from the region. A 2009 study by the Rand Corporation estimated that Hizballah earned about 20 million U.S. dollars a year from illicit activities in the region.22 Additionally, the man behind the 1994 bombing of the Buenos Aires Jewish cultural center, Assad Ahmad Mohamad Barakat, used the Galeria Page mall in Ciudad del Este to fundraise for Hizballah.23 This mall served as a Hizballah command post, with Barakat acting as the groups chief fundraiser and military planner in the TBA.24 Combatting the nexus between criminal and terrorist organizations has been difficult for local authorities. The illicit economy is a powerful force: the so-called shadow economy is an estimated 40 to 50% of Paraguays annual GDP, limiting the legal economys development. 25 Law enforcement officials suffer from corruption, insufficient funding, poor training, lack of motivation, and inadequate penal codes.26 Due in no small part to such hindrances, law enforcement experiences difficulty monitoring the remittances and money laundering schemes that fund organizations like Hizballah.27 As of 2004, the TBA was home to 35 banks and foreign exchange centers, any of which could be helping to launder illicit profits.28 The TBA is also a source of recruitment for Hizballah, which often recruits Shia immigrants at local mosques and Islamic community centers. Some of these immigrants have struggled to assimilate into their



new homes. High levels of poverty and unemployment in the TBA make them easier recruits for criminal and terrorist groups alike. 29 These immigrants and their children may be drawn to a life of crime, especially if they are expected to provide money for their struggling families back home. As Melani Cammett of Brown University explains, sympathetic views of Hizballah among Shia immigrants, as well as the paying of religious taxes to Shia clerics, even those linked to Hezbollah, are not commensurate to support for or participation in terrorist acts.30 Similarly, Colonel John Cope of the U.S. National Defense University notes the difficulty of determining whether the fundraising for organizations back in the Middle East is intended for legitimate charities or terrorist groups: if the money goes to Hizballahs general funds, even if it is meant for a charitable cause, it could easily go to its military operations instead.31 Although it is impossible to know precisely why some Shia immigrants have turned to crime in order to support Hizballah, the following case studies help to elucidate the connection. Case Studies The Ayman Joumaa Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering Network Ayman Joumaa is one of the most notorious Lebanese criminals to operate in Latin America in recent years. Based in Colombia, Joumaa is suspected of overseeing a drug trafficking network that links South America to Mexico, the United States, West Africa and Europe. Among his trafficking operations, Joumaa is believed to have sold large quantities of cocaine to the Zetas drug cartel.32 In order to hide his networks illicit profits, Joumaa launders money for his Colombian and Venezuelan suppliers using bulk cash smuggling and Lebanese exchange houses. 33 Two of these Lebanese exchange houses, Hassan Ayash Exchange Company and the Ellissa Exchange Company, were designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as Significant Foreign Narcotics Traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. 34 The exchange houses have ties to Hizballah and the Lebanese-Canadian Bank (LCB), another suspect institution. According to

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the U.S. Department of Justice, the exchange houses provide significant amounts of currency exchanges to and through LCB, without sufficient oversight or disclosures about the sources and purpose of the cash.35 The Justice Department estimates that the Joumaa network launders as much as $200 million per month. Moreover, according to a civil indictment filed by the Justice Department in December 2011, Joumaas organization uses Hizballah couriers to transport and launder narcotics proceeds, and pays fees to Hizballah operatives to facilitate the laundering of narcotics proceeds.36 In addition to the civil indictment, the U.S. government has made other attempts to target Joumaas drug trafficking and money laundering network. The Drug Enforcement Administration led much of the investigation against Joumaa, with important contributions from the Treasury and State Departments, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Customs and Border Protection.37 One month before the civil indictment, the Justice Department announced the federal criminal indictment of Joumaa for his plans to sell cocaine to the Zetas.38 Joumaa has been indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for trafficking at least tens of kilograms of cocaine into the United States via Central America and Mexico.39 This includes shipments of at least 85,000 kilograms of cocaine to the Zetas from 2005 to 2007.40 Additionally, Joumaa has been indicted for laundering hundreds of millions of dollars in drug money in the United States, and for helping to launder drug money from traffickers around the world and returning it to Colombia.41 Additionally, in January 2011 the U.S. Treasury Departments Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Joumaa a drug kingpin under the Kingpin Act. This designation sanctions Joumaa, making it illegal for Americans and American companies to do business with him. The designation also encourages banks in other countries, such as Colombia, to freeze a designees accounts. Despite his indictment by the United States, Joumaa remains at large.



The Treasury Department has also sanctioned Lebanese, Colombian and Venezuelan individuals and businesses that laundered money for Joumaa, including numerous front companies that hid the profits true destinations. In 2012, the Treasury Department designated Kassem Mohamad Saleh, Abbas Hussein Harb, Ibrahim Chibli, and three front companies owned or controlled by Abbas Houssein Harb and/or Kassem Mohamad Saleh.42 According to the Treasury Department, Kassem Saleh is a dual citizen of Lebanon and Venezuela and runs front companies for Joumaa.43 His brother, Ali Mohamad Saleh, a Lebanese Colombian national, was designated at the same time a Specially Designated Global Terrorist due to his Latin American fundraising activities for Hizballah. He will be discussed in greater detail later. On the other hand, Abbas Harb is a dual citizen of Venezuela and Lebanon. He runs a Colombia- and Venezuela-based organization that launders money for Joumaa via the Lebanese financial sector. His brother, Ali Houssein Harb, also a dual citizen of Lebanon and Venezuela, was designated as well for his connections to the Joumaa network.44 Finally, Chibli is a Lebanese citizen who used his position as the manager of the Abbassieh branch of Fenicia Bank in Lebanon to facilitate the movement of money for Joumaa and Harb In 2010, Joumaa moved over a million dollars into an account owned by Harb and managed by Chibli.45 Using accomplices connected to Hizballah, Joumaa is able to successfully launder his illicit profits. The Lebanese-Canadian Bank One of the key entities that Joumaa used to launder his illicit assets was the Lebanese-Canadian Bank, which was identified as a Primary Money Laundering Concern by the Treasury Department in 2011, making it illegal for U.S. financial institutions to interact with it. LCB is based in Beirut, has 35 branches in Lebanon and a representative office in Montreal. In 2009, LCBs assets were valued at more than $5 billion. LCB allows numerous criminal organizations to launder money, which the Treasury Department blames on management complicity, failure of internal controls, and lack of application of prudent banking standards.46 One of the most interesting cases is that of an estimated $329 million money-laundering scheme involving West Africa and American used

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cars.47 As the civil suit announcement filed by the U.S. Attorneys Office of the Southern District of New York explains, LCB laundered criminal proceeds made from the illegal sale of American cars in West Africa and facilitated the transfer of these funds to Hizballah.48 Channels for moving the money included money couriers, cash smugglers, hawaladars, and currency brokers.49 According to a New York Times investigation, one of the exchange houses used was owned by Ayman Joumaas family, whose members have also been sanctioned by the Treasury Department for their involvement in his network. 50 The Treasury Departments Financial Crimes Enforcement Network cooperated with the DEA to uncover this scheme. According to Derek Maltz, the DEA official who oversaw the agencys investigation into LCB, this ability of terror groups like Hezbollah to tap into the worldwide criminal funding streams is the new post-9/11 challenge.51 Similarly, DEA official Michele M. Leonhart has said in regard to LCB, Drug trafficking profits and terror financing often grow and flow together.52 In June 2013, LCB agreed to pay $102 million to settle the U.S. governments civil lawsuit.53 The Cheaitelly/El Khansa Laundering Network In 2011, OFAC designated Jorge Fadallah Cheaitelly and Mohammed Zouheir El Khansatwo Lebanese-Colombian nationalsSpecially Designated Narcotics Traffickers for their role in laundering drug trafficking profits. The Cheatielly/El Khansa network of front companies and money exchanges operates out of Panama and Colombia, and has ties to Mexico, Lebanon and Hong Kong as well as to Mexican and Colombian drug cartels. One of the import/export businesses located in Panamas Colon Free Trade Zone, Junior International S.A, is connected to Joumaa. Cheaitelly replaced Joumaa as the director of Junior International S.A. and operates the company with Joumaas brothers, who are also designated narcotics traffickers.54 Cheaitelly family members based in Colombia and El Khansa family based in Lebanon assist in the money laundering and were also designated by OFAC.55 Both Cheaitelly and El Khansa remain free.



Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kanan OFAC has also designated several other Latin American Hizballah fundraisers. In 2008, OFAC designated two Lebanese-Venezuelan citizens, Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kanan, for providing support to Hizballah. Nasr al Din is a Venezuelan diplomat and president of Caracass Shia Islamic Center. Nasr al Din served as Venezuelas Charg dAffaires in its embassy in Syria and as the Director of Political Aspects at its embassy in Lebanon. He facilitated fundraising for Hizballah in Latin America using his position at the Islamic Center. According to the Treasury Department, Nasr al Din has counseled Hizballah donors on fundraising efforts and has provided donors with specific information on bank accounts where the donors deposits would go directly to Hizballah. 56 In addition, Nasr al Din helped two Hizballah representatives to the Lebanese Parliament travel to Caracas to solicit donations for Hizballah. These operatives helped to open a Hizballah-sponsored community center and office in Venezuela.57 Nasr al Din also helped Hizballah members travel to Iran for training. Lastly, the diplomat held meetings with senior Hizballah officials in Lebanon to discuss the groups operations. 58 Fawzi Kanan, like Nasr al Din, facilitated the travel of Hizballah members and raised money for Hizballah in Venezuela. Kanan often used his two travel companies as a cover for trips and to transfer funds to Lebanon. Moreover, Kanan held meetings with senior Hizballah officials in Lebanon and has gone with other Hizballah members to train in Iran.59 Ali Mohamad Saleh Ali Mohamad Saleh is one of the Cheatielly/El Khansa networks money launderers, and is based in Maicao, Colombia. Saleh, a Lebanese Colombian national, was designated under the Kingpin Act for laundering funds for the network. He was designated by OFAC in 2012 as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Saleh is a former Hizballah fighter and directed Hizballah financing in Colombia. According to the Treasury Department, Saleh was the leader of a Hizballah support cell in Maicao

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that raised money for Hizballah: In this role, Saleh solicited donations for Hizballah from business owners and residents. Saleh coordinated the transfer of checks and U.S. dollars by courier from Maicao via Venezuela to Hizballah in Lebanon.60 Saleh is an example of a Hizballah supporter and financier with direct ties to the terrorist operations of Hizballah. While most of his Latin American comrades appear to have worked strictly in finance and recruiting, Saleh demonstrates the nexus between the logistical and openly violent sides of Hizballah. Evaluation of the Threat Thus far, the threat from the DTO-Hizballah connection has stemmed from fundraising and recruitment, not operational attempts. Nonetheless, the criminal-terrorist nexus remains an important security concern that should not be neglected by the United States and its hemispheric allies. Even if Hizballah and its criminal allies are not planning to attack the United States or other Western Hemisphere countries in the near future, their financing efforts provide an important source of funding for terrorists and criminals alike. Their criminal activities lead to regional destabilization through corruption, violence and illicit trade. Moreover, their profits increase their power, allowing criminals to expand their networks and Hizballah to launch larger attacks, especially against Israel and opposing regional forces. The DTO-terrorist connection subverts the state and its monopoly on force. As the previously mentioned case studies demonstrate, there are multiple layers of threats stemming from Hizballahs involvement in Latin America. Some Lebanese immigrants to Latin America, due to marginalization and lack of opportunities or family ties, may be drawn into organized crime. Those criminals, whether due to ideological belief or greed, may turn to family and cultural connections to Hizballah for assistance. These criminals may rely on Hizballah for help in expanding their illicit network, laundering their illicit profits, or smuggling goods into Hizballah-controlled territory. In these cases, the criminals may be willing to pay a tax or make a contribution to the organization to ensure continued good will. This type of Hizballah fundraising may be more



opportunistic than anything else. Such criminals act for their own profit more than Hizballahs and are willing to donate to the cause only for personal gain. There are multiple examples of this type of opportunistic relationship between Latin American DTOs and Hizballah. For example, the Justice Department believes that Ayman Joumaa uses Hizballah operatives to transport and launder the proceeds from his narcotics trafficking. 61 Additionally, some of the members of his organization have familial or personal ties to Hizballah. Kassem Saleh, one of Joumaas money launderers, is the brother of Ali Saleh, a designated narcotics trafficker and terrorist.62 Ali Saleh is a known Hizballah financier and former Hizballah fighter; however, he also launders money for Jorge Cheaitelly and Mohammed Harb, two Lebanese-Colombian citizens whose laundering operation seems focused on profit more than on ideological purposes.63 In Ali Salehs case, it is difficult to determine whether he is motivated by profit or ideological convictions. It may be that he is motivated by both and has been given the ability to pursue both angles through Lebanese crime organizations connections to Hizballah. In Joumaas case, the connections to Hizballah appear driven by his desire for easy profit and assistance in laundering these profits more than anything else. The money Joumaa has paid to Hizballah for help in his schemes seem to be another aspect of his financial aspirations rather than a desire to aid Hizballah in particular. In many ways, this interaction is just as dangerous as that of a true believer. Criminals such as Joumaa are opportunistic and will use any illicit connections to expand their empires, even if it means working with a terrorist organization to achieve that goal. Some of these immigrants, however, appear less motivated by profit and more driven by belief in Hizballahs mission. These people may use crime as one method of raising money for Hizballah, as in the case of the Buenos Aires bomber Assad Ahmad Mohamad Barakat.64 However, they may also turn to their immigrant community to exhort donations to the cause and to recruit other believers. Both Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kanan used their positions in their Venezuelan communities to facilitate Hizballah

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recruitment and fundraising. Moreover, the two used their access to international travel companies to attend Hizballah meetings in Lebanon, and in the case of Kanan, training sessions in Iran.65 Their examples fit more with the expectations of terrorist cells that provide support to the mother organization and could be expected to help organize an operation if called upon. Potential Solutions The powerful networks of drug traffickers, money launderers, and recruiters can contain important weaknesses for the organizations involved. According to Douglas Farah, targeting specific operatives is often an effective way of disrupting these networks.66 As many of the case studies demonstrate, these facilitators often interact with numerous networks, providing nodes at which law enforcement agencies can interfere to hinder their operations.67 By targeting the men and women who allow Hizballah to gain money and supporters in the region, officials can deter the group from strengthening its foothold in Latin America and limit its financial ability to carry out terrorist operations. Sanctions are a powerful way of reducing criminal and terrorist organizations ability to operate: without money, these organizations may be less attractive to vulnerable immigrant populations. Moreover, without financing, terrorist groups are unable to fund their attacks and criminals have a reduced ability to subvert local governments and law enforcement agencies. In this regard, countries in the region should look to OFACs example as a model for targeting money launderers and terrorist financers. Col. Cope also suggests looking at remittances as a method for controlling the flow of money to Hizballah. The United States should encourage Latin American countries and Lebanon to work together to develop a system to regulate the exchange of money between immigrant communities and their home countries. 68 Most of the money sent home by Lebanese immigrants is no doubt intended for legitimate use, but governments must collaborate to ensure that donations are not going to Hizballah-controlled organizations.



It is also important to encourage cooperation among intelligence and law enforcement agencies. In the past, cooperation between government bodies like the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury has been critical in targeting criminal networks like the LCB.69 One method of encouraging international cooperation would be a recommitment to the ideals put forth by the 3+1 Group on Triborder Area Security, which held anti-crime and anti-terrorism meetings between the United States and the TBA countries. 70 Criminal and terrorist organizations have worked successfully to overcome traditional boundaries between states; governments must do the same if they have any hope of countering such international illicit organizations. The Latin American DTOs are not only operating in one country, but in multiple regions. Their original crimes might begin in Latin America, but they spread as far as the United States and Lebanon, especially with regard to money laundering. 71 Furthermore, many countries affected by the cooperation between criminals and terrorists lack the capacity to combat them alone. By encouraging cooperation, intelligence sharing, and exchanges of law enforcement techniques, these countries can overcome their individual weaknesses. Finally, as Lieutenant Colonel Philip Abbott noted in a 2004 article on the TBA, countries need to address the causes of terrorism and criminality. They need to make a more committed effort to improving the negative social conditions that have the potential to breed instability.72 The effort to provide citizens, especially Shia immigrants at risk of radicalization, with viable alternatives for economic and social advancement needs to be driven by the international community as a whole, and encouraged by countries like the United States who can sponsor economic development projects. Conclusion Although Hizballah may not be establishing operational cells in Latin America, the connection between Hizballah and regional DTOs is nevertheless regionally destabilizing. The link profits a known terrorist organization and many criminal networks, allowing them to spread their area of influence through Latin America and abroad. Furthermore, the

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cooperation between Hizballah and DTOs breeds violence, criminality, and corruption in both Latin America and in Lebanon. States must cooperate to combat this governmental subversion. The criminal-terrorist nexus will be stopped only when the flow of funds is halted and those who facilitate this financing are stopped. Moreover, countries need to prevent their marginalized communities from becoming sources of criminal and terrorist recruits by expanding social outreach and development programs to include these disenfranchised populations. Hizballahs collaboration with Latin American DTOs is a serious threat, not because of their potential to directly attack the United States, but because of the relationships ability to help these violent groups prosper and grow. Endnotes 1 Guy Taylor, Hell to Pay if Terrorists Link to Drug Cartels Isnt Checked, Washington Times, February 2, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/2/hell-to-pay-if-terrorists-link-to-drug-cartels-isn 2 Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, Iranians accused of a plot to kill Saudis U.S. envoy, New York Times, October 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accuses-iranians-of-plotting-to-kill-saudi-envoy.html 3 Taylor; Stewart M. Powell, Border as Terror Route Worries U.S., Houston Chronicle, August 11, 2012, http://www.chron.com/news/nation-world/article/Border-as-terror-route-worries-U-S-3781740.php 4 Arthur Brice, Iran, Hezbollah mine Latin America for revenue, recruits, analysts say, CNN, June 3, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/world/americas/iran-latin-america/index.html; Douglas Farah, Hezbollah in Latin America: Implications for U.S. Security, Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, July 7, 2011, 20, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Farah.pdf See also: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Targets Hizballah in Venezuela, June 18, 2008, www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/hp1036.aspx 5 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, May 30, 2013, 175-76, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210204.pdf 6 John Barham, Hezbollahs Latin American home, Security Management: The Magazine, accessed May 9, 2014, http://www.securitymanagement.com/article/hezbollahs-latin-american-home



7 Matthew Levitt, Hizballah and the Qods Force in Irans Shadow War with the West, Policy Focus, 123, January 2013, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus123.pdf 8 Levitt, 10. 9 Farah, Hezbollah in Latin America, 2. 10 Brice 11 Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda (New York, NY: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009), 17-18. 12 Ibid., 10-11. 13 Douglas Farah, in Brice, Iran, Hezbollah mine Latin America. 14 Ibid. 15 Rex Hudson, Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America, The Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, December 2010, 26-27, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/TerrOrgCrime_TBA.pdf 16 Brice. 17 U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Major Money Laundering Network Linked to Drug Trafficker Ayman Joumaa and a Key Hizballah Supporter in South America, June 27, 2012, accessed May 9, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1624.aspx; Treasury Targets Hizballah in Venezuela. 18 Douglas Farah, Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Facilitators, in Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, eds. Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, April 2013), 78. 19 Lt. Col. Philip K. Abbott, Terrorist Threat in Tri-Border Area: Myth or Reality? Military Review, September-October 2004, 51, http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/SepOct04/abbott.pdf; Mark P. Sulivan and June S. Beittel, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, Congressional Research Service, April 5, 2013, 21, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf 20 George Ramsey, What is The Real Threat of Islamic Terrorism in Latin America? Christian Science Monitor, August 14, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/0814/What-is-the-real-threat-of-Islamic-terrorism-in-Latin-America; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, 176. 21 Roger F. Noriega and Jos R. Crdenas, The Mounting Hezbollah Threat in Latin America, Latin American Outlook, 3, October 2011, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1, http://www.aei.org/files/2011/10/06/Updated-No3LatinAmerican%202011g.pdf 22 Gregory F. Treverton, Carl Matthies, Karla J. Cunningham, Jeremiah Goulka, Greg Ridgeway, and Anny Wong, Film Piracy, Organized Crime, and Terrorism, RAND, 2009, xi, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG742.pdf

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23 Treverton, et al., 79; Hudson, , 12. 24 Hudson, 12, 27. 25 L.I. Shelley and J. T. Picarelli, Methods and motives: exploring links between transnational organized crime and international terrorism, Trends in Organized Crime 9.2 (Winter 2005), 61, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12117-005-1024-x 26 Hudson, 60. 27 Abbott, 52. 28 Ibid., 51. 29 Brice; Hudson, 9; Abbott, 52, 53. 30 Melani Cammett, in Brice, Iran, Hezbollah Mine Latin America. 31 Barham. 32 Mark P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, CRS Report RS21049 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 5, 2013), 24, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf 33 Ibid. 34 U.S. Department of Justice, DEA News: Civil Suit Exposes Lebanese Money Laundering Scheme for Hizballah, December 15, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr121511.html 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury targets major money laundering network. 38 Sullivan and Beittel, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, 24. 39 U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border, November 2012, 9. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Major Money Laundering Network. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Identifies Lebanese Canadian Bank Sal as a Primary Money Laundering Concern, February 10, 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/tg1057.aspx 47 Christie Smythe, Lebanese Canadian Bank to Pay $102 Million to Settle Suit, Bloomberg, June 25, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-25/lebanese-canadian-bank-to-pay-102-million-to-settle-suit.html 48 U.S. Department of Justice, DEA News. 49 Ibid. 50 Jo Becker, Beirut Bank Seen as Hub of Hezbollahs Financing, New York Times, December 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/world/middleeast/beirut-bank-



seen-as-a-hub-of-hezbollahs-financing.html; U.S. Department of Treasury, Recent OFAC Actions, January 26, 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20110126.aspx 51 Becker, . 52 Smythe. 53 Ibid. 54 U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Key Panama-based Money Laundering Operation Linked to Mexican and Colombian Drug Cartels, December 29, 2011, accessed May 9, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1390.aspx 55 Ibid. 56 U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Hizballah in Venezuela. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Major Money Laundering Network. 61 U.S. Department of Justice, DEA News. 62 U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Major Money Laundering Network. 63 Ibid.; U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Key Panama-based Money Laundering Operation. 64 Treverton, et al, 12. 65 U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Hizballah in Venezuela. 66 Farah, Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Facilitators, 75-76. 67 Ibid. 68 Col. John Cope, E-mail correspondence with author, November 5, 2013. 69 U.S. Department of Justice, DEA News. 70 Patricia Taft, David A. Poplack and Rita Grossman-Vermaas, The Crime-Terrorism Nexus: Risks in the Tri-Border Area, The Fund for Peace, 2009, 11, http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/ttcvr0905-threatconvergence-triborder-1204b.pdf 71 Sullivan and Beittel, 24. 72 Abbott, 53-54. 1 In Fall 2012 the Iranian rial hit record lows, and inflation hit 24%. Irans Inflation Rate Rises by 1.4% in a month, The Tehran Times, November 8, 2012, http://www.tehrantimes.com/economy-and-business/103101-irans-inflation-rate-rises-by-14-in-month- 2 Here, The West signifies the United States and Europe participating in negotiations as