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Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of ReligionAuthor(s): Ashild KolasSource: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Feb., 1996), pp. 51-66Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/425133

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? Journal of Peace Research, vol. 33, no. 1, 1996, pp. 51-66

TibetanNationalism: The Politics of Religion*

ASHILD KOLAS

International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

Tibetan Buddhism, rather than secular nationalist ideology, provides vital idioms for the politicaldiscourse on Tibetan independence. This article deals with the interrelations between Tibetan politicsand religion within Tibet and in exile Tibetan settlements in India. It is argued that within and outsideTibet, popular expressions of Tibetan identity rely on religious symbolism. In Tibet, religious idioms are

reappearing in completely new contexts, as political expressions of opposition to Chinese rule. In India,Tibetan refugee elites reinterpret these idioms in their own terms while redefining Tibetan identity andculture for the outside world and for refugees themselves. The educated, English-speaking sections ofthe refugee population are also the main producers of nationalist rhetoric in the secular sense. This is

particularly true of those who are based in Dharamsala, the Indian headquarters of the Dalai Lama andthe Tibetan government-in-exile. After examining the 'culture' of Tibetan politics, the questions raisedare how and why secular nationalist arguments, rather than arguments based on religion, become a part

of political discourse. The choice of arguments is found to reflect the notions of legitimacy and rhetoricof the different audiences addressed. Power relations surface in every aspect of politics, including theuse of political languages and definition of the boundaries and contents of 'the political'.

1. IntroductionThe interconnections between religion and

politics in Tibet have been the focus ofseveral historical studies (e.g. Burman,1979; Michael, 1982), and writers onTibetan history commonly recognize theclose ties between religion and politics in

Tibetan culture. Although an historical per-spective is included in the present article,

my main concern is to describe how politicsand religion are interconnected in the

present-day context of the Tibetan indepen-dence movement. My aim is to investigatedifferent ways of asserting Tibetan identity,and finally to relate these expressions tosome of the current theories of nationalism.

For analytical purposes, I distinguish be-tween three arenas of communication: three

different spheres of interaction whereTibetan identity is articulated. According tothe presumed audience or 'other', these aredistinguished as fellow Tibetans, theChinese and the Western world. In Tibetan,these categories of 'others' are commonlyexpressed by the terms bod pa (Tibetan),

* I am grateful to Malvern Lumsden of JPR, Per

Kvaerneand Ronald D. Schwartz for their comments ondraft versions. The field research for this article wasconducted in India and Tibet during 1989-92. I owe a

particular debt of gratitude to the many Tibetans who

provided me with help and information.

rgya mi (Chinese) and ing ji (Westerner).The approach outlined here thus regardsethnicity as a process both within and be-tween groups, although constantly from aTibetan perspective. Through the identifi-cation of these three arenas of communi-

cation, I attempt to illustrate how different,

although interreacting or 'intercommunicat-ing', political languages develop in different

spheres of interaction.The term political language here refers to

a set of conventions that are commonlyunderstood and used in discourse about the

legitimacy of power. A set of common

understandings is necessary in order tomake discourse possible: we need to agreeto a certain extent in order to disagree andcontest. Conventions and languages are not

entities separate from their expressions.Rather, the terms refer to the repetitive andestablished aspects of discourse. In the pro-cess of communicating, we are constantlyreconstructing, developing and changing theconventions we use. Power is reflected inthe ability to set standards for communi-cation, the ability to choose which conven-tions are valid, and to enforce the limits ofexpression.

The focus of this article is on politicaldiscourse taking place in a wide variety of

settings. In the Barkor Square of Lhasa,



52 AshildKolas

Tibetan demonstratorsshout for indepen-dence and the long life of the Dalai Lama.In the MainTempleof Dharamsala,official

speakersproclaim heirdualgoalof rebuild-

ing a Tibetanwayof life in exile and work-ingfor a futureFree Tibet. In the monaster-ies of Tibet, monks andnunsmake Tibetan

flags, compose anti-Chinese songs andpolitical pamphlets. In the classrooms ofTibetan schools in India, children learnTibetan languageand history, and partici-pate in Tibetan culturalactivities. In thehomes of those who identifythemselves asTibetans,picturesof the DalaiLama decor-ate walls or house altars. Not only the set-

tings,butthe situations,mediaandmethods

of expression vary, ranging from publi-cationsandpublicspeechesto street-songs,dance performances and initiation cere-monies.

When we set out to study 'politics' or'religion', we are already making use ofcategorieswe assumeare relevant,or maybe even take for granted.Implicit n thesecategories are some notions about theirboundariesand relations, i.e. what consti-tutes politics and how religion is differentfrom politics. As pointed out by Nicholas(1973) the Westernnotion of 'the political'relieson the dichotomybetweensacredandsecular,or spiritualand temporal.In otherwords, the political as a secularpursuitissomehowopposedto the sacredor religion.Whenwe are confrontedwithverydifferentnotions aboutthe political,e.g. in Asia andAfrica,we havedifficulties xplaining hesenotions. Nicholas (1973, p. 67) describesatypicalreactionto this: 'Culture' s invokedmainly o explainawayaberrationsromthe

expectedpatternsof 'politicaldevelopment'rather than treated as fundamentalto anunderstanding f what politicsis conceivedto be by the citizens of the new nations.NicholasfurtherarguesthatWesternsocialscienceis not conceptuallyprepared o dealwith this culturalcomponent,i.e. the struc-ture of meanings that evaluate politicalsymbolsandpoliticalacts.

The present article will, hopefully,providea contributiono the 'culturalanaly-sis' of politics. By reinvestigating he no

man'slandbetween politicsand religion, it

mayalsoshed freshlighton familiarwaysoflooking at nationalism.As the concept of'modern nationalism' is defined, how is'modernity' o be understood? f 'national-

ism' by definitionmustbe secular,the caseof Tibetan 'nationalism'mayproveto be anaberration.Before discussing ome theoriesanddefinitionsof nationalism, willpresentmymainsubject:the case of the 'culture'ofTibetanpolitics.

2. Historical Background: Religion andPolitics in Pre-Communist Tibet

2.1 Tibet as a Political Unit

BoundariesbetweenTibet and China werefirst establishedby treatyin the 8th centuryAD, when the forces of the Tibetanempiredominated the Silk Road lands and chal-lenged the ChineseTang rulers.The nameTibet1 henbecame associatednot onlywiththe core area around Lhoka and theYarlung Valley in CentralTibet, but withthe entire mountainregioncontrolledby thelineage of 'heavenly'kings (btsanpo) of theYarlung Dynasty. The name bod was orig-inally a name for CentralTibetor U-Tsang,whereasthe entire area of the 'three prov-inces' (Amdo, Khamand U-Tsang)came tobe known as bod chen or Great Tibet. Theterm Tibetan (bod pa) likewise evolvedfroma name for CentralTibetans, hroughadistinction between sedentary farmers and

nomads,to an expression or the people 'ofall regions' of Tibet, as exile Tibetansnowassert.2The term 'Tibet', a political devicein its own right, thus designates a territor-ially based politicalunit.

Since the People's Liberation ArmyinvadedTibet in 1950, the governmentofthe People's Republic of China has recog-nized the politicalunit of Tibet in the sensethat it has given 'Tibet Autonomous'status(whetheras 'Region' or 'Prefecture') o theareasroughlycorrespondingo GreatTibet.Thisis almostequivalent o the area claimedbythe Tibetangovernment-in-exile.

2.2 The Land of ReligionThe notionof the 'religious and', the polity

based on and legitimizedby religion, is re-



TibetanNationalism: The Politics of Religion 53

fleeted in the Tibetan concepts of chos srid

gnyis Idan, the dual religious and secular

system of government and of chos rgyal, the

king as protector and patron of religion.Chos

rgyal is a Tibetan expression for theBuddhist conception of Dharma king: the

king who turns the wheel of the law (dhar-

maraja). This conception of polity and

political legitimacy has a widespread canoni-cal basis in Buddhism throughout Asia.3 Inthe case of Tibet, the crucial status of theDalai Lama epitomized the political system.The Tibetan state continued the universalBuddhist paradigm of statehood, but col-

lapsed the two functions of patron of re-

ligion and head of religion into one - the

role of Dalai Lama (Schwartz, 1994a, p.735). The Dalai Lama was understood aschos rgyal in the dual role of political leaderand earthly manifestation of Tibet's protec-tor deity Chenrezig, the Buddha of Com-passion.

Dawa Norbu, a political scientist whogrew up in Central Tibet, maintains that thedistinction between Tibetan and non-Tibetan was a Buddhist differentiation be-tween believers and non-believers, and that'sub-national identities' prevailed in Tibet

before the Chinese invasion (Norbu, 1992a,p. 10). During interviews with elderly exileTibetans I similarly discovered that 'for-eigners' such as Nepalese, Chinese, Hui andMongols were distinguished as separategroups, but so were Amdowa, Tsangpa andother 'regional' identities. There was noclear distinction between 'national' andother identities based on place of origin.The most important distinction was in factaccording to belief. Those who shared the

belief in religion (chos) were identified asnang pa (literally 'insider'), regardless ofwhere they were born. According to Corlin(1975, pp. 150-153) the concept of bod(Tibet) describes the area of the Tibetanway of life, whereas chos (religion) de-scribes the cultural instrument that providesthe symbols of collective identification. Inother words, 'Tibet' describes a particularterritorial unit identified with and integratedby the Buddhist doctrine.

The clerical Buddhist traditions of Tibet

draw on a vast array of oral and ceremonial

as well as scriptural transmissions.4 Tibetan'folk religion' or 'religion of men' (mi chos)is based on oral traditions rather than scrip-tural (Stein, 1972). In these 'little traditions'

of popular beliefs, every community had itsown sacred spots, mountain deity, stupa,shrine or temple specific to the locality.These sacred centres defined the local com-munities, while Tibet in its entirety wasdefined by the sacred centre of Lhasa,where the Potala Hill was associated withthe sacred mountain at the centre of theworld, abode of the deity Chenrezig.

Lhasa was not only the largest city inTibet, but also the most important religiouscentre and centre of political power. The

Dalai Lama and his government (sde bagzhung) were based in the city itself, thelarge monasteries of Sera, Drepung andGanden were located close by, and the mostinfluential noblemen (sger pa) had theirestates in the core agricultural areas of theKyichu and Tsangpo river valleys. TheTibetan government administered most ofU-Tsang, and was expanding its influence inKham during the decades preceding theChinese occupation. These were the areasunder direct administration from Lhasa.The nomadic population of Amdo had anindependent tribal organization, whereasagricultural areas were controlled by thenoble families of Amdo and a few largemonasteries.

In addition to the somewhat weak govern-mental administration, political integrationwas furthered through the monastic system.Monasteries throughout Tibet were organ-ized as branches of the 'three seats' ofLhasa: Sera, Drepung and Ganden. The

'three seats' were also the monastic univer-sities of the Gelukpa school, providingreligious training for the high lamas of allGelukpa monasteries. Lhasa was thus acentre of religious pilgrimage as well as'education and administrative pilgrimage'.5

The Tibetan system of government wasknown as chos srid gnyis Idan or a 'com-bined religious and secular system'. Srid iscommonly translated as 'politics', whereaschos means religion. In the term chos srid,srid may be understood as 'undertakings for

the materialistic world' and chos as 'under-



54 AshildKolds

takings for the spiritual world' (Wangyal,1975, pp. 78-79). The term implies a dis-tinction between spiritual and worldlyaffairs, while at the same time emphasizingtheir interconnectedness. The ideal adminis-tration was seen as a balance between two

types of officials: monk officials and laynoble officials. This division in a sense re-

flected the accommodation of power be-tween the two sections of estate holders, themonasteries and the aristocracy. The third

major landholder was the government itself.At every level of administration, the dua-

lity of monk clerics and nobles was re-flected. The ministers of the cabinet thusincluded both lay and monk officials. At the

top of the hierarchy, the Dalai Lamabridged the gap between clerics and nobles.As a spiritual leader, he was the most im-

portant reincarnate lama (tulku), while hisparents received noble status and joined thehighest ranks of the Lhasa aristocracy. Theregent (rgyal tshab) who ruled during theminority of the Dalai Lama was also a rein-carnate lama.

The Tibetan polity was based on notionsof three different types of lineage. Fornobles and landholding farmers, duties to

the government and rights to land werepassed down through the lineage of descent.In the monastic community, the lineage ofdescent was replaced by the lineage ofteacher and disciple, and status accordingto ownership by stages of ordination.According to Buddhist doctrine, everyindividual has equal opportunity to attainenlightenment, regardless of his or her rankor hereditary status. The monk or nun thussymbolically starts a new life on entering the

monastic community, and is given a newname by the lama. The reincarnate tulkuepitomized the unimportance of hereditarystatus and represented a third kind oflineage: the lineage of reincarnation. Tulkuwere believed to be highly accomplishedspiritual masters who could control theirown rebirth and carry memories from theirpast lives. The identification of a child tulkudepended on these abilities, and on the in-terpretation of various supernatural signs.The tulku was in many if not most cases

found in a common family of farmers or

nomads. Once recognized, he immediatelyachieved the very highest monastic positionand inherited the property of his pre-decessors.

The Buddhist doctrine ofspiritual

causeand effect made hierarchy comprehensiblein the sense that a good rebirth could be

explained as a consequence of the meritaccumulated in past lives. The most effec-tual way of gaining merit was to become amonk or nun. For the laity, merit could be

gained from sponsoring religious activitiessuch as prayer ceremonies, the printing ofBuddhist scriptures or the construction of

religious monuments. The patronage of re-

ligion was likewise an important source of

legitimacy for secular leaders. The patrongained merit through economic support tothe monastic community, who in turn con-ducted ritual work for the benefit of 'all sen-tient beings'.

3. CurrentArenas of Political Discourse

3.1 Confronting the ChineseThe political language of present-day Tibethas evolved through the influence of andconfrontations with the Chinese Communistcolonizers and, since Liberalization,through the inspiration of Tibetans in exile.6Chinese administrators and their Tibetanhelpers have introduced a range of newterms and expressions, simultaneously cre-ating a new vocabulary for contestingChinese rule. Notions of equality, emanci-pation and progress have all been turnedagainst those who introduced them. From aTibetan point of view, the greatest successhas been attained in a dialogue based on

religious expressions.In 1950, the Tibetan Army was defeatedin Kham, and Tibet was occupied by the(Chinese) People's Liberation Army(PLA). The invasion itself had very littleimpact on the lives of ordinary Tibetans.Chinese military personnel in Tibet firstmade an effort to win the favour of theTibetan population, in particular, religiousleaders. However, outside Central Tibetland reforms and other so-called democraticreforms soon followed. These campaigns

were implemented in a spirit of total disre-



Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of Religion 55

gard, if not aggression, causing a spiral ofviolence.

Guerrilla groups were formed in Kham,

taking their name from an epitome for

Kham,Four Rivers Six

Ranges.The

guerril-las were also called 'Defenders of the Faith',an indication that religion had already be-come an important issue in the confron-tation between Tibetans and Chinese Com-munists. Violent resistance finally spread to

Lhasa, and in 1959 the Dalai Lama wasforced to escape to India, followed byanother approximately 80,000 Tibetan refu-

gees.After complete military control was

established throughout Tibet, the PRC

authorities gradually implemented a systemof exploitation which penetrated the lives ofall Tibetans. Monastic leaders were classi-fied as 'enemies of the state' and persecuted,along with members of the aristocracy,government officials and resistance leaders.Religious persecution was an important partof the process of dismantling the Tibetanpolitical system, soon followed by the 'redis-tribution' of land. Through the forced intro-duction of 'people's communes', Tibetansmallholders as well as large landowners

were required to give up their land to thelocal commune for the sake of Socialism.The suppression of religious practice wasparticularly harsh during the Cultural Rev-olution, although the processes of subjuga-tion continued relentlessly throughout the1960s and 1970s. The social, economic andnot least psychological scars left after thisperiod have still not healed.

In the wake of Liberalization, socialcontrol and 'separatist' activities have be-

come major concerns of the PRC leader-ship. Apart from civil unrest, there aregrowing problems concerning local-levelcorruption and transient populations. Liber-alization has meant new opportunities in theeconomic sphere, but also a widening gapbetween rich and poor. In Tibet, it hasmeant a relaxation towards religious ex-pression, and subsequently sharpened reac-tions against political dissent. Social in-equality has been growing along alreadyexisting ethnic lines, increasing the differ-

ences between Tibet and the prospering

Chinese provinces, between cities and ruralareas, and between Chinese and Tibetans.

Simultaneously, the Open Doors policy hasdone more than bring Holiday Inn to Lhasa.It has

broughta new awareness

about con-ditions outside China, while providing themeans for expressions of dissent to reach theoutside world.

The current religious revival in Tibetembodies the most important threat toChinese rule: the lack of popular support forthe Chinese government and its policies.More than anything else, the suppression of

religion has alienated the Tibetan peoplefrom their Chinese rulers. The suppressionof religion has become a metaphor for

Chinese repression in general, in a processwhere religious expressions have come tostand for resistance.

Since the 1980s, a few monasteries havebeen rebuilt and a select number of youngTibetans have been permitted to reviveTibetan religious tradition. Some of thesenew monks and nuns have gained the atten-tion of the international media as initiatorsof pro-independence demonstrations. InLhasa, demonstrations have been staged inthe Barkor, the pilgrimage route encirclingLhasa's 'Central Cathedral'. In the course ofthe Barkor demonstrations, the religious ex-pression of circumambulation has beenturned into a political statement of oppo-sition to Chinese authority.7

During the late 1980s, Chinese securityforces shot and killed a number of unarmeddemonstrators in the Barkor. Those who arearrested for demonstrating are still routinelytortured to extract 'confessions' (AmnestyInternational, 1993, p. 95). The symbolic ac-

complishments have thus been achieved at agreat personal risk, involving enormous sac-rifices for those who have been arrested.Sacrifice has in turn become an idealenhancing the appeal of demonstrating.8The value of sacrifice is explained in termsof Buddhist ethics associated with the imageof the altruistic Bodhisattva who hasreached enlightenment but continues to bereborn for the sake of helping others. TheDalai Lama is one such Bodhisattva.

Monks and nuns were traditionally vener-

ated for their ritual work for the common



56 Ashild Kolas

good. Sponsoring monks and nuns gave the

patron a share of the merit. In the same

way, political leaders gain moral legitimacy

by the patronage of religion. When monks

and nuns now protest against Chinese rule,this means that the Chinese 'patronage of

religion' is challenged and invariably loses

legitimacy.In the dialogue between Tibetans and

Chinese, there is a constant return to and

manipulation of religious language andidioms. These idioms pervaded discourse in

Tibet prior to the Chinese occupation, andare now being recreated and used in a new

political context. Religious idioms and

symbols are being manipulated by both

sides in various ways, and there seems to bea mutual understanding of their importance.A virtual 'battle for control' is being fought,where political expression in itself has be-come a matter of great significance. Thepractice of religion is ultimately a threat to

Chinese authority because it represents andenacts an alternative conception of society.From a Tibetan perspective, religion

provides a more legitimate set of values than

the Communist Party doctrine. Moral

power lies with the congregationof monks

and nuns, whereas physical power lies with

the security forces. Religion as politics is toopowerful to be disregarded.

One of the major problems for policy-

makers has been to allow religious ex-

pression while keeping political dissent atbay. The tourist business is an importantsource of income, and the reopening ofmajor monasteries and temples in Lhasaand Shigatse has been a very successful way

of attracting tourists. Moreover, the

Chinese government has been underincreasing international pressure, in particu-lar from the USA, to improve its human

rights record in Tibet. The Chinese govern-ment has been anxious to show the outsideworld that Tibetans are free to practice re-

ligion. Monk and nun demonstrators thus

pose a particular threat to the authorities.The harsh repression of demonstrations,including the martial law period betweenMarch 1989 and May 1990, illustrates theChinese leadership's apprehensions about

'opening up' and 'liberalization' policies.

New ideas about international law,human rights and democracy are currentlybeing expressed by politically-concernedTibetans, often through the idioms and vo-

cabulary of Tibetan Buddhism. The empha-sis on nonviolent protest is one aspect of this

political articulation. Demonstrators knowthat nonviolence is supported in 'foreigncountries', and choose their methods of pro-test accordingly. Although demonstratorsinvolve a Chinese audience of governmentofficials and, more directly, police and

security forces, the international media arein fact the main target of demonstrations.Tourism has provided a channel for dissemi-

nating information about demonstrations in

Lhasa to the outside world.While the Chinese Xinhua news agency

has lost its monopoly on information, a newkind of political awareness is spreading inTibet, partly as a result of contacts with theoutside world and Tibetans in exile. For twodecades (1959-1979) the southern bordersof Tibet were tightly closed. Although refu-gees still managed to escape, there was verylittle two-way traffic across the border.

Nepalese traders and All India Radio'sbroadcasting in Tibetan were the only chan-nels of information from the exile world to

Tibetans within the Bamboo Curtain. With

the coming of the Open Doors policy, travelrestrictions were relaxed. The result was notonly a flood of new refugees, but also a wide

range of opportunities for Tibetans to com-municate across the borders. Contacts be-tween relatives have been re-established,and pilgrimage to religious festivals in Indiahas been permitted.

During the Kalachakra festival at Bodh

Gaya in 1985, tens of thousands of pilgrimswere given official travel permits. Becauseof the large number of travellers, even thosewho lacked permits were able to cross theNepalese border unhindered. At Bodh

Gaya, they joined exile Tibetans listening tothe Dalai Lama's speeches, some directlyaddressing Tibetans in Tibet. Thesespeeches were available on tape, and werebrought back to Tibet for distribution.According to LAWASIA/TIN (1991, p. 43)912,782 products 'containing religious propa-

ganda with splittist content' were seized by




border customs officials between 1986 and1989. The list of items included 615 leafletsand 415 video tapes of the Dalai Lama.

Photos of the Dalai Lama in companywith Western

politicalleaders have been on

display in many temple altars, along withvarious Free Tibet items. Pocket-sized'Dalai Lama photos' are extremely popular,despite the fact that they have been period-ically banned and targets for confiscation.The Dalai Lama is gaining ground in Tibetas a political leader and a symbol. As

expressed by a young Lhasa monk in 1992:'The Chinese have Mao, we have the DalaiLama'.

In their Indian exile, the Dalai Lama and

his officials have created a system of govern-ment which is developing a reputation as aviable alternative to Chinese rule. In Tibet,

religious idioms derive their political mean-ing not only from the Pre-Communist reli-gio-political system and the confrontationbetween Buddhism and Communism, butfrom the use of these idioms in exile.

3.2 The Tibetan Community in ExileApproximately 90,000 Tibetans now live inIndia, the majority in planned refugee

settlements. For the Tibetan refugee com-munity, recreating and preserving thememories of Tibet is crucial for maintainingthe vision of Free Tibet as a common cause.These memories also provide the tools ofexpression, the language and idioms ofTibetan unity and identity. The heritage ofstories and rituals, sanctified by religion andincorporated in Tibetan language, forms abasis for expressing entirely new and rapidlychanging situations: the flight from Tibet

and life as refugees.The Dalai Lama as a personification ofthe protector deity of Tibet is the primarysymbol of Tibetan unity. As a reincarnationof the deity Chenrezig, the Dalai Lama isthe only unquestioned leader of the Tibetanpeople. Chenrezig not only provides conti-nuity to the history of Tibet, but epitomizesthe community of Tibetans itself. Thesethemes are repeatedly emphasized in public

ceremonies, the enactments of communityin exile.

The annual religious festivals are now ac-

companied by secular counterparts. Themost important of these is the annual com-memoration of the 1959 Lhasa uprising, the10 March Uprising Day. Uprising Day inDharamsala is celebrated at the

MainTemple, decorated with huge Tibetan flags,and features speeches by leading CTA rep-resentatives, the Dalai Lama's yearly state-

ment, the singing of the national anthem,marches by a drum and bugle corps, andfolk dances. The symbols of Uprising Dayare a mixture of old and more recent cre-

ations.'0 The British marches played bymilitary bands were first introduced duringthe 1920s, when British officers were

engaged in the training of Tibetan troops.

The national flag was designed in 1912,based on the formats of previous militaryflags, as a standard flag for all Tibetan mili-

tary defence establishments.Change is generally under-communicated

or ignored by exile administrators, whereascontinuity and the preservation of Tibetanculture are recurringthemes. An example ofthis is the government-in-exile itself, seen asthe direct continuation of the TibetanGovernment of the Dalai Lama at Lhasa.Similarly, ca. 165 monasteries and 8 nunner-ies have been 're-established' in India andNepal. In 1992, there were ca. 13,000 monksand 500 nuns in these monasteries and nun-neries, a third of whom had arrived since1980 as new refugees. The monasteries arestill vital institutions of the exile community,but their role in society has undergone im-portant changes. For example, monastic in-stitutions are no longer the sole keepers ofthe sacred scriptures and the mainstay ofTibetan medicine, astrology and art.

Through a range of new secular insti-tutions, Tibetan culture and identity isdefined and standardized. Tibetan textbooksand teachers likewise transmit a curriculumof 'Tibetaness'. In the name of preservationand tradition, notions of the 'Tibetan' arebeing formed and transformed. As an elitestrategy, the emphasis on Tibetan 'culture'and 'religion' is partly due to popularresponse, and partly a result of outside influ-ences. Indian authorities have imposedrestrictions on political activity, but not on

cultural and religious expression.



58 AshildKol&s

Tibetan elites in the exile administrationand large organizations play an importantrole as organizers of the Tibetan com-

munity, and of cultural institutions and

schools. During the 1960s, the first gener-ation of exile elites was made up mainly ofmonk scholars and members of the former

aristocracy who were educated in India.1'The noble families who were familiar with

India were among the first to leave Tibet

during the 1950s and settle in northernIndia. In 1960 many former officials and

monastic leaders joined the Dalai Lamawhen his headquarters at Dharamsala were

set up. They were appointed to manage thevarious offices and institutions which were

being established to administer aid to thethousands of empty-handed new arrivalsfrom Tibet.

Along with resettlement projects, one of

the top priorities of the exile administrationhas been to provide education for refugee

children. The goal has been to equipTibetan children to meet the 'modern

world', while at the same time 'keeping theTibetan heritage alive'. Through the

Tibetan boarding schools, Tibetan children

thus learn about their culture, through text-

books, prayer sessions, art classes, stagedevents and lectures rather than through par-ticipation in the activities of family life. Thetotal enrolment in Tibetan schools is high:

about 25,000 or 84% of Tibetan refugee

children according to Tibetan sources. In

comparison, the level of attendance for pri-

mary schools in Tibet is not more than 30%for rural areas.12 The Department of Edu-cation of the exile government recruits

teachers to all the Tibetan schools in India,

runs sponsorship programmes for children,arranges training courses for Tibetanteachers and supplies Tibetan textbooks tothe schools. Although the medium ofinstruction in Tibetan schools is English,Tibetan lessons are held daily, and Tibetanmusic and dance is part of the curriculum.

The Tibetan textbooks themselves and

other school activities are meant to providechildren with an understanding of Tibetan

history and traditions.Within a generation, modern education

has markedly changed the transmission of

knowledge. This change has been more pro-nounced in exile settlements than in Tibet

itself, where most children in rural areas

spend their childhood working along withtheir families. For

children in Tibet, beingTibetan is understood through the child-hood discoveries of 'us' and 'them' in theirimmediate environment. For Tibetan chil-dren in India, being Tibetan is taught at resi-dential schools and in the sheltered environ-ment of the Tibetan settlements, wheredifferences between Tibetans and Indiansare consciously played down, and the con-flict between Tibetans and Chinese is

emphasized and accentuated.

By the early 1970s, young Tibetans edu-

cated in the Tibetan schools in India weregraduating from colleges and universities. Anew generation of exile elites was takingshape. In the following years, a number ofnew institutions were established, such asthe Library of Tibetan Works and Archives,

the Information Office of H.H. the DalaiLama, the Department of Finance and the

Department of Health.The Library of Tibetan Works and

Archives has become an important insti-tution for the study of Tibetan history,including religious texts. Ancient docu-ments which have been brought out of Tibetare preserved in the archives. There is also amuseum which keeps a selection of sacredobjects. The library is often visited by pil-

grims from Tibet and Ladakh. In the even-ings, many residents of Dharamsala spend

their time circumambulatingthe library, andsome bring a small carpet and prostrate in

front of the doorway. The library has been

turned into a place of worship as well as a

cultural institution.In Tibetan religious practice there is

clearly an underlying emphasis on the valueof tradition itself. On the other hand, themuseums, libraries and institutes estab-lished by the government-in-exile aremodelled on Western ideas of cultural 'pres-

ervation'. The 'culture of Tibet' is in a sense

being constructed and objectified throughthe new institutions, and through the idea of

'culture' itself. Historical texts are beingreinterpreted, and new, secularized

accounts of the history of Tibet are being



Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of Religion 59

produced. New explanations and commentson rituals and religious traditions are also

being published. A relatively fluid mixtureof traditions is being bounded, fixed andrecorded much more efficiently than ever

before.The monasteries of Tibet were cultural

institutions in the sense that they wereinvolved in recording (in writing), reproduc-ing (in woodblock print) and storing scrip-tures, as well as passing down the teachingsto future generations. The stylized decor-ations and works of art of the monasteriesalso represented an objectification or pro-duction of symbols in that certain objectswere conventionally reproduced. However,

these symbols, works of art and teachingswere not perceived as specifically 'Tibetan'or belonging to the 'culture' of Tibetans,they were perceived as 'religious' or ratherbelonging to chos, the Buddha's teachings.

Maintaining and recreating a Tibetanidentity in exile involves a self-consciousdisplay of Tibetan Buddhist religion and anorganized construction of Tibetan culture.Publicly enacted religious expressionsenhance feelings of a common purposewithin the Tibetan community. Contained

within secular institutions, religious ex-pressions become the objects of Tibetan cul-ture which represent Tibetan identity to theoutside world.

3.3 Dealing with the WestIn their search for outside support, Tibetanelites have been learning the language ofinternational politics dominated by theWestern powers. Britain was the first West-ern power to be encountered by Tibetanleaders, in 1904 when Colonal Younghus-band and his armed expedition marchedinto Lhasa. As a counter-measure, Manchutroops subsequently launched an invasion inan effort to reclaim Tibet to the Chinesesphere of interest. With the ChineseNationalist take-over in 1912, Manchutroops were expelled from Tibet, and bothChina and Tibet for the first time officiallyasserted their 'independence'. The Westernconcept of 'independence' thus enteredTibetan elite discourse. The Thirteenth

Dalai Lama's 1912 proclamation not only

introduced the term 'independence', but

suggested the situation in which the termbecame significant:

Tibet is a country with rich natural resources; but it

is not scientifically advanced like other lands. Weare a small, religious, and independent nation. To

keep up with the rest of the world, we must defendour country. In view of past invasions by foreigners,our people may have to face certain difficulties,which they must disregard. To safeguard and main-tain the independence of our country, one and allshould voluntarily work hard.13

The 1913 'Treaty of Friendship andAlliance' between Tibet and Mongolia simi-

larly declares that 'Mongolia and Tibet,having freed themselves from the dynasty of

the Manchus and separated from China,have formed their own independentStates'.14 In the process of the 1913-14Simla Conference, Tibetan governmentofficials had a chance to learn the conven-tions of international politics, as defined bythe representatives of Great Britain. Britishinfluence continued, especially from 1921,when the Political Officer in Sikkim,Charles Bell, led an official mission toLhasa. Charles Bell was authorized to con-clude a new bilateral agreement with the

Tibetan government. According to theterms of this agreement, Britain undertookto 'grant to the Tibetan Governmentreasonable assistance in the protection anddevelopment of Tibet' (Praag, 1987, p. 64).

Although China and other countries ofthe Third World have been participants inthe growth of international law, the Westernworld has been able to choose the conven-tions and set the standards of validity. Afterthe Tibetan encounter with the UN in 1950,Tibetan leaders began to realize that

theywould be forced to argue their case accord-ing to these standards. In order to gain rec-ognition and support, they would have toconvince the world that Tibet had in factbeen a 'state' according to the legitimatedefinition, with a permanent population, adefined territory, government, and the ca-pacity to enter into relations with otherstates. Closely related to the concept of'permanent population' is the concept of'nationhood'.

The question of legitimate government



60 AshildKolas

has been constantly evolving during theTibetans' 30 years of exile, along withnotions of the Welfare State and its re-

sponsibilities. Some of the key politicalissues have also been taken

upin Tibetan

elite discourse, i.e. democracy, human

rights, development, peace and environ-mental protection. By learning to presenttheir case to a Western audience, Tibetans

have been increasingly successful in gainingattention and support. With the Dalai Lamain the lead, they have managed to create a

favourable impression of the people of Tibet

as propagators of Buddhist ethics.In the exile capitol of Dharamasala, con-

tact with Westerners is a part of everyday

life for many Tibetans. Through these con-tacts and through personal experience bytravelling, an increasing number of Tibetans

are acquainted with Western ideas and

methods of expression. In short, Tibetans

are learning more and more about how to

present their case successfully to a Western

audience.An important strategy in the struggle for

support has been the move towards democ-

racy. The Dalai Lama initiated the democ-

ratization process soon after his arrival in

India, with the first elections for theAssembly of Tibetan People's Deputies.This was of course an entirely new experi-

ence for the refugees. There were no candi-

dates, the voters simply wrote a name on a

piece of paper (Avedon, 1985, p. 138). Thefirst group of deputies gained experience by

working in the various departments. In 1963

a draft constitution was promulgated.There were probably various reasons for

initiating the democratization process, and I

am not implying that gaining legitimacy wasthe only one. However, the transition to-

wards democracy was certainly im-

plemented 'from above', and democratiza-tion no doubt helped present the Dalai

Lama as the true representative of the

Tibetan people.15 Democracy seems to be a

difficult question for Tibetans. When asked

about their views on democracy, a common

reply is that in a future independent Tibet

the Dalai Lama should have the complete

authority and there should be democracy.

There is no reason to doubt that the Dalai

Lama is needed as a leader, but someTibetans also maintain that the Dalai Lamais and has always been the only democraticleader of the Tibetan people. In fact, the

democratically elected Assembly haspre-sented the greatest opposition to changes in

the Dalai Lama's political role.The Charter of Tibetans-In-Exile, which

came into force in 1991, was a step further inthe direction of a democratic politicalsystem. The Charter maintains the DalaiLama's authority to dissolve the cabinet orremove ministers. However, other clauseslimit the authority of the Dalai Lama. For

example, one clause states that the execu-tive functions of the Dalai Lama shall be

exercised by the Council of Regency whenthe Tibetan Assembly, by more than two-thirds of its total members in consultationwith the Tibetan Supreme Justice Com-mission, decides that it is in the highestinterests of the Tibetan Administration andthe Tibetan people. Another clause statesthat any ordinances promulgated by theDalai Lama when the Assembly is not insession may be amended, altered or an-nulled by the Tibetan Assembly through de-liberation during their subsequent session.

The XIth Tibetan Assembly proposed thewithdrawal of precisely these two clauses,arguing that 'the people have been telling usthat since these two clauses run counter totheir hopes and aspirations, they must beamended if we want to be a true democracy'(Tibetan Bulletin, July-August 1992, p. 36).According to the same source, theAssembly's proposal was 'rejected' by theDalai Lama.

The Dalai Lama has had to take many

considerations into account. On the onehand, he relies on the support of the ma-jority of Tibetans, who look up to him as aBuddha of Compassion and saviour Bodhi-sattva. On the other hand, he relies on thesupport of Western governments, who donot understand his position in the Tibetancommunity, and measure representativity in

terms of a 'modern' political system. One of

the criteria of such a political system is the

separation of state and church. Within the

Tibetan community, the Dalai Lama fre-

quently consults the State Oracle, confirms




the authenticity of tulku rebirths, givesreligious teachings, blessings and initiations.

However, during visits to Western coun-

tries, he has approved of the complete sep-aration of

religiousinstitutions from the

system of government. He has frequentlystated that the future role of the Dalai Lamashould be purely religious.

The PRC diplomatic strategy has alwaysbeen to emphasize the religious role of theDalai Lama, and persuade other govern-ments to do the same. This has probablyaffected the premisses for much of the DalaiLama's diplomacy. In 1979, when the DalaiLama visited the Soviet Union and touredthe USA for the first time, he was welcomed

as a 'religious leader'. In this capacity he hasmet with a number of Christian religiousleaders, including pope John Paul II.

During the Dalai Lama's first visit to theUSA he was invited to speak at manychurches as well as Buddhist centres, andwas honoured with the Doctor's degree bytwo Christian universities.

Since the mid-1980s the Dalai Lama hasbeen gaining recognition not only as areligious leader, but as the exiled politicalleader of Tibet. In June 1987 the US House

of Representatives passed an amendmentdenouncing Chinese human rights violationsin Tibet. In addition, the Dalai Lama wasinvited to address the Human Rights Caucusof the US Congress, where in September1987 he presented his Five-Point PeacePlan. In 1988 the Tibetan leader was furtherinvited to speak at the European Parlia-ment, where he restated and expanded onhis Five-Point Peace Plan in what has beencalled the Strasbourg Proposal. When the

Dalai Lama visited Norway in October1988, he was still recognized there merely asa religious leader. He was invited privatelyby Buddhist organizations and Tibetans inNorway, and had no official meetings withNorwegian MPs or government representa-tives. One year later, the Nobel Peace Prizewas awarded the Dalai Lama as religiousand political leader of the Tibetan people.Needless to say, he was immediately con-gratulated by the Norwegian Prime Minis-ter.

In 1991 the United Nations 43rd Sub-

Commission on human rights passed thefirst UN resolution on Tibet since 1965. Theresolution expressed concern about 'con-

tinuing reports of violations of fundamentalhuman rights and freedoms', and added thatthese violations 'threaten the distinct cul-

tural, religious, and national identity of theTibetan people'. The suppression of the'distinctive cultural and religious life' of theTibetan people has likewise been the issueof UN resolutions on Tibet in 1959, 1961and 1965. For exile Tibetan leaders theseresolutions highlight the inferior currency of

religious and cultural identities, as opposedto national identity, as sources of politicallegitimacy.

4. Theories of NationalismWhile nationalism is not the only way to

legitimize statehood and claim rights to self-

determination, it is probably the most pre-dominant today. As such it has also been themain topic of academic discussion on seces-sionist movements.

The origin of nationalism is the classicissue which has preoccupied scholars (e.g.Best, 1982; Greenfeld, 1992; Kamenka,

1976; Kedourie, 1960 and 1970; Plamenatz,1976; Seton-Watson, 1977 inter alios).Although there seems to be a general agree-ment as to the 'when' of nationalism, theissue of the 'modernity' of nationalism is stilla topic of discussion. Anthony Smith hasreferred to this discussion as an oppositionbetween 'primordialists' and 'modernists'(Smith, 1986, pp. 7-13). More recently hehas distinguished between a 'primordialist'and an 'instrumentalist' approach, and

views of the nation as 'primordial' and'natural' vs. 'constructed' (Smith, 1988, pp.2-7; 1989; p. 341). According to Smith,Ernest Gellner (1983) and Benedict Ander-son (1983) are among the most importantadvocates of the 'modernist' view.

Gellner deals with nationalism as a socio-logical phenomenon rather than as dis-course about the legitimacy of power. Hebasically argues that nationalism is a naturaland necessary concomitant of industrialsociety, whereas agrarian society is unable

to produce the prerequisites of nationalism,



62 Ashild Kolas

especially in terms of mass education andcultural homogeneity. According to

Gellner, agrarian societies are not prone touse culture (i.e. language-based codes) to

define political units. He further claims thatIslam is unique in that it allows the use of a

pre-industrial great tradition of a clerisy as'the national, socially pervasive idiom andbelief of a new-style community' (Gellner,1983, p. 81).

The Tibetan case seems to be another

exception to Gellner's model. Before theChinese invasion in 1950, Tibetan Buddhist

'high culture' (whether as a code of conductor doctrine, a collection of writings, or a

society of monks and nuns) did in fact define

the political unit of Tibet. Gellner maintainsthat nationalism occurs when a high culture

pervades the whole of society, defines it,and needs to be sustained by the polity(1983, p. 18). Further, 'the imperative ofexo-socialization' is the main clue as to whystate and culture must be linked in the 'ageof nationalism' (1983, p. 38). I suggest thatin Tibet 'exo-socialization' took place in themonasteries, although the kind of education

acquired there was not oriented towards

production. State and culture were no doubtlinked, but not necessarily for material

purposes as such. The 'anachronism' ofTibet thus seems to point out importantflaws in Gellner's line of argument.

Gellner explains nationalism as an invari-able outcome of the development from'agrarian' to 'industrial society'. Gellner'saccount is thus modernist not only in a

chronological sense, but qualitatively.Moreover, mankind is described by Gellneras irreversibly committed to industrial

society, and the kind of cultural homogen-eity demanded by nationalism as one of theessential concomitants of industrial society(p. 39). For Gellner, nationalism is inherentin a certain set of social conditions; themutual relationship of a modern culture andstate springs inevitably from the require-ments of a modern economy (pp. 125, 140).This borders on historical determinism andin effect makes Gellner's nationalism asnatural as any primordialist could portray it.

Benedict Anderson's account of

'imagined communities' has no such impli-

cations. Nationalism is made possible byprint-capitalism, but it is not an unavoidable

consequence. In contrast to Gellner, Bene-dict Anderson is interested in the processes

by which the nation came to be imagined,and in explaining the attachmentpeople feelfor the inventions of their imaginations(Anderson, 1983, p. 129).

Anderson argues that the very possibilityof imagining the nation arose when andwhere three fundamental cultural concep-tions lost their 'axiomatic grip on men'sminds'. The first of these was the idea that a

particular script-language offered privilegedaccess to ontological truth. The second wasthe belief that society was naturally organ-

ized around and under high centres:monarchs who were persons apart fromother human beings and ruled by cosmologi-cal/divine dispensation. The third was a con-ception of temporality in which cosmologyand history were indistinguishable, the ori-gins of the world and of men essentiallyidentical. In place of these certainties print-capitalism made it possible for 'rapidlygrowing numbers of people to think aboutthemselves, and relate themselves to others,

in profoundly new ways' (Anderson, 1983,p. 40).Anderson's description of the ancient 'sac-

ral cultures' summarized above provides astriking characterization of old Tibetan'styles of imagining'. In Tibet, as in Ander-son's dynastic realm, populations were sub-jects, not citizens; the ruler derived his legit-imacy from divinity, not from populations;states were defined by centres, not legallydemarcated borders. Despite the accuracyofAnderson's description, an important

question remains. What are the conse-quences of these changes in the style of im-

agination, and do they necessarily mark theboundaries of nationalism? Ultimately, thisseems to be a question of how we definenationalism, and what we choose to includewithin the boundaries of our object of study.If nationalism as apolitical ideology is incom-

patible with religion by definition, national-ism inevitably becomes a matter of secular

politics, defined by its secular nature as such.Both Gellner and Anderson seem to be ap-plying this conception of nationalist politics.




The historicist claims of nationalist dis-course are apparently difficult to keep out ofthe academic discourse on nationalism.Claims to modernity are read as counter-claims to the nationalist's 'ancient and pro-mordial nation', whereas arguments for thenation's 'ethnic origins' are read as supportfor 'nationalist rhetoric'. Anthony Smith hasmade this problem clear in his discussion of

the 'myth of the "Modern Nation"', wherehe describes the academic effort to debunkthe claims of nationalism's own myth of the

nation, demythologizing the nation by view-

ing it through a neutral lens of sociologicaldetachment. According to Smith, thedramatic element in the myth's narrative is

the radical break between agrarian andindustrial, traditional and modern society,and it views human history as ultimately

progressive, if discontinuous (Smith, 1988,

pp. 6-7).Writing on the particular case of Tibet,

Dreyfus (1994) addresses a similar problem.According to Dreyfus, a suspicion ofnationalism is reflected in the recent litera-ture on the topic. A common tendency inthis literature has been to demythologizenationalism by arguing that, despite its

claim to represent and defend the originalroots of a people, nationalism is in fact amodern creation. Nationalism has thus beendepicted as a rootless 'invention of tra-dition', an artificial creation mythicallyretrojected into the past of a human com-munity in order to legitimize its presentpolitical organization. Dreyfus himselfattempts to exemplify a more diversified andinclusive understanding of nationalism byfocusing on the case of Tibet. He arguesthat although modern Tibetan nationalistideology idealizes its continuity with thepast and tends to primordialize its sense ofcommunity, such continuity does in factexist.

Continuity with the past is stronglyemphasized by Tibetans, and the way this isdone should be seriously taken into account.Recollecting the past is certainly not an acci-dental or spurious activity, it is a vital politi-cal tool. Symbolic construction, creativenegotiation and representation are inherent

aspects of all social life. The discourse of

ethnicity is neither an exception nor a

special case.

Excepting Dreyfus's article, most of theworks cited so far have either disregardednationalism outside of Europe altogether,or treated it as secondary or derivative. A

typical example is Kedourie's explanation ofnationalism as one of the European ideaswhich 'happened to be taken up overseas'and 'came to be known and adopted either

by the accident of transmission and diffusionor because they happened to be emphasizedor propagated for some reason in Europeitself' (Kedourie, 1970, p. 28).16In StateandNation in the Third World, Anthony Smithtries to correct this Eurocentric view by de-

scribing social and political change in Africaand Asia as the confrontation and interplayof Western ideals and forms with indigenousstructures and cultures (Smith, 1983, p. 122).

The Tibetan social scientist Dawa Norbuis one of the first writers to present a com-prehensive account and theory of ThirdWorld nationalism (Norbu, 1992b). Accord-ing to him, nationalism has both a tra-ditional and a modern component, and thesocial potency and mass appeal of national-ism resides in the unique combination of

two contrasting idea-systems. Traditionalculture provides the emotional power thatmystifies the rational mind, while egalitarianideology provides a rational framework forthe resolution of social problems (Norbu,1992b, p. 2). For Norbu, religion-inducedculture is a vital part of the traditional ele-ment of nationalism, and this is preciselywhy it is so important in political mobiliz-ation. Unlike most Western theorists,Norbu does not contrast religion andnationalism. Rather, he recognizes thatworld religions have the potential for masspolitics.

The questions posed in the present articleare not 'what is nationalism and how did itoriginate?' but rather 'how and why aresecular nationalist arguments, among otherkinds of arguments, a part of political dis-course?' For this purpose, 'nationalist argu-ments' are claims to ethnic nationhood as away of legitimizing claims to an independentstate. The concept of 'nation' thus implies a

concept of 'state'.



64 Ashild Kol&s

5. DiscussionBefore attempting an answer, it is importantto recognize that Tibetan religion and poli-tics are still closely intertwined. There is

thus an inherent difficulty in defining whichof the arguments for independence used byTibetans are 'nationalist arguments'. For

example, how are we to interpret the DalaiLama's role as protector deity of Tibet? Thisidiom has both a religious and a politicalsignificance which would be impossible to

separate.Before 1950, the idea of ethnic nation-

hood was represented in Tibetan political

language mainly through the idiom of theDalai Lama as the reincarnate protector

deity of Tibet. The lineage of the deityChenrezig goes back to the 'religious kings'and the mythical monkey forefather of theTibetan people, linking the principles of de-scent and reincarnation. Today, Chenrezigas the Dalai Lama remains the primarysymbol of the nation of Tibet, and the DalaiLama's unique position as spiritual andsecular leader still associates him with bothreligious collectivity and territorial politics.

Within the exile community, Tibetans

contestthe notion of 'Tibetanness' in vari-

ous ways. Religion (chos) comprises themain idiom of Tibetan identity; the sourceof unity between all Tibetans. Religion as asource of identity seems to be especially im-

portant to the uneducated, the elderly andrecent arrivals from Tibet. On the other

hand, the secular concept of Tibet (bod) is

now being established as the primary idiom

of identity, mainly as an elite project.

In the preceding pages I have describedthree different spheres of interaction where

distinct modes of communication or politicallanguages have developed. Mediating be-

tween two arenas of communication re-quires knowledge of both sets of conven-

tions, and the ability to translate betweendifferent political languages. Moreover,new concepts and expressions introduced

through communication with outsiders

gradually become incorporated into the

political vocabulary in use within the group.As an example, the word democracy

(dmangs gtso) was first introduced in Tibet

in the 1950s by Chinese and Tibetan cadres.

Since the 1980s, the Dalai Lama's demo-cratic system of government in exile hasserved as an example for Tibetans in Tibetwho contest Chinese rule as 'un-demo-

cratic'. In addition, the exile government'sclaims of democracy are being questionedby exile critics. The comparison of differentaudiences shows how expressions are inter-

preted according to different conventionsand contexts, and how symbols and idiomsare correspondingly used differently or re-

placed entirely according to the perceivedaudience. The dialogue itself affects the

meaning and use of political languages.Is nationhood important as a way of legiti-

mizing claims to an independent state and, if

so, which audience is this argumentaddressed to? Power relations are importantin determining which conventions are con-sidered relevant, which claims are acceptedas legitimate, and how these claims need tobe presented. Power relations also deter-mine the Tibetan struggle for outside sup-port. Tibetan elites need to adopt the lan-guage and political notions of the FirstWorld, and this affects the way religiousidioms are used in discourse aimed at aWestern audience.

In Tibet, a widespread sense of Tibetanidentity has become evident along with theincreasing Chinese presence. Despite this,ethnic nationalism in the secular sense hasnot become an important counter-argumentto Chinese rhetoric. The PRC authoritiesdepict the Chinese 'motherland' as a multi-national state. The 'Middle Kingdom' is notmeant to be comprised of 'one nation, onestate', but rather of a territory correspond-ing to the 'Chinese Empire'. Tibetans are

accepted as a nation or 'nationality', butaccording to the Chinese government thisdoes not give them the right to form a separ-ate state. Hence there is no reason forTibetans in Tibet to argue in terms ofnationalism, except towards an outsideWestern audience. Towards a Chineseaudience, claims to an independent state arebased on other terms, particularly onalternative versions of history and theperfect society. The 'Socialist Paradise' iscountered by the 'land of religion'. Young

monks and nuns, representatives of the tra-




ditional elite of Tibet, are thus among themost active advocates of independence inTibet.

On the other hand, educated English-

speakingexile elites have taken

upa

'modern' or secular variety of ethnicnationalism while propagating the Tibetancause specifically for a Western audience.

They are aware that Western notions of

legitimate government are based on claimsto nationhood. However, these are not the

only relevant claims. A range of other popu-lar issues are also brought into the dis-

course, and are sometimes more importantthan the question of nationhood. Western-

style education contributes to the spread of

'modern' nationalism, through the diffusionand development of a 'modern' political lan-

guage. As for the refugee Tibetans who lackthese skills of expression, their loyalties arestill towards religion (chos) rather thanTibet as a nation-state, not because they areuninterested in independence, but becausechos is their way of 'imagining Tibet'.

6. ConclusionThe role of religion needs to be re-examined

by theorists of nationalism, by posing newquestions about nationalist discourse andlooking at nationalism from new perspec-tives. It is not sufficient to treat religion asan obsolete phenomenon, as many theoristshave done. A typical example of thistendency is Gellner's comment that theagrarian world was 'far too well providedwith religions' for them all to survive 'evenin transmogrified form, as ethnic units'(1983, p. 72). Does the concept of national-ism have to be redefined, or do we include

only secular politics in our definition?Should we create a new subtype of national-ism to accommodate religious movements,or do they belong with the antiquated proto-nationalisms? As suggested in the presentarticle, we also need to rethink the questionof the appeal of nationalism, in particularthe importance of power relations.

NOTES

1. Tibetan: bod; Chinese: tubo (now transcribed as

tufan) or tubote.

2. For a description of the term bod pa as a distinctionbetween sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoral-ists, see Ekvall (1968), p. 23.

3. For a discussion of Buddhist kingship, see Tambiah

(1976, 1987).4. Samuel (1993) makes a distinction between clerical

Buddhism and shamanic Tantric Buddhism.5. This term is borrowed from Anderson (1983), ch.

7, where he describes the 'Last Wave' of national-ism in the colonial territories.

6. On the creation of a new political language, see R.D. Schwartz, 'Democracy, Tibetan Independenceand Protest Under Chinese Rule', The TibetJournal, vol. 17, no. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 3-27,and 'Nationalism and Human Rights in Tibet',Tibetan Review, vol. 36, no. 7, July 1991. pp. 15-17.

7. See Schwartz (1994b) for a more detailed dis-cussion of the current political role and motivationof monks and nuns.

8. See also Schwartz (1994a).9. The source of this information is 'The Slogan with a

77 Year Long History', in Hainan Island Review,August 1989, in Chinese.

10. For a more detailed description of the symbolismof Uprising Day, see Nowak (1984).

11. Since the 1920s some of the Lhasa nobles have senttheir children to English medium Christian mis-sionary boarding schools in Darjeeling and Kalim-pong.

12. I base this assessment on Grunfeld (1987), p. 165(citing official Chinese sources of 1976), and Gold-stein-Kyaga (1993), p. 147 (estimating on the basisof refugee interviews from 1989-90).

13. Cited in Shakabpa (1967), pp. 246-248.14. Cited in Praag (1987), pp. 320-321, reprinted from

F0535/16, no. 88, 1913.15. See also Edin (1992).16. See also Kedourie (1970), p. 61 on the way Indian

politicians and Asians and Africans in generalcame to speak a Western political idiom. Kedouriesuggests that most of these '. . . rather took it forgranted, accepted it unquestioningly, in the beliefit was the only possible language in the world . . .'.

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ASHILD KOLAS, b. 1961, Cand. Polit. in Social Anthropology (University of Oslo, 1994); assistant

at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (1993-94).

Documents

Kolas 1996 Tibetan Nationalism