Armed Actors, Violence andDemocracy in Latin America in the1990s: Introductory Notes

KEES KOONINGS1

Utrecht University

Democracy and violence in Latin America

In July 2001, the police forces of the Brazilian State of Bahia went on strike. Forsome commentators, rather than a strike it was a mutiny. Military and civil policeofficers occupied barracks and police stations, wielding their arms and wearingface-masks that made them look rather like members of the FARC or the EZLN(or ETA for than matter) than civil servants disputing a wage hike. As a result,violence erupted ± especially in the poorer districts of Salvador, the state capital ±and fear took hold of the city. Armed gangs roamed the streets and looted shops ±in some cases with men wearing police uniforms or insignia in their midst. After afew days, the federal government decided to deploy army troops to restore aminimum of order and a sense of safety for the frightened citizenry. The presspublished relieved reports of confraternization between the policemen and thefederal troops; earlier, fear of a violent confrontation between the two forces hadbeen aired. The `strike' in Bahia was settled, but police dissatisfaction wasspreading to other states. The federal government considered new legislation togive the army permanent policing prerogatives throughout the national territory.2

Despite its many problems, Brazil is ranked among those Latin Americancountries where democracy has taken hold. With the demise of militaryauthoritarianism and left-wing armed opposition, commitment to theconsolidation of democratic governance and the rule of law appears to havebecome widespread throughout the region during the past decade. Already in thelate 1970s the institutional dictatorships in South America had started to showfissures and cracks. From the mid-1980s onward, civil governments also came tothe fore in Central America, notably in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala.Although severely constrained by military tutelage and civil conflict, these newregimes proved to be one of the factors that facilitated Central American peace

ß 2001 Society for Latin American Studies. Published by Blackwell Publishers,108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 401

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1 Associate Professor of Development Studies at Utrecht University.2 This author was in Brazil during that month. See Jornal do Brasil, 28 July 2001 (`FH:

Exe rcito com poder policial', p. 3).

agreements in the 1990s. Throughout Latin America, during the 1990s emphasisshifted towards the mechanisms and conditions of democratic consolidation as,with a few exceptions, elected governments regularly succeeded one another.

Any effort to strike a balance of the results of democratic consolidation inLatin America at the beginning of the twenty-first century is bound to come tomixed conclusions. Open military rule has indeed been absent from the regionsince the demise of the latter-day `patriarchs' Pinochet and Stroessner more thanten years ago (Fitch, 1998). The formal apparatus of democratic governanceappears firmly in place and generally enjoys a sufficient degree of support amongvarious social categories and actors within political society (Diamond, Linz andLipset, 1995; Domõ nguez and Lowenthal, 1996). And what is more, the adoptionof often severe programs of economic adjustment seems so far not to have led tothe breakdown of democratic politics (Demmers, Ferna ndez Gilberto andHogenboom, 2001; Gwynne and Kay, 1999).

But three further issues related to the political and institutional dimensions ofdemocratisation are more problematic, at least in a number of countries (AguÈ eroand Stark, 1998). First, political culture and political practice within the newdemocracies of Latin America have often been criticised for retaining clearparticularistic (neo-patrimonial and personalistic) features. In addition, politicalculture in many Latin American countries combines a peculiar type of neo-populism with exclusionary technocracies and privileged and sociallyconservative elites. Second, the institutional prerogatives and political power ofthe military and related security forces within the domestic arena have not beensufficiently reduced in a number of countries (Fitch, 1998; Kruijt, this volume;Loveman, 1999; Silva, 2001). Finally, the stigma of social exclusion in variousguises (mass poverty, informality, disempowerment on the basis of class andcolour, and disrespect of citizenship rights of the underprivileged) casts seriousdoubts on the more substantial qualities of democratisation as a sociallytransformative proposition (Koonings and Kruijt, 1999; Me ndez, O'Donnell andPinheiro, 1999).

Against this background the articles brought together in this volume look atvarious dimensions of yet another but closely related problem of present-dayLatin America: the continuation of social and political violence and the ongoingpresence of so-called `armed actors'. One fundamental issue with respect todemocratic consolidation ± one that has been gaining more attention recently inthe international scholarly debate ± is the problem of regaining and maintainingthe monopoly of the legitimate use of force by accountable, democraticgovernments under civilian control. In a number of Latin American countries,this poses a problem despite the prevalence of formal political democracy. This isdue not only to the legacy of authoritarianism and state-induced repression, (left-wing) armed opposition, and open civil war, but also to the continuousproliferation of armed violence by a variety of groups sometimes linked to thestate or linked to social resistance or organised crime.

In theory, full democratic consolidation not only means the subordination ofthe security forces under civil rule. It requires the effective maintenance of the

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state's monopoly of the means of coercion and its deployment to secure publicorder, the rule of law, and citizenship rights on the basis of accountable normsand procedures. This ideal-type is far from established in many Latin Americancountries. Instead, social and political violence appears to have been maintainedeven in countries where democracy as a political form has made considerableheadway. It is hardly necessary to elaborate upon the relevance of this problemfor the long-term prospects of democratic governance. Wielding an effectivemonopoly over legitimate coercion is at the core of the modern nation-state.Democratic politics cannot be sustained unless the basic condition of the rule oflaw is upheld. Without it, governance becomes arbitrary and ineffective; supportfor any such regime, and indeed for the public cause itself, will be jeopardisedeven if democracy prevails in the electoral sense. In addition, democratic politicsimply, by definition, a peaceful encounter of diverging social interests throughinstitutional channels. The principle of non-violence is crucial for guaranteeingvoice, mobilisation and effective influence over policymaking.

Elsewhere we have referred to this phenomenon as the `new violence',although many of its manifestations are in fact far from new (Kruijt andKoonings, 1999: 12). This notion can make sense, at least as a heuristic tool, indelineating this specific configuration referred to above. The basic empiricalcharacteristic of the new violence is that it is increasingly available to a variety ofsocial actors and no longer solely a resource of elites or security forces. Its`newness' lies first and foremost in its contrast with the norms and expectationsderived from the democratisation process currently underway. Another clearcharacteristic is its variety: different forms of violence and conflict are subsumedunder this notion, such as everyday criminal and street violence, riots, socialcleansing, private account settling, police arbitrariness, paramilitary activities,post-Cold War guerrillas, etcetera. By definition, the new violence implies thefailure of the state's monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Instead, a variety ofactors takes to coercion and violence to pursue certain goals or simply toreproduce their own existence and way of life, or to pre-empt the usufruct byothers of rights acquired through participation in the democratic process.

Armed actors and the politics of coercion

This implies that Latin American democracies have not been able to freethemselves completely, or at all, from the presence of such armed actors. Thispresence means that political procedures, interest mobilisation, and the build-upof civil society within the canon of democratic governance may be ± and oftenhas been ± disrupted by the use of extra-legal and non-legitimate force. In thisparticular panopticum, different types of armed actors play out their part. Ipropose a simple typology.3

3 The following draws in part on Koonings (forthcoming).

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First, there are those armed actors that belong squarely in the public domain:the military, the security forces, and the police. Under ideal-typicalcircumstances, these forces are the tools of the use of legitimate coercion bydemocratic states, externally, against possible military opponents, and internally,against infractors of the rule of law and public order. As is shown by Kruijt inthis volume as well as by others (Koonings, forthcoming), these state-relatedarmed actors have in a number of cases been instrumental for the erosion or`freezing' of full democratisation. The military and the security and intelligenceforces have been doing this mainly through the preservation of semi- or extra-legal constraints on civil rule. The police, in many Latin American countries, isstill prone to arbitrariness in targeting social `enemies' rather than upholding therule of law, and to the use of violence rather than operational competence andrespect for citizens' rights (Chevigny, 1995; Soares, 2001).

Second, we see the proliferation of `extra-legal violence' in the name of `lawand order' but in the shadows and the interstices of the state, that is often used byprivate interests to pursue their goals (Huggins, 1991). In many cases a murkysymbiosis has developed between the official security forces and paramilitary andvigilante-type actors. This is clearly the case in the Colombian and Guatemalanconflicts, the Peruvian pax fujimoriana, or the particular methods of lawenforcement against the `marginal classes' in large Brazilian and other countries'cities (Pinheiro, 1996). In the specific case of rural `self-defence' patrols peculiarcombinations of subordination to state terrorism, particularism of localpowerholders, and more ore less justifiable instances of community defence,have emerged in countries such as Guatemala and Peru.

Third, old and new forms of guerrilla forces or opposition social movementsmay still employ violence as one of their options. Conventional guerrilla groupshave become scarce in post-Cold War Latin America (Wickham-Crowley, 1992;Gaspar, 1997) Shining Path and the guevarista Tupac Amaru revolutionarymovement in Peru have been significantly weakened, while the Central Americanguerrillas have been transformed into political forces after the peace settlementsin the region. Only in Colombia do left-wing guerrilla armies still bringconsiderable military power to bear against the state and paramilitary forces. Thetypical post-Cold War and `post-modern' guerrilla movement of the EZLN inSouthern Mexico has hardly done any fighting at all and should rather be seen asa guerrilla-turned social movement pursuing basic social and political reforms,alongside greater dignity for Mexico's long-ignored indigenous populations.Nevertheless subcomandante Marcos and his colleagues qualify as armed actorsbecause their initial show of force and their permanent use of guerrilla symbolismhave been an important aspect of their overall strategy.

Fourth, we have the phenomenon of `uncivil society' (Payne, 2000). In someinstances, social or political movements have shown a potential to radicalise, orin other words, have discovered that the use of force may be employed to back upeconomic or social claims. Violence is employed to make sure that particularisticinterests will not have to yield before the common good or because of theoperation of legitimate procedures. Clear examples are the tactics of the landless

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workers' movement in Brazil or Ecuador's indigenous movement in the 1980s and1990s.4 It is not surprising that these movements have been cited among the newsecurity threats identified by the military and the military police in thesecountries. In a number of cases there has been right-wing counter-reform violenceas well, most notably in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia and Brazil.5 Here,there is obvious room for different opinions on the acceptability of the use offorce depending on political or ideological preferences. For instance, many maydeem the coercive tactics of the MST in Brazil acceptable given the huge power ofthe landed elite and the application of blind repressive force by the military policeagainst the actions of the movement. It has become clear, however, that the use ofviolence always tends to erode the wider support for even the worthiest cause andis always prone to divert the orientation of such armed actors away fromconstructive politics.

Finally, large- and small-scale organised crime, linked to the internationaldrug trade or to local racketeering, has managed to mount parallel systems ofviolence and order on a national scale in countries such as Colombia and Mexico.This logic has been reproduced on a smaller scale by the drug bosses and theirgangs in the Brazilian favelas or by the maras, the criminal youth gangs in severalCentral American countries (Leeds, 1996; Peralva, 2000). In close relation to thisperversion of the rule of law, a myriad of armed actors already alluded to earlierhave come to the fore within the realm of everyday violence and the failure of theoverall rule of law These include street criminal gangs, vigilante and mob justice,civil patrols in poor neighbourhoods and rural communities, as well as thearbitrary and sometimes even criminal actions of police forces.

The contributions: armed actors in Guatemala, Peru andColombia6

These manifestations of the new violence and armed actors involved can be foundin varying degrees across the region. Throughout Latin America armed actorscontinue to put democratic political institutions and civil society under strain. Still,important differences in kind and degree exist among the countries of the region. In

4 Hammond (1999) makes this point with respect to the Brazilian landless workers'movement (MST).

5 See the thorough analysis by Payne (2000) of the Brazilian Rural Democratic Union, alandowners association with paramilitary dimensions set up to counter the threat ofland reform and MST invasions after 1985. She also refers to the Nicaraguan Contrasin the same study.

6 The contributions (with the exception of Kruijt's article) were originally presented asresearch papers at the session `Armed Actors: Security Forces, Militias, and Guerrillasin Latin America during the 1990s', organised by this author within the XXIIInternational LASA Congress in Miami, March 2000. I am grateful to the LASAProgramme Committee for facilitating the session and to the Netherlands Foundationfor the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO) and Utrecht University forproviding funds for the contributors' participation in this event.

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the three countries examined in particular in this volume, Guatemala, Peru andColombia, the consolidation of democratic politics is facing the challenge ofdealing with the fragmentation of armed actors that is reproducing situations ofviolence and fear, causing uncertainty as to the prospects of peace building anddemocratisation. The cases embrace a variety of such situations. Not only do weface the legacy and ongoing perversion of regimes ± and states ± by their ownsecurity forces, arbitrary rule, and terror (notably Peru and to a lesser degreeGuatemala), but also the continuing presence of armed actors who challenge thepolitical status-quo or have been undermining the institutional make-up of thepolity (Colombia and Peru). Notably in Peru and Guatemala, regimes of violencehave created new armed actors within the rural communities who continue toinfluence post-conflict reconstruction efforts. In Colombia the overall proliferationof violence not only consumes the body politic from the inside, but is also puttinghard-fought-for advances in terms of specific and localised entitlements in danger.

The contribution by Dirk Kruijt gives a vivid account of the persistence of thepolitical clout of official security forces in both formal and informal ways. Hemakes a basic distinction between two scenarios, that of gradual democratisation,and that of the emergence of neo-authoritarian regimes. In the latter cases, notablyin Peru and Colombia, self-legitimising interference of the security forces in formaldemocratic politics tends to lead to its eventual perversion (see also Koonings andKruijt, 2002) and submission to shady armed actors embedded in the core of thepolity. In a slightly different way, the continuation of the institutional weight of themilitary in Guatemala has led to a permanent situation of tutelage and to ruthlessactions in order to protect the interests of the corporation (as in the case of therecent investigation of the Gerardi murder).

Of the three countries, Guatemala also stands out because of the 1996comprehensive peace agreement that seeks to reform, inter alia, the securityforces, most notably the police. The article by Marie-Louise Glebbeek provides acritical assessment of this reform effort. Through looking at the overall results ofthe reform as well as at the details of the new recruitment and training practicesof the PolõÂ cia Nacional Civil, founded after the Peace Accords of 1996, she pointsat the difficulties involved in the transformation of the police into an armed actorthat can support peace-building, democratic governance and the rule of law.

The deployment of a new kind of police force in Guatemala, when effective,may be an important prerequisite for restoring a more peaceful and lawful orderat the local level. During the height of the civil war, local-level violence had beenamplified by the proliferation of self-defence patrols. Simone Remijnse shows inher contribution that, while the rural self-defence patrols were set up by themilitary to bolster their control over the countryside, they also played a role inlocal patterns of resource appropriation and political power, usually under thesway of leading local ladino families. The patrols were widely involved inarbitrary violence throughout the western highlands. Personal accounts recordedin the municipality of Joyabaj bring these episodes to life. At the same time, formany people, the memory or the threats of resurrection of the patrols continue toinstil fear and mistrust, despite their dismantling.

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Peasant patrols in Peru possibly had even more complex and more diverseorigins and trajectories than their Guatemalan counterparts. Mario Fumertonshows in his article that the early manifestations of rondas campesinas can to alarge extent be explained by growing peasant dissatisfaction with the coercionand violence inflicted upon them by Shining Path. When the state, in particularthe military, realised the potential of the peasant patrols, the latter were activelypromoted and incorporated in the official counter-insurgency strategy. Still, inmany cases these patrols continued to act as semi-autonomous armed actors;efforts to control them met with limited success, and patrol commanders took onlocal prominence in many communities. In the current `post-conflict' context,many patrols have sought to re-invent themselves as local developmentalcommittees (once again with the active support of the security forces). Thesecommittees find themselves at a disadvantage, however, vis-aÁ -vis other localactors such as the conventional authorities or NGOs.

Unlike Guatemala and Peru, nothing remotely resembling a post-conflictprocess seems to be imminent in Colombia. With the generalised violence of thelate 1980s and 1990s, the institutional integrity of the state, the legitimacy of thepolitical process, and the effectiveness of public policies, have been on (or past)the point of collapse. In Colombia, the use of raw force to further past interestshas been rampant. The state proved either incapable of stemming this tide or hasbeen actively involved, e.g. through alleged ties of politicians with the drug mafiaor of the military with paramilitary violence and their strategy of social cleansingon the basis of indiscriminate terror. Mieke Wouters shows that this spiral ofviolence has started to clash head-on with initiatives to secure certain rightsthrough peaceful and legal means. The black rural population of the westerndepartment of the Choco has been gaining collective land titles on the basis ofextensive mobilisation, making use of constitutional reforms established in 1991.These collective entitlements have been the object of paramilitary and guerrillaviolence since the mid-1990s up to the present day. The violence not onlyjeopardised the effective appropriation of communal resources but also theorganisational effort of the peasants and their nascent sense of ethnic identitythat lies at the very heart of the entitlement.

Taken together, the contributions in this volume disclose multiple ways inwhich the prevalence of armed actors and the legacy and continuation of violencecast shadows over democracy, the rule of law, and peaceful citizenship in LatinAmerican countries. Today, the biggest challenge for civilian, electedgovernments lies not so much in the maintenance of civil rule itself or in thesubordination of the formal security forces to democratic principles, althoughthis continues to be unfinished business in a number of countries. It lies rather inthe effective construction of the public monopoly of legal force, to be used topursue human security through the indiscriminate rule of law. Only in this waycan the current everyday arbitrariness and extra-legal violence inflicted by armedactors on their own people be dealt with.

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