L f JLessons from Japan: Fighting a Balance Sheet Recession

Richard C. KooChief Economist

Nomura Research InstituteTokyoy

May 2010

Exhibit 1. US Housing Prices Are Moving along the Japanese Experience

240

260

US: 10 Cities Composite Home Price Index

(U.S.: Jan. 2000=100, Japan: Dec. 1985=100) Futures

180

200

220

240

Composite Index FuturesJapan: Tokyo Area Condo Price 1

120

140

160

180

Japan: Osaka Area Condo Price 1

60

80

100

120

40

60

92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13

N 2 h i

77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98US

Japan

1

Note: per m 2, 5-month moving averageSources: Bloomberg, Real Estate Economic Institute, Japan, S&P, S&P/Case -Shiller® Home Price Indices, as of Apr. 13 , 2010

Exhibit 2. Drastic Rate Cuts Have Done Little to Revive Economies or House Pricesor House Prices

7

8(%)

Australia

6

7

UK

4

5

2

3 EU

US

Japan

0

1

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

2

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Sources: BOJ, FRB, ECB, BOE and RMB Australia. As of April 13, 2010.

Exhibit 3. Bursting of the Housing Bubble Weakened the U.S. Economy

3.5

4.0112

114(%, Seasonally adjusted, inverted)

Unemployment Rate( )

(2002=100, Seasonally adjusted)

4.5

5.0

5.5

6.0108

110

(right scale)

Industrial Production(left scale)

6.5

7.0

7.5104

106

8.0

8.5

9.0

9.598

100

102Last seen in 2003

L i 198310.0

10.5

11.094

96

98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

(Unemployment Rate) Last seen in 1983

(Industrial Production) Last seen in 1998

3

98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, FRB

Exhibit 4. Bursting of the Housing Bubble Weakened European EconomiesEuropean Economies

7.0115(%, Seasonally adjusted, inverted)(Seasonally adjusted, 2005=100)

7.5

8.0105

110Unemployment Rate

(right scale)

8.5

9 0

100

105

9.0

9.595 Last seen in 2000

10.0

10.585

90 Industrial Production(left scale)

Last seen in 1998

4

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Sources: Eurostat, Bloomberg

Exhibit 5. Japan’s Industrial Production and Employment also Sufferedalso Suffered

110

115

1 1

1.2(Seasonally adjusted, 2005=100)(Seasonally adjusted)

Industrial production (right scale) forecast

100

105

0 9

1.0

1.1

85

90

95

0.8

0.9

Last seen in 2002

75

80

85

0.6

0.7

Job offers to applicants ratio(left scale)

65

70

0.4

0.5

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Lowest on record

Last seen in 1983Last seen in 1999

5

Note: Forecasts are calculated from METI's survey on planned production.Sources: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare

Exhibit 6. Sharp Fall in Demand for Durables Hurt Japanese ExportersJapanese ExportersU.S. Real Consumption

135(03/1Q=100, Seasonally Adjusted)

125

130

Durables

Non-durables "Cash for Clunkers"

115

120

105

110

95

100Services

6

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bloomberg

Exhibit 7. U.S. Demand for Funds Is Falling even with Zero Interest Rates

20

30(D.I.)

ll fi

housing bubbleIT bubble

ll

0

10

small firms bubble collapsecollapse

-20

-10

f f

large and middle-market firms

-40

-30

business increasing demand for funds compared to 3 months ago

business decreasing demand for funds compared to 3 months ago

0

-501999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Source: Nomura Research Institute, based on FRB, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices.Note: D.I. are calculated f rom the answers to the question, "Apart f rom normal seasonal variation, how has demand for C&I loans

compared to 3 months ago

7

changed over the past three months?" D.I. = ("Substantially stronger" + "Moderately stronger"×0.5) - ("Moderately weaker"×0.5 + "Substantially weaker")

Exhibit 8. Euro Zone Demand for Funds Is Falling even with Ultra-Low Interest RatesUltra-Low Interest Rates

10

15(D.I.)

Small- andmedium-sized firms

0

5

-10

-5

Large-sized firms

-20

-15

business increasing demand for funds compared to 3 months ago

business decreasing demand for funds

0

-252003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Source: Nomura Research Institute, based on ECB, The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey .Note: D.I. are calculated from the answers to the question, "Over the past three months, how has the demand for loans or cred it

compared to 3 months ago

8

ote a e ca cu ated o t e a s e s to t e quest o , O e t e past t ee o t s, o as t e de a d o oa s o c ed tlines to enterprises changed at your bank, apart from normal seasonal fluctuations?" D.I. = ("Increased considerably" + "Increased somewhat" × 0.5) - ("Decreased somewhat"× 0.5 + "Decreased considerably")

Exhibit 9. Japan’s De-leveraging with Zero Interest Rates Lasted for 10 YearsLasted for 10 Years

1025

CD 3M rate

(% Nominal GDP, 4Q Moving Average) (%)

6

8

15

20

Borrowings from Financial Institutions (left scale)

Funds raised in Securities Markets (left scale)

(right scale)

2

4

5

10

-2

0

-5

0

Debt-financedbubble

Balance sheetrecession

-6

-4

-15

-10

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

(4 years) (16 years)

9

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09Sources: Bank of Japan, Cabinet Of f ice, Japan

Exhibit 10. Cumulative Capital Losses on Shares and Land since 1990 Reached $15 Trillion or 3 Years’ Worth of Japan’s GDP1990 Reached $15 Trillion, or 3 Years Worth of Japan s GDP

300

Shares Land

(Tril. yen)

(Capital Gain)

-300

0

-900

-600

¥1,560trillion

Equivalent to $45

trillion loss i h U S

-1200

in the U.S.

-1800

-1500

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

Land and Shares Combined (Capital Loss)

10

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

Source: Cabinet Office, Japan "National Accounts"

Exhibit 11. Japan’s GDP Grew in Spite of Massive Loss of Wealth and Private Sector De-leveragingand Private Sector De-leveraging

800

600(Tril.yen, Seasonally Adjusted) (Mar. 2000=100)

Nominal GDP

600

700

500

550Real GDP

(Left Scale)

(Left Scale)

400

500

400

450

Likely GDP Path w/o Government Action

Cumulative GDP 1990–2005Supported by Government

down87%

200

300

300

350

Last seen in 1973

Action:~ ¥2000 trillion

0

100

200

250

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

Land Price Index in Six Major Cities(Commercial, Right Scale)

11

Sources: Cabinet Office, Japan Real Estate Institute

Exhibit 12. Japanese Government Borrowed and Spent the Excess Savings of the Private Sector to Sustain GDPSavings of the Private Sector to Sustain GDP

100

110

Government spending

(Tril. yen)

80

90

100

Cumulative

60

70

Cumulative cyclical deficit1990–2005¥315 trillion

overall deficit ¥460

trillion40

50

Bubble collapse

20

30

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

So rce Ministr of Finance Japan

Tax revenuep

12

Source: Ministry of Finance, JapanNote: FY 2010 includes initial budget.

Exhibit 13. Large Deficits Do Not Mean Higher Interest Rates if the Government Is Borrowing and Spending Excess Private Sector Savings*Government Is Borrowing and Spending Excess Private Sector Savings

8

9

160

180

Balance Sheet Recession

(%)(% of GDP)

6

7

8

120

140

160JGB Outstanding as % of GDP (left scale)

Yields on 10-year JGB (right scale)

4

5

80

100

2

3

40

60

0

1

0

20

83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

13

* Household savings plus corporate debt repayment that are not borrowed by the private sectorSources: Cabinet Office, Japan, Japan Bond Trading Co., Japan Securities Dealers Association

Exhibit 14. Financial Surpluses of U.S. Households Are Now Greater than that of Japanese Householdsthan that of Japanese Households

14(% of GDP)

8

10

12

Japan

2

4

6

Shift of 9.1%

of GDP

4

-2

0

U.S.

-6

-4

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09Note: For Japan, fiscal year (April to March) is used. For U.S., calendar year is used.Sources: BoJ Flow of Funds FRB Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States

14

Sources: BoJ, Flow of Funds, FRB, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States

Exhibit 15. U.K. Private Sector Financial Surpluses Are Increasing Sharply

10

Financial Surplus or Deficit by Sector(as a ratio to nominal GDP, %)

(Financial Surplus)Households

4

6

8 Corporate Sector(Non-Financial Sector +

Financial Sector)

(Financial Surplus)

Rest of the World

Households

0

2

4

-6

-4

-2

-10

-8

87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

(Financial Deficit)

General Government

15

Source: Office for National Statistics, UKNote: For 2009 figures, 4 quarter averages ending with 3Q/2009 are used.

Exhibit 16. Premature Fiscal Reforms in 1997 and 2001 Weakened Economy Reduced Tax Revenue and Increased DeficitEconomy, Reduced Tax Revenue, and Increased Deficit

7070Tax RevenueBudget Deficit

Hashimotofiscal

f

Koizumifiscal

(Yen tril.) (Yen tril.)

Global Financial Obuchi-Mori

fiscal

50

60

50

60udget e c t reform reform Crisis

*

fiscalstimulus

30

40

30

40unnecessaryincrease in

deficit:¥97.6 tril.

10

20

10

20

0

10

0

10

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10(FY)

16

(FY)Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan*: estimated by MOF

Exhibit 17. Short- and Long-Term Trends of Global Economy

Lehman Shock Likely GDP PathBubble yWithout Lehman Shock

Weaker Demand

Burst

?

Weaker Demand from Private Sector

De-leveraging(A)

Economic weakness from private-sector

de-leveraging ?

(B)Economic weakness

Actual Path

C rrent Location

Stronger Demand from Government's

Fiscal Stimulus

(B)from policy mistake on Lehman

17

Source: Nomura Research InstituteCurrent Location

Exhibit 18. Features of Balance Sheet Recession

A balance sheet recession emerges after the bursting of a debt-financed asset price bubble that leaves many private-sectorb l h t ith li biliti th tbalance sheets with more liabilities than assets.

In order to repair their balance sheets, private sector moves awayfrom profit maximization to debt minimization.

Private sector de leveraging even with zero interest rates Private sector de-leveraging, even with zero interest rates,means there will be no borrowers of newly generated savingsand debt repayments. With no borrowers, the economy willcontinue to lose aggregate demand equivalent to the sum ofunborrowed savings and debt repaymentunborrowed savings and debt repayment.

The economy will not enter self-sustaining growth until privatesector balance sheets are repaired.

Fiscal consolidation should begin only after it is ascertained that Fiscal consolidation should begin only after it is ascertained thatfunds NOT borrowed by the government will be borrowed andspent by the private sector.

18

Exhibit 19. Four Kinds of Banking Crises and their Remedies

Normal demand forfunds

Weak or non-existentdemand for funds

Localized(I)

Quick NPL* disposalPursue accountability

(III)Normal NPL disposalPursue accountabilityBanking

C i i

Systemic(II)

Slow NPL disposalFat spread

(IV)Slow NPL disposal

Capital injection

Crisis

Type (I): 1989 S&L crisis

Type (II): 1982 Latin America debt crisis, nationwide credit crunch in the U.S. between 1991 and 1993, and the Nordic banking crisis in the early 1990s

Type (III): Japan prior to 1995 (for example, problems at two credit cooperatives)

Type (IV): Japan since 1996, Taiwan since 2000, the U.S. Great Depression of the 1930s, and U S and U K subprime crisis since 2007

19

and U.S. and U.K. subprime crisis since 2007Source: Richard Koo, The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore, 2008

*Non-Performing Loan

Exhibit 20. Japanese Banks Took Losses on NPLs Quickly

14

16(¥ tril.)

Actual Losses Incurred on NPLs1 Total NPL Losses

¥1021 tril. or $1.1 tril. @ ¥90 = $1

10

12

TakenakaEra

¥ 11.7 tril.

@ ¥90 $1

Equivalent to$3 1 t il

6

8$3.1 tril.

in the U.S.

L f U S

2

4Losses for U.S.

Financials2

$2.7 tril.

092 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

(FY)

1: Includes commercial banks only; investment banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions are NOT included.2: Based on IMF Global Financial Stability Report (Apr. 2009). Includes all financial institutions, including

20

y p ( p ) , ghedge funds.Source: Financial Services Agency, Japan

Exhibit 21. The West Fooled Itself by Looking at NPL Data NOT Adjusted for Loan-Loss ReservesNOT Adjusted for Loan-Loss Reserves

40

45

NPLs of Japanese Banks

(¥ tril.)

Takenakaera

30

35

20

25

10

15

0

5

92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

21

Source: Financial Services Agency, Japan (FY)

Exhibit 22. Inflation a Distant Prospect: Monetary Aggregates Behave Differently under Balance Sheet RecessionBehave Differently under Balance Sheet Recession

300

(1990/1Q=100, Seasonally adjusted)Quantitative

Easing

Japan

250

300Monetary BaseMoney Supply (M2+CD)Bank Credit Extended to the Private Sector

Textbook Balance Sheet

150

200 Economics(Monetary Policy

Ef fective)

Recession(Monetary Policy NOT Ef fective)

Down37%

50

100

1990/1Q

070 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

Note: Private sector borrowings seasonally adjusted by Nomura, adjustments made for discontinuities in line with BOJ's "Monetary Survey"

22

Source: Bank of Japan

Exhibit 23. Inflation a Distant Prospect: Monetary Aggregates Behave Differently under Balance Sheet RecessionBehave Differently under Balance Sheet Recession

U.S.

260 (Aug. 2008 =100, Seasonally Adjusted)

210

220

230

240

250 Monetary BaseMoney Supply (M2)Loans and Leases in Bank Credit

170

180

190

200

210

130

140

150

160

Down

90

100

110

120

08/1 08/3 08/5 08/7 08/9 08/11 09/1 09/3 09/5 09/7 09/9 09/11 10/1 10/3

17%

23

08/1 08/3 08/5 08/7 08/9 08/11 09/1 09/3 09/5 09/7 09/9 09/11 10/1 10/3

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Exhibit 24. Inflation a Distant Prospect: Monetary Aggregates Behave Differently under Balance Sheet RecessionBehave Differently under Balance Sheet Recession

U.K.

270280

(Aug. 2008 =100, Seasonally Adjusted*)

220 230 240 250 260 270

Reserve Balances + Notes & CoinM4 excluding intermediate OFCs**M4 Lending excluding intermediate OFCs

160170 180 190 200 210

08/8

110 120 130 140 150 160

Down8%

70 80 90

100

07/1 07/4 07/7 07/10 08/1 08/4 08/7 08/10 09/1 09/4 09/7 09/10 10/1S B k f E l d

24

Source: Bank of England*Reserve Balances data are only seasonally unadjusted

**Other Financial Corporations

Exhibit 25. Japan’s Money Supply Has Been Kept Up by Government BorrowingsGovernment BorrowingsBalance Sheets of Banks in Japan

December 2007December 1998Assets Liabilities

Assets Liabilities

CreditExtended tothe Private

Sector¥601.6 tril.

Money Supply(M2+CD)

¥621.5 tril.

CreditExtended tothe Private

Sector¥501.8 tril.

(-99.8)Money Supply

(M2+CD)¥744.4 tril.

(+122 9)

CreditExtended to thePublic Sector

Credit Extendedto the Public

(+122.9)

¥247.2 tril.(+106.8)

Foreign assets(net)

¥74.1 tril.(+41.4)

Foreign Assets(net)

¥32.7 tril.

to the PublicSector

¥140.4 tril.

Other Liabilities(net)

¥78.7 tril.(-74.5)

Other Liabilities(net)

¥153.2 tril.

Total Assets ¥823 1 tril (+48 4)Total Assets ¥774 7 tril Total Assets ¥823.1 tril. (+48.4)Total Assets ¥774.7 tril.

Source: Bank of Japan "Monetary Survey"

25

Exhibit 26. Post-1933 U.S. Money Supply Growth Was also Made Possible by Government BorrowingsPossible by Government Borrowings

June 1929 Assets Liabilities

June 1936 Assets Liabilities

Balance Sheets of All Member Banks

CreditExtended tothe Private

Deposits$32.18 bil.

CreditExtended

to thePrivateSector

$15.71 bil.C

June 1933 Assets Liabilities

Deposits$34.10 bil.

the PrivateSector

$29.63 bil.

$(-0.09)Credit

Extended tothe Private

Sector$15.80 bil.

(-13.83)

Deposits$23.36 bil.

(-8.82)

(+10.74)

Credit

CreditExtended

to thePublicSector

(= Money Supply)

CreditExtended tothe Public

Sector$5.45 bil.

OtherLiabilities$6.93 bil.

CreditExtended

to thePublicSector

$8.63 bil.(+3.18)

$16.30 bil.(+7.67)

Other

OtherAssets

$8.91 bil.(+2.54)

OtherLiabilities$4.84 bil.

(-2 09)

OtherLiabilities$7.19 bil.(+2 35)

Other Assets$8.02 bil.

Reserves$2.36 bil.

Capital$6.35 bil.

Total Assets $45.46 bil. Total Assets $33.04 bil. (-12.42) Total Assets $46.53 bil. (+13.49)

Assets$6.37 bil.

(-1.65)Reserves$2.24 bil.

(-0.12)

Reserves$5.61 bil.(+3.37)

(-2.09) (+2.35)

Capital$4.84 bil.

(-1.51)

Capital$5.24 bil.(+0.40)

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1976) Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914-1941 pp.72-79

26

Exhibit 27. New Deal Policies Doubled Fiscal Expenditures without Increasing Budget Deficit*without Increasing Budget Deficit

14000 28($ mn, June) (%)

New Deal policies

8000

10000

12000

16

20

24Expenditures (left scale)Unemployment rate

(right scale)

4000

6000

8

12

-2000

0

2000

-4

0

4Revenue (left scale)

Budget deficit as % ofGNP (right scale)

-400023 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

-8

GNP (right scale)

* As a percentage of GDPS B d f G f th F d l R S t (1976) V l 1 513 U S B f th C (1975)

27

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1976), Vol. 1, p. 513; U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), p.229

Exhibit 28. German Fiscal Stimulus Reduced Unemployment Dramatically

30

35

30

35(DM bn) （%）

Governmentdit

Nazis come topower

20

25

30

20

25

30

Unemployment rate( i ht l )

expenditure(left scale)

power

10

15

10

15(right scale)

Governmentrevenue

(left scale)

Fiscal deficit as %of GDP

(right scale)

-5

0

5

-5

0

5

N.A. N.A.

-101930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

-10

Source: Mitchell (1975), p. 170; Flora et al. (1987), p. 350; Deutsche Bundesbank (1976).

28

Exhibit 29. The Exit Problem: Debt Rejection Syndrome It Took U S 30 Years to Normalize Interest Rate after 1929It Took U.S. 30 Years to Normalize Interest Rate after 1929

8

9

US government bond yieldsPrime BA 90days

(%)

6

7

8 Prime BA, 90daysUS government bond yields 1920-29 average (4.09%, June 1959)Prime BA, 90days 1920-29 average (4.13%, September 1959)

Oct '29 NY StockMarket Crash

Jun '50 KoreanWar

Dec '41 PearlHarbor Attack

4

5

6 WarHarbor Attack

'33～New Deal

2

3

0

1

1920 21 2223 24 2526 27 2829 30 3132 33 3435 36 3738 39 4041 42 4344 45 4647 48 4950 51 5253 54 5556 57 5859 60

Source: FRB, Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914-1970 Vol.1, pp.450-451 and 468-471, Vol.2, pp.674-676 and 720-727

29

Exhibit 30. Yin Yang Cycle of Bubbles and Balance Sheet Recessions

BubbleYin (Shadow) Yang (Light)

(1) Monetary policy is tightened, leading the bubble to collapse.

(8) With the economy healthy,the private sector regains its vigour,

f

(9) Overconfident private sector triggers a bubble.

(2) Collapse in asset prices leaves private sectorwith excess liabilities,

forcing it into debt minimization mode.

U.S.

and confidence returns.

(7) Monetary policy becomes the maineconomic tool, while deficit reduction

becomes the top fiscal priority.

(3) With everybody paying down debt,monetary policy stops working.

Fiscal policy becomes the main economic toolto maintain demand.

o c g t to debt at o odeThe economy falls into a balance sheet recession.

U.K.

Spain

(6) Private sector fund demand recovers,and monetary policy starts working again.

Fiscal policy begins to crowd out private investment.

(4) Eventually, private sector finishes its debt repayments,ending the balance sheet recession.

But it still has a phobia about borrowing, which keepsinterest rates low and the economy less than fully vibrant.

Economy prone to mini-bubbles.Germany

Source: Richard Koo, The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore, April 2008 p.160.:

(5) Private sector phobia towards borrowing gradually disappears,and it takes a more bullish stance towards fundraising.

y

Japan

30

, y p , y , g p , p p

Exhibit 31. Contrast Between Yin and Yang Phases of a Cycle

Yang YinTextbook economy Balance sheet recession1) Phenomenon Textbook economy Balance sheet recession

Adam Smith's "invisible hand" Fallacy of composition

Assets > Liabilities Assets < Liabilities

Profit maximization Debt minimization

1) Phenomenon

2) Fundamental driver

3) Corporate financial condition

4) Behavioral principle

Greatest good for greatest number Depression if left unattended

Effective Ineffective (liquidity trap)

Counterproductive (crowding-out) Effective

Inflationary Deflationary

5) Outcome

6) Monetary policy

7) Fiscal policy

8) Prices Inflationary Deflationary

Normal Very low

Virtue Vice (paradox of thrift)

a) Localized Quick NPL disposal Normal NPL disposal

8) Prices

9) Interest rates

10) Savings

a) Localized Pursue accountability Pursue accountability

b) Systemic Slow NPL disposalFat spread

Slow NPL disposalCapital injection

Source: Richard Koo, The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession ,John Wiley & Sons Singapore 2008

11) Remedy forBanking Crisis

John Wiley & Sons, Singapore, 2008

31