Korean War Dissemination of Combat Information 1 Oct 1953

8/7/2019 Korean War Dissemination of Combat Information 1 Oct 1953

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UNCLASSIFIED OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES

Fo r t Monroe, VirginiaATTNG-26 350. 05/12(DOCI)(C)(l Oct 53) I October 1953

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat ~ n f o r m a t i o n

mation, the inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded for evaluation and necessaryac t ion . It may be appropriate, in certain cases, to take action upon a single extracted i tem; :in others , i t may be de sirahle to develop a cross-sec t ion of accumulated extracts on a part icular subject before i ~ i t i a t i n g action; and, often the extracted i tem se rve s to reaffirm .our doctrines and techniques.

2. Copies a re furnished to other mil, tary agencies to keep them informed concerning theater problems from the front l ine through the logist ical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which are classified SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user , this Office ass igns each extracted i tem the lowe st classificat ion, compatible with security. No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any port ion of the extracted remarks , so that none of the original intent is lost.

4. Combat information EXTRACTS which are applicable to t rainin g at the company/bat tery level appear in Army F ield Force sTRAIN1NG BULLETINS.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:DEClAS 'FlED BY AUnlORI

/ 9 2 ~ 2 ; : - - . Q f.,

I Inel /T J. SMITH AWe LOG #Extrac ts , I tems C ((olonel, AGC No 61 thru 94 Asst Adjutant General 53-10- 4 5 - ~

DISTRIBUTION: eN 82522(Over)

Army-OCAFF-3730. Copy I -of.- ~ - - - - C o P i e s : '

. .

TO: See distribution

1. In accordance with SR 525 -85 - 5, Proce ssing of Combat Infor
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3 ACOFS, G -1 . DA 3 ACOFS, G-2. DA 10 The Surgeon General15 ACOFS. G-3. DA 4 Chief of Transportation20 ACOFS. G-4, DA OCAFF 1 The Adjutant General 1 Gl 2 Chief of Chaplains 1 G2 10 Chief Chemical Officer 20 G3 10 Chief of Engineers 2 G4 2 Chief of Finance 5 DT 2 Chief of Information I Ch 2 The Inspector General I Cml 2 The Judge Advocate Genera l 1 Compt 2 Chief of Mili tary History I Engr 2 Chief, National Guard Bureau 1 Ir.fo

10 Chief of Ordnance 1 Med 2 The Provos t Marshal General 1 Ord 10 The Quarte rmas te r Genera l I PM 2 Executive for Reserve and 1 QM ROTC Affai rs I Sig 10 Chief Signal Officer 1 Trans COPIES FURNISHED:

13 4 TAG (40 CG, US Army Force s , Fa r Eas t (Main); 44 CINC,US Army, Europe; 10 ea CGl s , other major oversea commands)

CGls2 Fi r s t Army2 Second Army2 Third Army

10 Fourth Army2 Fifth Army - '-: C 'c2 Sixth Army : --- -

);4 Army AA Command -: - (X)2 Military Distr ict of Washington :A

__ ..J2 Tactical Air Command C 'C r0 r2 The Armored Center , ,2 The Arti l lery Center r; 'V1 ,, c---:2 The Infantry Center r" l J l c;"1 Mountain & Cold Weather Tng Command I Chairman. Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Chief of Staff. Dept of the Army 2 Chief of Naval Operat ions. Dept of the Navy 2 Comdt, US Marine Corps

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t ~ " i Q J t 7 _ r i i i ; "UNCLASSIFIED 2 "J $ "" SJi" J 3ATTNG-26 350. 05!12(DOCI)(C)(1 Oct 53) 1 October 1953Subject: Dissemination of Combat InformationCOPIES FURNISHED: (Cont)

2 Chief, Army Advisory Gp, Air Command and Staff School,Air University1 A F F LNO, Army Cm l Cen2 Comdt of Cadets, US Military Academy

Comdt1 Armed Forces Staff College2 Marine Corps School2 USAF Air-Ground Operations School2 C o u n t e ~ Intel l igence Corps School2 The Provost Marshal General 's School

Army War CollegeCGSCArmy General School2 The Armored School2 The Artil lery School

2 The Infantry School2 Army Aviation School2 Asst Comdt, The Artil lery SchoolAA&GM Branch

2 C h i ~ f , Army Security Agency1 Officer in Charge, Atlantic Fleet Intelligence Cen,

Attn: Ground Forces OfficerI Director , Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Secy of Defense,Attn: Col Train

PresI Bd No 1, OCAFF1 Bd No 2, OCAFF1 Bd No 3, OCAFFI Bd No 4, OCAFF1 CO, Arctic Tes t Branch, OCAFF

Chiefs1 A FF HRU No II AFF HRU No 21 D ir of Special Weapons Developments, A FFI Dir, Air University Library

OCAFF1 DCOFS2 Combat Developments OCAFF4 Combat A rm s Advisory Gp 5 G3(26 )2 Bri t ish Liaison Officer I AG Records2 Canadian Liaison Officer 11 Extra copies

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UNCLASSIFIED (a.STRICTED) ITEM NO 61

COUNTERFIRE EXPEIUMENT. - An experiment wail made usingthe direct support artillery battalion FDC plotting center as a mastercounterfire plotting center. The infantry counterfire platoon plotting cente r remained in the regimental FSCC and forwarded i ts information to thedirect support artillery plotting center. The artillery plotting center thencombined this information with information sources such as countermortarradar, and forwarded it directly to the artillery firing batteries and to th eheavy mortar FDC. The system has these advantages:

a. Avoids maintaining two co-equal plotting centers, one infantry and one artillery, and eliminates the need for time-consuming exchange of information.

b. Retains infantry control of the counterfire platoon. and insure.direct access of regimental S2 to shell fire intelligence. by retaining theinfantry counterfire plotting center in the infantry regimental FSCe.

c. Simplifies forwarding of counterfire information to heavy mortars. (Command Report - 32d In f Regt - Feb 53.)rOCAFF Comment: FM states that the artillery commander co

ordinates countermortar activities; however. he does not coordinate infantry counterfire operations against direct fire weapons. While thesystem used undoubtedly had value in this particular situation. the overall adoption of such a system is not deemed des i rableJ(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 62

EMPLOYMENT OF COUNTERFIRE PLATOON IN STATIC DEFENSE.Experience indicated the locating of the counterfire plotting center in theregimental FSCC is sound. It improved control of counterfire operations.exploited available FSeC communications. and p r o v i ~ e d rapid reportingof shell fire directly to the regimental S2. Direct l ine. aOre required toeach OP in spite of lateral communications between Opls; direct l ine.were laid to the remaining three counterfire OPls.

Study of the location of sound OPI.,during the period indicated that. ix sets of sound equipment allocated by T /O&E of a counterfire platoonare inadequate to efficiently cover a 10.000 yard regimental front. Toavoid leaving large areas of the front uncovered. the machines were placed1.000 or more yards apart making it impossible to operate them in pai r .INCLOSURE

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in the manner for which they are de signed. To overcome this difficulty,the counterfire platoon employed nine teams, including three attachedteams from the re serve regiment . .Comparison of the re sults of February ' soperat ions (nine OP's ) with J a ~ u a r y ' s operat ions (six O P' s , none paired)follows:Month Incoming Rds Azimuths Intersect ions:

2-way 3-way 4-wayJanFeb

52475789

474704

67182

31 2

o1

Trials were made with paired machines and with three machinesworking together. Resul ts indicated that , in t er ra in favorable for thisemployment , the three machine employment is m ore efficient than thepaired employment . The opera tor of the center machine was used as thecontrol opera tor . (Command Report - 32 d Inf Regt - Jan & Feb 53 )

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 63PATROLLING PRINCIPLES. - The present confl ict is fought almost

entirely forward of the MLR by' relatively small groups of men in brief butsavage patrol clashes. Lessons learned follow:

Higher commanders mus t impr es s the r i f lemen with the vital importance and nece ssity of accompl ishing the pat ro l mission by visitingpatro ls during rehearsals . inspections and briefings.

The patrol must be provided with every possible support and facility in i ts accomplishment of th e mission to include:

a. Aeria l reconnaissance.b. Recent aer ia l photographs and specia l maps of routes, objec

t ive s and surrounding terrain .c. Fire support to include i l lumination and close support by air

craf t i f de sired.d. Special equipment such as sniperscopes, flame t h r o w ~ r s , mine

detectors , shaped charge s, communicat ions device s, and i tems of specia lclothing.

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UNCLASS1F1ED I {I]Ltfilllt.JP" e. Intell igence brief ings by "exper ts" on weather , t er ra in and

enemy. I t is absolutely paramount that the pat ro l leader and assis tant be

aggress ive , intel l igent , forceful and thoroughly briefed. In th is type of warfare where static defense l ines a re surrounded by

minefields , pat ro l pa t te rns are easi ly es tabl ished. To avoid th is , gaps inminefields mus t be frequently closed and other s opened to prevent theenemy from locating the routes of exit and entrance into our posi t ions.

A'ground reconnaissance, from a ground O P as a minimum require ment , m u s t be conducted by each m e m b e r of the patrol .

A thorough rehearsa l of the ent i re pat ro l , over s imila r t er ra in , a ta corre sponding t ime of the day i s a definite requirement . Since the vas tmajor i ty of pat ro ls operate during the hours of darkness mos t of themshould be rehearsed both during the day and at night.

Specia l measur e s mus t be undertaken to camouflage the radio andi t s opera tor . The Chinese at tempt to neutra l ize this group immediately .General ly speaking, if communica t ion is los t the pat ro l should not continueon its miss ion unt i l communica t ion has been re -es tab l i shed .

Each patrol should have as an adjunct the following elements:a. A support group of approximately the same size as the patrol

which wil l remain within suppor t ing distance (50 -200 yards) to ass i s t thepat ro l when contact is made with the enemy. This support will be briefedand rehearsed with the patrol proper .

b. An aler t force must be designated to b e ready for immediatedispatch to ass i s t a pat ro l if in t rouble , or to sweep the area of contac t forpr isoners and friendly casual t ies . This aler t force should be of cons ider able size and led by an officer . The leaders of these groups m u s t be exceptionally strong. They must push the i r pa t ro ls through enemy divers ionary groups and areas of heavy shell ing to re inforce the engaged patrol .

c. Check points mus t be established where the pat ro l render s arepor t to the company OP. In th is manner the exac t whereabouts of thepat ro l can be determined, and if a fi refight develops, even though com municat ions m ay be lost , f ire support can be effectively supplied, and thealer t group accurate ly dispatched.

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d. Trained p er sonnel mus t be provided, including in te rpre te r sfo r the KATUSA, for immediate de br ief ings.

After an enemy contact an immedia te sweep of th e battlefield mus tbe init iated. I f the patrol is unable to accomplish the sweep, then the suppor t or a le r t group mus t per form this essent ia l task. This is one of thebes t ways to obtain pr isoners of war and mus t be done to prevent friendlyMIA's . Enemy dead mus t be searched for identification, documents, andequipment .

The use of volunteers for p at rol l ing should not be encouraged,although they should be accepted for special t asks if t ruly voluntary innature. The ul3e of volunteer units and the continual employment of individual volunteers tend s to emphasize patroll ing as a specia l ty , ra ther thana pr imar y task of every infantryman.

Each battalion and higher commander should charge his operat ionsoff icer with the over -al l supervision and control of the patro l l ing act ivi t iesof h is unit . Intel l igence off icers should be consulted frequently for detai l sin planning for pat ro ls , selecting object ives, and in briefing and debr ief ing patrols . The intell igence off icers should not be charged with control l ing or coordinating pat ro ls as operat ions.

Outguard s in cri t ical area s m u s t receive specialized training comparable to that of a patrol . The extensive use of barbed wire and t r ipf lare s m u s t be emphasized to el iminate th e po s sibili ty of surpr ise . Allpersonnel mus t be impressed with the wisdom of employing rif le f laresin appropr iate combat situations.

Recommend that all infantry t raining, whether i t be basic or advanced in CONUS, emphasize s t rongly the subject of patro l l ing . Par t icu la rs t r ess should be placed on all phases of night patrol l ing. The aspect s ofaggre ss ivene ss , stealth, and teamwork mus t be s tre ssed repeatedly . Theconfidence of the individual soldier can be enhanced i f he is made to rea l ize the t r emendous support he has f rom the infantry, ar t i l le ry , tanks andA ir Force . Continuous effor t mus t be directed to inst i l l the will to clo sewith the enemy and kil l or capture him. Our pat ro ls inevitably emergevictor ious when aggress ive , d o se - in contact is init iated. (CommandRepor t - 2d Inf Div - Feb 53.)

L-OCAFF Comment : Addit ional t raining is being prescr ibed incur ren t r ev i s ions of AT P ' s which emphasizes pat rol l ing and fighting atnight..:.? 4

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(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 64INFANTRY MORTAR BATTALION EMPLOYMENT. - Whenever

the tac t ica l si tuat ion permi ts , this battalion operates intact and the f i r ing companies remain under th e control of battalion headquar ters .

Each company operates i ts own FDC while the battalion headquar te r s acts as a coordinating agency for the companies . The b a t t a l ~ ion i s normal ly in general support of the infantry division and under operat ional cont-rol of the division ar t i l le ry . This method of employmentand control is far spper ior to that of dividing the battalion into sma l l e runi ts and attaching piecemeal throughout the division. Under operat ionalcontrol of division ar t i l le ry , the fire power o f the battalion is used effectively and is cO,ordinated with that of the ar t i l lery which prevents aduplication of effort and indiscr iminate waste of ammunit ion. The firesof the battalion can be massed and placed where the need is the grea tes twithout the res tr ic t ion of being l imited to one narrow sec tor . Such cont ro l does not l imit the f i res of the mortar s to a smal l sector but allowsfull util ization of a ll capabilitfes, ' (Command Report - 461 s t Inf Bn (H vMortar ) - M ar 53. )

rOCAFF Comment: The use of the heavy mor ta r battalion as aunit under .operational c9ntrol of division ar t i l lery permi ts full advantage to be gained from use of the battalion or regimental FSCC as outl ined in DA TC No 9. 1953. I1Coordination of Fire S u p p o r t . ~ 7

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 65INFANTRY BATTALION FSCC COMMUNICATION. - The infant ry battal ion FSCC's had no radio communication with the infantryheavy weapons . Since the ar t i l lery l iaison officer is the fi re suppor tcoordinator for the infantry battalion, coordination of infantry weaponsis virtual ly impossible if infantry wire goes out.

The FSCC at the infantry battalion level should be provided withradio communica t ion to infantry heavy weapons, and adequate infantrypersonnel to ass i s t the ar t i l lery l iaison officer should also be provided.(Command Report - 49th FA Bn - Mar 53. )

LOCAFF Comment: Though the ar t i l lery l iaison officer is thefi re suppo rt coordina tor for the infantry battalion. the battalion is tofurnish personnel and equipment to implement establ ishment of an FSCC.Radios for communica t ion with infantry heavy weapons units should beprovided by those units to the FSCC, together with a representa t ive asprescr ibed in DA TC No 9. 1953, su!lject: I1Coordination of Fire S u p p o r t . ~ 7

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(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 66SNIPERSCOPES. - Most patrol leaders insist on taking a sniper

scope with each patrol . The more vulnerable outguard posi t ions a realso equipped with scopes when available. Extensive experimentationhas been done with the scopes . They are now being used both forsearching and signall ing.

Recommend that :a . Instruction presented in CONUS include sufficient prac t ica l

work to convince each 'man that he can operate the equipment and toteach him the capabil i t ie s and l imitations of the equipment.

rOCAFF Comment: The issue of the sniperscope to CONUS GRuni ts 'as-author ized in SR 310-30-55, 15 December 1952, and contemplated changes to A T P 7-300 will provide sniperscope training in units ofthis type during advance individual and basic unit training. In addition,CONUS a rms schools and The Engineer School offer courses to officersand enlisted personnel which include mechanical training, firing and/ormaintenance of sniperscopes.=}

b. Two m en be added to each infantry bat tal ion headquarterscompany to maintain and ins t ruc t in the operation and maintenance ofinfrared equipment.

rOCAFF Comment : Should a requi rement for a ~ d i t i o n a l maintenance p ~ r s o n n e l develop, such personnel should be included in th e regimental service company, not at battal ion level.=}

c. A division maintenance section under th e division Engineerbe establ ished to provide rapid repair facilities (s imilar to the SignalCorps repa ir system for signal i tems) .

rOCAFF Comment : Tw o mechanics a re currently included inthe Engineer battal ion for the repai r of sniperscopes.!.7

d. A throw-away battery, with an enclosed cable, and a moredurable scope be developed. A throw-away battery would eliminate mucht ime and equipment necessary to recharge batter ies . (Command Report 31st Inf Regt - May 53. )

rOCAFF Comment: A disposable type, one- t ime use ba t te ry .(copper-chloride) is being developed to replace the battery now in use-=-7

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(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 67MECHANICAL FAILURES O F M-46 TANKS. - M-46 tanks in

posit ions on the MLR a re confronted with many unusual maintenanceprob lems . The steep mounta ins and poor roads also cont r ibute to mechanical fa i lures . Unfortunately the lack of space in tank posit ionsprevents proper exercis ing of tanks. Most fa i lures show up on roadmarches performed after tanks have been in posit ion for long per iods .Common mechanical fa i lures a re final drives . oil l ines and oil coolerfans. Few road marches a re made without one of these i tems causinga breakdown. The quality of replacement par t s for the i tems l isted isoften unsatisfactory. I t is not unusual fo r replacement i t ems to breakdown o r fail to perform soon af ter instal lat ion.

Recommend tha t oil l ines . f inal drive s and cooler fans be fabricated from s t ronger mater ia ls . (Command Report - 140th Tank Bn May 53. )

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 68GAS TANK DRAINAGE O F M-46 TANKS. - Another problem is

encountered when draining gas tanks of the M-46 and 46A 1. As thedra in plug is unscrewed, gasol ine hits the man ' s hand and is deflectedinto the tank. When the sediment bowl is removed gasoline is easilyspil led on the floor of the engine compartment . Such conditions contribute to a dangerous f i re hazard . However , it is necessary to drain gastanks a t f requent in tervals as a grea t deal of condensation and dir t accumulate in the tanks and must be removed; otherwise gasoline l inesbecome clogged and cause fuel stoppages.

Recommend tha t a m o r e efficient drain be developed for gastanks. (Command Report - 140th Tank Bn - May 53. )

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 69ONE- WAY REVERSIBLE REM OTE CIRCUIT. - The provisions

for a one-way revers ib le remote control c i rcu i t for the radio se tAN/GRC-26A used in the FSCC A ir Request Net was made by locatingthe radio se t approximately one mile from the FSCC operat ions building. The sys tem provides for remote control by means of a l o ~ a l l y buil t control uni t as the equipment instal lat ion, two te lephone pairs extending between the installation and the operat ions building, and onedouble-throw " t ransmit - rece ive" switch a t the FSCC operat ions building with red and green l ights to indicate the switch posi t ion.typewri ter m ay be used for both transmitt ing and receiving.mand Repor t - 50th Sig Bn - M ar 53. )

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rOCAFF Comment: A signal modificat ion work order is beingp r o c e s ~ d which will equip the AN/GRC- 26A with remote control facili t ies. In other models of the AN/GRC- 26, the remote control facility isan integral par t of the radio s ' e t ~ 7

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 70CABLE SPLICER'S TENT LC-37. - The cable sp l icer ' s tent

LC - 37, although designed to be used aer ial ly , frequently is required forground operation. When the wind is blowing, a problem exists in keep- .ing the side walls anchored. An improvised f ramework has been designed to eliminate the necessi ty for anchoring th e side walls and provide a sturdy support ing s t ruc ture which can be used on aer i a l projectsas wel l as for ground operat ions . The f ramework designed as an addition to the tent LC-37 is of l ight construction, is collapsible, and can bemoved a t will by merely loosening four wing nuts. (Command Report 50th Sig Bn - Mar 53.)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 71IMPROVISED CABLE LAYING TRAILER. - A cable laying

t ra i ler capable of laying as many as 12 pair of WD-l /TT wire in theform of cable was developed. The device consists of 3 axles placedacross the width of a 1/4-ton t ra i ler . On these a re placed wire reelsDR-4. The l ines a re passed through a gathering ring where they aregrouped and wound spiral ly with one metall ic pair from a dispenser MX306 A /G mounted on the gathering f rame. The t rai ler can instal l cableat a tate of 4 to 5 miles per hour and requires only 2 wiremen to oper ate; consequently the balance of the wire team is available for policingthe 'cable off the ground. All mater ia ls used a re available local ly. (Command Report - l59th FA Bn - M ar 53.)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 72LA YING WIRE USING ROCKET LAUNCHER. - Tests were con

ducted laying wire from dispensers by using a launcher, rocket 3 .5 inch(bazooka) as described in FM 24-20. Results of these tes ts indicate thatthis method of wire laying is dependable for distances up to 300 yardsfor WD-l /TT in dispenser MX 306 A/G. I t was also determined that1/2 inch rope coiled to payou t freely could be thrust at l eas t 100 yardsusing this method. The rope used in these tests was new and consequently stiff. Considerably m ore than 100 yards could be reached witha more l imber rope. (Command Report - 3d Sig Co - May 53.)

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U N C L A S S I F ; I E D ~ ! ! ! ~ ~ ! (RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 73

AR TILLERY C O M M U ~ I C A TIONS. - Radios , AN!PRC-6 a rebeing employed to supplement existing means of communica t ion betweenthe computers in battalion FSCC and the firing bat tery executive posts ;also as la te ra l means of communication between OP's . In orde r to speedup the warning to aircraf t in the impact area where VT fused rounds a reto be f ired, a plan has been developed that permi ts a single radio operator to t r ansmit simultaneously the warning on the two division ar t i l leryfi re direct ion channels over tw o separate radio sets . This cuts in halfthe t ime required to make this t ransmiss ion, thus reducing the time necessary to del iver fire on a given target . The base se t radio and telephoneswitchboard instal lat ions in battalion FSCC a re in alcoves, thereby saving f loorspace and effectively reducing interference between radio andswitchboard opera tors . (Command Report - 158th FA Bn - May 53 . )

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 74OPERA TION O F RADIO SET AN!PRC-6 UNDER COMBAT CON

DITIONS. - AN!PRC-6 radio set has prov?d to be eminently suited tothe operat ions of an infantry battalion under a wide variety of difficultconditions. In range of t ransmis sion, frequency and in durabil i ty, i t hasproved super ior to a ll ava,ilable t ransceivers .

The flexible antenna AN!PRC-6 has proved most unsatisfactoryunder field conditions. The bottom sect ion of the antenna spli ts eventhough ex t reme care is exercised. Heavy taping of this sect ion preventsspli t t ing but destroys flexibility. The push-to-talk button does not standup under heavy use. The case is not waterproof. (Command Report 224th Inf Regt - May 53 . )

rOCAFF Comment: TB Sig 213, July 1953, provides fo r modi ..fication-of sets now in product ion to cor rec t deficiencies outlined above.

Section V, TB Sig 555- 5, June 1953, presc r ibes the expedient oftaping of antenna to cor rec t this deficiency in sets now in use.7

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 75COMPOSITE SIGNAL PLATOON. - In orde r to effect a c losercoordination between related communication facil i t ies a.nd attain a higherdegree of operat ional efficiency, inter- transfer of the radio re lay platoon and the teletypewriter sect ion was made between R &- M Companyand T &- T Company. The Radio Relay Platoon was combined to form acompos ite platoon with the Car r ie r Platoon, and the Teletypewri ter

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UNCLASSIFIED Section was combined to form a composite platoon with the MessageCenter Platoon. Normal field operations dictate just such combina"tionsfor communicat ions efficiency and .job proficiency . (Command Report 50th Sig Bn - Mar 53.)

rOCAFF ,Comment: Essential ly th e same organization is included in the la tes t revis ion to the T /O&E for the Corps Signal Battali o n ~ 7

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 76PACKAGE WEIGHT FOR HAND CARRY. - The package weight of

all construction mater ia ls should be reduced to a maximum of 40 to 50pounds . A specific case is that of rol ls of barbed wire , which at presentweigh approximately 100 pounds. Extended hand car ry of weights in exces s of 45 to 50 pounds is not efficiently accompl ished. (Command Repor t - 35th Inf Regt - Mar 53.)(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 77

GFT FOR 105-MM HOWITZER ILltUMINATING SHELL. - Recommend that a GFT be devised fo r 105-mm howitzer i l luminating shell .At present, due to the calculat ions necessary when using the tabular firin g tables , fire with i l luminating shell cannot be delivered as rapidly asfire with HE shell . A GFT for i l luminating shel l would ~ a c i l i t a t e the delivery of t imely fire, which is a necess i ty when i l luminating shell iscalled for on a night attack. (Command Report - 58th FA Bn - May 53. )

(RESTRIC TED) ITEM NO 78AR TILLERY DELIVERED ILLUMINATION. - Illumination has

become a requi rement for immediate close- in fires just as pressing asthe barrage during hours of darkness . Noises at night assum e majorproport ions which tend to magnify the size of an enemy believed to be infront of friendly posit ions . Without immediate i l lumination, heavy volumes of fire have been placed in the darkness against relat ively unimpdrtant targets . By encouraging the use of i l lumination to pe r mi t obse r vation and evaluat ion of the target , all aspects of operations after darkare improved.

An i l lumination platoon is designated in each bat tery and receivesall rounds of i l luminating shell in the bat tery . Based on enemy activityduring the day and other intel l igence factors , i l lumination is planned fo rthe a r ea s of most likely enemy activi ty. The remaining tw o platoons ineach battery a re sufficient to develop and sustain an intense rate of fireon the normal bar rage . (Command Report - 49th FA Bn - May 53.)

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(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 79EMPLOYMENT OF SlLARCHLIGHTS. - I l lumination should not

be constant , since a fixed beam i s general ly avoidable by the enemy,and th e continuous diffused light on rear s l o p e : ~ is of considerable a idto enemy work part ies and supply details .

Arti l lery fire frequently delivered concurrent with the shiftingof i l lumination induces enemy associat ion of the tw o and thus enhancesthe harass ing .value of th e l ights when used alone.

"Fi re planning" for "on-cal l" searchl ight miss ions proves valuable in a var ie ty of defensive and offensive operat ions. One such mis sion is in conjunction with night reconnaissance; for example, a patrolmoves to concealed posit ions, and then cal ls for i l lumination of the areato be observed.

The demand for coordination is again s t ressed , to include c lear ance with adjacent units as well as a careful review of subordina te patrolactivi ty scheduled in areas to be i l luminated. (Eighth Army Arty InfoBulletin No 6 - June 53. )

(CONFIDENTIAL) ITEM NO 80USE O F SEARCHLIGHTS IN AAA ROLE. - Searchlights were

used against enemy ai rcraf t attacking the i s land. One enemy planecrashed into the channel just eas t of the is land during the engagement.Enemy ai rcraf t conducting these at tacks are of the PO-2 type whichapproach a t low alt i tude and slow speed to avoid detection by sound andradar . The use of searchlights against this type of attack is proving tobe exceptionally effective. I t allows aimed automatic weapons fi re tobe delivered a t night. Searchl ights have a dete r r i. g effect on enemypilots and cause enemy a irc ra f t to take evasive action immediately uponbeing i l luminated. (Command Report - 933d AAA A W Bn. (Mbl) - May53. )

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 81 DETONATING X-200 NAPALM LAND MINES. - Tests were conducted to determine the best means of detonating X-200 land mines.Electr ical means of detonation had proven undependable due to frequentcutting of e lec t r ica l lead wires by enemy per sonnel and incoming ar t i l lery and mor ta r rounds. Following methods a re recommended for use:

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a. Elect r ica l - f i r ing 1Ising multiple blast ing caps and lead wires .b. Pull-type firing d ~ v i c e s using multiple t r ip wires and /or

lanyards.c. Pul l - re lease type firing devices wired to function even thought r ip wires m ay be cut by enemy personnel .Following points are s t ressed :a . When electr ical means of detonation are used insure that the

source of electr ic cur ren t is sufficiently strong to activate a ll electr icblasting caps in the circui t .

b. Test the source of electr ici ty frequently.c . Connect relatively fe w mines in ser ies thus reducing the, elec

t r ici ty requirements and insuring that the entire field will not .be renderedineffective by one break in the wiring sys tem.

d. Use multiple blasting caps , lead wires or lanyards . (Command Report - 40th lnf Div - Apr 53.)

(RESTRlC TED) ITEM NO 82TEST O F X-ZOO NAPALM LAND MINE. - One X-ZOO napalm

land mine prepared and left in outdoor storage since November 195Z wasdetonated in 'March 1953. This mine had been exposed to rain, snow,mud, tempera ture ranges from _100 F to 65 0 F, and t ransported overgrea t distances in t rucks. There was no evicence of deterioration; norusting of the metal container had occurred , no leakage was apparent,seams were intact , the carry ing handle was secure, and th e threadedfiller, cap was easi ly removed. The napalm filling gave no evidence ofbreakdown. The punch-out hole in the filling cap had been covered withadhes ive tape throughout the storage period, thus assuring the exclusionof mois ture from the burs ter and the napalm filling.

L e ~ s o n s Learned: Punch-out holes on a ll X-ZOO land mines assembled and emplaced fo r tact ical use should be sealed with tape. (Commctnd Report - 40th In f Div - Mar 53.)

rOCAFF Comment: See i tem, "Per iod of Effectiveness of theX-ZOO Land Mine" published under Source No 751, l tr ATTNG-Z6350. 05/7(DOCI)(C)(3 Jun 53), OCAFF, 3 June 1953, subject: "Dissemination of Combat Information.

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(RESTRIC TED) ITEM NO 83MINIA TURE FOUGASSE. - Work was completed on the "Fi rebal l , "

a device essentially a miniature Fougasse. Basical lY'i t is composed ofa five-gal lon oil can filled with napalm. one WP grenade with the fuseremoved , a l /2-pound block of TNT, and an electr ic blasting cap (seesketch). Each "Fireball" will effectively cover an area up to 10 0 yardslong by some 20 to 30 yards wide. In principle the container is c r u s h ~ d by the exploding TNT and hurled through the a ir dropping ignited napalmen route . The WP grenade. shat tered by the explosion. provides thenecessary ignit ion. Aside from the casual ty producing effect , the\}>sychological effect is t remendous. This device can be used to good a ~ a n tage in strengthening defensive posit ions. (Command Report - 25th InfDiv - Jan 53. )

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 84FLAK SUPPRESSION FO_R ARMY AIRCRAFT. - Effective flak

suppress ion, especially in areas where the enemy is sensit ive. is rapidlybecoming a m u s t i f Army ai rcraf t a re to remain directly over th e ta rge tarea in the per formance of their miss ion. At present there is need forstandardization of flak suppress ion in the major units . (Command Repor t - Eighth Army - Dec 52. )

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 85NEED FOR TWO-PLACE TACTICAL ARMY AIRCRAFT. - In re cent years the emphasis on fixed wing ai rcraf t development at DA level

has been placed on multiplace a irc ra f t . Since the Army now has tw osuitable types of multiplace aircraf t in the L-20 and the L-23, the em':'phasis on r esearch and development. aside from helicopters, should beshifted to the two-place tactical aircraf t .

Although the L- 19 airc raf t has per formed well in Korea, increasedenemy flak has proved i ts weakne ss in tw o aspects - - need for self protect ive armament and emergency get-away speed. The basic importanceof Army ai rcraf t still remains a tactical one - - providing observationand reconnaissance. preferably over the target a rea . Constant improvement in th e cur ren t tactical a irc ra f t and far- reaching research and development is desirable and must be str ived for. (Command Report Eighth Army - Dec 52.)

rOCAFF Comment: Requirement for armament and speed inArmy observation type ai rcraf t is current ly under study at this Office.:...?

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"FIREBALL"

W P Grenade and TNT Centered

Taznped Ear th___ Cap LeadII,

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l iz -poundTNT

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on Bottozn of Can. Sand Bags znaybe used in place of Taznped Ear thon To p of Can.

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(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 86REQUIREMENT FOR 30KW DIESEL GENERATOR. - The opera

t ion of the bakery equipment for 24 hours each day puts a s tra in on the25KW gasoline generators used to operate the bakery equipment.

Recommend that the 25KW gasoline generators be replaced with30KW diese l genera tors . These 'generators could handle the load without the operat ional strain no w incurred by the 25KW units. (CommandReport - 470th OM Bakery Co - J un 53 . )

I

rOCAFF Comment : 30KW gasoline genera tors are now authorized in l ieu of th e 25KW generators as par t 0 f the mobile bakery equipment for this type unit. Diesel genera tors are considered im pract icablebecause of their weight and increased fuel supply problem..:}

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 87UTILIZATION OF 55-GALLON DRUM FOR BURNER. OIL.

STOVE. TENT. M-1941. - Experience in Korea has indicated that organizat ions and units supplied with the Stove, tent, M-194l . equipped

\with the B ~ r n e r , oil , stove, tent , M-194l , have been modifying theAdapter, gravity feed, 5-gallon can in orde"r to have a larger fuel supply. This modification consis ts of withdrawing the breather tube fromthe adapter , closing th e breather hole into the fuel can top, and util izingthe complete adapter assembly with a 55-gallon drum placed on a cradle.The modificat ion provides the stove with a much greater fuel supply andel iminates the constant refi l l ing of the 5-gallon can.

Recommend that the Office of the Quar te rmas te r General conducta r esearch and development study to provide a modification for theAdapter, gravity feed, which can be utilized with a 55-gallon drum.(Command Report - 55th QM Base Depot - June 53.)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 88CHANGES TO ENGINEER TOPOGRAPHIC CO (CORPS). - There

is a weakness in the T/O&E of this unit (T!O&E 5-l67). The authorizedFire ' Control Ins t rument Repairman (MOS 3922) is trained in maintenanceof equipment pertaining to a rm am ent and ordnance i tems but is general lyriot qualif ied to repair survey equipment of th e type used by this company.Recommend that this MOS be eliminated from the T /O&E and in i ts placeauthorize a Non- electr ical Equipment Repairman (MOS 3098). The t rainin g and qualificat ions of this MOS fit closely th e requirements for a unit

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, '."CQQSj{Qi.'.2.. . Ii J J hit SRi" IS 2UNCLASSIFIEDof this type. This change along with change of Elect r ic ian (MOS 3078)for a Field Radio Mechanic (MOS 3648) would provide necessary personnel to maintain the many delicjite i tems of equipment authorized thisunit . (Command Report - 62 d Engr Topographic Co - May 53. )

rOCAFF Comment: Recommendation appears to have meri tand con-;ideration will be given to changing subject MOS's when table isrevised.!.'?

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 89ENEMY 3 .5 ROCKETS. - Five enemy spin stabil ized 3.5 rocket

rounds were found in th e Yokkok-Chon r iver valley approximately 500yards from the route tanks were using to enter th e valley. Followingresul ts were noted: maximum effective range 54 7 yards , maximumpenetra t ion 3-1/2 inches at a 90 degree angle. The rocket is point detonating. (Command Report - 73 d Tank Bn (M ) - Mar 53.)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 90AUTHORIZATION OF TELEPHONE EE-l05 IN T /O&E 11- 500.

General Maintenance teams are authorized by T/O&E 11-500 four each,telephones, EE-8 to perform maintenance on open wire systems. However , the telephQne EE-8 cannot be used on open wire sys tems whichhave car r i e r terminati 'on without disrupting communicat ions on all channels. All open wire sys tems maintained by this organization utilize car r ier equipment.

Recommend that GM teams ,be authorized by T /O&E 11-500, te lephohe EE-I05 which is designed fo r maintenance of open wire with car r ier sys tems in lieu of the telephone EE-8 . (Command Report - 59th SigSupport Co - June 53.)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 91HELICOPTER FOR SIGNAL CO (T /O&E 11-117). - Supplying and

maintaining the VHF si tes by ai r -ground l ia ison team s presents greatt ravel problems in Korea. Due to their inaccessibil i ty by road thesesi tes may be off the a ir for many hours. Some sites are a t the tops ofmountains and even upon arr-iving at the base of the mountain i t takesover 1-1/2 hours to reach them.

Open wire maintenance is a difficult task over Korean t e r ra in .Most of the l ines run through passes and m o u ~ t a i n s ; thus, they are

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Recommend that a signal company of this type be authorized onehelicopter. (Command Report - 57th Sig Support Co - June 53.)

rOCAFF Comment: There is not sufficient just ificat ion to author ize a hel icopter for the following reason: Some of the difficulties encountered in supplying and maintaining VHF si tes a re unique to Korea.I t should be possible for th e unit to obtain the use of a helicopter fromone of th e other Signal Units in the Army Signal Group or from Transportation Helicopter Companies..:..?

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 92SIGNAL CORPS AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHERS. - Recommend s tepsbe taken to assure Signal Corps aer ia l photographers prompt flight status

and incentive flying pay in combat zones.Tact ical l ight aviat ion photography has been considerably impaired

by exist ing regulat ions which require DA approval for Signal enlisted per sonnel engaging in these hazardous miss ions . Inasmuch as these Signalc a m ~ r a - m e n undertake the same r isks as the pilots who fl y them overenemy t er ra in , recommend they receive th e same recognit ion for flightpay commensura te with grade. (Command Report - 3d Sig Co - May 53.)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 93NEW TYPE SIGNAL LINE TR UCKS AND EAR TH BORERS. - Rec

ommend that the new type Signal l ine trucks and ear th borers (V-17 &t V-IS) be equipped with dual t i r es to obtain grea te r stabil i ty. These vehicles a re top heavy, especia.lly when traveling over the rugged t er ra inin Korea . (Command Repor t - 26th Sig Const Bn - May 53 . )

(RESTRICTED) ITE1v1 NO 94PROTEC TING PRISONERS. - The frigid Korean winter has had

i ts effect in reducing the number of prisoners taken. Enemy t roops arenot as active during cold weather as they are in milder temperatures .Consequently. enemy movement is so res tr ic ted in f ront of their MLRthat captures by raiding par t ies and ambushes are part icularly difficultto accomplish . Cold weather adds to the problem even further sincewounded pr isoners often do not survive shock and cold until they can beevacuated through friendly l ines. Rather unusual measures have' been

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adopted to surmount this difficulty. The ROK 6th Infantry Division' hasmade i t a practice to car ry extra blankets on patrol for the express purpose of wrapping wounded pri-soners. On severa l occasions. 7th InfantryDivision patrols have carr ied a 'wounded PW between tw o l i t ters in' orderto secure as well as protect him. The ultimate in protection of PW'sseems to have been reached when a soldier of the ROK 1st Infantry Division, taking par t in a raid on BIG NORI, .put both his helmet and armoredvest on a captured Chinese soldier to ensure his safe return to friendlypositions. (Command Report - Eighth Army - Jan 53.)

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Documents

Korean War Dissemination of Combat Information 1 Oct 1953