Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester

Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology

Kristiaan Rodrigo Knoester

MA Paper: Filosofie van Wetenschap en Politiek (2007-08) Dr. Huub Dijstelbloem

Introduction

The notion of technology is usually linked to the progress of thought: it is said to be a product

of reason and the growth of knowledge, while equally contributing to the overall progress of

the human condition, both intellectually and materially. This dual perspective has become so

ingrained in the modern mindset, that the logic of technology now seems inevitable.

If this is the case – a claim whose accuracy we will first need to determine – then the

following political challenge can be deduced: technological trends may possibly hold

individual autonomy hostage by undermining the authority of reason over technological

development. Or, to put it in political terms, perceiving the logic of technology as inevitable

or necessary, and accepting it without properly understanding the changes that it creates, may

undermine the decision-making process of modern democratic nation-states. It would be

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Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester tantamount to subjugating action to fate. To the extent that the ‘logic of technology’ – in

whichever form it may manifest itself – is adopted in practice, without a proper engagement at

the theoretical level – whether in terms of its epistemological or ontological significance – the

result may equal the deification of technology itself: it may come to represent a categorical

absolute that will always tower above the categories of human understanding.

This hegemony of technological progress should first be qualified in itself; i.e., as a

discernible social or political process. Doing so entails identifying a public, insofar

technology does not only encroach the private realm of thought but is a collective matter of

concern. I will illustrate this by means of a case study that gives shape to a notion of

technology capable of accommodating the critical framework of this essay; i.e., the question

whether or not the logic of technology can be placed underneath a political framework. This

case study – which deals with the political significance of synthetic worlds and communities –

brings together ontological, epistemological, ethical, and moral issues. It does so in a two-fold

manner. The case study will, on the one hand, formulate a conception of technology as a

medium of thought, and on the other, a medium of socio-economic development and

interaction. The former brings to the fore the relation of reason and thinking to technology,

while the latter brings the relation of the collective itself to technology.

The next step will then be to challenge the notion of technology itself. This will take the form

of two questions: does technology accommodate thought and reason, to the extent that these

are traditionally understood in terms of being intrinsic and necessary to the possibility of

moral autonomy? Or does it instead undermine thought and reason, by allowing the

perpetuation of its logical process (logos) without disclosing the logic of its system, i.e.,

without opening itself to the possibility of reflexivity? Putting these two questions together,

my claim is that the latter will be the case insofar as technology undermines the possibility of

moral autonomy. Furthermore, if moral autonomy is taken for granted in the private sphere,

e.g. for technologically related economic benefits or necessities, the political relevance of a

‘public’ will itself erode, and with it many of the liberal and democratic mechanisms that

depend on the private/public dichotomy. With this in mind, I will try to show that politics

needs technology to shed light on the polis, but immediately thereafter needs the public to

assert its political authority on technology so as not to become ensnared by its own web of

logic. Politics and technology are essentially related.

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Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester

The Logic of Modernity

Although technology is traditionally considered a product of modernity, this perspective is

flawed on two accounts: 1) the concept of modernity itself requires specification, and 2) it

portrays technology too strongly as a product of historically contingent circumstances.

Despite these inaccuracies, we may yet be able to shed some light on the matter by using this

as our starting point. We may begin by observing that, in the wake of the Scientific

Revolution, the concept of technology emphasizes the control and manipulation of nature by

means of a technical apparatus. With the institutionalisation of the controlled experiment as a

logically structured process, modern science developed a conception of technology strongly

identified by an apparatus (machine) or tool serving some form of practical function, either in

itself or in relation to the experiment. Heidegger speaks of a process of “setting upon that

challenges the energies of nature,”1 revealing energy heretofore concealed, but which can then

be ‘unlocked, transformed, stored, distributed and switched about.’ But just as the machine

(tool), in terms of being a ‘standing-reserve,’ is not autonomous – i.e. it stands-by awaiting

the order to set itself upon nature (reveal that which challenges) – man does not control the

process of unconcealment itself; “at any given time the actual shows itself or withdraws.”

Then again, this process of actuality – the ‘revealing that orders’ – is possible insofar “man

for his part is already challenged to exploit the energies of nature.” Heidegger points out that

man is therefore not a tool of nature, or ‘mere standing-reserve’, for it is man in particular

who is “challenged more originally than are the energies of nature.” It is man who furthers the

progress of technology by taking part in “ordering as a way of revealing.”2

We will get back to Heidegger’s conception of technology as a process of revealing towards

the end of this essay. For the moment it is sufficient to keep in mind how the development of

modern technological tools, and their experimental use, helped sustain the ongoing effort to

reduce the contingent variables of nature complicating man’s quest for self-sufficiency. In

fact, this experimental approach would not have been possible had the space for autonomous

behaviour and thought not first been established. It is therefore important that we keep in

mind how the new natural science of the 17th century was strongly influenced by an earlier

1 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ in Basic Writings. Ed. David Farrell Krell. New York: HarperCollins Publishers (1993): 321. 2 Ibid., 324.

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Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester event: the break with classical political philosophy. We will briefly retrace this trajectory

through the thought of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke.

Leo Strauss suggests that these two events share a ‘hidden kinship’ which meet in the political

philosophy of Machiavelli. According to Strauss, Machiavelli’s teaching – which removed the

classical emphasis on virtue as the pursuit of the highest good – inaugurated a view of

humanity that lowered the standards of human action. Machiavelli’s argument instead located

virtue within society; it begins with a conception of morality as a product of society itself,

turning upside down the idea that man is by nature directed towards virtue. The result of this

reversal is that man gains in terms of power and autonomy the control that nature and chance

had previously held against him. In this manner, according to Strauss, Machiavelli

inaugurated modern political philosophy:

[Machiavelli’s] lowering of the standards is meant to lead to a higher probability of

actualisation of that scheme which is constructed in accordance with the lowered standards.

Thus, the dependence on chance is reduced: chance will be conquered. […] Machiavelli is the

first philosopher who attempted to force chance, to control the future by embarking on a

campaign, a campaign of propaganda. […] He was the first of a long series of modern

thinkers who hoped to bring about the establishment of new modes and orders by means of

enlightenment. The enlightenment—lucus a non lucendo—begins with Machiavelli.3

This in turn laid the basis for a new conception of political authority; a radical scheme which

culminates in Hobbes’ Leviathan: the modern state as a symbol of the unity of god, man,

animal, and machine.4 According to Strauss, Hobbes took the problem of justice more

seriously than Machiavelli; he did not accept that it was simply a product of society. Instead,

following the traditional view, he believed in the existence of natural right. And yet, in

agreement with Machiavelli, he too felt that traditional political philosophy had elevated this

principle of justice too highly. His doctrine of a “state of nature” was a means for refuting the

basis of Machiavelli’s theory: selfishness and the desire for glory as the primary element of

society. Instead, he elaborates the fear of death as the founding principle of government and

civil society.

3 Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1988): 41, 46. 4 Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, Trans. George Schwab. London: Greenwood Press (1996): 82.

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Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester

In other words, whereas the pivot of Machiavelli’s political teaching was glory, the pivot of

Hobbes’s political teaching is power. Power is infinitely more businesslike than glory. Far

from being the goal of a lofty or demonic longing, it is required by, or the expression of, a

cold objective necessity. Power is morally neutral. […] It emerges through an estrangement

from man’s primary motivation. It has an air of senility… Respectable, pedestrian hedonism,

sobriety without sublimity and subtlety, protected or made possible by “power politics”—this

is the meaning of Hobbes’s correction of Machiavelli. (Strauss, 1988: 48-49)

According to Carl Schmitt, Hobbes’s symbol – the Leviathan – was ultimately intended to

bring about a “natural unity of spiritual and secular power.” In this Hobbes failed, explains

Schmitt, because his symbol was constructed in response to a technical age, and as such relied

on a rationalism that, following the logic of any technology, attempted to subjugate chance by

means of conscious thought. More importantly, “he opened the door for a contrast to emerge

because of religious reservation regarding private belief and thus paved the way for new,

more dangerous kinds and forms of indirect powers.”5 The scientism of Hobbes’s thought,

which culminated in the technology of the modern state– i.e., the sovereignty of decision-

making power – also released indirect powers, i.e., powers that may not require public

legitimacy but which nonetheless could subvert centralized political authority. For this reason,

although Hobbes’s “image did not unequivocally conjure up a definite and clear enemy, it

contributed the insight that indivisible political unity was destroyed from within by the

demolition work of indirect powers.”6

The legitimation of these indirect powers found their expression in the work of Locke, who

changed Hobbes’s desire for self-preservation into a desire for property. With the

establishment of the right of acquisition, the morality of economism becomes secured

politically. Strauss writes that “economism is Machiavellianism come of age”7 for it presents

the best political solution to the social goals of modern political philosophy, but without the

need to justify an original transition governed by anarchy and bloodshed. “With a view to the

resounding success of Locke, as contrasted with the apparent failure of Hobbes, especially in

the Anglo-Saxon world, we can say that Machiavelli’s discovery or invention of the need for

an immoral or amoral substitute for morality, became victorious through Locke’s discovery or

invention that that substitute is acquisitiveness.”8

5 Ibid., 83. 6 Ibid., 85. 7 Strauss, 1988: 49. 8 Ibid.,

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Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester

With this development we have laid the basis for understanding techno-economic progress as

a tool of the Enlightenment project of emancipation. We may further construe the significance

of this development by looking at another view of modern technology in its current political

context: Ulrich Beck’s conception of modernity in terms of reflexivity and the production of

risks.

Risk and Reflexivity in Modernity

In Risk Society, Beck explains techno-economic progress as a sub-political institution within

modern society. Based on the historical sketch provided above, we can now see how

“[Machiavelli’s] shift from the formation of character to the trust in institutions” could not

only lead to “the belief in the almost infinite malleability of man,”9 but to the modern faith in

progress, or similarly, ‘the belief in the almost infinite creativity of technology’. Beck himself

writes that “faith in progress is the self-confidence of modernity in its own technology that

has become creativity. The productive forces, along with those who develop and administer

them, science and business, have taken the place of God and the Church.”10

To begin, Beck speaks of (post-)modernity in terms of two modes of organizing social change

that are the result of the globalization of industrial society: on the one hand we have the

establishment and proliferation of political parliamentary democracy, and on the other techno-

economic progress. Beck characterizes the latter as unpolitical and non-democratic11, for it

reduces the scope of democratic oversight while at the same time taking a leading role in

shaping society12. This development – falling between politics and non-politics – he therefore

categorizes as sub-politics13; although it retains political influence, the logic of techno-

economic innovation also evades the principles of parliamentary democracy—“progress

replaces voting.”14

This, however, does not yet entail a crisis of modernity. The modern society that wishes to

retain the principle of parliamentary democracy is not on the verge of succumbing from 9 Ibid., 43. 10 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Trans. Mark Ritter. London: SAGE (1992): 214. 11 Ibid., 184. 12 Ibid., 14. 13 Ibid., 186. 14 Ibid., 184.

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Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester within due to the effects of sub-political innovations. Beck’s argument is not that modern

society is at risk. Instead, modern society is a risk society. It is precisely the success of

modernization that has brought about the actualisation of the concept of industrial society

which had up to now rested upon a dual contradiction: “the universal principles of modernity

– civil rights, equality, functional differentiation, methods of argumentation and scepticism –

and the exclusive structure of its institutions, in which these principles can only be realized on

a partial, sectoral and selective basis.”15

In other words, the principle of modernity – progress – has empowered the sub-political

systems of scientific, technological and economic modernization. The techno-economic

system, driven by the logic (faith) of technological progress and economic distribution, has as

a result displaced politics from its traditional seat of power and centrality: the government as

sovereign representative of collective power.

Scott Lash and Brian Wynne, in the introduction to Beck’s Risk Society, explain how Beck’s

conception of reflexivity is a product of the postmodern critique of modernity, in particular

the culture of scientism and its ideological adherence to the Enlightenment project. Although

Beck wants to retain the “moral claim to rationality which is equal to that of modern

science.”16 he is critical of the cultural imposition of scientism in the public sphere.

Nevertheless, he believes that modernization itself makes it possible to transcend this level

through its own intrinsic process of structural change. In effect, the continuing process of

individualization in the private sphere produces a change in the relationship between

individuals (social agents) and institutions (social structures) due to the very risks that are

produced by the growing conjunction of industry and science. In other words, on the one hand

we have the process of individualization within the private sphere and sphere of work which

requires social agents to make decisions concerning their identities and interests, while in the

public sphere we see a growing awareness of the distribution of risks, which are in effect

increasingly produced and dealt with at the sub-political level.

But what is being meant hear with ‘risk’? Lash and Wynne define risks as “the probabilities

of physical harm due to given technological or other processes,” with the result that “technical

experts are given pole position to define agendas and impose bounding premises a priori on

15 Ibid., 14. 16 Ibid., 2.

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Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester risks discourses.” It is curious that risk is taken in such a narrow sense; surely an equally

strong component arising from the techno-economic process is financial risk. In effect, the

distribution of risk is an intrinsic element of the global economy, and has resulted in ever

more ingenious financial ‘products’ – such as collaterilized debt obligations (CDO’s),

structured investment vehicles (SIV’s), mortgage-driven securities, and many other financial

instruments of the modern globalized economic system. This has resulted in a much more

integrated web of interests between countries and financial institutions, all competing in order

to maximize their own interests while at the same time being forced to cooperate in order to

insure the required stability of the financial markets. On the other hand, though market

liberalism has decentralized control – thereby distributing risk – it has also made it more

difficult for governments and central banks to act decisively and effectively if necessary.

What is interesting is that the nature of financial risks is essentially [practically]

technological: financial innovation is being driven by increasingly complex financial products

with no immediate market value. Instead, the value that these theoretical ‘products’ –

essentially computer algorithms promising a return on investment – create is speculative,

relying less on actual market values than on faith that the system is stable enough to predict.

Value is therefore a product of shared perception. Hence the constant monitoring of market

psychology, such as the need to maintain investor and consumer ‘confidence,’ governing

public statements from high-ranking institutional representatives. The bottom line, however,

is that these products are essentially virtual – the value that they offer as products is the result

of the diversity of risk that their technical complexity has made possible.

Economic risk distribution and technological risk distribution are therefore quite related,

particularly when one observes that technological innovation has made the integration of

economic information, and as a result more complex financial products, possible at a global

level. Likewise, globalized economic growth has influenced technological innovation through

investments and the sharing of information. The necessity of reflexivity arises from the

distribution of risks and the growing social dependence on actors and institutions whom,

acting at the sub-political level, nevertheless retain knowledge and expertise necessary for the

proper negotiation of modern risks, i.e., risks occasioned by “technological and other

processes.” But what is it about technology, or the economy for that matter, that requires a

“reflexive learning process”? Although Lash and Wynne speculate on ‘private reflexivity’ as

necessarily predating its public manifestation, eventually they recognize that Beck’s work,

which deals with risk and identity as social constructions, does not yet deal with “the sources

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Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester and social dynamics of forms of reflexivity.”17 In order to continue this enquiry, which I

consider essential in determining the essence of the relation between politics and technology,

I move on to the synthetic reality of cyberspace.

The Immanence of Reality

There are three internet-related trends that are applicable to our discussion thus far. These are

Web 2.0,18 social networking websites, and online virtual worlds. We will start with a brief

description of each.

Web 2.0

Although there still seems to be discussions in the application of this term (does it refer to a

certain business model or ethical code?), there do seem to be some general characteristics that

can be used in distinction to what can then be defined as the traditional ‘Web’ or Web 1.0.

Whereas Web 1.0 consists of internet-sites whose content is basically read-only and web-

related services with a limited flow or application of information (basic download/uploading

procedures), Web 2.0 consists of platforms capable of learning from the aggregative

interaction between content and user. It is a locus of data and applications whose interface is

open and dynamic enough to be able to adapt to the heterogenous circumstances surrounding

each interaction, sometimes in real-time. Examples of this are Google (e.g. PageRank,

AdSense, GoogleMaps), BitTorrent, RSS, and Wikipedia. Whether or not such platforms are

meant to serve a particular business model, their success nevertheless depends on the

accumulation of data and the control of information.

Online Social Networks

Although on the surface these seem to be simple websites that offer a virtual space where

people can establish a virtual presence and form virtual communities with other people, what

we in fact have here are platforms offering an immersive social experience based on some of

the principles of Web 2.0. The best examples of these are MySpace and Facebook, and

actually augment the principles of Web 2.0 to the extent that the interface, by building upon

the growing number of users and the information they provide when using the platform, in 17 Ibid., 7. 18 Ofcourse, some are already looking ahead to what will ‘obviously’ come next: Web 3.0. See e.g.: William L. Hosch, ‘Web 3.0: The Dreamer of the Vine.’ The Brittanica Blog. 6 Jul. 2007 <http://blogs.britannica.com/blog/main/2007/07/web-30-the-dreamer-of-the-vine/> 31 Jan. 2008.

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Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester turn reinforces both the platform itself and the user’s experience. For example, one of the

most distinctive features of Facebook is the “news feed.” This program is an ongoing log of

user activity, accessible to other users that have been included to somebody’s friends list or

are members of a shared network. The dissemination of this [private] information in effect

allows users to keep track of what other people do, whether it be adding new ‘friends’ to their

network, uploading pictures and videos, or using applications with other people. Despite

initial criticisms concerning privacy issues – which forced Facebook to change it’s ‘opt-out’

option of the service to ‘opt-in’ – the “news feed” has still become one of the most popular

features of Facebook. As Ari Melber notes in an article,19 privacy is no longer about

concealing but ‘sharing’ information; it is about control. In other words, online social

networks translate the struggle for information and data control into the realm of identity

formation and privacy. As we will see, the relevance of these issues come together in

synthetic worlds.

Synthetic Worlds

In speaking of synthetic worlds, I am borrowing Edward Castronova’s terminology to

describe online virtual worlds not as ‘spaces’ that are essentially trying to appear ‘real’ from

the outside, i.e. in terms of sensory immersion, but which are already immersive from the

inside by virtue of a shared crafted reality. The focus is less on individual and physical

immersion than on the shared experience itself. The key technological component is therefore

the software enabling a network-user interface capable of sustaining immersion in a synthetic

environment, regardless of how ‘unreal’ the graphic interface may appear. Synthetic,

therefore, means “crafted by humans”, while a “virtual world is crafted by a computer”.20 It is

precisely this aspect that explains, according to Castronova, why precisely games have been

leading the way in the creation of online virtual worlds, instead of traditional research into

Virtual Reality (VR) technology: “A game perspective focuses all thought and research on the

user’s subjectivity and well-being. It insists on immediate usability. It thrives on widened

access and multiple uses. And it generates a willing suspension of disbelief, without which

genuine immersion cannot happen.”21 Online games therefore contain certain aspects that

sustain prolonged immersion in synthetic environments, such as a community of players

immersed and sharing the virtual space of a synthetic world, and software enabling an

19 Ari Melber, ‘About Facebook,’ The Nation. 20 Dec. 2007 <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080107/melber > 31 Jan. 2008. 20 Edward Castronova, Synthetic Worlds: The Business and Culture of Online Games. London: The University of Chicago Press (2005): 294. 21 Ibid., 292.

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Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester immersive user interface (gaming experience). In doing so, online games apparently cater to a

widespread and growing desire.

Although this desire for immersion and play has sustained the development of online games,

synthetic worlds are starting to incorporate other real-world aspects into their environments.

Castronova actually began most of his research on the socio-economic aspects of synthetic

worlds, not only in their relation to the real world financial systems, but as economic systems

in themselves which have evolved their own processes of value creation. He has concluded

that all synthetic worlds contain genuine economies, if by economy we understand the system

of resource allocation that results due to scarcity. In synthetic worlds it is the scarcity of time

that brings about economic activity. Value is created the moment a user chooses how to

allocate his or her time; from deciding which game/world to ‘inhabit’, to the activities

themselves. However, one particular aspect of synthetic economies in online games stands

out: it is the result of pleasure, not necessity. Castronova’s research itself tries to begin an

inquiry on the different elements that make these synthetic economies fun, and how these may

be developed further in order to foster user interest without making it too easy to fulfil one’s

desires; i.e. maintaining economic stability.

Before I continue discussing the techno-economic development of online games with an

example, I think we should keep in mind the following: as we have seen, modern economies

developed out of political necessity. The result has been a vast improvement in the quality of

life for people in general. This in turn has resulted in the growth of a middle class as an

important political factor. Likewise, we can speak of a universal leisure class capable of

developing and following its own personal interests. It is here, in the advent of leisure as

commodity and right – a product of economic activity and liberal thought – that we witness

the creation of a new form of economy; one combining the latest technological innovations.

Casus – Project Entropia

Project Entropia is a virtual world that wants to be more than just a game. It wants to be real.

Actually, it wants to mimic reality: “The Entropia Universe is for real. Real people, real

activities, and a Real Cash Economy in a massive online universe.”22 So far, the main

distinguishing factor that separates Project Entropia from other synthetic environments is the

22 http://www.entropiauniverse.com/index.var

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Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester integration of its economic framework with real-world monetary mediums such as credit-

cards and ATM’s that permit the rapid transferral of money from one environment to the

other. Accepting the potential of this environment, both individuals and businesses are

increasingly seeking to invest real money in order to develop online services that reproduce,

and may replace, services in both the real world (e.g. retail outlets) and internet (such as on-

demand video and gambling). Thus far, the most ambitious project comes from the Cyber

Recreation Development Corp. (CRD) which is financed by the Beijing Municipal People’s

Government.23 This joint project with MindArk PE AB (which runs Project Entropia) aims to

integrate Beijing to Project Entropia by creating a cash-based economy that runs parallel to

both environments. The idea is to develop the economy of Beijing by extending and

integrating it with the synthetic universe of Entropia. CRD would then get its own virtual

planet which it could fashion according to its own specifications, populated and controlled by

citizens of Beijing in much the same way as any internet-based business, only that they are

present, during work, in the synthetic environment. The result of this economic activity,

however, should help develop both the synthetic world in Entropia and the real city in China.

Although at this stage we can already posit questions on the social implications that such a

framework of physical disconnection may produce, it is first worth considering what CRD

actually has in mind. According to Ahong Lee, president of the District Company:

“With the characteristics of experiencing, entertaining, interactive, and competing, cyber

entertainment will become part of the way of future daily life. Cyber entertainment and its

related industries will get into various aspects of life, it changes urban spaces and layout of

humanity. It will develop a new era for economic growth in a city. The digital entertainment of

China has get [sic] into a new stage of development in various aspects.

As a leader of cyber entertainment in China, Beijing Municipal People’s Government has

selected culture and digital entertainment as part of the “the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for

Economic and Social Development in Beijing and established Beijing Cyber Recreation

District (CRD) covering the west side of town to promote cyber recreation industries.”24

In fact, the long-term plan to fully integrate the virtual and the real by means of economic

development requires control of the medium, in this case the platform, that integrates content

23 ‘Entropia Universe Enters China to Create the Largest Virtual World Ever.’ Entropia Universe (Press Release). 30 May 2007 < http://www.marketwire.com/mw/release.do?id=737761&k=Mindark > 31 Jan. 2008. 24 http://crd.gov.cn/en/index.htm (Link no longer available)

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Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester developers and users. What is pivotal in such a strategy is being there first, and encompassing

as much of the content available within a synthetic framework (architecture) that manages to

attract, and harness, the aggregative power of users. This goal has been reiterated in several

public statements by MindArk.25 In a recent presentation in Beijing, MindArk, Paynova

(online payment services provider), and the CRD presented the latest developments of their

plan to transform a 100 square kilometer site into the real-world home of what will become

the metaverse uniting consumers and producers. Estimates between now and 2010 speak of

having 150 million (Chinese) avatars (virtual identities) interacting in various worlds, while

Robert Lai, chief scientist at the CRD, speaks of various virtual universes capable of

supporting billons of avatars. The idea obviously expresses the goal of capitalizing on the sort

of business model that has made web-based brands such as YouTube, FaceBook, and Google

universally recognizable and highly profitable in a very short period of time. When asked

about the commercial impact of this project, Robert Lai said: "We want to be humble, but the

word virtual in English is an interesting one. The virtual is also real. It will change the world

of commerce but for now people don't want to accept this or to believe China can do this in

such a short time."26

Of course, commercial interests require a stable environment and appropriate rules of

conduct. In this sense it is interesting to note that although SecondLife has more subscribed

members than Entropia, it is the latter that fit the CRD’s commercial interests. The rationale

has to do with control: SecondLife is minimal in its control of its environment and actually

welcomes the creative freedom of its members. Entropia on the other hand regulates carefully

what is possible in its universe, both aesthetically and behaviorally. As the business

development director of MindArk, David Simmons, explained: “To me, if you just think of

the real world, when there are no rules there is chaos and anarchy.”27 Obviously, chaos and

anarchy are bad for business.

Of course, in this environment, as in other web 2.0 platforms, consumers can also become

producers, capable of selling their own designs to other consumer/producers. Although this

seems to place everyone on the same level, with distinctions based on the meritocracy of

creativity and self-styled marketing, it is important to note that the logical framework

concentrates power solely in the coding authority – the officers and customer service

25 ‘Virtual World Entropia Universe Selects State-of-the-Art CryENGINE 2(R) to Create the Future.’ Entropia Universe (Press Release). 25 Jul. 2007 < http://account.entropiauniverse.com/pe/en/rich/5079.html > 31 Jan. 2008. 26 Haydn Shaughnessy, ‘Virtual reality as China commerce goes online’. Irish Times Ltd. 18 Nov. 2007 < http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/innovation/2007/1119/1195251428713.html > 31 Jan. 2008. 27 Ibid.,

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Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester representatives of the world. There is no formal structure that legitimates, or even seeks to

promote, governance within these worlds. Castronova points out that there is no trace of

democracy in any synthetic world:

The typical governance model in synthetic worlds consists of isolated moments of oppressive

tyranny embedded in widespread anarchy. Basically, [Hobbes’s] state of nature is never

allowed to occur. There is a tyrant in place from the beginning, but an extraordinarily inactive

one.28

Furthermore, the logic of these synthetic worlds, as in Web 2.0 platforms, is meta-

hierarchical, i.e., driven to encompass as many users and variables of experience as possible,

insofar these do not destabilize the architecture of the system/platform. It is from this

perspective that we should consider the joint-investment of MindArk/PayNova/CRD. The

whole endeavour should be seen as an attempt to establish the virtual/commercial platform of

the future. And even if doesn’t succeed, the meta-hierarchical logic of this technology –

rooted in a techno-economic structure – will eventually produce other attempts. Still, the fact

that the government of China is formally backing CRD’s $30billion investment (which

includes private capital), and that the Swedish Royal Family has spoken in behalf of MindArk

in Beijing earlier this year, illustrates how high the economic value of these synthetic worlds

are perceived to be, and therefore how important they are for national and commercial

interests. Being the first to shape its development is therefore of strategic importance; a lesson

which we see reflected in the unprecedented success of Google today, which is only matched

by the rise and (continuing) dominance of Microsoft before it. MindArk’s announcement last

month29 of its’ intention to be the first virtual world to seek a real-world share listing shows

how eager it is to move quickly and establish its position. The question remains, however,

whether in the context of this essay, this development constitutes a legitimate object of

politics.

The Politics of Technology

As I have previously suggested following the work of Beck, techno-economic development

can be characterized in terms of sub-politics, and that which adds to the displacement of risk.

28 Castronova, 2005: 207. 29 ‘MindArk Intends to Go Public.’ MindArk PE. 4 Dec. 2007 < http://www.marketwire.com/mw/release.do?id=799324> 31 Jan. 2008.

14

Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester But we have yet to understand how this political shift necessitates a socially dynamic form of

reflexivity.

This is because, despite the risk involved in the challenge that these synthetic worlds pose to

traditional conceptions of value, privacy, identity, justice, reality – in fact, all the topics of

interest normally discussed in the political and social sciences – these do not yet reveal

synthetic worlds as a political matter of concern. They are still sub-political. This is the case

even when we recognize that entering most synthetic worlds entails giving up certain civil

rights,30 though these may vary depending on the nature of the synthetic world – e.g. the right

to own property is essential in worlds trying to integrate their economy with real-world

financial institutions.31 Regardless, the political can itself not be defined in terms of the

concepts taken to be the result of modern political philosophy.

Reaching a similar conclusion, Gerard de Vries in an article32 brings up the Aristotelian

distinction between praxis and poiesis as a means of determining the essence of politics; as

that which makes political action good in the classical sense of the word. According to

Aristotle’s own definitions, praxis is defined as “actions that aim at the activities themselves”

and poiesis as “action undertaken with the intention to produce some external end.” De Vries 30 Before entering any world one must agree to the terms of contract established by the owner(s), usually labeled an “End User Licensing Agreement” (EULA). Castronova provides the following list of civic rights one gives up upon entering these worlds:

• Freedom of speech • Rights to privacy • Freedom of association • Right to self-government • Right to information • Right to trial by peers • Right to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure • Right to own property • A free press • Freedom of assembly

(Castronova, 2005: 239.) 31 We should also keep in mind that even Web 2.0 platforms require users to comply to EULA terms beforehand, most of which go unread. For example, it is doubtful whether most Facebook users realize how little control they have over private information they disseminate or are able to receive. Consider the following excerpts from Facebook’s Privacy Policy: "When you use Facebook, you may set up your personal profile, form relationships, send messages, perform searches and queries, form groups, set up events, add applications, and transmit information through various channels. We collect this information so that we can provide you the service and offer personalised features. […] When you update information, we usually keep a backup copy of the prior version for a reasonable period of time to enable reversion to the prior version of that information. […] ... we cannot and do not guarantee that user content you post on the site will not be viewed by unauthorised persons. We are not responsible for circumvention of any privacy settings or security measures contained on the site. You understand and acknowledge that, even after removal, copies of user content may remain viewable in cached and archived pages or if other users have copied or stored your user content. […] Facebook may also collect information about you from other sources, such as newspapers, blogs, instant messaging services, and other users of the Facebook service through the operation of the service (eg, photo tags) in order to provide you with more useful information and a more personalised experience. […] Facebook reserves the right to send you notices about your account even if you opt out of all voluntary email notifications. […] By using Facebook, you are consenting to have your personal data transferred to and processed in the United States ... We may be required to disclose user information pursuant to lawful requests, such as subpoenas or court orders, or in compliance with applicable laws. We do not reveal information until we have a good faith belief that an information request by law enforcement or private litigants meets applicable legal standards. Additionally, we may share account or other information when we believe it is necessary to comply with law, to protect our interests or property, to prevent fraud or other illegal activity perpetrated through the Facebook service or using the Facebook name, or to prevent imminent bodily harm. This may include sharing information with other companies, lawyers, agents or government agencies." (Taken from Facebook’s Privacy Policy by: Tom Hodgkinson, ‘With Friends Like These…” The Guardian Unlimited, 14 Jan. 2008 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/jan/14/facebook> 31 Jan. 2008.) 32 Gerard de Vries, What is Political in Sub-politics? (Article forthcoming in Social Studies of Science): 16-17.

15

Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester then leads us to the understanding that for Aristotle, the essence of politics is to localize the

polis within the praxis itself; i.e. in the midst of the political process itself. The object of

politics is therefore not the realization of certain ends, as in modern political philosophy –

which if we recall moved away from the ‘highest good’ as a political object – but with a form

of being that makes no distinction between the means and the end of political action. In other

words, whereas modern political philosophy moved away from a concern with the ‘highest

good’ or the ‘good life’ in order to focus on establishing the best possible political state

according to limitations of human nature, classical philosophy was guided by a concern with

understanding the nature of human action itself through the experience itself:

Within the modern mindset, we are accustomed to distinguish between on the one hand

ideals, plans and desires, and on the other the realization of an ideal, the execution of a plan,

and the fulfillment of desire. For us, a ‘good life’ is an ideal to be realized. For Aristotle,

however, the good life is not an ideal at all. It is, in the first place, a kind of life, namely, the

life of those who act virtuously in the polis. In Politics – and its companion volume the

Nicomachean Ethics – Aristotle tries to understand what a good life is. […] He wants to give

people insight into the nature of their lives, an understanding of what is the point of praxis in

the polis: to live a truly human life (Lear, 1988: Ch. 5).33

I do not share De Vries’s confidence that this notion of praxis succeeds in revealing what is

political in subpolitics. I don’t see how, “by arising from a plurality of views, experiences and

interests, a common object [of politics] emerges together with the appropriate technologies

that establish the constitution of an association in which this object can circulate and in which

it may serve as an aim for praxis.”34 The problem is that he takes for granted the ‘public’ or

‘demos’ (he speaks of a “Community of Mini-Kings” [CMK]) as an assembly of political

subjects surrounding the object of politics. His focus on praxis, however, does not explain

what makes these political subjects political35 without making the unwarranted move of

defining politics in terms of modern political conceptions, such as ‘constitution’ and

‘welfare.’

In order to avoid this pitfall, I will turn once again to Heidegger.

33 Ibid., 19-20. 34 Ibid., 39-40. 35 This problematic is illustrated in the case of synthetic worlds, and the non-existence of political communities.

16

Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester If we recall, Heidegger was explaining modern technology in terms of a process of revealing,

which he also refers to as a ‘coming to presence.’ The Greek word for revealing is alētheia.

Technology, Heidegger explains, is rooted in technē, which refers to both the “activities and

skills of the craftsman” as well as “the arts of the mind and the fine arts.” It is therefore also

poetic; it “belongs to bringing forth, to poiēsis.”36 Heidegger adds what he considers an even

more important observation: until Plato technē had been traditionally linked to epistēmē, both

of which referred to “knowing in the widest sense.” Aristotle, in turn, drew a distinction with

regards to “what and how they reveal.” As such, technē is a mode of alētheuein; it belongs to

the realm of alētheia, truth, “where revealing and unconcealment take place.”37

Heidegger also characterized modern technology as a challenge of the ‘standing-reserve’

[Bestand] – a word meant to represent that which is disposed to become present, but which as

such does not stand-by as an object – though with regards to man this is actually an ordering

of the standing-reserve. Modern technology does therefore not ‘bring-forth’ in the sense of

poiēsis, but is an enframing [Ge-stell], it is a “challenging that gathers man into ordering” the

“self-revealing as standing-reserve.”38 This enframing is itself not technological, eventhough

it is the means by which the actual reveals itself. It is this means, then, that is the essence of

modern technology.

We are still left with the question: what is the essence of that which is revealing itself? With

this mode of questioning, we enter the essence of history, for now it is the actual everywhere,

actuality itself, that becomes standing-reserve. It is the activity which sees “history as

something destined.”39 This is crucial, for as Heidegger adds, it is this “destining of revealing”

where man becomes truly free, but as such also represents the danger. It is that which creates

the space – i.e. enframes – where man is revealed as his own destining, or where he simply

‘obeys’, i.e. accepts fate.

This, finally, reveals the essence of technology. It is both a supreme danger and a saving

power. It is the former when it conceals its own essence, for when man no longer encounters

himself he may be tempted to believe that he is master of himself and nature, and that this

condition is his destiny. But it is the latter insofar in technology lies the enduring and

permanent demand of enframing itself: the challenge that leads to revealing. 36 Heidegger, 1993: 318. 37 Ibid., 319. 38 Ibid., 324. 39 Ibid., 329.

17

Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester

The essential unfolding of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that

all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the

unconcealment of standing-reserve. Human activity can never directly counter this danger.

Human achievement alone can never banish it. But human reflection can ponder the fact that

all saving power must be of a higher essence than what is endangered, though at the same

time kindred to it.40

Here, then, lies the political significance of modern technology: because it may lead man to

believe the illusion of his own history as that which has been shaped by his own conscious

activity, it may conceal the nature of his relation with actuality in terms of thought (revealing)

and activity (presence). This crafting of actuality is dangerous, insofar it impedes man from

reflecting on that which remains concealed from him. And yet, all “coming to presence, not

only modern technology, keeps itself everywhere concealed to the last.” This view of

technology is the step missing in Beck’s account of reflexivity and in De Vries’ account of

political praxis: technology helps conceal and reveal the essence of thought (reflexivity) and

man (polis) as both creator and product of the technological age.

40 Ibid., 339.

18

Synthetic Worlds and the Revelation of Technology – K.R. Knoester Conclusion

In revealing the essence of this danger, modern technology challenges man to uncover that

which, in the realm of thought, lies in his capacity. Synthetic worlds may play an important

role to this end.

In terms of risk, synthetic worlds illustrate the ease with which thought may immerse itself in

a technological construct without properly assessing the dangers. Because of this, synthetic

worlds help reveal the very dangers which surround thought in actuality. Virtual reality is the

reality of thought in actuality; i.e., it is surrounded by the very risks it creates in the process of

self-actualization (development). It is the product of the risks produced by technology and

economic activity. Thought, in seeking to escape its limitations, puts the public at risk. The

desire of thought becomes reflexivity.

But not before manifesting itself as economy and technology. In releasing the autonomy of

passion and desire for acquisition (glory and self-preservation), thought leads to economy,

making possible the political praxis of thought in the creation of value. Technology, on the

other hand, is the manifestation of the desire to control nature; i.e., to be creative. It is

therefore the poesis of thought, though it also conceals the nature of its own desire for

knowledge. In both we see the production of risk. The culmination of this process manifests

itself in synthetic worlds.

19

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