Labor Parties and Labor Movements in a Post-Fordist Political Economy: The British, French, and German Cases (1991) Anthony Daley, Chris Howell, and Stephen J. Silvia

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Labor Parties and Labor Movements in aPost-Fordist Political Economy:

The British, French, and German Cases

by Anthony DaleyDept of Government, Wesleyan University

Chris HowellDept of Politics, Oberlin College

and Stephen J. SilviaSchool of International Service, The American University

Working Paper Series #35

Prepared for delivery at the Workshop "The Changing Place of Labor in European SOciety: TheEnd of Labor's Century?," Center for European Studies, Harvard University, November 23-24,1991



P o l i t i c a l and l abor -marke t mobi l iza t ion have t aken s t r ange tw i s t s ove r

th e l a s t decade . One f inds notable examples of coun t r i es where once dominant

l e f t par t i e s have exper ienced long per iods o f oppos i t ion , bu t o ther s where th e

1980s have seen prev ious ly excluded l e f t forces dominate government . Labor

unions have exper ienced of ten dramat ic d e c l i n e s in membership and su f f e r ed

impor tant p o l i t i c a l and i ndus t r i a l se tbacks in some coun t r i es , whi le union

dens i ty and organ iza t iona l s t r eng th have he ld up wel l i n o th e r s .

An exc lus ive focus on quan t i ta t ive i n d i c a t o r s - - union dens i ty , l e f t

share of power - - masks a c r u c i a l and deep-seated cr i s i s o f both th e p o l i t i c a

and i ndus t r i a l wings of the l abor movement. A qua l i t a t i ve s h i f t has t aken

p lace in th e scope of s o c i a l change t h a t unions and l e f t p o l i t i c a l forces can

contempla te . That scope i s narrower now than a t any t ime in th e l a s t seventy

year s . One has to look back to th e 1920s fo r a s im i l a r s e t of " c o n s t r a i n t s "

imposed upon th e workers ' movement. Even where th e l e f t holds power, i t s

programs have become more cau t ious , l e s s r ed i s t r i bu t i ve , l e s s concerned with

i s sues o f economic power, and a t t imes bare ly d i s t ingu i shab le from its e l e c

t o r a l compet i tor s on th e r i gh t . Even where unions have survived th e economic

tu rbu lence o f t he pas t tw o decades , t h e i r concre te ga ins have been much

reduced, and unions have been forced onto the defens ive as barga in ing agendas

a re now dominated by th e concerns of employers r a th e r than workers .

The cur r en t debates surrounding employee par t i c i pa t i on i l l u s t r a t e th e

changed d iscourse within employer groups , governmental c i r c l e s , and even many

unions . Gone are th e p r e - o i l c r i s i s debates over worker power, r evea led most

s t a r k l y perhaps by th e desuetude in which th e concep t o f sel f-management

(autoges t ion) has f a l l en . Ins tead , one f inds e i t h e r a n e o - l i b e r a l s t r a t e g y i n

which th e market d i s c ip l i n e s worker demands o r par t i c i pa t i on schemes in which



2aley, Howell , and Si l v ia

the focus becomes th e wel l - be ing o f the economic u n i t and not empowerment of

th e worker h im/her se l f .

Th e cen te r ing of th e p o l i t i c a l l e f t and th e market pres sures on the

l a b o r l e f t have placed se r ious s t r a i ns on th e t i e s between unions and par t i e s

in th e l a s t decade. The so -ca l l ed t ransmiss ion b e l t fo r communist , s o c i a l i s t ,

o r s o c i a l democrat ic movements has worn t h in a t l e a s t p a r t i a l l y because th e

environments in which unions and par t i e s have ac ted have become more t u r

bu len t . An examinat ion of those t i e s provides a window onto both th e dec l in

ing for tunes of t r ade unions and l e f t par t i e s as wel l as on th e changing

matr ix o f i n t e r e s t between th e two s ince th e l a t e 1970s. Those t i e s have

var ied broadly from the c lose and i n s t i t u t i o n a l to th e weak and in fo rmal . Th e

re la t ionsh ip i t s e l f , however, has been c o n s i s t e n t l y important because the con

s t i t u e n c i e s of unions and l e f t p a r t i e s have h i s t o r i ca l l y over lapped ~ n

because th e capac i ty to achieve th e goa l s of one has depended on th e invo lve

ment of the o ther .

Th e case s examined in t h i s essay - - Bri ta in , Germany, and France - - pro

vide a range o f types of union-par ty r e l a t ionsh ips (from c lose to d i s t a n t ) , a

range of r ecen t union exper iences (from s t a b i l i t y to d e c l i n e ) , and a range of

recen t l e f t governance (from p o l i t i c a l exc lus ion to e l ec t o r a l dominance) .

While these cases e x h i b i t important con t r as t s and th e h i s t o r i e s of t hese

respect ive l e f t s a re very d i f f e r en t , however, they a l l exper ienced over th e

course of the 1980s a weakening in th e re la t ionsh ip between th e p o l i t i c a l and

i ndus t r i a l wings of th e l abor movement.

This paper a t tempts to exp la in the cr i s i s i n the re la t ionsh ip between

unions and l e f t par t i e s through an examinat ion of the changing s o c i a l and eco

nomic environments facing them, with par t i cu l a r emphasis on th e acce le ra t ion

in economic re s t ruc tu r ing and the exhaust ion of Ford i s t growth t h a t have



3aley, Howell, and Si lv ia

a f fec ted th e economics o f the advanced c a p i t a l i s t world . We argue t ha t th e

i n t e r e s t s and cons t i tuenc ies o f the tw o wings o f t he l abor movement overlapped

to a s i gn i f i can t degree dur ing the f i r s t t h r ee decades o f th e postwar per iod .

The re la t ionsh ip between them was po t en t i a l l y harmonious and mutual ly r e i n

fo rc ing . The c r i s i s o f Fordism, beginning in the l a t e 1960s, and t he ba re ly

v i s i b l e contours of a pos t -Ford i s t p o l i t i c a l economy today, encouraged a c o l

lapse in t he mate r i a l bases of th e c lose re la t ionsh ip between unions and l e f t

pa r t i e s . The soc io log ica l bases of both wings fragmented and developed mul t i

p le l ines of conf l i c t , i n t e r e s t s began to diverge, and th e vir tuous na tu re o f

th e re la t ionsh ip became i nc reas ing ly problemat ic .

We proceed in f ive s teps . Par t one lays out i n i dea l - t yp i ca l terms the

re la t ionsh ip between unions and l e f t par t i e s under Fordism and pos t -Fordism.

We po in t to economic and p o l i t i c a l bargains t h a t bound unions and l e f t par t i e s

t oge ther and suggest t h a t those bargains have unraveled because o f changes in

the na tu re and locus of economic change. In par t s two, th ree , and four , we

exp lo re in d e t a i l the contours o f those bargains i n Br i t a in , Germany, and

France . The concluding p a r t at tempts to exp la in the d i f f e r en t na t iona l expe

r i ences , and to o f f e r some prognosis for the fu tu re .

P o l i t i c a l Exchange and the Transi t ion out o f Fordism

The re la t ionsh ip between unions and l e f t par t i e s has h i s t o r i c a l l y re s ted

upon both a p o l i t i c a l and economic bargain , although they were r are ly a r t i c u

l a t ed as such. Ins tead, they were im p l i c i t in th e l e f t coa l i t i ons formed to

achieve p o l i t i c a l power and to compensate fo r labor market weaknesses . In the

Ford is t per iod , the l ink between t r ade unions and l e f t par t i e s provided the

po t en t i a l o f ga ins fo r bo th . The b e n e f i c i a l nature of those l inks was no t

co inc iden ta l in t h i s per iod . I t re s ted on th e economic dynamic and soc i a l

s t r uc t u r a l cha r ac t e r i s t i c s o f Fordism i t s e l f .




The mater i a l bases of both bargains , however, began to crumble with both

th e c r i s i s of Fordism a f t e r the l a t e 1960s and th e economic re s t ruc tu r ing from

1973-1983. After th e mid-1970s, advanced p o l i t i c a l economies exper ienced a

doub le - sh i f t in economic power away from th e nat ion s t a t e , "downward" to th e

f irm and "outward" to the in te rna t iona l economy. This double s h i f t had th ree

important consequences fo r par ty-union r e l a t i ons . F i r s t , th e profound eco

nomic re s t ruc tu r ing assoc ia t ed with th e exhaust ion of Ford i s t mass product ion

s h i f t s f ragments th e soc ia l bases of both unions and l e f t par t i e s , sh r ink ing

th e over lap and th e commonality of i n t e r e s t between them. Second, th e double

sh i f t a l t e r s the na tu re o f th e growth dynamic by weakening th e l inks in the

Ford i s t c i r c u i t of growth. Consequently, the i n t e r e s t s of workers are no

longer "universal" and s t a t e s have l e s s need to work with t r ade unions , who

themselves become more "dysfunct ional" fo r the economy. Third, as nat ion

s t a t e s l o se th e capaci ty to inf luence impor tan t aspec t s o f economic po l i cy , so

th e ab i l i ty of l e f t par t i e s t o maintain d i s t i n c t po l i cy packages and to

de l ive r ce r ta in goods to unions decl ines as wel l .

The Economic Bargain . The Fordis t growth dynamic re s ted upon a v i r tuous

c i r c l e of produc t iv i ty gains leading to higher r ea l wages, feeding an expand

ing mass demand, permit t ing inc reased p r o f i t s and investment, and r e su l t i ng in

higher produc t iv i ty [Glyn, Hughes, Lipie tz and Singh 1990]. The connection

between expanding produc t iv i ty and aggregate demand cons t i tu ted th e c r i t i c a l

spark plug in t h i s c i r c u i t . Some combination of r egu la r i zed co l l ec t i ve

barga in ing , Keynesian demand management, and s t a t e r egu la t ion c losed th e c i r

c u i t [Boyer 1986]. This " in tens ive" growth dynamic was not a by-product of

th e p o l i t i c a l l e f t as ev idenced by i t s development in th e United Sta tes and in

Br i t a in dur ing the 1950s. However, it d id "un iver sa l i ze" the i n t e r e s t s of

l abor , thereby l eg i t imiz ing an important ro le fo r th e rep resen ta t ives of l abor



5aley, Howell , and S i lv i a

and of fe r ing th e po t en t i a l fo r a ser i es of working c l a s s economic and soc i a l

ga ins .

Nonethe less , th e Achi l l es hee l o f t he Ford i s t c i r c u i t qu ick ly became the

combinat ion o f f u l l employment with r e l a t i ve l y powerful t r ade unions . No

"s top - ru le" would prevent th e inc reased market power of labor from press ing

wage ga ins in excess of produc t iv i ty inc reases , l ead ing to both in f l a t ionary

expecta t ions and ea t ing in to pro f i t s [Offe 1984]. Th e Ford i s t growth dynamic

re s ted a t l e a s t p a r t i a l l y on wage r e s t r a i n t by workers and t h e i r r ep resen ta

t i v e s . In th e absence of such r e s t r a in t , a tendency e x i s t e d fo r in f l a t ionary

wage i nc reases and economic d i s rup t ion from s t r i ke ac t ion , par t i cu l a r l y damag

ing in the highly cap i ta l ized , in te rdependent Ford i s t s e c to r s . This posed

se r ious problems fo r t r ade unions whose membership bore th e economic cos t s and

fo r l e f t par t i e s in power who were saddled with p o l i t i c a l r e spons i b i l i t y .

The economic bargain re su l ted from t h i s mutual v u ln e r a b i l i t y . On th e

one hand, it re s ted upon th i s mutual need to avoid damage to the compet i

t i veness of the na t iona l economy and hence th e e l e c t o r a l v i a b i l i t y of l e f t

p a r t i e s . On the o the r hand, it r e l i ed upon t he capac i ty o f t r ade unions to

induce wage r e s t r a i n t on the p a r t of t h e i r members. Trade unions of fe red wage

r e s t r a i n t in re tu rn fo r f u l l employment, and perhaps a higher soc i a l wage,

a long wi th o t h e r p o l i t i c a l gains - - union r i gh t s , l abor market po l i cy , na t ion

a l i za t i on o f key companies , e t c . [Cameron 1984] This barga in took var ious

i n s t i t u t i o n a l forms - - from informal unders tandings in th e Uni ted Sta tes to

t r ipar t i sm in Br i t a in to more formal ized c o r p o r a t i s t barga in ing in th e

Scandinavian con tex t - - b u t everywhere it re su l ted from th e fundamental

dilemma f ac ing unions and l e f t par t i e s in t he Ford i s t per iod : l abo r ' s exerc i se

of market power had s e l f - d e f e a t i n g impl i ca t ions . The economic barga in

enhanced th e e l e c t o r a l v iab i l i t y of th e l e f t because it could claim a b e t t e r



6aley, Howell , and Si lv i a

a b i l i t y to con t ro l the t r ade unions and gain t h e i r t r u s t . P o l i t i c a l exchange

cou ld no t t ake p lace without t h a t t r u s t .

The economic barga in became both more d i f f i c u l t to assemble and l e s s

r e levan t to t he t a sks of economic pol icy-making wi th the d e t e r io r a t i o n of the

mass product ion paradigm. The bargain of t he Ford i s t pe r iod i s fa r more d i f

f i c u l t to put t oge ther because both s ides of the bargain become problemat ic .

On th e one hand, s t a t e s a re l e s s able to d e l i v e r f u l l employment and inc reased

s o c i a l expend i tu r e because in te rna t iona l compet i t ion makes Keynesian r e f l a t i on

in one count ry se l f -de fea t ing in most economies [Stewart 1983]. On t he o the r

hand, th e f ragmenta t ion and decen t r a l i za t ion of bargaining make wage r e s t r a i n t

even more d i f f i c u l t fo r na t iona l union confederat ions to o rches t ra te . Th e

i nab i l i t y to de l ive r wage r e s t r a in t , a l l i e d to th e fac t t ha t f i rms a re now

more concerned to encourage f lex ib le ra the r than f ixed wages, means t h a t the

i n t e r e s t s of workers a re l e s s c l ea r l y compat ible wi th those o f th e economy as

a whole. Th e sp e c i a l re la t ionsh ip between l e f t par t i e s and unions i s more

l i ke l y t o be regarded as a l i ab i l i t y than as an a s s e t .

For our purposes , th e movement towards th e Single European Market by the

end of 1992 can be seen as a dramatic acce le r a t ion o f t h i s process , i n so f a r as

it removes na t iona l con t ro l over key economic p o l i c i e s without r e c e n t r a l i z in g

those p o l i c i e s a t a European l eve l , weakens th e p O l i t i c a l resources of labor ,

exacerbates th e pres sures o f compet i t ive deregu la t ion , and permits a mobi l i ty

to c a p i t a l which is denied l abor by v i r tue of its only p a r t i a l l y commodified

s t a t u s . As a r e su l t , th e economic bargain o f t he Ford i s t pe r iod becomes more

d i f f i c u l t to d e l iv e r and l e s s valuable to economic growth.

Th e P o l i t i c a l Barga in . In the Ford is t pe r iod , a c lose re la t ionsh ip

ex is ted between c lass s t ruc tu re and l e f t p o l i t i c a l power, mediated by t r ade

unions , which provided a s t rong ob jec t ive i n t e r e s t fo r both union and l e f t





8aley, Howell , and Si lv ia

needed some propor t ion of the whi t e - co l l a r vote , bu t the source o f e l e c t o r a l

s t a b i l i t y fo r th e l e f t was the blue co l l a r vote , and l e f t p o l i t i c a l power

re s ted pr imar i ly on its capac i ty to mobi l ize blue c o l l a r workers [Pontusson

1988] .

Lipse t and Rokkan [1967] descr ibed t he pa r ty sys tems of Western European

coun t r i es as " f rozen" in the in te rwar and postwar per iods . Where i ndus t r i

a l i za t i on had been thorough and completed compara t ive ly e a r ly , th e s t r u c tu r e

of s o c i a l cleavages tended to become "s impl i f ied , " and c l a s s became th e p r i

mary de te rminant of vo t ing and the bas i s fo r the l e f t - r i g h t dimension o f par ty

systems. During th e Ford i s t per iod o f economic growth, th e s i ze and

homogeneity of th e mass production sec to r , and i t s organizat ion and mobi

l i za t i on by t r ade unions, provided th e e l ec t o r a l ra w mater i a l of l e f t p o l i t i

c a l power and prevented a thawing o f par ty systems. Th e p o l i t i c a l barga in

re s ted upon th e high degree of over lap between t he cons t i tuenc ies of t r ade

unions and l e f t par t i e s , and hence the l imi t ed degree of conf l i c t with in and

between those cons t i tuenc ies . The organ iza t ion o f mass product ion workers in

t r ade union, in t u rn , permi t ted t h e i r e l ec t o r a l mobi l iza t ion by l e f t pa r t i e s .

Th e eros ion o f the Fordis t model sh i f t ed the cons t i tuenc ies of both

t r ade unions and l e f t pa r t i e s . The r e la t ive homogeneity of t he Ford i s t

per iod , r e s t i n g upon the weight of th e mass product ion sec to r , g ives way to

more f ragmenta t ion. This permits grea te r conf l i c t s both with in and between

each cons t i tuency .

Soc ia l s t r uc t u r a l s h i f t i s not new t o the 1970s o r 1980s. In most

advanced c a p i t a l i s t economies th e s h i f t i n to g r e a t e r pub l i c s e c to r employment

and from manufacturing to se rv ices , has been a long term one, a l though th e

r eces s ions a f t e r 1974 acce le r a t ed t ha t proces s . S t i l l , the l a s t twenty years

have witnessed a decl ine in the absolute numbers employed in manufac tur ing ,




and a r i s e in th e numbers employed in se rv ices , par t i cu l a r l y in the pub l ic

s e c to r . Some evidence sugges ts a po la r iza t ion of s k i l l s , with t he dec l ine in

th e weight of th e arche typa l semi - sk i l l ed mass product ion worker , and th e r i s e

both in more h igh ly sk i l l ed more unsk i l l ed "junk" jobs [Harr ison and

Blues tone 1988] . Thus, workforces have cons i s t ed of i nc reas ing numbers of

whi te -co l la r employees, women, and s o c i a l margina ls - - young people , minor i

t i e s , and immigrants .

Economic re s t ruc tu r ing has exacerba ted th e d i s t r i bu t i ona l conf l i c t s t ha t

a l ready ex is ted . To some ex ten t , unions may f ind organizing white co l l a r

workers and women more d i f f i c u l t than predominant ly male blue c o l l a r workers ,

e s p e c i a l l y t o t he ex ten t t h a t women f ind themselves in bus ines s and consumer

se rv ices [Myles 1990] . Workers in jobs with high tu rnover have a lso been h i s

t o r i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t to organ ize . Thus, the unionized segment of the workforce

wi l l i nc reas ing ly r ep resen t decl in ing s e c to r s . Union membership i s also

l i ke ly to s h i f t as whi te co l l a r and publ ic sec to r unions expand in number,

s i z e , and weight in th e labor movement. This has the e f f e c t o f moving con

f l i c t s between pub l i c and p r iv a t e sec to r workers, b lue and whi te c o l l a r

workers , sk i l l ed and l e s s sk i l l ed workers, and male and female workers i n s ide

union movements, the reby making th e aggregat ion o f i n t e r e s t and co l l ec t i ve

ac t ion more d i f f i c u l t [Offe 1985]. The easy so l ida r i t y of mass product ion

work, borne o f geographic and organizat ional concent ra t ion , w i l l l e s s l i ke l y

be r e p l i c a t e d i n the newer s i t e s of work [Jenson 1989]. A f ragmenta t ion of

organized l abo r ' s i n t e r e s t s t ends to r e su l t , and new axes o f c o n f l i c t develop

within the l abor movement. In shor t , the capaci ty o f a union movement to

"de l ive r " memberships to a l e f t par ty diminishes , and th e range o f i n t e r e s t s

and demands t h a t a union movement may make in re tu rn fo r such suppor t i s

expanded and compl ica ted .



Daley, Howell , and Si lv ia 10

A r e l a t e d process has taken p lace wi th in th e cons t i tuency o f l e f t

p a r t i e s . Elec to ra l dealignment and the unfreezing o f cleavages , much remarked

upon s ince the 1960s, pose par t i cu l a r problems fo r the l e f t which had r e l i ed

upon both s t rong c l a s s i den t i f i ca t i on and a c l e a r l inkage between t h a t i den t i

f i ca t ion and l e f t par ty a t tachment . The sources o f deal ignment a re complex

and con ten t ious [Crewe and Denver 1985; Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984] .

They include th e f a i lure of l e f t par t i e s to mobi l ize a long c lass l i nes - - the

f a t a l flaw o f th e ca t ch - a l l s t ra tegy - - and the d is i l lus ionment o f workers

with th e benef i t s provided by " th e i r " par ty , and th e r i s e of new s o c i a l groups

with new i n t e r e s t s or values [ Inglehar t 1977; Offe 1987] Such e l e c t o r a l f r ag

mentation has posed acute problems fo r l e f t p a r t i e s . As t he o ld manual indus

t r i a l working c lass dec l ined in absolute and r e l a t i ve t e rms , the need to

appeal to new s o c i a l ca tegor i es becomes acute . The i n t e r e s t s and p o l i t i c s of

new s o c i a l groups - - predominant ly young, well-educated, white co l l a r , of ten

pub l ic sec to r o r decommodified groups - - a re f a r from homogeneous. They

occupy "contradic tory c l a s s locat ions" [Wright 1978] and t end to be "c l a s s

aware" but not "c lass conscious" [Giddens 1973]. The na tu re o f t h e i r i n t e r

es t s has been hard to dec ipher desp i t e asse r t ions o f " p o s t - m a te r i a l i s t

va lues , " pos t - i ndus t r i a l e thos , " and "production po l i t i c s " [ Inglehar t 1977;

Oppenheimer 1985; Stephens 1979]. These i n t e r e s t s , however, c l ea r l y diverge

from those of manual , i ndus t r i a l workers .

Such e l e c t o r a l sh i f t s have e i the r encouraged th e c rea t ion o f new p o l i t i

c a l par t i e s which force t r a d i t i o n a l l e f t par t i e s to compete in new ways o r

they have d iv ided l e f t par t i e s which now seek to appeal both to t h e i r t r a d i

t i ona l b lue c o l l a r e l e c to r a t e and th e more d i f fuse new s o c i a l ca tegor i es [Offe

1987]. Ki t sche l t [1989] has ident i f i ed some of th e dilemmas involved in

appeal ing to these new ca tegor i es . "Lef t - l ibe r t a r ian" pa r t i e s and con




s t i t uenc i e s t end t o r e j ec t formal a f f i l i a t i o n and avoid th e "p i l l a r i zed"

l inkages between t r ad i t i ona l par t i e s and t h e i r cons t i tuenc ies . For such

reasons , one can speak of a l og ic of "organ iza t iona l dea l ignment . " The For

d i s t p o l i t i c a l bargain becomes more muddled because of mul t ip l e i n t e r e s t s and

conf l i c t s within l e f t par t i e s , pa r t i cu l a r l y when th e l inkage between l e f t

par ty and organized l abor can be seen by important e l e c t o r a l cons t i tuenc ies as

i l l eg i t i ma t e . Th e tendency towards deal ignment of par ty and e l ec t o r a t e i s

c l ea r l y des t ruc t ive of t r ad i t i ona l ly c lose par ty -un ion r e l a t i o n s h ip s .

Economic change and th e sh i f t i ng composi t ion of th e workforce which

accompanies it have contr ibuted to a c r i s i s in the re la t ionsh ip between unions

and l e f t pa r t i e s . This a lso con t r ibu tes to an i deo log ica l c r i s i s as the

l inkage i t s e l f comes under f i r e both within unions and l e f t par t i e s and

without . A re la t ionsh ip t h a t was once seen as n a tu r a l and even b e n e f i c i a l ,

now comes to be deemed i l l eg i t i ma t e , a concession to spec ia l i n t e r e s t s , and an

encouragement to "ungovernabi l i ty" and des t ruc t ive economic growth.

Trade Unions and th e Labour Par ty in Br i ta in : Family o r J u s t Good Fr iends?

Th e re la t ionsh ip between th e Br i t i sh Labour Par ty and th e t r ade unions

has evolved cons iderably in the 1980s, a decade in which th e Labour Par ty was

excluded from power and a Conserva t ive government with a pa r t i cu l a r ly v i r u l e n

an t i -un ion agenda ru led . That re la t ionsh ip has d e t e r io r a t e d to t he po in t t ha

th e p o l i t i c a l and i ndus t r i a l wings of the labor movement are now f u r th e r apar

than a t any po in t in pos twar Br i t i s h h i s to r y . This reduced mutual dependence

i s more than th e produc t s imply of a hos t i l e s t a t e , p o l i t i c a l exc lus ion , and

th e Conserva t ive government 's re jec t ion o f t r ipar t i sm as a mode of po l icy

making. There are ind ica t ions of more profound reasons , rooted in s t ruc tu ra l

changes in th e economy and the recomposi t ion o f th e organized labor force , fo

be l i ev ing t h a t t h i s new, more d i s t an t , re la t ionsh ip wi l l endure .



Daley, Howell , and Si l v i a 12

The P o l i t i c a l and Economic Bargains i n t he Fo rd i s t Per iod . Th e r e l a

t ionsh ip between the t r ade union movement and the B r i t i sh Labour Par ty has

h i s to r i ca l l y been an except ional ly c lose one. The par ty was founded by the

t rade unions as a p o l i t i c a l arm of the labor movement in 1900, and almost from

th e s t a r t the t r ade unions have had an i n s t i t u t i o n a l ro le in th e cons t i tu

t iona l s t ruc ture of the par ty . The Annual Conference is the formal governing

body of t he pa r ty . At Conference unions wield b lock votes (which a re in tended

to rep resen t the membership of the unions) amounting to a t o t a l of about s ix

mil l ion vo tes . This dwarfs th e cons t i tuency Labour pa r t i e s (CLPs), par

l iamentary Labour par ty (PLP) and t he o the r a f f i l i a t e d organiza t ions present

a t Conference, and it ensures t h a t t r ade unions dominate vot ing . Th e National

Execut ive Committee (NEC), which governs the par ty between Conferences, has 12

of 29 sea t s reserved fo r unionis t s , and th e union block votes a re a lso impor

t an t i n e l e c t i ng seve ra l o the r sea t s on th e NEC.

During th e f i r s t th ree decades of the postwar period a vers ion of the

p o l i t i c a l bargain descr ibed above operated between unions and the Labour

Par ty . Th e B r i t i sh economy, having i ndus t r i a l i zed comparatively e a r l y , saw

i ndus t r i a l employment peak a t 48% of c i v i l employment as ea r l y as 1955

[Rowthorn 1986: 5] . These jobs were concentra ted i n t he core manufactur ing

mass product ion s e c t o r s . In t h i s period the Labour Par ty was able to win

around two-th i rds (69% in the 1966 e lec t ion ) o f t he manual working c l a s s vote

[Kavanagh 1990: 168].

I t i s impor tan t to note t ha t s ign i f i can t numbers of manual workers d id

not vote Labour. Complicated h i s to r i ca l reasons ex i s t fo r the pers i s tence of

a s t r a in of working c la s s Conservat ive vo te r [Nairn 1966] , but an impor tan t

pa r t of the exp lana t ion l i e s in th e unevenness of un ion iza t ion . union dens i ty

i n Br i t a in i s in th e middle range of European count r ie s , r i s i ng from 38.6% in




1945 to a peak of 55.4% in 1979 [McIlroy 1988: 201-202]. Pontusson [1988] has

pointed out t h a t the i nab i l i t y to mobil ize a l a rge r propor t ion o f manual

workers fo r the Labour par ty was r e la ted to lower l eve ls o f union dens i ty .

Trade un ion i s t s voted heavi ly for the Labour Par ty - - fo r example, in 1964

almost th ree quar t e r s of union members voted Labour [McIlroy 1988: 57 ] - - bu t

th e p o l i t i c a l "t ransmiss ion be l t " could only opera te where t r ade unions were

s t rong ly implanted.

Nonetheless , the weight of manufactur ing in th e economy, t he s t r eng th o

t r ade unions, and the c l ea r i den t i f i ca t i on between t he t r ade union movement

and th e Labour Par ty provided a s tab le base o f Labour vo te rs . Class remained

th e bes t p red ic to r o f vo t ing i n Br i t a in .

The t r ade unions are a l so c r u c i a l to th e f i n a n c i a l hea l th o f the Labour

Par ty . In 1983 47 o f the 58 unions with p o l i t i c a l funds were a f f i l i a t ed to

th e Labour Par ty [McIlroy 1988: 33] . Through p o l i t i c a l l ev ies from i nd iv idua

un ion is t s , and o t h e r funds ra i sed by t he t r ade unions , th e t r ade unions pro

vided about 75% of Labour Par ty f inances . In add i t ion , i nd iv idua l unions

sponsor members of par l iament (which involves paying much of t h e i r e l e c t i o n

expenses) . Somewhere between 15 0 and 20 0 Labour cand ida tes are sponsored by

unions . Fina l ly , union in f luence a t Conference t ime and on th e NEC i s an

impor tan t resource fo r any f ac t ion of the Labour Par ty , a resource which has

t r ad i t i ona l ly been deployed on behal f o f th e more moderate, o r r ight-wing,

elements o f th e par ty .

The economic bargain was more compl ica ted in Br i t a i n . Some foon o f

union wage r e s t r a i n t was c e r t a in ly necessary . B r i t a i n ' s dependence upon

manufactur ing expor ts , th e per s i s t en t balance o f payments and cur rency c r i se s ,

and th e re fusa l of Labour and Conservative governments al ike to contemplate

devaluat ion , made wage cos t s of cen t ra l economic impor tance . But while wage



Daley, Howell, and Si lv ia 14

r e s t r a in t was necessary , it wa s hard to opera te . The problem lay in th e f r ag

mented, decen t r a l i zed , c r a f t s t ruc tu re of Br i t i s h t rade unionism. The TUC i s

r e l a t i ve l y weak v i s - a - v i s th e i nd iv idua l unions, and the absence of a s ing le ,

cen t ra l ized confedera l s t r u c tu r e , plus the emphasis l a id upon maintain ing

"d i f f e r en t i a l s " between categor ies of workers, ensured t h a t incomes pol ic ies

tended to be shor t - l ived , to weaken t he au thor i ty of union leaders within

t h e i r unions, and to end in in f la t iona ry surges as workers sought to recoup

l o sses [Panitch 1976]. Some kind of incomes po l i cy was in opera t ion almost

cont inuously from 1961 to 1979, but the success of these po l i c i e s wa s always

l imi t ed . Nonetheless , the more impor tan t wage r e s t r a i n t became ( p a r t i c u l a r ly

from the e a r ly 1960s onwards) , th e mOre t h i s enhanced th e l eg i t imacy o f th e

Labour Par ty as the par ty most l i ke l y to be able to work with th e unions .

The Crumbling of the P o l i t i c a l and Economic Bargains . Both the p o l i t i

c a l barga in , and th e much more uneasy economic bargain , of t he Ford i s t per iod

became l e s s e f f ec t i ve and p laus ib le from the ea r l y 1970s onwardS. I t i s d i f

f i c u l t here to d is t ingu ish the e f f e c t s of long term economic change from the

p o l i c i e s of th e Thatcher government which was e lec ted in 1979. The combina

t ion o f a t i g h t f i s c a l and monetary s tance and the s t rong pound in the f i r s t

phase o f economic pol icy a f t e r 1979 dramat ica l ly acce le r a t ed the de

i ndus t r i a l i za t i on of Br i t a in . Between 1979 and 1987 employment in manufactur

ing f e l l by 27% whi le employment in services rose by a lmost 14% [Wells 1989:

25-26] . Th e s h i f t in employment from indust ry to se rv ices i s obvious ly a long

term one - - th e employment share of indust ry peaked in 1955, and dec l ined in

abso lu te numbers a f t e r 1966 - - but t he sca le o f the changes in t he pas t decade

i s nonetheless remarkable.

This has had impor tan t s t r uc t u r a l impl ica t ions fo r Br i t i sh t r ade

unionism. F i r s t , overa l l union densi ty has dec l ined . Union membership f e l l




rthrOUghout th e 19BOs from 55.4% in 1979 to 43% in 19B5 [McIlroy 19BB: 201] .

While th e decl ine s lowed in the second h a l f o f th e 1980s it has nonetheless

cont inued , and Trade union Congress (TUC) membership dec l ined by 2.9% in 1989

a lone [Terry 1991: 99] . Inso fa r as t r ade unions helped to pre-o rgan ize

workers to vote fo r th e Labour Par ty , the decl ine in union organizat ion i s

l i ke l y t o have repercuss ions fo r the pOl i t i ca l i den t i f i ca t i on o f workers .

Second, t he re has been a r i se in the number and inf luence o f whi te co l

l a r unions . The f a s t e s t growing unions in th e 1970s and 1980s were publ ic

sec to r and white co l l a r / t echn i ca l unions, while the gr ea t e s t dec l ines were in

t r a d i t i o n a l blue co l l a r manufacturing unions [Taylor 1987: 153-154]. Since

19B2 a new pr inc ip le has been used to determine union r ep resen ta t ion on the

TUC General Counci l , one which grants automat ic r ep resen ta t ion to unions above

a ce r t a i n number of members. This has helped s h i f t th e balance o f TUC p o l i c y -

making towards white c o l l a r unions.

Th e impl ica t ions o f t h i s development are no t en t i r e ly c l ea r . Some white

c o l l a r unions, pr imar i ly those in th e pub l ic sec to r , a re mi l i t an t , p o l i t i c a l

unions with s t rong ideo log ica l t i e s to the Labour Par ty ( the Nat iona l Union o f

Publ ic Employees (NUPE), fo r example) . For the most par t , however, white co l

l a r unions are l e s s l i ke l y to be a f f i l i a t e d to th e Labour Par ty than blue co l

l a r unions, and l ess l i ke l y t o con t r ibu te to th e p o l i t i c a l levy [Coates and

Topham 1986: 129-130]. A d i s t i nc t i on might be usefu l here . White co l l a r

unions are o f t en pOl i t i c i zed in th e sense t h a t they recognize th e p o l i t i c a l

inf luences and pressures on t h e i r normal barga in ing func t ion , bu t they a re

r are ly p o l i t i c a l in th e sense of seeing a n a tu r a l and au tomat ic l ink between

t h e i r ac t ion in th e i ndus t r i a l sphere and a working c lass p o l i t i c a l par ty .

This should come as no su rp r i se given t ha t , in 1987 fo r example, 52% o f of f i ce

and c l e r i c a l workers and 59% of profess iona l and managerial s t a f f voted Con




se rva t ive [McIlroy 1988: 57] . The na tura l a f f i n i t y o f t r ade unionis t s for the

Labour Par ty i s much l ess na tura l among the f a s t e s t growing unions . Beyond a

cont inuing dra in on par ty f inances and votes , th i s impl ies a growing

divergence between the i n t e r e s t s of the TUC and those of the Labour Par ty .

Third , th e growing heterogenei ty of the t r ade union movement has encour

aged s p l i t s within the movement. Unions have tended to e i t h e r leave the

umbrel la of the TUC or , in the case of newly formed unions, not to seek to

jo in the TUC. There has a l so been t a lk of se t t i ng up a r i va l t r ade union con

fede ra t ion which would be exp l i c i t l y apo l i t i c a l and wil l ing to t a lk to

governments of any p o l i t i c a l s t r i p e . In 1988 the TUC expel led th e e l e c

t r i c i a n s union (EEPTU) fo r t echnica l reasons having to do with the "poaching"

of members from o the r unions [Kel ly and Richardson 1989: 145-147]. The EEPTU

is in the fore f ront o f the New Rea l i s t unions and it is cur ren t ly engaged in

merger t a l k s with th e engineer ing union (AEU). In 1990 a r i v a l to the TUC,

fo r white co l l a r workers only , was formed - - COMPS: Counci l of Pro fess iona l

and Managerial Services - - and was desc r ibed by its pres iden t as " the new,

accep tab le , reasonable face of t r ade unionism" [Terry 1991: 100-101]. A

broader , but still informal r iva l to th e TUC i s th e grouping of unions ca l led

"Center U ni ty . "

The l ike l ihood o f a se r ious s p l i t in the TUC i s unc lea r . But it seems

probable t h a t even i f i ne f f e c t i ve as a funct ioning a l t e rna t i ve t r ade union

confedera t ion , a s ign i f i can t number of important unions ou t s ide the TUC se t s

up th ree kinds of problems fo r th e t r ad i t i ona l par ty -un ion re l a t ionsh ip .

Fi r s t , those unions outs ide the TUC do not have the t r ad i t i ona l l i nk to th e

Labour Party , and indeed a re mil i t an t ly apo l i t i c a l . This reduces the flow o f

funds and vo tes to the pa r ty . Second, it c rea te s an oppor tun i ty fo r the cur

r e n t government to break the TUC monopoly on the t r i p a r t i t e bodies which do




sill ex i s t . Indeed th e government has now appoin ted non-TUC r epresenta t ives

to both th e Health and Safety Commission (HSC) and the Advisory , Conci l ia t ion

and Arbi t ra t ion Service (ACAS). Third , it makes any fu ture at tempt by the TUC

to encourage voluntary wage r e s t r a in t in conjunct ion with a Labour government

even more d i f f i c u l t , as the already l imi ted cen t r a l i za t i on of B r i t i sh t r ade

unions i s fu r t he r weakened.

A ll these f ac tor s have reduced the over lap in i n t e r e s t s and cons t i tuency

between the t r ade unions and th e Labour Par ty . The s t a rkes t measure of these

changes , and t h e i r e l e c t o r a l impact on the Labour Party , i s t ha t i n the 1987

e l ec t i on only 50% of semi- sk i l l ed manual workers, 34% of sk i l l ed manual

workers , and 22% of o f f i c e / c l e r i c a l workers voted Labour, and t h a t , in com

par i son to th e 73% of t r ade union members who voted Labour in 1964, in 1987,

even of t r a de union members, only 42% voted Labour [McIlroy 1988: 57] .

The economic bargain r e s t i ng upon wage r e s t r a i n t wa s always an uns tab le

and an uneasy one. I t became more so , f i r s t as th e dec l ine of th e B r i t i sh

economy r e l a t i ve to its European compet i to rs became more se r ious and more

v i s ib l e in th e 1960s, and second as th e deep recess ion a f t e r 1974 h i t the

Br i t i sh economy pa r t i cu l a r l y hard . Keynesianism was declared dead even before

Thatcher took power by Callaghan, th e Labour pr ime minis te r , and th e i nab i l i t y

of th e Labour government of 1974-79 to promise f u l l employment and expanded

soc i a l se rv ices made th e mate r i a l base of pO l i t i c a l exchange even more shaky

than it al ready was. As w i l l become c lear , corporat ism was never on th e cards

dur ing th e 1980s because of the h o s t i l i t y of th e Conserva t ive government , bu t

even had some bargain been contemplated, the autonomy of the B r i t i sh economy,

and of s t a t e economic po l i cy , had eroded too f a r [Howell 1991].

Trade Union-Labour Par ty R e la t ions . Th e h i s to r i ca l l y c lose r e l a t i ons h i p

between th e Labour Par ty and the t r ade unions became a good dea l c l o se r in the



Daley, Howell, and S i lv i a 18

1970s in response both to Conservat ive l eg i s l a t i on hos t i l e to unions and the

economic c r i s i s fo l lowing the f i r s t o i l shock. During the 1970-74 Conserva

t ive government the TUC became more ac t ive ly involved in th e i n t e r na l a f f a i r s

of the Labour Par ty in order to avoid a r epea t o f th e 1964-70 Wilson

government 's a t tempt to regula te union behavior ( in th e 1969 White Paper "In

Place of Str i fe" ) and to ensure th e r epea l of th e 1971 I ndus t r i a l Rela t ions

Act . The Labour Par ty a l so wanted to be able to go to th e e l ec t o r a t e and

argue p laus ib ly t h a t only it could ensure l abor peace . Discuss ions took p lace

through a new Liaison Committee with members of th e TUC General Counci l , th e

NECand the Labour Shadow Cabine t . The r e su l t was

ar a d i c a l program which

committed a fu ture Labour government to at tempt to re s to re f u l l employment,

extend th e welfare s t a t e , pass a package of l eg i s l a t i on concern ing working

cond i t ions , and expand s t a t e - d i r ec t ed investment . The new, more i n t e r

ven t ion is t s t a t e machinery was to be run in a genuine ly t r i pa r t i t e manner with

ex tens ive union involvement in pol icy-making.

When the Labour Par ty re turned to power in 1974, it wa s ab le to meet

some o f l abo r ' s programat ic asp i ra t ions , in par t i cu l a r th e sa lvag ing o f f i rms

in f inanc ia l d i f f i c u l t i e s through the National Ente rp r i se Board. S t i l l , th e

overa l l r e su l t of t h i s c lose r re la t ionsh ip between unions and Par ty was a d i s

a s t e r fo r both of them [Coates 1980]. As th e economic c r i s i s deepened, th e

Labour government turned to th e one resource t ha t it had t h a t a Conservative

government d id no t : its pr iv i leged re la t ionsh ip with th e t r ade unions . S t a r t

in g in 1975 the Labour government attempted to con t ro l i n f l a t i on through a

negot ia ted incomes po l i cy which went under the l a b e l o f th e "Socia l Contract ."

Th e unions were thereby drawn in to a c lose r re la t ionsh ip with th e government

and became an i n t eg r a l pa r t , th e cen te rp iece in f ac t , of the government ' s eco

nomic s t r a t e g y . The Socia l Contrac t wa s a shambles because Labour was unable ,




due to th e deep r eces s ion and IMF cond i t iona l i ty ru les , to de l ive r on th e

promised r a d i c a l program. Therefore , what promised to be a mutual exchange

developed in to a one-way barga in : l abor gave so Labour could s tay in power.

Nonethe less , th e TUC went along with t he po l i cy fo r as long as it could

because th e a l t e r na t i ve appeared to be a Conserva t ive government . However,

n e i th e r th e TUC nor the leaderships of i nd iv idua l unions was ab le to sus ta in

the wage r e s t r a i n t pol icy in th e face of r i s i ng d i scon ten t from the rank and

f i l e . Wildcat s t r i kes , a rad ica l iza t ion i n s ide some unions ( p a r t i c u l a r ly the

publ ic sec to r unions) , and f i na l l y , the infamous Winter of Discon ten t in

winter 1978-79, th rea tened union leaders and pushed unions to th e l e f t [Coates

1989] .

Meanwhile, the closeness of the Labour government 's re la t ionsh ip with

th e unions became a severe e l ec t o r a l l i ab i l i t y to th e p a r ty . The f ac t t ha t

th e Socia l Con t rac t wa s a t l e a s t as i l l u s t r a t i v e of the weakness of th e union

l eader sh ip and confedera l s t ruc tu re as of the s t r eng th of union power, was too

sub t le a po in t fo r most people , par t i cu l a r l y as th e t e l ev i s ion news was f i l l ed

with p ic tu res of unco l lec ted garbage in the s t r e e t s and unburied bodies in

munic ipa l graveyards . The par ty wa s seen as unwi l l ing to confront th e unions

p r e c i s e ly because of i t s dependence upon, and c lose r e l a t i o n s h ip with, th e

t r ade unions . In the 1979 e lec t ion campaign th e par ty -un ion r e l a t i o n s h ip wa s

he ld up by th e Conserva t ives as a major cause of economic dec l ine , and th e

Conserva t ive l eader , Margaret Thatcher, in r e fe rence to the t r ade unions ,

promised: "B y God I'll conf ront them" [Jenkins 1988: 23] .

Thus, th e exper ience of the 1974-79 Labour government, and in par t i cu l a r

th e par ty -un ion re la t ionsh ip embodied in the Socia l Con t rac t , wa s perceived as

a f a i l u re . Union leaders took as t h e i r lesson t h a t wage r e s t r a i n t could only

be a one-s ided bargain t h a t could only weaken them in s ide t h e i r own unions ,



Daley, Howell , and S i lv i a 20

and the Labour leadership sa w themselves cas t as a s e c t i o n a l par ty , in hock to

th e t r ade unions , and hence unf i t to govern.

For the new Conservat ive government the unions were not simply an eco

nomic t h r ea t . They were also a p O l i t i c a l t h r ea t . The unions were blamed from

br ing ing down the Heath government, and the quas i -co rpora t i s t not ion of

providing a ro le fo r impor tan t s o c i a l ac to r s in pOlicy-making was deemed

i l l eg i t i ma t e [Mitchel l 1987: 511J. The neo-c lass ica l ideology of th e Thatcher

government sought to re inforce the separat ion between th e p o l i t i c a l and th e

economic spheres . This vers ion o f Conservat ive ideology wanted both a f ree

market a s t rong s t a t e , and indeed the former r equ i red th e l a t t e r [Gamble

1988J. The Thatcher government wa s exp l i c i t l y concerned with th e p o l i t i c a l

of t r ade unions, and t ha t i nev i t ab ly focused a t t e n t i o n upon th e r e l a t i on

ship between th e t r ade union movement and th e Labour Par ty .

The re la t ionsh ip between th e Labour Par ty and th e t r ade unions underwent

a two-s tep s h i f t i n the 1980s. I n i t i a l l y , in response to th e i n t e r na l con

s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s of the par ty , the unions became much more i n f luen t i a l and

c lose ly involved i n the running of th e par ty . Then, from 1983 onwards, both

par ty and unions backed away from each other , and sought to reduce th e

sa l i ency o f t h e i r t i e s , fo r t h e i r own s e l f - i n t e r e s t .

The per iod from th e 1979 e lec t ion defeat u n t i l e a r ly 1982 was one o f

in tense conf l i c t within th e Labour Par ty . The cen t r a l i s sue wa s the at tempt

by the "Outside Lef t , " located pr imar i ly in the CLPs, to make the PLP, and

par t i cu l a r l y the par ty l eader sh ip , more accountable to Conference and th e NEC

[Kogan and Kogan 1982J. Given th e weight of the unions a t Conference and on

the NEC, th e votes o f t he t r ade unions were c r u c i a l to the outcome o f t h i s

conf l i c t and no reform could t ake p lace without union suppor t . This drew the

unions in to t he s t rugg le , and i n to the in t ense lobbying which took p lace a t a




se r i e s o f par ty conferences in 1979-81. The unions were, unsurp r i s ing ly ,

d iv ided . The chaos of the l a s t months of the previous Labour government , and

th e outcome o f th e Socia l Con t rac t , made some elements o f th e left's case

p laus ib le , e spec ia l ly to th e pub l ic se c t o r unions l i ke NUPE and th e National

Associat ion of Local Government Off icers (NALGO), which had borne th e brunt of

the incomes po l i cy . For t h i s reason, and because of th e l ack o f a common

union f ron t , NEC con t ro l o f the e l e c t i o n manifes to and mandatory re - se lec t ion

o f members o f par l iament passed qu ick ly . But t he i s sue o f elec t ion of the

p a r ty leadership (previous ly th e exc lus ive p reserve o f th e PLP) was more con

t e n t i o u s . Th e r e l a t i ve balance between r i g h t and l e f t in th e PLP and CLPs

meant t h a t u l t imate ly , a t th e January 1981 Spec ia l Wembley Conference, th e

compromise was an e l ec t o r a l col lege in which the unions had th e l a r ges t share

of the votes (40% fo r unions , and 30% each fo r th e PLP and CLPs) .1

In th e con tex t o f th e s p l i t in the Labour Par ty , th e c rea t ion o f th e

Socia l Democrat ic Par ty (SOP), and the prospect o f another Conserva t ive e l ec

t ion v ic to ry , severa l of the l a r ges t unions organized more aggress ive ly in an

e f f o r t to mediate between r i g h t and l e f t i n s ide the p a r ty . Severa l t r ade

unions had founded Trade Unions fo r a Labour Victory (TULV) in 1978 with th e

express purpose o f helping the par ty elec tora l ly .2 In th e con tex t of the

ea r ly 1980s t h i s organ iza t ion took on a c e n t r a l r o l e in th e a f f a i r s o f th e

par ty . In p r in c ip l e TULV was non-par t i s an with r espec t to th e con t inu ing war

f a r e in s ide t he pa r ty , but in p rac t ice it favored th e r i gh t because moderates

s tood a b e t t e r chance of l ead ing the Par ty to v ic to ry in an e l ec t i on [Taylor

1987] •

Th e TULV cal l ed a meet ing in January 1982 a t Bishops S to r t f o r d and

forced the var ious f ac t ions o f the par ty to agree to a compromise which would

l i m i t open conf l i c t . Later , t r ade union votes engineered a s h i f t to th e r igh

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/electorally.2

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/electorally.2




on th e NEC a t th e 1982 Labour Par ty Conference. Fina l ly , with th e par ty in

d i sa r r ay , it was the TULV which played a major ro le in fund- ra i s ing and

organizing dur ing the 1983 e lec t ion campaign.

Thus, in the four years a f t e r 1979, t he t r ade unions were dragged in to a

much c lose r re la t ionsh ip with th e Labour Par ty as a r e su l t of the need to

mediate between the l e f t and the r i g h t and the e l ec t o r a l needs of th e par ty .

In 1983 th e unions were much more i n f l uen t i a l i n s ide the Labour Par ty than

they had been in 1979, by v i r tue o f t h e i r share o f the e l e c t o r a l co l l ege , the

grea te r ro le o f Conference and the NEC in par ty a f f a i r s , and th e dependence of

the par ty upon union funding.

From 1983 onwards, however, the par ty and unions drew a p a r t . The 1983

e l e c t i o n defeat permi t ted Nei l Kinnock to become l eader of th e par ty and he

has spen t t h e p a s t e igh t years a t tempting to make th e par ty more e l ec t o r a l l y

appeal ing [Hughes and Wintour 1990]. This has involved, among o ther th ings ,

demonstrat ing th e independence of the par ty from the unions. The l i tmus t e s t

fo r pa r ty independence from t he t r ade unions has been t he fu tu re o f the f ive

packages of Conservat ive i ndus t r i a l re la t ions l eg i s l a t i on 3 [Coates 1989;

Terry, 1991]. Unt i l 1983 the par ty was committed to r epea l a l l Conservative

ant i -union l eg i s l a t i on . This wa s problemat ic because publ ic opinion, and

indeed many t r ade un ion i s t s , sa w ce r ta in aspec t s o f the l eg i s l a t i on as l e g i t i

mate and pos i t ive reforms [Taylor 1987: 160-165].

Between 1983 and 1986 a j o in t TUC-Labour Par ty commit tee worked on the

i ssue o f i ndus t r i a l r e l a t i o n s l eg i s l a t i on under a fu ture Labour government.

At its 1986 conference, the TUC agreed to keep ba l l o t s before s t r i kes , but

still cal l ed fo r th e r epea l of the r e s t of th e Tory l eg i s l a t i on [Marsden

1987]. Discuss ion continued in the con tex t of a Labour Par ty po l i cy review

s e t up a f t e r th e 1987 e lec t ion defea t . F ina l ly , a t the 1990 TUC conference,




th e TUC l eader sh ip narrowly defea ted a motion which would have demanded th e

r epea l of a l l Conserva t ive i ndus t r i a l r e l a t i o n s l e g i s l a t i o n . This wa s an

important v ic to ry fo r Kinnock and those who wanted g r e a t e r independence fo r

th e par ty from th e unions . After a decade of Thatcher , th e unions were no

longer ca l l i ng upon th e Labour Par ty to re turn to the s t a t us quo an te .

At th e same t ime, t he t r ade unions had reasons fo r want ing to weaken

t h e i r t i e s with Labour, o r a t l e a s t to d iv e r s i f y t h e i r p o l i t i c a l t i e s . Th e

unions came to recognize th e durabi l i ty o f th e Thatcher government; they could

no t mainta in con tac t s exc lus ive ly with the Labour Par ty and subordinate a l l

ac t iv i ty to "praying fo r a Labour government" [Burgi 1990: 214] . Th e 1983 TUC

conference sa w th e emergence o f the doc t r ine l abe l led th e "New Realism." This

re fe r red both to a more compromising a t t i t ude v i s - a - v i s employers , and to a

wil l ingness to t a lk to the government and to o ther oppos i t ion par t i e s (such as

th e SOP) [Taylor 1987]. However, the New Realism was s t i l l b o r n with r espec t

to more hanmonious r e l a t i o n s with th e Thatcher government . Thatcher d isp layed

not th e s l i gh te s t i n t e r e s t in opening up discussions with the TUC. It i s

c l e a r t h a t fo r t h i s Conserva t ive government t he i s sue was not th e p o l i t i c a l

o r i e n t a t i o n of th e t r ade unions, but th e very l eg i t imacy (or r a th e r ,

i l l eg i t imacy) of th e quas i -co rpora t i s t fonm of i n t e r e s t group inf luence

des i r ed by th e TUC.

This was most c l e a r ly demonstra ted by an i nc iden t a t the Government Com

municat ions Headquarters (GCHQ) when th e government declared a s t a f f union

i l l e g a l a t a secur i ty i n s t a l l a t i on [Ewing and Gearty 1990]. Here th e TUC, in

the s p i r i t of the New Realism, of fe red a compromise which would have al lowed

th e union to remain, but given a no-s t r ike pledge ( the main s t a t ed concern of

th e government wa s the poss i b i l i t y o f i ndus t r i a l ac t ion damaging na t iona l

secu r i t y ) . The government re jec ted the compromise and th e br i e f f l i cke r of



Daley, Howel l , and Si l v i a 24

a l t e r na t i ve re la t ionsh ip between Conservat ive government and t r ade union move

ment was ex t ingu ished .

One fu r the r po in t i s worth making with r espec t to th e Conserva t ive

government 's po l i cy towards th e r e l a t ionsh ip between the Labour Par ty and th e

t r ade unions . Th e 1984 Trade Union Act r egu la ted the crea t ion and use o f

t r ade union p o l i t i c a l funds . These funds provide th e bulk of Labour Par ty

f inances , and th e 1984 Act was widely seen as a b l a t an t l y p o l i t i c a l a t tempt to

c r ipp le th e Labour Par ty f inanc ia l ly , par t i cu l a r l y because no equ iva len t ba l

lo t of shareholders was an t ic ipa ted for bus iness con t r ibu t ions .

The 1984 Act c a l l e d for per iodic sec re t ba l l o t s upon t he ex i s t ence o f

p o l i t i c a l funds in each union 4 [S tee le , Mil le r and Gennard 1986]. Th e sub

sequent campaigns waged i n s ide each union t o r e t a in p o l i t i c a l funds, however,

r ece ived overwhelmingly favorable vo tes . The r e su l t o f th e 37 ba l l o t s he ld in

th e f i r s t year o f operat ion of the new law was t h a t p o l i t i c a l funds were

r e t a ined in every case , with an average vote of 83% in favor [S tee le , Mi l l e r

and Gennard 1986: 456] . Bal lo t s he ld s ince have been equa l ly f avorab le .

Deta i l ed s tud ies have demonstrated t ha t unions campaigned a lmost exc lus ive ly

on th e i s sue o f the need to have p o l i t i c a l funds in order to have some p o l i t i

c a l voice [Source???] . The i s sue o f a f f i l i a t i o n to th e Labour Par ty was only

ra re ly d iscus sed . Thus, th e outcome wa s indeed a s lap i n the face fo r th e

government , bu t it cannot be t aken as an endorsement by ord inary t r ade union

members o f a l ink between t h e i r union and th e Labour Par ty .

The most t r aumat ic , and u l t imate ly des t ruc t ive , aspect of th e r e l a t i on

sh ip between th e unions and th e 1974-79 Labour government was th e a t tempt to

mainta in an incomes po l i cy . The Socia l Contrac t no t only f a i l ed , bu t in th e

Iprocess weakened th e unions , d isc red i ted th e Labour government , and pr ov ided

!ViSible evidence of the Conservative claim that the party-union l ink was

p o l i t i c a l l y and economical ly damaging.



Daley, Howell, and Si l v i a 25

Since 1979 th e TUC has repeated ly r e jec ted any form o f wage r e s t r a i n t in

d i scuss ions with th e Labour Party , and has emphasized its commitment to f r ee

co l l ec t i ve bargain ing . A re so lu t ion a t th e 1980 TUC Conference forbade th e

TUC General Counci l from even discuss ing wage r e s t r a in t , and a j o i n t TUC

Labour Par ty po l i cy document in 1985 re -a f f i rmed th e at tachment to bargain ing

unhindered by voluntary or s t a tu tory incomes po l i c i e s . While a fe w unions

(NALGO i n 1982, and th e TGWU and GMBATU in 1986, for ins tance) have

occas iona l ly ca l l ed fo r wage r e s t r a in t dur ing the f i r s t period of a fu tu re

Labour government, th e grea t majori ty of unions have re j ec ted it in any form.

This poses se r ious problems fo r Labour. I t s economic pol icy i s now

b u i l t around the ext remely suspect not ion t ha t i nd iv idua l workers and t h e i r

unions w i l l volunta r i ly sca le back wage demands in response to t he a n t i c i pa t e d

f a l l in unemployment and expansion in publ ic spending [TUC-Labour Par ty 1985].

I t w i l l t ake another e lec t ion campaign to t e s t how t enab le the B r i t i sh e l ec

t o r a t e f inds th i s a t tempt to square the c i rc le o f Keynesianism without an

incomes po l i cy in a market economy.

Th e pas t decade has a lso seen a s i gn i f i can t e ros ion in th e number and

importance o f t r i p a r t i t e bodies in Bri t a in . The Thatcher government sought to

dismant le th e panoply of in termediary bodies which sprung up i n t he pos twar

per iod . Th e pa r t i cu l a r kind of negot ia ted pol icy-making assoc ia ted with co r

porat ism i s unpala tab le in a more market -dr iven economy. The weakening o r

e l imina t ion o f t r i p a r t i t e bodies on which they sa t has been pa r t i cu l a r ly

se r ious fo r th e t r ade unions . In 1987 the government announced t ha t th e

National Economic Development Counci l would meet only qua r t e r l y and t ha t more

than ha l f o f its reg ional development committees would be abol i shed [McIlroy

1988: 50] . The Manpower Services Commission was f i r s t renamed and th e number

of employer r epresenta t ives inc reased , and then abol i shed in September 1988




because o f a TUC boyco t t of th e government 's Employment Tra ining Scheme [Kel ly

and Richardson 1989].

Clear ly these changes a re reve rs ib le . A fu tu re Labour government could

choose to r e tu rn to t r i p a r t i t e nego t ia ted pol icy-making . Ind ica t ions a re

t ha t , a t l e a s t i n the area of t r a in ing , th e Labour Par ty now envisages a major

expansion in funding and th e range o f government i n t e rven t ion , and one can

a n t i c ip a t e union and employer involvement [The Economist March 2, 1991].

Never the less , a s i zeab le chunk o f th e i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework of t r ipar t i sm

has gone and re-bui ld ing it would take t ime .

Th e re la t ionsh ip between th e t r ade unions and th e Labour Par ty has

changed dur ing th e 1980s. After a br i e f per iod in which th e t r ade unions

became involved and i n f l uen t i a l within th e par ty , mainly in order to

mediate between warr ing fact ions in th e par ty , th e tw o have drawn a p a r t . The

memory and consequences of the Social Cont ract in th e second h a l f o f th e 1970s

have le d both par ty and unions to see th e dangers of too c lose a mutual iden

t i f i c a t i o n . Thus Kinnock now procla ims th e independence of th e Labour Par ty

from th e unions , and th e unions refuse to contemplate any form o f incomes

po l i cy with a fu ture Labour government. The new re la t ionsh ip i s cap tu red by

phrases l ike " fa i rness not favours" (Kinnock), and " inf luence not power" (John

Edmonds o f GMB) [London Times September 5, 1990] , and th e s u b - t i t l e o f Robert

Taylo r ' s r ecen t musing on th e par ty-union re la t ionsh ip : " t ime fo r an open mar

r i age" [Taylor 1987] .

One can ques t ion the d u r a b i l i t y of t h i s par t i cu l a r kind of mar r iage .

Clear ly many t r ade unions still see a Labour government as a c r u c i a l an t ido te

to Thatcher , and her l e s s conf ron ta t iona l b ut no l e s s an t i -un ion succes sor .

I t i s a l so l i ke l y t h a t any fu tu re Labour government, if it ge ts in to t r oub le ,

w i l l a t tempt to p lay th e union card and g e t some form of wage r e s t r a i n t . And




unions w i l l be tempted to go along in order to avoid a change o f government .

The Labour Par ty and t r ade unions have promised to avoid incomes po l i c i e s

before only to in t roduce them in extremis .

But something has changed a f t e r a decade o f rad ica l Conservat ive

governments and socio-economic re s t ruc tu r ing . Th e t r ade union movement now

has a much reduced capaci ty to provide wage r e s t r a in t , even if it wanted to ,

and it i s i nc reas ing ly dominated by t r ade unions which are ce r t a i n l y a p o l i t i

ca l , and of ten hos t i l e to th e Labour Par ty . Meanwhile, th e Labour Par ty i s

l e s s ab le t o d e l i v e r f u l l employment and expanded s o c i a l se rv ices . Even

before th e complet ion of th e Single European Market in 1992, and th e Labour

Par ty (and t r ade union movement 's) embrace of t h i s development, Keynesian

so lu t ions were d isc red i ted within the par ty .

Thus , many o f th e mutual benef i t s which came from t he c lose re la t ionsh ip

between par ty and unions are una t t a inab le o r problemat ic . Th e t r a d i t i o n a l

t i e s between t r ade unions and a s o c i a l democrat ic par ty seem l e s s n a tu r a l and

l e s s use fu l . Under t hese c i rcumstances the u t i l i t y of th e re la t ionsh ip i s

l i ke ly to be i nc reas ing ly ques t ioned.

Labor and Socia l Democracy in Germany: The Forward Ret rea t

By th e end o f the 1970s, th e mutua l ly advantageous and l a rge ly

harmonious economic and p o l i t i c a l re la t ionsh ip es tab l i shed a decade e a r l i e r by

between th e Socia l Democrat ic Par ty of Germany (SPD) and th e predominant l abor

confedera t ion in the Federa l Republ ic , the German Trade Union Federa t ion

(DGB), began to crumble. As the Ford i s t model f rayed in th e 1980s and the

t r a d i t i o n a l d i s t r i bu t i ve p o l i t i c s o f the pos twar e ra became l e s s v iab le , o f f i

c i a l s from both th e SPD and th e DGB unions came to be l i eve t h a t they had no

choice bu t to experiment with fundamental ly new organ iza t iona l forms and

ex te rna l a l l i ances in order to su rv ive . These depar tu res , which are by no




means guaranteed to succeed, have r epea ted ly s t r a i ne d r e l a t i ons between th e

unions and th e SPD throughout the 1980s and ea r ly 1990s. Nonethe less , the

common dangers and unce r ta in t i e s of the emerging pos t -Ford i s t environment t ha t

both face have also kept them t oge the r .

DGB - SPD Relat ions under Fordism. Although th e r e l a t i ons h i p between

th e SPD and DGB has been c lose throughout the postwar e ra , it has remained

informal , owing to l abo r ' s adoption o f "un i t a ry and nonpar t isan unionism"

(Einhe i t sgewerkschaf t ) a s an organiz ing pr i nc i p l e immediately a f t e r th e war.

Th e pr i nc i p l e o f Einhe i t sgewerkschaf t ca l led on the unions to mainta in t i e s

with a l l democrat ic p o l i t i c a l pa r t i e s , while a t the same t ime remaining

p o l i t i c a l l y independent . Th e c rea tor s and suppor ters of th e Einhe i t sgewerk

scha f t pr i nc i p l e , however, d id no t in tend p o l i t i c a l independence to be

synonymous with i nd i f fe rence o r neu t r a l i t y . On the cont rary , unions were to

engage ac t ive ly in a l l p o l i t i c a l as well as economic e f fo r t s t h a t would

enhance th e pos i t ion of t h e i r members.

In pr a c t i c e , however, th e shared commitment of both th e pos twar German

l abo r movement and the SPD to th e idea l s o f s oc i a l democracy have a c t ua l l y

he lped to preserve t h e i r t r ad i t i ona l l y c lose t i e s , which date back to th e l a t e

nineteenth cen tu ry . Widespread over lapping memberships among top o f f i c i a l s

from both organ iza t ions in the postwar years have s t rong ly re in fo rced t h i s

spec ia l re l a t ionsh ip .5 S t i l l , the pr i nc i p l e of Einhei tsgewerkschaf t precludes

d i rec t e l ec t o ra l a id and even an i nd i r e c t endorsement o f one par ty over th e

others [Brauntha l 1983; Markovi ts and Allen 1984].

The postwar r eo rgan iza t ion o f the West German economy a l so p laced the

unions in an arm's leng th r e l a t i ons h i p . The organiza t ion of product ion

remained only p a r t i a l l y Ford i s t u n t i l wel l in to th e 1960s, l a r ge l y f o r p o l i t i

c a l reasons . Although the Federal Republ ic quickly es tab l i shed a c e n t r a l i z e d



Daley, Howell, and Si lv i a 29

system o f i ndus t r i a l r e l a t i o n s t ha t generated r egu la r r e a l wage i nc reases , t he

p o l i t i c a l dominance of the conservat ive Chr i s t i an Democratic Union (CDU) and

its Bavarian s i s t e r - pa r t y , t he Chr i s t i an Socia l Union (CSU), precluded the

in t roduc t ion o f Keynesian demand management to complete th e F o r d i s t c i r c u i t .

Besides , th roughout th e f i r s t decade of the Federal Republ ic , th e SPD and the

t r ade unions of f ic ia l ly championed na t iona l iza t ion , s t a t e planning, and worker

con t ro l o f major indus t r ie s ra the r than Keynesian demand management.

After the e l ec t o r a l drubbing o f 1957, th e SPD i n i t i a t e d a comprehensive

renewal of the pa r ty ' s or i g i na l postwar program because of its l imi ted appeal

outs ide of th e working c l a s s . The Bad Godesberg par ty conference o f November

1959 sought to t ransform th e SPD from a "workers ' par ty" in to a "ca t ch - a l l

par ty" (Volkspartei) t h a t would a t t r a c t the growing c l a s s o f profess iona l

whi te -co l la r employees without undermining th e pa r ty ' s core of working c lass

suppor t . I t qu ick ly became c l ea r t ha t the SPD could bes t accomplish t h i s end

by adopt ing a new par ty program t h a t embraced Keynesian demand management as

its cen te rp iece . This new program would allow th e SPO to j u s t i fy in

un i ve r sa l i s t terms th e prov is ion o f t ang ib le benef i t s such as o f f u l l employ

ment and a comprehensive welfare s t a t e to its core cons t i tuency , th e working

c l a s s . Simul taneous ly , th e par ty could por t r ay i t s e l f to whi te -co l la r profes

s iona ls as th e p o l i t i c a l force b e s t s u i t e d t o manage th e West German economy

along "modern," Ford i s t l i nes [Padget t and Pat t e r son 1991; SPD, n .d . ] .

Coterminously, although not without cons iderab le organ iza t iona l t u r

bulence , th e DGB i n i t i a t e d a renewal of its program in 1960 [Markovits 1986:

97-98] . Three year s l a t e r , th e member unions of th e DGB he ld an ex t r ao rd inary

congress in Dusse ldor f to complete a programmatic renewal fo r t he l abor move

ment. The f i n a l t e x t of th e 1963 Dusseldorf Basic Program s t ruck a d e f t com

promise between th e Keynesian and Marxis t f ac t ions of the DGB by re ta in ing th e




concept o f s t a t e planning , but by def in ing it in Keynesian t e rms. For a l l

pr ac t i ca l purposes , however, t h i s meant t h a t Keynesian demand management

became th e new o f f i c i a l po l i cy o f German l abor . Most un ion i s t s favored

Keynesianism fo r th r ee reasons : it represented fo r them " the economic s t ra tegy

b e s t su i ted to th e highly complex advanced c a p i t a l i s t soc ie ty whose problems

could not be solved by e i t h e r Marxism o r c l a s s i c a l l ibe ra l i sm;" they found it

fa r super io r to th e economic p o l i c i e s of the conserva t ive Chr i s t i an Democrats

in power; and it opened an avenue fo r l abor t o pa r t i c i pa t e d i r ec t l y in

government . Thus, as a r e s u l t of the Dusseldorf conference , both th e West

German union movement and the Soc ia l Democrat ic Par ty had adopted Keynesianism

as t h e i r leading pol icy proposa l [Markovi ts 1986: 101-107].

S t i l l , it took th e economic c r i s i s of 1966-67 and th e ascens ion of the

SPD in to government re spons ib i l i ty to usher in Keynesianism as th e o f f i c i a l

po l i cy of th e Fede r a l Republ ic . The German r eces s ion o f the mid 1960s,

al though ac tua l ly qu i t e mild, unleashed a tremendous p o l i t i c a l shock wave. It

sha t t e r ed th e reputa t ion fo r economic competence of the Federa l Chance l lor ,

Ludwig Erhard (CDU), who had been hera lded as th e a r c h i t e c t o f th e German

"economic mirac le" of the 1950s. Since th e r eces s ion s t ruck whi le Erhard was

in o f f i c e , many Germans concluded t h a t the Chance l lo r ' s heavy r e l i ance on

market forces to crea te "p rosper i ty fo r a l l " had become outmoded, and t h a t

Keynesian demand management akin to what th e United Sta tes had success fu l ly

employed s ince th e e lec t ion o f Kennedy r ep resen ted a modern, super io r a l t e r na

t i ve fo r managing an economy. A ll of the l ead ing Keynesian economis t s ,

however, were in th e SPD. Thus, t he pa r ty needed to share power fo r th e Fed

e r a l Republ ic adopt Keynesianism [Bark and Gress 1989] .

The r eces s ion a l so encouraged West German organ iza t ions and p o l i t i c a l

par t i e s to compromise in nove l ways. Because th e economic problems o f th e






an a l l i ance with two conservat ive, market-or iented p a r t i e s . I t s s t rong show

ing in th e 1969 f edera l e lec t ions , however, enabled them to forge a govern ing

c o a l i t i o n with the smal l l i b e r a l Free Democrat ic par ty (FOP). During th e

campaign, th e SPD's chancel lor candidate , Willy Brandt , proposed a sweeping

s e t o f economic and s o c i a l reforms under th e s logan "dare more democracy."

The formation of th e s o c i a l - l i b e r a l coa l i t ion in 1969 unleashed a b u r s t o f

"reform euphor ia" among German un ion i s t s and within th e l e f t [Lehrer t 1983] .

Between 1969 and 1974, Brandt and th e SPD spearheaded a s ig n i f i c a n t

expansion of the welfare s t a t e and th e r ev i s ion o f th e Works Counci l Act in

1972. Demand s t imula t ion kept th e West German economy expanding a t an annual

average o f over f ive pe r cen t and held unemployment a t roughly one percen t .

This performance, in no smal l measure a product of th e e a r l i e r barga in s t ruck

between th e unions and S c h i l l e r , y ie lded r i ch p o l i t i c a l and economic rewards

fo r both th e SPD and th e unions in th e ear ly 1970s. In 1972, th e SPD obtained

i t s l a r g e s t sha r e o f th e vote (45.2%) in th e h is to ry o f th e Federa l Republ ic .

The par ty had succeeded in un iver sa l i z ing i t s appeal on th e bas i s o f its

Godesberg program. 6 Real wages advanced by 6.3 percent annual ly between 1969

and 1973. Union dens i ty began to r i s e fo r th e f i r s t t ime in th e h i s to r y of

th e Federa l Republic, cl imbing from 30.0 in 1969 to 35.2 p e r c e n t in 1983.

Thus, al though th e SPD was unable to meet a l l expec ta t ions o f th e l abor move

ment (due to t he r es i s t ance o f th e FOP it could not extend par i t y codetermina

t i o n t o l a rge f i rms ou ts ide of the coa l and s t e e l i ndus t r i e s ) , German unions

p r o f i t e d from t h e i r imp l i c i t ba r ga in with th e SPD [Markovits 1986; Hemmer and

Schmitz 1990; Padge t t and Pat te r son 1991; Tageszei tung , 28 May 1991] .

The Col lapse of th e P o l i t i c a l and Economic Barga ins . Despi te i t s

obvious successes , th e implementation o f th e Bad Godesberg program had ulso

genera ted de le t e r ious s id e - e f f e c t s fo r th e SPD. The reforms c rea ted an



Oaley, Howell, and Si lv ia 33

environment with in the par ty conducive to i n t e r na l f ragmenta t ion and ex te rna l

d iv i s ion . Th e opening o f the SPO toward whi te - co l l a r employees and s tudents

a t t r ac t ed whole new c lasses o f vo te r s , bu t it a l so turned what wa s once " the

par ty of the workers" in to " the par ty o f publ ic servants and s tuden ts . " In

1958, blue co l l a r workers comprised 55% of th e SPO's membership; whi te -co l la r

employees (predominant ly from th e pub l ic s ec to r ) on t he o the r hand accounted

fo r only 21 percen t . By 1982, however, the percentage of b l ue - co l l a r workers

had f a l l en to 21.1% ( i . e . , roughly h a l f the percentage of b l ue - co l l a r workers

found in t he adu l t popu la t ion) , whereas th e combined share o f s tuden t and

whi te -co l la r employees in th e par ty had reached 45.9%. Furthermore, by th e

mid 1970s, c u r r e n t and former pub l ic - sec to r employees he ld more pos i t ions

with in th e SPO than any o ther group [Grafe 1991; Michal 1988: 278; Padge t t and

Pat t e r son 1991: 49].

This occupat ional s h i f t crea ted se r ious s p l i t s within th e par ty : one

"sub-par ty" fo r workers and another fo r s tudents and publ ic se rvan ts . Over

t h e p a s t decade, t hese two have disagreed, of ten voc i f e rous ly , over th e major

i s sues o f the day ( e .g . , economic growth, s e c u r i t y , and eco logy) . This has

grea t ly complicated the e f fo r t s to aggregate opinion with in th e SPO and to

develop a coherent and convincing program fo r the par ty to guide i t s members

and to sway th e e l ec t o r a t e .

Moreover, th e f a i l ed grass - roo t s e f f o r t of th e s tuden t ne w l e f t to take

over the SPO in the l a t e 1960s and the 1970s l e f t both i n t e r na l and ex te rna l

s c a r s . Th e par ty leadership , which has always been c lose ly a l l i e d with the

unions , pZ8served i t s power by c e n t r a l i z in g au thor i ty and s t i f l i n g democracy

within th e par ty . Th e cos t s of t h i s s t ra tegy were par t i cu l a r l y high. I t made

th e SPO i nc reas ing ly s t e r i l e and immobile . I t a l so sparked the c rea t ion o f a

r i v a l l e f t -wing a l t e r na t i ve to th e SPO in the form of th e Greens. The com




b ina t ion of t hese fac to r s made th e Social Democrats ' d e f e a t in th e March 1983

f edera l e lec t ion hardly su rp r i s ing . Th e SPD garnered l e s s than 40% o f th e

vote fo r th e f i r s t t ime s ince 1965 in a l a c k lu s t e r campaign led by Hans-Jochen

Vogel [Armingeon 1989a: 322-23; Grafe 1991; Koelble 1991: 84] .

Over th e course of the 1970s , th e barga ins between German l abor and th e

Socia l Democrats began t o d e t e r io r a t e , as each s ide found it i nc reas ing ly d i f

f i c u l t to uphold i t s end o f t he dea l . Helmut Schmidt, who served as Chancel

lo r from 1974 to 1982, bore the b run t o f t h i s problem fo r the gPO. On th e one

hand, DGB o f f i c i a l s could no l onge r cred ib ly a s s e r t t h a t they could provide

fo r any wage r e s t r a i n t because an explos ion in worker mil i t ancy , t i g h t l abor

marke ts , and acce le r a t ing i n f l a t i on made th e management of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n

ing f a r more d i f f i c u l t fo r th e union l eader sh ip . On t he o the r hand, r i s i ng

f r i c t i on between th e SPD and FDP - - in par t i cu l a r , over th e expansion o f

codetermina t ion r i g h t s - - hampered th e SPD's a b i l i t y to f u l f i l l any demands

made by l a b o r on th e par ty . As a r e su l t , a growing propor t ion o f u n i o n i s t s

f e l t t h a t they were be ing "he ld hos tage" by t h e i r own government , while gPD

o f f i c i a l s came i nc reas ing ly to be l ieve t h a t th e unions would inev i tab ly leave

them i n t h e lu rch whenever tough economic t imes a r r ived [Klonne and Reese

1990; Koelble 1991; Padge t t and Pat te r son 1991].

By th e e a r ly 1980s, t hen , the capa c i ty o f the government to use

Keynesian demand management to in su la te th e Federa l Republ ic from f luc tua t ions

in th e world economy had come to an end . Th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of th e

economy and f i s c a l l imi t s made the guarantee o f f u l l employment and s teady

economic growth i nc reas ing ly tenuous fo r th e soc i a l - l i be ra l coa l i t i on . Con

sequent ly , th e SPD's Bad Godesberg Basic Program, which e x p l i c i t l y embraced

Keynesianism as th e essence of the par t y ' s economic program, had suddenly l o s t

its v a l i d i t y . Th e SPD recognized th e dec l in ing u t i l i t y o f n a t i o n a l macro




economic po l i c i e s f a s t e r than i t s l abor a l l y . The r e s u l t i n g gap in percep t ion

quickly fue led tensions between th e two. These came to a head in 1981 over

th e sudden r e tu rn o f mass unemployment and a government p lan fo r sharp cu t s in

th e next f edera l budget . Th e subsequent co l l apse o f th e s o c i a l - l i b e r a l coa l i

t ion on 1 October 1982 over the in t roduct ion of medium-range miss i le s to

Europe marked th e formal end of the Soc ia l Democratic Par t y ' s "prosperous , and

in many ways qu i te g lo r ious , Bad Godesberg era" [Markovits 1986: 428; Koelble

1991: 2; Padget t and Pat terson: 54; S i lv i a 1990: 448-49].

Trade Union - Socia l Democratic Par ty Rela t ions in a Pos t -Ford i s t Era.

Although th e t r ans i t i on to oppos i t ion undoubtedly r ep resen ted a t r aumat ic

defea t fo r the Socia l Democratic Par ty , r e l inqu i sh ing the r e spons i b i l i t i e s of

government gave the SPD th e brea th ing space t ha t it despera te ly needed to

r e e s t a b l i s h i t s bear ings . Th e par ty used th e years immediate ly fo l lowing th e

"Wende" ( reversal ) o f 1982 to s t a r t hea l ing i n t e r na l d iv is ions , assess the

changing i n c l i n a t i o n s o f i t s ever more heterogeneous membership, r e f l e c t on

i t s fu tu re course , and improve r e l a t i o n s with th e unions and o ther s o c i a l

groups t r ad i t i ona l ly c lose to the par ty .

Th e change in government in th e ea r ly 1980s a l so led th e unions to reas

sess t h e i r s t r a t eg i e s . They began to s h i f t away from t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l heavy

dependence on th e s t a t e , which had become par t i cu l a r l y pronounced a f t e r 1969,

and back toward " re ly ing on our own power" to make ga ins [Markovits and Allen

1984: 171-172] . Soon a f t e r th e 1983 e lec t ion , a b a t t l e developed with in the

conf ines of col l ec t ive barga in ing . The metalworkers union, IG Meta l l , began

press ing fo r a " q u a l i t a t i v e " ( i . e . , non-wage) demand - - shor tening the work

week to 35 hours - - in an e f f o r t to reduce unemployment. Th e i n t ens i t y of

t h i s barga in ing round quickly became overdetermined, as it i nc reas ing ly became

a t e s t of s t reng th fo r th e union . While th e new government took th e unusual



Daley, Howell , and Si lv i a 36

s t ep of pub l i c ly s id ing with th e employers, th e member unions o f th e DGB were

d iv ided over t he i s sue [S i lv i a 1988: 164-165] .

The accommodationist wing of German l abor le d by IG Chemie pre fe r red an

e a r ly r e t i r ement scheme to shor tening the workweek as a means of lowering

unemployment. Th e government made the most o f t h i s d iv i s ion within th e ranks

of l abor by pr ov id ing pub l ic funds to suppor t ea r ly r e t i r ement p lans . S t i l l ,

IG Meta l l remained f i rm and waged a succes s fu l 6-1/2 week s t r i ke in 1984 t h a t

achieved a reduct ion of the workweek from 40 to an average o f 38-1/2 hour s .

At f i r s t , th e SPD s tayed out of t he d i spu te because o f th e s p l i t within th e

l abor movement i t s e l f over weekly working t ime reduct ion and opinion p o l l s

i nd ica t ing weak suppor t fo r IG Meta l l among workers . Yet, once th e s t r i ke

began, th e v a s t major i ty of workers suppor ted th e union, i n l a rge p a r t owing

to the government 's b la t a n t an t i -un ion ac t ions . Th e SPD and a l l of the o the r

unions a l so r a l l i e d behind IG Meta l l once th e s t r i ke began, nar rowing the rift

within th e l a b o r movement and br ing ing about a reconc i l ia t ion between th e

unions and th e SPD. Once IG Meta l l had proved t ha t weekly working t ime reduc

t i on wa s a t t a in a b l e , a l l the o ther unions - - both a c t i v i s t and accom

moda t ion i s t - - began t o nego t i a t e fo r it i n t h e i r se c t o r s [Markovits 1986:

437-41; Vogel 1988: 388].

From F a l l 1985 to Spring 1986, th e German l abor movement fought a second

b a t t l e t h a t seemed to extend th e 1984 s t r i ke to th e p o l i t i c a l sphere . The

government , a t th e in s i s tence of German indus t ry , a l t e r ed A r t i c l e 116 of the

Arbei ts forderungsgesetz (Employment Promotion Act) to deny unemployment bene

f i t s to workers in o ther bargaining d i s t r i c t s who were l a id o f f in th e even t

of s t r i ke ac t ions .? While not a f fec t ing wage d i spu tes , t he language o f th e

Act inc reased th e d i f f i cu l ty in s t r i k i ng over "qua l i ta t ive" i s sues , such as

working t ime o r inves tment dec i s ions , because unions could not d i f f e r en t i a t e




such demands su f f i c i en t l y enough across bargaining d i s t r i c t s to allow for the

payment of unemployment benef i t s t o i nd i r ec t l y a f fec ted workers . Thus, th e

rev i s ion o f A r t i c l e 11 6 ef fec t ive ly prevented unions from t ak ing advantage of

the inc reased economic l everage t ha t th e sens i t i v i ty of pos t -Ford is t f l e x ib l e

manufactur ing g ives them to expand the scope o f col l ec t ive barga in ing beyond

the c l a s s i c repe r to i re of wages, benef i t s , and o t h e r immediate t e rms and con

d i t i o n s o f employment. The unions and the SPD uni ted in oppos i t ion to the

rev i s ion o f A r t i c l e 116 and mobil ized aga ins t it fo r months. The Greens a lso

worked aga ins t the passage of Art ic le 116, bu t th e wide s o c i a l and i deo log ica l

gap between th e Greens and l abor preven ted them from forging a more enduring

coa l i t i on [S i lv ia 1988: 165-170].

Reconci l ia t ion between the Socia l Democrats and l abor d id not help the

SPD in th e January 1987 f edera l e lec t ions in par t because of th e f lawed e l ec

t o r a l s t r a t e g y of the p a r t y ' s candidate for chancel lor , Johannes Rau. To

a t t r a c t th e b l ue - co l l a r workers who had voted fo r the CDU/CSU in 1983 back to

th e SPD, Ra u re jec ted any c o a l i t i o n with the Greens and in s tead cla imed t h a t

he was aiming fo r an abso lu te majo r i ty for the SPD. Ra u hoped t ha t t h i s

s t ra tegy would a l so deny th e Greens t he f ive percen t of the vote t h a t they

needed to remain in th e Bundestag by forc ing voters to choose th e SPD if they

wanted to ous t th e conservat ive coa l i t i on . However, s ince th e FOP had no

in ten t ion of l eav ing the government, the SPD was l e f t without a po t en t i a l

coa l i t i on p a r tn e r . In p r a c t i c e , the booming economy garnered a s t rong vote of

confidence for the Kohl government and Rau's f u t i l e appea l to t r a d i t i o n a l

b l ue - co l l a r workers al lowed th e Greens to pick up an even l a r ge r share of the

" p o s t - m a te r i a l i s t " vo te r s . The SPD's share of the vote f e l l by another 1.2%.

At the s t a r t o f 1988, th e Socia l Democratic Par ty and th e unions sud

denly found themselves in conf l i c t once again over a provoca t ive book by Oska






c i a l s in l a t e Apr i l . Nonetheless , Lafonta ine cont inued to promote h is ideas

throughout 1988 and 1989, much to the i r r i t a t i o n of organized l abor . Thus,

Lafonta ine and th e union leaders came to personi fy the l a r ge r tensions ins ide

th e SPD between its t r ad i t i ona l and pos t -mate r i a l f ac t ions [WSI-Pressedienst ,

4 March 1988; Handelsb la t t , 1 September 1988; Spiegel , 14 March, and 3 October

1988] .

These tensions underscored th e devasta t ing impact o f th e s o c i a l and eco

nomic changes of the 1980s on th e SPD. In con t ras t , th e t r ade unions managed

to endure the 1980s l a rge ly i n t ac t . Union dens i ty has remained s teady a t

roughly 35% and, a f t e r a b r i e f pause in th e e a r ly 1980s, German workers con

t i nued to achieve t ang ib le c o l l e c t i v e bargaining gains , inc lud ing r ea l wage

i nc reases and working t ime r educ t ion . Th e cen t ra l ized sys tem of col l ec t ive

barga in ing has survived th e pres sures o f fragmentation, and th e par t i c i pa t i on

o f DGB o f f i c i a l s on quas i -governmenta l bodies , such as th e s o c i a l insurance

and the voca t iona l t r ad ing boards , r ~ m a i n s vigorous . Although th e Kohl

government chipped away a t some pro tec t ions , it never a t tempted to undermine

th e cen t r a l framework o f l eg i s l a t i on suppor t ing l abor . Th e DGB unions ' pos i

t ion in t h e i r u n o f f i c i a l s t ronghold on th e shop f loo r , th e works counci ls ,

a l so remained so l i d [Armingeon 1991a; Markovi ts and Si lv ia , for thcoming] .

German labor fared be t t e r than the Soc ia l Democrat ic Par ty fo r tw o

reasons . F i r s t , unl ike most o f th e advanced coun t r i es , Germany exper ienced

little d e in d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n beyond the s t ee l , shipbui ld ing, and, to a l e s s e r

e x t e n t , t e x t i l e i n d u s t r i e s dur ing the 1980s. Germany's r i s e dur ing t he pas t

decade to become th e world ' s leading expor ter helped to preserve and even

c rea te manufac tur ing jobs . Since union membership t ends to be concen t ra ted in

th e manufac tur ing sec to r , th e expor t boom even enabled German t r ade unions to

expand t h e i r membership r o l l s during th e l a t t e r h a l f of th e 1980s . Second,






Service and Transpor ta t ion Workers Union (OTV) i n i t i a t e d an innova t ive

campaign on th e " fu tu re o f pub l ic service" and IG Metal l held a se r i e s of

gather ings to develop a s t ra tegy to c rea te what i t s l eader s c a l l e d , " the o ther

fu tu re . " Union o f f i c i a l s began " the o ther fu ture" p r o j e c t with th e premise

t h a t t he l abor movement could not s imply accept pass ive ly the market-based,

highly i nega l i t a r i an , and i nd iv idua l -o r i en ted Ze i tg e i s t t h a t th e Kohl

government and th e employers fos t e r ed . Ins tead , it coun te r - a t t acked with an

a l t e r na t i ve v i s ion t h a t would be f a r more r ed i s t r i bu t i ve t o workers and the

disadvantaged . Moreover, IG Meta l l o f f i c i a l s recognized t h a t th e union badly

needed to develop new methods fo r motivat ing t he inc reas ing numbers of members

who were not responding to the s tandard c a l l fo r so l i da r i t y , and to a t t r a c t

and in tegra te younger workers, whi te c o l l a r profess iona l s , and women in to the

union as t h e i r s ign i f i cance in the work force cont inued to grow. Ult imate ly ,

both IG Meta l l and OTV hoped t ha t t h e i r "other fu ture" programs would al low

them to move beyond th e c l a s s i c a l model of col l ec t ive barga in ing over wages

and b e n e f i t s " to r epo l i t i c i ze" workers and to "co-shape th e what and how of

product ion" [JUrgen Hoffmann 1991: 1989; Indus tr iegewerkschaf t Metal l 1988;

Indus tr iegewerkschaf t Metal l 1989; Schabedoth and Tiemann 1989: 703-7; Schauer

1990: 467; Wulf-Mat thies 1988].

The l eader s of IG Metal l and OTV have proposed t h a t unions open them

se lves up to ou t s ide in f luence and engage soc ie ty acros s a broad spectrum of

i s sues beyond co l l ec t i ve barga in ing . These labor leaders qlso argue t h a t

unions should become more f l e x ib l e and incorpora te t r ad i t i ons ou t s ide o f t h e i r

own - - inc lud ing those of the peace movement, fo re ign workers , and re l ig ious

groups - - the reby cap i t a l i z i ng on t he inc reas ing he te rogene ity of th e work

fo rce to r a i se th e e f fec t iveness o f th e organ iza t ion . Moreover, IG Metal l and

OTV o f f i c i a l s asse r t t ha t unions need to develop an "argumenta t ive cu l tu re"




(S t re i tku l tu r ) and a r r ive a t i n t e r n a l dec i s ions through co l l ec t i ve d iscourse

and persuas ion i n s t ead of pass ing down "orders" through a s t r i c t cha in -o f

command. Fina l ly , these l abor l eader s s t r e s s t ha t unions should decen t r a l i ze

au thor i ty and become f a r more r e l i an t on l o c a l i n i t i a t i v e [Hoffmann 1991;

Schabedoth and Tiemann 1989; Strasse r 1991].

Neither IG Meta11 nor OTV have managed to implement t hese reforms suc

c e s s f u l l y f o r severa l reasons . Fi r s t , co l lec t ing and synthesiz ing the wide

var ie ty of opinions found among the membership in to a process t ha t genera tes

workable dec i s ions would invar iably over tax t he o rgan iza t iona l capac i ty o f any

union.Second, th e economic, and u l t imate ly p o l i t i c a l , s t r eng th o f a

unioni s

based on i t s con t ro l over r eg iona l and sec to ra l l abor marke ts . Any "opening"

t ha t undermines th i s con t ro l would invar iably weaken a union. Thi rd , the

p o l i t i c a l cu l tu re of t r ade unions i s t a i l o r ed above a l l to t he s t ag ing of suc

c e s s f u l c o l l e c t i v e bargaining rounds and, if need be, l abor d ispu tes . Any

opening t ha t weakens a un ion ' s resolve o r sows d is sens ion in a union would

d is rup t t h i s core a c t i v i t y . Fourth , in the postwar era , German unions have

thus f a r l imi ted themselves to con tes t s over th e d i s t r i bu t i on o f income. Any

a t tempt to expand beyond t h i s realm may t u rn th e government and th e employers

aga ins t organized labor . F i f th , union leaders are at tempting to promulgate

openness and decen t ra l iza t ion from th e top down, reminiscent of the f a i l ed

e f f o r t s a t reform in Eastern Europe during the 1970s and 1980s .

Moreover, as th e 1988 d ispu te with Oskar Lafonta ine and c lashes with

r ank-and- f i l e m i l i t a n t s have revealed, labor leaders still have a narrow

def in i t ion of th e types of openness and decen t ra l iza t ion they t o l e r a t e . Any

d issen t t ha t exceeds th e l eader s ' ca re fu l ly presc r ibed boundar ies has been

denounced ra the r than encouraged, par t i cu l a r l y if it t h r ea tens the p o l i t i c a l

s t a b i l i t y of the l eader sh ip i t s e l f . Moreover, union o f f i c i a l s a t lower l e v e l s




have t yp i ca l l y balked a t t hese new approaches , r e jec t ing them as unworkable ,

i ne f f i c i en t o r both [Spiege l , 3 June and 8 July 1991; Hoffmann 1991: 100-101;

Glotz 1988: 1038-39] .

IG Chemie has developed an a l t e r na t i ve v i s ion of the fu ture t h a t ca l l s

fo r t ransforming unions in to se rv ice organ iza t ions to meet the concre te needs

o f th e employers and members as if they were customers of th e union. IG

Chemie 's approach r e l i e s on c lose cooperat ion with chemical manufac ture rs

( i . e . , meso-corporat ism) to devise a s e c to r a l i ndus t r i a l po l i cy to preserve

employment, r a i se t he t echn ica l s k i l l s of i t s work force and p r o t e c t the

environment . This approach r e l i e s on "soc ia l par tne r sh ip" r a th e r than the

"countervai l ing power," which IG Meta l l and, i nc reas ing ly , OTV pr e f e r . Yet,

IG Chemie's program does not confront the problems of th e l a r ge r soc ie ty , such

as unemployment, and i s i n s t ead wi l l ing s imply to hive i t s e l f o f f from them.

Moreover, IG Chemie does not address the disadvantages of accep t ing a j un io r

par tne r sh ip ro le with bus iness t ha t i t s plan impl ic i t ly e n t a i l s [Hoffmann

1991: 100; Indus tr iegewerkschaf t Chemie-Papier-Keramik 1988] .

One common t h r ead runs through the proposals o f th e a c t i v i s t and accom

modat ionis t wings o f th e DGB: both represent a reduct ion in cooperat ion with

th e SPD. Th e r epo l i t i c i za t i on a t th e grass - roo ts l eve l t h a t the a c t i v i s t

unions propose s tands as an imp l ic i t a l t e r na t i ve to channel ing p o l i t i c s

through t he pa r ty , whereas IG Chemie 's new or ien ta t ion toward se rv ices con

s t i t u t e s a withdrawal from na t iona l p o l i t i c a l par t i c i pa t i on in order to con

cen t ra te on the l o c a l l eve l .

Th e evidence from th e p a s t decade i nd ica tes t h a t n e i th e r th e SPD nor th e

German t r ade union movement has come any c lose r to re -es tab l i sh ing a v iab le

p o l i t i c a l agenda. Divergent organ iza t iona l t r a j e c t o r i e s , demographic sh i f t s ,

and r e l a t i ve successes have he ightened t he t ens ions between par ty and move






v i r tua l ly none come from the ranks of th e workers . Most a re i n t e l l e c t u a l s or

former d i s s id e n t s from t he P ro tes t an t peace movement. The unions have con

sequen t ly had to engage d i r ec t l y in p o l i t i c a l as wel l as economic a c t i v i t i e s ,

which pu l l s them f u r th e r away from a re l iance on the SPD. Th e d isas t rous

se r i e s of demonst ra t ions he ld in Spring 1991 showed t h a t th e unions have not

y e t maste red th e sub t l e t i e s o f d i r ec t p o l i t i c a l par t i c i pa t i on [S i lv ia 1991].

The West German p o l i t i c a l l e f t always had an ambivalent a t t i t ude toward

German un i ty and the GDR. Some l e f t i s t s took so lace in the German Democrat ic

Republ ic as an example o f " r ea l ex is t ing soc ia l i sm," while most o ther s pu t

grea t f a i t h in th e Ostpo l i t ik o f Willy Brandt and the SPD as an ins t rument

t h a t would br ing about th e even tua l t r ans fo rmat ion o f th e GDR in to a t r u ly

democrat ic s o c i a l i s t s t a t e . The l e f t tended to see th e d iv is ion of Germany as

an appropr ia te h i s to r i ca l punishment fo r t he coun t ry ' s t r ansgress ions o f the

f i r s t ha l f o f the twent ie th century [FES-Informat ionen, March-Apri l 1991: 24;

Padget t and Pat terson 1991]. Although th e eas te rn c i t i z e n s ' movements t h a t

brought down the Honnecker regime a t th e end of 1989 appeared to have more

mobi l i za t iona l po t en t i a l than t h e i r s t a i d western coun te rpar t s , t h i s proved

i l l u so r y . The f i r s t f ree East German e lec t ions in March 1990 demonst ra ted

convinc ingly t h a t "Mit te ldeutschland" was no longer th e Socia l Democratic bas

t i o n t h a t it had been before th e Nazi e r a . I t s c i t i zens more i n t e r e s t ed in

catching up mate r ia l ly to th e West than in dev is ing an exper imental " th i rd

way" of organ iz ing soc ie ty . Large segments of th e SPD in the west consequen

t i a l l y tu rned t h e i r back on th e e a s t .

Uni f i ca t ion a l so se t back s i gn i f i can t l y th e SPD's renewal e f f o r t s . Most

impor tant , German un i ty rendered i r r e l e v a n t th e SPD's s ix -yea r e f f o r t to dr a f t

a new Basic Program to r ep lace th e Bad Godesberg program. Th e new Basic

Program, which the par ty i ssued in Ber l in in December 1989, con ta ined many of



4aley, Howell , and Si lv ia

th e same ca l l s fo r openness, d iv e r s i t y and decen t ra l iza t ion found in th e

fu ture programs of the more a c t i v i s t unions . Unlike th e Ba d Godesberg docu

ment, however, the Ber l in Basic Program conta ined no under lying s t ra tegy and

expressed no coherent vis ion o f t he fu tu re . Ins tead , it simply encapsulated

th e par t y ' s ra the r uneasy i n t e r n a l t ens ions . Moreover, th e core of the Ber l in

program d id not take in to account th e dramat ic changes in t roduced by u n i f i c a

t ion because th e SPD completed it before th e even t s o f F a l l 1989 unfo lded . In

December 1989, th e Social Democrats in se r ted las t -minute r e fe rences to

un i f ica t ion in to th e Ber l in program, but they looked out of p lace , c lash ing

withth e

ambiguous but d i s t i nc t ly pos t -mate r i a l document[Padget t

and Pa t t e r

son 1991; Pot thof f 1991; Muller 1990: 63-64; SPD 1990; Winter 1990: 350-58].

As a r e s u l t , th e Ber l in Basic Program proved i n e f f e c t i v e as an e l ec t o r a l

too l i n the f i r s t postwar all-German e lec t ion in December 1990. After th e

e l e c t i o n , even SPD par l iamentary par ty ch ie f Hans-Jochen Vogel conceded t h a t

the Ber l in Program had been "somewhat s t i l l bo r n" [Hande lsb la t t , 29 May 1991] .

Unfor tuna te ly fo r th e SPD, the Ber l in program was no t th e only problem th e

par ty had dur ing th e 1990 campaign. When par ty o f f i c i a l s se lec ted Lafonta ine

as th e SPD's candida te fo r Chancel lor in the sp r ing o f 1989, they hoped t h a t

h is post-modern approach would make Helmut Kohl appear o ld - fash ioned and ou t

of -s tep to West German vo te r s . Unif ica t ion complete ly a l t e r ed th e campaign

because it made mater i a l and high p o l i t i c a l concerns paramount. Consequently,

both eas te rn and western vo te r s pre fe r r ed Kohl ' s se iz ing the moment to

Lafon ta ine ' s warnings about th e cos t s and problems of u n i f i c a t i o n , r egard less

o f t h e i r accuracy. Consequent ly , th e conservat ive coa l i t i on won th e f i r s t

postwar all-German e lec t ion in a l ands l ide .

The SPD's share o f th e vote in western Germany f e l l to 35.4% - - a l e v e l

comparable to th e par t y ' s pre-Bad Godesberg era - - and th e p a r t y ' s eas te rn




t a l l y came to j u s t 24%. Although the German unions duly provided Lafonta ine

with the s tandard repe to i re o f in d i r e c t help t h a t they make ava i lab le to a l l

SPD cand ida tes , t h e i r e f f o r t was per func to ry a t bes t . The absence o f a so l i d

union i n f r a s t r uc t u r e and the l ack o f a f irm commitment to s o c i a l democracy

among th e new eas te rn union members a l so hur t t he SPD in th e former GDR,

preven t ing it from conver t ing a l a rge percentage o f t hese workers in to votes

fo r the par ty [Padge t t and Pat terson 1991: 71; Pot thof f 1991: 360].

The SPD's Bremen par ty congress in May 1991 named Bjorn Engholm, th e

prime mini s t e r o f Schleswig-Hols te in , a s the p a r t y ' s new genera l sec re ta ry ,

making him th e SPD's most l ike ly candidate fo r chancel lor in the next f edera l

e l ec t i on . Although Engholm shares many o f th e "pos t - l e f t " a t t r i bu te s of

Lafontaine, par t i cu l a r l y a l av i sh personal l i f e s t y l e , Engholm has a l ready

shown t h a t he has l ea rned a grea t dea l from Lafon ta ine ' s e r r o r s . One of Eng

holm's f i r s t ac ts was to appoint Karlheinz Bless ing (age 34) , previously a

c lose a ide to IG Metal l pres iden t Franz Steinkt ih ler , to th e powerful pos t of

SPD bus ines s manager . Engholm has a l so spoken and wr i t t en o f the need to

maintain c lose t i e s to t he l abor movement and to apply th e l e s sons o f IG

Meta l l ' s confe rences on the fu ture to make th e SPD more open and f l ex i b l e .

Engholm has argued t he necess i ty to el iminate the SPD's lengthy caree r l adder

t h a t has come to resemble a long, s tu l t i fy ing "ox s log . " Instead , he would

draw from th e "bes t people" both i n s ide and ou ts ide o f the par ty to under take

spec i f i c t a s k s . Bless ing ' s appointment symbolizes t h i s change: Engholm

picked him to help recas t th e SPD a long th e l i nes o f IG M e ta l l ' s "o ther

fu ture" program [Engholm 1991: 229-30; Fetscher 1991: 224] .

S t i l l , Engholm has not addressed the po t en t i a l fo r i n t e r na l demora l iza

t i o n t h a t ou t s ide r ec ru i tmen t might have on the morale of th e par ty organ iza

t i o n . He has a l so neg lec ted th e poss ib i l i t y o f re s i s tance to h is reforms




within th e SPD. Could th e SPD pursue a recognizable p o l i t i c a l l ine by "sub

con t rac t ing" i t s a c t i v i t i e s out to a wide var ie ty o f spec i a l i s t s from th e

ranks o f unions , employers , c iv i c assoc ia t ions , new soc ia l movements, spor t s

c lubs , and churches? Nonetheless , th e proposa ls demons t ra te t ha t th e SPD and

th e German l abor movement a re coalescing around proposals fo r a new organ iza

t i ona l framework t h a t were l a rge ly insp i r ed by th e a c t i v i s t wing of the German

l abor movement.

Both th e SPD and organized l abor have recognized t h a t th e economic foun

da t ions and p o l i t i c a l cond i t ions t h a t suppor ted t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s have crumbled

beyond r e p a i r . German r eun i f i ca t ion has only served to a c c e l e r a t e t h i s f r ag

menta t ion. As a r e su l t , both have searched fo r a s u i t a b l e replacement by

se iz ing upon a plan to emulate th e new soc ia l movements in order to to regain

organ iza t iona l s t reng th . This r i sks d i sso lv ing th e remnants o f th e s o c i a l

bonds t h a t both hold th e tw o organ iza t ions t oge ther i n t e r na l l y and connect

them with one ano the r without any assurance t h a t t h i s new approach w i l l al low

fo ra

succes s fu l r econf igura t ion o f th e i n s t i t u t i ons and t h e i r a l l i ances . The

t a t t e r e d p o l i t i c a l and economic bargains remain in f lux .

France : Organizat ional P lural ism and D if f i c u l t Bargains

I f th e economic and p o l i t i c a l bargains have sh r ive led in Germany and

Br i t a in , they proved d i f f i c u l t to e s tab l i sh in th e f i r s t p lace in France . The

absence of s t rong ly i n s t i t u t i ona l i zed unions and weak employer f edera t ions

combined with th e i n t e r v e n t io n i s t s t a t e to make barga in ing between l abor and

cap i t a l - - mediated by p o l i t i c a l fo rces l e s s compel l ing throughout th e

en t i r e postwar per iod . Th e p o l i t i c a l and economic bargains t yp i ca l l y forged

dur ing th e Ford i s t per iod d id no t bind t oge ther th e unions and l e f t p a r t i e s .

One can speak o f an im p l i c i t acceptance of produc t iv i ty barga in ing by both




l abor and c a p i t a l [Boyer 1984]. Yet, it d id not involve the labor movement as

a coherent a c to r capable of de l ive r ing goods to a p a r t i s a n a l l y . When the

Soc i a l i s t s a r r ived in power in 1981, they sought to es t ab l i sh a s e t o f

barga ins in order to jump s t a r t the growth c i r c u i t . However, t hese inc ip ien t

barga ins were at tempted within an i ndus t r i a l r e l a t i o n s framework charac te r i zed

by des t ruc t ive ly compet i t ive unionism, prevent ing coherent l abor responses .

More impor tant ly , the d i s in t e g r a t i o n of French Fordism made such barga ins l e s s

a t t r ac t ive to employers . The lesson drawn by th e Soc i a l i s t s in power wa s t ha t

they d id not need organized l abor as a l oya l a l ly .

FrenchFordism

and I n t e r e s t Linkages . Perhaps more than any o therEuro

pean count ry , France adopted f a s t e s t and most thoroughly the Ford i s t system of

i ndus t r i a l organizat ion as imported from the United Sta tes [Piore and Sabel

1984]. A coherent bureaucracy, a cen t ra l ized admin i s t r a t ive au thor i ty , an

ind ica t ive planning mechanism to bu i ld p o l i t i c a l coa l i t i ons , and e f f ec t i ve

po l i cy l ever s permi t ted the French s t a t e to assume a key ro le in the deve lop

ment o f mass product ion i n d u s t r i e s . As in Germany, Keynesianism came l a t e to

th e French con tex t [Rosanvallon 1989]. In con t ras t , however, ac t ive demand

management came within the context o f compet i t ive unions , and wage growth

developed ou t s ide the formal ins tances o f co l l ec t i ve barga in ing . Increases in

aggrega te demand came from s t a t e - l ed moderniza t ion , in p a r t i c u l a r , th e move

ment o f f th e land b u t also publ ic works programs and s t a t e inf luence of indus

trial r e l a t i ons - - minimum wage se t t i ng and wage l eader sh ip by s ta te companies

[Caron; Carre e t a l . ] The c i r c u i t o f growth wa s c losed without th e par t i c i pa

t ion o f organized labor . Thus, l abo r ' s i n t e r e s t s were p a r t i a l l y un iver sa l i zed

without an ac t ive ro le played by organized l abor .

This d i s t i nc t i ve French pa t te rn o f Ford i s t accumulat ion had severa l con

sequences fo r l abo r - l e f t r e l a t i ons . S ta t e - l e d growth meant t h a t government




min is t r ie s assumed re spons ib i l i ty fo r th e terms of economic change. Left

par t i e s sought to in f luence th e course of th e growth regime through the cap

tu re of s t a t e power. A ll p o l i t i c a l par t i e s , of course , seek to inf luence eco

nomic po l i cy . Yet, the French l e f t showed a s ingu la r des i re to r e - o r i e n t cap

i t a l i s t growth. More than in any o ther European count ry , then , th e ideas and

act ions o f th e p o l i t i c a l l e f t in France presupposed th e autonomy o f th e

na t iona l s t a t e in the in te rna t iona l arena and the dominance of s t a t e i n s t i t u

t ions in th e domest ic arena.

Because th e p o l i t i c a l l e f t d id not hold power u n t i l 1981, bargains d id

not have to be a r t i cu l a t ed between par ty and unions to r egu la t e the economy.

The r i g h t pres ided over economic growth (del iver ing some goods) and acquiesced

to au thor i ta r ian workplace prac t ices which t r ea ted l abor not as a j un io r par ty

but as a s o c i a l ou tcas t . Unions never assumed r e s p o n s ib i l i t y fo r the t e rms of

economic growth. They could bare ly con t ro l memberships, l e t a lone the en t i r e

workforce [Daley 1988]. Th e economic dilemma facing unions was never t e s t ed .

Rela t ions between French unions and the Lef t par t i e s had always su f f e r ed

from ambivalence. Since the Communist Par ty (PCF) s p l i t from the Soc i a l i s t

Par ty in 1920, th e tw o p o l i t i c a l forces have sought th e l oya l t i e s o f workers

and th e leadership of th e l e f t . P o l i t i c a l d isun i ty fos te red d iv i s ion within

th e t r ade union movement. Union compet i t ion has le d to outcomes ranging from

j o in t act ion to ou t r igh t h o s t i l i t y . Since th e mid-1960s, unions have been

a f f i l i a t e d to f ive separate confederat ions , r e f l ec t i ng deep h i s to r i ca l d iv i

s ions expressed in con t r as t ing ideo log ica l t r ad i t i ons . These range from

s ta t i sm to syndicalism, Catholicism to secular i sm, Lenin i s t an t icap i ta l i sm to

bus iness unionism. Frequent ly competing fo r members or l e s s formal ized sup

por t within th e same es tab l i shments , the unions have t yp i ca l l y been w e a ~ l y

organized a t th e l eve l of the f i rm. In prac t ice , they have depended on s t a t e




i n t e rven t ion in labor-management r e l a t i o n s , i ndus t r i a l development, and macro

economic performance to secure t h e i r pos i t ion , extend wage ga ins , and assure

employment [Ross 1982a] . The s t ronges t organ iza t ions shared t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n

to n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s even whi le they remained d iv ided over s t r a t eg i c or i en t a

t ions and, l a rge ly in consequence, excluded from t he po l i cy arena .

Of t hese par t i e s and unions, the PCF and th e Confederation Generale du

Trava i l (CGT) had th e c lo s e s t r e l a t i ons . 9 After th e war, th e par ty t ended to

use its leadership pos i t ions within th e union to make l abor market ac t ions

complement programat ic pos i t ions . Par ty dominance l e s sened , however, in the

1960s because th e t ransmiss ion b e l t could not funct ion in a complex soc i a l

s i t ua t i on t ha t demanded union independence [Ross 1982b]. Instead , th e union

gained " r e l a t i ve autonomy" from t he pa r ty , implying not a "po l i t i ca l " t r ade

unionism bu t c lass -based ac t ion - - a syndica l i sme de masse e t de c l a s se .

S t i l l , th e consonance of world views between the dominant fac t ion of th e CGT

and the PCF meant t h a t th e tw o could borrow i deo log ica l pos i t ions and l abor

analyses from one another .

The PCF-CGT r e la t ion was no t th e only par ty-union connect ion. The Force

Ouvrie re (FO) def ined i t s e l f as vaguely s o c i a l i s t i n sp i t e of i t s he te rodox

composi t ion and had cord ia l r e l a t i o n s with the p redeces sor o f th e Soc i a l i s t

Par ty (PS), th e SFIO. Relat ions between Catho l ic unionism and th e remnants o f

French Chr is t ian Democracy were also c lose a f t e r th e war. 10 The Confedera t ion

Franca i se Demoratique du Trava i l (CFDT) found i t s e l f close to the P a r t i

Socia l i s t e Unif ie u n t i l a s i gn i f i can t p a r t o f th e PSU merged with th e

Soc i a l i s t Par ty in 1974. The connec t ion between th e CFDT and th e PSU fac t ion

of the PS le d to analyses o f a "second l e f t , " one t h a t is l e s s s t a t i s t , more

decen t ra l iz ing than th e o ld l e f t [Hamon and Rothman 1982] .

Nonethe less , the PCF-CGT nexus was d i f f e r en t from th e o the rs . U n t i l th e

l a t e 1970s, the PCF was t he s t ronges t p o l i t i c a l force a t both the na t iona l and




loca l l e v e l s , while th e CGT was hegemonic within th e l abor movement. The con

f luence of sheer o rgan iza t iona l resources enabled th e union and par ty to main

t a i n a l a rge mobi l iza t iona l e f f o r t . The t i g h t l i nkage between union and par ty

gave th e PCF-CGT re la t ion an impor tan t grounding in working c l a s s c u l t u r e . As

an oppos i t iona l p o l i t i c a l fo rce , excluded from governing between 1947 and

1981, th e PCF provided s t r i den t c r i t i q u e s of French cap i t a l i sm and s t a t e - l ed

moderniza t ion. I t s a r t i cu l a t i on o f working-c lass pos i t ions helped sharpen th e

express ion o f c lass c o n f l i c t among French workers.

In order to capture s t a t e power, both th e Communists and Soc i a l i s t s

rea l ized t h a t they had to jo in fo rces . With its unswerving loya l ty to th e

Sovie t Union and i t s program narrowly worker i s t , the PCF remained i so l a t ed

from o ther p o l i t i c a l ac to r s u n t i l th e ear ly 1960s. The non-communist l e f t had

s p l i t in to numerous par t i e s , and had been se r ious ly compromised by th e

co lon ia l debac les of the 1950s with th e SFIO los ing membership, v o t e r s , and

v i t a l i t y . The l og ic of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i ons of th e Fi f th Republic, however,

pushed th e tw o l e f t forces t oge ther . Th e doub le -ba l lo t major i ty e l ec t o r a l

system rewarded cooperat ion. Th e p r e s id e n t i a l campaign in 1965 showed th e

ex ten t to which de Gaulle was p o l i t i c a l l y vulnerable and a un i t ed l e f t had th e

p o te n t i a l to reach power. Lef t uni ty in l eg i s l a t i ve e l e c t i o n s tw o year s l a t e r

brought th e combined l e f t within s t r i k i ng d i s t ance of a major i ty in the

n a t i o n a l assembly. Th e recomposi t ion of th e PS with Francois Mit te r rand as

its leader in 1971 fur thered the process of l e f t un i ty .

Nascent un i ty of the p o l i t i c a l l e f t encouraged j o i n t ac t ion in the l abor

movement. In 1966, th e CGT and th e CFDT began over a decade of cooperat ion in

s t r i ke ac t ions and c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. While th e two confedera t ions could

agree on p o l i c i e s t o confront a business community j ea lous o f its pre roga t ives

and a s t a t e which he ld t he r e ins of i ndus t r i a l change, i deo log ica l and




s t r a t eg i c pos i t ions var i ed . Th e CGT sought to develop c l a s s ac t ions - - d i s

c ip l ined and r espons ib le while th e CFDT leaned towards more spec tacu la r

t ypes of l abor conf l i c t . Meanwhile, th e FO remained a loof pursuing a bread

and-bu t t e r unionism, seek ing only wage increases and disdain ing th e a n t i

cap i t a l i sm of t he o the r tw o confedera t ions . By th e e a r ly 1970s, th e CGT and

th e CFDT could agree on a s t ra tegy t ha t would emphasize loca l , b u t d i s

c ip l ined , mil i tancy and support fo r a p o l i t i c a l s t ra tegy t h a t would br ing the

Lef t to power in na t iona l e l e c t i o n s .

Th e r a p id i t y of growth a f t e r 1945 le d to th e development of a dua l econ

omy - - European-level f irms and smal l bus iness - - capably managed in p o l i t i c a l

terms by th e Gaul l i s t coa l i t ion a f t e r 1958 [Berger 1980]. The engine fo r

growth, however, cons i s t ed of the na t iona l champions crea ted th rough a panoply

of measures ranging from th e pos twar na t iona l iza t ions to s e l e c t i v e c r e d i t

a l l o c a t i o n i n th e 1960s. Nat ional champions depended upon both expanding

markets fo r t h e i r outpu t and increasing economies of s c a l e . The f i r s t was

accomplished through European in teg ra t ion and th rough t r ade l i be ra l i za t ion v ia

GATT, th e l a t t e r th rough mergers in th e 1960s. Unity in ac t ion with in th e

labor movement promised t o r e - d i r ec t t he Ford i s t growth model.

Cr i s i s of the Ford i s t compromise. As elsewhere, th e French Ford is t

model ran i n to d i f f i c u l t i e s in th e 1970s. Export dependency grew vu lnerab le

to th e compet i t ive t h r ea t of th e NICs in bas ic mass product ion i ndus t r i e s and

th e tu rbu lence in th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l economy (par t i cu lar ly concern ing

exchange r a t e s ) . By the end o f th e 1970s, few of th e n a t i o n a l champions were

expor t champions i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l markets. Economies of sca le became l e s s

impor tan t with th e economies o f scope in t roduced th rough microe lec t ron ics in

which th e French su f f e r ed a compet i t ive disadvantage.

The c r i s i s o f French Fordism was delayed by the overwhelming inf luence

of th e s t a t e in both i ndus t r i a l and l abor po l i cy . I ndus t r i a l po l i cy in th e




1970s cons i s t ed of e rec t ing market bar r i e r s and extending subs id ies to f i rms

which suddenly found themselves i n d e f i c i t . Soc i a l i s t i ndus t r i a l po l i c i e s

a f t e r 1981 sought to revive the na t iona l champion po l i c i e s through the deve l

opment o f ve r t i ca l ly in teg ra ted companies ( f i l i e r e s ) . Both th e Chirac

government in 1974 and th e l e f t a f t e r 1981 sought to i n j e c t purchas ing power

in to the economy. Not su rp r i s ing ly , r e a l wages cont inued to r i s e u n t i l 1983.

S t i l l , manufacturing jobs began decl in ing a f t e r 1974. The manifes t i nab i l i t y

to c rea te new jobs necess i t a t ed s t a t e l abor-marke t i n t e rven t ion [Daley 1990] .

I t a l so eroded t he o rgan iza t iona l capac i t i e s of the d iv ided unions .

All iance s t r a t eg i e s of th e p o l i t i c a l l e f t developed within th e con tex t

o f Ford i s t d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n and s t a t e obfusca t ion . Th e Common Program of

Government, s igned by the Communists and the Soc i a l i s t s in 1972, promised a

mix of na t iona l iza t ions and worker contro l designed to revive the f l agg ing

for tunes of the compet i t ive sec to r and e s t a b l i s h the p o l i t i c a l and economic

bargains miss ing from th e G a u l l i s t ~ o d e l . These were easy to d iges t fo r the

CGT and fo r par t of the CFDT who sought not only p O l i t i c a l i nc lus ion bu t pro

t e c t i o n by the s t a t e from capr ic ious employers and unfr iendly marke ts . They

were b i t t e r l y re jec ted by employers .

After the narrow defea t of the l e f t in th e l eg i s l a t i ve e lec t ion o f 1973

and the p r e s id e n t i a l e lec t ions of 1974, the l e f t seemed on th e verge of power

and a l l pred ic t ions po in ted to an overwhelming v ic to ry in the 1978 l eg i s l a t i ve

e l e c t i o n s . Th e PS, however, appeared to be growing a t th e expense o f th e PCF

and the l a t t e r , in an apparent t a c t i c a l maneuver, demanded t he r enego t i a t ion

of th e Common Program in l i g h t o f the economic c r i s i s . Th e t a l k s broke down

in to acrimony in 1977, abor t ing th e l e f t v ic to ry the fo l lowing year . 11

The Common Program renegot ia t ions se r ious ly d iv ided th e unions , c rys t a l

l i z i ng those i deo log ica l d i f f e r ences t h a t had been bur ied in pub l i c hand



Daley, Howell, and Si lv i a 55

shak ing . Th e CGT openly s ided with th e PCF whi le th e CFDT t i l t e d , a l b e i t l e s s

pub l i c ly , to th e PS. The e l ec t o r a l debacle forced a r e - th ink ing with in the

labor movement over the appropr ia te labor-market s t r a t eg i e s to confront th e

economic c r i s i s which, i n tu rn , would a f f ec t a l t e r na t i ve p o l i t i c a l a l l i ances .

This crea ted i n t e r na l turbulence with in each confederat ion because it ques

t ioned th e previous pol icy of r e ly ing on the Common Program. Both confedera

t ions argued t h a t a p o l i t i c a l so lu t ion demobil ized workers , but they each drew

d i f f e r en t conclus ions .

In th e CGT, a group o f m i l i t a n t s began exp lo r ing a "proposi t ion force"

unionism t h a t would develop a l t e r na t i ve i ndus t r i a l so lu t ions to t roubled se c

t o r s to preserve employment and increase compet i t iveness . Such a f l i r t a t i o n

with n o n - p o l i t i c a l unionism implied a break with th e oppos i t iona l i sm o f th e

c l a s s approach, s t r a t eg i c openings to sympathet ic soc i e t a l ac to rs inc lud ing

t he o the r unions, and a decreased r e l i ance on th e PCF. Hard- l iners eventual ly

t r iumphed, ev ic t ing many of the "p ropos i t ion force" l eader s from t h e i r p o s i

t i o n s [Moynot 1982] .

They were re inforced in t h e i r house-c leaning by a p a r a l l e l evo lu t ion

within th e CFDT [Groux and Mouriaux 1989] . The l a t t e r also fought an i n t e r na l

s t rugg le between those argu ing fo r a l oca l ly -based s t ra tegy to preserve

employment and increase compet i t iveness - - s imi la r to t he p ropos i t ion force

un ion is t s i n the CGT - - and those arguing fo r more convent ional co l l ec t i ve

barga in ing s t r a t eg i e s . Both sought an apo l i t i c i sm or l e a s t a g r e a t e r r e l i ance

on l abor -marke t a c t i o n . The more convent ional s t ra tegy t r iumphed under the

rubr i c o f " recen te r ing , " confirming fears within th e CGT t h a t the CFDT had

succumbed to reformism and c lass co l l abora t ion . Th e CFDT meanwhile argued

t h a t CGT had once aga in become a too l o f th e PCF. Thus, th e i n t e r na l con

f l i c t s in th e wake of t he de fea t of the l e f t in 1978 des t royed j o i n t ac t ion in

th e l abor movement and s e t each confederat ion on d ivergen t courses .




By 1981 both th e p o l i t i c a l l e f t and th e l a b o r movement were profoundly

d iv ided . The v ic to ry of th e l e f t in th e p r e s id e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s r e s u l te d more

from d iv i s ions within th e r igh t than a popular mobi l iza t ion dependent upon

t i g h t l inkages between th e p o l i t i c a l l e f t and t he l abor movement. In th e

th ree years preceding th e e lec t ions , r e la t ions between th e tw o par t i e s had

degenera ted in to b icker ing reminiscent of the wors t s tages of th e Cold War.

Increas ing unemployment and i n t e r na l d iv i s ion served to demobi l ize th e l abor

movement. Only th e a t tempts by th e r igh t government of Raymond Barre to

res t ruc tu re th e economy through a s t rengthened cur rency, thereby choking o f f

inves tment , and an i nab i l i t y to con ta in i n f l a t i o n a r y pres sures d iv ided the

bus iness community and s p l i t the previous p r e s id e n t i a l major i ty .

With th e e lec t ion of Mitter rand as pres iden t and th e overwhelming l e f t

major i ty in th e subsequent l eg i s l a t i ve e lec t ions , th e l e f t could put in to

p rac t ice th e p o l i c i e s deve loped whi le in oppos i t ion: th e na t iona l iza t ion

program promised more p o l i t i c a l con t ro l of th e economy and l abor la w reform

would democrat ize i ndus t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , of fe r ing a t l e a s t th e oppor tun i ty fo r

" i ndus t r i a l governance ." Agains t th e cur ren t o f t he o the r advanced coun t r i es ,

th e l e f t government sought t o s t imula te the economy by r a i s i n g incomes and

consumption. I ron ica l ly , th e reform push found mixed reviews i n the t r ade

union movement. Th e CGT suppor ted th e Keynesian push most voc i f e rous ly fo r it

doveta i led with th e confedera t ion ' s own economic po l i cy o f na t iona l iza t ion and

i n d u s t r i a l re la t ions s t ra tegy premised upon s t rong wage demands. Th e FO main

t a ined a s taunch antagonism to much of t he ac t ion of th e "Socialo-Communis t"

government, opposing th e i n i t i a l appointment o f Communist mini s t e r s , denounc

ing th e na t iona l iza t ions as over ly expensive and unnecessary , and arguing

a g a i n s t most of th e Auroux Laws, be l i ev ing they would s t r eng then the o the r

confedera t ions a t its expense. The CFDT of fe red cau t ious suppor t fo r th e




left's i n i t i a t i v e s . I t sen t a number of top l eader s to na t iona l min is t r ie s

and it welcomed and helped wri te the Auroux Laws. Yet, it emit ted mixed s i g

na l s about th e na t iona l iza t ions and worr ied t h a t an over ly s t imula ted economy

would c rea te an i n t e r n a t i o n a l backlash.

The l e f t in power brought access to government po l i cy makers fo r the CGT

and th e CFDT. Union leaders had been po l i t e l y received in mi n i s t e r i a l of f ices

under th e r i gh t . At l e a s t i n i t i a l l y a f t e r 1981, however, they became r egu la r

i n t e r l ocu t o r s . Only th e FO f e l t neg lec ted as i t s leadership had enjoyed c lose

r e la t ions with previous r i g h t governments . S t i l l , access d id no t mean

i n f luence . As the l e f t government f in i shed i t s reform push and as a s e t of

economic choices needed to be made about the con t inua t ion of demand s t imula

t i o n , pol icy-making bore i nc reas ing ly l e s s resemblance to union progams.

Between 1981 and 1984, th e French l e f t in power a t tempted to nego t i a t e

th e p o l i t i c a l and economic bargains lacking in th e pos twar growth model. 12

The f a i l u r e to reach a se t t l emen t can be a t t r i bu t ed t o a number o f f a c to r s .

The p o l i t i c a l l e f t cohered around a program t ha t e x p l i c i t l y sought to com

pensa te fo r th e l abor-marke t weaknesses o f organized l abor by re - inv igora t ing

s t a t e power. Such cent ra l i za t ion proved cumbersome in dea l ing with market

tu rbu lence , obscured market changes tak ing p lace , paper over th e f rac tu res

within th e l e f t . Both th e r i g id i ty of the PCF and th e PS's a t tempts to bury

its e rs twh i le a l ly prevented th e coherence of a working-c lass p o l i t i c a l force .

Organ iza t iona l plural i sm within th e labor movement prevented th e cohe

s ion o f fo rces capable of nego t i a t ing a s tab le compromise. French unionism

became even more compet i t ive dur ing th e course of the 1970s as th e CFDT ga ined

rough par i t y with th e CGT. Th e l a t t e r re ta ined th e l a r ges t coverage bu t its

base in manufacturing shrank and the CFDT proved more adept a t organ iz ing th e

new middle c l a s ses . Thus, as t he Ford i s t model began to show s igns of wear,

th e French l abor movement l o s t i t s veneer of cohes iveness .




Pol i t i ca l Centrism and Post-Fordism. The s to ry of th e Soc i a l i s t U-turn

i s wel l known [Cameron 1988; Hal l 1986]. In an uncer ta in i n t e r n a t i o n a l

environment, demand s t imulat ion quickly backf i red , fue l ing the consumption of

imports over domest ical ly produced goods, thereby f a i l i ng to provide enough

purchasing power to fue l an i ndus t r i a l recovery, and pu t t ing pressu re on the

f ranc. Th e under ly ing weakness of French indust ry in genera l con t r ibu ted to

the high import e l a s t i c i t y . Already in mid-1982, the government f roze wages

and pr ices , l a t e r de- indexing pub l ic sec to r wages. Devalua t ion sought to slow

the run on the f ranc in October 1981 and June 1982. Another round of measures

in ea r ly 1983 t ransformed the "pause" in to aus t e r i t y : wage-price gu ide l ines

e f f ec t i ve l y reduced purchas ing power, budgetary re trenchments stemmed th e

inc reases in t r ans f e r payments, and another deva lua t ion sought to r e s t r i c t

consumption o f foreign goods.

S t i l l , as dr as t i c as they were, such measures might have been viewed as

temporary had they not been accompanied by a new d iscourse on economic change

[Ross 1990]. Between 1983 and 1986 the Socia l i s t s embraced th e f irm as the

genera to r o f wealth, the spearhead of compet i t iveness , and the source of

c rea t iv i ty in soc ie ty . Economic "real ism" meant th e t o l e r a t i on of increasing

l eve ls o f unemployment. I t impl ied the search fo r European market norms in

th e p lace of French ones in th e be l i e f t ha t French f i rms could not meet th e

chal lenges of th e Japanese and the Americans without Europe-wide organ iza

t i o n . 13 This dis tanced na t iona l p o l i t i c a l s t rugg les from market outcomes,

pu t t ing organized l abor a ta

fu r the r disadvantage . I t impl ied th e r e t r e a t o f

the s t a t e , not in i t s i n t e r v e n t io n i s t capac i ty , but as th e guaran to r o f work

in g c l a s s welfa re .

The new compet i t iveness campaign and th e PCF's depar tu re from government

in 1984 t ransformed an uncomfortably p lu r a l l e f t in to a f r a t r i c i d a l one. Th e






in t roduced by th e Auroux Laws had little pr ac t i ca l e f f ec t in of f se t t i ng th e

weakening l abor market . Employers used th e d i r ec t express ion groups to c i r

cumvent th e unions . The combination of membership dec l ines and newly crea ted

(or strengthened) r ep resen ta t ive i n s t i t u t i ons meant t h a t l abor l eader s would

become i nc reas ing ly enmeshed in adminis t ra t ive jobs and divorced from t h e i r

members. Fina l ly , th e unions could not a l t e r t he inc reas ing l abor-marke t

f l ex ib i l i ty sought by employers s ince 1981 and the Soc i a l i s t s a f t e r 1983. Th e

Auroux Laws had permi t ted th e a t ta inment of more l o c a l wage-se t t ing . The l o i

Delebarre in 1986 permit ted more f lex ib le t ime schedules . 14

Th e per iod between 1986 and 1991 can b e s t be charac te r i zed as cen t r i s t

consensus bui ld ing between th e S o c ia l i s t s and p a r t s of the par l i amenta ry

r i gh t . Th e Right government ' s i n i t i a l "an t i - r e fo rm" push in 1986 sought to

undo much of what th e l e f t had put in p lace . 15 A ll t h r ee confedera t ions sa w

these e l ec t o r a l promises as undercu t t ing th e s t a t e ' s compensation fo r th e

organ iza t iona l weaknesses of th e l abor movement. Yet, they d id not provide

the glue to bond them t oge ther . Th e CGT reacted vigorous ly in l i ne with both

its economism and i t s l inkage to th e PCF, while th e FO accepted some o f th e

arguments - - never having been a fan of na t iona l iza t ion , fo r instance - - and

argued fo r concre te s t eps to improve th e l abor law. The CFDT wavered between

i t s own col l ec t ive bargaining mode and a cr i t ique o f t he s t r idency of the

r i g h t ' s proposa l s . Thus, th e unions saw to varying degrees th e r i g h t ' s push

as changing t h e i r environment , bu t each pursued those al l i ance s t r a t eg i e s t h a t

had been se t in p lace by 1984: th e CGT pushed fo r th e PCF, th e FO remained

neu t ra l , and the CFDT provided lukewarm suppor t fo r th e PS.

Prime Minis te r Chirac cou ld only implement h a l f th e pr i va t i za t i ons , fo r

the s tock market crash of 1987 and th e p r e s id e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s of 1988 s lowed

th e i n i t i a t i v e . Th e r i g h t government d id abroga te t he admin i s t r a t ive au thor




i za t ion of l ayof f s , but pushed unions (minus th e CGT) and employers to i ron

out a col l ec t ive bargaining agreement t ha t would se t th e terms fo r l ayof f s .

I t f a i l ed to a l t e r s i gn i f i can t l y employee r ep resen ta t ion in t he pub l i c sec to r .

I t d id develop a number of l abor market programs which spurred th e employment

of unemployed ( espec ia l ly young) workers a t below minimum wage.

The s o c i a l compromise achieved by th e end o f 1987 would be in place over

four years l a t e r . Candidate Mit te r rand promised ne i the r more nor fewer

na t iona l iza t ions in h i s p r e s id e n t i a l campaign in 1988, and he has kept t h a t

promise . The government o f Michel Rocard (1988-91) fol lowed a cau t ious labor

market s t ra tegy , refusing to res to re s t a t e con t ro l o f l ayof f s and encouraging

th e unions and employers to i ron out t h e i r own d i f fe rences . Labor market

po l i cy cont inued a pol icy of encouraging employment by of fe r ing ta x incent ives

to employers t o h i r e add i t iona l workers, e f f ec t i ve l y inducing employers to

compete on the bas i s o f lo w wages. Both th e Chirac and Rocard governments

in t roduced f l e x i b i l i t y in h i r ing and th e use of l abor . Th e new centr ism was

symbol ized i n the appointment o f Jean-p ie r r e Soisson, a l ead ing backer of

Raymond Barre in th e UDF c o a l i t i o n , as Minis te r o f Labor in th e Rocard

government . Th e appointment ensured po l i cy con t inu i ty and c r i t i c a l c o a l i

t i o n a l vo tes fo r th e minor i ty Soc i a l i s t government.

Since 1984 l abor po l i cy has been subordinate to economic po l i cy goa l s .

Economic orthodoxy meant t h a t budgetary r igo r would dampen co l l ec t i ve consump

t i on , keeping growth in household spending below t ha t o f i nc reases in na t iona l

product . Par t of th e proceeds of pr i va t i za t i on was used to reduce th e

ex te rna l deb t . P r i ce s t a b i l i t y would encourage domest ic investment while

decreases in corpora te t axes would lower product ion c o s t s . Publ ic sec to r wage

gu ide l ines he lped keep sa la ry increases down, and smal l i nc reases in th e mini

mum wage have prevented pr ice inc reases r everbera t ing through th e wage h i e r a r




chy. A s t rong currency f ac i l i t a t ed th e coordinat ion of European economic

pol icy , enabl ing French f i rms to d ive rs i fy within Europe. This d i s in f l a t i on

ary pol icy was accompanied by reduct ions in income and va lue-added taxes to

pr even t a s l i de in to r ap id def la t ion . French economic po l i cy - - forged by the

Soc i a l i s t s in 1984, s t rengthened by Chirac in 1986, and cont inued by Michel

Rocard between 1988 and 1991 - - has won accolades from th e bus ines s and f inan

c i a l communities [F inancial Times, Apr i l 14, 1990: OECD 1990, 1991].

Th e unions have not been well-p laced to chal lenge t h i s c e n t r i s t con

sensus . Th e job hemorrhage in t r ad i t i ona l indust ry cont inued in to 1987, f u r

t h e r eroding a weak union base. In sp i te of job growth, unemployment has

remained high a t around 9%, thereby weakening wage claims . Mil i tancy has been

d i f f i c u l t to generate as indicated by annual ly dec l in ing s t r i k e r a t e s : by 1990

France would be among those coun t r i es with the lowest r a t e s . Union membership

has cont inued to s l i de such t ha t the percentage of the non-agr i cu l tu ra l work

force organized hovers between 6 and 9%, lowest among th e OECD coun t r ie s .

Discree t ca tegor i es of workers have r e s i s t ed th e new environment fo r l abor

ra i lway workers , a i r c o n t r o l l e r s , pos ta l workers, nurses , and c i v i l servants

( tax co l l ec to r s ! ) . Yet, th e most e f f e c t i v e ac t ions have been led by coordina

t i o n s , ex t r a - and f r equen t ly ant i -union assemblies of workers , which have

secured i so la ted ga ins in the face of wage r e s t r a i n t . The unions have t aken

con t r ad ic to ry pos i t ions on these a c t i v i t i e s . Th e CFDT expel led severa l pos ta l

loca l s fo r cooperat ing in one coord ina t ion . The CGT has sought with very

mixed success to assume con t ro l of s t r i ke a c t i o n .

Such ad hoc ac t ion h igh l igh t s the t r a j ec t o r y of the French l abor move

ment. The CGT hardened i t s s tance against the Rocard government to th e po in t

of d i s i l l u s i on i ng So c ia l i s t s within the confederat ion, and a number of purges

have sought to ensure organ iza t iona l conformi ty . I t has pursued a go- i t -a lone




approach, a t tempt ing va in ly to spearhead each workplace ac t ion , and l ambas t ing

t he o the r unions as incurably r e fo rmis t . It has seen a s l i gh t i nc rease in

suppor t in workplace e lec t ions as a r e su l t . The CFDT has found its niche in

concess ionary barga in ing , wi l l ing to t r ade previous ga ins fo r g rea te r work

shar ing . Af te r a leadership change, th e FQ has hardened its oppos i t ion to

wage moderat ion and now chal lenges the CGT in i t s r h e to r i c . S t i l l , th e

l a r ges t s ing le force in workplace e lec t ions cons is t s of th e "non-un ion is t s "

[Minis te re du Trava i l 1991]. Labor uni ty appears now only a d i s t a n t pos

s i b i l i t y , and the union movement i t s e l f i s coming a p a r t a t th e seams.

The Chirac and Rocard governmental exper iences encouraged the

c e n t r i f u g a l fo rces t ea r ing th e l abor movement away from th e p o l i t i c a l l e f t .

The CGT found so lace in i t s l inkage to th e PCF, a l though by Summer 1991 its

lame-duck l eader Henri Krasucki wa s s id ing with Communist d i s s id e n t s in both

th e union and th e par ty . S t i l l , th e CGT-PCF connec t ion has prevented any

workable re la t ionsh ip with the PS. The PS has of fe red no ind ica t ion of a

changed course s ince 1984. After 1988, th e CGT perce ived Rocard as exp l i c i t l y

an t i - l abor and as enjoying over ly close t i e s to th e CFDT - - the infamous "sec

ond l e f t . " Th e CFDT i t s e l f needed to d i s t ance i t s e l f from Rocard to avoid an

i n t e r na l r e v o l t , so it emi t ted r ese rves about the cont inued high l e v e l of

unemployment. However, its cr i t iques were moderate , once again demanding t ha t

th e government show economic " r espons i b i l i t y . " I t even s tood behind th e new

f l a t ta x on wage earners in Fa l l 1990 as a mechanism to br ing in to balance th e

soc i a l s e c u r i t y sys tem. Ties to th e PS have a l so been tenuous because th e

CFDT r e fused to endorse the Soc i a l i s t s i n th e 1988 l eg i s l a t i ve e l ec t i ons . Th e

FQ remained susp ic ious o f the "second l e f t " - - espec ia l ly its soc i a l Catho l ic

components - - and it opposed the f l a t t a x . S t i l l , it carefu l ly developed a

re la t ionsh ip with the PS if not with th e former prime min is te r .




Much to i t s chagr in , th e PS has not become the hegemonic par ty o f th e

l e f t s im i l a r to i t s s o c i a l democrat ic coun te rpar t s elsewhere in Europe. The

development o f a c ross -c lass c a t c h - a l l par ty has been s t i l l b o r n . Working

c lass votes have migrated from th e PCF and th e PS but not to th e ex ten t

expec ted by th e l a t t e r . While the PCF's vote has dropped from 20% to under

10%, thereby t r a i l i n g th e Nat iona l Front as th e f i f t h p o l i t i c a l fo rce , the

Soc i a l i s t s have not recuperated a l l th e l o s t vo tes . Considerable evidence

sugges ts t h a t d i s i l l u s io n e d working c l a s s voters are now abs ta in ing a t a r a te

higher than th e na t iona l average . The Socia l i s t s have seen t h e i r vote f l u c

tua te between a high o f 38% in th e 1981 l eg i s l a t i ve e lec t ions to 24% in th e

European e lec t ions of 1989. The s tubborn re s i s tance o f the par l i amenta ry

r i g h t sugges ts t ha t the PS w i l l have d i f f i cu l ty cap tu r ing th e cen te r . The

claim f i f t een years ago t h a t th e l e f t enjoyed a "soc io log ica l major i ty" has a

hollow r ing in th e 1990s. Most voters do no t see a major prograrnat ic d i f

fe rence between the PS and th e r igh t [SOFRES 1990] , t r ans l a t i ng in to weak

p a r t i s a n i den t i f i ca t i on .

The PS has f l i r t ed with c ircumventing th e mat e r i a l i s t compromise o f

s o c i a l democracy in favor of a na t iona l appeal based on r i g h t s and

oppor tun i t i e s . Here th e argument is t h a t th e changing nature of French

soc ie ty has already pu l l ed apar t c l ass -based cons t i tuenc ies and modifying o ld

vot ing pa t te rns [Nouvelle revue soc i a l i s t e 1991] and t h a t th e par ty should

gauge i t s appea l to th e broades t possib le spectrum of th e e l ec t o r a t e . (Michel

Rocard, fo r ins t ance , was more popula r among sen io r managers than among

workers and held th e confidence of th e former more than th e par t i e s o f th e

r igh t ! ) However, th e PS entered th e 1990s ex t rao rd ina r i ly f r ag i l e as an

organizat ion . Membership and mil i t ancy have dec l ined s teadi ly over the l a s t

decade, as they have fo r o the r French pa r t i e s . Th e s t rugg les over success ion




to Francois Mit te r rand have d i s i l l u s io n e d par ty mi l i t an t s . Having accepted

t he log ic of p o l i t i c a l compet i t ion in the Fi f t h Repulic , th e par ty has

embraced pres iden t ia l i sm bu t remains in search of a coherent program. By

1990, th e par ty cons t i tu ted a v i r t u a l mir ro r o f French soc ie ty in terms o f i t s

c l a s s composi t ion as well as i t s e l ec t o r a l audience . While most s o c i a l

democat ic par t i e s have a so l id middle -c las s membership, animosi ty toward th e

PCF removed t h a t pole of the l e f t c loses t to l abor . Consequent ly , th e nexus

with l abor remains i r r egu l a r and ad hoc.

Th e acerbic r e l a t i o n s within th e l e f t , the widening d iv is ions among th e

unions themselves, and th e S o c i a l i s t s ' economic po l i c i e s have prevented any

rapprochement be tween organized l abor and the PS , th e only par ty of the l e f t

capable o f re-working a new s e t of barga ins . The Soc i a l i s t s in power

acce le r a t ed th e f l ex ib i l t y o f pos t -Fordism while pres id ing over a degradat ion

in th e working environment o f the labor force . S ta te- induced labor market

f l e x i b i l i t y has improved compet i t iveness bu t on th e bas i s of lo w wages. The

l abor movement has been pu l l ed apar t by i nc reas ing ly powerful c e n t r i f u g a l

forces while i t s hold on workers has become ever weake r. Labor and th e l e f t

conf ron t th e 1990s more disorganized than a t any o ther t ime in t h i s century

[Daley 1991].

Linkages between the l e f t and organized l abor have h i s t o r i c a l l y been

informal in France . Th e absence of i n i t i a l economic and p o l i t i c a l barga ins

has f a c i l i t a t e d the process of unravel l ing . Any new growth c i r c u i t w i l l have

d i f f i c u l t y inc lud ingorganized

labor .

Conclus ion

Change i n the re la t ionsh ip between l abor and th e l e f t in these th ree

coun t r i es seems to confirm th e hypotheses of the moderniza t ion t heo r i s t s

twenty- f ive year s ago: economic change a l l ev i a t e s the pr imordia l c l a s s




cleavages t ha t rocked c a p i t a l i s t soc i e t i e s . That economic af f luence engenders

p o l i t i c a l moderat ion appeared to have been r e fu ted in th e l a t e 1960s and 1970s

by the evo lu t ion of Eurocommunism, th e rad ica l break foreseen by th e Common

Program in France, and th e growth of th e Labour l e f t in Br i t a in . Even th e

development of an ex t ra -par l i amenta ry oppos i t ion t ha t would even tua l ly t r ans

form i t s e l f in to th e Greens in Germany suggested t ha t s o c i a l democrat ic

par t i e s could be se r ious ly chal lenged on t h e i r l e f t wings. Such chal lenges

argued fo rce fu l ly aga ins t long- term t r ends toward p o l i t i c a l moderat ion . The

r i s e in s t r i ke volume in th e l a t e 19605 and ea r ly 1970s implied t h a t economic

change and p o l i t i c a l accommodation were not eas i l y r econc i led .

By th e 1990s, however, rad ica l iz ing p o l i t i c s had sh r ive led . Unions have

been d isc ip l ined by market fo rces , and th e p o l i t i c a l l e f t has accep ted a new

" rea l i sm." The Labour Par ty has s t rugg led on the t e r r a in of Thatcherism and

has accepted some of the pro-market po l i c i e s . The French Soc i a l i s t s

engineered a pol icy U-turn t h a t embraced economic orthodoxy. By th e end of

1990 th e Greens were out of the Bundestag, and th e SPD has still unwi l l ing to

chal lenge the German model. 1 6

Once again we are forced to explore th e sources of l e f t par ty p o l i t i c a l

moderat ion . The modernizat ion t heo r i s t s suggested t ha t pa r t i e s would become

more heterogenous in e l ec t o r a l appeal - - th e end of the mass-class par ty

and t h a t unions would become more func t iona l to " i ndus t r i a l governance." The

former has happened fo r reasons o ther than those suggested and the l a t t e r has

come undone because of the mobi l i za t ion o f c a p i t a l .

Unlike Kirchheimer [1966] and Lipset [1964] , the re fo re , we do not argue

t h a t a changing c lass s t ruc tu re has been the motor fo rce o f p o l i t i c a l modera

t i on . 1 7 Rather , we look to th e market and e l ec t o r a l sources o f i n t e r e s t

l inkages - - i . e . , th e connect ion o f th e c i t i zen to p o l i t i c a l par ty v ia the




l abor movement. This focus p laces a premium on th e t r ansac t ions made in

response to changes in th e environment . I S

We have argued t h a t s imi la r pressures have confronted the par ty -un ion

nexus in these th ree coun t r i es . Unemployment, economic re s t ruc tu r ing , p res

su res fo r l abor-marke t f l e x i b i l i t y , and t he s t agna t ion of the soc i a l wage have

undercut union nego t i a t ing pos i t ions . Left par t i e s have sought wider con

s t i t uenc i e s ou t s ide the bes ieged l abor movement. Th e capac i t i e s and wil l ing

ness to nego t i a t e th e economic and p o l i t i c a l barga ins o f a generat ion ago have

been much reduced. Th e t r ans i t i on out of Fordism has weakened th e p o l i t i c a l

r ep resen ta t ion o f c l a s s i n t e r e s t s . Th e powerful decen t ra l iz ing and i n t e r

na t iona l iz ing forces in the p o l i t i c a l economy have changed th e paramete rs of

mobi l iza t ion , coa l i t ion -bu i ld ing , and s t ra tegy fo r union and par ty a l i ke .

We might charac te r ize th e p o l i t i c a l consequences o f post-Fordism as

having four components: 1) productivism r ep laces income d i s t r i bu t i on as a

p o l i t i c a l pr io r i t y ; 2) f i rm- and s e c to r - s p e c i f i c microeconomic po l i c i e s t ake

precedence over cen t r a l demand management; 3) t he l abor movement becomes l e s s

aggrega t ive o f soc i e t a l i n t e r e s t s ; and 4) the par ty f inds i t s e l f confronted

with new soc i e t a l demands and develops new po l i c i e s and nur tu res d i f f e r en t

a l l i a n c e s t o remain in power. Consequent ly , the pos t -Ford is t environment

des t ab i l i zes th e par ty-union nexus s ince each ac to r has l e s s t o o f f e r th e

o the r .

These case s tud ies , however, a l so suggest cons iderab le v a r i a t i o n .

Social democracy in Germany and Labourism in Br i ta in have proven more

r e s i l i e n t to th e forces of decomposi t ion. Although f rayed a t th e edges, th e

l inkages between par ty and union have been l a rge ly mainta ined in sp i t e of tw o

very d i f f e r en t economic performances. In c o n t r a s t , "socia l i sm without

workers" [Kesselman 1983] in France has proven f r ag i l e , vu lnerab le t o d i v i




s ions with in th e l e f t , th e divided union movement, and oppos i t ion from th e

bus iness community. with th e demise o f French Communism th e l inkages between

l e f t and l abor have been broken in France.

Sources of var ia t ion . The re s i l i ency o f the l a b o r - l e f t re la t ionsh ip i s

most obvious ly inf luenced by th e na tu re o f the l inkages under Fordism. Here

th e bargains between par ty and union were l e a s t developed in th e French con

t ex t , most organic in Bri ta in , and s t rong (a l though sub t l e and informal ) in

Germany. However, we should be ca re fu l in pos t hoc ergo prop te r hoc explana

t i o n s : t he ex i s t ence of previous conf igura t ions does not necessa r i ly imply

con t inua l evo lu t ion . "His tory mat ters" but th e presen t i s more than s imply

th e produc t of the p a s t . We need to exp la in both th e sources and th e degree

o f change in the l abo r - l e f t nexus.

Th e durabi l i ty of p o l i t i c a l and economic bargains between par ty depends

on both th e s t r eng th and un i ty of organized l abor and th e s t ra tegy and

maneuverabi l i ty of p o l i t i c a l par t i e s . These tw o broad fac to rs - - th e

coherence and s t r a t eg i c or ien ta t ion of the l abor movement and th e p o l i t i c a l

l e f t - - depended to some extent on what we might c a l l the " t iming o f Ford i s t

t r ans i t i on . " We can opera t iona l i ze those f ac to r s in terms o f f ive se t s o f

var i ab les t h a t a f f e c t th e bargains between l abor movements and l e f t p a r t i e s :

th e s o c i a l composi t ion and previous e l ec t o r a l appea l o f th e par ty i t s e l f , th e

r e l a t i ve homogeneity of l e f t mobi l iza t ion , th e governing p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f th e

l e f t par ty , t he r e l a t i ve homogeneity of th e labor movement, th e economic

space ava i l ab le fo r th e inclusion of organized l abor in cor por a t i s t - s t y l ed

bargaining networks .

The s o c i a l composi t ion of l e f t par t i e s has changed cons iderab ly i n the

postwar per iod. Leaders t end to be rec ru i ted i nc reas ing ly from th e pro fes

s iona l middle c lasses and l e s s from th e working c l a s s . However, t h i s i s a




process t h a t has been cont inuing fo r near ly a hundred year s . As Michels

showed, l e f t par t i e s were vulnerable to th e same forces aga ins t which they

s t rugg led in soc ie ty a t l a rge . Changes in th e na tu re o f th e p a r t i e s them

se lves have t ended to separate them from t h e i r union p a r tn e r s . This has been

ev iden t in th e Labour Par ty with the a t tempts by the const i tuency par t i e s to

exer t more in f luence a t th e expense of the unions in th e ear ly 1980s . The SPD

has seen a rapid increase in th e numbers of col lege educated , non-working

c l a s s o f f i c e ho lder s . Th e s o c i a l composi t ion of the PS has always been

d iver se . I t s leadership has t ended to be composed of e i t h e r old- s ty le

no tab les around Mit te r rand o r, s ince the mid-1970s, graduates of th e qrandes

e c o l e s . Nei ther s o c i a l base has a par t i cu l a r a f f i n i t y to t he l abor movement.

The demise of French Communism fu r the r d i s t ances l e f t p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s from

working c l a s s o r ig in s . Thus, in d i f f e r en t ways perhaps , each of these th ree

l e f t s has moved toward g r e a t e r i n t e r na l and leadership heterogenei ty .

More impor tant ly , l e f t par t i e s in a l l th e advanced coun t r i es have sought

to expand t h e i r cons t i tuenc ies beyond th e t r ad i t i ona l working c l a s s . We can

a t t r i bu te t h i s genera l s ea rch fo r enlarged cons t i tuenc ies to tw o f a c to r s .

F i r s t , th e t r ad i t i ona l working c l a s s never a t ta ined a numerica l major i ty and

has been sh r ink ing , a l b e i t a t d i f f e r en t r a t e s , in a l l the advanced coun t r i es

[Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Giddens 1973; Stephens 1979]. This process has

undoubtedly been acce le r a t ed through i ndus t r i a l r e s t r u c tu r in g s ince the l a t e

1970s. Second, the i n s t i t u t i o n a l organ iza t ion o f th e par ty sys tem fo rces

these p a r t i e s to seek c ross -c lass votes . Th e f i r s t -pas t - the -pos t e l e c t o r a l

sys tem i n Br i t a in encourages par t i e s t o widen t h e i r e l e c t o r a l appea l s .

Modified propor t iona l r ep resen ta t ion in Germany e l imina tes t h a t c o n s t r a in t .

However, the s t a b i l i t y of the SPD vote forces p o l i t i c a l a l l i ances with o ther

p a r t i e s . Pres iden t i a l i sm in France has motiva ted th e PS to organize along




na t iona l l i nes . There fore , e l ec t o r a l appea l and governing p o s s i b i l i t i e s have

become inex t r icab ly mixed a t l ea s t in France and Germany.

Ing lehar t [1977, 1990] has shown t he ex ten t to which th e idea t iona l

o r ien ta t ion of th e l e f t e l e c to r a t e has changed s ince the 1960s. Since th e

1960s, perhaps because of i t s Bad Godesberg compromises, th e SPD has had con

s ide rab le pres sure from non-mate r i a l i s t vo te r s . I t has ac t ive ly sought to

en la rge its s o c i a l base , espec ia l ly s ince it can no long t ake even th e union

vote fo r gran ted . Given the exis tence of a s t rong Communist r i va l , th e French

Soc i a l i s t s had oppos i te e l ec t o r a l pres sures - - a t t r ac t i ng working c l a s s votes

which it has done qu i t e impress ively . While it i n f r inged on th e PCF's con

s t i t uenc i e s , however, it sought entrenchment both among new ca tegor i es of

workers and even th e o ld middle c lasses . In Bri ta in , pa r ty i den t i f i ca t i on has

been dec l in ing fo r th e l a s t tw o decades , and Labour s ince Harold Wilson has

explored new s o c i a l bases .

Elec to ra tes have become f rac t iona l ized and the l e f t has had to cope with

a decrease in homogeneity . S t i l l , p o l i t i c a l cu l t u r a l exp lana t ions have d i f f i

cu l ty in exp la in ing the mobi l i za t ion o f those values . Mo bil izat ion depends on

th e capac i ty of s o c i a l movements and p o l i t i c a l par t i e s t o p u l l t oge ther va r i

ous i n t e r e s t s and devise programat ic appea ls t h a t can bind them t oge ther .

Bri ta in , Germany, and France have witnessed very d i f f e r en t types of coa l i t i on

bu i ld ing . For our purposes we need to explore t he ex ten t to which such

coa l i t ion -bu i ld ing has af f ec ted the re la t ionsh ip to organized l abor . In o ther

words, to what ex ten t have l e f t p o l i t i c a l c o a l i t i o n s and l abor l inkages been

zero-sum o r p o s i t i v e sum?

The r e l a t i ve homogeneity of the labor movement seems to exp la in the

l a r ges t amount of var ia t ion in par ty-union r e l a t i ons . Organ iza t iona l

cohes iveness i s th e s ina £Q£ o f a s tab le durable nexus . Such




heterogenei ty a f f ec t s both the i n t e r e s t aggregat ive c a p a c i t i e s of l abor and

its po t en t i a l v iab i l i t y as e i t h e r a p o l i t i c a l or policy-making p a r tn e r . We

are no t arguing here t ha t a union counterweight e l imina tes the p ressu res on

t h a t nexus .1 9

Rather , th e union counterweight encourages g r e a t e r po l i cy com

promise given pres sures on t h a t nexus . Thus, th e g r e a t e r the aggregat ive

capaci ty of the l abor movement, th e st ronger wi l l be th e re s i s tance to d i s

i n t e g r a t i v e pressu res . We have found t ha t re s i s tance to be t he s t ronges t in

Germany, the weakest in France, and Bri ta in somewhere in th e middle .

While s imi la r coa l i t i ona l pres sures have ex is ted fo r a l l th ree l e f t s ,

important d i f f e r ences remain. Br i t i sh Labour remains cons t i t u t i ona l l y depend

en t on th e unions . Th e PS not has only very informal l inkages to labor , only

one fac t ion within t he pa r ty i s c lose to one of the th ree major unions , the

CFDT. The SPD has mainta ined s t rong organ iza t iona l l inkages to th e eGB while

both i n s t i t u t ions remain independent of one ano ther . The t ens ions with in the

nexus in Br i t a in and Germany seem to i n t e r na l i ze d i f f e r ences in competing

agendas while the absence of l inkages in France exposes such d i f f e r ences to

more pub l i c , and potent i a l ly des t ruc t ive , sc ru t iny .

What fu ture? We have sugges ted t h a t th e s t r e s s of economic change on

the aggregat ive capac i t i e s of unions has in f luenced the l a b o r - l e f t nexus.

That nexus can only be sus ta ined with coherent i n t e r l ocu t o r s . We would be

remiss , however, to neg lec t al t e rna t ive barga ins t ha t are conce ivable if no t

exac t ly in the wings.

Th e emergence of an economic bargain forged a t th e Europe-wide organ iza

t i on may provide the bas i s fo r th e achievement o f some form of economic

bargain . New bargains might be s e t t l e d around t he i s sues of jobs , t r a i n i ng ,

and s k i l l acqu is i t ion . To t he ex ten t t h a t companies, r eg ions , and economies

move in th e d i r e c t i o n of a more highly sk i l l ed workforce, we wi l l f ind p res




sures fo r ac t ive employee involvement. The prec i se na tu re of t ha t invo lve

ment, o f course , can vary enormously . Th e cos t s to organized l abor fo r such

barga ins , however, may be th e sac r i f i ce of t he o rgan iza t iona l needs of th e

union for the b e n e f i t of the economic un i t .

S t i l l , we should not imply t h a t l ea rn ing has not taken p lace within

unions and l e f t p a r t i e s . Th e problems we have sugges ted a re more ev iden t to

t he ac to r s themse lves than to i n t e r e s t e d observers . One can f ind numerous

examples th roughout Europe of l o c a l p o l i t i c a l coa l i t ions involving l e f t

par t i e s , unions , and new so c i a l movements which have surmounted th e

cen t r i fuga l tendencies crea ted through competing i n t e r e s t s . They have pro

vided compet i t ive environments and i n d u s t r i a l governance prec ise ly because

unions , employers, and p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s have t a rge ted human cap i t a l develop

ment [Kern and Sabel 1991] .

A new p o l i t i c a l barga in may t ake longer t o nego t i a t e . The fu ture of

union-par ty r e l a t i o n s in th e midst of th e "double sh i f t " w i l l u l t imate ly

depend on ne w forms of p o l i t i c a l mobil izat ion and l abor -marke t coa l i t i on

bu i ld ing . His to r ica l ly , l abor o rgan iza t ion has fol lowed th e development of

th e market [Polanyi 1957] . As new market arenas develop, we should expect

p a r a l l e l a t tempts to c rea te new i n s t i t u t i ons to r ep resen t th e i n t e r e s t s of

working peop le . Although the European Trade Union Confedera t ion has had d i f

f i c u l t i e s coord ina t ing labor market ac t ions [S i lv i a 1990a] , Europe-wide organ

i za t ion w i l l t ake p lace even tua l ly . A Europe-wide p o l i t i c a l barga in would

depend upon t he ex ten t to which power sh i f t s from the European Counci l and

Commission to th e European Par l iament as wel l as th e a b i l i t y of n a t i o n a l l e f t

par t i e s to a c t in a un i f i ed fashion wi thin a s ing le European organ iza t ion .

In sp i t e of the s t r e s s e s and s t r a i ns facing unions and p a r t i e s , th e tw o

still need each o ther . Unions can no more af fo rd to view l e f t p a r t i e s in a




neu t ra l fashion than can th e l a t t e r view l abor as s imply another s o c i a l i n t e r

e s t . Unions need the p o l i t i c a l r e l ay to compensate fo r the inadequac ies of

col l ec t ive barga in ing se t t l emen t s . Left par t i e s in power need to be ab le

(when necessa ry) to s t ab i l i ze l abor marke ts . Th e t r ans i t i on to pos t -Fordism

does no t imply the end o f s t a t e i n t e rven t ion . Training cos t s and i n f r a s t r uc

t u r a l improvements demand some s o c i a l i z a t i o n of inves tment . Labor-market

po l i c i e s w i l l cont inue to be promoted both by those seeking gr ea t e r soc i a l

j u s t i ce and those seeking to ensure s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y . Thus , th e bas i s remains

for the barga ins t h a t in an e a r l i e r e ra were much more s e l f - e v id e n t .

Contemporary l i b e r a l democracy has always s t rugg led with th e organ iza

t ion of the market . Th e f i rm as a s i t e of soc i a l ac t iv i ty has no t provided

fo r ac t ive and equa l par t i c i pa t i on . Likewise, the in f luence of l a rge market

ac to rs on community decision-making has undermined th e no t ion o f equa l power

with in th e p o l i t i c a l realm. S t i l l , a modus vivend i had developed in th e

pos twar per iod t h a t in teg ra ted l abor in to th e p o l i t i c a l order . Over th e l a s t

t en to f i f t een year s , however, th e r ep resen ta t ive funct ions of organized l abor

have been a l t e r ed by market s h i f t s . This weakening of the r ep resen ta t ion of

c l a s s i n t e r e s t s , however imper fec t ly it ex is ted in an e a r l i e r e r a , has

weakened th e i n t e g r a t i v e capac i ty o f l i b e r a l democracy.




ENDNOTES

1 In f a c t , so c r u c i a l were union vote s t h a t th e e l ec t o r a l col lege system only

passed because of the misguided abs ten t ion of one union, th e Amalgamated Union

of Engineer ing Workers (AUEW), which refused to vote fo r any sys tem which d id

not give th e P-LP a t l eas t a 75% share of the vo te .

2 Th e unions most involved in t h i s e f f o r t were: th e General and Municipal

Workers Union (GMWU), the Transpor t and General Workers Union (TGWU), th e

AUEW, and th e Nat iona l Union of Railwaymen (NUR).

3 Plans fo r a s ix th package o f t r ade union reforms wa s announced in Ju ly 1991.

4 I t i s worth no t ing t h a t a Tory demand fo r con t r ac t ing - in ins t ead o f

con t r ac t ing -ou t , was avoided by th e TUe's acceptance of a vo lun ta ry code o f

conduct .

5 For example , roughly n ine ty pe r cen t of a l l fu l l - t ime union o f f i c i a l s a re

members of th e SPD and a s imi la r percentage of SPD Bundestag de lega tes a re

union members.

6 Sixty-seven percen t o f a l l manual workers and f i f t y - t h r ee percen t o f a l l

whi te - co l l a r employees voted for the SPD in 1972.

7 Workers do not r ece ive unemployment benef i t s if they a re from the same sec

to r as th e s t r i k e r s , if they have r a i sed a s imi la r demand in t h e i r d i s t r i c t ,

and if th e f i na l r e su l t of th e l abor d i spu te w i l l most l i ke l y be copied in th e

con t r ac t of the region no t in d i spu te .

S Trad i t iona l SPD members r e f e r dismiss ingly to th e a f f l u e n t p o s t - m a te r i a l i s t s

within th e par ty as th e "Tuscany fac t ion , " because of t h e i r penchant for ,

among o ther th ings , t ak ing f requent vaca t ions to I t a ly .

9 At t he na t iona l l eve l , t he sec re t a ry genera l of th e union t yp i ca l l y s i t s on

the P o l i t i c a l Bureau of th e par ty , and a number of o ther union o f f i c i a l s have

par ty r e spons i b i l i t i e s . Perhaps ten percen t of union members be long to th e




Communist Par ty [Ross 1979: 40-41] . In sp i t e of Communist l eader sh ip , t he

confedera l counc i l has always had a minor i ty of Soc i a l i s t s . Both a t na t iona l

and l o c a l l e v e l s , however, o f f i c i a l pol icy ra re ly diverges between union and

par ty .

10 For t he t ens ion between the minor i ty f ac t ion o f the CFTC, which wa s l a t e r

to gain con t ro l and c rea te th e CFDT, and th e MRP, see Vignaux, 1980, and Bran

c i a r d 1982: 45-66.

11 The i rony of these years only became ev iden t l a t e r . The Common Program was

negot ia ted before th e c r i s i s in th e growth model became ev iden t . Th e PCF

demands to rework the document made sense but fo r th e wrong reasons . The

par ty used th e c r i s i s as an excuse to r e-equi l ibra te th e l e f t , when th e docu

ment i t s e l f s tood i n se r ious need of r ev i s ion . The Soc i a l i s t s , f r eed from the

dependency on a par ty they never t r u s t e d , premised e l ec t o r a l (and eventual ly

governing) s t r a t eg i e s on t h a t outdated document.

12 This was no t th e f i r s t t ime t ha t such bargains had been at tempted. One

cou ld po in t to incomes pol icy at tempts in the e a r ly 19605 and th e "New

Socie ty" i n i t i a t i v e under Pompidou's prime mini s t e r , Jacques Chaban-Delmas in

1969-70. Both f a i l ed due to th e i nab i l i t y of p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s to change the

shopf loor a t t i t udes of French employers. Th e 1981-84 per iod , however, d i f

fered from t hese e a r l i e r at tempts s ince the bargains (had they s tuck) would

have l i nked management of th e economy with over lapping cons t i tuenc ies , making

th e economic and p o l i t i c a l bargains mutually r e in fo rc ing .

13Th e embrace of Europe fo r French soc ia l i sm came in th ree s t ages : t he

accep tance of th e European Monetary System in 1983 and t he dec i s ion to devalue

and in t roduce aus t e r i t y ; the acceptance of th e Davignon Plan in 1984 to s o r t

ou t t he t roub led s t e e l indust ry ; and the leadership of Mit ter rand in nego t ia t

ing th e Single European Market . See Daley 1991.

14 This l eg i s l a t i on , t y p i c a l of French postwar i ndus t r i a l r e l a t i ons , re su l ted




from th e f a i lure of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining to reach a s im i l a r s e t of po l i c i e s .

15 Th e r i g h t ' s e l e c to r a l platform had ca l led fo r th e pr i va t i za t i on of th e

banking sec to r , th e insurance companies , t e l e v i s io n networks , and those indus

trial groups na t iona l i zed in 1982. I t promised to r ev i se employment la w

ending th e admin is t r a t ive au thor i za tion o f l ayof f s in th e p r iv a t e s e c to r and

to r ev i se the laws democra t iz ing the pub l ic sec to r . Th e r i g h t c o a l i t i o n

wanted to spur compet i t iveness through en t r ep reneur i a l energy and f l e x ib l e

l a b o r marke ts .

16 The add i t ion o f o the r cases sugges ts a more un iver sa l t r end . The I t a l i an

Communists, fo r in s tance , f e l t more comfortable with s o c i a l democrats and by

1990 had even changed t h e i r name. Spanish Socia l i sm under Fel ipe Gonzales has

given new meaning to the term "market soc ia l i sm." Th e Swedish Socia l Demo

c r a t s , in applying fo r membership to th e European Community, have accepted th e

" fa t a l i t y " of unemployment.

17 The arguments on pos t - indus t r i a l i sm a re themselves ra the r obscure . See

Block 1990.

18 While th e count ry ske tches wi l l in t roduce some order here , we a re sugges t

ing t ha t th e German economy has been b e t t e r able to bu i ld f l e x i b i l i t y in to th e

process o f i ndus t r i a l adjus tment than have th e French and th e Br i t i sh .

19 Recent events in Sweden, fo r in s tance , sugges t t h a t union and par ty agendas

can be separa ted even with a high l e v e l of par ty-union power r esources .




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The Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies

The Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies is an interdisciplinaryprogram organized within the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences anddesigned to promote the study of Europe. The Center's governing committeesrepresent the major social science departments at Harvard and theMassachusetts Institute of Technology.

Since its establ ishment in 1969, the Center has tried to orient students towardsquestions that have been neglected both about past developments ineighteenth- and nineteenth-eentury European societies and about the present.The Center's approach is comparative and interdisciplinary, with a strongemphasis on the historical and cultural sources which shape a country'spolitical and economic policies and social structures. Major interests of Centermembers include elements common to industr ial societies: the role of the statein the political economy of each country, political behavior, social movements,parties and elections, trade unions, intellectuals, labor markets and the crisis ofindustrialization, science policy, and the interconnections between a country'sculture and politics.

Documents

Labor Parties and Labor Movements in a Post-Fordist Political Economy: The British, French, and German Cases (1991) Anthony Daley, Chris Howell, and Stephen J. Silvia