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G.R. No. 81269 July 19, 1989

LIBERTY COMMERCIAL CENTER, INC., petitioner,

vs.

PURA FERRER CALLEJA-BLR DIRECTOR/SAMAHANGMANGGA-GAWA NG LIBERTY COMMERCIAL CENTER— ORGANIZED LABOR ASSOCIATION IN LINE INDUSTRIESAND AGRICULTURE (SMLCC-OLALIA-

KMU), respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The principal issue in this case is whether or not public

respondent Pura Ferrer Calleja, in her capacity as the

Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) of the

Department of Labor and Employment, can order a

certification election among the rank and file

employees working in the Tabaco, Albay office and inthe Legaspi City office of petitioner Liberty Commercial

Center, Inc., despite the existence of two separate

collective bargaining agreements for each of the two

said office.

Petitioner questions the decision of Director Calleja

dated September 2,1987 in BLR Case No. A-6-205-87

(MED-ARB-Case No. R05-41-87), the dispositive portion

of which is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the

Order of the Med-Arbiter dated May 8,

1987 is hereby set aside and vacated

and a new one entered, calling for a

certification election among the rank

and file employees of Liberty

Commercial Center, Inc., Tabaco and

Legaspi City, with the following choices:

1. Samahan ng Mangagawa sa Liberty

Commercial Center-Olalia;

2. Association of L.C.C. Employees;

3. Liberty Employees Association; and

4. No union.

Let, therefore, the records of this case

be immediately remanded to the Office

of Origin for the conduct of the

certification election.

SO ORDERED. 1

On February 10, 1988, this Court issued a temporary

restraining order enjoining the execution of the said

decision. 2

The undisputed pertinent facts follow:

Petitioner has its principal business office at Tabaco,

Albay, and a branch office at Legaspi City. Private

respondent SMLCC Olalia KMU is an organized labor

union. The Association of Liberty Commercial Center

Employees (ALCCE) and the Liberty Employees

Association (LEA) are registered labor unions since July

29, 1986.3 Their certificates of registration bear the

signatures of Director of Labor Cresenciano B. Trajano

and then Minister of Labor and Employment Augusto S.

Sanchez. The authenticity of these two certificates has

never been successfully assailed.

The ALCCE represented all the rank and file employees

of the petitioner in Legaspi City, while the LEA

represented the rank and file employees of petitioner in

Tabaco, Albay. Both unions are represented by a lawyer

from the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG).

After five months of negotiation, two separate

collective bargaining agreements were executed. They

both took effect on December 1, 1986, and were to last

for a period of three years.

The collective bargaining agreement between the

petitioner and the ALCCE is a notarized document

consisting of eleven pages. 4 The said document is

accompanied by a certification of union secretary Lina

Pasmayor that the collective bargaining agreement was

posted in two places within the premises of the office

five days before ratification, and that it had been

ratified by a majority of the members of the union.5

Similarly, the collective bargaining agreement between

petitioner and the LEA is a notarized documentconsisting of eleven (11) pages 6 together with a

certification by union secretary Lorna Kallos that the

said agreement was posted in two places within the

premises of the office five days before ratification, and

that it was ratified by a majority of the members of the

union.7

It is recorded in the minutes of the board membership

meeting for the ratification of the collective bargaining

agreement between petitioner and the ALCCE that the

majority of the members signed for ratification (221signatures).

8 The minutes of the general membership

meeting for the ratification of the collective bargaining

agreement between petitioner and the LEA also show

that the majority of the members signed for ratification

(124 signatures). 9

In the meantime, the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU filed a petition

for certification election with the Bureau of Labor

Relations.

On April 2, 1987, a group led by the SMLCC-Olalia-KMUpicketed the Legaspi City office of petitioner at around

8:00 o'clock in the morning. Petitioner learned that the

said group consisted of slum dwellers and employees

dismissed as early as January, 1983.

At around 11: 00 o'clock in the morning of the same

day, Atty. Domingo Reyes, a conciliator from the

Department of Labor and Employment arrived at the

office of petitioner. He informed the management that

a Notice of Strike was filed by the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU. In



a conference organized by the conciliator and attended

by the officers of petitioner, the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU

demanded the reinstatement of the dismissed

employees of petitioner.

While the conference was going on, the SMLCC- Olalia-

KMU picket continued. As there was no settlement, the

group became unruly and started to harass petitioner's

customers and other employees. Petitioner soughtrelief in court. In due time, the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU was

ordered to desist from committing acts of grave threats,

grave coercion and disturbance of the peace, and from

barricading the business establishment of petitioner.

After arrests were made, there was a lull.

On May 3, 1987, the same group led by the SMLCC-

Olalia-KMU picketed the Tabaco, Albay office of

petitioner. Inasmuch as the same acts of harassment

had been committed in the picket line, petitioner

sought police intervention.

On April 9,1987, petitioner was furnished a copy of the

notice setting the initial hearing of the petition for

certification election, as well as the petition for direct

certification filed by the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU, docketed

as Med-ARB Case No. R05-41-87 and now BLR Case No.

A-6-205-87.

On April 20,1987, petitioner filed an "Answer With

Motion To Dismiss the Petition For Direct Certification"

on the ground that the petition has no legal and factual

basis.

On May 8, 1987, the Med-Arbiter dismissed the Petition

for Direct Certification on the ground that the same had

been filed before the sixty-day freedom period. 10 On

May 22, 1987, the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU interposed an

appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations, and on

September 2, 1987, the BLR Director penned the

questioned decision in BLR Case No. A-6-205-87. Hence,

this petition.

The petition is meritorious.

An examination of the record clearly shows that both

the ALCCE and the LEA are duly registered unions of

petitioner's employees in its two separate offices, one

at Tabaco, Albay and the other at Legaspi City. The

certificates of registration of both unions appear to be

authentic even considering that both unions were

organized and registered on the same date. In the

absence of strong evidence to the contrary, both ALCCE

and LEA must be considered registered unions

representing the employees of petitioner in twoseparate offices.

Likewise, there is no denying that two separate

collective bargaining agreements were entered into

between petitioner and the ALCCE on one hand, and

between petitioner and the LEA on the other. Both

agreements were to be in force until December 1, 1989.

Again, notwithstanding the observation of public

respondent that the certificates of registration were

executed on the same dates thus casting doubt on their

authenticity, it appears that the two collective

bargaining agreements are notarized documents

bearing the certifications of ratification and the

signatures of the ratifying employees. The authenticity

of both collective bargaining agreements must be

sustained.

Examining the Petition for Direct Certification filed by

the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU, it clearly appears that onlyfourteen supposed employees of petitioner signed

it. 11 Petitioner contends, and this was never

controverted by the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU, that those

signatories are dismissed employees of petitioner. It

also appears that the said petition was filed before the

sixty-day freedom period prior to the expiration of the

said collective bargaining agreements.

The law is explicit. A petition filed before or after the

sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright.12

What could be immediately perceived in this case is that

notwithstanding the existence of two legitimate labor

unions (ALCCE and LEA) representing the employees of

petitioner, and despite the existence of two collective

bargaining agreements as ratified by an overwhelming

majority of the said employees, the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU

pretended to represent the employees of petitioner by

committing illegal acts of picketing and by filing a

petition for certification election. The said petition had

only fourteen signatories and petitioner's contention

that all of them were previously dismissed employees

was never controverted.

The only logical conclusion is that the SMLCC-Olalia-

KMU had questionable motives in filing the petition for

certification election and in resorting to illegal acts to

coerce petitioner to allow it to intrude upon the

activities of two legitimate unions. We cannot agree

with the perceptions of the public respondent who,

without supporting evidence, doubted the authenticity

of the certificates of registration of the two labor

unions. Inasmuch as the authenticity of the certificates

of registration has not been successfully assailed, thisCourt cannot accept the gratuitous statement of the

public respondent that both unions are company unions

in the absence of evidence to establish the imputation.

The SMLCC-Olalia-KMU obviously does not have any

lawful basis in filing a petition for direct certification.

Indeed, by its Coercive acts tending to harass petitioner,

it betrayed its motives to be far from sincere.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of

the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated

September 2, 1987 in BLR Case No. A-6-205-87 is hereby

SET ASIDE. The petition for certification election filed by

the private respondent is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.



ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU)-TUCP, Petitioners,v. HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, as Officer-In-

Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, ASSOCIATIONOF DEMOCRATIC LABOR ORGANIZATION (ADLO) and

MITSUMI PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.

Romeo S. Occeña for Petitioner .

Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio andAssociates for private respondent ADLO.

The Solicitor General for public Respondent .

D E C I S I O N

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a

temporary restraining order, seeking review of the

resolution of the Director of Labor Relations* dated

January 30, 1987 in BLR Case No. A-1-18-87 ordering a


employees of respondent company and the order of

public respondent** dated February 24, 1987

dismissing petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for

lack of merit.

The dispositive portion of the questioned resolution of

the Bureau of Labor Relations dated January 30, 1987(Rollo. p. 55), reads, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Accordingly, let a certification election be conducted

within twenty (20) days from receipt of this Resolution,

subject to the usual pre-election conference, with the

following as choices:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Association of Democratic Labor Union (ADLO);

2. Associated Labor union-ALU; and

3. No Union.

Let, therefore, the records be forwarded to the Office of

origin for the immediate implementation of this

Resolution."cralaw virtua1aw library

The undisputed facts of the case are as

follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioner herein is the recognized collective bargaining

representative of all the rank and file employees of

respondent company with a collective bargainingagreement effective January 1, 1984 to December 31,

1986. Article XX of the collective bargaining agreement

provides that the CBA shall be for a period of three (3)

years effective January 1, 1984 to December 31, 1986,

provided that within sixty (60) days before its expiration

the parties shall renegotiate for a new one

(Memorandum for the Petitioner, Rollo, p.

208).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On October 22, 1986, a big majority of the covered

employees of respondent Company petitioned for the

renewal of the expiring agreement which petitioner and

the respondent Company agreed to negotiate. The

parties, however, failed to arrive at an acceptable

agreement so that a bargaining deadlock on CBA

negotiation was declared (Memorandum for the

Petitioner, Rollo, p. 209).

On November 3, 1986, petitioner filed a notice of strike

(Rollo, p. 27). Failing to arrive at an agreement during

the conciliation following the filing of the notice of

strike, on December 1, 1986 petitioner went on strike.

Meanwhile, on November 4, 1986 private respondent

Union, Association of Democratic Labor Organization

(ADLO) file with the Ministry of Labor and Employment,

Panlalawigang Tanggapan ng Paggawa, Bataan Export

Processing Zone, a verified petition for certification

election among the regular rank and file workers of

private company, docketed as Case No. BZED-CE-11-

011-86 (Rollo, p. 87).

On December 4, 1986, petitioner and respondent

company came to an agreement with representatives of

the parties setting their signature on the resulting CBA

on the same date (Rollo, p. 28), ratified by a big majority

of the covered employees, 584 out of 742 covered

employees, also on the same date (Rollo, p. 43).

Petitioner registered the new CBA with the Regional

Director of the Ministry of Labor and Employment San

Fernando, Pampanga on December 4, 1986 (Rollo, p.41) as required under Article 231 of the Labor Code.

Petitioner herein intervened in the petition for

certification election. On December 9, 1986, the Med-

Arbiter called for a conference to see whether a consent

election could be agreed upon between the intervenor

union and the petitioner union, but the parties failed to

reach an agreement despite several conferences (Rollo,

pp. 59; 78).

The Med-Arbiter, Eladio de Jesus, issued an order forthe holding of a certification election in a resolution

dated December 10, 1986, premised on the fact that

the petitioner, respondent union herein, "has

satisfactorily complied with the jurisdictional

requirement of this Office. The same records show that

the instant petition was seasonably filed within the

sixty-day freedom period." (Rollo, p. 59). The said

resolution was appealed by petitioner to the Director of

Bureau of Labor Relations but the appeal was dismissed

for lack of merit, in the questioned resolution of January

30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 53). Petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration dated February 12, 1987 (Rollo, p. 19)was likewise dismissed in the equally questioned order

of February 24, 1987 (Rollo, p. 17). The Med-Arbiter

then set the certification election for March 17, 1987

(Rollo, p. 60).

Instant petition was filed with the Court on March 9,

1987 (Rollo, p. 2). On the same date, petitioner filed an

urgent ex parte motion for issuance of a temporary

restraining order (Rollo, p. 6). On March 16, 1987, the



Second Division of this Court, without giving due course

to the petition, required the respondents to comment

thereon and issued a temporary restraining order

effective on the same date that the resolution was

passed, to continue until otherwise ordered by the

Court (Rollo, p. 64).

The comment of public respondent was filed by the

Office of the Solicitor General on June 3, 1987 (Rollo, p.75). In a resolution dated June 29, 1987, petitioner was

require to file a reply thereto and the letters addressed

to then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, of twenty one

(21) progressive democratic labor unions in Japan

protesting the temporary restraining order issued by

the Court on March 16, 1987 was noted (Rollo, p. 129).

Again on August 31, 1987, the Court resolved to note

the letters of the progressive democratic organization in

Japan (Rollo, p. 140).

On August 10, 1987, the petition was given due both

parties were required to submit their simultaneous

memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice (Rollo,

p. 166). On September 18, 1987, the Office of the

Solicitor General manifested that it was adopting for its

memorandum its comment on the petition

for certiorari filed with the Court on June 3, 1987 (Rollo,

p. 194) which was noted by the Court in its resolution

dated November 11, 1987 (Rollo, p. 202). In the same

resolution, the Court also noted receipt of two

telegrams of the Mitsumi Workers Union — ALDO of

Mariveles, Bataan dated September 3 and September 9,

1987 (Rollo, pp. 184, 185), requesting for informationon the status of the case and for its expeditious

resolution, and the letters all addressed to the Chief

Justice from progressive unions in Japan together with

two undated letters signed in Japanese characters, all

demanding for a certification election (Rollo, pp. 170-

182).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Memorandum for the Petitioner was filed on November

27, 1987 (Rollo, p. 208) noted by the Court in its

resolution dated February 15, 1988 (Rollo, p. 231). The

motion to admit memorandum filed by respondentunion on April 7, 1988 (Rollo, p. 232) was granted by the

Court in its resolution dated April 18, 1988 (Rollo, p.

259) wherein the Court also noted the memorandum of

respondent union attached to the motion (Rollo, p.

234).

The issues raised by petitioner (Rollo, p. 212), are as

follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I

THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN NOT

HOLDING THAT NO CERTIFICATION ELECTION MAY BE

HELD DUE TO THE FACT THAT A BARGAINING

DEADLOCK TO WHICH PETITIONER IS A PARTY IS

SUBMITTED TO CONCILIATION/ARBITRATION AND

THERE IS A VALID NOTICE OF STRIKE PRIOR TO THE

FILING OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION

ON DECEMBER 4, 1986.

II


HOLDING THAT THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO AS A RESULT OF A

BARGAINING DEMAND CONCILIATION DURING THE

PROGRESS OF A STRIKE HAVING BEEN ACCORDINGLY

REPORTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ANDEMPLOYMENT PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF

ARTICLE 231 OF THE LABOR CODE RENDERS THE FILING

OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION

PREMATURE.

III


DISMISSING THE PETITION, ANNEXED "D" AND

HOLDING THAT THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

AGREEMENT (ANNEX "B" to ANNEX "B" HEREOF)

HAVING BEEN RATIFIED BY THE MEMBERS AND THE

BENEFITS THEREIN ENJOYED IS A BAR TO THE HOLDING

OF A CERTIFICATION ELECTION.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Simply stated, the sole issue is whether or not public

respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a

certification election considering that at the time the

petition for certification election was filed there was abargaining deadlock between company and the

petitioner union, as a result of which petitioner union

filed a notice of strike.

In fact, it actually went on strike, and pending decision

on the said petition, petitioner and respondent

company came to terms on the collective bargaining

agreement duly ratified by a big majority of the covered

members and duly registered with the Department of

Labor and Employment.

Public respondent denied petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration, finding "no compelling justification to

effect a consideration, much less a reversal" of the

resolution of January 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 18). The

aforesaid resolution dismissed the appeal of petitioner

as intervenor in the petition for certification election

based on the following: (1) the records show that the

petition for certification election was seasonably filed

within the sixty (60) day freedom period; and (2) the

records likewise reveal that the petition is supported by

two hundred forty-two (242) of the more or less six

hundred (600) rank-and-file employees of MitsumiPhilippines, Inc., hence, has complied with the thirty

percent (30%) statutory requirement (Rollo, p. 54). The

provision of the law then in force was Article 258 of the

Labor Code inasmuch as Executive Order No. 111 which

amended it took effect only on March 4, 1987. Article

258 reads, as follows:chanrobles virtualawlibrary

chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 258. Requisites for certification election. — Any



petition for certification election filed by any legitimate

labor organization shall be supported by the written

consent of at least thirty percent (30%) of all the

employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt and

verification of such petition, it shall be mandatory for

the Bureau to conduct a certification election for the

purpose of determining the representative of the

employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and

certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargainingrepresentative of all the employees in the unit."cralaw

virtua1aw library

There is no question that the 30% support requirement

for a certification election had been met even if the

covered employees number 742, as alleged by

petitioner (Memorandum for Petitioner, Rollo, p. 217)

not 600. Hence, it became mandatory for the Director

of Labor Relations to call a certification election (Atlas

Free Workers Union (AFWU-PSSLU Local v. Noriel, 104

SCRA 565 [1981]; Vismico Industrial Workers

Association (VIWA) v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569 [1984];

Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Noriel,

134 SCRA 152 [1985]), and in the language of the Labor

Code, "mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a

certification election for the purpose of determining the

representative of the employees in the appropriate

bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive

bargaining representative of all employees in the unit"

(Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros

Trabajadores de Filipinas v. Noriel, 72 SCRA 24 [1976];

Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Noriel, 77 SCRA 414

[1977]).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"No administrative agency can ignore the imperative

tone of the above article. The language used is one of

command. Once it has been verified that a petition for

certification election has the support of at least 30% of

the employees in the bargaining unit, it must be

granted. The specific word used yields no other

meaning" (Federation of Free Workers v. Noriel, 86

SCRA 132 [1978]; Warren Manufacturing Workers

Union (WMWU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R. No.

76185, March 30, 1988).

Petitioner, however, insists that the deadlock in

negotiation already submitted to

conciliation/arbitration after the filing of a valid notice

of strike based on deadlock in negotiation the filing of

the petition for certification election bars the holding of

a certification election, basing its argument on the

contract bar rule under Section 3 of Rule V, Book V of

the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code

(Memorandum for the Petitioner, Rollo, p. 213), which

provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 3. When to file — In the absence of a collective

agreement submitted in accordance with Article 231 of

the Code, a petition for certification election may be

filed at any time. However, no certification election may

be held within one year from the date of issuance of

declaration of a final certification election result.

Neither may a representation question be entertained

if, before the filing of a petition for certification

election, a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent

or certified bargaining agent is a party had been

submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become

the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.

"If a collective agreement has been submitted in

accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for

certification election or a motion for intervention can

only be entertained within 60 days to the prior to expiry

date of such agreement."cralaw virtua1aw library

As the introductory sentence of the first paragraph

states, said paragraph applies where there is no existing

collective bargaining agreement. This circumstance is

not obtaining in the instant case. As admitted by

petitioner (Memorandum in the Petitioner, Rollo, p.

208) there was an existing collective bargaining

agreement when the petition for certification election

was filed, which was to expire on December 31, 1986. It

is the second paragraph which is applicable to the case

at bar.

In a recent decision, this Court interpreted the above in

provision as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This rule simply provides that a petition for

certification election or a motion for intervention can

only be entertained within 60 days prior to the expiry

date of an existing collective bargaining agreement.

Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of for

certification election during the existence of a collective

bargaining agreement except within the freedom

period, as it is called when the said agreement is aboutto expire. The purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability

in the relationship of the workers and the management

by preventing frequent modifications of any collective

bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in

good faith and for the stipulated original period."

(Associated Trade Unions (ATU) v. Trajano, G.R. No.

75321, June 20, 1988)

Undoubtedly, the petition for certification election was

filed during the 60-day freedom period. The fact that

petitioner was able to negotiate a new CBA withrespondent company on December 4, 1986 within the

freedom period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose

the right of a rival union, which in this instant case is the

respondent union, to challenge petitioner’s claim to

majority status, by filing earlier on November 4, 1986, a

timely petition for certification election before the old

CBA expired on December 31, 1986 and before

petitioner signed a new CBA with respondent company

(Kapatiran Sa Meat and Canning Division (TUPAS Local

Chapter No. 1027) v. Calleja, G.R. No. 82914, June 20,

1988). There should be no obstacle to the right of the

employees to petition for a certification election at theproper time, that is, within sixty (60) days prior to the

expiration of the life of a certified collective bargaining

agreement (General Textiles Allied Workers Association

(GTAWA v. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, 84

SCRA 430 [1978]; Warren Manufacturing Workers

Union (WMWU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations, supra),

not even by a collective agreement submitted during

the pendency of a representation case.chanrobles law

library



On said subject, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules

Implementing the Labor Code,

provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 4. Effects of early agreements. — The

representation case shall not, however, be adversely

affected by a collective agreement submitted before or

during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement orduring the pendency of the representation case."cralaw

virtua1aw library

The new CBA negotiated by petitioners whether or no

submitted to the MOLE in accordance with Article 231

of the Labor Code cannot be deemed permanent,

precluding commencement of negotiations by another

union with management, considering that it was

entered into at a time when the petition for

certification election had already been filed by

respondent union (Associated Trade Unions (ATU) v.

Trajano, supra). Meantime this interim agreement must

be recognized and given effect on a temporary basis so

as not to deprive the workers of the favorable terms of

the agreement (Vassar Industries Employers Union

(VIEW) v. Estrella, 82 SCRA 280 [1978]; National Mines

and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWUMIF) v. Estrella, 87

SCRA 84 [1978], cited in Associated Trade Unions (ATU)

v. Trajano, Ibid.)

If, as a result of the certification election, respondent

union or a union other than petitioner union which

executed the interim agreement, is certified as theexclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file

employees of respondent company, then, such union

may adopt the interim collective bargaining agreement

or negotiate with management for a new collective

bargaining agreement (Associated Trade Unions (ATU)

v. Trajano, Ibid).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition for certiorari is

DISMISSED for lack of merit; (b) the resolution of the

Bureau of Labor Relations dated January 30, 1987 and

the order of the Bureau dated February 24, 1987 areAFFIRMED; and (c) temporary restraining order issued

by the Court on March 9, 1987 is LIFTED permanently.

SO ORDERED.



G.R. Nos. 94929-30 March 18, 1992

PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES(PWUP), petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR ANDEMPLOYMENT BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ATTY.ANASTACIO L. BACTIN, MED-ARBITER NCR-DOLE,

Public Respondents; INTERNATIONAL CONTAINERTERMINAL SERVICES, INC., (ICTSI) and ASSOCIATEDPORT CHECKERS AND WORKERS UNION (APCWU),Private Respondents; SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWASA DAUNGAN (SAMADA) and PORT EMPLOYEESASSOCIATION AND LABOR UNION (PEALU), NominalPrivate Respondents,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

There was muffled excitement among the workers of

the International Container Terminal Services, Inc.

(ICTSI) because its collective bargaining agreement with

private respondents Associate Port Checkers and

Workers Union (APCWU), the incumbent union, was

due to expire on April 14, 1990. Other unions were

seeking to represent the laborers in the negotiation of

the next CBA and were already plotting their moves.

The first challenge to APCWU was hurled on March 14,

1990, when the Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan

(SAMADA) filed a petition for certification election. Theconsent signatures of at least 25% of the employees in

the bargaining unit were submitted on March 26, 1990,

or eleven days after the petition.

On April 2, 1990, herein petitioner Port Workers Union

of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for

intervention.

Still another petition for certification election was filed

by the Port Employees Association and Labor Union

(PEALU), on April 6, 1990. The consent signatures weresubmitted on May 11, 1990, or thirty-five days after the

filing of the petition.

The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated

for joint decision. On April 26, 1990, APCWU filed a

motion to dismiss them on the ground that they did not

comply with the requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule

V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted in part as

follows:

In a petition involving an organizedestablishment or enterprise where the

majority status of the incumbent

collective bargaining union is

questioned through a verified petition

by a legitimate labor organization, the

Med-Arbiter shall immediately order

the certification election by secret

ballot if the petition is filed during the

last sixty (60) days of the collective

bargaining agreement and supported by

the written consent of at least twenty-

five percent (25%) of all the employees

in the bargaining unit. Any petition filed

before or after the sixty-day freedom

period shall be dismissed outright. The

twenty-five percent (25%) requirement

shall be satisfied upon the filing of the

petition, otherwise the petition shall bedismissed . (Emphasis supplied.)

Specifically, APCWU faulted both petitions for non-

compliance with the requirement for the 25% consent

signatures at the time of filing. This contention was

upheld by the Med-Arbiter in an order dated June 5,

1990, dismissing the consolidated petitions. 1

PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor on June 28,

1990, arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not

require the written consent to be submitted

simultaneously with the petition for certification

election. The principal petitioners did not appeal. On

August 21, 1990, DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido

Laguesma affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter and

dismissed PWUP's appeal. 2

Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for

a new collective bargaining agreement, which was

concluded on September 28, 1990. This was ratified on

October 7, 1990, by a majority of the workers in the

bargaining unit, i.e., 910 out of the 1,223 members, and

subsequently registered with the DOLE.

PWUP is now before us, claiming grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the public respondent in the

application of Article 256 of the Labor Code. The article

provides in part as follows:

Art. 256. Representation issue in

organized establishments. — In

organized establishments, when a

verified petition questioning the

majority status of the incumbentbargaining agent is filed before the

Department of Labor and Employment

within the sixty-day period before the

expiration of the collective bargaining

agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall

automatically order an election by

secret ballot when the verified petition

is supported by the written consent of

at least twenty-five (25%) percent of all

the employees in the bargaining unit to

ascertain the will of the employees in

the appropriate bargaining unit. . . .

The petitioner argues that under this article, the Med-

Arbiter should automatically order election by secret

ballot when the petition is supported by at least 25% of

all employees in the bargaining unit. SAMADA and

PEALU substantially complied with the law when they

submitted the required consent signatures several days

after filing the petition. The petitioner complains that

the dismissal of the petitions for certification election,



including its own petition for intervention, had the

effect of indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole and

exclusive bargaining representative of the ICTSI

employees.

Private respondent ICTSI maintains that the dismissal

was based on Article 256 of the Labor Code as

implemented by Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the

Implementing Rules, quoted above. Moreover, underSection 10, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules,

decisions of the Secretary in certification election cases

shall be final and unappealable.

ICTSI also cites the following ruling of this Court in

Tupas v. Inciong: 3

We find no merit in the petition. As

observed by the Solicitor General, while

the petition of TUPAS for a certification

election may have the written support

of 30 per cent of all the workers of the

bargaining unit, it is also an undisputed

fact that UMI (the rival union of TUPAS)

has a clear majority of the said workers,

as shown by the fact that 499 workers

out of the total working force of 641

have not only ratified the collective

bargaining agreement concluded

between UMI and LUSTEVECO, but also

affirmed their membership in UMI so

that there is no more need for holding a

certification election. (Emphasissupplied.)

For its part, APCWU questions PWUP's personality in

these proceedings in view of the lack of consent

signatures in its petition, and argues as well that the

petitioner has no authority to represent SAMADA or

PEALU, which had not appealed. The private respondent

also invokes Tupas and maintains that the ratification of

the new CBA by the majority of the workers was an

affirmation of their membership in the union that

negotiated that agreement.

In his own Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with

the petitioner that there has been substantial

compliance with the requirements of the law. He

submits that Article 256 should be liberally interpreted

pursuant to Article 4 of the Labor Code, stating as

follows:

Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor . —

All doubts in the implementation and

interpretation of the provisions of this

Code including its implementing rules

and regulations, shall be resolved in

favor of labor.

The Court has deliberated on the arguments of the

parties in their respective pleadings and finds for the

petitioner.

We have held that pursuant to the constitutional

provision guaranteeing workers the right to self-

organization and collective bargaining, "the constant

and unwavering policy of this Court" has been "to

require a certification election as the best means of

ascertaining which labor organization should be the

collective bargaining representative."4

The certification election is the most democratic and

expeditious method by which the laborers can freely

determine the union that shall act as theirrepresentative in their dealings with the establishment

where they are working. 5 As we stressed in Belyca

Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja,6 the holding of a

certification election is a statutory policy that should

not be circumvented.

This Court also held in Western Agusan Workers Union-

Local 101 of the United Lumber and General Workers of

the Philippines vs. Trajano:7

. . . it has long been settled that the

policy of the Labor Code is indisputably

partial to the holding of a certification

election so as to arrive in a manner

definitive and certain concerning the

choice of the labor organization to

represent the workers in a collective

bargaining unit. Conformably to said

basic concept, this Court recognized

that the Bureau of Labor Relations in

the exercise of sound discretion, may

order a certification election

notwithstanding the failure to meet the30% requirement. (Scout Ramon V.

Albano Memorial College v. Noriel, 85

SCRA 494 [1978]; Vicmico Industrial

Wokers Asso. v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569

[1984])

In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative

rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25%

consent signatures upon the filing of petition for

certification election should not be strictly applied to

frustrate the determination of the legitimaterepresentative of the workers. Significantly, the

requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the

law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason

why the regulation should at best be given only a

directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere

filing of a petition for certification election within the

freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an

order for the holding of a certification

election, 8 subject to the submission of the consent

signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.

This interpretation is consonant with Philippine

Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor

Relations,9 where we declared:

. . . even conceding that the statutory

requirement of 30% of the labor force

asking for a certification election had

not been strictly complied with,

respondent Director is still empowered

to order that it be held precisely for the



purpose of ascertaining which (of the

contending labor organizations) shall be

the exclusive collective bargaining

representative. (National Mines and

Allied Workers Union v. Luna, et al., 83

SCRA 607)

It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by

PWUP did not carry the 25% consent signatures, butthat the requirement is in fact not applicable to a

petition in intervention. We so held in PAFLU v. Ferrer-

Calleja thus:10

It is crystal clear from the said

provisions that the requisite written

consent of at least 20% of the workers

in the bargaining unit applies to

petitioners for certification election

only and not to motions for

intervention. . . . As long as the motion

for intervention has been properly and

timely filed and the intervention would

not cause any injustice to anyone, it

should not be denied and this is so even

if the eventual purpose of the Motion

for Intervention is to participate in the

Certification Election. After all, the

original applicant had already met the

20% requirement.

The contention that the petitioners had no right to

represent the principal petitioners which had notappealed the dismissal order is also not acceptable. We

repeat that the certification election is not litigation but

a mere investigation of a non-adversary character

where the rules of procedure are not strictly

applied. 11 Technical rules and objections should not

hamper the correct ascertainment of the labor union

that has the support of confidence of the majority of

the workers and is thus entitled to represent them in

their dealings with management.

The above-quoted decision affirms the right of PWUP tocall for the holding of the election although it was

initially only an intervenor. That recognition should not

be defeated by the circumstance that the other

petitioning unions have not seen fit to appeal the

dismissal of their petitions even if such dismissal was

questionable and is in fact being reversed here. The

petition for intervention was viable at the time it was

filed because the principal petitions had complied with

the requirement for the consent signatures as specified

by Article 256. Hence, its intervention should not be

disallowed simply because of the withdrawal or failure

to appeal of SAMADA and PEALU.

It is correct to say that as a matter of strict procedure, a

petition for intervention should be deemed

automatically dismissed where the principal petition

itself fails. However, that technical rule should be

allowed to prevent a correct determination of the real

representative of the workers in line with their

constitutional rights to self-organization and collective

bargaining.

Regarding the invocation of Inciong by the private

respondents, the Court has modified that decision

in Associated Labor Unions vs. Calleja, 12 where we held:

Finally, the petitioner assails the

decision of the respondent Director on

the ground that "the ratification of the

collective bargaining agreement

renders the certification election mootand academic."

This contention finds no basis in law.

The petitioner was obviously referring

to the contract-bar rule where the law

prohibits the holding of certification

elections during the lifetime of the

collective bargaining agreement. Said

agreement was hastily and prematurely

entered into apparently in an attempt

to avoid the holding of a certification

election.

Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only

where the need for industrial stability is clearly shown

to be imperative. 13 Subject to this singular exception,

contracts where the identity of the authorized

representative of the workers is in doubt must be

rejected in favor of a more certain indication of the will

of the workers. As we stated in Philippine Association of

Free Labor Union vs. Estrella, 14 any stability that does

not establish the type of industrial peace contemplatedby the law must be subordinated to the employees'

freedom to choose their real representative.

The private respondents contend that the

overwhelming ratification of the CBA is an affirmation

of their membership in the bargaining agent, rendering

the representation issue moot and academic and

conclusively barring the holding of a certification

election thereon. That conclusion does not follow. Even

Tupas did not say that the mere ratification of the CBA

by the majority of the workers signified theiraffirmation of membership in the negotiating union.

That case required, first, ratification of the CBA, the

second, affirmation of membership in the negotiating

union. The second requirement has not been

established in the case at bar as the record does not

show that the majority of the workers, besides ratifying

the new CBA, have also formally affiliated with APCWU.

Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules

implementing the Labor Code provides that the

representation case shall not be adversely affected by a

collective agreement submitted before or during the

last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the

pendency of the representation case. As the new CBA

was entered into at the time when the representation

case was still pending, it follows that it cannot be

recognized as the final agreement between the ICTSI

and its workers.

On the allegation that the decision of the Secretary of

Labor on certification election is final and inappealable,



this Court held in San Miguel Corp. v. Secretary of

Labor 15 that:

It is generally understood that as to

administrative agencies

exercising quasi-judicial or legislative

power there is an underlying power in

the courts to scrutinize the acts of such

agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of

review is given by statute. (73, C.J.S.

506, note 56). . . . judicial review is

proper in case of lack of jurisdiction,

grave abuse of discretion. error of law,

fraud or collusion (Timbancaya v.

Vicente, 82 O.G. 9424; Macatangay v.

Secretary of Public Works and

Communication, 63 O.G. 11236; Ortua

v. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440).

There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public

respondents when they dismissed the petitions for

certification election because the consent signatures

had not been submitted simultaneously with the

petition. The issue of majority representation thus

remains open and awaits settlement. Following the

rulings above-quoted, we hereby declare that the

newly-concluded CBA cannot constitute a bar to the

holding of a certification election.

It is possible that the APCWU will prevail in thecertification election, in which event the new CBA it

concluded with ICTSI will be upheld and recognized. It is

also possible that another union will be chosen, in

which event it will have to enter into its own

negotiations with ICTSI that may result in the adoption

of a new CBA. In the meantime, however, the old CBA

having expired, it is necessary to lay down the rules

regulating the relations of the workers with the

management. For this reason, the Court hereby orders

that the new CBA concluded by ICTSI and APCWU shall

remain effective between the parties, subject to theresult and effects of the certification election to be

called.

The certification election is the best method of

determining the will of the workers on the crucial

question of who shall represent them in their

negotiations with the management for a collective

bargaining agreement that will best protect and

promote their interests. It is essential that there be no

collusion against this objective between an

unscrupulous management and a union covertly

supporting it while professing its loyalty to labor, or at

least that the hopes of labor be not frustrated because

of its representation by a union that does not enjoy its

approval and support. It is therefore sound policy that

any doubt regarding the real representation of the

workers be resolved in favor of the holding of the

certification election. This is preferable to the

suppression of the voice of the workers through the

prissy observance of technical rules that will exalt

procedure over substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged

order dated August 21, 1990, is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE and the public respondent is DIRECTED to

schedule and hold certification election among the

workers of the International Container Terminal

Services, Inc., this to be done with all possible dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.



G.R. Nos. L-34069-70 February 28, 1973

B.F. GOODRICH PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.

B.F. GOODRICH (MARIKINA FACTORY) CONFIDENTIAL& SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION-NATU, B.F. GOODRICH(MAKATI OFFICE) CONFIDENTIAL & SALARIEDEMPLOYEES UNION-NATU, and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS, respondents.

Manuel O. Chan for petitioner.

Domingo E. de Lara and Associates for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The specific question raised impressed with an aspect of

novelty, sustained with vigor and plausibility, persuadedthis Court that the petition was worth looning into. It is

whether the determination of an unfair labor practice

case, brought against respondent-unions, must precede

the holding of a certification election. A negative

response came from respondent Court of Industrial

Relations, through Judge Ansberto Paredes. His order,

affirmed by respondent Court en banc, is sought to be

nullified in this certiorari proceeding. The answer filed

on behalf of respondent-unions would sustain its

validity. What is more, it called attention to what is

characterized as a consistent pattern of anti-union

practices on the part of petitioner intended to defeatthe rights of labor to collective bargaining. A careful

study of the specific legal issue posed, namely, whether

the existence of an unfair labor practice case against a

labor organization, consisting of an illegal strike, would

suffice to call for the postponement of a proposed

certification election, incidentally started at the

instance of petitioner itself, yields the same conclusion

reached by respondent Court. The objectives of the

Industrial Peace Act 1 would be sooner attained if, at the

earliest opportunity, the employees, all of them of an

appropriate collective bargaining unit, be polled todetermine which labor organization should be its

exclusive representative. Moreover, the discretion on

the matter vested in respondent Court is rarely

interfered with. We dismiss the petition.

It was shown in the petition that on February 27, 1971,

one Rodolfo Pajaro, as President of B.F. Goodrich

(Makati Office) Confidential and Salaried Employees

Union-NATU, sent a letter to the petitioner, seeking

recognition as the bargaining agent of such employees

so that thereafter there could be negotiations for acollective contract. 2 Similarly, on the same date, one

Pablo C. Fulgar, as President of B.F. Goodrich (Marikina

Factory) Confidential and Salaried Employees Union-

NATU and one Marcelino Lontok, Jr., representing

himself as Vice-President, NATU, sent a letter to the

petitioner, of a similar tenor. 3 Petitioner, as employer,

countered by filing on March 6, 1971, two petitions for

certification election with respondent Court of

Industrial Relations. 4 Then came on March 10, 1971,

two strike notices from respondents, filed with the

Bureau of Labor Relations, demanding union

recognition. 5 It was not until April 13, 1971, that

respondent Court commenced the hearings of the

petitions for certification election. 6 It was then alleged

that on two days in April 19 and 20, 1971, there was a

strike staged by those affiliated with private

respondents, to force recognition of their

unions. 7Subsequently, after preliminary investigation

first had, on a finding of a prima facie case of illegalstrike and unfair labor practice committed by the

members of the two unions, Case No. 5612-ULP of the

Court of Industrial Relations for unfair labor practice

was filed against them. 8 There was on May 27, 1971, an

answer with affirmative defenses filed in such

case. 9 Earlier, on May 20, 1971, the petitioner filed

identical motions in MC Cases Nos. 2995 and 2996 to

hold in abeyance the hearings of the petitions for

certification election.10

Then, on August 5, 1971,

respondent Court, through Judge Ansberto Paredes,

denied the petitioner's motions to hold in abeyance the

hearing of MC Cases Nos. 2995 and 2996. 11

The challenged order of Judge Paredes stated the

nature of the issue before him as well as the respective

positions of the parties: "Submitted for resolution

without further arguments are petitioner's motions

filed in each of the above-entitled cases, praying that

the proceedings therein be held in abeyance pending

final judgment in Case No. 5612-ULP and the

oppositions thereto filed by the respondent unions. It is

petitioner's stand that if Case No. 5612-ULP will prosper

and the strike staged by respondent unions during thependency of the instant cases will be declared illegal

and the individual members cited therein as

respondents found guilty of the unfair labor practice

acts complained of, the latter will consequently lose

their status as employees and will be disqualified to

vote in a certification election that may be ordered by

the Court. On the other hand, respondents-oppositors

maintain that the pendency of said unfair labor practice

case is not a bar to the hearing of the instant cases,

following the ruling of this Court in Case No. 2536-MC

entitled "In re: Petition for Certification Election at theCentral Textile Mills, Inc., Vicente Flores, et al." " 12 This

was his ruling: "The motions can not be granted.

Individual respondents in the ULP case are still

employees and possessed of the right to self-

organization. Included therein is their choice of a

bargaining representative (Secs. 2 [d], 3 & 12, R. A. 875).

To hold the certification proceedings in abeyance until

final judgment of the ULP case will be a denial of the

aforesaid statutory right, the employees being left

without a collective bargaining representative." 13 The

dispositive portion was to deny the motions for lack of

merit. There was a motion for reconsideration, but such

motion did not prosper. It was denied on August 31,

1971.14

These certiorari proceedings were then filed with this

Court, with petitioners maintaining through copious

references to National Labor Relations Board cases that,

with the declaration of what it considered to be an

illegal strike resulting in an unfair labor practice case,

the status as employees of members of the two



respondent Labor Unions would be placed in doubt and

thus should be determined before the certification

election. This Court, in a resolution of November 10,

1971, required private respondents to file an answer.

There is, on the whole, an admission of the allegations

of the petition. In addition, the following special and

affirmative defenses were interposed: "That up to the

present, the strike of the respondent unions is still on,

thus the striking employees cannot be considered tohave abandoned, quit, or otherwise terminated their

employment relationship with the petitioner company,

on the basis of the doctrine that a strike does not serve

to sever the employer-employee relationship; ... That

the respondent unions were virtually coerced by the

petitioner company's blatant resort to all kinds of

union-busting tactics, topped by the technical refusal to

recognize and bargain with the respondent unions

through the neat trick of filing a baseless petition for

certification election and questioning therein the right

of over 90% of the unions' membership to join the

unions; ... That the members of the respondent unions

are still employees of the petitioner company and as

such are qualified to vote in any certification election

that the Court of Industrial Relations may direct to be

held on the petitioner company's own petition,

pursuant to Section 2(d) of Republic Act 875, ...

." 15 They sought the dismissal of these certiorari

proceedings for lack of merit. Subsequently,

memoranda were filed by the parties, and the case was

deemed submitted on February 14, 1972.

As made clear at the outset, petitioner has not madeout a case for the reversal of the challenged order of

Judge Ansberto Paredes.

1. There is novelty in the specific question raised, as to

whether or not a certification election may be stayed at

the instance of the employer, pending the

determination of an unfair labor practice case filed by it

against certain employees affiliated with respondent-

unions. That is a matter of which this Court has not had

an opportunity to speak on previously. What is settled

law, dating from the case of Standard CigaretteWorkers' Union v. Court of Industrial

Relations, 16 decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor

organization objecting to the participation in a

certification election of a company-dominated union, as

a result of which a complaint for an unfair labor practice

case against the employer was filed, the status of the

latter union must be first cleared in such a proceeding

before such voting could take place. In the language of

Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente: "As correctly pointed

out by Judge Lanting in his dissenting opinion on the

denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, a

complaint for unfair labor practice may be considered a

prejudicial question in a proceeding for certification

election when it is charged therein that one or more

labor unions participating in the election are being

aided, or are controlled, by the company or employer.

The reason is that the certification election may lead to

the selection of an employer-dominated or company

union as the employees' bargaining representative, and

when the court finds that said union is employer-

dominated in the unfair labor practice case, the union

selected would be decertified and the whole election

proceedings would be rendered useless and

nugatory." 17 The next year, the same jurist had

occasion to reiterate such a doctrine in Manila Paper

Mills Employees and Workers Association v. Court of

Industrial Relations, 18 thus: "We agree with the CIR on

the reasons given in its order that only a formal charge

of company domination may serve as a bar to and stop

a certification election, the reason being that if there isa union dominated by the Company, to which some of

the workers belong, an election among the workers and

employees of the company would not reflect the true

sentiment and wishes of the said workers and

employees from the standpoint of their welfare and

interest, because as to the members of the company

dominated union, the vote of the said members in the

election would not be free. It is equally true, however,

that the opposition to the holding of a certification

election due to a charge of company domination can

only be filed and maintained by the labor organization

which made the charge of company domination,

because it is the entity that stands to lose and suffer

prejudice by the certification election, the reason being

that its members might be overwhelmed in the voting

by the other members controlled and dominated by the

Company," 19 It is easily understandable why it should

be thus. There would be an impairment of the integrity

of the collective bargaining process if a company-

dominated union were allowed to participate in a

certification election. The timid, the timorous and the

faint-hearted in the ranks of labor could easily be

tempted to cast their votes in favor of the choice ofmanagement. Should it emerge victorious, and it

becomes the exclusive representative of labor at the

conference table, there is a frustration of the statutory

scheme. It takes two to bargain. There would be instead

a unilateral imposition by the employer. There is need

therefore to inquire as to whether a labor organization

that aspires to be the exclusive bargaining

representative is company-dominated before the


2. The unique situation before us, however, it exactlythe reverse. It is management that would have an unfair

labor practice case filed by it for illegal strike engaged in

by some of its employees concluded, before it would

agree to the holding of a certification election. That is

the stand of petitioner. It does not carry conviction. The

reason that justifies the postponement of a certification

election pending an inquiry, as to the bona fides of a

labor union, precisely calls for a different conclusion. If

under the circumstances disclosed, management is

allowed to have its way, the result might be to dilute or

fritter away the strength of an organization bent on a

more zealous defense of labor's prerogatives. The

difficulties and obstacles that must be then hurdled

would not be lost on the rest of the personnel, who had

not as yet made up their minds one way or the other.

This is not to say that management is to be precluded

from filing an unfair labor practice case. It is merely to

stress that such a suit should not be allowed to lend

itself as a means, whether intended or not, to prevent a

truly free expression of the will of the labor group as to

the organization that will represent it. It is not only the



loss of time involved, in itself not likely to enhance the

prospect of respondent-unions, but also the fear

engendered in the mind of an ordinary employee that

management has many weapons in its arsenal to bring

the full force of its undeniable power against those of

its employees dissatisfied with things as they are. There

is no valid reason then for the postponement sought.

This is one instance that calls for the application of the

maxim, lex dilationes semper exhorret . Moreover, isthere not in the posture taken by petitioner a

contravention of what is expressly set forth in the

Industrial Peace Act, which speaks of the labor

organizations "designated or selected for the purpose of

collective bargaining by the majority of the employees

in an appropriate collective bargaining unit [be the

exclusive] representative of all the employees in such

unit for the purpose of collective bargaining."20

The law

clearly contemplates all the employees, not only some

of them. As much as possible then, there is to be no

unwarranted reduction in the number of those taking

part in a certification election, even under the guise that

in the meanwhile, which may take some time, some of

those who are employees could possibly lose such

status, by virtue of a pending unfair labor practice case.

3. Nor would any useful purpose be served by such a

postponement of the holding of a certification election

until after the determination of the unfair labor practice

case filed. The time that might elapse is hard to predict,

as the matter may eventually reach this Tribunal. In the

meanwhile, there is no opportunity for free choice on

the part of the employees as to which labororganization shall be their exclusive bargaining

representative. The force of such an objection could be

blunted if after a final decision to the effect that the

employees complained of were engaged in illegal strike,

they would automatically lose their jobs. Such is not the

law, however. 21 It does not necessarily follow that

whoever might have participated in a strike thus

proscribed has thereby forfeited the right to

employment. What will be gained then by holding in

abeyance the certification election? There is no

certitude that the final decision arrived at in thepending unfair labor practice case would sustain the

claim of petitioner. Even if success would attend such

endeavor, it cannot be plausibly asserted that its

employees adjudged as having been engaged in such

illegal strike are ipso facto deprived of such status.

There is thus an aspect of futility about the whole thing.

Why should not respondent Court then decide as it did?

4. This Court, moreover, is led to sustain the challenged

order by another consideration. In General Maritime

Stevedores' Union v. South Sea Shipping Line, 22 a 1960

decision, Justice Labrador, speaking for this Court,

stated that the question of whether or not a

certification election shall be held "may well be left to

the sound discretion of the Court of Industrial Relations,

considering the conditions involved in the case, ...

." 23 This Court has since then been committed to such a

doctrine. 24As a matter of fact, the only American

Supreme Court decision cited in the petition, National

Labor Relations Board v. A.J. Tower Co.,25

likewise,

sustains the same principle. It was there held that the

discretion of the labor tribunal, in this case, the National

Labor Relations Board of the United States, is not lightly

to be interfered with. The issue in that case, as noted in

the opinion of Justice Murphy, equally noted for his

labor law decisions, as well as his civil libertarian views,

"concerns the procedure used in elections under the

National Labor Relations Act in which employees

choose a statutory representative for purposes of

collective bargaining. Specifically, we must determinethe propriety of the National Labor Relations Board's

refusal to accept an employers post-election challenge

to the eligibility of a voter who participated in a consent

election." 26 His opinion then went on to state that the

First Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the Board's

order. The matter was then taken to the United States

Supreme Court oncertiorari . In reversing the Circuit

Court of Appeals, Justice Murphy made clear the

acceptance of such a doctrine in the light of the

National Labor Relations Act thus: "As we have noted

before, Congress has entrusted the Board with a wide

degree of discretion in establishing the procedure and

safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free choice

of bargaining representatives by employees." 27 Hence,

this ruling of American Supreme Court: "It follows that

the court below erred in refusing to enforce the Board's

order in full." 28 In the United States as in the

Philippines, the decision in such matters by the

administrative agency is accorded the utmost respect.

Relevant is this affirmation by the then Justice, now

Chief Justice, Concepcion that in such proceedings, the

determination of what is an appropriate bargaining unit

is "entitled to almost complete finality." 29 Theprevailing principle then on questions as to certification,

as well as in other labor cases, is that only where there

is a showing of clear abuse of discretion would this

Tribunal be warranted in reversing the actuation of

respondent

Court. 30 There is no showing of such a failing in this

case.



G. R. No. L-53406 December 14, 1981

NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR, THEHONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR, THEHONORABLE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABORRELATIONS, PRODUCERS BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioner

Union to compel public respondents to conduct a


employees of the respondent employer in Case No.

LRD-M-8-360-79 or in the alternative, to require the

respondent Minister of Labor or his Deputy to act onprivate respondent's "Appeal" and on petitioner's

"Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Execute."

It appears that on August 17, 1979, petitioner Union

filed a petition to be directly certified as collective

bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of

private respondent corporation (Annex "A"; p. 26, rec.).

On September 7, 1979, the date of the hearing, private

respondent was required to submit on October 5, 1979

a payroll of employees as of July 31, 1979. On the same

date, in a handwritten manifestation, respondentemployer through counsel, agreed that as soon as the

registration certificate of the local union was issued by

the Ministry of Labor and that it was shown that the

local union represents the majority of the rank and file,

the Bank would recognize the said union and would

negotiate accordingly (Annex "B" p. 27, rec.).

On October 5, 1979, the above said registration

certificate of the local union [Certificate No. 9352-LC,

issued by the Ministry of Labor] was secured. On

October 15, 1979, petitioner filed a Manifestation andUrgent Motion to Decide and submitted a copy of the

Registration Certificate of the local union and union

membership application of 183 members out of more

or less 259 rank and file employees of employer Bank,

authorizing the National Union of Bank Employees

(NUBE) [herein petitioner] to represent them "as their

sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent in all

matters relating to salary rates, hours of work and other

terms and conditions of employment in the Producers

Bank of the Philippines" (p. 38, rec.). Nonetheless,

respondent corporation failed to submit the requiredpayroll and the list of rank and file workers based on

said payroll.

On October 18, 1979, Med-Arbiter Climaco G. Plagata

issued an order directing the holding of a certification

election, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a

certification election is hereby ordered

held, conducted, and supervised by

representation officers of this office

within 20 days from receipt hereof. The

same representation officers shall

conduct pre-election conferences in

order to thresh out the mechanics and

other minor details of this election

including the inclusion and exclusion

proceedings to determine the qualifiedelectors in this election. The choice shall

be either YES, for Petitioner, or No, for

NO UNION DESIRED.

SO ORDERED (Annex "C", pp. 28-29,

rec.).

On October 19, 1979, respondent corporation filed a

motion to suspend further proceedings in view of an

allegedly prejudicial issue consisting of a pending

proceeding for cancellation of the registration of

petitioning union for allegedly engaging in prohibited

and unlawful activities in violation of the laws (Annex

"D" pp. 30-32, rec.).

On October 23, 1979, by agreement of the parties,

respondent then Deputy Minister of Labor Amado

Inciong, acting for the Minister of Labor, assumed

jurisdiction over the certification election case and the

application for clearance to terminate the services of

thirteen (13) union officers by private respondent

corporation. Thus, an order was issued on the same

date which reads:

On October 23, 1979 the parties

entered into an agreement that the

Office of the Ministry of Labor shall

assume jurisdiction over the following

disputes under P.D. No. 823 in the

interest of speedy labor justice and

industrial peace:

1. certification election

case; and

2. application for

clearance to terminate

thirteen (13) employees

with preventive

suspension.

(Agreement, October

23, 1979).

Accordingly, the Deputy Ministerdeputized Atty. Luna C. Piezas, Chief of

the Med- Arbiter Section, National

Capital Region, to conduct summary

investigations for the purpose of

determining the definition of the

appropriate bargaining unit sought to

be represented by the petitioning union

as wen as compliance with the 30%

mandatory written consent in support



of the petition under the bargaining

unit as shall have been defined.

On the application for clearance to

terminate with preventive suspension,

this Office deems it necessary, for the

mutual protection of each party's

interest and to assure continuance of

the exercise of their respective rightswithin legal limits, to lift the imposition

of preventive suspension on the subject

employees. The lifting of the preventive

suspension shall include Messrs. Castro

and Sumibcay who are presently on

leave of absence with pay in pursuance

of the agreement reached at the level

of the Regional Director. Further,

should the two (2) employees' leave

credits be exhausted, they are to go on

leave without pay, but this shall not be

construed as done in pursuance of the

preventive suspension.

Finally, the lifting of the preventive

suspension shall be without prejudice

to the continuance of the hearing on

the application for clearance involving

the thirteen (13) employees the

determination of the merits of which

shall be disposed of at the Regional

level (Annex "E", pp. 33-34, rec.).

Hence, Med-Arbiter Luna Piezas conducted hearings but

withdrew, in view of the alleged utter disrespect for

authority, gross bad faith, malicious refusal to

appreciate effective, prompt and honest service and

resorting in malicious and deliberate lying in dealing

with Ministry of Labor officials by a certain Mr. Jun

Umali, spokesman of the Producers' Bank Employees

Association. The case was then transferred to Med-

Arbiter Alberto Abis on November 7, 1979 (Annex " F ",

p. 35, rec.).

During the hearing on November 9, 1979, respondent

Bank failed to submit a list of rank and file employees

proposed to be excluded from the bargaining unit.

Respondent Bank's counsel however, in a verbal

manifestation pressed for the exclusion of the following

personnel from the bargaining unit:

1. Secretaries;

2. Staff of Personnel

Department;

3. Drivers;

4. Telephone

Operators;

5. Accounting

Department;

6. Credit Investigators;

7. Collectors;

8. Messengers;

9. Auditing Department

Personnel;

10. Signature Verifiers;

11. Legal Department

Personnel;

12. Loan Security

Custodians; and

13. Trust Department

Personnel.

On November 19, 1979, Med-Arbiter Alberto Abis Jr.

ordered the holding of certification election among the

rank and file employees but sustained the stand of

respondent company as to the exclusion of certain

employees. Thus, the pertinent portion of said order

reads:

After a careful perusal of the records,

evaluation of the evidence on hand and

consideration of the positions taken by

the parties, we find and so hold that

Petitioner-Union has substantially

complied with the mandatory and

jurisdictional requirement of 30%

subscription of all the employees in the

bargaining unit as prescribed by Section

2, Rule 5, Book V of the Rules and

Regulations Implementing the Labor

Code. Submission by the Petitioner

during the hearing of copies of the

application and membership forms of

its members wherein they have duly

authorized Petitioner 'as their sole andexclusive collective bargaining agent

constitutes substantial compliance of

the mandatory and jurisdictional 30%

subscription requirement, it appearing

from the records that out of the 264

total rank and file employees, 188 are

union members who have so authorized

Petitioner to represent.

With respect to respondent bank's

motion to suspend the proceedings inthe instant case pending resolution of

the cancellation proceedings now

pending in the Bureau of Labor

Relations, we find that the same is not

tenable in the absence of a restraining

order.

In consideration of the agreement of

the parties, it is hereby ordered that the



scope or coverage of the appropriate

bargaining unit should include the Head

Office of the Producers Bank of the

Philippines and all its branch offices and

shall comprise of an the regular rank

and file employees of the bank.

Excluded are all managerial and

supervisory employees, probationary,

contractual and casual employees andsecurity guards. It is further ordered

that by virtue and in consonance with

industry practice as revealed by the

CBAs of 18 banks submitted by

Petitioner-Union, the following positions

should likewise be excluded from the

bargaining unit; Secretaries of bank

officials; employees of the Personnel

Department; EXCEPT Manuel Sumibcay

Primi Zamora and Carmelita Sy;

employees of the Accounting

Department; employees of the Legal

Department employees of the Trust

Department, credit investigators,

telephone operators, and loan security

custodians. Signature verifiers, drivers,

messengers and other non-confidential

employees included in the bank's list of

proposed exclusions should be allowed

to vote, but the votes should be

segregated as challenged. In case a

doubt arises as to whether or not the

position held by an employee isconfidential in nature, the employee

should be allowed to vote, but his vote

should be segregated as challenged .

WHEREFORE, in the light of the

foregoing considerations, it is hereby

ordered that a certification election be

conducted among the regular rank and

file employees of the Producers Bank of

the Philippines (the appropriate

bargaining unit of which is definedabove) after the usual pre-election

conference called to formulate the list

of qualified voters and discuss the

mechanics of the election.

It is further ordered that the election in

the bank's branches outside the Metro

Manila area be conducted by the

appropriate Regional Offices of the

Ministry of Labor having jurisdiction

over them.

SO ORDERED (pp. 5-7, Annex "G"; pp.

41-43, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On November 29, 1979, petitioner filed a partial appeal

to the Director of Bureau of Labor Relations questioning

the exclusions made by Med-Arbiter Abis of those

employees who are not among those expressly

enumerated under the law to be excluded. It vigorously

urged the inclusion of the rest of the employees which

is allegedly the usual practice in the banking industry. It

likewise urged the holding of a certification election

allowing all those excluded by Med-Arbiter Abis to vote

but segregating their votes as challenged in the

meantime. Hence, it averred:

It is in the position of the petitioner that

notwithstanding the statements above

that the petition for certification shouldbe held immediately by allowing all

those not excluded from Arbiter Abis'

order to vote without prejudice to a

final decision on the matters subject of

these appeal. Which we also submit

that in order to expedite the

proceedings these exclusions should

also be allowed to vote even pending

resolution of the appeal but segregating

them for further consideration (pp. 3-4,

Annex "H"; p. 46- 47, rec.).

On December 4, 1979, respondent bank likewise

appealed from the aforesaid November 19, 1979 order

of Med-Arbiter Alberto Abis, Jr. to the Minister of Labor

on the following grounds:

(1) that the act of Med-Arbiter Abis in

issuing the abovesaid Order is ultra

vires, full and complete jurisdiction over

the questioned petition being vested in

the office of the Minister of Labor and

hence the only adjudicative bodyempowered to resolve the petition;

(2) that the fact that petitioner's Union

registration was subject of cancellation

proceedings with the Bureau of Labor

Relations rendered the issuance of the

abovequestioned Order directing the

holding of a certification election

premature; and

(3) that the bargaining unit was notappropriately defined [Annex " I " pp.

49-57, rec.].

On December 7, 1979, the entire records of the case

were allegedly elevated as an appealed case by Regional

Director Francisco L. Estrella to the Director of the

Bureau of Labor Relations and was docketed thereat as

appealed case No. A-1599-79.

On January 21, 1980, the Union of Producers Bank

Employees Chapter-NATU filed a motion to intervene inthe said petition for certification election alleging

among other things that it has also some signed up

members in the respondent Bank and consequently has

an interest in the petition for certification election filed

by petitioner as it will directly affect their rights as to

who will represent the employees in the collective

bargaining negotiations (Annex "P"; pp. 100-101, rec.).

On January 24, 1980, the Bureau of Labor Relations

Director Carmelo C. Noriel rendered a decision affirming



the Med-Arbiter's order with certain modifications, the

pertinent portion of which reads:

Preliminarily, the issue of jurisdiction is

being raised by respondent bank but we

need not be drawn into nor tarry in this

issue but instead proceed to consider

the merits of the case. Suffice it rather

to say that the appealed order wassigned by the med-arbiter a quo and

the records of the case were elevated

on appeal to this Bureau by the

Regional Director of the National

Capital Region. Besides respondent

should not unduly press the

jurisdictional issue. Such question does

not lead nor contribute to the

resolution of the real pressing issue—

the certification election issue. What is

at stake here is the right of the

employees to organize and be

represented for collective bargaining

purposes by a union at the respondent

bank where none existed up to the

present time. On this consideration

alone, respondent's vigorous objection

alleging want of jurisdiction cracks from

tangency of the issue.

xxx xxx xxx

The matter of defining the bargainingunit, that is to say the appropriateness

thereof, usually presents for

determination three questions to wit,

the general type of the bargaining unit

or whether it should be an industrial

unit embracing an the employees in a

broad class or a craft unit that is

confined to a small specialized group

within a broad class, the scope of the

bargaining unit or whether it would

embrace all employees in a given classat only one plant or at several plants of

an employer, and the specific

composition of the bargaining unit, that

is, whether or not the unit should

include employees of different

occupational groups, like clerks,

inspectors, technical employees, etc.

On these questions, we are not without

legal guidelines. The law and the Rules

are clear. The petition for certification

election, whether filed by a legitimate

labor organization or by an employer

case, shall contain inter alia, the

description of the bargaining unit which

shall be the employer unit unless

circumstances otherwise require. Thus,

the policy under the Labor Code on the

matter of fixing the bargaining unit is to

favor larger units and this is sought to

be implemented on a two-tiered basis.

On the lower tier, the law mandates the

employer unit as the normal unit of

organization at the company level, thus

discouraging if not stopping

fragmentation into small craft or

occupational units as what prevailed

prior to the Labor Code. But the Code

envisions further consolidation into

larger bargaining units. Thus, on the

higher tier, the law mandates theeventual restructuring of the labor

movement along the "one union, one

industry" basis. There should therefore

be no doubt as to the law and policy on

the fixing of the appropriate bargaining

unit which is generally the employer

unit. Applying this rule to the instant

case, the appropriate bargaining unit

should embrace all the regular rank and

file employees at the head as well as

branch offices of respondent bank. Of

course, the exception to this employer

unit rule is when circumstances

otherwise require. But such is not at

issue here, respondent not having

adduced circumstances that would

justify a contrary composition of the

bargaining unit.

Respondent however insists on the

definition of the appropriate bargaining

unit upon the question of whether or

not to exclude admittedly regular rankand file employees which it considers

confidential, managerial and technical.

This question, it should be pointed out,

does not enter the matter of defining

the bargaining unit. The definition of

the appropriate unit refers to the

grouping or more precisely, the legal

collectivity of eligible employees for

purposes of collective bargaining. The

presumption is that these employees

are entitled to the rights to self-organization and collective bargaining,

otherwise they would not be, in the

first place be considered at all in the

determination of the appropriate

bargaining unit.

The question therefore of excluding

certain rank and file employees for

being allegedly confidential, managerial

or technical does not simply involve a

definition of the bargaining unit but

rather raises the fundamental issue of

coverage under or eligibility for the

exercise of the workers' rights to self-

organization and collective bargaining.

On this score, the law on coverage and

exclusion on the matter should by now

be very clear. Article 244 of the Labor

Code states that all persons employed

in commercial, industrial and

agricultural enterprises, including



religious, charitable, medical or

educational institutions operating for

profit shall have the right to self-

organization and to form, join, or assist

labor organizations for purposes of

collective bargaining. Articles 245 and

246 (ibid) provide that security guards

and managerial employees are not

eligible to form, assist or join any labororganization. As defined by the Code, a

managerial employee is one who is

vested with powers or prerogatives to

lay down and execute management

policies and/or to hire, transfer,

suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,

assign or discipline employees, or to

effectively recommend such managerial

actions. All employees not falling within

this definition are considered rank and

file employees for purposes of self-

organization and collective bargaining.

It is in the light of the foregoing

provisions of law that the challenged

order, in so far as it excludes all

managerial and supervisory employees,

secretaries of bank officials, credit

investigators, telephone operators, loan

security custodians, employees in the

accounting, auditing, legal, trust and

personnel departments respectively,

should be modified for being eithersuperfluous, discriminatory or simply

contrary to law. The express exclusion

of managerial employees in the Order is

superfluous for the same is already

provided for by law and is presumed

when the bargaining unit was defined

as comprising all the regular rank and

file employees of the bank. It is also

anomalous and discriminatory when it

excluded employees of the personnel

department but included specificindividuals like Manuel Simibcay Primi

Zamora and Carmelita Sy. Exclusion as

managerial employee is not based on

the personality of the occupant but

rather on the nature and function of the

position. The exclusion of the other

positions is likewise contrary to law,

there being no clear showing that they

are managerial employees. The mere

fact of being a supervisor or a

confidential employee does not exclude

him from coverage. He must strictly

come within the category of a

managerial employee as defined by the

Code. The Constitution assures to all

workers such rights to self-organization

and collective bargaining. Exclusions,

being the exception and being in

derogation of such constitutional

mandate, should be construed

in strictissimi juris.

Furthermore, to uphold the order of

exclusion would be to allow the

emasculation of the workers' right to

self-organization and to collective

bargaining, statutory rights which have

received constitutional recognition

when they were enshrined in the 1973

Constitution. Indeed, the further rulings

that 'other non-confidential employeesincluded in the bank's list of proposed

exclusion be allowed to vote but the

votes should be segregated as

challenged and that in case of doubt as

to whether or not the position held by

an employee is confidential in nature,

the employee should be allowed to

vote but his vote should be segregated

as challenged' both complete the said

order's self-nullifying effects.

At the most and indeed as a policy,

exclusion of confidential employees

from the bargaining unit is a matter for

negotiation and agreement of the

parties. Thus, the parties may agree in

the CBA, to exclude certain highly

confidential positions from the

bargaining unit. Absent such

agreement, coverage must be

observed. In any event, any negotiation

and agreement can come after the

representation issue is resolved and thisis just the situation in the instant case.

In fine, the appropriate bargaining unit

shall include a regular rank and file

employees of the respondent including

the positions excluded in the challenged

order dated 19 November 1979, with

the exception of the secretaries to the

Bank President, Executive Vice-

President, Senior Vice President and

other Vice-Presidents as agreed uponby the parties during the hearings.

Respondent vehemently interposes also

the pendency of cancellation

proceedings against petitioner as a

prejudicial issue which should suspend

the petition for certification election.

We cannot fully concur with this

contention Unless there is an order of

cancellation which is final the union's

certificate of registration remains and

its legal personality intact. It is entitled

to the rights and privileges accorded by

law, including the right to represent its

members and employees in a

bargaining unit for collective bargaining

purposes including participation in a

representation proceeding. This is

especially true where the grounds for



the cancellation of its union certificate

do not appear indubitable.

The rights of workers to self-

organization finds general and specific

constitutional guarantees. Section 7,

Article IV of the Philippine Constitution

provides that the right to form

associations or societies purposes notcontrary to law shall not be abridged.

This right more pronounced in the case

of labor. Section 9, Article II (ibid)

specifically declares that the State shall

assure the rights of workers to self-

organization ,collective bargaining,

security of tenure and just and humane

conditions of work. Such constitutional

guarantees should not be lightly taken

much less easily nullified. A healthy

respect for the freedom of association

demands that acts imputable to officers

or members be not easily visited with

capital punishments against the

association itself.

On the 30% consent requirement,

respondent contends that the

bargaining unit is not appropriately

defined 'hence, the med-arbiter's

finding that there was compliance with

the 30% 'jurisdictional requirement is

patently erroneous. To this we mustdisagree. As earlier stated, the

definition of the appropriate bargaining

unit does not call for an actual head

count or Identification of the particular

employees belonging thereto. That is

done in the pre-election conference. It

is sufficient that the bargaining unit is

defined such that the employees who

are part thereof may be readily

ascertained for purposes of exclusions

and inclusions during the pre-electionconference when the list of eligible

voters are determined.

In this regard, respondent does not

really seriously question the 264 total

number of employees except for the

alleged exclusion which should reduce

the number thus allegedly affecting the

sufficiency of the supporting signatures

submitted. We have already ruled

against the exclusions as violative of the

constitutional guarantee of workers'

right to self-organization. Consequently,

since 188 of the 264 employees

subscribed to the petition, which

constitutes 70% of the total employees

in bargaining unit, the 30% consent

requirement has been more than

sufficiently complied with. In any case,

even if we grant the alleged exclusions

totalling about 45, the same will not

give any refuge to respondent's

position. For assuming momentarily

that the exclusions are valid, the same

will not fatally affect the 30% consent

compliance.

Finally, lest it be so easily forgotten, a

certification election is but an

administration device for determiningthe true choice of the employees in the

appropriate bargaining unit as to their

bargainer representative. Unnecessary

obstacles should not therefore be

thrown on its way. Rather, the parties

should take their case, if they have,

directly to the real and ultimate arbiter

on the matter, the employees sought to

be represented in the bargaining unit.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the

foregoing considerations, the Order

dated 19 November 1979 calling for a

certification election is hereby affirmed

with the modification that the same

shall be conducted among all the

regular rank and file employees of the

respondent bank at its head and branch

offices, including those excluded in said

Order, except only the positions of

secretary to the Bank President,

Executive Vice-President and other

Vice-Presidents which agreed to beexcluded from the bargaining unit by

the parties during the hearings. The

choice shall be between the petitioner

and no union.

Let the certification election be

conducted within twenty (20) days from

receipt hereof. The pre-election

conference shall be immediately called

to thresh out the mechanics of the

election. The list of qualified voters shallbe based on the July 1979 payroll of the

company.

SO ORDERED (pp. 5-9, Annex "J" pp. 63-

67, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On February 11, 1980, petitioner received an undated

and unverified appeal of the respondent bank to the

Minister of Labor questioning the decision of Bureau of

Labor Relations Director Carmelo C. Noriel which appeal

alleged that:

I. THE QUESTIONED ORDER IS NULL

AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED

WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION SINCE —

(i) It is this Honorable Office, not the

BLR, that has jurisdiction over the

parties' appeals from the Order of Med-

Arbiter Alberto A. Abis, Jr.



II. ASSUMING, AD ARGUENDO, THAT

THE BLR HAS JURISDICTION, THE

APPEALED ORDER IS NONETHELESS

NULL AND VOID, THE BLR HAVING

GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

NOT FINDING THAT THE ORDER, DATED

NOVEMBER 19, 1979, OF MED-ARBITER

ABIS IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING

BEEN ISSUED WITHOUTAUTHORITY/JURISDICTION

CONSIDERING THAT —

(i) Full and complete

jurisdiction over this

petition is vested in this

Office, which, under

P.D. 823, as amended,

and by agreement of

the parties, is the

adjudicative body solely

and exclusively

empowered to resolve

this petition.

(ii) The fact that

petitioner's Union

registration is now the

subject of cancellation

proceedings before the

BLR renders the

issuance of an Order

directing the holding ofa certification election

premature; and

(iii) The bargaining unit

is not appropriately

defined; hence, the

BLR'S and before it, the

Med-Arbiter's finding

that there was

compliance with the

30% jurisdictionalrequirement is

completely without

basis and, therefore,

grossly erroneous.

III. THE MOTION FOR INTERVENTION

FILED BY INTERVENOR UNION OF

PRODUCERS BANK EMPLOYEE'S

CHAPTER-NATU WHICH THE BLR, FOR

UNKNOWN REASON(S), FAILED TO

RESOLVE, RENDERS IMPERATIVE THE

REDETERMINATION OF WHETHER OR

NOT THE MANDATORY 30%

JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT HAS

BEEN MET. (Pp. 2-3, Annex "K", pp. 69-

70, rec.).

On February 21, 1980, petitioner union filed a

manifestation on respondent's undated and unverified

appeal (Annex "L"; pp. 91-94, rec.).

On the same date, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss

with motion to execute (Annex " M " pp. 95-96, rec.).

On March 3, 1980, petitioner filed an urgent motion to

resolve respondent's appeal together with pertitioner's

motion to dismiss and motion for execution ( Annex

"N"; pp. 97-98, rec.).

On March 14, 1980, petitioner received a copy of aletter endorsement dated March 7, 1980 which reads:

Respectfully referred to the Honorable

Minister of Labor, the herein attached

Motion to Execute and Manifestation to

Dismiss with Motion to Execute and

Manifestation on Respondent's undated

and unverified Appeal dated Feb. 21,

1980 and February 20, 1980

respectively, for appropriate action.

In a memorandum dated 9 November

1979, the Deputy Minister of Labor

completely inhibited himself in this case

(p. 169, rec.).

Public respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel did not

proceed to hold the certification election, neither did

the Minister of Labor act on the appeal of private

respondent and on petitioner's motion to dismiss with

motion to execute.

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition on March 19,1980.

On May 2, 1980, private respondent Bank filed its

comments (pp. 111-122, rec.).

On June 25, 1980, public respondents filed their

comment (pp. 131-142, rec.).

On August 16, 1980, petitioner filed its memorandum

(pp. 155-169, rec.).

On September 2, 1980, private respondent Bank filed its

memorandum (pp. 179-197, rec.).

On October 1, 1980, public respondents filed a

manifestation in lieu of memorandum alleging inter

alia that:

1. The instant petition for mandamus

seeks to compel the respondent

Minister of Labor to act on respondent

Producers Bank's Appeal and onpetitioner's motion to execute the

decision of respondent Director of

Labor Relations dated January 24, 1980,

directing the holding of a certification

election in said bank;

2. The said petition, however, is now

moot and academic because:



(a) Respondent Minister

of Labor had already

acted on the said

appeal in his decision

dated April 11, 1980 the

dispositive portion of

which is as follows:

Wherefore, respondentBank's Appeal is hereby

dismissed and the

validity of the Decision

of January 24, 1980,

herein adopted is

hereby recognized. No

motion for

reconsideration of this

Order shall be

entertained.

(b) Petitioner may now

file, if it so desires, with

respondent Director of

Labor Relations, a

motion for the

execution of his

decision so that the

certification election

can be held at

respondent bank;

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayedthat the instant petition be dismissed

for being moot and academic (pp. 201-


On October 10, 1980, petitioner filed a "Manifestation

Re: Decision of the Minister of Labor" alleging among

other things that.

xxx xxx xxx

2. Petitioner had not received any copyof such April 11, 1980 decision of the

Minister of Labor mentioned by the

Honorable Solicitor General. In fact, the

Comment of the public respondents

dated June 11, 1980 signed by Assistant

Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez

and Trial Attorney Elihu A. Ybañez made

no mention of the same in the private

respondent's memorandum of

September 2, 1980" (p. 204, rec.).

On October 28, 1980, petitioner filed a comment on

manifestation of the Honorable Solicitor General dated

30 September 1980 and motion alleging therein that

despite inquiries made, no official copy of the

alleged April 11, 1980 decision of the Minister of

Labor mentioned in the manifestation of the Solicitor

General has been furnished the petitioner. Hence, it

prayed that the Minister of Labor be requested to

submit to this Court a certified copy of the

aforesaid April 11, 1986 decision of the Minister of

Labor.

On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a manifestation

and comment stating that:

1. On October 29, 1980, it received a

copy of the decision of the Honorable

Minister of Labor in Case No. NCR-LRD-8-360-79 as may be seen from Annex

"A".

2. The decision is dated October 23,

1980 and not April 11, 1980 as stated in

the Manifestation in Lieu of

Memorandum of the Office of the

Honorable Solicitor General, dated 30

September 1980.

3. Petitioner respectfully request anexplanation from the public

respondents on this apparent

discrepancy which has in fact misled

even this Honorable Court (p. 21 1,

rec.).

On November 11, 1980, private respondent Bank filed a

manifestation/motion stating that the aforementioned

April 11, 1980 decision of the Minister of Labor is non-

existent, as in fact the Minister of Labor issued an order

affirming the decision of BLR Director Noriel only on

October 23, 1980.

xxx xxx xxx

3. Notwithstanding the issuance of the

October 23, 1980 Order by the Minister

of Labor, the Bank respectfully submits

that this petition for mandamus,

initiated by petitioner on March 19,

1980 and given due course by this

Honorable Court should not be

dismissed. The petitioner herein prays from this Honorable Court that public

respondents be ordered to conduct the

certification election as ordered by

Med-Arbiter Plagata, Abis and BLR

Director Noriel among the rank-and-file

employees ... of the Bank. Alternatively,

the petitioner prays that the Minister of

Labor or his Deputy be required "to act

forthwith" on the appeal filed by

petitioner herein As could be gleaned

clearly from the allegations and prayer

in this petition for mandamus, the

petitioner primarily seeks the holding of

a certification election Only secondarily

is it asking this Court to command the

Minister of Labor or his Deputy to

resolve the appeal filed by the Bank.

4. The affirmance by the Minister of the

disputed order of BLR Director Noriel

thus renders moot and academic only



the secondary or alternative prayer of

the Union in this mandamus case. What

still remains for resolution by this

Honorable Courts the issue squarely put

before it on the propriety or impropriety

of holding a certification election. This

issue has been traversed by the

petitioner and the Bank in their

respective memoranda filed with thisCourt, with the Bank stressing that a

certification election would be

improper because, among others, the

petitioning Union violated the strike

ban, there is a pending case for

cancellation of its registration

certificate, and applications for

clearance to dismiss the Union's striking

members are pending approval by the

BLR Director.

5. A dismissal of this petition for

mandamus would unduly delay the

resolution of the issue of whether a

certification election should be held or

not.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully moved

that this Honorable Court rule on the issue of whether

or not a certification election should be held under

circumstances obtaining in the present case (pp. 214-


On November 24, 1980, public respondents filed a reply

to the manifestation and comment of petitioner

explaining the discrepancy of the two dates—October

23, 1980, the actual date of the order of the Minister of

Labor affirming the decision of the BLR Director and

April 11, 1980, the date mentioned by the Solicitor

General as the alleged date of the aforesaid order of the

Minister of Labor. Thus, the pertinent portion of the

letter of Director Noriel to the Solicitor General likewise

explaining the apparent discrepancy of the aforesaid

dates reads:

It should likewise invite your attention

to the date of the Order which is

October 23, 1980 and not April 11, 1980

as indicated in the "Manifestation in

Lieu of Memorandum" dated

September 30, 1980 of the Solicitor

General filed with the Supreme Court.

The April 11, 1980 date must have been

based on a draft order which was

inadvertently included in the records of

the case that was forwarded to your

office. We wish to point out, however,

that the dispositive portion as quoted in

the Manifestation is exactly the same as

that in the Order eventually signed and

released by the Labor Minister on

October 23, 1980 (p. 220, rec.).

Public respondents further averred that "(I)n any event,

whether the order is dated April 11, 1980 or October

23, 1980 will not matter since both 'orders' dismissed

the appeal of the respondent Bank, upon which

dismissal the Manifestation in Lieu of Memorandum

dated September 30, 1980, of public respondents, was

based." Public respondents thus reiterated their prayer

that the instant petition be dismissed for being

allegedly moot and academic (pp. 219-222, rec.).

On December 5, 1980, petitioner filed a comment tomanifestation/motion of counsel for private respondent

alleging inter alia that "... should the Honorable Court

be minded to resolve the issue raised in the

Manifestation/Motion of private respondent-i.e.-

whether the alleged strike ban violation is a bar to a

certification election, it will be noted that the matter of

whether there has been a 'violation' of the strike ban or

not is still to be heard by the Regional Director through

Labor Arbiter Crescencio Trajano after this Honorable

Court dismissed G.R. No. L-52026 on the matter of

jurisdiction competence of the Regional Director to hear

the question raised therein. To the present, although,

the Regional Director has commenced to act on the

case, there is no decision on whether the strike ban has

been violated by the petitioner union." Petitioner union

vigorously asserted that while private respondent Bank

has a pending petition for cancellation of the

registration certificate of herein petitioner union, it is

still premature for private respondent Bank to claim

that the petitioner union has violated the strike ban.

Petitioner then alleged that "(T)here is also no

proof or decision that acts indulged in by the petitioner

and its members amounted to a strike and evenassuming arguendo that such act (which was the

holding of a meeting for 30 minutes before office time

in the morning) constitutes a 'strike' and further that

such act violates the strike ban. It has been held

through Honorable Justice Antonio P. Barredo in

Petrophil. vs. Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO (75 SCRA

73) that only the leaders and members who

participated in the illegal activity are held responsible. If

this were so, then the rest of the members who are

innocent are still entitled to the benefits of collective

bargaining. There is thus no need to delay the holdingof a certification election on the alleged ground that

there is a pending action of the respondent company

against the petitioner union for 'violation of the strike

ban' " (pp. 226-227, rec.).

It is likewise pointed out by petitioner union that even if

it would be ultimately confirmed that indeed petitioner

union has violated the strike ban, cancellation of the

registration certificate of petitioner union is not the

only disciplinary action or sanction provided for under

the law but other penalties may be imposed and not

necessarily cancellation of its registration certificate.

On January 12, 1981, pursuant to the resolution of this

Court dated December 4, 1980, petitioner union filed its

rejoinder which reiterated the stand of the Solicitor

General that the present case has become moot and

academic by virtue of the decision of the Minister of

Labor affirming the decision of the BLR Director which

ordered a certification election (p. 230, rec.).



It is quite obvious from the facts set forth above that

the question of jurisdiction vigorously asserted by

herein private respondent Bank has become moot and

academic.

What therefore remains for this Court to resolve is the

issue as to whether or not a certification election should

be held under the circumstances obtaining in the

present case. Is it proper to order a certificationelection despite the pendency of the petition to cancel

herein petitioner union's certificate of registration?

The Court rules in the affirmative. The pendency of the

petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of

herein petitioner union is not a bar to the holding of a

certification election. The pendency of the petition for

cancellation of the registration certificate of petitioner

union founded on the alleged illegal strikes staged by

the leaders and members of the intervenor union and

petitioner union should not suspend the holding of a

certification election, because there is no order

directing such cancellation (cf. Dairy Queen Products

Company of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial

Relations, et al. No. L-35009, Aug. 31, 1977). In said

Dairy Queen case, one of the issues raised was whether

the lower court erred and concomitantly committed

grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the fact that

therein respondent union's permit and license have

been cancelled by the then Department of Labor and

therefore could not be certified as the sole and

exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file

employees of therein petitioner company.

While the rationale of the decision was principally

rested on the subsequent rescission of the decision

ordering the cancellation of the registration certificate

of the respondent union, thereby restoring its legal

personality and an the rights and privileges accorded by

law to a legitimate organization, this Court likewise

declared: "There is no showing, however, that when the

respondent court issued the order dated December 8,

1971, certifying the Dairy Queen Employees Association

CCLU as the sole and exclusive bargainingrepresentative of all regular rank and file employees of

the Dairy Queen Products Company of the Philippines,

Inc., for purposes of collective bargaining with respect to

wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and

conditions for appointment, the order of cancellation of

the registration certificate of the Dairy Queen

Employees Association-CC-1,U had become final" 78

SCRA 444-445. supra, emphasis supplied).

It may be worthy to note also that the petition for

cancellation of petitioner union's registration certificate

based on the alleged illegal strikes staged on October

12, 1979 and later November 5-7, 1979 was evidently

intended to delay the early disposition of the case for

certification election considering that the same was

apparently filed only after the October 18,

1979 Order of Med-Arbiter Plagata which directed the

holding of a certification election.

Aside from the fact that the petition for cancellation of

the registration certificate of petitioner union has not

yet been finally resolved, there is another fact that

militates against the stand of private respondent Bank,

the liberal approach observed by this Court as to

matters of certification election. In a recent case, Atlas

Free Workers Union (AFWU)-PSSLU Local vs. Hon.

Carmelo C. Noriel, et al . (No. 51005, May 26, 1981),

"[T]he Court resolves to grant the petition (for

mandamus) in line with the liberal approach

consistently adhered to by this Court in matters ofcertification election. The whole democratic process is

geared towards the determination of representation,

not only in government but in other sectors as well, by

election. Thus, the Court has declared its commitment

to the view that a certification election is crucial to the

institution of collective bargaining, for it gives substance

to the principle of majority rule as one ' of the basic

concepts of a democratic policy" (National Mines and

Allied Workers Union vs. Luna, 83 SCRA 610).

Likewise, Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College vs.

Noriel, et al . (L-48347, Oct. 3, 1978, 85 SCRA 494, 497,

498), this Court citing a long catena of cases ruled:

... The institution of collective

bargaining is, to recall Cox, a prime

manifestation of industrial democracy

at work. The two parties to the

relationship, labor and management,

make their own rules by coming to

terms. That is to govern themselves in

matters that really count. As labor,

however, is composed of a number ofindividuals, it is indispensable that they

be represented by a labor organization

of their choice. Thus may be discerned

how crucial is a certification election. So

our decisions from the earliest case

of PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Co.

Free Telephone Workers Union to the

latest, Philippine Communications,

Electronics & Electricity Workers'

Federation (PCWF) v. Court of Industrial

Relations, had made clear. The sameprinciple was again given expression in

language equally emphatic in the

subsequent case of Philippine

Association of Free Labor Unions v.

Bureau of Labor Relations: 'Petitioner

thus appears to be woefully lacking in

awareness of the significance of a

certification election for the collective

bargaining process. It is the fairest and

most effective way of determining

which labor organization can truly

represent the working force. It is a

fundamental postulate that the will of

the majority, if given expression in an

honest election with freedom on the

part of the voters to make their choice,

is controlling. No better device can

assure the institution of industrial

democracy with the two parties to a

business enterprise, management and

labor, establishing a regime of self-rule.'



That is to accord respect to the policy of

the Labor Code, indisputably partial to

the holding of a certification election so

as to arrive in a manner definitive and

certain concerning the choice of the

labor organization to represent the

workers in a collective bargaining unit

(emphasis supplied).

It is true that under Section 8, Rule II, Book V of the

Labor Code, cancellation of registration certificate may

be imposed on the following instances:

(a) Violation of Articles 234, 238, 239

and 240 of the Code;

(b) Failure to comply with Article 237 of

the Code;

(c) Violation of any of the provisions ofArticle 242 of the Code; and

(d) Any violation of the provisions of

this Book.

The aforementioned provisions should be read in

relation to Article 273, Chapter IV, Title VIII which

explicitly provides:

Art. 273. Penalties. — (a) Violation of

any provision of this Title shall be

punished by a fine of One Thousand

Pesos [P l, 000.00] to Ten Thousand

Pesos [P 10, 000.00] and/or

imprisonment of one (1) year to five (5)

years.

(b) Any person violating any provision

of this Title shall be dealt with in

accordance with General Order No. 2-A

and General Order No. 49.

(c) Violation of this Title by anylegitimate labor organization shall be

grounds for disciplinary action

including, but not limited to, the

cancellation of its registration permit.

x x x x x x x x x

(emphasis supplied).

From the aforequoted provisions, We are likewise

convinced that as it can be gleaned from saidprovisions, cancellation of the registration certificate is

not the only resultant penalty in case of any violation of

the Labor Code.

Certainly, the penalty imposable should be

commensurate to the nature or gravity of the Legal

activities conducted and to the number of members and

leaders of the union staging the illegal strike.

As aptly ruled by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations

Director Noriel: "The rights of workers to self-

organization finds general and specific constitutional

guarantees. Section 7, Article IV of the Philippine

Constitution provides that the right to form associations

or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not

be abridged. This right is more pronounced in the case

of labor. Section 9, Article II (ibid) specifically declares

that the State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure

and just and humane conditions of work. Such

constitutional guarantees should not be lightly taken

much less easily nullified. A healthy respect for the

freedom of association demands that acts imputable to

officers or members be not easily visited with capital

punishments against the association itself" (p. 8, Annex

"J"; p. 66, rec.).

WHEREFORE, THE WRIT OF mandamus PRAYED FOR IS

GRANTED AND RESPONDENT BLR DIRECTOR NORIEL

HEREBY ORDERED TO CALL AND DIRECT THE

IMMEDIATE HOLDING OF A CERTIFICATION ELECTION.

NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. L-44350 November 25, 1976

U.E. AUTOMOTIVE EMPLOYEES AND WORKERSUNION-TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES ANDALLIED SERVICES, petitioners,

vs.

CARMELO C. NORIEL, PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OFLABOR, AND U. E. AUTOMOTIVE MANUFACTURING

CO., INC., respondents.

Tupaz & Associates for petitioners.

Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant

Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Trial Attorney

Joselito B. Floro for respondent Carmelo C. Noriel.

Alejandro C. Villaviza for respondent Phil. Federation of

Labor.

Poblador, Nazareno, Azada, Tomacruz & Paredes forrespondent Company.

FERNANDO, J.:

It is a notable feature of our Constitution that freedom

of association is explicitly ordained; 1 it is not merely

derivative, peripheral or penumbral, as is the case in the

United States. 2 It can trace its origin to the Malolos

Constitution. 3 More specifically, where it concerns the

expanded rights of labor under the present Charter, it is

categorically made an obligation of the State to assure

full enjoyment "of workers to self-organization [and]

collective bargaining." 4 It would be to show less than

full respect to the above mandates of the fundamental

law, considering that petitioner union obtained the

requisite majority at a fair and honest election, if it

would not be recognized as the sole bargaining agent.

The objection by respondent Director finds no support

in the wording of the law. To sustain it, however, even

on the assumption that it has merit, just because when

petitioner asked for a certification election, there waslacking the three-day period under the Industrial Peace

Act then in force 5 for it to be entitled to the rights and

privileges of a labor organization, would be to accord

priority to form over substance. Moreover, it was not

denied that respondent Director of Labor Relations on

January 2, 1975 certified that it was petitioner which

should be "the sole and exclusive bargaining

representative of all rank and file employees and

workers of the U.E. Automotive Manufacturing,

Inc."6 He had no choice as the voting was 59 in favor of

petitioner and 52 for private respondent Union. Itwould appear evident, therefore, that in the light of the

constitutional provisions set forth above and with the

present Labor Code, the challenged order of February

24, 1975 setting aside such certification and ordering

the holding of a new election did amount to a grave

abuse of discretion. That was to run counter to what

the law commands. 7

The facts are undisputed. The comment submitted by

respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel, through Acting

Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. and Assistant

Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno,8 made it clear. There

was, on August 15, 1974, a petition for certification

election with the National Labor Relations Commission

filed by petitioner. Thereafter, on August 26, 1974,

private respondent Philippine Federation of Labor

submitted a motion for intervention. Three conferencesbetween such labor organizations resulted in an

agreement to hold a consent election actually

conducted on September 19, 1974 among the rank and

file workers of respondent management firm. Petitioner

obtained fifty-nine votes, with respondent union having

only fifty-two votes in such consent election. There was,

on September 19, 1974, a motion by petitioner to issue

an order of certification duly granted on January 2, 1975

by respondent Director who did certify petitioner as the

sole land exclusive collective bargaining representative

of such rank and file employees of respondent firm.

There was, however, a motion for reconsideration

which was granted notwithstanding opposition by the

union on January 22, 1975, setting aside the previous

order certifying petitioner as the sole bargaining

representative. It is such an order sustaining a motion

for reconsideration that resulted in this petition. 9

The submission of respondent Director to sustain the

validity of his order in the comment submitted on his

behalf follows: "Petitioner union is not a legitimate

labor organization. Section 2(f) of, Republic Act Number

875 defines a legitimate labor organization as any labororganization registered by the Department of Labor.

Petitioner union isnot duly registered with the

Department of Labor. The records of the Labor

Registration Division of the Bureau of Labor Relations,

Department of Labor show that the application for

registration of petitioner union was filed therein on July

19, 1974. Petitioner union filed a petition for

certification on August 15, 1974 or merely after a period

of twenty-seven (27) days. Section 23(b) of Republic Act

Number 875 explicitly provides, thus: 'Any labor

organization, association or union of workers dulyorganized for the material, intellectual and moral well-

being of the members shall acquire legal personality

and be entitled to all the rights and privileges within

thirty days of filing with the Office of the Secretary of

Labor notice of its due application and existence and

the following documents, together with the amount of

five pesos as registration fee, except as provided in

paragraph "d" of this section (emphasis supplied).' It is

clear therefore that the petition for certification

election was filed before the expiration of the period of

thirty (30) days. It is futile therefore for the petitioner to

claim that it has already legal personality and is entitled

to all the rights and privileges granted by law to

legitimate labor organizations by virtue of Section 23(b)

of Republic Act Number 875." 10 As noted at the outset,

such an argument rests on an infirm and shaky

foundation. It definitely runs counter to what this Court

has held and continues to hold in a number of cases in

accordance with the constitutional freedom of

association, more specifically, where labor is concerned,



to the fundamental rights of self-organization. Hence

the merit in the present petition.

1. There is pertinent to this excerpt from a recent

decision, Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera

v. Noriel: 11 "Clearly, what is at stake is the

constitutional right to freedom of association on the

part of employees. Petitioner labor union was in the

past apparently able to enlist the allegiance of theworking force in the Anglo-American Tobacco

Corporation. Thereafter, a number of such individuals

joined private respondent labor union. That is a matter

clearly left to their sole uncontrolled judgment. There is

this excerpt from Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.

Pan American Employees Association: 'There is both a

constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers

have the right to form unions to take care of their

interests vis-a-vis their employees. Their freedom to

form organizations would be rendered nugatory if they

could not choose their own leaders to speak on their

behalf and to bargain for them.' It cannot be otherwise,

for the freedom to choose which labor organization to

join is an aspect of the constitutional mandate of

protection to labor. Prior to the Industrial Peace Act,

there was a statute setting forth the guideline for the

registration of labor unions. As implied in Manila Hotel

Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, it was enacted

pursuant to what is ordained in the Constitution. Thus

in Umali v. Lovina, it was held that mandamus lies to

compel the registration of a labor organization. There is

this apt summary of what is signified in Philippine Land-

Air-Sea Labor Union v. Court of Industrial Relations, 'toallow a labor union to organize itself and acquire a

personality distinct and separate from its members and

to serve as an instrumentality to conclude collective

bargaining agreements * * *.' It is no coincidence that in

the first decision of this Court citing the Industrial Peace

Act, Pambujan United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining

Company, the role of a labor union as the agency for the

expression of the collective will affecting its members

both present and prospective, was stressed. That

statute certainly was much more emphatic as to the

vital aspect of such a right as expressly set forth in thepolicy of the law. What is more, there is in such

enactment this categorical provision on the right of

employees to self-organization: 'Employees shall have

the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist

labor organizations of their own choosing for the

purpose of collective bargaining through

representatives of their own choosing and to engage in

concerted activities for the purpose of collective

bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. The new

Labor Code is equally explicit on the matter. Thus: 'The

State shall assure the rights of workers of self-

organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure

and just and humane conditions of work.'"12

2. The matter received further elaboration in the

Federacion Obrera decision in these words: "It is thus of

the very essence of the regime of industrial democracy

sought to be attained through the collective bargaining

process that there be no obstacle to the freedom

Identified with the exercise of the right to self-

organization. Labor is to be represented by a union that

can express its collective will. In the event, and this is

usually the case, that there is more than one such group

fighting for that privilege, a certification election must

be conducted. That is the teaching of a recent decision

under the new Labor Code, United Employees Union of

Gelmart Industries v. Noriel. There is this relevant

except: 'The institution of collective bargaining is, to

recall Cox, a prime manifestation of industrial

democracy at work. The two parties to the relationship,labor and management, make their own rules by

coming to terms. That is to govern themselves in

matters that really count. As labor, however, is

composed of a number of individuals, it is indispensable

that they be represented by a labor organization of

their choice. Thus may be discerned how crucial is a

certification election. So our decisions from the earliest

case of PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Co. Free

Telephone Workers Union to the latest, Philippine

Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers'

Federation (PCWF) v. Court of Industrial Relations, have

made clear.' An even later pronouncement in Philippine

Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor

Relations, speaks similarly: 'Petitioner thus appears to

be woefully lacking in awareness of the significance of a

certification election for the collective bargaining

process. It is the fairest and most effective way of

determining which labor organization can truly

represent the working force. It is a fundamental

postulate that the will of the majority, if given

expression in an honest election with freedom on the

part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling.

No better device can assure the institution of industrialdemocracy with the two parties to a business

enterprise, management and labor, establishing a

regime of self-rule.' "13

3. Deference to the above principles so often reiterated

in a host of decisions ought to have exerted a

compelling force on respondent Director of Labor

Relations. As a matter of fact, that appeared to be the

case. He did certify on January 2, 1975 that petitioner

should be "the sole and exclusive collective bargaining

representative of all rank-and-file employees andworkers of the UE Automotive Manufacturing,

Inc." 14 The voting, having been 59 in favor of petitioner

and 52 for private respondent Union, had to be

respected. Had he stood firm, there would have been

no occasion for the certiorari petition. He did, however,

have a change of mind. On February 24, 1975, he set

aside such certification. In his comment, earlier referred

to, he would predicate this turnabout on the Union

lacking the three-day period before filing the petition

for certification under the appropriate provision of the

Industrial Peace Act then in force. That could be an

explanation, but certainly not a justification. It would

amount, to use a phrase favored by Justice Cardozo, to

a stultification of a constitutional right.

4. The excuse offered for the action taken lacks any

persuasive force. It may even be looked upon as

insubstantial, not to say flimsy. The law is quite clear;

the expression is within thirty days, not after thirty

days. Even if meritorious, however, it can be

disregarded under the maxim de minimis non curat



lex . 15 Then, too, the weakness of such a pretext is made

apparent by the well-settled principle in the Philippines

that where it concerns the weight to be accorded to the

wishes of the majority as expressed in an election

conducted fairly and honestly, certain provisions that

may be considered mandatory before the voting takes

place becomes thereafter merely directory in order that

the wishes of the electorate prevail. 16 The indefensible

character of the order of February 24, 1975 settingaside the previous order certifying to petitioner as the

exclusive bargaining representative becomes truly

apparent.

5. Nor is the different outcome called for just because

at the time of the challenged order, there was as yet no

registration of petitioner Union. If at all, that is a

circumstance far from flattering as far as the Bureau of

Labor Relations is concerned. It must be remembered

that as admitted in the comment of respondent

Director, the application for registration was filed on

July 19, 1974. The challenged order was issued seven

months later. There is no allegation that such

application suffered from any infirmity. Moreover, if

such were the case, the attention of petitioner should

have been called so that it could be corrected. Only thus

may the right to association be accorded full respect. As

far back as Umali v. Lovina,17

a 1950 decision, it was

held by this Court that under appropriate

circumstances, mandamus lies to compel registration.

There is, in addition, a letter signed by a certain Jesus C.

Cuenca, who Identified himself as the Acting Registrar

of Labor Organizations, stating that this

Office "has taken due note of your letter of July 25,

1974 informing us that this union has been accepted by

the Federation as local chapter No. 580."18

When it is

taken into consideration that the Bureau of Labor

Relations itself had allowed another labor union not

registered but affiliated with the same Federation to be

entitled to the rights of a duly certified labor

organization, there would appear clearly an element of

arbitrariness in the actuation of respondent

Director.

19

It is likewise impressed with a character of adenial of equal protection. Lastly, this Court,

in Nationalists Party v. Bautista, 20 where one of the

defenses raised is lack of capacity of petitioner as a

juridical person entitled to institute proceedings, after

holding that it was entitled to the remedy of prohibition

sought, allowed it either to amend its petition so as to

substitute a juridical person, or to show that it is

entitled to institute such proceeding. So it should be in

this Case. In the absence of any fatal defect to the

application for registration, there is no justification for

withholding it from petitioner to enable it to exercise

fully its constitutional right to freedom of association. In

the alternative, the petition could very well be

considered as having been filed by the parent labor

federation. What is decisive is that the members of

petitioner Union did exercise their fundamental right to

self-organization and did win in a fair and honest

election.

WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is granted, the

challenged order of February 24, 1975 setting aside the

certification is nullified and declared void, and the

previous order of January 2, 1975 certifying to

petitioner Union as the "sole and exclusive collective

bargaining representative of all rank and file employees

and workers of the U.E. Automotive Manufacturing

Company, Inc.," declared valid and binding. Whatever

other rights petitioner Union may have under the

present Labor Code should likewise be accorded

recognition by respondent Director of the Bureau ofLabor Relations. This decision is immediately executory.

No costs.



G.R. No. 92391 July 3, 1992

PHILIPPINE FRUITS AND VEGETABLE INDUSTRIES,INC., petitioner,

vs.

HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Secretary ofthe Department of Labor and Employment and TRADEUNION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES

(TUPAS), respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari with prayer for the

issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or

preliminary injunction assails the following:

(1) The Resolution dated December 12, 1989 of public

respondent Secretary of Labor

1

affirming on appeal theOrder dated March 7, 1989 issued by Med-Arbiter

Danilo T. Basa, and certifying private respondent Trade

Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (or TUPAS)

as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all regular

rank-and-file and seasonal workers at Philippine Fruits

and Vegetable Industries, Inc. (or PFVII), petitioner

herein; and

(2) The Order dated February 8, 1990 issued by public

respondent Secretary of Labor 2 denying petitioner's

Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner PFVII contends the questioned resolution and

order are null and void as they are contrary to law and

have been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and

having no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in

the ordinary course of law, it filed with this Court the

petition now at hand.

The facts of the case are well-stated in the Comment

filed by the Solicitor General, and are thus reproduced

hereunder, as follows:

On October 13, 1988, Med-Arbiter Basa

issued an Order granting the petition

for Certification election filed by the

Trade Union of the Philippines and

Allied Services (TUPAS). Said order

directed the holding of a certification

election among the regular and

seasonal workers of the Philippine

Fruits and Vegetables, Inc. (p. 42, NLRC,

Records).

After a series of pre-election

conferences, all issues relative to the

conduct of the certification election

were threshed out except that which

pertains to the voting qualifications of

the hundred ninety four (194) workers

enumerated in the lists of qualified

voters submitted by TUPAS.

After a late submission by the parties of

their respective position papers, Med-

Arbiter Basa issued an Order dated

December 9, 1988 allowing 184 of the

194 questioned workers to vote,

subject to challenge, in the certification

election to be held on December 16,

1989. Copies of said Order were

furnished the parties (p. 118, NLRC,Records) and on December 12, 1988 the

notice of certification election was duly

posted. One hundred sixty eight (168)

of the questioned workers actually

voted on election day.

In the scheduled certification election,

petitioner objected to the proceeding,

through a Manifestation (p. 262, NLRC,

Records) filed with the Representation

Officer before the close of the election

proceedings. Said Manifestation

pertinently reads:

The posting of the list

of eligible voters

authorized to

participate in the

certification election

was short of the five (5)

days provided by law

considering that it was

posted only onDecember 12, 1988 and

the election was held

today, December 16,

1988 is only four days

prior to the scheduled


By agreement of petitioner and TUPAS,

workers whose names were

inadvertently omitted in the list of

qualified voters were allowed to vote,subject to challenge (p. 263, NLRC,

Records). Thirty eight of them voted on

election day.

Initial tally of the election results

excluding the challenged votes showed

the following:

Total No. of the Votes

291

Yes votes 40

No votes 38

Spoiled 7

Challenged (Regular) 38

——

Total No. of Votes Cast

123

On January 6, 1989, Management and

TUPAS agreed to have the 36



challenged votes of the regular rank-

and-file employees opened and a

canvass thereof showed:

Yes votes 20

No votes 14

Spoiled 4

——

Total 38

Added to the initial election results of

December 16, 1988, the canvass of

results showed:

Yes 60

No 52

Spoiled 11

——

Total 123

Based on the foregoing results, the yes

votes failed to obtain the majority of

the votes cast in said certification

election, hence, the necessity of

opening the 168 challenged votes to

determine the true will of the

employees.

On January 20, 1989, petitioner filed a

position paper arguing against the

opening of said votes mainly because

said voters are not regular employeesnor seasonal workers for having

allegedly rendered work for less than

180 days.

Trade Union of the Philippines and

Allied Services (TUPAS), on the other

hand, argued that the employment

status of said employees has been

resolved when Labor Arbiter Ricardo N.

Martinez, in his Decision dated

November 26, 1988 rendered in NLRCCase No. Sub-Rab-01-09-7-0087-88,

declared that said employees were

illegally dismissed.

In an Order dated February 2, 1989 (pp.

278-280, NLRC, Records) Med-Arbiter

Basa ordered the opening of said 168

challenged votes upon his observation

that said employees were illegally

dismissed in accordance with the

foregoing Decision of Labor ArbiterMartinez. As canvassed, the results

showed

Yes votes 165

No votes 0

Spoiled 3

——

Total 168

On February 23, 1989, petitioner

formally filed a Protest (pp.

284-287, NLRC, Records) claiming that

the required five day posting of notice

was not allegedly complied with and

that the list of qualified voters so

posted failed to include fifty five regular

workers agreed upon by the parties as

qualified to vote. The Protest furtheralleged that voters who were ineligible

to vote were allowed to vote.

Med-Arbiter Basa, in his Order dated

March 7, 1989, dismissed said Protest

which Order was affirmed on appeal in

the Resolution dated December 12,

1989 of then Secretary of Labor,

Franklin Drillon.

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration

was denied for lack of merit in public

respondent's Order dated February 28,

1990.

(pp. 84-88, Rollo) 3

The instant petition has, for its Assignment of Errors,

the following:

(1) The Honorable Secretary of Labor

and Employment acted with grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and committed manifest

error in upholding the certification of

TUPAS as the sole bargaining agent

mainly on an erroneous ruling that the

protest against the canvassing of the

votes cast by 168 dismissed workers

was filed beyond the reglementary

period.

(2) The Honorable Secretary of Labor

committed an abuse of discretion incompletely disregarding the issue as to

whether or not non-regular seasonal

workers who have long been separated

from employment prior to the filing of

the petition for certification election

would be allowed to vote and

participate in a certification election. 4

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

For it is to be noted that the formal protest of petitionerPFVII was filed beyond the reglementary period. A close

reading of Sections 3 and 4, Rule VI, Book V of the

Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, which read as

follows:

Sec. 3. Representation officer may rule

on any-on-the-spot questions. — The

Representation officer may rule on any

on-the-spot question arising from the



conduct of the election. The interested

party may however, file a protest with

the representation officer before the

close of the proceedings.

Protests not so raised are deemed

waived . Such protest shall be contained

in the minutes of the proceedings.

(Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 4. Protest to be decided in twenty

(20) working days. — Where the protest

is formalized before the med-arbiter

with five (5) days after the close of the

election proceedings, the med-arbiter

shall decide the same within twenty

(20) working days from the date of

formalization. If not formalized within

the prescribed period, the protest shall

be deemed dropped. The decision may

be appealed to the Bureau in the same

manner and on the same grounds as

provided under Rule V. (Emphasis

supplied)

would readily yield, as a matter of procedure, the

following requirements in order that a protest filed

thereunder would prosper, to wit:

(1) The protest must be filed with the

representation officer and made of

record in the minutes of theproceedings before the close of election

proceedings, and

(2) The protest must be formalized

before the Med-Arbiter within five (5)

days after the close of the election

proceedings.

The records before Us quite clearly disclose the fact that

petitioner, after filing a manifestation of protest on

December 16, 1988, election day, only formalized thesame on February 20, 1989, or more than two months

after the close of election proceedings (i.e., December

16, 1988). We are not persuaded by petitioner's

arguments that election proceedings include not only

casting of votes but necessarily includes canvassing and

appreciation of votes cast and considering that the

canvassing and appreciation of all the votes cast were

terminated only on February 16, 1989, it was only then

that the election proceedings are deemed closed, and

thus, when the formal protest was filed on February 20,

1989, the five-day period within which to file the formal

protest still subsisted and its protest was therefore

formalized within the reglementary period. 5

As explained correctly by the Solicitor General, the

phrase "close of election proceedings" as used in

Sections 3 and 4 of the pertinent Implementing Rules

refers to that period from the closing of the polls to the

counting and tabulation of the votes as it could not

have been the intention of the Implementing Rules to

include in the term "close of the election proceedings"

the period for the final determination of the challenged

votes and the canvass thereof, as in the case at bar

which may take a very long period. 6 Thus, if a protest

can be formalized within five days after a final

determination and canvass of the challenged votes have

been made, it would result in an undue delay in the

affirmation of the employees' expressed choice of a

bargaining representative. 7

Petitioner would likewise bring into issue the fact that

the notice of certification election was posted only on

December 12, 1988 or four days before the scheduled

elections on December 16, 1988, instead of the five-day

period as required under Section 1 of Rule VI, Book V of

the Implementing Rules. But it is not disputed that a

substantial number, or 291 of 322 qualified voters, of

the employees concerned were informed, thru the

notices thus posted, of the elections to be held on

December 16, 1988, and that such employees had in

fact voted accordingly on election day. Viewed thus in

the light of the substantial participation in the elections

by voter-employees, and further in the light of the all-

too settled rule that in interpreting the Constitution's

protection to labor and social justice provisions and the

labor laws and rules and regulations implementing the

constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court adopts the

liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor

rights, 8 We find the lack of one day in the posting of

notices insignificant, and hence, not a compelling

reason at all in nullifying the elections.

As regards the second assignment of error, the publicrespondent Secretary of Labor did not completely

disregard the issue as to the voting rights of the alleged

separated employees for precisely, he affirmed on

appeal the findings of the Med-Arbiter when he ruled

The election results indicate that TUPAS

obtained majority of the valid votes cast

in the election — 60 plus 165, or a total

of 225 votes out of a possible total of

291.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

appeal is hereby denied and the Med-

Arbiter's order dated 7 March 1989

affirmed. Petitioner TUPAS is hereby

certified as the sole and exclusive

bargaining agent of all regular rank-and-

file and seasonal workers at Philippine

Fruits and Vegetable Industries,

Inc.9 (p. 26, Rollo)

At any rate, it is now well-settled that employees who

have been improperly laid off but who have a present,

unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment,

are eligible to vote in certification elections.10

Thus, and

to repeat, if the dismissal is under question, as in the

case now at bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal

and/or unfair labor practice was filed, the employees

concerned could still qualify to vote in the elections.11

And finally, the Court would wish to stress once more

the rule which it has consistently pronounced in many



earlier cases that a certification election is the sole

concern of the workers and the employer is regarded as

nothing more than a bystander with no right to

interfere at all in the election. The only exception here

is where the employer has to file a petition for

certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the

Labor Code because it is requested to bargain

collectively. Thus, upon the score alone of the

"Bystander Rule", the instant petition would have beendismissed outright.

WHEREFORE, the petition filed by Philippine Fruits and

Vegetable Industries, Inc. (PFVII) in hereby DISMISSED

for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 97189 May 11, 1993

JISSCOR INDEPENDENT UNION, petitioner,

vs.

HON. RUBEN TORRES and BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA,in their capacity as Secretary and Undersecretary ofLabor, respectively; ASSOCIATED LABOR UNI0N (ALU)and SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG

JISSCOR, respondents.

Romeo B. Igot Law Office for petitioner.

Joji L. Barrios for private respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

On June 27, 1990, petitioner JISSCOR Independent

Union (JIU) filed a petition for certification electionamong the rank-and-file employees of the Jacinto Iron

and Steel Sheets Corporation (JISSCOR) before the Med-

Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and

Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region, Manila.

By agreement of the petitioner, JIU, the intervenor SMJ-

ALU and the JISSCOR management, the Med-Arbiter

issued an Order on August 29, 1990, setting the

certification election on September 4, 1990.

However, on the appointed date, instead of an election,

as previously agreed upon by all the parties, another

pre-election conference was held in the Department of

Labor and Employment. Another agreement was

entered into by JIU, JISSCOR and SMJ-ALU, providing

that the election would be conducted on September 6,

1990 from 8:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M., and that "the

mandatory five (5) days posting is hereby waived by

agreement of the parties" (p. 172, Rollo).

The results of the certification election held on

September 6, 1990 were the following:

JISSCOR Independent Union 46

Samahang Manggagawa ng JISSCOR-

ALU 50

No Union 0

Spoiled 3

Total Votes Cast 99 (p. 21, Rollo.)

The JIU, which obtained only the second highest

number of votes, registered a protest in the minutes of

the election stating that: "we file protest on the

following grounds using visor, emblem" (p. 174, Rollo).

On September 11, 1990, the JIU filed a formal protest

before the Department of Labor, National Capital

Region, on the following grounds:

I. The election was conducted very

disorderly and irregular (sic) as there

was no compliance of (sic) mandatory

posting of notice of certification

election and necessary list of qualified

voters in accordance to (sic) Section 1

of Rule VI of the Implementing Rules

and Regulations;

II. The lack of the required posting had

mislead (sic) and/or misinformed the

voters/workers of the manner of voting,

thus it resulted to some spoiled votes;

III. Escorting of workers by SMJ-ALU

officers and members, especially a

certain Rene Tan from their place of

work to the election registration;

IV. Forcing the workers to vote for SMJ-

ALU by posting of a very big streamer

with printed words: Vote! Samahang

Manggagawa Ng JISSCOR-ALU at the

entrance front door of the chapel

where the election was held;

V. Forcing the workers to vote for SMJ-

ALU by wearing of sunvisors and pins

with printed words: Vote! SMJ-ALU

before and during voting inside the

polling place (chapel). (pp- 45-

46, Rollo.)

On November 21, 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas F.

Falconitin issued an Order declaring the September 6,

1990 certification election null and void.

On December 12, 1990, the winner, respondent SMJ-

ALU appealed to the DOLE Secretary and prayed that it

be declared the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of

the rank-and-file employees of JISSCOR.

On January 18, 1991, a decision was rendered by theSecretary of Labor and Employment granting the appeal

of SMJ-ALU and setting aside the Order dated

November 21, 1990 of the Med-Arbiter. A new order

was entered certifying SMJ-ALU as the sole and

exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file

workers of JISSCOR pursuant to the results of the

certification election conducted on September 6, 1990.

In due time, the JIU filed this petition

for certiorari alleging that the public respondents

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting toexcess of jurisdiction in certifying SMJ-ALU as the sole

and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file

employees of JISSCOR.

The petition has no merit.

Section 3, Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules

implementing the Labor Code provides that the grounds

of a protest may be filed on the spot or in writing with



the representation officer and shall be contained in the

minutes of the proceedings. Protests not so raised are

deemed waived.

The minutes of the certification election show,

however, that JIU only protested against the use of

emblem, visor, pin. Hence, other "protests [such as the

posting in the chapel entrance of a huge streamer with

the words: "Vote! Samahang Manggagawa ng JISSCOR-ALU"]not so raised are deemed waived" (Sec. 3, Rule VI,

Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor

Code).

There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the

non-posting of the notice of the certification election as

prescribed by Section 1, Rule VI, Book V of the Onmibus

Rules Implementing the labor Code misled and

confused the workers regarding the mechanics of the

election. The petitioner is estopped from raising that

issue for it signed an agreement with the private

respondent to waive the mandatory five (5) days

posting of election notices. The doctrine of estoppel is

based on grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good

faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to

speak against his own act, representations, or

commitments to the injury of one to whom they were

directed and who reasonably relied thereon (PNB vs.

Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 357).

The results of the certification election belie the

petitioner's allegation that the workers were

misinformed about the election for the records showthat out of 104 eligible voters, 99 were able to cast their

votes and only 3 were spoiled ballots.

On the alleged use of sunvisors, pins, emblems and the

posting of a huge streamer, the Undersecretary found:

. . . nothing in the records shows that

the alleged wearing of sunvisors and

pins, the posting of huge streamers, as

well as the alleged escorting of voters

by SMJ-ALU have unduly pressured,influenced, vitiated, or in any manner

affected the choice of the workers of

their bargaining agent. (p. 49, Rollo.)

That finding of fact of the head of an administrative

agency is conclusive upon the court (Reyes vs. Minister

of Labor, 170 SCRA 134).

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on

the part of the public respondents, the Secretary and

Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, in renderingthe questioned decision, the petition for certiorari is

hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the

Undersecretary of Labor, by authority of the Secretary

of Labor, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. L-24711 April 30, 1968

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

BCI EMPLOYEES and WORKERS UNION-PAFLU,PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS,CIPRIANO CID and JUANITO GARCIA, defendants-

appellees.

Ross, Selph, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for plaintiff-

appellant.

Cipriano Cid and Associates for defendants-appellees.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The contending parties in this case —Benguet

Consolidated, Inc., ("BENGUET") on the one hand, and

on the other, BCI Employees & Workers Union

("UNION") and the Philippine Association of Free Labor

Unions ("PAFLU") —do not dispute the following factualsettings established by the lower court.

On June 23, 1959, the Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union

("BBWU"), for and in behalf of all BENGUET employees

in its mines and milling establishment located at

Balatoc, Antamok and Acupan, Municipality of Itogon,

Mt. Province, entered into a Collective Bargaining

Contract, Exh. "Z" ("CONTRACT") with BENGUET.

Pursuant to its very terms, said CONTRACT became

effective for a period of four and a half (4-½) years, or

from June 23, 1959 to December 23, 1963. It likewise

embodied a No-Strike, No-Lockout clause. 1

About three years later, or on April 6, 1962, a

certification election was conducted by the Department

of Labor among all the rank and file employees of

BENGUET in the same collective bargaining units.

UNION obtained more than 50% of the total number of

votes, defeating BBWU, and accordingly, the Court of

Industrial Relations, on August 18, 1962, certified

UNION as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining

agent of all BENGUET employees as regards rates of

pay, wages, hours of work and such other terms andconditions of employment allowed them by law or

contract.

Subsequently, separate meetings were conducted on

November 22, 23 and 24, 1962 at Antamok, Balatoc and

Acupan Mines respectively by UNION. The result

thereof was the approval by UNION members of a

resolution 2directing its president to file a notice of

strike against BENGUET for:

1. [Refusal] to grant any amount as monthlyliving allowance for the workers;

2. Violation of Agreements reached in

conciliation meetings among which is the taking

down of investigation [sic] and statements of

employees without the presence of union

representative;

3. Refusal to dismiss erring executive after

affidavits had been presented, thereby

company showing [sic] bias and partiality to

company personnel;

4. Discrimination against union members in the

enforcement of disciplinary actions.

The Notice of Strike3

was filed on December 28, 1962.Three months later, in the evening of March 2, 1963,

UNION members who were BENGUET employees in the

mining camps at Acupan, Antamok and Balatoc, went

on strike. Regarding the conduct of the strike, the trial

court reports: 4

... Picket lines were formed at strategic points

within the premises of the plaintiff. The

picketers, by means of threats and intimidation,

and in some instances by the use of force and

violence, prevented passage thru the picket

lines by personnel of the plaintiff who were

reporting for work. Human blocks were formed

on points of entrance to working areas so that

even vehicles could not pass thru, while the

officers of the plaintiff were not allowed for

sometime to leave the "staff" area.

The strikers forming picket lines bore placards

with the letters BBWU-PAFLU written thereon.

As a general rule, the picketers were unruly,

aggressive and uttered threatening remarks to

staff members and non-strikers who desire topass thru the picket lines. On some occasions,

the picketers resorted to violence by pushing

back the car wherein staff officers were riding

who would like to enter the mine working area.

The picketers lifted one side of the vehicle and

were in the act of overturning it when they

were prevented from doing so by the timely

intervention of PC soldiers, who threw tear gas

bombs to make the crowd disperse. Many of

the picketers were apprehended by the PC

soldiers and criminal charges for grave coercionwere filed against them before the Court of

First Instance of Baguio. Two of the strike

leaders and twenty-two picketers, however,

were found guilty of light coercion while

nineteen other accused were acquitted.

There was a complete stoppage of work during

the strike in all the mines. After two weeks

elapsed, repair and maintenance of the water

pump was allowed by the strikers and some of

the staff members were permitted to enter the

mines, who inspected the premises in the

company of PC soldiers to ascertain the extent

of the damage to the equipment and losses of

company property.

x x x x x x x x x

On May 2, 1963, the parties agreed to end the raging

dispute. Accordingly, BENGUET and UNION executed

the AGREEMENT, Exh. 1. PAFLU placed its conformity



thereto and said agreement was attested to by the

Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. About a year

later or on January 29, 1964, a collective bargaining

contract was finally executed between UNION-PAFLU

and BENGUET. 5

Meanwhile, as a result, allegedly, of the strike staged by

UNION and its members, BENGUET had to incur

expenses for the rehabilitation of mine openings, repairof mechanical equipment, cost of pumping water out of

the mines, value of explosives, tools and supplies lost

and/or destroyed, and other miscellaneous expenses,

all amounting to P1,911,363.83. So, BENGUET sued

UNION, PAFLU and their respective Presidents to

recover said amount in the Court of First Instance of

Manila, on the sole premise that said defendants

breached their undertaking in the existing CONTRACT

not to strike during the effectivity thereof .

In answer to BENGUET's complaint, defendants unions

and their respective presidents put up the following

defenses: (1) they were not bound by the CONTRACT

which BBWU, the defeated union, had executed with

BENGUET; (2) the strike was due, inter alia, to unfair

labor practices of BENGUET; and (3) the strike was

lawful and in the exercise of the legitimate rights of

UNION-PAFLU under Republic Act 875.

Issues having been joined, trial commenced. On

February 23, 1965, the trial court rendered judgment

dismissing the complaint on the ground that the

CONTRACT, particularly the No-Strike clause, did notbind defendants. The latters' counterclaim was likewise

denied. Failing to get a reconsideration of said decision,

BENGUET interposed the present appeal.

The several errors assigned by BENGUET basically ask

three questions:

(1) Did the Collective Bargaining Contract

executed between BENGUET and BBWU on

June 23, 1959 and effective until December 23,

1963 automatically bind UNION-PAFLU upon itscertification, on August 18, 1962, as sole

bargaining representative of all BENGUET

employees?

(2) Are defendants labor unions and their

respective presidents liable for the illegal acts

committed during the course of the strike and

picketing by some union members?

(3) Are defendants liable to pay the damages

claimed by BENGUET?

In support of an affirmative answer to the first question,

BENGUET first invokes the so-called "Doctrine of

Substitution" referred to in General Maritime

Stevedores' Union v. South Sea Shipping Lines, L-14689,

July 26, 1960. There it was remarked:

x x x x x x x x x

We also hold that where the bargaining

contract is to run for more than two years, the

principle of substitution may well be adopted

and enforced by the CIR to the effect that after

two years of the life of a bargaining agreement,

a certification election may be allowed by the

CIR; that if a bargaining agent other than the

union or organization that executed the

contract, is elected, said new agent would haveto respect said contract , but that it may bargain

with the management for the shortening of the

life of the contract if it considers it too long, or

refuse to renew the contract pursuant to an

automatic renewal clause. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x x x x x x x

The submission utterly fails to persuade Us. The above-

quoted pronouncement was obiter dictum. The only

issue in the General Maritime Stevedores' Union case

was whether a collective bargaining agreement which

had practically run for 5 years constituted a bar to

certification proceedings. We held it did not and

accordingly directed the court a quo to order

certification elections. With that, nothing more was

necessary for the disposition of the case. Moreover, the

pronouncement adverted to was rather premature. The

possible certification of a union different from that

which signed the bargaining contract was a mere

contingency then since the elections were still to be

held. Clearly, the Court was not called upon to rule on

possible effects of such proceedings on the bargainingagreement. 6

But worse, BENGUET's reliance upon the Principle of

Substitution is totally misplaced. This principle,

formulated by the NLRB 7 as its initial compromise

solution to the problem facing it when there occurs a

shift in employees' union allegiance after the execution

of a bargaining contract with their employer, merely

states that even during the effectivity of a collective

bargaining agreement executed between employer and

employees thru their agent, the employees can changesaid agent but the contract continues to bind them up to

its expiration date. They may bargain however for the

shortening of said expiration date. 8

In formulating the "substitutionary" doctrine, the only

consideration involved was the employees' interest in

the existing bargaining agreement. The agent's interest

never entered the picture. In fact, the justification 9 for

said doctrine was:

... that the majority of the employees, as an

entity under the statute, is the true party in

interest to the contract , holding rights through

the agency of the union representative. Thus,

any exclusive interest claimed by the agent is

defeasible at the will of the principal....

(Emphasis supplied)

Stated otherwise, the "substitutionary" doctrine only

provides that the employees cannot revoke the validly

executed collective bargaining contract with their



employer by the simple expedient of changing their

bargaining agent. And it is in the light of this that the

phrase "said new agent would have to respect said

contract" must be understood. It only means that the

employees, thru their new bargaining agent, cannot

renege on their collective bargaining contract, except of

course to negotiate with management for the

shortening thereof.

The "substitutionary" doctrine, therefore, cannot be

invoked to support the contention that a newly certified

collective bargaining agent automatically assumes all

the personal undertakings — like the no-strike

stipulation here — in the collective bargaining

agreement made by the deposed union. When BBWU

bound itself and its officers not to strike, it could not

have validly bound also all the other rival unions

existing in the bargaining units in question. BBWU was

the agent of the employees, not of the other unions

which possess distinct personalities. To consider UNION

contractually bound to the no-strike stipulation would

therefore violate the legal maxim thatres inter alios nec

prodest nec nocet . 10

Of course, UNION, as the newly certified bargaining

agent, could always voluntarily assume all the personal

undertakings made by the displaced agent. But as the

lower court found, there was no showing at all that,

prior to the strike, 11 UNION formally adopted the

existing CONTRACT as its own and assumed all the

liability ties imposed by the same upon BBWU.

BENGUET also alleges that UNION is now in estoppel to

claim that it is not contractually bound by the

CONTRACT for having filed on September 28, 1962, in

Civil Case No. 1150 of the Court of First Instance of

Baguio, entitled "Bobok Lumber Jack Ass'n. vs. Benguet

Consolidated, Inc. and BCI Employees Workers Union-

PAFLU" 12 a motion praying for the dissolution of the ex

parte writ of preliminary injunction issued therein,

wherein the following appears:

In that case, the CIR transfered the contactualrights of the BBWU to the defendant union. One

of such rights transferred was the right to the

modified union-shop — checked off union dues

arrangement now under injunction.

The collective bargaining contract mentioned in

the plaintiff's complaint did not expire by the

mere fact that the defendant union was

certified as bargaining agent in place of the

BBWU. The Court of Industrial Relations in the

case above mentioned made it clear that the

collective bargaining contract would be

respected unless and until the parties act

otherwise. In effect, the defendant union by act

of subrogation took the place of the BBWU as

the UNION referred to in the contract .

(Emphasis supplied)

There is no estoppel. UNION did not assert the above

statement against BENGUET to force it to rely upon the

same to effect the union check-off in its favor. UNION

and BENGUET were together as co-defendants in said

Civil Case No. 1150. Rather, the statement was directed

against Bobok Lumber Jack Ass'n., plaintiff therein, to

weaken its cause of action. Moreover, BENGUET did not

rely upon said statement. What prompted Bobok

Lumber Jack Ass'n. to file the complaint for declaratory

relief was the fact that "... the defendants [UNION and

BENGUET] are planning to agree to the continuation of

a modified union shop in the three camps mentionedabove without giving the employees concerned the

opportunity to express their wishes on the matter ..."

BENGUET even went further in its answer filed on

October 18, 1962, by asserting that "... defendants

havealready agreed to the continuation of the modified

union shop provision in the collective bargaining

agreement...."13

Neither can we accept BENGUET's contention that the

inclusion of said aforequoted motion in the record on

appeal filed in said Civil Case No. 1150, now on appeal

before Us docketed as case No. L-24729, refutes

UNION's allegation that it has subsequently abandoned

its stand against Bobok Lumber Jack Ass'n., in said case.

The mere appearance of such motion in the record on

appeal is but a compliance with the procedural

requirement of Rule 41, Sec. 6, of the Rules of Court,

that all matters necessary for a proper understanding of

the issues involved be included in the record on appeal.

This therefore cannot be taken as a rebuttal of the

UNION's explanation.

There is nothing then, in law as well as in fact, tosupport plaintiff BENGUET's contention that defendants

are contractually bound by the CONTRACT. And the

stand taken by the trial court all the more becomes

unassailable in the light of Art. 1704 of the Civil Code

providing that:

In the collective bargaining, the labor union or

members of the board or committee signing the

contract shall be liable for non-fulfillment

thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no question, defendants were not signatories

nor participants in the CONTRACT.

Lastly, BENGUET contends, citing Clause II in connection

with Clause XVIII of the CONTRACT, that since all the

employees, as principals, continue being bound by the

no-strike stipulation until the CONTRACT's expiration,

UNION, as their agent, must necessarily be bound also

pursuant to the Law on Agency. This is untenable. The

way We understand it, everything binding on a duly

authorized agent, acting as such, is binding on the

principal; not vice-versa, unless there is a mutual

agency, or unless the agent expressly binds himself to

the party with whom he contracts. As the Civil Code

decrees it: 14

The agent who acts as such is not personally

liable to the party with whom he contracts,

unless he expressly binds himself or exceeds the

limits of his authority without giving such party



sufficient notice of his powers. (Emphasis

supplied)1äwphï1.ñët

Here, it was the previous agent who expressly bound

itself to the other party, BENGUET. UNION, the new

agent, did not assume this undertaking of BBWU.

In view of all the foregoing, We see no further necessity

of delving further into the other less important pointsraised by BENGUET in connection with the first

question.

On the second question, it suffices to consider, in

answer thereto, that the rule of vicarious liability has,

since the passage of Republic Act 875, been expressly

legislated out. 15 The standing rule now is that for a

labor union and/or its officials and members to be

liable, there must be clear proof of actual participation

in, or authorization or ratification of the illegal

acts. 16 While the lower court found that some strikers

and picketers resorted to intimidation and actual

violence, it also found that defendants presented

uncontradicted evidence that before and during the

strike, the strike leaders had time and again warned the

strikers not to resort to violence but to conduct

peaceful picketing only. 17 Assuming that the strikers did

not heed these admonitions coming from their leaders,

the failure of the union officials to go against the erring

union members pursuant to the UNION and PAFLU

constitutions and by-laws exposes, at the most, only a

flaw or weakness in the defense which, however,

cannot be the basis for plaintiff BENGUET to recover.

Lastly, paragraph VI of the Answer 18 sufficiently

traverses the material allegations in paragraph VI of the

Complaint, 19 thus precluding a fatal admission on

defendants' part. The purpose behind the rule requiring

specific denial is obtained: defendants have set forth

the matters relied upon in support of their denial.

Paragraph VI of the Answer may not be a model

pleading, but it suffices for purposes of the rule.

Pleadings should, after all, be liberally construed. 20

Since defendants were not contractually bound by the

no-strike clause in the CONTRACT, for the simple reason

that they were not parties thereto, they could not be

liable for breach of contract to plaintiff. The lower court

therefore correctly absolved them from liability.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court appealed

from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered



[G.R. No. 111836. February 1, 1996]

PAMBANSANG KAPATIRAN NG MGA ANAK PAWIS SAFORMEY PLASTIC NATIONAL WORKERSBROTHERHOOD, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OFLABOR, SECRETARY BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA,FORMEY PLASTIC, INC., KALIPUNAN NGMANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMAPI) andMED-ARBITER RASIDALI C.ABDULLAH, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The rank and file workers of Formey Plastic, Inc.

(FORMEY), formed a local union known as Pambansang

Kapatiran ng mga Anak Pawis sa Formey

Plastic (KAPATIRAN) under the auspices of the NationalWorkers Brotherhood (NWB). They ratified their

Constitution and By-Laws on 4 April 1993.

On 22 April 1993 KAPATIRAN filed a Petition for

Certification Election[1] with the Department of Labor

and Employment Med-Arbiter Division alleging that

there was no existing and effective Collective Bargaining

Agreement (CBA) between FORMEY and any union;

neither was there any recognized union within the

company.

FORMEY moved to dismiss the

petition[2] while Kalipunan ng Manggagawang

Pilipino (KAMAPI) intervened and likewise moved to

dismiss[3] on the ground that there was already a duly

registered CBA covering the period 1 January 1992 to 31

December 1996 hence the “contract bar rule”[4] would

apply. KAPATIRAN opposed both motions to

dismiss[5] with an Addendum[6]

thereto claiming that the

CBA executed between FORMEY and KAMAPI was

fraudulently registered with the Department of Labor

and Employment and that it was defective since what

was certified as bargaining agent was KAMAPI which, as

a federation, only served as mere agent of the localunion hence without any legal personality to sign in

behalf of the latter.

Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah found that a valid

and existing CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI

effectively barred the filing of the petition for

certification election.[7]

KAPATIRAN appealed[8] imputing grave abuse of

discretion to the Med-Arbiter in applying the “contract

bar rule” and in not adopting the case of Progressive

Development Corporation v. Secretary, Department ofLabor and Employment ,

[9] as authority to disregard the

CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI. The Secretary of

Labor acting through Undersecretary Bienvenido E.

Laguesma upheld the decision of the Med-

Arbiter.[10] The Motion for Reconsideration having been

denied[11] KAPATIRAN now files this Petition for

Certiorar i [12]

charging the Secretary of Labor with grave

abuse of discretion in applying the “contract bar rule”

literally and in ruling that the Progressive Development

Corporation[13]

case could not be invoked.

Pending resolution of the petition KAMAPI filed

an Urgent Motion to Dismiss[14]

the instant petition

contending that it had become moot and academic due

to the cancellation of NWB’s[15] certificate of

registration and its delisting from the roll of

labor federations.[16] KAPATIRAN opposed the

motion[17] claiming that the cancellation and delisting

were not yet final and executory considering that it had

filed a motion for reconsideration[18] with the Bureau of

Labor Relations.

The rule is that findings of facts of quasi-judicial

agencies will not be disturbed unless there is a showing

of grave abuse of discretion. We find none in the case

at bench. We therefore affirm that there is a validly

executed collective bargaining agreement between

FORMEY and KAMAPI.

Art. 253-A of the Labor Code provides that “(n)opetition questioning the majority status of the

incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no

certification election shall be conducted by the

Department of Labor and Employment outside of the

sixty (60) day period immediately before the date of

expiry of such five-year term of the collective bargaining

agreement.” Sec. 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus

Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides that “x x x

(i)f a collective bargaining agreement has been duly

registered in accordance with Article .231 of the Code, a

petition for certification election or a motion forintervention can only be entertained within sixty (60)

days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.”

The subject agreement was made effective 1

January 1992 and is yet to expire on 31 December

1996. The petition for certification election having been

filed on 22 April 1993 it is therefore clear that said

petition must fail since it was filed before the so-called

60-day freedom period. KAPATIRAN insists that the CBA

was a fake it having been surreptitiously registered with

the Department of Labor and Employment.

The resolution of this issue hinges on the

determination of factual matters which certainly is not

within the ambit of the present petition for

certiorari. Besides, the contention is without any legal

basis at all; it is purely speculative and bereft of any

documentary support. Petitioner itself even admitted

the existence of an agreement but argued that its

provisions were not being implemented nor adhered to

at all. Suffice it to mention that the filing of the petition

for certification election is not the panacea to this

allegedly anomalous situation. Violations of collective

bargaining agreements constitute unfair labor practiceas provided for under Art. 248, par. (i), of the Labor

Code. In consonance thereto, Art. 261 equips petitioner

with the proper and appropriate recourse

-Art. 261. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of

Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive

jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances

arising from the interpretation or implementation of

the Collective Bargaining Agreement x x x Accordingly,

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/feb1996/111836.htm#_edn1



































































violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except

those which are gross in character, shall no longer be

treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved

under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For

purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective

Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or

malicious refusal to comply with the economic provision

of such agreement.

The CBA entered into between FORMEY and

KAMAPI stipulates among others –

Article IX - GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

Sec. 1. Any complaint, grievance, difficulty,

disagreement or dispute arising out of any section

taken (sic) by the Company and/or by the Union

concerning the interpretation of the terms and

conditions of the agreement and/or which may arise

regarding (sic) the terms and conditions of employment

shall be settled in the manner provided for under thisArticle.

Sec. 2. The Company and the Union agree to create and

establish a Grievance Committee composed of two (2)

representatives from the Company and two (2) from

theUnion to receive complaint, grievance or dispute

from the workers and/or from the Company with the

view to settle it amicably.

Sec. 3. In case a complaint or grievance has been filed

by either the Union or the Company, the grievancecommittee shall discuss the same and have (sic) to

settle it. If after the meeting of the grievance

committee no satisfactory settlement is reached the

matter shall be referred to the top officers of

the Union and the Company for the settlement of the

said grievance or dispute.

Sec. 4. Within five (5) days from the time the top

officers of the Union and the Company has (sic) failed to

reach an amicable settlement of the grievance or

dispute, the same shall be submitted for voluntary

arbitration. The arbitrator or arbitrators shall be chosen

by lottery and the union and the Company shall

avail (sic) the list of arbitrators of the Honorable Bureau

of Labor Relations.

Sec. 5. The mutually agreed or chosen arbitrator shall

proceed to try and hear the case and for (sic) the

reception of evidence and to call witnesses to testify

and after the submission of the case by both parties an

award or order shall be issued in accordance with the

rules and guidelines promulgated by the Honorable

Department of Labor and Employment based on thepertinent laws and established jurisprudence. The

expenses of the arbitration proceedings shall be

borned (sic) equally by the Company and theUnion.[19]

By filing the petition for certification election it is

clear that KAPATIRAN did not avail of the

abovementioned grievance procedure.

It is further argued that the CBA has no binding

force since it was entered into by KAMAPI as a

federation and not by the local union. Perusal of the

agreement proves the contention flawed. The

signatories for KAMAPI consisted of its national

president and of the duly elected officers of the local

union. Thus the fact that KAMAPI was particularly

mentioned as the bargaining party without specifying

the local union cannot strip it of its authority toparticipate in the bargaining process. The local union

maintains its separate personality despite affiliation

with a larger national federation.[20]

The doctrine laid down in Progressive Development

Corporation[21]

is a mere clarification of the principle

enunciated in Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v.

Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc.[22]

Both cases have provided

that “the mother union acting for and in behalf of its

affiliate ha(s) the status of an agent while the local

union remained the basic unit of the association free to

serve the common interest of all its members subjectonly to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and

By-Laws of the association.” Nonetheless, the facts and

principles laid down in both cases do not jibe squarely

with the case at bench. The controversy in Progressive

Development Corporation[23]

centered on the

requirements before a local or chapter of a federation

may file a petition for certification election and be

certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent,

while in Liberty Cotton Mills Worker s[24]

the issue

involved was the disaffiliation of the local union from

the federation The question of whether there was avalid and existing CBA, which is the question being

resolved in the case at bench, was never raised in the

two cited cases since it was already an accepted fact

that the CBA was validly executed and existing.

Anent the Urgent Motion to Dismiss[25]

filed by

KAMAPI on the ground that the instant petition had

become moot and academic due to the cancellation by

the Bureau of Labor Relations of NWB’s certificate of

registration and its consequent delisting from the roll of

labor federations, suffice it to state that at this juncture

we cannot properly rule on the issue considering thatKAMAPI has not proven that the decision of the Bureau

of Labor Relations has become final and executory

taking into account KAPATIRAN’s filing of a motion for

reconsideration with the Bureau. This notwithstanding,

Sec. 9, Rule II, Book V of theOmnibus Rules

Implementing the Labor Cose requires that an appeal be

filed with the Bureau, or in case of cancellation by the

Bureau, with the Secretary of Labor and Employment

whose decision shall become final and no longer subject

of appeal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decisionof the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated 15

August 1993 sustaining the order of the Med-Arbiter

dated 31 May 1993 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.





























Note: Different from citation.. cant find the one frgave.

G.R. No. 82759 June 8, 1990

RIZAL WORKERS UNION, petitioner,

vs.

HON. PURA FERRER CALLEJA, in her capacity as

Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and theCONFEDERATION OF FILIPINO WORKERS, respondents.

Jimenez & Associates for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for

intervenor.

NARVASA, J .:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to set

aside the decision of the respondent Director of the

Bureau of Labor Relations annulling the result of a

certification election held among the workers of the La

Campana Fabrica de Tabacos, Inc. (La Campana).

The records show that the Confederation of Filipino

Workers (CFW) had challenged the incumbency of

present petitioner Rizal Workers Union (RWU) as the

collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file

employees of La Campana and had, within the freedom

period, petitioned the Bureau of Labor Relations for a

certification election. The petition, initially denied for

allegedly lacking the support of at least 20% of the

membership of the bargaining unit, 1 was subsequently

granted, and the certification election was held on

September 5, 1987 under the supervision of

representatives of the Department of Labor and

Employment headed by Adelaida C. Gregorio. RWU won

over CFW by a 3-to-1 margin, the tally sheets showing

the following voting results: for RWU, 304 votes; for

CFW, 102 votes; No union, 1 vote; Spoiled Ballots, 7;

Total, 414. Accordingly, and the supervision teamhaving certified in the election minutes that the election

had been "... free, clean, honest, peaceful and

orderly," 2 RWU was proclaimed the winner.

The defeated union (CFW) signed the minutes under

protest and thereafter filed a formal protest3 with the

Bureau of Labor Relations, seeking annulment of the

election results for these alleged irregularities:

a) Company owners stayed inside the

polling place campaigning for RWU andharassing voters sympathetic to CFW;

b) Management prevented 200 workers

from leaving the plant on the eve of the

election;

c) Many persons, not workers of the

company, were allowed to vote using

employee Identification cards;

d) Management distributed free T-shirts

and money on the eve of the election to

induce the recipients to vote for RWU;

e) Workers Identified with the CFW

were barred from the company

premises. 4

These claims were subsequently amplified in asupplemental protest which made mention of at least

one instance of an outsider who had been caught

attempting to vote with the use of an employee's

Identification card and of 115 employees not being able

to vote, It was further alleged that the frauds were

deliberately calculated to ensure the victory of RWU

because it was a company union, as was evident from

the fact that despite its 33-year incumbency during

which no less then eleven (11) collective bargaining

agreements were executed with the company, the

workers' wages had remained very low.

In an order dated November 12, 1987, 5 Med-Arbiter

Manages T. Cruz dismissed the protest for lack of merit

and declared the election results final and RWU the

certified exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-

file workers of La Campana. He found no substantial

evidence to support the protestant's charges of fraud

and gave credit to the Election Minutes attesting to the

integrity of the election.

On appeal, however, to the respondent Director of

Labor Relations, the decision was reversed and another,dated February 12, 1988 6 was rendered annulling the

certification election and ordering that another election

be held. In her decision, said respondent accorded full

credence to the allegations made in the protest, found

these to have been sufficiently proven by the

protestant's evidence consisting of a

"Kapasyahan/Resolusyon" dated September 24,

1987 7 and signed by some 100 workers (111 according

to the respondent Director; 109 by the Med-Arbiter's

court), and a sworn statement purportedly executed by

one Eric Gamueda.8

According to the first of saiddocuments: (1) before the election about 200 workers

were detained in their work stations and thereby

prevented from voting; (2) early in the morning of the

election, management distributed free T-shirts to

workers who were then taken to the elections booths to

vote; (3) construction men, not company employees,

working in a building within the company premises

were issued employee Identification cards enabling

them to vote in the election. The sworn statement in

allegedly to the effect that the declarant (Eric

Gamueda) was one of those construction workers who

was issued a La Campana employees' Identification card

so that he could vote in the election. Respondent

Director also faulted the petitioner for opposing the

protest by mere general averment without categorically

refuting the charges of fraud.

Having twice filed for reconsideration and been

rebuffed both times, RWU finally instituted the present

petition, impugning the respondent Directories decision

as rendered with grave abuse of discretion in that the



factual conclusions made therein are without support in

the evidence and rest on nothing more substantial than

the protestant's bare allegations.

In a motion to intervene accompanied by a petition-in-

intervention, 9 La Campana took up the cudgels for the

petitioner, denied having intervened in the election or

connived with the petitioner in any cheating, and

echoed the charge that the Director's decision wastainted with grave abuse of discretion for want of

substantial evidentiary basis.

It being well-settled rule that the findings of fact of

quasi-judicial agencies of the Department of Labor and

Employment are binding on this Court if supported by

substantial evidence, 10 all that is necessary in order to

resolve this case is to determine whether or not

evidence of such character exists or has been presented

which would justify the decision of the respondent

Director. From even a perfunctory assessment, it

becomes apparent that the "evidence" upon which said

decision is professedly based does not come up to that

standard of substantiality.

Neither the "Kapasyahan/Resolusyon" nor the

Gamueda statement was Identified by their purported

authors or signatories. None of the one hundred or

more employees who supposedly signed that manifesto

was presented at the hearing to claim authorship or,

howsoever routinely, affirm that what is narrated

therein had in fact transpired. The same is true of the

statement attributed to Eric Gamueda. As far as theprotest was concerned, therefore, both documents

were nothing but mere scraps of paper without

evidentiary value and, indeed, were not even admissible

against herein petitioner, deprived as it was of the right

and opportunity to confront their authors and examine

them about the truth of their declarations. 11

It is of course also sound and settled rule that

administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial

functions are unfettered by the rigid technicalities of

procedure observed in the courts of courts oflaw, 12 and this so that disputes brought before such

bodies may be resolved in the most expeditious and

inexpensive manner possible. But what is involved here

transcends mere procedural technicality and concerns

the more paramount principles and requirements of

due process, which may not be sacrificed to speed or

expediency. Such a primary, made inherent in the

judicial process by constitutional fiat, is implicitly

recognized in Art. 221 of the Labor Code, as amended,

which in part provides:

Art. 221. Technical rules not binding and

prior resort to amicable settlement . —

In any proceeding before the

Commission or any of the Labor

Arbiters, the rules of evidence

prevailing in courts of law or equity

shall not be controlling, and it is the

spirit and intention of this code that the

Commission and its members and the

Labor Arbiters shall use every and all

reasonable means to ascertain the facts

in each case speedily and objectively,

without regard to technicalities of law

or procedure, all in the interest of due

process. ...

The clear message of the law is that even in the

disposition of labor cases, due process must never be

subordinated to expediency or dispatch. Upon thisprinciple, the unidentified documents relied upon by

the respondent Director must be seen and taken for

what they are, mere inadmissible hearsay. They cannot,

by any stretch of reasoning, be deemed substantial

evidence of the election frauds complained of. And as

this Court held in Ang Tibay vs. CIR:13

... (the) assurance of a desirable

flexibility in administrative procedure

does not go so far as to justify orders

without a basis in evidence having

rational probative force. Mere

uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does

not constitute substantial evidence.

But even given the benefit of every doubt as to their

admissibility, said statements still fail to qualify as

credible or persuasive evidence of the alleged frauds.

The 'Resolusyon/ Kapasyahan," for one, is so sketchy in

content that it gives the impression of being no more

than a collection of general allegations presented ready-

made to people who signed it without really knowing or

caring about whether they were true or not. It states,for example, that more than 200 employees were not

allowed to vote. But that figure must have been plucked

out of thin air because there are repeated references in

the record 14 which the respondent union (CFW) has

never seriously disputed that the voters list agreed

upon by the parties showed only 495 eligible voters out

of which number 414 in fact voted, as shown by the

official tally, thus leaving only 81 who failed to vote for

one reason or another. The existence of an agreed

voters list against which the Identity of every

prospective voter could be checked also renders quiteimplausible the insinuation made in said statements

that anyone who presented himself at the polling place

with an employee's Identification card would be

allowed to vote without question. The election minutes

record that in the one instance where a voter's status as

an employee was questioned by a CFW representative,

although his name appeared in the voters list and he

presented an Identification card, his ballot was ordered

segregated by the DOLE supervision team when he

failed to produce his residence certificate, which

decision however did not satisfy the CFW

representatives, who walked out of the proceedings. 15

It results that the only relevant and competent evidence

regarding the conduct of the certification election is the

election minutes accomplished and signed by the DOLE

supervision team, and according to which the election

proceeded in a "... free, clean, honest, peaceful and

orderly manner." Based on said evidence, it is the Med-

Arbiter's decision according it faith and credit that

should be upheld, in preference to that of the



respondent Director which, in ignoring said minutes and

relying on mere unproven allegations of fraud, was

rendered with manifest grave abuse of discretion.

The role played by La Campana in the disputed election

as well as in these proceedings has not escaped the

Court's attention. Although the charges of its active

intervention and electioneering have not been

substantiated, the record shows that it sat with partiesand the DOLE representatives during the election

proceedings. 16 This Court has time and again ruled that

the employer is not a party in a certification election,

which activity is the sole concern of the workers. The

only instance in which an employer may involve itself in

that process is where it is obliged to file a petition for

certification election by reason of its workers' request

to bargain collectively, pursuant to Article 258 of the

Labor Code. Even then, the employer's involvement

ceases, and it becomes a neutral bystander, after the

order for a certification election issues. 17 It was entirely

improper for La Campana to be present at all during the

proceedings, even as an observer, let alone sit in and

participate therein through a representative, as the

minutes show it did.

WHEREFORE, certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned

decision of the public respondent is ANNULLED and SET

ASIDE.

The Med-Arbiter's order of November 12, 1987

declaring final the result of the certification election of

September 5, 1987 and certifying petitioner RizalWorkers' Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining

agent of all rank-and-file workers of La Campana Fabrica

de Tabacos, Inc. is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. This

Court's restraining order of April 27, 1988 18 against the

execution or implementation of the respondent

Director's order of February 12, 1988 subject of the

petition is made permanent. La Campana Fabrica de

Tabacos, Inc. is ADMONISHED for its improper

participation and involvement in its workers'

certification election of September 5, 1987 and

WARNED against repetition thereof. Costs against theprivate respondents.

SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 76185 March 30, 1988

WARREN MANUFACTURING WORKERS UNION(WMWU), petitioner,

vs.

THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS; PHILIPPINEAGRICULTURAL, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIALWORKERS UNION (PACIWU); and SAMAHANG

MANGGAGAWA SA WARREN MANUFACTURINGCORP.-ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST AND GENUINELABOR ORGANIZATIONS (SMWMC-ANGLO), respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for

a preliminary injunction and/or the issuance of a

restraining order seeking to set aside: (1) Order of theMed-Arbiter dated August 18,1986, the dispositive

portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a

certification election is hereby ordered

conducted to determine the exclusive

bargaining representative of all the rank

and file employees of Warren

Manufacturing Corporation, within 20

days from receipt of this Order, with

the following choices:

1. Philippine

Agricultural,

Commercial and

Industry Workers Union

(PACIWU);

2. Warren Mfg.

Workers Union;

3. Samahan ng

Manggagawa saWarren Mfg.

Corporation petition-

ANGLO; and

4. No Union.

The representation Officer is hereby

directed to call the parties to a pre-

election conference to thresh out the

mechanics for the conduct of the actual

election.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 15).

and (2) the Resolution dated October 7, 1986 of the

Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor dismissing the

appeals of Warren Manufacturing Corporation and

herein petitioner (Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 16-18).

This certification case had its inception in an intra-union

rivalry between the petitioner and the respondent

Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial

Workers Union (PACIWU for short) since 1985.

The undisputed facts of this case as found by the Med-

Arbiter of the Bureau of Labor Relations are as follows:

On June 13,1985, PACIWU filed apetition for certification election,

alleging compliance with the

jurisdictional requirements.

On July 7, 1985, respondent thru

counsel filed a motion to dismiss the

petition on the ground that there exist

a C.BA between the respondent and the

Warren Mfg. Union which took effect

upon its signing on July 16, 1985 and to

expire on July 31, 1986.

While the petition was under hearing,

PACIWU filed a Notice of Strike and on

conciliation meeting, a Return-to-Work

Agreement was signed on July 25,1985,

stipulating, among others, as follows:

To resolve the issue of

union representation at

Warren Mfg- Corp.

parties have agreed to

the holding of aconsent election among

the rank and file on

August 25, 1985 at the

premises of the

company to be

supervised by MOLE. ...

It is cleanly understood

that the certified union

in the said projected

election shall respectand administer the

existing CBA at the

company until its expiry

date on July 31, 1986.

On 12 August 1985, an Order was

issued by this Office, directing that a

consent election be held among the

rank and file workers of the company,

with the following contending unions:

1. Philippine

Agricultural,

Commercial and

Industrial Workers

Union (PACIWU)

2. Warren Mfg.

Workers Union;



3. No Union.

On August 25, 1985, said consent

election was held, and yielded the

following results:

PACIWU--------------------

--------94

WMWU---------------------

-------193

Feeling aggrieved, however, PACIWU

filed an Election Protest.

In December, 1985 a Notice of Strike

was again filed by the union this time

with the Valenzuela branch office of

this Ministry, and after conciliation, the

parties finally agreed, among others, towit:

In consideration of this

payment, ... individual

complaints and

PACIWU hereby agree

and covenant that the

following labor

complaints/disputes

are considered

amicably settled and

withdrawn/dismissed,to wit: ...

On the basis of a Joint Motion to

Dismiss filed by the parties, the Election

Protest filed by the PACIWU was

ordered dismissed. (Rollo, pp. 12-13).

On June 5, 1986, the PACIWU filed a petition for

certification election followed by the filing of a petition

for the same purposes by the Samahan ng Manggagawa

sa Warren Manufacturing Corporation-Alliance ofNationalist and Genuine Labor Organizations (Anglo for

short) which petitions were both opposed by Warren

Manufacturing Corporation on the grounds that neither

petition has 30% support; that both are barred by the

one-year no certification election law and the existence

of a duly ratified CBA. The therein respondent,

therefore, prayed that the petitions for certification

election be dismissed. (Rollo, pp. 11-12).

As above stated, the Med-Arbiter of the National

Capital Region, Ministry of Labor and Employment,ordered on August 8, 't 986 the holding of a certification

election within twenty 20) days from receipt to

determine the exclusive bargaining representative of all

the rank and file employees of the Warren se

Manufacturing Corporation, with the above-mentioned

choices.

Both Warren Manufacturing Corporation and petitioner

herein filed separate motions, treated as appeals by the

Bureau of Labor Relations, which dismissed the same

for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

This petition was filed solely by the Warren

Manufacturing Workers Union, with the company itself

opting not to appeal.

The Second Division of this Court in the resolution of

November 3, 1986 without giving due course to the

petition, required the respondents to comment and

issued the temporary, restraining order prayed for

(Rollo, pp. 18-20).

The comment of the respondent PACIWU was filed on

November 27, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 29-32). The public

respondent through the Hon. Solicitor General filed its

Comment to the petition on December 10, 1986 ( Ibid .,

pp. 34-43) and private respondent ANGLO, filed itscomment on December 16, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 45- 51). The

petitioner with leave of court filed its reply to comment

entitled a rejoinder on January 6,1987 (Ibid., pp. 52-62).

In the resolution of January 26, 1987, the petition was

given due course and the parties were required to

submit their respective memoranda (Ibid ., p. 76).

Memorandum for public respondent was filed on

February 20,1987 (Ibid ., p. 82-88). Respondent

PACIWU's memorandum was filed on March 18, 1987

(Ibid., pp. 95-99). SMWMCANGLO'S Memorandum wasfiled on March 23,1987 (Ibid ., pp. 100-1 09) and the

petitioner's memorandum was filed on March 31,1987

(Ibid ., pp. 110-120).

In its memorandum, petitioner raised the following

issues:

A. The holding of a certification election

at the bargaining unit is patently

premature and illegal.

B. The petition filed by private

respondents do not have the statutory

30% support requirement.

C. Petitioner was denied administrative

due process when excluded from med-

arbitration proceedings.

The petition is devoid of merit.

A.

Petitioner's contention is anchored on the following

grounds:

Section 3, Rule V of the Implementing Rules and

Regulations of the Labor Code provides, among others:

... however no certification election

may be held within one (1) year from



the date of the issuance of the

declaration of a final certification result.

and

Article 257, Title VII, Book V of the Labor Code provides:

No certification election issue shall be

entertained by the Bureau in anyCollective Bargaining Agreement

existing between the employer and a

legitimate labor organization.

Otherwise stated, petitioner invoked the one-year no

certification election rule and the principle of the

Contract Bar Rule.

This contention is untenable.

The records show that petitioner admitted that whatwas held on August 25,1985 at the Company's premises

and which became the root of this controversy, was a

consent election and not a certification

election (Emphasis supplied). As correctly distinguished

by private respondent, a consent election is an agreed

one, its purpose being merely to determine the issue of

majority representation of all the workers in the

appropriate collective bargaining unit while a

certification election is aimed at determining the sole

and exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in

an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of

collective bargaining. From the very nature of consentelection, it is a separate and distinct process and has

nothing to do with the import and effect of a

certification election. Neither does it shorten the terms

of an existing CBA nor entitle the participants thereof to

immediately renegotiate an existing CBA although it

does not preclude the workers from exercising their

right to choose their sole and exclusive bargaining

representative after the expiration of the sixty (60) day

freedom period. In fact the Med-Arbiter in the Return

to Work Agreement signed by the parties emphasized

the following:

To resolve the issue of union

representation at Warren Mfg. Corp.,

parties have agreed to the holding of a

consent election among the rank and

file on August 25,1985 at the premises

of the company to be supervised by the

Ministry of Labor and Employment .....

It is clearly understood that the

certified union in the said projectedelection shall respect and administer

the existing CBA at the company until

its expiry date on July 31, 1986. (Rollo,

pp. 46, 48-49).

It is, therefore, unmistakable that the election thus held

on August 25, 1985 was not for the purpose of

determining which labor union should be the bargaining

representative in the negotiation for a collective

contract, there being an existing collective bargaining

agreement yet to expire on July 31, 1986; but only to

determine which labor union shag administer the said

existing contract.

Accordingly, the following provisions of the New Labor

Code apply:

ART. 254. Duty to bargain collectivelywhen there exists a collective

bargaining agreement .—When there is

a collective bargaining agreement, the

duty to bargain collectively shall also

mean that neither party shall terminate

or modify the agreement at least sixty

(60) days prior to its expiration date. It

shall be the duty of both parties to keep

the status quo and to continue in full

force and effect the terms and

conditions of the existing agreement

during the 60-day period and/or until a

new agreement is reached by the

parties.

Corollary to the above, Article 257 of

the New Labor Code expressly states

that No certification election issue shall

be entertained if a collective agreement

which has been submitted in

accordance with Article 231 of this

Code exists between the employer and

a legitimate labor organization exceptwithin sixty (60) days prior to the

expiration of the life of such certified

collective bargaining agreement."

(Rollo, pp. 83-84)

Thus, as stated by this Court in General Textiles Allied

Workers Association v. the Director of the Bureau of

labor Relations (84 SCRA 430 [19781) "there should be

no obstacle to the right of the employees to petition for

a certification election at the proper time. that is, within

60 days prior to the expiration of the three year period...

Finally, such premature agreement entered into by the

petitioner and the Company on June 2, 1986 does not

adversely affect the petition for certification election

filed by respondent PACIWU (Rollo, p. 85).

Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules

Implementing the Labor Code clearly provides:

Section 4.Effect of Early Agreement

.—

There representation case shall not,

however, be adversely affected by a

collective agreement submitted before

or during the last sixty days of a

subsisting agreement or during the

pendency of the representation case.

Apart from the fact that the above Rule is clear and

explicit, leaving no room for construction or

interpretation, it is an elementary rule in administrative



law that administrative regulations and policies enacted

by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they

are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law and are

entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans

Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985)).

As aforestated, the existing collective bargaining

agreement was due to expire on July 31, 1 986. The

Med-Arbiter found that a sufficient number ofemployees signified their consent to the filing of the

petition and 107 employees authorized intervenor to

file a motion for intervention. Otherwise stated, he

found that the petition and intervention were

supported by more than 30% of the members of the

bargaining unit. In the light of these facts, Article 258 of

the Labor Code makes it mandatory for the Bureau of

Labor Relations to conduct a certification election

(Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Noriel,

et al., 134 SCRA 152 [1985]). In the case of Federation of

Free Workers (Bisig ng Manggagawa sa UTEX v. Noriel

etc., et al., 86 SCRA 132 [1978]), this Court was even

more specific when it stated "No administrative agency

can ignore the imperative tone of the above article. The

language used is one of command. Once it has been

verified that the petition for certification election has

the support of at least 30% of the employees in the

bargaining unit, it must be granted, The specific word

used can yield no other meaning. It becomes under the

circumstances, "mandatory"..."

The finality of the findings of fact of the Med-Arbiter

that the petition and intervention filed in the case atbar were supported by 30% of the members of the

workers is clear and definite.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED,

SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 97020 June 8, 1992

CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURINGCORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABORBIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ABD FEDERATION OF FREEWORKERS (FFW), CALIFORNIA MFG. CORP.

SUPERVISORS UNION CHAPTER(CALMASUCO),respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for

preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining

order seeking to annul and set aside the (a)

resolution * of the Department of Labor and

Employment dated October 16, 1990 in OS-A-10-283-90(NCR-OD-M-90-05-095) entitled "In Re: Petition for

Certification Election Among the Supervisors of

California Manufacturing Corporation, Federation of

Free Workers (FFW) California Mfg. Corp. Supervisors

Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), petitioner-appellee,

California Manufacturing Corporation, employer-

appellant" which denied herein petitioner's appeal and

affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter Arsenia Q. Ocampo

dated August 22, 1990 directing the conduct of a

certification election among the supervisory employees

of California Manufacturing Corporation, and (b) the

Order ** of the same Department denying petitioner'smotion for reconsideration.

As culled from the records, the following facts appear

undisputed:

On May 24, 1990, a petition for certification election

among the supervisors of California Manufacturing

Corporation (CMC for brevity) was filed by the

Federation of Free Workers (FFW) — California

Manufacturing Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter

(CALMASUCO), alleging inter alia, that it is a dulyregistered federation with registry certificate no. 1952-

TTT-IP, while FFW-CALMASUCO Chapter is a duly

registered chapter with registry certificate no. 1-AFBI-

038 issued on May 21, 1990 (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 63);

that the employer CMC employs one hundred fifty (150)

supervisors; that there is no recognized supervisors

union existing in the company; that the petition is filed

in accordance with Article 257 of the Labor Code, as

amended by Republic Act No. 6715; and that the

petition is nevertheless supported by a substantial

member of signatures of the employees concerned

(Annexes "E" and "F", Ibid., pp. 28-29).

In its answer, CMC, now petitioner herein, alleged

among others, that the petition for the holding of a

certification election should be denied as it is not

supported by the required twenty-five percent (25%) of

all its supervisors and that a big number of the

supposed signatories to the petition are not actually

supervisors as they have no subordinates to supervise,

nor do they have the powers and functions which under

the law would classify them as supervisors (Annex

"D", Ibid., P. 25).

On July 24. 1990, FFW—CALMASUCO filed its reply

maintaining that under the law, when there is no

existing unit yet in a particular bargaining unit at the

time a petition for certification election is filed, the 25%

rule on the signatories does not apply; that the

"organized establishment" contemplated by law doesnot refer to a "company" per se but rather refers to a

"bargaining unit" which may be of different

classifications in a single company; that CMC has at

least two (2) different bargaining units, namely, the

supervisory (unorganized) and the rank-and-file

(organized); that the signatories to the petition have

been performing supervisory functions; that since it is

CMC which promoted them to the positions, of

supervisors. it is already estopped from claiming that

they are not supervisors; that the said supervisors were

excluded from the coverage of the collective bargaining

agreement of its rank-and-file employees; and that the

contested signatories are indeed supervisors as shown

in the "CMC Master List of Employees" of January 2,

1990 and the CMS Publication (Annex "G", Ibid ., p 30).

On August 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order,

the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is

hereby ordered that a certification

election be conducted among the

supervisory employees of CaliforniaManufacturing Corporation within

twenty (20) days from receipt hereof

with the usual pre-election conference

of the parties to thresh out the

mechanics of the election The payroll of

the company three (3) months prior to

the filing of the petition shall be used as

the basis in determining the list of

eligible voters.

The choices are:

1. Federation of Free

Workers (FFW)

California

Manufacturing

Corporation

Supervisors Union

Chapter (CALMASUCO);

and

2. No union.

SO ORDERED. (Annex

"H" Ibid ., p. 33).

CMC thereafter appealed to the Department of Labor

and Employment which, however, affirmed the above

order in its assailed resolution dated October 16, 1990

(Annex, "B", Ibid , a 18) CMC's subsequent motion for

reconsideration was also denied in its order dated



November 17, 1990 (Annex "A", Ibid ., p. 15), hence, his

petition.

a) whether or not the term

"unorganized establishment' in Article

257 of the tabor Code refers to a

bargaining unit or a business

establishment;

b) whether or not non-supervisors can

participate in a supervisor's certification

election; and

c) whether or not the two (2) different

and separate plants of herein petitioner

in Parañaque and Las Piñas can be

treated as a single bargaining unit.

The petition must be denied.

The Court has already categorically ruled that Article

257 of the Labor code is applicable to unorganized labor

organizations and not to establishments where there

exists a certified bargaining agent which had previously

entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the

management (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja,

G.R. No. 85085, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 127)

(Emphasis supplied). Otherwise stated, the

establishment concerned must have no certified

bargaining agent (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v.

Calleja G.R. No. 82260, July 19, 1989, 175 SCRA 490). In

the instant case, it is beyond cavil that the supervisorsof CMC which constitute a bargaining unit separate and

distinct from that of the rank-and-file, have no such

agent. thus they correctly filed a petition for

certification election thru union FFW-CALMASUCO,

likewise indubitably a legitimate labor organization.

CMC's insistence on the 25% subscription requirement,

is clearly immaterial. The same has been expressly

deleted by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6715 and is

presently prescribed only in organized establishments,

that is, those with existing bargaining agents.

Compliance with the said requirement need not evenbe established with absolute certainty. The Court has

consistently ruled that "even conceding that the

statutory requirement of 30% (now 25%) of the labor

force asking for a certification election had not been

strictly compiled with, the Director (now the Med-

Arbiter) is still empowered to order that it be held

precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which of the

contending labor organizations shall be the exclusive

collective bargaining agent (Atlas Free Workers Union

(AFWU)-PSSLU Local v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-51905, May

26, 1981, 104 SCRA 565). The requirement then is

relevant only when it becomes mandatory to conduct a

certification election. In all other instances, the

discretion, according to the rulings of this Tribunal,

ought to be ordinarily exercised in favor of a petition for

certification (National Mines and Allied Workers Union

(NAMAWU-UIF) v. Luna, et al., G.R. No. L-46722, June

15, 1978, 83 SCRA 607).

In any event, CMC as employer has no standing to

question a certification election (Asian Design and

Manufacturing Corporation v. Calleja, et al., G.R. No.

77415, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 477). Such is the sole

concern of the workers. The only exception is where the

employer has to file the petition for certification

election pursuant to Article 259 (now 258) of the Labor

Code because it was requested to bargain collectively.

Thereafter, the role of the employer in the certification

process ceases. The employer becomes merely a

bystander. Oft-quoted is the pronouncement of theCourt on management interference in certification

elections, thus:

On matters that should be the exclusive

concern of labor, the choice of a

collective bargaining representative,

the employer is definitely an intruder,

His participation, to say the least,

deserves no encouragement. This Court

should be the last agency to lend

support to such an attempt at

interference with purely internal affair

of labor. (Trade Unions of the

Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)

v. Trajano. G.R. No. L-61153 January 17,

1983, 120 SCRA 64 citing Consolidated

Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, G.R No. L-47752

July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469, 473).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for

utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.



COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

G.R. No. L-54334 January 22, 1986

KIOK LOY, doing business under the name and styleSWEDEN ICE CREAM PLANT, petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC)

and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA(KILUSAN), respondents.

Ablan and Associates for petitioner.

Abdulcadir T. Ibrahim for private respondent.

CUEVAS, J.:

Petition for certiorari to annul the decision

1

of theNational Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated July

20, 1979 which found petitioner Sweden Ice Cream

guilty of unfair labor practice for unjustified refusal to

bargain, in violation of par. (g) of Article 249 2 of the

New Labor Code, 3 and declared the draft proposal of

the Union for a collective bargaining agreement as the

governing collective bargaining agreement between the

employees and the management.

The pertinent background facts are as follows:

In a certification election held on October 3, 1978, the

Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa (Union for short), a

legitimate late labor federation, won and was

subsequently certified in a resolution dated November

29, 1978 by the Bureau of Labor Relations as the sole

and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file

employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant (Company for

short). The Company's motion for reconsideration of

the said resolution was denied on January 25, 1978.

Thereafter, and more specifically on December 7, 1978,

the Union furnished 4 the Company with two copies ofits proposed collective bargaining agreement. At the

same time, it requested the Company for its counter

proposals. Eliciting no response to the aforesaid

request, the Union again wrote the Company reiterating

its request for collective bargaining negotiations and for

the Company to furnish them with its counter

proposals. Both requests were ignored and remained

unacted upon by the Company.

Left with no other alternative in its attempt to bring the

Company to the bargaining table, the Union, onFebruary 14, 1979, filed a "Notice of Strike", with the

Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of

unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining. 5

Conciliation proceedings then followed during the

thirty-day statutory cooling-off period. But all attempts

towards an amicable settlement failed, prompting the

Bureau of Labor Relations to certify the case to the

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for

compulsory arbitration pursuant to Presidential Decree

No. 823, as amended. The labor arbiter, Andres

Fidelino, to whom the case was assigned, set the initial

hearing for April 29, 1979. For failure however, of the

parties to submit their respective position papers as

required, the said hearing was cancelled and reset to

another date. Meanwhile, the Union submitted its

position paper. The Company did not, and instead

requested for a resetting which was granted. TheCompany was directed anew to submit its financial

statements for the years 1976, 1977, and 1978.

The case was further reset to May 11, 1979 due to the

withdrawal of the Company's counsel of record, Atty.

Rodolfo dela Cruz. On May 24, 1978, Atty. Fortunato

Panganiban formally entered his appearance as counsel

for the Company only to request for another

postponement allegedly for the purpose of acquainting

himself with the case. Meanwhile, the Company

submitted its position paper on May 28, 1979.

When the case was called for hearing on June 4, 1979 as

scheduled, the Company's representative, Mr. Ching,

who was supposed to be examined, failed to appear.

Atty. Panganiban then requested for another

postponement which the labor arbiter denied. He also

ruled that the Company has waived its right to present

further evidence and, therefore, considered the case

submitted for resolution.

On July 18, 1979, labor arbiter Andres Fidelino

submitted its report to the National Labor RelationsCommission. On July 20, 1979, the National Labor

Relations Commission rendered its decision, the

dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the respondent Sweden

Ice Cream is hereby declared guilty of

unjustified refusal to bargain, in

violation of Section (g) Article 248 (now

Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended.

Further, the draft proposal for a

collective bargaining agreement (Exh."E ") hereto attached and made an

integral part of this decision, sent by

the Union (Private respondent) to the

respondent (petitioner herein) and

which is hereby found to be reasonable

under the premises, is hereby declared

to be the collective agreement which

should govern the relationship between

the parties herein.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner now comes before Us assailing the aforesaid

decision contending that the National Labor Relations

Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction

or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction in rendering the challenged decision. On

August 4, 1980, this Court dismissed the petition for

lack of merit. Upon motion of the petitioner, however,

the Resolution of dismissal was reconsidered and the



petition was given due course in a Resolution dated

April 1, 1981.

Petitioner Company now maintains that its right to

procedural due process has been violated when it was

precluded from presenting further evidence in support

of its stand and when its request for further

postponement was denied. Petitioner further contends

that the National Labor Relations Commission's findingof unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain is not

supported by law and the evidence considering that it

was only on May 24, 1979 when the Union furnished

them with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining

Agreement and it was only then that they came to know

of the Union's demands; and finally, that the Collective

Bargaining Agreement approved and adopted by the

National Labor Relations Commission is unreasonable

and lacks legal basis.

The petition lacks merit. Consequently, its dismissal is in

order.

Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations

towards a collective agreement, 6 is one of the

democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code,

designed to stabilize the relation between labor and

management and to create a climate of sound and

stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of

the employer and the Union and is characterized as a

legal obligation. So much so that Article 249, par. (g) of

the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an

employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly andexpeditiously in good faith for the purpose of

negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours

of work, and all other terms and conditions of

employment including proposals for adjusting any

grievance or question arising under such an agreement

and executing a contract incorporating such agreement,

if requested by either party.

While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain,

the employer, however, is not under any legal duty to

initiate contract negotiation. 7

The mechanics ofcollective bargaining is set in motion only when the

following jurisdictional preconditions are present,

namely, (1) possession of the status of majority

representation of the employees' representative in

accordance with any of the means of selection or

designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of

majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain

under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . ... all

of which preconditions are undisputedly present in the

instant case.

From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in

relation to the task of negotiation, there can be no

doubt that the Union has a valid cause to complain

against its (Company's) attitude, the totality of which is

indicative of the latter's disregard of, and failure to live

up to, what is enjoined by the Labor Code — to bargain

in good faith.

We are in total conformity with respondent NLRC's

pronouncement that petitioner Company is GUILTY of

unfair labor practice. It has been indubitably established

that (1) respondent Union was a duly certified

bargaining agent; (2) it made a definite request to

bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed

Collective Bargaining Agreement, to the Company not

only once but twice which were left unanswered and

unacted upon; and (3) the Company made no counter

proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate

lack of a sincere desire to negotiate.8

A Company'srefusal to make counter proposal if considered in

relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate

bad faith and this is specially true where the Union's

request for a counter proposal is left

unanswered. 9 Even during the period of compulsory

arbitration before the NLRC, petitioner Company's

approach and attitude-stalling the negotiation by a

series of postponements, non-appearance at the

hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting its

financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except

that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement

with the Union. Petitioner has not at any instance,

evinced good faith or willingness to discuss freely and

fully the claims and demands set forth by the Union

much less justify its opposition thereto. 10

The case at bar is not a case of first impression, for in

the Herald Delivery Carriers Union (PAFLU) vs. Herald

Publications11

the rule had been laid down that "unfair

labor practice is committed when it is shown that the

respondent employer, after having been served with a

written bargaining proposal by the petitioning Union,

did not even bother to submit an answer or reply to thesaid proposal This doctrine was reiterated anew

in Bradman vs. Court of Industrial Relations12 wherein it

was further ruled that "while the law does not compel

the parties to reach an agreement, it does contemplate

that both parties will approach the negotiation with an

open mind and make a reasonable effort to reach a

common ground of agreement

As a last-ditch attempt to effect a reversal of the

decision sought to be reviewed, petitioner capitalizes

on the issue of due process claiming, that it was deniedthe right to be heard and present its side when the

Labor Arbiter denied the Company's motion for further

postponement.

Petitioner's aforesaid submittal failed to impress Us.

Considering the various postponements granted in its

behalf, the claimed denial of due process appeared

totally bereft of any legal and factual support. As herein

earlier stated, petitioner had not even honored

respondent Union with any reply to the latter's

successive letters, all geared towards bringing the

Company to the bargaining table. It did not even bother

to furnish or serve the Union with its counter proposal

despite persistent requests made therefor. Certainly,

the moves and overall behavior of petitioner-company

were in total derogation of the policy enshrined in the

New Labor Code which is aimed towards expediting

settlement of economic disputes. Hence, this Court is

not prepared to affix its imprimatur to such an illegal

scheme and dubious maneuvers.



Neither are WE persuaded by petitioner-company's

stand that the Collective Bargaining Agreement which

was approved and adopted by the NLRC is a total nullity

for it lacks the company's consent, much less its

argument that once the Collective Bargaining

Agreement is implemented, the Company will face the

prospect of closing down because it has to pay a

staggering amount of economic benefits to the Union

that will equal if not exceed its capital. Such a stand andthe evidence in support thereof should have been

presented before the Labor Arbiter which is the proper

forum for the purpose.

We agree with the pronouncement that it is not

obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to

precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the

other. But an erring party should not be tolerated and

allowed with impunity to resort to schemes feigning

negotiations by going through empty gestures. 13 More

so, as in the instant case, where the intervention of the

National Labor Relations Commission was properly

sought for after conciliation efforts undertaken by the

BLR failed. The instant case being a certified one, it

must be resolved by the NLRC pursuant to the mandate

of P.D. 873, as amended, which authorizes the said

body to determine the reasonableness of the terms and

conditions of employment embodied in any Collective

Bargaining Agreement. To that extent, utmost

deference to its findings of reasonableness of any

Collective Bargaining Agreement as the governing

agreement by the employees and management must be

accorded due respect by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The

temporary restraining order issued on August 27, 1980,

is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.



Note: Different citation by fr. But this is the one thatcontains the kiok loy quote..

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL MILLINGCORPORATION INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION(GMC-ILU), and RITOMANGUBAT, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J .:

Before us is a petition for certiorari assailing the

decision[1] dated July 19, 2000, of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. SP No. 50383, which earlier reversed the

decision[2] dated January 30, 1998 of the National Labor

Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-0112-

94.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-

Lapu City, petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC)

employed 190 workers. They were all members of

private respondent General Milling Corporation

Independent Labor Union (union, for brevity), a duly

certified bargaining agent.

On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a

collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included

the issue of representation effective for a term of three

years. The CBA was effective for three years retroactive

to December 1, 1988. Hence, it would expire onNovember 30, 1991.

On November 29, 1991, a day before the

expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed

CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be

submitted within ten (10) days.

As early as October 1991, however, GMC had

received collective and individual letters from workers

who stated that they had withdrawn from their union

membership, on grounds of religious affiliation and

personal differences. Believing that the union no longer

had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any

counter-proposal.

On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the

union’s officers, Rito Mangubat and Victor

Lastimoso. The letter stated that it felt there was no

basis to negotiate with a union which no longer existed,

but that management was nonetheless always willing to

dialogue with them on matters of common concern and

was open to suggestions on how the company may

improve its operations.

In answer, the union officers wrote a letter datedDecember 19, 1991 disclaiming any massive

disaffiliation or resignation from the union and

submitted a manifesto, signed by its members, stating

that they had not withdrawn from the union.

On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed Marcia

Tumbiga, a union member, on the ground of

incompetence. The union protested and requested

GMC to submit the matter to the grievance procedure

provided in the CBA. GMC, however, advised the union

to “refer to our letter dated December 16, 1991.”[3]

Thus, the union filed, on July 2, 1992, a complaint

against GMC with the NLRC, Arbitration Division, Cebu

City. The complaint alleged unfair labor practice on the

part of GMC for: (1) refusal to bargain collectively; (2)

interference with the right to self-organization; and (3)

discrimination. The labor arbiter dismissed the case

with the recommendation that a petition for

certification election be held to determine if the union

still enjoyed the support of the workers.

The union appealed to the NLRC.

On January 30, 1998, the NLRC set aside the labor

arbiter’s decision. Citing Article 253-A of the Labor

Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715,[4]which fixed

the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the

NLRC ordered GMC to abide by the CBA draft that the

union proposed for a period of two (2) years beginning

December 1, 1991, the date when the original CBAended, to November 30, 1993. The NLRC also ordered

GMC to pay the attorney’s fees.[5]

In its decision, the NLRC pointed out that upon the

effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6715, the duration of a CBA,

insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, is five

(5) years which, in the case of GMC-Independent Labor

Union was from December 1, 1988 to November 30,

1993. All other provisions of the CBA are to be

renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its

execution. Thus, the NLRC held that respondent union

remained as the exclusive bargaining agent with theright to renegotiate the economic provisions of the

CBA. Consequently, it was unfair labor practice for GMC

not to enter into negotiation with the union.

The NLRC likewise held that the individual letters of

withdrawal from the union submitted by 13 of its

members from February to June 1993 confirmed the

pressure exerted by GMC on its employees to resign

from the union. Thus, the NLRC also found GMC guilty

of unfair labor practice for interfering with the right of

its employees to self-organization.

With respect to the union’s claim of discrimination,

the NLRC found the claim unsupported by substantial

evidence.

On GMC’s motion for reconsideration, the NLRC set

aside its decision of January 30, 1998, through a

resolution dated October 6, 1998. It found GMC’s

doubts as to the status of the union justified and the

allegation of coercion exerted by GMC on the union’s

members to resign unfounded. Hence, the union filed a

petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. For

failure of the union to attach the required copies ofpleadings and other documents and material portions

of the record to support the allegations in its petition,

the CA dismissed the petition on February 9, 1999. The

same petition was subsequently filed by the union, this

time with the necessary documents. In its resolution

dated April 26, 1999, the appellate court treated the

refiled petition as a motion for reconsideration and

gave the petition due course.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/feb2004/146728.htm#_ftn1





















On July 19, 2000, the appellate court rendered a

decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

NLRC Resolution of October 6, 1998 is hereby SETASIDE, and its decision of January 30, 1998 is, except

with respect to the award of attorney’s fees which is

hereby deleted, REINSTATED.[6]

A motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed

by GMC, but in a resolution dated October 26, 2000, the

CA denied it for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari alleging

that:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VIOLATED

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE THAT NO

DECISION SHALL BE RENDERED BY ANY COURT

WITHOUT EXPRESSING THEREIN CLEARLY ANDDISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON

WHICH IT IS BASED.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE

DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION IN THE ABSENCE OF

ANY FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

SERIOUS ERROR IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT

THE NLRC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO

DETERMINE THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF

A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.[7]

Thus, in the instant case, the principal issue for our

determination is whether or not the Court of Appeals

acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction in (1) finding GMC guilty ofunfair labor practice for violating the duty to bargain

collectively and/or interfering with the right of its

employees to self-organization, and (2) imposing upon

GMC the draft CBA proposed by the union for two years

to begin from the expiration of the original CBA.

On the first issue, Article 253-A of the Labor Code,

as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715, states:

ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargainingagreement. – Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that

the parties may enter into shall, insofar as therepresentation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five

(5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of

the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained

and no certification election shall be conducted by the

Department of Labor and Employment outside of the

sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry

of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining

Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective

Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later

than three (3) years after its execution....

The law mandates that the representation

provision of a CBA should last for five years. The

relation between labor and management should be

undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year.

Hence, it is indisputable that when the union requested

for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA onNovember 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective

bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking

said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of

effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The union’s

proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-

year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA,

albeit just before the last day of said period. It was

obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to

negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing to

send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain

anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company

committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of

the Labor Code, which provides that:

ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. – It shall

be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the

following unfair labor practice:

. . .

(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as

prescribed by this Code;

. . .

Article 252 of the Labor Code elucidates the

meaning of the phrase “duty to bargain collectively,”

thus:

ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. –

The duty to bargain collectively means the performance

of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly

and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of

negotiating an agreement....

We have held that the crucial question whether or

not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in

good faith typically turn$ on the facts of the individual

case.[8] There is no per se test of good faith in

bargaining.[9] Good faith or bad faith is an inference to

be drawn from the facts.[10] The effect of an employer’s

or a union’s actions individually is not the test of good-

faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or

actions, considered as a whole.[11]

Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties arerequired to perform their mutual obligation to meet

and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith

for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union

lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals

for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the

effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty

under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy

excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and



























the status of its membership to prevent any

negotiation.

It bears stressing that the procedure in collective

bargaining prescribed by the Code is mandatory

because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring

lasting industrial peace. Thus:

ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. – The

following procedures shall be observed in collective

bargaining:

(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it

shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a

statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a

reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from

receipt of such notice. (Underscoring supplied.)

GMC’s failure to make a timely reply to the

proposals presented by the union is indicative of its

utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Itsexcuse that it felt the union no longer represented the

workers, was mainly dilatory as it turned out to be

utterly baseless.

We hold that GMC’s refusal to make a counter-

proposal to the union’s proposal for CBA negotiation is

an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did

not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining

proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the

duty to bargain collectively.[12]

Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation tosubmit a reply to the union’s proposals, GMC violated

its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair

labor practice. Perforce, the Court of Appeals did not

commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction in finding that GMC is, under the

circumstances, guilty of unfair labor practice.

Did GMC interfere with the employees’ right to

self-organization? The CA found that the letters

between February to June 1993 by 13 union members

signifying their resignation from the union clearly

indicated that GMC exerted pressure on itsemployees. The records show that GMC presented

these letters to prove that the union no longer enjoyed

the support of the workers. The fact that the

resignations of the union members occurred during the

pendency of the case before the labor arbiter shows

GMC’s desperate attempts to cast doubt on the

legitimate status of the union. We agree with the CA’s

conclusion that the ill-timed letters of resignation from

the union members indicate that GMC had interfered

with the right of its employees to self-organization.

Thus, we hold that the appellate court did not commit

grave abuse of discretion in finding GMC guilty of unfair

labor practice for interfering with the right of its

employees to self-organization.

Finally, did the CA gravely abuse its discretion

when it imposed on GMC the draft CBA proposed by the

union for two years commencing from the expiration of

the original CBA?

The Code provides:

ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when thereexists a collective bargaining agreement. – ....It shall be

the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to

continue in full force and effect the terms and

conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day

period [prior to its expiration date] and/or until a new

agreement is reached by the parties. (Underscoring

supplied.)

The provision mandates the parties to keep

the status quo while they are still in the process of

working out their respective proposal and counter

proposal. The general rule is that when a CBA already

exists, its provision shall continue to govern the

relationship between the parties, until a new one is

agreed upon. The rule necessarily presupposes that all

other things are equal. That is, that neither party is

guilty of bad faith. However, when one of the parties

abuses this grace period by purposely delaying the

bargaining process, a departure from the general rule is

warranted.

In Kiok Loy vs. NLRC ,[13] we found that petitioner

therein, Sweden Ice Cream Plant, refused to submit any

counter proposal to the CBA proposed by its employees’

certified bargaining agent. We ruled that the former

had thereby lost its right to bargain the terms and

conditions of the CBA. Thus, we did not hesitate to

impose on the erring company the CBA proposed by its

employees’ union - lock, stock and barrel. Our findings

in Kiok Loy are similar to the facts in the present case, to

wit:

…petitioner Company’s approach and attitude – stalling

the negotiation by a series of postponements, non-

appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay

in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other

conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and

reach an agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not

at any instance, evinced good faith or willingness to

discuss freely and fully the claims and demands set

forth by the Union much less justify its objection

thereto.[14]

Likewise, in Divine Word University of Tacloban vs.

Secretary of Labor and Employment ,[15] petitioner

therein, Divine Word University of Tacloban, refused to

perform its duty to bargain collectively. Thus, we upheld

the unilateral imposition on the university of the CBA

proposed by the Divine Word University Employees

Union. We said further:

That being the said case, the petitioner may not validly

assert that its consent should be a primordial

consideration in the bargaining process. By its acts, noless than its action which bespeak its insincerity, it has

forfeited whatever rights it could have asserted as an

employer.[16]

Applying the principle in the foregoing cases to the

instant case, it would be unfair to the union and its

members if the terms and conditions contained in the

old CBA would continue to be imposed on GMC’s

employees for the remaining two (2) years of the CBA’s























duration. We are not inclined to gratify GMC with an

extended term of the old CBA after it resorted to

delaying tactics to prevent negotiations. Since it was

GMC which violated the duty to bargain collectively,

based on Kiok Loy and Divine Word University of

Tacloban, it had lost its statutory right to negotiate or

renegotiate the terms and conditions of the draft CBA

proposed by the union.

We carefully note, however, that as strictly

distinguished from the facts of this case, there was no

pre-existing CBA between the parties in Kiok

Loy andDivine Word University of Tacloban.

Nonetheless, we deem it proper to apply in this case the

rationale of the doctrine in the said two cases. To rule

otherwise would be to allow GMC to have its cake and

eat it too.

Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory

upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately

accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an

erring party should not be allowed to resort with

impunity to schemes feigning negotiations by going

through empty gestures.[17] Thus, by imposing on GMC

the provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the union,

in our view, the interests of equity and fair play were

properly served and both parties regained equal

footing, which was lost when GMC thwarted the

negotiations for new economic terms of the CBA.

The findings of fact by the CA, affirming those of

the NLRC as to the reasonableness of the draft CBA

proposed by the union should not be disturbed sincethey are supported by substantial evidence. On this

score, we see no cogent reason to rule

otherwise. Hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals

did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction when it imposed on GMC,

after it had committed unfair labor practice, the draft

CBA proposed by the union for the remaining two (2)

years of the duration of the original CBA. Fairness,

equity, and social justice are best served in this case by

sustaining the appellate court’s decision on this issue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and theassailed decision dated July 19, 2000, and the resolution

dated October 26, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. SP No. 50383, are AFFIRMED. Costs against

petitioner.

SO ORDERED.





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