Labstan - Cases - Set 1 (Part 1)

7/30/2019 Labstan - Cases - Set 1 (Part 1)

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G.R. No. 169472 January 20, 2009

FRANCISCO LANDICHO, FEDERICO LANDICHO ANDBUENAVENTURA LANDICHO, Petitioners,vs.FELIX SIA, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, C.J.:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of theDecision1 and Resolution2of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 61554, dated February 23, 2005 and July 6,2005, respectively, reversing the decision of theDepartment of Agrarian Reform (DAR), AdjudicationBoard (DARAB), in DARAB Case No. 4599. The DARABdecision affirmed with modification the Decision of theProvincial Adjudicator of Region IV, Quezon, in PARADCase No. IV-QUI-0343-94 dated October 24, 1995,awarding the petitioners disturbance compensation, ahome lot consisting of 200 square meters, and damages.

The appellate court found that the complaint against therespondent is dismissible for lack of cause of action onthe ground of prescription.

The instant case involves three parcels of agriculturalland located in Barangay Mateona, Tayabas, Quezon,covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 135953- Lot No. 9297,3TCT No. 135952 - Lot No. 9856,4 and TCTNo. 135929 - Lot No. 9895,5with an aggregate area ofapproximately 27,287 square meters. The subject parcelsof land were originally owned by Loreanne Z. Aragon,Alberto Z. Aragon, Jr., and Alberto Z. Aragon III(Aragons).6The agricultural land was tenanted by thelate Arcadio Landicho from 1949 until his death in19727after which his tenancy rights were succeeded byhis son, petitioner Francisco Landicho.8 The otherpetitioners, Buenaventura Landicho, Francisco Landichosson, and Federico Landicho, Franciscos brother, helpedhim cultivate the land.9

On January 31, 1976, Francisco Landicho voluntarilysurrendered his tenancy rights over the three parcels ofland to Eloisa Zolota, married to Alberto Aragon, througha notarized "Kasulatan sa Pagsasauli ng GawaingPalayan" (1976 Kasulatan),10 for a consideration ofPhP1,000.00. The 1976 Kasulatan provides, viz.:

KASULATAN SA PAGSASAULI NG GAWAING PALAYAN

HAYAG SA SINUMANG MAKABABASA:

Ako, Francisco,[sic] Landicho, may sapat na gulang, mayasawa, filipino, at sa ngayon ay naninirahan sa nayon ngMationa, bayan ng Tayabas, lalawigan ng Quezon, sa bisang Kasulatang itoy

NAGSASAYSAY:

Na ako ang tunay at rehistradong mangagawa ng tatlong

(3) parcelang palayan na may kasamang niogan, nanatatayo sa nayon ng Mationa, bayan ng Tayabas,lalawigan ng Quezon, na ang mga sukat, at hangganannito ay lalong makikilala at matutonton sa mgapalatandaang sumusunod: (emphasis supplied)

TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE No. T-135953

"A parcel of land (Lot 9297 of the Cad. Survey ofTayabas), with the improvements thereon,situated in the Barrio of Mationa, Municipality of

Tayabas, Quezon. x x x containing an area ofFour Thousand Three Hundred Eighty Three(4,383) square meters more or less, x x x."


"A parcel of land (Lot 9856 of the Cad. Survey ofTayabas) with the improvements thereon,situated in the Barrio of Mationa, Municipality of

Tayabas. x x x containing an area of NineteenThousand Thirty Two (19,032) square meters,more or less, x x x."


"A parcel of land (Lot 9895 of the CadastralSurvey of Tayabas), with the improvementsthereon, situated in the Barrio of Mationa,

Municipality of Tayabas, x x x containing an areaof Three Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Two(3,872) square meters, more or less, x x x."

Na sapagkat ako ay mayroon pang ilang palayangginagawa at alang-alang din sa halagang ISANG LIBONGPISO (P1,000.00), salaping umiiral na ibinayad attinanggap ko naman ng buong kasiyahan buhat kayEloisa Zolota, may sapat na gulang, Filipino [sic] kasalkay Alberto Aragon at sa ngayon ay naninirahan din ditosa bayan ng Tayabas, lalawigan ng Quezon, ay aking

kusang loob na ISASAULI AT IBABALIK sa may-ari nito angtatlong (3) parcelang palayan na binabanggit sa itaasnito x x x. (emphasis supplied)

SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, ay nilalagdaan ko ito ngayongika-31 ng Enero, taong 1976, dito sa bayan ng Tayabas,lalawigan ng Quezon.

DIGPI NG KANANG HINLALAKI

FRANCISCO LANDICHOManggagawa

x x x x

Notwithstanding the execution of the 1976 Kasulatan, thepetitioners continued cultivating the subjectlandholdings11 until 1987 when another notarized"Kasulatan ng Pagsasauli ng Gawaing Palayan" (1987Kasulatan)12 was executed on July 2, 1987 by FranciscoLandicho through which he surrendered his tenancyrights to the Aragons for a consideration ofPhP3,000.00. 13 The 1987 Kasulatan provides, viz.:

KASULATAN NG PAGSASAULI NG GAWAIN

TANTUIN ANG SINUMANG MAKAKABASA NITO:

Ako, FRANCISCO LANDICHO, asawa ni Lucia Reyes, maysapat na gulang, filipino,[sic] at naninirahan sa bayan ng

Tayabas, lalawigan ng Quezon, dito ay nagsasalaysay ngmga sumusunod: (emphasis supplied)

Na ako ang siyang gumagawa at nagaalaga ng tatlongpalagay na lupa na mayroong pagkakaayos gaya ngsumusunod: (emphasis supplied)

TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-135953

A parcel of land (Lot 9897 of the Cad. Survey ofTayabas), with the improvements thereon,situated in the Barrio of Mationa, Municipality of

Tayabas, Quezon. x x x containing an area ofFour Thousand Eight Hundred Three [sic] (4,383)square meters

A parcel of land (Lot 9856) of the CadastralSurvey of Tayabas), with the improvementsthereon, situated in the Barrio of Mationa,

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Municipality of Tayabas. x x x containing an areaof Nineteen Thousand Thirty Two (19,032)square meters, more or less

A parcel of land (Lot 9895 of the Cad. Survey ofTayabas), with the improvements thereon,situated in the Barrio of Mationa, Municipality of

Tayabas x x x containing an area of ThreeThousand Eight Hundred Seventy Two (3,872)square meters, more or less

Naitong [sic] naulit na lupa ay pagaari nila Loreanne Z.Aragon, Alberto Aragon, Jr., Alberto Aragon III, gayondinsapagkat ako ay matanda na at gayondin hindi ko nakayang gumawa sa naulit na lupa, kaya itong naulit nalupa ay aking ISINASAULI at IBINABALIK sa naulit namayaring nasasabi sa taas nito; (emphasis supplied)

Na simula ngayon ay mayroong karapatan na sila nakumuha o humanap ng ibang gagawa sa naulit na lupa athindi na akong makikiaalam dito, at gayondin mayroonglaya silang ipagbili ang naulit na lupa, at hindi akomakikialam dito; na ito ay binasa sa akin at naunawaanko naman ang nilalaman nito;(emphasis supplied)

SA KATUNAYAN ng lahat, [sic] ng ito akoy lumagda sakasulatang ito ngayong ika 2 ng Hulyo, /[sic]1987 dito saTayabas, Quezon.

Diin ng Kgg. Hinki

FRANCISCO LANDICHOManggagawa

x x x x

On the same day as the execution of the 1987 Kasulatan,the three parcels of land were sold to respondent Felix L.Sia by the spouses Alberto P. Aragon and Eloisa Zolota

Aragon by virtue of a general power of attorney executedin their favor by their children, the Aragons. A "Deed ofAbsolute Sale"14 was executed, whereby the threeparcels of land mentioned above were sold, transferredand conveyed by way of an absolute sale for and inconsideration of PhP50,000.00.

Upon the sale of the subject land to respondent Felix Sia,he converted the same to a residential subdivisionwithout a DAR Clearance and ejected the petitioners fromthe subject land.15 Aggrieved, the petitioners first soughtthe assistance of Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee

(BARC) Chairman Rosalio Cabuyao,16 who in turn broughtthe matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office(PARO) of Quezon.

Petitioners Federico Landicho and BuenaventuraLandicho then filed a protest before the DAR PARO, LegalDivision of Lucena City17 alleging that they are thetenants of the parcels of land owned by respondent FelixSia and claimed that they are entitled to a disturbancecompensation. During the mediation conference held atthe DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Office on July 22,

1992, it was admitted by Francisco Landicho that hevoluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights over thesubject parcels of land in consideration ofPhP3,000.00.18Thus, in the Report andRecommendation19 of DAR Provincial Legal Officer III,Ernesto M. Arro, Jr., dated October 1, 1992, it was foundthat the petitioners had no claim for tenancy rights overthe subject parcels of land. It was held by the DARProvincial Legal Officer that Francisco Landicho is thelegal and bona fide tenant of the parcels of land but hecannot be awarded disturbance compensation becausehe voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights over thesaid properties twice, through the 1976 and the 1987Kasulatan. In the case of Buenaventura and FedericoLandicho, it was found that they are merely farm helpersof Francisco Landicho and are not entitled to disturbance

compensation.

Dissatisfied with the ruling of the DAR PARO of LucenaCity, petitioners Buenaventura and Federico Landichofiled another Protest before the DAR Legal Division,Region IV, Pasig, Metro Manila. On February 15, 1993, aMemorandum20 was issued by Legal Officer II,Dandumum D. Sultan, Jr., which also dismissed theprotest of the petitioners. It was likewise found thatFederico and Buenaventura are not tenants of the land inquestion but are merely farm helpers of the legitimatetenant, Francisco Landicho, who surrendered his tenancyrights to the former owner, the Aragons. During aninterview with Buenaventura Landicho conducted byLegal Officer II Dandumum Sultan, Jr. it was affirmed by

Buenaventura that it was only Francisco Landicho, hisfather, who was allowed and permitted to work on thesubject land and that both he and Federico had notsecured the permission of the landowner to farm theland.21

In response to the complaint of BARC Chairman RosalioCabuyao, DAR Region IV Director Percival C. Dalugdugwrote a letter, dated April 25, 1994, stating that theresults of an investigation conducted by theirrepresentatives revealed that Buenaventura Landichoand Federico Landicho are not tenants of the subject land

and are thus not entitled to disturbance compensation. Itwas also stated in the letter that it is only FranciscoLandicho who is the legitimate tenant of the land ownedby the Aragons. However, he surrendered his tenancyrights by virtue of the 1976 and 1987 Kasulatan.22Theletter23 states:

Ika-25 ng Abril 1994

G. Rosalio J. CabuyaoBARC ChairmanBrgy. Mationa, Tayabas, Quezon

Mahal na G. Cabuyao,

Kami po ay lumiham sa inyo upang ipaabot sa inyo angpinakahuling ulat mula sa aming PARO sa Quezon I [sic]hinggil sa inyong iniharap na reklamo na ayon po sa inyoay hindi binibigyang pansin ni Atty. Rolando Roldan.

x x x x

Hinggil naman sa pagbibigay ng disturbancecompensation kina G. Buenaventura at Federico

Landicho, ikinalulungkot po naming ipaalam sa inyo nawala tayong sapat na batayan upang magawa ito. Ayonsa pagsisiyasat na isinagawa ng aming kawani, angmagkapatid na Buenaventura at Federico ay hindikasama o walang ugnayang kasama (tenancyrelationship) sa may-ari ng lupa sapagkat ang kanilangama ang siyang may karapatan at lehitimong kasama.Ayon din sa ulat, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatan sapagsasauli ng gawaing palayan ay isinuko na ni G.Francisco Landicho ang kanyang mga karapatan bilangkasama at magsasaka sa lupang pinaguusapan. x x x.

Maraming salamat po sa inyong pagsulat at sana aynabigyang linaw namin ang inyong hinaing.

Sumasainyo,

(Sgd.)Percival C. DalugdugDirektor Pangrehiyon

On June 10, 1994, petitioners Francisco Landicho,Federico Landicho and Buenaventura Landicho filed aComplaint24 against Alberto Aragon, Jr., Alberto Aragon IIIand Felix Sia before the DARAB for fixing and payment ofdisturbance compensation and awarding of home lot. The

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petitioners allege that they are tenants of the subjectland since January 31, 1976 and that they wereunlawfully ejected from the subject land by virtue of the1976 and 1987 Kasulatan which they allege to be invalid,since they were executed by Francisco through theinsidious words, undue influence and strategy employedby the Aragons, in connivance with respondent Sia.

In their Answer25dated July 7, 1994, the Aragonsrecognized only Francisco as their former tenant until hesurrendered his tenancy rights through the 1976

Kasulatan and finally surrendered the land upon theexecution of the 1987 Kasulatan. They assert that therewas no undue advantage exerted over petitionerFrancisco Landicho since the 1976 and the 1987Kasulatan were written in Tagalog, a languageunderstood by Francisco.26 They raised the defense thatthe petitioners have no cause of action on the grounds ofprescription, laches, and estoppel, that the claim isbarred by prior judgment, and that the claim has beenabandoned or otherwise extinguished.27 On the otherhand, respondent Felix Sia, in his Answer withCounterclaim28dated July 11, 1994, alleged that when hebought the subject parcels of land, they were free fromtenants since Francisco had already relinquished histenancy rights therein through the execution of publicdocuments.

After the filing of the parties respective position papers,the DAR Provincial Adjudicator of Region IV rendered adecision in PARAD Case No. IV-QUI-0343-94,29datedOctober 24, 1995, in favor of the petitioners. ProvincialAdjudicator Oscar C. Dimacali ruled that against theirwill, the petitioners were dispossessed of the land thatthey have been cultivating. He also ruled that it is notnecessary to decide on the issue of whether Federico andBuenaventura are merely farm helpers of Francisco, noris it essential to determine whether the 1976 and 1987Kasulatan are valid. The dispositive portion30of thedecision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following are

hereby ordered:

1. defendant Felix Sia to pay each of theplaintiffs a disturbance compensation equivalentto five (5) years based from the average normalharvest to be determined by the MAROconcerned who is hereby required to make areport to this Office within one (1) month fromreceipt hereof;

2. defendant Felix Sia to provide each plaintiff ahomelot [sic] of 200 square meters in thesubject landholdings; and,

3. defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly andseverally the sum of P10,000.00 as moraldamages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.

No pronounce [sic] as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

The Aragons and respondent Sia appealed the foregoingdecision to the DARAB,31 which issued a decision32 onSeptember 18, 2000 that affirmed in part the decision ofthe Provincial Adjudicator, and deleted the award ofdisturbance compensation on the basis of the finding thatthe petitioners are still bona fide tenants in theirrespective landholdings. The DARAB did not give credit tothe report and recommendation of Legal Officer IIIErnesto M. Arro and Legal Officer II Dandumum D. Sultan,

Jr. that Francisco Landicho voluntarily surrendered histenancy rights.33 The DARAB found that a tenancyrelationship exists between the petitioners and theAragons and that when Felix Sia became the owner of

the subject land, he assumed to exercise the rights andobligations that pertain to the previous owners. Thedispositive portion34of the DARAB decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealeddecision dated October 24, 1995, is hereby affirmed withMODIFICATION in so far as the disturbance compensationwhich is not obtaining in the case at bar considering thatplaintiffs-appellees are still bona fide tenants in theirrespective landholdings.

Furthermore, the DAR-BALA of Quezon Province incoordination with the Office of the DAR Secretary, ishereby directed to file criminal charges for illegalconversion against defendants-appellants, if

circumstances may still warrant.

No Pronouncement as to Costs.

SO ORDERED.

Felix Sia then filed a Petition for Review35 under Rule 43with the Court of Appeals, which rendered a decision36onFebruary 23, 2005 that set aside the decision of theDARAB and dismissed the complaint. The Court ofAppeals found that the essential requisites are not

present to establish a tenancy relationship betweenpetitioners Buenaventura and Federico Landicho and theAragons, and that the tenant-landlord relationshipbetween Francisco Landicho and the Aragons also endedupon the surrender of his tenancy rights through the1976 and 1987 Kasulatan; consequently, no tenancyrelationship also exists between the petitioners andrespondent Felix Sia. The Court of Appeals also ruled thateven assuming that the petitioners have a cause ofaction, the same had already prescribed since thecomplaint was only filed seven years from the time thecause of action accrued.37

On March 22, 2005, the petitioners filed a Motion forReconsideration38 of the Court of Appeals decision. TheCourt of Appeals issued a Resolution39 on July 6, 2005,denying the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorar i40 of theDecision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals with thefollowing assignment of errors:41

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred:

1. When it gave due course to the petition and

consequently granted the same; and

2. When it disregarded the finding of facts [sic]of the DARAB that petitioners are bonafide [sic]tenants of the land purchased by hereinrespondent and therefore entitled to security oftenure.

The parties filed their respective Memoranda42 whichboth raised the following issues:43(1) whether or not thepetitioners are bona fide tenants of the land purchasedby the respondent; and (2) whether or not the cause ofaction of the petitioners already prescribed at the time ofthe filing of the complaint.

We deny the petition.

The case before us involves the determination of whetherthe petitioners are tenants of the land purchased by therespondent, which is essentially a question of fact. As ageneral rule, questions of fact are not proper in a petitionunder Rule 45.44 But, since the findings of facts of theDARAB and the Court of Appeals contradict each other, itis crucial to go through the evidence and documents onrecord as a matter of exception to the rule. 45

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In determining the existence of a tenancy relationshipbetween the petitioners and the respondent, it isnecessary to make a distinction between petitionerFrancisco Landicho and petitioners Buenaventura andFederico Landicho.

With respect to Francisco, both the petitioners and therespondent agree that he was recognized by the Aragonsas a bona fide tenant of the subject land when hecontinued the cultivation of the land after the death ofhis father Arcadio in 1972.46 The dispute between the

parties arose when the petitioners were ejected from theland on the basis of the 1976 and the 1987 Kasulatan,the validity of which is questioned by the petitioners. Thepetitioners assert that the Aragons, the predecessors-in-interest of the respondent, through insidious words andmachinations, took advantage of Francisco Landichosilliteracy and old age in order to make him sign the 1976and 1987 Kasulatan.47The Aragons and respondent FelixSia deny that they took advantage of petitioner FranciscoLandicho and the respondent also denies employing anyfraudulent scheme48since both the 1976 and the 1987Kasulatan were written in Tagalog, a languageunderstood by Francisco Landicho.49They further arguethat these are public documents, the validity of whichcannot be collaterally attacked.50 They aver that the 1976and 1987 Kasulatan were voluntarily executed by

Francisco Landicho and that he willingly surrendered histenancy rights, which thus validly extinguished thetenancy relationship.51

With respect to Buenaventura and Federico Landicho, itis asserted by the petitioners that they have beencultivating the three lots, which were divided amongthem for cultivation in this wise:

TCT No. 135953 with Lot No. 9895- tenanted by FranciscoLandicho

TCT No. 135952 with Lot No. 9896- tenanted by FedericoLandicho

TCT No. 135929 with Lot No. 9897- tenanted byBuenaventura Landicho.52

They claim that there was an implied tenancyrelationship because the Aragons have personalknowledge of the fact that the petitioners were the oneswho cultivated the land53and they were in continuouspossession of the land until sometime in 1987 when theywere unlawfully ejected by virtue of the invalid 1987Kasulatan.54

The DARAB did not give credit to the report andrecommendation of the DAR Provincial Legal Officer andDAR Provincial Adjudicator of Region IV that FranciscoLandicho voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rightsthrough the 1987 Kasulatan and that Federico andBuenaventura Landicho were merely farm helpers. TheDARAB found that a landlord-tenant relationship existsbetween the petitioners and the respondent and ruled inthis wise:

However, We find it hard to believe that plaintiffs-

appellees who have been tilling the land in question forso long a time, would suddenly lose interest in it for goodtime [sic] when they know that full ownership over thesame would soon be in their hands. Besides, plaintiffs-appellees Francisco Landicho et., [sic] al., would not eventhought [sic] of filing a complaint if they have alreadyabandoned or surrendered the subject landholdings infavor of herein defendants-appellants. Anyone in his rightmind for that matter, would not waste time[,] effort andmoney especially if he is poor to prosecute an unworthyaction.55

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the DARABand agreed with the ruling of the DAR PARO and theRegion IV DAR Legal Division that only petitioner

Francisco Landicho was the tenant of all of the three lotscovered by TCT No. 135953, TCT No. 135952 and TCT No.135929 and that he voluntarily surrendered his tenancyrights upon the execution of the 1987 Kasulatan. TheCourt of Appeals also agreed with the PARO and theRegion IV DAR that Federico and Buenaventura Landichowere merely farm helpers of Francisco, ruling that theywere considered as part of the bona fide tenantsimmediate farm household and for this reason, theAragons cannot be faulted for not questioning theirpossession and cultivation of the subject landholdings.56

We agree with the Court of Appeals and give credence tothe findings of the DAR PARO and Region IV DAR.

A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No.1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act ofthe Philippines, as:

x x x a person who, himself and with the aid availablefrom within his immediate farm household, cultivates theland belonging to, or possessed by, another, with thelatter's consent for purposes of production, sharing theproduce with the landholder under the share tenancysystem, or paying to the landholder a price certain orascertainable in produce or in money or both, under theleasehold tenancy system.57

A tenancy relationship arises between a landholder and atenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, toundertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging tothe landholder, as a result of which relationship thetenant acquires the right to continue working on andcultivating the land.58

The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot bepresumed and claims that one is a tenant do notautomatically give rise to security of tenure.59 For atenancy relationship to exist, all of the following essential

requisites must be present: (1) the parties are thelandowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter isagricultural land; (3) there is consent between theparties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5)there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) thereis sharing of the harvests between the parties.60

Not all of these requisites obtain in the case at bar.

The essential element of consent is absent because thelandowners never recognized petitioners Federico andBuenaventura Landicho as legitimate tenants of thesubject land. And, although Federico and Buenaventuraclaim that they are tenants of "Lot No. 9896 and Lot No.9897,"61 respectively, simply because they continuously

cultivated and openly occupied the subject land; therewas no evidence presented to establish the presence ofthe essential requisites of a tenancy relationship otherthan the self-serving statements of the petitioners.Furthermore, both the 1976 and the 1987 Kasulatan onlymentioned Francisco as the tenant of the subject parcelsof land, and there was no mention of petitioners Federicoand Buenaventura.

The petitioners cannot rely on their self-servingstatements to prove the existence of a tenancyrelationship because independent and concreteevidence, aside from self-serving statements, is neededto prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvests, orconsent of the landowner.62 A tiller or a farmworker does

not automatically become an agricultural tenantrecognized under agrarian laws by mere occupation orcultivation of an agricultural land.63

The DARAB did not cite any evidence to show theexistence of the requisites of a tenancy relationship andmerely based the conclusion that the petitioners aretenants of the Aragons on the weak reasoning that filinga complaint is inconsistent with the voluntary surrenderof the landholdings and that it is unlikely that petitionerswould suddenly lose interest in the subject land whenthey know that ownership would soon be transferred to

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them.64The DARABs inferences are without basis and arepurely speculative, and except for its sweepingconclusion, there is no other independent and concreteevidence in the record of the case that would sustain thefinding that Federico and Buenaventura are tenants ofthe Aragons.

It was not shown that Federico and Buenaventuracultivated the land with the consent of the landowners.

The Court of Appeals correctly held that only Franciscowas the bona fide tenant of the land in question and that

Federico and Buenaventura were just farm helpers ofFrancisco, as part of his immediate farmhousehold.65 This is supported by the evidence on recordwhere, in the Memorandum of DAR Region IV LegalOfficer II Dandumum Sultan, Jr., it is stated that during aninterview conducted with Buenaventura Landicho, hedisclosed that it was only Francisco Landicho, his father,who was allowed and permitted to work on the subjectland and that both he and Federico had not secured thepermission of the landowner to farm the land.66

There was also no evidence presented to show thatFederico and Buenaventura gave a share of their harvestto the Aragons. Independent evidence, such as receipts,must be presented to show that there was a sharing of

the harvest between the landowner and thetenant.67And, assuming the landowners received a shareof the harvest, it was held in the case of Cornelio de

Jesus, et al. v. Moldex Realty, Inc.68that "[t]he fact ofreceipt, without an agreed system of sharing, does notipso facto create a tenancy."69

There is no tenancy relationship between the Aragonsand petitioners Federico and Buenaventura without theessential elements of consent and sharing of agriculturalproduce.70

Neither can we give any weight to the petitionerscontention that there was an implied tenancy by reasonalone of their continuous cultivation of the land.

Acquiescence by the landowner of their cultivation of theland does not create an implied tenancy if thelandowners have never considered petitioners Federicoand Buenaventura as tenants of the land and if theessential requisites of a tenancy relationship are lacking.

There was no intention to institute the petitioners asagricultural tenants. In the case of Epitacio Sialana v.Mary Y. Avila, et al.71 it was held that "x x x for an impliedtenancy to come about, the actuations of the partiestaken in their entirety must be demonstrative of an intentto continue a prior lease established by the landholder xx x."72

With respect to petitioner Francisco Landicho, the Courtof Appeals also correctly held that although Franciscowas the legal tenant of the subject land, he voluntarilysurrendered his tenancy rights when he knowingly andfreely executed the 1987 Kasulatan.73This conclusionfinds basis in the investigation conducted by the PARO,where during the mediation conference, petitionerFrancisco Landicho admitted that he voluntarilysurrendered his tenancy rights over the subject parcelsof land in consideration of PhP3,000.00.74The tenancyrelationship was validly extinguished through theexecution of the 1987 Kasulatan and upon the voluntarysurrender of the landholdings pursuant to Section 8 ofRepublic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as theAgricultural Land Reform Code, to wit:

SECTION 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural LeaseholdRelation. The agricultural leasehold relationestablished under this Code shall be extinguished by:

(1) Abandonment of the landholding without theknowledge of the agricultural lessor;

(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding bythe agricultural lessee, written notice of whichshall be served three months in advance; or

(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine tosucceed to the lessee, in the event of death orpermanent incapacity of the lessee.75

The petitioners also failed to support their claim that theAragons took advantage of Franciscos old age andilliteracy and employed fraudulent schemes in order todeceive him into signing the Kasulatan. It has been heldthat "[a] person is not incapacitated to contract merelybecause of advanced years or by reason of physicalinfirmities. It is only when such age or infirmities impairthe mental faculties to such extent as to prevent onefrom properly, intelligently, and fairly protecting herproperty rights, is she considered incapacitated."76

The petitioners contention that the Aragons employedfraud, aside from being unsubstantiated, is also contraryto the records of the case. Both the 1976 and the 1987Kasulatan were also written in Tagalog, which is thelanguage understood by Francisco Landicho. They werewritten in an uncomplicated manner and clearly statedthat he is returning the land that he has been cultivatingto the landowners because he is already old and could nolonger work on the land.77The 1987 Kasulatan also states

that the contents of the document were read to him andthat he understands the same.

It is also important to note that both the 1976 and 1987Kasulatan are duly notarized and are considered aspublic documents evidencing the surrender of Franciscostenancy rights over the subject landholdings. They wereexecuted with all the legal formalities of a publicdocument and thus the legal presumption of theregularity and validity of the Kasulatan are retained inthe absence of full, clear and convincing evidence to

overcome such presumption.78 Strong evidence isrequired to prove a defect of a public instrument,79andsince such strong and convincing evidence was notpresented in the instant case, the 1976 and the 1987Kasulatan are presumed valid.

Coming now to the second issue of prescription, thepetitioners argue that they did not sleep on their rightsbecause although the Complaint with the DARAB wasfiled on June 10, 1994, they already filed a protest beforethe DAR Legal Division of Lucena prior to their Complaintbefore the DARAB.80

This contention cannot be sustained.

An action to enforce rights as an agricultural tenant isbarred by prescription if not filed within three (3)years.81Section 38 of Republic Act No. 3844, otherwiseknown as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, specificallyprovides that:

SECTION 38. Statute of Limitations. An action toenforce any cause of action under this Code shall bebarred if not commenced within three years after suchcause of action accrued.82

The records of the case show that the protest before theDAR Legal Division of Lucena was filed sometime in 1992when the case was set for a mediation

conference.83

Even assuming that they have a cause ofaction, this arose in 1987 when they were ejected fromthe landholdings they were cultivating which means thatit took them about five (5) years to file a protest beforethe DAR Legal Division of Lucena, and it took them seven(7) years to file a Complaint before the DARAB. Clearly,their cause of action has already prescribed.

Accordingly, the petitioners complaint against therespondent is dismissible on the ground of prescriptionand for lack of cause of action.

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IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision and Resolution of theCourt of Appeals under review are hereby AFFIRMEDwithout pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169570 March 2, 2007

RICARDO PORTUGUEZ, Petitioner,vs.GSIS FAMILY BANK (Comsavings Bank) and THEHON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For resolution is a Petition for Review by Certiorari underRule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, of theDecision1dated 25 April 2005 and the Resolution2dated25 August 2005 of the Court of Appeals. The assailedDecision and Resolution reversed the findings of both theNational Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and theLabor Arbiter, in their Decisions dated 30 January 2004and 30 June 2003, respectively, that respondent GSISFamily Bank is guilty of the illegal dismissal of petitionerRicardo Portuguez. The dispositive portion of the assaileddecision of the appellate court reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition ishereby GRANTED, the assailed NLRC Decision dated

January 30, 2004, together with the Resolution dated

June 22, 2004, are RECALLED and SET ASIDE, and a newone entered DISMISSING NLRC NCR CA No. 037015-03(NLRC NCR Case. No. 07-05075-2002). Nopronouncement as to costs.3

The factual and procedural antecedents of this instantpetition are as follows:

Petitioner was employed by the respondent bank asutility clerk on 1 February 1971. Later, he rose from theranks and was promoted as branch manager of the Gen.

Trias Branch, and was subsequently assigned to otherbranches of respondent bank within the Province ofCavite. Eventually, he was appointed as BusinessDevelopment and Public Relations (BDPR) Officer of theentire respondent bank.4

In addition to his regular duties as BDPR Officer,petitioner was designated as a member of theProcurement Bidding and Awards Committee (PBAC),Oversight Committee and Investigating Committee of therespondent bank.5

On 23 October 1997, petitioner was temporarily assignedas caretaker of respondent bank. Finally, he wasdesignated as Acting Assistant Vice-President and at thesame time Officer-In-Charge of the respondent bank on15 June 1998.6

Respondent bank, on the other hand, is a bankinginstitution duly authorized and existing as such under thePhilippine laws. It was originally known as Royal SavingsBank. In 1983 and the early part of 1984, respondentbank underwent serious liquidity problems and wasplaced by the Central Bank of the Philippines (CentralBank) under receivership. However, due to the continuedinability to maintain a state of liquidity, the Central Bank

ordered its closure on 9 July 1984. After two months, therespondent bank was reopened under the control andmanagement of the Commercial Bank of Manila and wasthen renamed as Comsavings Bank.7

In 1987, the Government Service Insurance System(GSIS) acquired the interest of the Commercial Bank ofManila in the respondent bank and together with theCentral Bank and the Philippine Deposit InsuranceCorporation (PDIC), GSIS infused a substantial amount offresh capital into respondent bank in order to ensure itseffective rehabilitation. Resultantly, GSIS took over thecontrol and management of the respondent bank thatwas renamed as GSIS Family Savings Bank.8

Accordingly, Amando Macalino (Macalino) was appointedas President of the respondent bank on 21 December1998. In view of Macalinos appointment, the designationof petitioner as Officer-In-Charge and caretaker ofrespondent bank was recalled; however, his appointmentas Acting Assistant Vice-President, was retained.9

In line with its policy to attain financial stability,respondent bank adopted measures directed to cut downadministrative overhead expenses through streamlining.

Thus, respondent bank came up with an early voluntary

retirement program. On 15 April 2001, petitioner opted toavail himself of this retirement package, supposedly,under protest, and received the amount of P1.324 Millionas retirement pay.10

On 11 July 2002, petitioner filed a complaint against therespondent bank and Macalino for constructive dismissaland underpayment of wages, 13th month pay andretirement benefits before the Labor Arbiter.11In hisPosition Paper,12petitioner alleged that due todiscrimination, unfair treatment, and intense pressure he

had received from the new management throughMacalino, he was forced to retire at the prime of his life.

In a Decision13dated 30 June 2003, the Labor Arbiteradjudged the respondent bank guilty of illegal dismissal,the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, findingcomplainant to have been illegally dismissed.Concomitantly, Respondents are jointly and solidarilyliable to pay RICARDO PORTUGUEZ the following:

P1,148,333.33

representingbackwages;

1,280,000.00

representing separationpay;

443,884.32

representing salarydifferentials;

500,000.00

representing moraldamages;

400,000.00

representing exemplarydamages;

Ten percent of the total award as attorneys fees.

Other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

The detailed computation of the Computation &Examination Unit, National Capital Region is made part ofthis Decision.14

Aggrieved, respondent bank appealed the adversedecision to the NLRC which adopted in toto the findingsof the Labor Arbiter. In a Decision15 dated 30 January2004, the NLRC dismissed the appeal and found the

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decision of the Labor Arbiter to be sufficiently supportedby the facts on record and law on the matter.

Respondent banks Motion for Reconsideration waslikewise denied by the NLRC in its Resolution16dated 22

June 2004 for failing to show that patent or palpableerrors have been committed in the assailed decision.

The NLRC Resolution dated 22 June 2004, denyingrespondent banks motion for reconsideration, wasprematurely declared final and executory and wasentered into judgment on 6 August 2004.17

Shortly thereafter, on 16 August 2004, respondent banktimely elevated the matter to the Court of Appealsthrough a Special Civil Action for Certiorari18under Rule65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Incorporated with itspetition was the Urgent Application for the Issuance of

Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ ofPreliminary Injunction.

Pending resolution of its petition and application for theissuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunctionbefore the appellate court, the Labor Arbiter, on 16September 2004, issued a Writ of Execution19for thesatisfaction of the NLRC decision dated 30 January 2004.On the same date, a Notice of Garnishment20was servedon the manager/cashier of respondent bank in thePamplona Uno, Las Pias City Branch.

Acting on the application for TRO, the Court of Appealsenjoined the implementation of the NLRC decision dated30 January 2004 and therefore, the satisfaction of theWrit of Execution dated 16 September 2004 issued bythe Labor Arbiter was tolled for a period of 60 days.21

Eventually, the appellate court issued a Writ ofPreliminary Injunction22permanently enjoining theexecution of the NLRC decision dated 30 January 2004until the final resolution of the case.

On 25 April 2005, the Court of Appeals resolved thecontroversy by reversing the judgment of the LaborArbiter and the NLRC and ruling out constructivedismissal considering that petitioners separation fromservice was voluntary on his part when he chose to availhimself of the respondent banks early retirementprogram and received the amount of P1.324 Million asretirement pay.23

Similarly ill-fated was Petitioners Motion forReconsideration which was denied by the Court ofAppeals in its Resolution24 dated 25 August 2005.

Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.25

For the resolution of this Court are the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALSERRED WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONERWAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED FROMEMPLOYMENT.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALSERRED WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER ISNOT ENTITLED TO SALARY DIFFERENTIAL.

Before we delve into the merits of the case, it is best tounderscore that the factual findings of the NLRC affirmingthose of the Labor Arbiter, who are deemed to have

acquired expertise on the matters within theirjurisdiction, when sufficiently supported by evidence onrecord, are accorded respect if not finality, and areconsidered binding on this Court.26It is equally true,however, that when the findings of the Labor Arbiter andthe NLRC are inconsistent with that of the Court ofAppeals, there is a need to review the records todetermine which of them should be preferred as moreconformable to evidentiary facts.27

As borne by the records, it appears that there is adivergence between the findings of the Labor Arbiter asaffirmed by the NLRC, and those of the Court of Appeals.For the purpose of clarity and intelligibility, therefore, thisCourt will make an infinitesimal scrunity of the records

and recalibrate and reevaluate the evidence presentedby the parties all over again.

We have already repeatedly held that this Court is not atrier of facts. Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court limitsthe office of a Petition for Review to questions of law andleaves the factual issues as found by the quasi-judicialbodies, as long as they are supported by evidence.28Wenever fail to stress as well that when the rulings of thelabor tribunal and the appellate court are in conflict, weare constrained to analyze and weigh the evidenceagain.29

Substantively, petitioner alleges that respondent bank,through Macalino, subjected him to all forms ofunbearable harassment that can be mustered in order toforce him to resign. Petitioner specifically claims that hewas deprived of his salary and other benefits andprivileges appurtenant to his position as the ActingAssistant Vice-President, including his office. Respondentbank allegedly granted much higher salary to the newlyhired bank officers compared to what he was receivingduring his tenure.

In contrast, respondent bank maintains that petitionerwas not coerced to resign but voluntarily opted to availhimself of the early retirement program and was dulypaid his retirement benefits. It posits that petitioner wasmerely holding the position of Assistant Vice-President inacting capacity subject to the ratification of therespondent banks Board of Directors and since hisappointment has never been ratified by the Board,respondent bank cannot therefore grant him the salaryand benefits accorded to such position.

In finding that petitioner was not constructivelydismissed from employment, the Court of Appealsstressed that there was no showing that petitionersseparation from employment was due to involuntaryresignation or forced severance. Neither was it shownthat there was a decrease in salary and privileges ordowngrading of petitioners rank. What can be clearlydeduced from the evidence was that until his voluntaryretirement in 2001, petitioner was holding the position ofActing Assistant Vice-President and was receiving thesalary and benefits accorded thereto.

After scrupulously examining the contrasting positions ofthe parties, and the conflicting decisions of the LaborArbiter and the NLRC, on one hand, and the appellatecourt, on the other, we find the records of the case bereftof evidence to substantiate the conclusions reached byboth the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that petitioner wasconstructively dismissed from employment.

Constructive dismissal or constructive discharge hasbeen defined as quitting because continued employmentis rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as anoffer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution inpay. 30In the case at bar, a demotion in rank ordiminution in pay was never raised as an issue. Settledthen is the fact that petitioner suffered no demotion inrank or diminution in pay that could give rise to a causeof action against respondent bank for constructivedismissal under this definition.

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Worthy to stress, however, is that constructive dismissaldoes not always take the form of demotion in rank ordiminution in pay. In several cases, we have ruled thatthe act of a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdainby an employer may become so unbearable on the partof the employee so as to foreclose any choice on his partexcept to resign from such employment.31

It is upon the aforementioned legal tenet that petitioneranchored his case. Petitioner strenuously argues thatwhile the newly hired bank officers were given higher

salaries and fat allowances, he was merely paid theamount of P15,000 basic pay and P4,000 allowance forthe position of Acting Assistant Vice-President which,according to him, was way below what the newly hiredbank officers were enjoying. Stated differently, petitioneravers that he was discriminated against by therespondent bank in terms of payment of salary and grantof benefits and allowances.

We do not agree.

Upon careful perusal of the position papers, memorandaand other pleadings submitted by petitioner from theLabor Arbiter up to this Court, including the evidenceappended thereon, we find that no evidence, substantial

or otherwise, was ever submitted by petitioner tobuttress the very premise of his position that there wasdiscrimination.

Discrimination has been defined as the failure to treat allpersons equally when no reasonable distinction can befound between those favored and those notfavored.32 Thus, before a claim for discrimination canprosper, it must be established that, first, there is noreasonable distinction or classification that can beobtained between persons belonging to the same class,and second, persons belonging to the same class havenot been treated alike.33

Apropos thereto, petitioner failed to establish that he

possessed the same skills, competencies and expertiseas those of the newly hired bank officers so as toeliminate any possibility of substantial distinction thatmay warrant the unequal treatment between them. Noproof was likewise presented by petitioner to show thatthe functions, duties and responsibilities he wasperforming are the same as those of the newly hiredbank officers.

Petitioner likewise failed to present any proof tending toshow that he was discriminated against by the

respondent bank. While he vigorously cried that thenewly hired bank officers were afforded higher salariesand benefits compared to what he was earning,petitioner, however, miserably failed to substantiate hisclaim. No evidence was ever offered by petitioner toprove the amount of salaries and bonuses actuallyenjoyed by the newly hired bank officers, except for hisbare allegations contained in his demand letter34dated20 February 2001, to wit:

Mr. Portuguez has reliably learned that Bank records

could show that your newly hired officers are being paidthe basic salaries in the range of P25,000 to P30,000. 35

Such bare and sweeping statement contains nothing butempty imputation of a fact that could hardly be given anyevidentiary weight by this Court. It is indeed true that thedemand letter made reference to bank records uponwhich petitioner purportedly derived his allegation but nosuch bank records were ever presented as evidence atany stage of the proceedings.

Indubitably, such self-serving and unsubstantiateddeclaration is insufficient to establish a case beforequasi-judicial bodies. Well-entrenched is the rule that thequantum of evidence required to establish a fact in quasi-

judicial bodies is substantial evidence. Substantialevidence is such amount of relevant evidence which areasonable mind might accept as adequate to support aconclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds mightopine otherwise.36

It is beyond question that the evidence presented bypetitioner cannot be considered as substantial evidence.Verily, petitioners case is devoid of substance toconvince even the unreasonable minds, for evidently therecords are stripped of supporting proofs to, at the veryleast, even just verify his claim.

In addition, petitioner asseverates that in cases ofconstructive dismissal, the burden of proof rests on the

employer to show that the employee was dismissed on avalid and just cause.37 And failing to discharge suchpresumption, as in the case at bar, respondent bankshould be adjudged guilty of illegal dismissal.

Again, we are not persuaded. We are not unaware of thestatutory rule that in illegal dismissal cases, theemployer has the onus probandi to show that theemployees separation from employment is notmotivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, oreffected as a form of punishment or demotion without

sufficient cause.38It bears stressing, however, that thislegal principle presupposes that there is indeed aninvoluntary separation from employment and the factsattendant to such forced separation was clearlyestablished.

This legal principle has no application in the instantcontroversy for as we have succinctly pointed above,petitioner failed to establish that indeed he wasdiscriminated against and on account of suchdiscrimination, he was forced to sever his employment

from the respondent bank. What is undisputed is the factthat petitioner availed himself of respondent banksearly voluntary retirement program and accordinglyreceived his retirement pay in the amount of P1.324Million under such program. Consequently, the burden ofproof will not vest on respondent bank to prove thelegality of petitioners separation from employment butaptly remains with the petitioner to prove his allegationthat his availment of the early voluntary retirementprogram was, in fact, done involuntarily.

As we have explicitly ruled in Machica v. RooseveltService Center, Inc.39:

The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the

burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were burdenedto prove their allegation that respondents dismissedthem from their employment.It must be stressed thatthe evidence to prove this fact must be clear,positive and convincing.The rule that the employerbears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases findsno application here because the respondents denyhaving dismissed the petitioners. (Emphases supplied.)

Verily, petitioner did not present any clear, positive orconvincing evidence in the present case to support hisclaims. Indeed, he never presented any evidence at allother than his own self-serving declarations. We mustbear in mind the legal dictum that, "he who asserts,not he who denies, must prove."40

In the same breath, we are constrained to denypetitioners claim for salary differentials. We are notunmindful that the amount of P19,000 a month may notbe commensurate compensation to the position of ActingAssistant Vice-President, but in the case at bar, the factsand the evidence did not establish even at least arational basis for how much the standard compensationfor the said position must be. It is not enough thatpetitioner perceived that he was receiving a very lowsalary in the absence of a comparative standard upon

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which he can peg his supposed commensuratecompensation.

Petitioners incessant reliance on the findings of theLabor Arbiter and the NLRC is equally unavailing. At theoutset, we have already laid down that findings of fact ofquasi-judicial bodies are conclusive and are not subjectto review by the Court. However, this rule does not applyif such findings are tainted with mistake or not supportedby evidence. 41

In finding that respondent bank is guilty of constructivedismissal, the Labor Arbiter mainly hinges its ruling onthe Constitutional dogma that due to the lopsided powerof capital over labor, the State shall intervene as anequalizer consistent with the social justice policyaffording protection to labor.42

While we agree with the Labor Arbiter that in light of thisConstitutional mandate, we must be vigilant in strikingdown any attempt of the management to exploit oroppress the working class, it does not mean, however,that we are but bound to uphold the working class inevery labor dispute brought before this Court for ourresolution.

While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutionalpolicy on social justice and on the protection of labor, itdoes not mean that every labor dispute will be decided infavor of the workers. The law also recognizes thatmanagement has rights which are also entitled to respectand enforcement in the interest of fair play.43

It should be remembered that the Philippine Constitution,while inexorably committed towards the protection of theworking class from exploitation and unfair treatment,nevertheless mandates the policy of social justice so asto strike a balance between an avowed predilection forlabor, on the one hand, and the maintenance of the legalrights of capital, the proverbial hen that lays the goldenegg, on the other. Indeed, we should not be unmindful ofthe legal norm that justice is in every case for thedeserving, to be dispensed with in light of establishedfacts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.44

The presumption in favor of labor cannot defeat the verypurpose for which our labor laws exist: to balance the

conflicting interest of labor and management and toguaranty that labor and management stand on equalfooting when bargaining in good faith with each other,not to tilt the scale to favor one over the other.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instantpetition is DENIED. The Decision dated 25 April 2005,and the Resolution dated 25 August 2005, both renderedby the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85723, arehereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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Documents

Labstan - Cases - Set 1 (Part 1)