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Science, metaphysics and method
James Ladyman
Published online: 11 May 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
Abstract While there are many examples of metaphysical theorising being heu-
ristically and intellectually important in the progress of scientific knowledge, many
people wonder how metaphysics not closely informed and inspired by empirical
science could lead to rival or even supplementary knowledge about the world. This
paper assesses the merits of a popular defence of the a priori methodology of
metaphysics that goes as follows. The first task of the metaphysician, like the
scientist, is to construct a hypothesis that accounts for the phenomena in question. Itis then argued that among the possible metaphysical theories, the empirical evidence
underdetermines the right one, just as the empirical evidence underdetermines the
right scientific theory. In the latter case it is widely agreed that we must break the
underdetermination by appeal to theoretical virtues, and this is just what should be
and largely is done in metaphysics. This is part of a more general line of argument
that defends metaphysics on the basis of its alleged continuity with highly theo-
retical science. In what follows metaphysics and theoretical science are compared in
order to see whether the above style of defence of a priori metaphysics is successful.
Keywords Metaphysics IBE Underdetermination Scientific realism
1 Introduction
Many philosophers are not content to think of metaphysics as the mere explication
of our conceptual scheme or schemes, as in Strawsons descriptive metaphysics,
J. Ladyman (&)
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Road, Bristol BS29YS, UK
e-mail: [email protected]
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Philos Stud (2012) 160:3151
DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9910-y
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but rather regard it as aiming to describe the truth about objective reality.1 Prima
facie it is puzzling that although we have successful empirical science, philosophers
also carry out a separate form of a priori enquiry into the nature of things. If there
are supernatural entities and realms, or if the world is ultimately mental or spiritual
in nature, then it is reasonable that mere thought or at least non-sensory experiencemight access it. However, contemporary analytic metaphysics does not usually
presuppose such ideas but rather seems to treat of the world under the same
assumptions about it that are made in everyday and scientific investigation. Science
gives us an evidentially and practically supported description of the phenomena of
extraordinary richness for philosophical reflection. The elaborate and complex
nature of the world, for example, the structure and effects of the periodic table of
elements, is much more interesting, and even more far removed from common
sense, than the ancient ideas of substance as water, fire, or some combination of
elements. The a priori speculations of the ancient Greek atomists are a goodexample of how reflection and metaphysical theorising can be of great value, and,
arguably science without it would quickly atrophy. However, truth is stranger than
fiction in matters of metaphysics, for our contemporary atomists talk about hidden
dimensions, virtual particles, ghost fields, holographic projections, and the
mathematical structure of all these things that makes ancient numerology seem
utterly banal; how could a priori speculation produce ideas that are crazy enough to
be true (the transmutation of base metals into gold being a lucky guess)? More
importantly, science seems to compete with a priori metaphysics when it comes to
the nature of life, matter, mind, space and time and even perhaps causation andmodality. While there are many examples of metaphysical theorising being
heuristically and intellectually important in the progress of scientific knowledge,
many people wonder how metaphysics not closely informed and inspired by
empirical science could lead to rival or even supplementary knowledge about the
world.2
This paper assesses the merits of a popular defence of the a priori methodology of
metaphysics that goes as follows. The first task of the metaphysician, like the
scientist, is to construct a hypothesis that accounts for the phenomena in question.
This usually means deploying some key terms in definitions and axioms, and this is
non-trivial since one must arrive at a consistent theory this is also compatible with
the data, and it must be parsimonious enough in its concepts and claims to be
cognisable.3 To achieve the latter, as in science, abstraction and idealisation is
necessary, and as in science the elegance with which all this is done is part of the
prize. It is then argued that among the possible metaphysical theories, the empirical
evidence underdetermines the right one, just as the empirical evidence underde-
termines the right scientific theory. In the latter case it is widely agreed that we must
1 See Strawson (1959) for his distinction between descriptive and speculative metaphysics. For a
contemporary metaphysician who is clear about the ambitions of metaphysics in this regard see Sider(2011).2 Of course, others such as Van Fraassen (2002) and Price (2009) reject metaphysics altogether.3 In a symposium in this journal on van Fraassens The Empirical Stance I argued that he understates
the difficulties in constructing a coherent metaphysical theory that is compatible with known science
(2004, p. 133).
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break the underdetermination by appeal to theoretical virtues, for example,
simplicity or explanatory power, and this is just what should be and largely is
done in metaphysics.4 This is part of a more general line of argument that assumes
scientific realism and then defends metaphysics on the basis of its alleged continuity
with highly theoretical science. In what follows metaphysics and theoretical scienceare compared in order to see whether the above style of defence of a priori
metaphysics is successful. In the next section, the relationship between scientific
realism and metaphysics is introduced, and it is argued that the recent rise of the
latter is linked to the development of the former. In Sect. 3 the content and
methodology of analytic metaphysics is briefly considered, before metaphysics and
theoretical science are compared in respect of the nature of the underdetermination
in each case, and briefly also other arguments, in Sect. 4. It is argued that the
explanationist defence of metaphysics is at least problematic on the basis of a
number of disanalogies between theoretical science and the kind of hypotheses atissue in much contemporary debate in analytic metaphysics. Finally, in Sect. 5, it is
suggested that metaphysical theorizing ought to be fruitful for the rest of our thought
especially science, and that metaphysics should be naturalized; following Ladyman
and Ross (2007), a distinctive creative task for naturalistic metaphysicians is
recommended that goes beyond engaging in the metaphysics of particular sciences,
important though that is.
2 Metaphysics and scientific realism
There is a lot of controversy abouthow to define scientific realism and a fair amount
about how to define metaphysics.5 For the moment, take the latter to be enquiry
concerning the most general questions about the nature of reality including, for
example, questions about the nature of matter, abstracta, fundamentality, space
and time, and causation, law, necessity and probabilitythat at least captures
metaphysics pretty well in extension. A preliminary definition of scientific realism
is that it is the claim that we have knowledge of the unobservable entities and
processes posited by our best scientific theories. However, this is not precise enough
since those who agree with this but also regard the ontology in question as ideal or
socially constructed are not properly regarded as scientific realists. (Hence, when
Kant says that he is an empirical realist, the qualification is enough to exclude him
from the camp of scientific realists, and of course many of his followers were
prominent critics of scientific realism including notably Poincare.) The spirit of
scientific realism requires a background commitment to something like mind-
independence or external realism about the physical world in general. Once this is
assumed scientific realism can be defined as a lack of epistemic discrimination
against unobservables, so that truths about electrons are known just as truths about
tables are. The problem with this way of thinking about scientific realism is that it
does not address the seeming incompatibility of everyday and scientific ontology; it
4 A good source for this view is Swoyer (1983) as well as Paul in this volume.5 Of course, there is also lots of controversy about the status of metaphysics, see Chalmers et al. (2009).
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is arguable that the table of common sense cannot co-exist with its scientific
counterpart and one or other must be reduced or eliminated so that we must chose
between realism about the manifest and scientific images of the world. In order not
to beg answers to such complex questions it is best to define scientific realism as a
self-standing thesis (though the comparison with everyday realism is importantwhen it comes to the arguments for scientific realism once defined as we will see
below).
The standard definition of scientific realism involves metaphysical, semantic and
epistemic components.6 The former is roughly the aforementioned commitment to
the mind-independence of the unobservable world; the semantic component requires
that theoretical terms and statements be taken literally as putatively referring to
unobservable entities, properties and processes, and that the ordinary conception of
truth as correspondence to reality is operative although perhaps understood in a
deflationary sense;7
finally, the epistemic component is the claim that we haveknowledge of scientific claims involving unobservables which are at least
approximately true.8
The fortunes of metaphysics often run in parallel to the fortunes of scientific
realism. This is not surprising because scientific realism is often taken as equivalent
to the claim that science can deliver metaphysical knowledge about, for example,
the nature of space and time, the nature of matter and perhaps mind, causation, and
so on. Even if that is going too far, scientific realism is at least a necessary condition
for science to deliver metaphysical knowledge. Historically, empiricists have been
the chief critics of scientific realism, and they have derived their criticisms of it, orof particular posits within theories, from their antipathy to metaphysics. Similarly,
in current philosophy of science, van Fraassen argues that scientific realism is
objectionable just because it is metaphysical (1985, 1989), and other prominent
critics of scientific realism are equally opposed to metaphysics (Stanford 2007).
However, it is possible to defend one without the other. For example, scientific
realists among scientists may be hostile to metaphysics, and some metaphysicians
do not look to science for either metaphysical knowledge or methodological
guidance. Historically, it is undoubtedly the case that, while the revival of
metaphysics in late twentieth century philosophy had many causes, it coincided with
the resurgence of scientific realism as both recovered from the assault to which they
were subjected by positivism in both philosophy and science.
The philosophical programme of logical positivism defined itself in part by the
elimination of metaphysics. The positivist reaction to the excesses of metaphysics
6 See Psillos (1996). The discussion of scientific realism in this paper is much expanded in Ladyman
(2002) and Ladyman and Ross (2007).7 There are scientific realists such as Brian Ellis who adopt pragmatic accounts of truth but then much of
the debate about scientific realism becomes moot, since, for example, the question of whether theoretical
virtues are epistemically as well as pragmatically valuable collapses.8 The notion of approximate truth is vital to the defense of scientific realism since no sensible realist
believes that our best current theories are absolutely true. However, it is proved very difficult to arrive at a
theory of approximate truth. We return to this issue below but for now note that it is not at all clear what
approximate truth in metaphysics would amount to whereas in the scientific case we can always fall back
on approximate empirical adequacy.
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was to seek a criterion of empirical significance that would reveal metaphysical
hypotheses to be meaningless, or at least to lack cognitive content and so be
irrelevant to science. Perhaps the folklore about the demise of positivism directly
influenced attitudes among late twentieth and early twenty-first century philosophy
more than the real intellectual history. According to simplified narratives thefortunes of logical positivism and its critique of metaphysics turned on the
verification principle and the analytic-synthetic distinction. The former failed to do
its job because it was a metaphysical principle itself being neither tautological nor
empirically verifiable. If metaphysics cannot be avoided we may as well do it
openly and not be in denial about it. Quines critique of the analytic-synthetic
distinction then also spelled disaster for the key empiricist tenet of the positivists
that necessity could be reduced to the analytic and the way was clear to the
metaphysics of modality. Kripkes work in possible world semantics and Lewis
work using possible worlds for a variety of projects in epistemology and semanticsbut also in metaphysics made the latter seem philosophically exciting to many
philosophers, as did itsrevival in Australia by those using it to articulate their views
about mind and matter.9
However, the demise of positivism was also due to the rise of scientific realism in
response to the problems that beset the logical positivists attempt to account for the
use of theoretical terms in science. The nineteenth century positivist Mach thought
that science should not posit unobservable entities like atoms for to do so is to leave
the empirical world for one constructed by metaphysical theorizing free from the
constraints of evidence from the senses. He argued that where neither confirmationnor refutation is possible, science is not concerned (1893[1960, 587]). While, the
logical positivists were greatly inspired by this, and indeed many scientists today
would agree with this statement and testability remains a popular criterion for
science, it remains a slogan without a rigourous account of confirmation and
refutation. The logical positivists contributed greatly to inductive logic and did
pioneering work in statistical inference and probabilistic epistemology, however,
their parallel project to reduce the meaning of the theoretical terms of scientific
theories to their potential observational consequences fared poorly. In particular,
there were two major problems: dispositional terms and theoretical terms especially
those of what I shall call high theory. Examples of the former include catalyst,
and examples of the latter include scalar curvature.
Originally Carnap wanted to define explicitly theoretical terms, but he gave up on
this in the 1930s and settled for partial definition (see his 19361937a, b). The
problem with the latter is that for any theory in which some terms are defined only
partially there will be lots of models and so there is no unique interpretation for it,
hence it would seem to make no sense to talk of it being true or false of the world.
Hempel (1963, p. 695) and Carnap (1939, p. 62) solved this problem by stipulating
that the theory is to be given an intended interpretation; theoretical terms are
interpreted as (putatively) referring to the entities and so on appropriate to the
9 A version of this folklore is presented with due recognition that it is a great simplification of the real
history in Callender (2011). Price (2009) criticizes the claim that Quine made metaphysics respectable.
Friedman (1999) develops a new historiography of the demise of logical positivism.
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normal meanings of them in scientific (and everyday use). The picture of the
referent of electron as somehow related to classical point particles and apt to be
deployed in an account of the constitution of macroscopic matter is important in
determining to what it is to that the theory of electrons refers. With partial definition
the meanings of the theoretical terms that do not have testable consequences arenonetheless important in determining their reference. The logical empiricists
became committed to this excess or surplus meaning of theoretical terms over
and above the meaning given by the partial interpretation in terms of what can be
observed. Feigl recognised this explicitly and argued for the view that theoretical
terms genuinely refer to unobservable entities as a consequence (1950).
Carnap (1939) eventually gave up on the requirement that all theoretical terms be
related to an observational basis altogether, though he continued to seek an account
of the cognitive significance of theoretical terms (1956). Meanwhile, of course the
development of science in the twentieth century eventually made Machianreservations about unobservable entities seem idle as the new experimental
technology of bubble chambers, X-ray spectroscopy and electron microscopy
opened up a new world of phenomena with atoms at their heart. The view that
theoretical terms could be analysed in terms of observations and empirical evidence
came to seem irrelevant as the working commitment to atoms and the sub-atomic
world became routine in experimental science and engineering. Scientific realism is
still contested but its critics do not deny its semantic component above; both sides in
the debate now take theoretical language literally as describing an unobservable
world.The resurgence of scientific realism also led to metaphysics coming to be seen as
legitimate by the subgroup of philosophers to whom it was previously most
abhorrent namely philosophers of science. This aspect of the revival of metaphysics
is not so well known. Apart from the aforementioned reasons for no longer
regarding metaphysics as different in principle from high theoretical science, there
were a number of factors that led to metaphysics acquiring a positive valence among
philosophers of science.
1. The surplus content of theoretical terms: As mentioned above it was widely
agreed that to explicate fully the meaning of theoretical terms required morethan systematizing how in a given theory they could be used to relate
observables; it also came to be accepted that the excess content of terms such as
atom was important to theory development and heuristics for example via the
role of analogy and metaphor in model building. This directly led to the large
amount of current work on models in science through the work of early pioneers
such as Black (1962), Hesse (1966) and Suppes (1961).
2. The continuum between high theory and metaphysics: As mentioned above, the
positivist attempt to demarcate meaningful, scientific, and therefore for them
empirical discourse, from meaningless metaphysics floundered in part becauseof the impossibility of making an explicit the observational basis for claims
highly theoretical claims in science. As well terms like field and force,
physics in the twentieth century became progressively more abstract and made
statements about the structure of space and time, and incorporated symmetry
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principles and conservation laws. It seems that there is a continuum between
high theory and metaphysics.
3. Analogous to the continuum in the terms of observational science, theory and
metaphysics, Quine influentially argued for a holism about confirmation in the
same article in which he allegedly destroyed the analytic/synthetic distinction(1951). This may suggest that metaphysics is part of the web of belief that gets
tested along with everything else. For a philosopher of science like Lakatos
(1978), metaphysics is part of the hard core of a research programme and that is
like being at the centre of the web of belief. Accordingly, when a research
programme progresses this is tantamount to confirmation for metaphysical
hypotheses, and when one degenerates metaphysical hypotheses are effectively
refuted.
4. Putnam and causal theories of reference: Scientific realism faced a challenge
that was absolutely nothing to do with the positivist demand for testability inthe form of Thomas Kuhns historiography of science. Philosophers of science
became more aware of the history of science in part because of the challenges to
their realism and its axiology of approximate truth, convergence, cummulativity
and progress that came from historians and sociologists of science inspired by
Kuhn. In response to the concern that the meanings of scientific terms such as
atom in different theories are incommensurable, Putnams (1975) influentially
incorporated the causal theory of reference into his version of scientific realism
and generated a wealth of work on reference in philosophy of science, and the
metaphysics of causation, rigid designation and possible worlds became part ofphilosophy of science.
5. The explicit engagement with metaphysical issues in science: Perhaps the most
significant factor that contributed to the recent rise of metaphysics is that the
sophistication of twentieth century science gave rise to intricate issues at the
intersection of science and metaphysics. Probably the most important example
is the debate about the quantum mechanics that led to the Einstein associating
his defence of scientific realism with specific metaphysical claims such as
individuality, determinism, locality and perhaps most importantly of all
possessed values for counterfactual measurement outcomes.10 (This latter
claim fully associates scientific realism with realism about the external world
since it is seen to be analogous to believing in possessed values for everyday
perceptual experiments that we merely could perform and the basis of both is
inference to the best explanation, of which more below.)
In the context of general relativity, the classic metaphysical issue of substan-
tivalism versus relationalism was revived in the context of General Relativity as
Einstein at first sought a Machian theory in which the structure of space and time
would be entirely determined by the distribution of matter, but actually developed a
theory that treats spacetime as a dynamical entity and so seems to grant it physicalstatus. This raises metaphysical issues about determinism and the identity and
10 The EPR paper made explicit these issues that are beautifully explained in Redhead (1987).
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individuality of spacetime points that have again interacted with the philosophy of
modality.11
In relation to quantum particles issues of identity and individuality have also
came to the fore and the standard view is that the principle of the identity of
indiscernibles was false for quantum particles rendering them non-individuals.12
Questions of identity over time and transworld identity are also discussed.
Furthermore, quantum mechanics was important to philosophical theorising about
causation as the idea that the world might be fundamentally indeterministic
combined with the increasingly widespread use of statistics in the special sciences
promoted the development of theories of probabilistic causation beginning with
Reichenbach (1956).
However, it was not only in physics that important metaphysical issues arose as
science developed. In biology the development of theories of the unobservable
structures of DNA, genes, fitness and function, information, and natural selectionraised many metaphysical issues about essence, identity and individuality, kindhood
and teleology.13 Other areas of new science that are metaphysically rich include the
theories of information and computation, complexity science and cosmology.
All these fascinating subjects for metaphysical enquiry are empty on a narrow
instrumentalist construal of science. Scientific realism is a rich source of
metaphysical inspiration, and it suggests if not requires that metaphysical
components to scientific theorising are important and not to be dismissed as
lacking cognitive content. By 1974 John Watkins gave a presidential address to The
British Society for the Philosophy of Science entitled Metaphysics and theAdvancement of Science, in which he says, I have the impression that it is now
almost universally agreed that metaphysical ideas are important in science as it is
that mathematics is. (p. 91) For all the reasons explained above, philosophers of
science came to believe that metaphysics is part of science and contributes to
scientific progress. However, Watkins warns, this idea is liable to misuse just as
mathematics has been abused in the service of pseudo-scientific work in the social
sciences: The likelihood of such misuse might be reduced by a methodological
account of the proper role of metaphysical ideas in science. (p. 92) The implication
is that Watkins does not want to grant free reign to metaphysical theorising that they
way to avoid doing so is to ensure that the latter is tied to its role in scientific
methodology. For Watkins, as for Zahar, whose most recent book is called Why
Science Needs Metaphysics (2007), metaphysics is rehabilitated not as an
autonomous discipline, but rather only in so far as it contributes to the progress
of science. Not surprisingly what Watkins and Zahar mean by metaphysics is very
different from what is often discussed by contemporary metaphysicians. More on
this below; first consider current metaphysics.
11 See, for example, Maudlin (1990) and Hoefer (1996).12 See French and Krause (2006) and for a dissenting view Saunders (2006).13 See Hull (1967) for an early influential account. The radical metaphysical implications of evolutionary
biology for individuation were noted earlier by in.
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3 The content and methodology of analytic metaphysics
The problems with which much work in metaphysics is now concerned have drifted
away from any mooring to science. The paradigmatic subject matter has become the
special composition question, perdurantism versus endurantism, universals versustropes, and the question as to whether physical objects are identical with the matter
of which they are made.14 To these questions we can add those concerning the
existence of mathematical objects and the metaphysics of modality. There is a
widely shared emphasis on truth-makers and a truth-making relation that seems to
have absolutely nothing to do with anything in science. The first debate concerns
whether or not there are composite objects composed of whatever the alleged
ultimate partless parts or simples there are, and if so on what principle governs the
relationship between such wholes and their parts. The literature on this issue is
largely if not completely lacking any engagement with scientific accounts ofcomposition. Instead, the problem is taken to be a completely general and abstract
one, the solution to which is imagined to consist of principles that make no mention
of any scientific theories. Likewise, while the debate about the persistence of
material objects, which is largely about whether their three-dimensional existence
endures, or they are in fact temporally extended entities with temporal as well as
spatial parts, might have been inspired in part by consideration of the implications
of relativity theory, the current arguments about it do not engage closely if at all
with the physics of space and time, nor with any science about how entities manage
to cohere. Similarly, as Maudlin (2007) points out, the problem of universals isaddressed without reference to what science tells us about properties and relations.
Finally, it is hard even to imagine a way in which science could be relevant to the
debate about whether a statue is identical with the lump of clay out of which it is
fashioned.15
There are various metaphysical packages, and sometimes it seems as if the choice
from the metaphysical menu depends only on quasi-aesthetic criteria and taste. Even
metaphysical views that virtually everybody regards as scoring very badly on
accordance with common sense and intuition must be taken seriously if they are not
inconsistent and are accompanied by arguments that are ingenious enough. Positions
in logical space with little to recommend them other than their boldness and novelty
are liable to be entertained if they can avoid the logical snares set for them by the
critics.
As, we have seen, those who embraced metaphysics because of its importance to
science, make room for a kind of remote empirical support for metaphysics, at least
in so far as there are periods in which a particular metaphysics seems to be refuted
14 Of course this is only the first-order subject matter and much work in metaphysics addresses higher-
order questions.15 An anonymous referee objects that high-level ontology is important in high-level science and hence
that the debate about statues and lumps of clay ought not to be dismissed so lightly. The relationship
between the ontologies of the special sciences and fundamental physics is indeed important and
interesting but the metaphysical debate about whether statues co-exist with lumps of clay is liable to shed
no light on the former issue since the latter debate pays no attention to dynamics, regime and scale all of
which are fundamental to accounts of composition in science (see Ladyman and Ross 2007, Chap. 1).
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because the science that goes with it is rejected. This happened with Descartes
metaphysics of matter without vacuum as his plenum theory entailed that all action
was action by contact, but Newtons postulation of a universal gravitational force
was just too successful for the mysterious action at a distance it seemed to describe
stand in the way of its acceptance. The Cartesian metaphysic was in decline bythe time the electrostatic force was introduced by Coulomb. Other examples are
discussed below, but supposing that we are considering hypotheses that have no
even indirect connection to science, what methodology can we use to choose among
competing theories? Furthermore, in the face of the poor track record of a priori
insight into the nature of reality why suppose there is any such method at all? For
traditional rationalism, the intelligibility of the world to the human mind was
evidence of the beneficence of the creator, but absenting such an appeal to a positive
reason for faith in a priori methods metaphysical seems liable to lack any
naturalistically respectable method or justification.However, there is a common line of defence of metaphysics that is worth
examination. It involves the idea that the metaphysical method should be like the
methods of empirical science only without the connection to testability that
scientists always like to keep in mind. As noted above, even constructing a logically
consistent system of the world with something to say about all its phenomena and
their kinds and how they interrelate is hardly easy. So metaphysics begins with the
task of constructing a coherent theory of the world and integrating it with
philosophical logic. This is no mean feat if it is to be simple enough to be
expressible reasonably briefly, however, of course there may be many such systemsso some way must be found to chose among them. The solution is to undertake a
cost-benefit analysis of the various theories, and to take the costs and benefits to be
closely modelled on those weighed in theoretical science when choices must be
made between theories that are all consistent with the data, but some are argued to
be simpler or more explanatory, and from that is inferred their superiority. Consider,
for example, the standard story about Special Relativity and its superiority to
Lorentzs theory that avoided radical revision of space and time by positing forces
to distort matter in the measurement device so that the motion of the Earth through
the ether would not affect the observed speed of light. Special Relativity is more
parsimonious and less ad hoc and so superior even though empirically equivalent in
accounting for the failure to detect the Earths motion through the ether. Similarly,
while Poincare(1905) argued that the geometry of the world can never be measured
because it is always possible to reproduce the effects of curvature with universal
forces, General Relativity triumphs over such theories because of its overall
simplicity in comparison with them, or at least for some other reason to do with the
pathological and ad hoc nature of universal forces that might be subsumed by
arguing that they are not genuinely explanatory.
This line of argument is reinforced by the recognition that the only way to defeat
sceptical hypotheses about induction, other minds and the external world seems to
be on the grounds of the super-empirical virtues of our normal hypotheses.
However, unlike in science, in metaphysics the cost-benefit analysis often proceeds
with the assumption that giving up common sense or contradicting intuition is a
cost, as is any ontological or ideological commitment. So, for example, the claim
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that tables do not strictly speaking exist is a cost because it violates common sense,
the claim that there are other concrete possible worlds is an ontological cost, and the
claim that there is natural necessity is an ideological cost. On the other hand, an
explanation of something is a benefit, and it often seems so too is being intuitive,
natural or similar.Ontology and ideology are necessary to discharge the costs that ensue from
commitments to claims that originate with common sense and everyday experience,
such as that there are whose states are largely independent of our beliefs and desires,
but may also include commitments to laws of nature and menageries of scientific
species. The idea is that our ontology and ideology should explain the ordinary and
scientific facts that we accept, and those we revise. For example, necessitarians such
as Armstrong (1985) and Bird (1998) argue that inference to the best explanation
(IBE) provides a route to metaphysical knowledge of natural necessity because it is
needed to explain the rationality of induction and to underpin the rest of theexplanations we have of the phenomena we observe. As Anjan Chakravartty puts it
the basic methodology of much work in metaphysics is to seek trade-offs involving
ontology and explanation (Chakravartty2007, xiii).
Bas van Fraassen is the latest in a long line of opponents of scientific realism who
are also sharply critical of metaphysics, indeed he is more scathing about the latter
than the former. However, in the case of both the fundamental basis of his critique is
his rejection of the idea that explanatory power has any probative force. Van
Fraassens empiricist critique of explanation and IBE is often dismissed on the
grounds that his view leaves no positive grounds for everyday realism or induction.To many critics agnosticism about unobservable entities seems to be a form of
mere philosophical doubt analogous to scepticism about the existence of the
external world. Hence it is argued that van Fraassen is a selective sceptic who ought
similarly to be a sceptic about all inductive knowledge even of observable objects.
Hence, the explanationist defence of scientific realism and metaphysics according
to which there is a seamless connection between the rationality of everyday
induction, inference to the existence of unobservable entities in science, and
inference to the best explanation in metaphysics. In the next section, the
explanationist defence of metaphysics is considered in more detail.
4 Comparing metaphysics with theoretical science
The purpose of this section is to assess the arguments about scientific realism to
inform a comparison between the appeal to explanatory power in science and in
metaphysics. The most directly relevant argument is the underdetermination
argument. As discussed above, it is often argued that metaphysical hypotheses are
no different from theoretical scientific claims in being underdetermined by the data
in strict empirical terms, and that in both cases explanatory power is what solves the
problem. However, it is questionable whether explanatory power is really as
important in the epistemology of science as the above argument suggests. It is also
not established that explanation in science is the same or similar enough to
explanation in metaphysics. If the explanatory power of scientific theories plays the
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role it does in theory choice because of the relationship between theoretical
explanation and the empirical virtues of scientific theories, but the alleged
explanatory power of some metaphysical hypotheses is decoupled from any
prospect of empirical success, then we would have no reason to think that kind of
explanatory power is worth pursuing on the basis of the value of pursuing it incommon sense and in science. Accordingly there follows an examination of the role
of explanatory power in scientific theory choice. Sections 4.1and4.2concern the
underdetermination problem, and Sect. 4.3 offers reasons to think that the
importance of explanatory power in science and in explaining its history is limited.
In Sect.4.4theoretical science and metaphysics are briefly compared in respect of
the pessimistic meta-induction and other arguments. Section4.5argues that there is
a difference between the kind of metaphysics that is important to science and its
counterpart in current analytic metaphysics.
4.1 Varieties of underdetermination
The standard form of the argument for the underdetermination of theory by data is
as follows:
(1) There are empirically equivalent theories.
(2) Such theories are evidentially equivalent
Therefore theory choice is underdetermined.
The response to the scientific underdetermination problem that suggests a similardefence of metaphysics is to deny (2) on the grounds that there are superempirical
theoretical virtues such as simplicity, elegance, coherence with background beliefs,
and explanatory power. Hence, it is argued that evidence properly understood does
not reduce to what empirical facts a theory entails, rather how those empirical facts
follow from the theory and how the theory otherwise is are part of the evidential
basis for it. However, it is widely acknowledged that it is difficult to argue that
simplicity or elegance are direct evidence for the truth of a theory so realists have
tended towards the view that all the superempirical virtues are subsumed under
explanatory power so that the solution to the underdetermination problem is IBE.16
The most sustained defence of inference to the best explanation is that of Lipton
(2004). He argues that in cases of everyday inductive reasoning where many
hypotheses could account, for example, for what appear to be bear tracks in the
snow, the hypothesis we prefer is the one that best explains the phenomena. Perhaps
the tracks appeared by chance, perhaps there is a practical joker around, perhaps
there is a new kind of creature with tracks indiscernible from bears, perhaps there
are no tracks at all but some kind of illusion, perhaps, the world came into existence
10 min ago and so on. All these hypotheses are consistent with the phenomena, but
that there is a bear is a simple hypothesis that is unified with background beliefs, and
16 See Psillos (1996) for an account of the explanationist defence of scientific realism that originates with
Richard Boyd and others. The underdetermination argument and realist responses to it are discussed with
great care in Kukla (1998). My own account is in Ladyman (2002, Chap. 6).
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with background metaphysical assumptions such as that tracks dont come from
nowhere.
(1) is also contestable depending on what empirical equivalence is taken to be
and depending on to what kind of theories it is taken to apply. The latter distinction
is that between localand globaltheories, in the sense that theories may be putativetheories of everything or merely theories in some specific domain such as optics (see
Hoefer and Rosenberg1994). Almost all the theories that have been proposed in the
history of science have been understood by all to be local in their scope, though of
course a theorys scope may be expanded as when the laws of optics came to be
understood to apply to electromagnetic radiation other than visible light, or when
thermodynamics was applied to the whole universe. Theories may also be
empirically equivalent with respect to all the observations we have carried out up
to now (weak), or with respect to all possible observations (strong). (Clearly the
modality here may be of different strengths too.)The problem of induction is a form of weak (and usually local) underdetermin-
ation. Universal generalisations are underdetermined weakly by the observed
regularities since the latter are also consistent with counter-inductive claims
according to which the future will not resemble the past in respect of the behaviour
of colliding billiard balls or whatever. Inductive projections and counter-inductive
projections are clearly not equivalent with respect to all possible observations, but
only with respect to those we have made so far. In The Scientific Image(1981), van
Fraassen discusses the underdetermination of the different hypotheses about the
state of relative constant motion of the centre of mass of the universe with respect toabsolute space in the context of Newtonian mechanics. This is a case of strong
underdetermination since because the covariance of Newtonian mechanics under
Galilean transformations means that the facts about the matter could make no
possible difference to the outcome of any mechanical experiment. However, critics
argue that van Fraassens disavowal of IBE means he has no solution to the problem
of weak underdetermination either and hence should be a sceptic about all inductive
knowledge.
According to many realists, the difference between the inference to the existence
of unobserved and the existence of the unobservable is of no epistemic significance.
In some cases of the former we may never check directly so the entities in question,
for example, dinosaurs, may just as well be unobservable. We believe in them, just
as we believe in unseen bears, because their existence is the best explanation of the
phenomena, and realists argue belief in electrons is similarly justified.
However, explaining the difference between the reliability of projections of
regularities into the future by appealing to an ontology of everyday and scientific
objects does not licence all forms of explanation by posit. The underdetermination
of metaphysical hypotheses by data is clearly of the strong and global kind.
However, as far as science goes strong, global underdetermination is a problem in
principle not in practice since it is not a problem that has ever been faced: we have
never had a globally empirically adequate theory and it remains an option to adopt
Newton-Smiths (1981) arrogance response, according to which the two theories
that are globally empirically adequate theories are just notational reformulations of
each other, if such a case did arise. This response also does not arise with the kind of
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underdetermination we face in the case of the bear-tracks just as it does not arise in
science. The hypotheses that we chose among in everyday life and in science are at
most weakly underdetermined by the empirical facts.
There are familiar philosophical examples of global strong underdetermination
by construction. Descartes evil demon hypothesis, or Russells suggestion that theworld came into being 5 min ago being globally empirically equivalent to the
common sense views they rival. However, these hypotheses are entirely parasitic in
their empirical content on the beliefs they are proposed to call into question. In the
context of the underdetermination problem in science such artificiality leads to
doubt about whether global underdetermination should be taken seriously.
4.2 Defeating the underdetermination problem in science
Duhem (1906) was concerned to explain how science solves weak, localunderdetermination. This is a practical problem of theory choice. He invokes
scientific good sense to explain how it is resolved in practice, but he thought that
this is only necessary temporarily because subsequent scientific developments will
find some additional domain of observations with respect to which otherwise weakly
empirically equivalent theories will differ in their predictions (Ivanova2010). Even
strongly empirically equivalent theories may turn out to differ when they are
extended to new domains or conjoined with different background theories and
auxiliary assumptions (Laudan and Leplin1991). Science itself may be what tells us
that theories are empirically equivalent by demarcating the limits of the observable:for example, free quarks cannot be observed according to the quark confinement
model, and colour charge is unobservable in principle for theoretical reasons
according to QCD. Accordingly, science may tell us that what is observable has
changed, as when distant galaxies or blood flow in the brain become observable
because of new technology. Crucially, the genuinely scientific underdetermination
problems like the problems of making inductive generalisations in everyday life arise
for agents situated at particular times facing choices about which particular theories
to develop, and later observations will or at least could show which was correct.
As mentioned above, in response to the underdetermination argument in the
context of science, there is no need to invoke explanation if the first premise is
denied. As well as the considerations just mentioned concerning the definition and
status of empirical equivalence, Laudan and Leplin also argue that, at least, in the
case of strong and global underdetermination, there are no genuine scientific
examples to establish the general claim that (1) makes. The examples we do have are
often not even strong, for example, underdetermination between wave and particle
theories of light which was resolved by the observation of interference effects, and
the underdetermination of Special Relativity, which was only weak because there
was later confirmation of it by the Compton effect and the inter-convertability of
mass and energy, and in any case it became moot when General Relativity issued
quite new empirical predictions. None of these theories were global in any case. The
example of global underdetermination mentioned above namely the underdetermin-
ation of uniform motion with respect to absolute space in Newtonian mechanics, is
best understood as evidence that there is no fact of the matter because surplus
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structure is being attributed to spacetime. Hence, Galilean spacetime is the right one
for Newtonian physics in which there is no underdetermination because there is no
absolute space, but still a notion of absolute acceleration (Penrose 2004, chapter 17).
On the other hand, Laudan and Leplin argue that the philosophical arguments that
purport to establish (1) in the global strong case all involve cheap tricks or logico-semantic trickery. For example, one way of establishing (1) so interpreted is to use
the observable/unobservable distinction to define a theory T as the observable
phenomena are as if T but T is not true; this is clearly ad hoc in every sense that
Popper and his followers elaborated.
In the light of all these arguments many philosophers of science are not
persuaded that there really is a global and strong underdetermination problem in
science. Hence, the scientific and metaphysical underdetermination problems are
different, and even in the scientific case it is questionable that inference to the best
explanation is needed. Even IBE is vindicated in overcoming underdetermination,all actual cases in science and common sense are at best strong and local, but not
strong and global as in the case of the kind of metaphysical hypotheses surveyed in
3 above. There is no analogue of the distinction between genuine and artificial
examples in such examples since all the hypotheses in question are the products of
philosophers tricks.
4.3 Explanatory power and scientific theory choice
Philosophers of science such as Alan Musgrave and Ernan McMullin argue thathistorical or diachronic virtues of theories are needed to explain how underdeter-
mination in science is resolved. According to McMullin, Dichronic virtues of
theories include their lack of ad hocness, their fecundity for future development and
extension, and the degree to which they enjoy novel predictive success. According
to, Musgrave (1974), the evidential support a hypothesis receives from observations
depends in general on the temporal relationship between them and is not a purely
logical relation. As mentioned above, it is often claimed that both Special and
General Relativity are to be preferred over their empirically equivalent rivals on
account of their simplicity and explanatory power. However, this is tendentious. The
rival hypotheses of Lorentz and Fitzgerald were not merely ad hoc and had good
theoretical motivations. A detailed investigation of why Einsteins programme
superceded Lorentzs was carried out by Zahar (1973a,b,1988). He found that the
most compelling grounds for preferring relativity theory is that the metaphysical
principles that formed the positive heuristic in the hard core of Einsteins research
programme were ones that had great fecundity for the future development of
science. In particular, special relativity has had two great offshoots. The first is
General Relativity and the second is the relativistic quantum theory of Dirac, and
the programme of Lorentz-covariant quantum field theory. Both of these have
enjoyed significant predictive success of the strongest variety. If explanatory power
of these stories it is as a method for the development of future science.
Another example of a central scientific theory about which it is claimed that it
was chosen on the grounds of its explanatory power is the theory of evolution by
natural selection. However, evolutionary biology has been highly predictive and
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subsequently confirmed.17 Explanatory power in science is closely connected to
predictive power, and often both explanandum and explanans are very specific and
precise. Such explanatory and unifying power is usually achieved in part by
mathematics. For example, the inverse square law of Newtonian gravitation unified
terrestrial and celestrial mechanics, and Maxwells field theorys highly abstractmathematics unified electricity and magnetism. Furthermore, quantum theory in its
orthodox form was chosen despite its complete lack of an explanatory basis for the
nature of superpositions, wavefunction collapse, and the correlations between
entangled states. (It is worth noting that both Arthur Fine and Bas van Fraassen
argue powerfully that the pursuit of explanations of the latter is completely futile,
and Jeffery Bub argues that there cannot in principle be an explanation of quantum
measurement.)
Even those who value and pursue explanatory power in science, do not consider
it enough. Hence, the scepticism among many contemporary physicists about stringtheory, and the fact that dark matter is not regarded as proven without empirical
success over and above its explanation of the phenomena it was introduced to
explain. It is a lesson of Poppers critique of Marxism and psychoanalysis that
explanatory power is sometimes cheap and does not carry the probative force of
prediction especially novel prediction. In any case, in so far as explanatory power is
supported by its use in science and in everyday life it is coupled to empirical and
practical success because it is never global and strong underdetermination that is
there at issue. In sum, in the case of scientific realism, technological success,
intervention and detection and crucial in motivating the idea that theoretical virtuesin general and explanatory power in particular, are epistemic and not merely
pragmatic. Explanatory power plays the role it does in theory choice because of the
relationship between theoretical explanation and the empirical virtues of scientific
theories. We have inductive grounds for believing that pursuing simplicity and
explanatory power in science will lead to empirical success, but no such grounds
where we are dealing with distinctively metaphysical explanations, since the latter is
completely decoupled from empirical success.
4.4 Arguments from theory change among others
The arguments that bother most scientific realists are based on the history of theory
change in science rather than on abstract and artificial worries about global strong
underdetermination. The pessimistic meta-induction may be severely weakened if
17 An anonymous referee objects that explanationists paradigm cases are from (largely) non-predictive
sciences such as evolutionary biology. It is certainly true that much of evolutionary biology is not
predictive and seeks to reconstruct and explain the history of life on Earth. However, evolutionary
biology is replete with successful predictions. For example: Darwin himself successfully predicted thathuman ancestors arose in Africa based on homologies with African apes; theory successfully predicted
higher mutation rates for organisms in heterogeneous and rapidly changing environments (Oliver et al.
2000); theory predicts that genealogy there should be all manner of transitional forms subsequently
unearthed; theory predicts that homologies in phylogeny will be accompanied by homologies in
genealogy; and finally more prosaically, evolutionary biology predicts there will be no evidence pre-
Cambrian rabbits.
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the kind of empirical success insisted upon for realist commitment is novel
predictive success. However, it seems that there are cases of novel predictive
success based on theoretical terms that do not refer, and or on theoretical
explanations that are not correct. The response of scientific realists has been to make
the criteria for epistemic assent to theoretical claims extremely restrictive. Notably,Philip Kitcher proposes an account of selective confirmation according to which
those parts of science that are idle in the production of novel empirical success
enjoy no support from it. A similar account is proposed by Psillos (1996), whose
divide and conquer strategy crucially involves regarding the metaphysical content
of theories such as the caloric theory of heat, according to which heat is composed
of particles or a fluid of some material kind, as dispensable. In general, the bar is set
very high for epistemic commitment in the scientific realism debate. The most
developed and defensible forms of scientific realism are ones that would not endorse
our believing in the metaphysical content of contemporary physics on the basis of itsexplanatory power.
Other disanalogies between scientific realism and metaphysics include that there
is no analogue of entity realism for metaphysical hypotheses concerning universals,
tropes, composition, and the like, while in philosophy of science, entity realism and
the associated inference to the most probable cause as opposed to inference to the
best explanation, are what make the likes of Nancy Cartwright and Ian Hacking
realists. There is also no analogue of the debate concerning whether or not theoretical
entities such as atoms, dark matter, sub-atomic particles and so on are in fact
observable and observed. In respect of theory change again, there is no analogue ofthe way that successful scientific theories that are abandoned are retained as limiting
cases in their successors, nor for the other structural relations between theories that
inspired structural realism. The historical case against the accuracy of a priori
metaphysical speculation is stronger than that against theoretical science.
4.5 Metaphysics versus high science
Recall that one of the reasons for the recent rise of metaphysics is the fact that
metaphysical issues were explicitly discussed in the context of debates in theoretical
science. The marks of this kind of metaphysics are as follows:
(i) extreme generality
(ii) untestable
(iii) continuous with paradigmatically metaphysical subject matter
Some examples were mentioned briefly above. Other important cases in which a
metaphysical doctrine has formed the central heuristic of a successful research
programme in science are as follows:
Atomismthe idea that all matter is composed of tiny particles and that their
dynamical and structural properties might give rise to the apparent properties of
everyday material objects such as their colours and textures was first articulated as
purely metaphysical speculation with no observational implications, but of course it
led to chemical atoms, the kinetic theory of gases and ultimately to the sub-atomic
world.
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Locality principlesthe idea that all action was action by contact was an
important heuristic in the development of the mechanical philosophy although
Newtons law of universal gravitation violated it. Subsequently the development of
field theory restored locality to the theories of light and electromagnetism and
ultimately to gravity as well. Locality principles can be formulated in both spatialand temporal terms and are now routinely expressed in terms of the spatio-temporal
metric of relativity theory, hence it is said that the causal past of any event must lie
within its backwards lightcone.
The principle of the conservation of energy has its origin in the idea of nothing
being created from nothing and the ancients articulation of the idea of substance. In
its modern form it began with the conservation of kinetic energy in systems without
friction and the conservation of momentum more generally, but became funda-
mental to all science after the experiments on the conversion of heat and work in the
nineteenth century. It is now a unifying principle throughout all science (thoughthere are issues about it in General Relativity).
Physicalismarose out of late nineteenth and early twentieth century controversy
about whether physical processes could account for biological and chemical
phenomena without the need for chemical and vital forces (Papineau 2001). It is
now regarded as fundamental to our understanding of biology that biological
processes are essential chemical and physical processes and that and the basic
taxonomy of atoms embodied in the periodic table of elements is a fundamental
presupposition of all the natural sciences.
The central dogma of molecular biologyis effectively a metaphysical claim sinceit places a condition on all causation and explanation of the traits of organisms
according to which it is not possible for information to be transmitted from acquired
characteristics of the organism to the genetic basis for the inheritance of traits by the
next generation.
Other examples, include the imposition of Lorentz invariance of quantities and
covariance of laws, and the methodological use of other symmetry principles in
quantum field theory both of which have led to the standard model of particle physics.
In all these cases the explanatory power of the hypotheses is coupled to their
fecundity for the development of local theories that are empirically adequate and
crucially predictive. Now consider the debate about special composition, or tropes
versus universals. The purported explanations offered are decoupled from anything
but the most general and common empirical content and bear no relationship to any
research programmes in current science. These disconnections break the continuum
between high theory and metaphysics.
5 Conclusion: in defence of metaphysics
There is a lot more that can be said in defence of a priori metaphysics other than the
explanationist argument criticised above. One may argue that exploring logical
space is valuable intrinsically just as it is in logic and pure mathematics. This may
be so but there are two important disanalogies between metaphysics and its a priori
cousins in the mathematical sciences. Firstly, logicians and mathematicians have
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much more claim to be genuinely exploring an objective structure because their
results once established are forever part of the edifice of knowledge because of the
apodictic nature of proof in those subjects. If this is true at all in metaphysics and
not only that part of it that could be called philosophical logic, then it is to a lesser
extent. Secondly, even if logic and pure mathematics are entirely constructed, it isfair to say their structure is usually of far greater intricacy and intellectual beauty
than that of metaphysical theories.
Of course, if metaphysics is regarded as descriptive rather than speculative in the
sense of Strawson, then it is perhaps possible or even necessary to do some of it
a priori. Alyssa Ney (this volume) defends a kind of descriptive metaphysics. Against
this no argument has been given in this paper. The Canberra Plan proposes a kind of
descriptive metaphysics that is not completely a priori because it investigates the
implicit commitments of our beliefs by Ramsifying our theories to distil their
cognitive content. This programme brings us back to the positivists for it was Carnapwho first elaborated a theory of scientific knowledge based on the Ramsey sentence
approach. Worrall (forthcoming) argues that his structural realism does not face the
underdetermination problem because two Ramsey sentences with all the same
empirical consequences cannot be incompatible, hence he adopts the aforementioned
arrogance response by declaring any differences between theories with the same
Ramsey sentence to be merely notational. However, he believes that the cognitive
content of theories is contained in their Ramsey sentences that leave out their
metaphysical content. However, the metaphysical content of theoretical terms can
play a productive role in the progress of science, as, for example, with Worralls ownexample of Fresnel and the hypothesis that the ether is a mechanical solid.
There are also utilitarian defences of metaphysics. For example, it may be argued
that metaphysical debate is worthwhile because it keeps alive empirically dormant
metaphysical issues that may once again become scientifically important for example,
determinism versus indeterminism, individuation and PII, and substantivalism/
relationalism. It is not possible to decide a priori on the basis of their content which
metaphysical hypotheses are scientifically valuable. So this is a possible defence of
novel work in metaphysics too. Godfrey-Smith (2006) argues that metaphysics should
be thought of as generating models of reality at a very abstract level but analogous to
scientific models. It is plausible to argue that this might help science occasionally as
the very abstract models of metaphysics may be applicable to a scientific problem, as
perhaps with functionalism in the metaphysics of mind, and also as with possible
world semantics, for there is no doubt that the debate about modality following the
seminal work of Kripke and Lewis has been of great importance for the theory of
artificial intelligence and computer science. Even if metaphysical models are not
applicable they may indirectly open up ways of thinking that allow scientists to
conceive of new types of theory and so overcome a major impasse to theory
development problem of unconceived alternatives (Stanford2006).
In any case, there are always the metaphysics problems of the special science that
it was argued were an important factor in the revival of metaphysics. It is arguable
whether they should really be called metaphysics since it is the kind that could
always be called theoretical science. Definitions aside, the interesting question is
whether there is another job for metaphysicians other than working at the highly
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theoretical end of a special science. Metaphysics has often concerned itself with an
underlying unity to the world beyond the phenomena. What matters is how such a
unifying metaphysics is sought and in particular whether it is hermetically sealed
from science or integrated with it. There is a possible task for naturalistic
metaphysicians, not working in the special sciences one by one, but makingconnections between them and understanding their interface and even perhaps how
they all fit together. This is a distinctive creative role for naturalistic metaphysics:
the unification of science and the elaboration of a picture of the world that brings
together what we have learnt from physics and the special sciences. Perhaps this
cant be done, as Nancy Cartwright and John Duprebelieve, but at the moment it is
still arguably a goal worth pursuing given the success of doing so thus far. However,
the challenge of disunitarians is important because conceptual conservatism in
metaphysics is only appropriate when the concepts are at the core of a progressive
research programme and form the framework for the successful development ofeveryday and scientific thought.
Acknowledgments Versions of this paper were presented at the Metaphysics of Science conference in
Melbourne in 2007, the British Society for the Philosophy of Science conference in 2009, and at the
universities of East Anglia and Oxford. I am very grateful to Alexander Bird, George Darby, Steven
French, Leon Horsten, Phyllis McKay Illari, Alyssa Ney, Samir Okasha, Laurie Paul, Barry Loewer,
Damian Veal and anonymous referees for this journal for comments, discussions and criticisms.
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