Lalican, Villarin,, Republic, Revaldo

8/13/2019 Lalican, Villarin,, Republic, Revaldo

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[G.R. No. 108619. July 31, 1997]EPIFANIO LALICAN, pet i t ioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City

and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.D E C I S I O N

ROMERO, J.:The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary

restraining order is whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of"timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, towarrant the quashal of an information charging the former offense or a "nonexistent crime."

On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, was filedby the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican,

iRuben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo

before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543, the information reads:"That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without lawful authority orpermit, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfullyand feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions oflumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (14,000.00), Philippine Currency, tothe damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount aforestated.

CONTRARY TO LAW."At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged did not

constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to "lumber," andasserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree"does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legaldocuments required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be quashed as itviolated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.

ii

The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law norto set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a "product orderivative after the timber is cut." The position of the prosecution was that

to hold otherwise would result in the easy circumventionof the law, for one could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. Theprosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a question of law.

iii

On September 24, 1991, the lower court,ivguided by the principles that penal laws should be construed strictly against the

state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an Order quashing the information. It held that thedistinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the two terms. Sec.3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product while Sec. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product.

Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" withoutcompliance with grading rules established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated that:

"Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to forest lands by being cut,gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold. Thus, Sec. 68 cannot be made to apply to lumber."The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by petitioner upon a holding that the case could be

resolved on some other grounds or issues.

v

The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of theDepartment of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece of wood for it may consist of squared andmanufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider aperson who had made lumber out of timber as not criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law.

Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused presented Private Land Timber PermitNo. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the productactually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of transportagreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificateof lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one point to another.

vi

Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's definition of "timber" is erroneousbecause the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber" in Sec. 68 could only mean a clearlegislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized under that section.

vii

Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from takingcognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was subsequently assigned to Branch 52.

On June 10, 1992, the lower courtviii

issued the herein questioned Order setting aside the quashal Order of the previous judge.It declared that from the law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the possession without the required legaldocuments, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It stated that even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forestproduct and possession thereof without legal documents is equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the definition offorest products.

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that thelower court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order and in denying hismotion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber orother forest products."

The petition is devoid of merit.Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued on July 25, 1987 by then President

Corazon C. Aquino, provides:"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.- Any person who

shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable ordisposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the

legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposedunder Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, orcorporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officersare aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission onImmigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used inthe area where the timber or forest products are found." (Underscoring supplied.)

Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest productsfrom theplaces therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest productswithout the legal documentsas required under existing forest laws and regulations.

In the recent case of Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,ixthis Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, held:

"The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as


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defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of 'Processing plant,'which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for theprocessing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paperboard, pulp, paper or other finished wood product.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the termlumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary,lumber is defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after being prepared for the market.' Simply put, lumber is a processed log

or timber.It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be

given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal

documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processedtimber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus."Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed

reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277, are the following:"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and

welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and

implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in

the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; andWHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to make our forestry laws more

responsive to present situations and realities; x x x"To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should

not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeatcompliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law.

xAfter all, the phrase "forest products" is

broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merelyresult in tautology. As the lower court said:

"Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the prohibition, still it cannot bedenied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally and, to the same extent,prohibited. Sec. 3 (q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code defines forest products,viz., x x xStress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product (supra). If we are to follow the rathertangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber, then, it will be very easy for a person to circumvent thelaw. He could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. It is rathertoo narrow an interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumberis wood. x x x.

If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that lumber seized in their possession wereprocured from lawful source, all they have to do is produce the legal documents contemplated by the law. It is not themere cutting or possession of timber, forest products or whatever that is prohibited and penalized by the law. What is

prohibited and penalized is the act of cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or other forest products without lawfulauthority."The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the information.

The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuseof discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all incontemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personalhostility.

xiGrave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power.

xii

On the other hand, certiorarimay not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded itsjurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion.

xiiiWhere the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not

correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.xiv

As this Courtsaid:

"x x x. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of thejurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of itsjurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration ofjustice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its

jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of certiorari."xv

In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the

judge's findings and conclusions.xvi

The unavailability of the writof certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the fact that what petitioner

considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the denial of his motion to quash the information filed against him and threeothers. This Court has consistently defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused has to enter aplea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on themerits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.

xvii

Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the appropriate recourse is toproceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by thefact that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of apetition for certiorari.

xviii The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.

xix An

interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorarior prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess ofjurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

xx However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards

interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorariwould not only

delay the administration of justice but also would unduly burden the courts.xxiPetitioner may not seek refuge under Flordelis v. Himalaloan

xxiifor his contention that a denial of a motion to quash may be the

subject of a petition for certiorari. That case has an entirely different factual milieu from the one at bar. The information herein notbeing "patently defective" nor that the offense charged has prescribed,

xxiiithis case may not be considered an exception to the rule

on the proper remedy for the denial of a motion to quash.With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would have this Court consider,

xxivthis Court

has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for judicial review of a constitutional matterare present in a case,

xxvthis Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis motaof the case or if the case can

be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of the statute or general law.xxvi

The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country, considering that the

deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing rampaging floods in thelowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equallytrue that when the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a


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solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 68 of theRevised Forestry Reform Code. This task, however, has not at all been a difficult one considering that, contrary to petitioner'sassertion, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law have not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorariand prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is enjoined to proceedwith dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and G.R. No. 175289

ANIANO LATAYADA,

Petitioners, Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

- versus - BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. August 31, 2011x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest laws and regulations makes one automatically liable ofviolation of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,1 as amended. Lack of criminal intent is not a valid defense.

This petition for review on certiorariseeks to reverse the June 28, 2005 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.26720 which affirmed in all respects the Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Cagayan De Oro City, finding petitioners guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended. Likewise assailed in this petition is the September 22, 2006Resolution4 denying petitioners Motion for

Reconsideration.5

Factual Antecedents

In a Criminal Complaint6 filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City by Marcelino B. Pioquinto(Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit under the TL Strike Force Team of Department of Environment and NaturalResources (DENR), petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, BarangayCaptain Camilo Sudaria (Sudaria) of Tagpangi,Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amendedby Executive Order No. 277.7


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Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Resolution8 dated March 13, 1996recommending the filing of an Information for the aforesaid charge not only against Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac but also against petitionerCrisostomo Villarin (Villarin), then BarangayCaptain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City. The dismissal of the complaint against Sudaria waslikewise recommended. Said Resolution was then approved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao through a Resolution9 dated May 9,1996 ordering the filing of the Information in the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City.

Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information10 was filed against petitioners Villarin and Latayada and their co-accused Baillo and Boyatac,for violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as follows:

That on or about January 13, 1996, in Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction ofthis Honorable Court, pursuant to RA 7975, the accused, Crisostomo Villarin,

a public officer being the Barangay Captain of

Pagalungan, this City, with salary grade below 27, taking advantage of his official position and committing the offense in relationto his office, and the other above-named accused, all private individuals, namely: Marlon Baillo, Cipriano Boyatac, and AnianoLatayada, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather andpossess sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of varying sizes belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of Four ThousandThree Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued at P108,150.00, without any authority and supporting documents asrequired under existing forest laws and regulation to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.12 They alleged that the

Joint Affidavit13of thepersonnel of the DENR which became one of the bases in filing the Information never mentioned Villarin as one of the perpetrators of the crimewhile the accusations against Baillo and Boyatac were not based on the personal knowledge of the affiants. They also asserted that theirindictment was based on polluted sources, consisting of the sworn statements of witnesses like Latayada and Sudaria, who both appeared to haveparticipated in the commission of the crime charged.

Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, in its Order14 dated January 27, 1997, directed Villarin, Boyatac, and Bailloto file their Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, it being the entity which filed the Information in Court. OnMarch 31, 1997, only Villarin filed a Petition for Reinvestigation15 but same was, however, deniedby the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao inan Order16 dated May 15, 1997 because the grounds relied upon were not based on newly discovered evidence or errors of fact, law orirregularities that are prejudicial to the interest of the movants, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 07 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of theOmbudsman in Criminal Cases. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao likewise opined that Villarin was directly implicated by Latayada, his co-accused.

The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered separate pleas of not guilty.17 Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution


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On December 31, 1995, at around five oclock in the afternoon, prosecution witness Roland Granada (Granada) noticed that a publicutility jeep loaded with timber stopped near his house. The driver, petitioner Latayada, was accompanied by four to five other persons, one ofwhom was Boyatac while the rest could not be identified by Granada.18 They alighted from the jeep and unloaded the timber 10 to 15 metersaway from the Batinay bridge at BarangayPagalungan, Cagayan De Oro City. Another prosecution witness, Pastor Pansacala (Pansacala), alsonoticed the jeep with plate number MBB 226 and owned by Sudaria, loaded with timber.19 Being then the president of a community-basedorganization which serves as a watchdog of illegal cutting of trees,20 Pansacala even ordered a certain Mario Bael to count the timber.21

At six oclock in the evening of the same day, BarangayCaptain Angeles Alarcon (Alarcon)22 noticed that the pile of timber was alreadyplaced near the bridge. Since she had no knowledge of any scheduled repair of the Batinay bridgeshe was surprised to discover that the timberwould be used for the repair. After inquiring from the people living near the bridge, she learned that Latayada and Boyatac delivered the timber.23

Another prosecution witness, Ariel Palanga (Palanga), testified that at seven oclock in the morning of January 1, 1996, Boyatac bought astick of cigarette from his store and requested him to cover the pile of timber near the bridge for a fee. Palanga acceded and covered the pile withcoconut leaves.24

On January 13, 1996, at around ten oclock in the morning, prosecution witness Juan Casenas (Casenas), a radio and TV personality ofRMN-TV8, took footages of the timber25 hidden and covered by coconut leaves. Casenas also took footages of more logs inside a bodega at theother side of the bridge. In the following evening, the footages were shown in a news program on television.

On the same day, members of the DENR Region 10 Strike Force Team measured the timber which consisted of 63 pieces of Apitongflitches and determined that it totaled 4,326 board feet26 and subsequently entrusted the same to Alarcon for safekeeping.

Upon further investigation, it was learned that the timber was requisitioned by Villarin, who was then BarangayCaptain of Pagulangan,Cagayan de Oro City. Villarin gave Sudaria the specifications for the requisitioned timber. Thereafter, Boyatac informed Villarin that the timber wasalready delivered on December 31, 1995.27

On January 18, 1996, Felix Vera Cruz (Vera Cruz), a security guard at the DENR Region 10 Office, received and signed for theconfiscated timber since the property custodian at that time was not around.

The filing of the aforestated Information followed.

The Version of the Defense

In response to the clamor of the residents of BarangaysTampangan, Pigsag-an, Tuburan and Taglinao, all in Cagayan De Oro City,Villarin, decided to repair the impassable Batinay bridge. The project was allegedly with the concurrence of the BarangayCouncil.

Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin commissioned Boyatac to inquire from Sudaria about the availability oftimber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and Boyatac to


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Issues

Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE] MATTER OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION[,]DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT;

2. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM WHAT THE SUPREME COURT HASALWAYS BEEN SAYING, THAT, TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME MUST BE PROVENBEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT and;

3. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN AFFIRMING THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE COURT AQUO[,] DEPARTED FROM JURISPRUDENCE THAT EVEN IN CRIMES [INVOLVING] VIOLATION OF SPECIALLAWS[,] SPECIAL CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CIRCUMSTANCES THAT [CAN BE CONSIDERED

AS MITIGATING HAD THE VIOLATION BEEN PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN ORDER TOREDUCE PENALTY].36

Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation is tantamount to a denial of the right to due process. AsVillarin was indicted in the Information despite his not being included in the criminal complaint filed by Pioquinto of the TL Strike Force Team of theDENR, they claim that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation. They also bewail the fact that persons who appear to be equally guilty, suchas Sudaria, have not been included in the Information. Hence, they argue that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in denyingtheir petition for reinvestigation because it deprived Villarin of his right to preliminary investigation and in refusing and to equally prosecute the guilty.They contend that the Ombudsman should not have relied on the prosecutors Certification37 contained in the Information to the effect that apreliminary investigation was conducted in the case.

Moreover, petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt since they had no intentionto possess the timber and dispose of it for personal gain. They likewise claim that there was failure on the part of the prosecution to present thetimber, which were the object of the offense.

Our Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Villarin was properly afforded his right to due process.

Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal complaint charging Sudaria, Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac withviolation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.38 The said complaint did not state the known addresses of the accused. Neither was thenotarized joint-affidavit of the complainants attached thereto. The subpoena issued to the accused and the copy of their counter-affidavits were also

not part of the record. Moreover, the complaint did not include Villarin as a respondent. However, said infirmities do not constitute denial of dueprocess particularly on the part of Villarin.

It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the Office of the City Prosecutor that Villarin and all the accusedparticipated in the scheduled preliminary investigation that was conducted prior to the filing of the criminal case.39 They knew about the filing of thecomplaint and even denied any involvement in the illegal cutting of timber. They were also given the opportunity to submit countervailing evidenceto convince the investigating prosecutor of their innocence.

Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the assertion that Villarin was not afforded a preliminary investigation.Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in denying Villarins motion forreconsideration. It validly relied on the certification contained in the Information that a preliminary investigation was properly conducted in this case.The certification was made under oath by no less than the public prosecutor, a public officer who is presumed to have regularly performed hisofficial duty.40 Besides, it aptly noted that Villarin was implicated by x x x Latayada in his affidavit dated January 22, 1996 before Marcelino B.Pioquinto, Chief, Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit. The denial of Villarin cannot prevail over the declaration of witnesses.41


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Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have been waived. This is to allow thetrial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarilyinvolves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding ofprobable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation.42

Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for Reinvestigation. However, whenthe Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He accepted the Ombudsman's verdict, entered a plea of not guilty duringhis arraignment and actively participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations andtestifying on his own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again assailed the conduct of thepreliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration.43 Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of apreliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his

right to preliminary investigation.

Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included as a principal in the commission of the offense. However, whetherSudaria should or should not be included as co-accused can no longer be raised on appeal. Any right that the petitioners may have in questioningthe non-inclusion of Sudaria in the Information should have been raised in a motion for reconsideration of the March 13, 1996 Resolution of theOffice of the City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Sudaria.44 Having failed to avail of the properprocedural remedy, they are now estopped from assailing his non-inclusion.

Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705.

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.Any personwho shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable ordisposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without legaldocuments as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officerswho ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in additionto the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable ordisposable public land, or from private land without any authorization; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.45

The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is consummated by the mere possession of forest products withoutthe proper documents.

We reviewed the records and hold that the prosecution had discharged the burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged.The evidence of the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners were in custody of timber without the necessary legaldocuments. Incidentally, we note that several transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) were not submitted by the trial court. No explanation wasprovided for these missing TSNs. Notwithstanding the incomplete TSNs, we still find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonabledoubt petitioners culpability.

The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that timber was confiscated from petitioners. It presented a Tally Sheet46 toprove that the DENR Strike Force Team examined the seized timber on January 13, 1996. The number, volume and appraised value of saidtimber were also noted in the Tally Sheet. Seizure receipts were also presented to prove that the confiscated timber were placed in the custody of

Alarcon47 and eventually taken to the DENR Office.48 There was a photograph of the timber taken by the television crew led by Casenas.49


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The prosecution likewise presented in evidence the testimonies of eyewitnesses Granada and Pansacala who testified that Latayada

and Boyatac were the ones who delivered the timber.50

More significantly, Villarin admitted that he was the one who commissioned the procurement of the timber51 for the repair of the Batinaybridge. He even deputized Boyatac to negotiate with Sudaria and gave Latayada P2,000.00 to transport the logs. Boyatac later informed him ofthe delivery of timber. However, he could not present any document to show that his possession thereof was legal and pursuant to existing forestlaws and regulations.

Relevant portions of the testimony of Villarin are as follows:

Q As Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, of course, you heard reports prior to the incident on December 31, 1995 that

Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria was also engaged in supplying forest products like forest lumber?A Yes, because I always go to Cagayan de Oro and I can always ride on his jeepney.

Q And you were sure that information of yours was received by you and not only by one but several persons fromBarangay Tagpangi even up to Barangay Pagalungan?

A Thats true because he even has a record with the police.

Q And you learned [this] prior to January 1995?A Yes, Sir.

Q And your information was even to the effect that Sudaria was supplying illegally cut lumber regularly?A What I have noticed because I always ride on his jeep wherein lumber was being loaded, the lumber will be taken

when it arrived in Lumbia, kilometer 5.

Q Even if there were already raids being conducted to the person of Camilo Sudaria, still he continued to load illegallycut lumber?

A He slowed down after several arrest because maybe he was ashamed because he was the Barangay Captain ofTagpangi.

Q And his arrest and the slackening of his activities of illegally cut lumber occurred prior to June 1995?A Yes, sir.

Q [In spite] of your knowledge that he is engaged [in] illegally cut[ting] forest products, you as Barangay Captain ofPagalungan transacted with him for the purpose of acquiring lumber [for] the bridge at Pagalungan?

A As we rode together in his jeep, he informed me that he has some lumber to be used to build his house and he toldme he will sell it for the repair of the bridge in Pagalungan.

Q And because of that, in addition, you sent him the specifications of materials for the repair of the bridge inPagalungan?

A I let Boyatac go to him and [inquire] from him if he has those specifications.

Q And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of those specification?A Yes, because he sent to Boyatac some requirements of the specifications and he let me sign it.

Q And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria?A Yes, because I sent somebody to him and we did not talk anymore.

Q And thereafter on December 31, 1995, according to your testimony before, Aniano Latayada delivered the lumberflitches you ordered on board the passenger jeep of Camilo Sudaria?

A When the specifications were given, we were informed that the lumber were already there. So, it was delivered.

Q Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?A Boyatac.

Q And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside the Batinay Bridge.A Yes, Sir.

Q And even without personally inspecting it, you immediately paid Latayada the compensation for the delivery of thoselumber?

A There was already an advance payment for his delivery.

Q To whom did you give the advance?A To Latayada.

Q You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?


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A No, Sir.

Q In fact, the money that you paid to Latayada was specifically for the transportation of the lumber from Tagpangi toBatinay bridge?

A Yes, Sir.

PROS. GALARRITA:Q And at that time, you paid Latayada P2,000 as payment of the lumber?

A Yes, Sir.

COURT:

Q Did you pay Latayada?A Yes, Sir.

Q How much?A P2,000.

Q And you gave this to the conductor?A Yes, Sir.

Q You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?A Yes, sir.

Q What did the conductor say?A The conductor said that the money was for the payment for the transporting of lumber from Tagpangi.52

(Underscoring ours.)

Violat ion of Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amend ed, is

malum proh ib i tum.

As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitumand as such, criminal intent is not an essential element . However, theprosecution must prove that petitioners had the intent to possess (animus possidendi) the timber.53 Possession, under the law,includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the [object of the crime] is in the immediatephysical control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the [object of the crime] is under the dominion and controlof the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.54

There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin andLatayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage without any license or permit issued by any competent authority. Given

these and considering that the offense is malum prohibitum,petitioners contention that the possession of the illegally cut timber was not forpersonal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.

Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commiss ion of the Crime

Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the corpus delictihad not been established. They assert that the failure topresent the confiscated timber in court was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.

We disagree. [C]orpus delictirefers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or substance of the crime . In itslegal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered55 or, in this case,to the seized timber. Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witnessuncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delictimay even be established bycircumstantial evidence.56

Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delictiwas established by the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. TheTally Sheet, Seizure Receipts issued by the DENR and photograph proved the existence of the timber and its confiscation. The testimonies of thepetitioners themselves stating in no uncertain terms the manner in which they consummated the offense they were charged with were likewisecrucial to their conviction.


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We find no reason to deviate from these findings since it has been established that factual findings of a trial court are binding on us,absent any showing that it overlooked or misinterpreted facts or circumstances of weight and substance.57 The legal precept applies to this case inwhich the trial courts findings were affirmed by the appellate court.58

The Proper Penalty

Violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is penalized as qualified theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of theRevised Penal Code (RPC). The pertinent portions of these provisions read:

Art. 310. Qualified TheftThe crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees thanthose respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of

confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premisesof the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,volcanic eruption, or any calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

Art. 309. Penalties.Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty ofprision mayorin its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penaltyshall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, butthe total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with theaccessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall betermedprision mayoror reclusion temporal, as the case may be. x x x

The Information filed against the petitioners alleged that the 63 pieces of timber without the requisite legal documents measuring 4,326board feet were valued at P108,150.00. To prove this allegation, the prosecution presented Pioquinto to testify, among others, on this amount.Tally Sheets and Seizure Receipts were also presented to corroborate said amount

. With the value of the timber exceeding P22,000.00, the basic

penalty isprision mayorin its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in its maximum, the range of which is eight (8) years, eight (8) monthsand one (1) day to ten (10) years. Since none of the qualifying circumstances in Article 310 of the RPC was alleged in the Information, the penaltycannot be increased two degrees higher.

In determining the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 is to be deducted from P108,150.00, which results to P86,150.00. Thisremainder must be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. Consequently, eight (8) years must be added to thebasic penalty. Thus the maximum imposable penalty ranges from sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to eighteen (18) years ofreclusion temporal.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty should be taken

anywhere within the range of the penaltynext lower in degree, without considering the modifying circumstances. The penalty one degree lower fromprision mayorin its minimum andmedium periods isprision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods, the range of which is from two (2) years, four (4) months and one

(1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, erroneously fixed the minimum period of the penalty at twelve (12) years ofprisionmayor.

Finally, the case against Boyatac must be dismissed considering his demise even before the RTC rendered its Judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 28, 2005 and the Resolution dated September 22, 2006 inCA-G.R. CR No. 26720 are AFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATIONSthat petitioners Crisostomo Villarin and Aniano Latayada are each sentencedto suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, eight (8)months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The complaint against Cipriano Boyatac is hereby DISMISSED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),

Petitioner,

- versus -

PAGADIAN CITY TIMBER CO., INC.,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 159308

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CHICO-NAZARIO,NACHURA, andREYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 16, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION


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NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari59 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside theDecision60 dated October 18, 2001 and the Resolution61 dated July 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59194entitled Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. v. Antonio Cerilles, as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources(DENR) and Antonio Mendoza, as Regional Executive Director, DENR, Region IX.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On October 14, 1994, petitioner, through the DENR, and respondent Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. executed IndustrialForest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. R-9-04062 whereby petitioner, represented by then Regional Executive Director (RED)for Region IX, Leonito C. Umali, authorized respondent, represented by its President Filomena San Juan, to develop, utilize, andmanage a specified forest area covering 1,999.14 hectares located in BarangaysLangapod, Cogonan, and Datagan, Municipality ofLabangan, Zamboanga del Sur, for the production of timber and other forest products subject to a production-sharing scheme.

Respondent later submitted the required Comprehensive Development and Management Plan (CDMP) which the DENRapproved on August 17, 1995.

On October 8, 1998, in response to the numerous complaints filed by members of the Subanen tribe regardingrespondents alleged failure to implement the CDMP, disrespect of their rights as an indigenous people, and the constant thre atsand harassment by armed men employed by respondent, RED Antonio Mendoza, DENR Region IX, issued Regional Special OrderNo. 217 creating a regional team to evaluate and assess IFMA No. R-9-040.

Thus, the DENR sent a letter dated October 22, 1998 to respondent, giving notice of the evaluation and assessment to beconducted on the area from October 22-30, 1998 covering the years 1997 and 1998. In the notice, the DENR requested anyrepresentative of the company to appear at the CENRO Office, Pagadian City, and bring with him documents and maps concerningits IFMA operations.

On October 23, 1998, a DENR Evaluation Team composed of Aniceto Wenceslao (Forester, DENR, Zamboanga del Sur),Isabelo Mangaya-ay (Intern Chief, RCBF/MCO), Philidor Lluisma (Forester II, Regional Office), Chanito Paul Siton (C. Forester,CENRO-Pagadian City), Adelberto Roullo (Forester, CENRO, Pagadian City), and Francisco Martin (Carto LEP, CENRO, PagadianCity) went to the IFMA site. After a briefing conference between the Evaluation Team and respondents Operations Manager,Inocencio Santiago, actual field evaluation and assessment followed.

On October 29, 1998, an exit conference and dialogue on post evaluation and assessment of IFMA R-9-04 was heldbetween DENR officials, namely, CENR Officer Maximo O. Dichoso, IFMA Regional Team Leader, Forester Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay,

and IFMA Regional Team Member, Forester Philidor O. Lluisma, and IFMA Representative and Operations Manager InocencioSantiago at the CENRO, Pagadian City.63 The exit conference was called to order at 1:30 p.m. and was concluded at 3:00 p.m.Forester Mangaya-ay presented the representative results and findings of the Evaluation Team, to wit:

The presiding officer started with the mango plantation in the Noran, Langapod side. That out of theestimated number of seedlings planted of about 2,008 hills, within an equivalent area of 20 hectares, the result orfinding of the inventory conducted at 100% intensity is only 98 hills of seedlings survived including the doubtfuland badly deformed. The species planted along trails are Gmelina and Mahogany species. The said foot trailplanted with the aforementioned species starts from the entrance of the IFMA are where the notice billboard isposted up to the only existing look-out tower. The estimated average of percent survival for Gmelina is more orless 30%. There are also portions where higher percentage of survival is recorded at 56% and lower at 14%.There are areas planted declared by Kagawad Cerning Becagas of Barangay Cogonan now covered by CSC.The areas covered by CSC, a waiver is needed to be issued by the IFMA holder.

CENR Officer Maximo O. Dichoso commented that during a meeting held before, the IFMA holder was

willing to give up the said areas.

The presiding officer continued that on the courtesy call made to the Barangay Chairman of BarangayCogonan, Mr. Roberto Palaran recounted the assistance extended by the IFMA holder to his barangay asCommunity Assistance/service which includes electric generator, handheld radio and laborers for the repair of


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Noburan Cogonan road and the repair of the hanging bridge at Sitio Tialaic to which the said BarangayChairman issued a duly signed certification to this effect.

With regards, the seedling stock within the nursery, there are approximately a total number of about44,460 seedlings of Gmelina species. That the infrastructure implemented or constructed, there exist only onelook-out tower of the reported 4 look-out towers constructed. Moreover, the team had also noted only 1bunkhouse and 1 stockroom or shedhouse. There is also 1 Multi-purpose shed and 1 dilapidated or neglectednotice billboard poster at the entrance trail leading to the IFMA area. That with regards the concrete monument,there are only 2 recorded. The other corners visible are those located at junctions of creeks and rivers. But theothers cannot be visibly or never planted for the same cannot be pinpointed or shown to the team allegedly forlack of knowledge by the representative of the IFMA holder. Finally, the presiding officer reminded the herein

IFMA representative Mr. Inocencio Santiago that per actual survey, inspection and ground verification, the teambelieves that the other reported areas planted are located outside the designated IFMA area particularly theNoburan and Langapod sides.64

After the presentation, Mangaya-ay asked Santiago if he had comments, suggestions, or questions regarding the matterand the manner of the conduct of the evaluation and assessment by the Evaluation Team. Santiago said he had none, butrequested a copy of the report of the Evaluation Team. Mangaya-ay informed him that it was only RED Mendoza who may furnishhim a copy of the report.

Later, the Evaluation Team submitted a report through a Memorandum65 dated November 6, 1998 to the DENR-RED ofRegion 9, Zamboanga City, on the evaluation and assessment of respondent under IFMA No. R-9-040. The said Memorandumstated

In compliance with Regional Special Order No. 217, Series of 1998, please be informed that the hereininformation is the result or findings of the team for the conduct of evaluation and assessment following theguidelines setforth under Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 11, Series of 1995 of Pagadian Timber Co.,Inc. under IFMA No. R9-040 against their actual accomplishment as mandated under the terms and conditions ofthe IFMA including other applicable laws, rules and regulations of the department on the matter.

At the onset, the team conducted a briefing conference and dialogue with the IFMA holder, the CENROfficer of Pagadian City and personnel concerned for the proper and orderly implementation and conduct of theevaluation and assessment (please see attached).

The team was composed of the Regional Evaluating Team, the CENRO and PENRO representatives andthe representatives of the IFMA holder. The team proceeded to the western portion of the area of the herein IFMAparticularly Barangay Cogonan, Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur. The evaluation and assessment was thenconducted on the main nursery, the established plantation, the look-out towers, the boundary of ISF and claimedor occupied areas, natural or residual forest, the IFMA boundary, monuments planted, foot trails, other

improvements introduced and the billboard and signboard posted. The inspection, evaluation and assessmentconducted were all undertaken in the presence of the IFMA holder, representatives, laborers and other personnelon the area. (please see attached report, tall sheets, pictorials and map).

In the conduct of the same, the IFMA representatives or laborers that assisted the team could only showthe subject area under evaluation but the other areas alluded to as accomplished or undertaken by the companyappeared upon actual verification and inspection to be negative and non-existent thus dispelling their allegation.

With regard the information and dissemination conducted by the IFMA holder including other servicesextended to the communities within the IFMA area and vicinities, it is noteworthy for recognition the donationsmade by the company. (Please see attached minutes of the dialogue with the barangay officials of BarangayCogonan and pictorials).

The evaluation conducted on the nursery operations show that the facilities and other necessaryimplements were generally below par. An inventory of the seedlings stock of pure Gmelina species have already

lapsed its plantability or have overgrown in the seedbed with an average grand total of about 44,460 within theestablished 2-hectare main nursery area. There was no other subsidiary nursery established in the area. Alsonoted is the enrichment planting conducted along both sides of the foot-trail which extends approximately 18 kms.From the entrance of the IFMA area going to the lookout tower of the four (4) lookout towers reported, only one (1)has been noted remaining in the area and the rest were destroyed or burned (pls. see attached pictorials). Thesignboard posted was unattended and in the state of disrepair. There were no monument planted or any markingalong the IFMA boundary and in residual forest except the monuments found in the ISF boundaries within theIFMA area (please see attached pictorials). The plantation established is composed of Gmelina species with 4 x 4spacing over a total of about 10.18 hectares. Basing on 5% estimate inventory, the result is 43% seedlingsurvival.

Thereafter, the team also conducted evaluation and assessment at the eastern portion particularly atLangapod, Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur. The team inspected and verified on the ground the reported 20hectares mango plantation with a spacing of 10 x 10 meters at 100% intensity inventory. The accounted numberof mango seedlings planted of about 2,008 hills, only 98 seedlings survived. Wherefore, it generally represents

5% seedling survival. (Please see attached)


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Finally, the team conducted an exit conference with the CENR Officer, and the IFMA holder where thetentative and general findings of the evaluation and assessment was laid-out and presented to the body. (Pleasesee attached)66

On the basis of such findings, the Evaluation Team made the following recommendations

1. The lessee should be required to explain why they failed to develop their IFMA area (PlantationDevelopment) in accordance with the approved Comprehensive Development and Management Plan(CDMP);

2. The boundary and area coverage of IFMA No. R9-040 should be amended to exclude areas coveredby Certificates of Stewardship Contracts (CSC) under the ISF Program with an area of 226.17 hectares,other areas previously identified as occupied/claimedand other conflict areas;

3. The amended boundary should be delineated/surveyed on the ground with a precise instrument andall corners appropriately marked/monumented;

4. The company should hire a full time forester.67

Acting on the Memorandum dated November 6, 1998, RED Antonio M. Mendoza, DENR-IX, Zamboanga City, submitted tothe DENR Secretary a Memorandum68 dated April 7, 1999 regarding the performance evaluation of IFMA No. R-9-040. The REDMemorandum reads

This has reference with the instruction to validate the performance/accomplishment of IFMAs of RegionIX, Western Mindanao. Validation of IFMAs is in accordance with the existing policy of the DENR, to determinethe capabilities of the holders to develop their Lease areas in consonance with their submitted and approvedComprehensive Development Management Plan.

x x x x

On 6 November 1998, Foresters Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay and Philidor Lluisma, pursuant to RegionalSpecial Order No. 217, Series of 1998, conducted the evaluation of the performance of IFMA No. R9-040 ofPagadian City Timber Company, Inc. located at Langapod and Cogonan, Municipality of Labangan and Datagan,Municipality of Sominot, all of Zamboanga del Sur. Result of the evaluation reveals that the holder violated thefollowing DENR existing Rules and Regulations particularly Section 26 of DAO 97-04 GROUNDS FORCANCELLATION of IFMA which provides that, any of the following violations shall be sufficient grounds for thecancellation of IFMA.

1. Paragraph 26.5, Section 26, DAO 97-04, Series of 1997, provides that failure to implement theapproved Comprehensive Development and Management Plan.

As of 1998, the 4thyear of existence of IFMA No. R9-040, the holder must have developed a

total of 1,597.0 hectares as per approved CDMP. However, based on the report submitted by theEvaluation Team only 365.2 hectares was planted which are about 22.8%. During the evaluation,however, the IFMA representative could not even pinpoint the planted areas.

Per report of the Pagadian CENRO Composite Monitoring Teamconducted on 21 August 1998the plantation area was burned resulting to the damage of about 300 hectares leaving only about 20.0hectares undamaged. No report had been submitted/received since then.

In infrastructure, the holder managed to put up one (1) out of four (4) programmed look-outtowers; developed one (1) out of two (2) forest nurseries and constructed only 6 km. foot trail which isonly about 27% accomplishment of the whole infrastructure.

2. Paragraph 26.8 of Section 26, DAO 97-04, specifically provides that failure to implement or adoptagreements made with communities and other relevant sectors.

Attached herewith, please find several petitions, sworn statements, affidavits and resolutions from varioussectors particularly the Subanen Communities (IPs) within the area. The existence and approval ofIFMA No. R9-040 contract is being protested and is demanding for its cancellation.

The primary complaint was a blatant disrespect to their rights as an Indigenous People and the non-peaceful co-existence between them and the holder of the IFMA R9-040. Accordingly, they wereconstantly threatened/harassed by armed men employed by the holder.

In the same Memorandum, RED Mendoza recommended to the DENR Secretary the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040. 69


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It appears that RED Mendoza issued a subsequent but similar Memorandum70 dated April 21, 1999 to the DENR

Secretary relative to IFMA No. R-9-040. It stated

This has reference with the instruction to validate the performance/accomplishment of IFMAs of RegionIX, Western Mindanao. Validation of IFMAs is in accordance with the existing policy of the DENR to determine thecapabilities of the holders to develop their Lease areas in consonance with their approved ComprehensiveDevelopment and Management Plan.

In furtherance thereto, Foresters Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay and Philidor Lluisma, pursuant to RegionalSpecial Order No. 217, Series of 1998, conducted the evaluation of the performance of IFMA No. R9-040 of

Pagadian City Timber Company, Inc. located at the Municipalities of Labangan, Datagan and Sominot, all ofZamboanga del Sur, on November 6, 1998. Result of the evaluation revealed that the holder violated Rules andRegulations which are sufficient ground for cancellation as stipulated under Section 26 of DAO 97-04, they are asfollows

1. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT THE APPROVED COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT ANDMANAGEMENT PLAN.

Under the approved comprehensive and development plan, 1,597.0 ha of plantation should have beenestablished from the Approval of the CDMP. However, only 365.2 ha were reportedly planted from CY 1995 to1997. This represents only 28% of the targeted goal on plantation establishment.

Field validation of the reported established plantation revealed otherwise. The findings of the team are:

A. Portion of the area reported as established plantation by the IFMA holder is an ISFproject with an area of 226.17 ha. These are covered with Certificate of Stewardship;

B. Locations and boundaries of reported plantations established from 1995 to 1997cannot be located on the ground by the team neither by the representative of the IFMAholder who accompanied the validating team; and

C. No plantation was established during CY 1998.

On Infrastructure, the holder constructed only one (1) lookout tower as against the goal of 4 towers;established one (1) nursery as against the goal of two (2); and constructed only 6km foot trail. These representonly 27% of the total infrastructure to be undertaken by the holder over the area.

2. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT OR ADOPT AGREEMENT WITH COMMUNITIES AND OTHERRELEVANT SECTORS.

Attached herewith are copies of petitions, sworn statements, affidavit and resolutions from SubanenCommunities (IPs) and other sectors in the area demanding the cancellation of IFMA R9-040.

The complaints and demand for cancellation by the people where the IFMA is located is a manifestationand proof of non-social acceptance of the project by the residents in the locality.

In view of the above findings, IFMA No. R9-040 is hereby recommended for cancellation.71

Acting on the latter Memorandum from RED Mendoza, then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles, on June 7, 1999, issuedan Order72 canceling IFMA No. R-9-040 for failure to implement the approved CDMP and for failure of the lessee to protect the areafrom forest fires. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, IFMA No. R9-040 issued to Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. is

hereby ordered cancelled. The IFMA holder is hereby ordered to immediately vacate the area and tosurrender/return copy of the Agreement to the Regional Executive Director, DENR Region 9, Zamboanga City.

The RED concerned or his duly authorized representative is hereby directed to serve this Order;determine best end use of the land; take appropriate measures to protect the same and inform this Officeimmediately of his compliance.

SO ORDERED.73


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On July 2, 1999, respondents President, Filomena S. San Juan, wrote DENR Secretary Cerilles that the company wassurprised to receive the Order of the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040 on June 22, 1999. She claimed that

The DENR regional office is fully aware that the company is doing its best to manage and develop thearea by continually planting trees and protecting the area from forest fires and illegalities. No company would everset fire on its own plantation for obvious reasons. The company observed precautionary measures especiallyduring the time of the El Nio phenomenon. If there have been mistakes and miscommunications in the reports ofthe DENR field officers, these could have been threshed out by a conference between DENR and the PagadianTimber Company Inc.

The company was not accorded due process before the order of cancellation was issued. The companywas not furnished copy of the evaluation and recommendation of the DENR Regional Executive Director of RegionIX. Had the company been given the opportunity to contest the findings, evaluation and recommendation of thesaid office, the result would be otherwise.74

She appealed for the reconsideration of the Order asking that a re-investigation be conducted to comply with due process.

Even as the said letter for reconsideration was not yet acted upon, respondent appealed to the Office of the President (OP).

In the Resolution75 dated January 12, 2000, the OP affirmed the cancellation order based on the results of the actualevaluation and assessment of the DENR team. It ruled that the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040 was primarily and specificallygoverned by Section 26 of Department Administrative Order (DAO) 97-04. Relative to respondents invocation of due process, theOP held that respondent was afforded the right to be heard when it filed its motion for reconsideration and its subsequent appeal tothe OP.

The motion for reconsideration filed by respondent of the January 12, 2000 Resolution was denied by the OP in theResolution76 dated May 8, 2000.

Respondent went up to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for review with a prayer for the issuance of a writ ofpreliminary injunction against the implementation of the assailed Order dated June 7, 1999.

In its Resolution dated January 17, 2001, the CA issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, directing and orderingrespondents (petitioner) and/or any other person acting under their command, authority and/or for and in their behalf, to DESISTfrom implementing the assailed Order of cancellation dated June 7, 1999, and/or taking over the IFMA premises of [respondent],pending the termination of this proceeding.

In its Decision77 dated October 18, 2001, the CA ruled in favor of respondents. In striking down the rulings of the OP and

the Order dated June 7, 1999, the CA declared that IFMA No. R-9-040 was a contract that could not be unilaterally cancelled withoutinfringing on the rights of respondent to due process and against impairment of contracts. The appellate court agreed withrespondent when the latter argued that it was entitled to the benefits of Sections 3578 and 3679 of IFMA No. R-9-040 such thatrespondent should have been given 30 days, after due notice, to remedy any breach or default of the provisions of the IFMA and/orthat the dispute regarding the bases for the cancellation of the IFMA should have first been submitted to arbitration.

Petitioner moved to reconsider the CA Decision. In the Resolution80 dated July 24, 2003, the motion was denied for lackof merit. Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:


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I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that IFMA No. R9-040 is a contract and not a mereprivilege granted by the State to respondent.

II. The Court of Appeals seriously erred in ordaining that respondent can rightfully invoke prior resort toarbitration or the option to mend its violations under IFMA No. R9-040.81

In essence, petitioner argues that an IFMA is not an ordinary contract which is protected by the Constitution againstimpairment82 but a mere privilege granted by the State to qualified persons by means of a permit, license, franchise, agreement, orother similar concessions, which in this case is the exploration, development and utilization of the forest lands belonging to the Stateunder its full control and supervision. Thus, the cancellation of the IFMA does not amount to a rescission of a contract but a mere

withdrawal of this privilege. As such, the due process clause under the Constitution83 does not likewise apply since the IFMA areacannot be considered as property of respondent. According to petitioner, IFMA No. R-9-040, with the forest lands covered by it, isimbued with paramount considerations of public interest and public welfare such that whatever rights respondent may have under itmust yield to the police power of the State. In this sense, respondent cannot take refuge in Sections 35 and 36 of IFMA No. R-9-040to prevent the IFMAs cancellation.

Inasmuch as the grounds cited by petitioner are interrelated, they shall be jointly discussed hereunder.

The petition is impressed with merit.

IFMA No. R-9-040 is a license agreement under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 (Revised Forestry Code), the law whichis the very basis for its existence.84 Under Section 3, paragraph (dd) thereof, a license agreement is defined as a privilege85granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources within any forest land with the right of possession and occupation thereofto the exclusion of others, except the government, but with the corresponding obligation to develop, protect and rehabilitate thesame in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in said agreement. This is evident in the following features, amongothers, of IFMA No. R-9-040, to wit:

1. The State agreed to devolve to the holder of IFMA No. R-9-040 the responsibility to manage thespecified IFMA area for a period of 25 years, specifically until October 14, 2019, which period is automaticallyrenewable for another 25 years thereafter;

2. The State imposed upon respondent, as holder of IFMA No. R-9-040, the conditions, the means, andthe manner by which the IFMA area shall be managed, developed, and protected;

3. The State, through the DENR Secretary, shall not collect any rental within the first five (5) years of theIFMA, after which it shall be entitled to annual rental of fifty centavos (P0.50) per hectare from the sixth to the tenthyear thereof, and one peso (P1.00) per hectare thereafter;

4. The IFMA area, except only the trees and other crops planted and the permanent improvements

constructed by the IFMA holder, remains the property of the State; and

5. Upon cancellation of the IFMA through the fault of the holder, all improvements including forestplantations existing within the IFMA area shall revert to and become the property of the State.

An IFMA has for its precursor the Timber License Agreement (TLA), one of the tenurial instruments issued by the State to itsgrantees for the efficient management of the countrys dwindling forest resources. Jurisprudence has been consistent in holding thatlicense agreements are not contracts within the purview of the due process and the non-impairment of contracts clauses enshrinedin the Constitution. Our pronouncement inAlvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.86 is enlightening

In unequivocal terms, we have consistently held that such licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in thecountrys forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless of changes in policyand the demands of public interest and welfare. (citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993,224 SCRA 792, 811) Such unswerving verdict is synthesized in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., (id., at pp. 811, 812)

where we held:


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In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in hismotion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted withutmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits andadvantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Governmentto strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless ofchanges in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that ascorrectly pointed out by petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of theForestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

x x x Provided, that when the national interest so requires, the

President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession,permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein x x x.

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not acontract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the constitution. InTan vs. Director of Forestry,[125 SCRA 302, 325 (1983)] this Court held:

x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulatesthe utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfareis promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the dueprocess clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawnwhenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise wouldbe unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, ormunicipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is itproperty or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation(37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does notcreate irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights. (People vs.Ong Tin,54 O.G. 7576). x x x

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. DeputyExecutive Secretary [190 SCRA 673, 684 (1990):

x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are theprincipal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization anddisposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. Andit can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by theState to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or

irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest productstherein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded bythe Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are notdeemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause. [SeeSections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.Director of Forestry,G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall bepassed.

cannot be invoked.

Even assuming arguendo that an IFMA can be considered a contract or an agreement, we agree with the Office of theSolicitor General that the alleged property rightsthat may have arisen from it are not absolute.

All Filipino citizens are entitled, by right, to a balanced and healthful ecology as declared under Section 16, 87 Article II ofthe Constitution. This right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment,88 particularly our diminishingforest resources. To uphold and protect this right is an express policy of the State.89 The DENR is the instrumentality of the Statemandated to actualize this policy. It is the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management,development and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources, including those in reservation and watershedareas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by lawin order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations ofFilipinos.90


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Thus, private rights must yield when they come in conflict with this public policy and common interest. They must give way

to the police or regulatory power of the State, in this case through the DENR, to ensure that the terms and conditions of existinglaws, rules and regulations, and the IFMA itself are strictly and faithfully complied with.

Respondent was not able to overturn by sufficient evidence the presumption of regularity in the performance of officialfunctions of the Evaluation Team when the latter inspected, assessed, and reported the violations respondent committed under DAONo. 97-04 which eventually led to the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040.

It is worthy to note that petitioner followed regular procedure regarding the assessment of IFMA No. R-9-040. It gavenotice of the evaluation on October 22, 1998 to be held within the period October 22-30, 1998. Respondent admitted through the

affidavits of its President,91 Operations Manager,92 and workers93 that an Evaluation Team arrived at the IFMA area on October23, 1998. On October 23, 1998, prior to the actual assessment, a briefing was held on the conduct thereof in the presence of theIFMA representatives. On October 29, 1998, an exit conference with IFMA Operations Manager Inocencio Santiago was held at theCENRO Office, Pagadian City, where the results of the assessment were presented. That day, the DENR officials asked Santiago ifhe had any questions or comments on the assessment results and on the manner the evaluation was conducted, but the latterreplied that he had none.

We do not understand why Santiago did not lift a finger or raise an objection to the assessment results, and only much laterin his Affidavit executed almost ten months thereafter, or on August 12, 1999, to claim so belatedly that there was no notice given onOctober 22, 1998, that the Evaluation Team did not actually extensively inspect the IFMA area on October 23, 1998, and that therewas no proper exit conference held on October 29, 1998. The same observation applies to respondents President herself, whoinstead claimed that she vehemently opposed the appointment of then DENR Secretary Cerilles because he was bent on cancelingthe IFMA at all costs, prior to the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040.

Besides, the detailed findings on the failure of respondent to implement its CDMP under its IFMA, as shown by theNovember 6, 1998 Report of the Evaluation Team and the Memoranda dated April 7, 1999 and April 21, 1999, together with all itsattachments, belie respondents claim that there was no actual evaluation and assessment that took place on October 23, 1998.That the Evaluation Report was dated November 6, 1998 does not conclusively show that the evaluation was actually held on thatdate. Neither was this properly proven by the Memoranda of RED Mendoza which stated that the evaluation was conducted onNovember 6, 1998, since RED Mendoza could have been merely misled into such an assumption because of the date of theEvaluation Report. The sweeping denials made by the IFMA representatives and their self-serving accomplishment reports cannotprevail over the actual inspection conducted, the results of which are shown by documentary proof.

Respondent, likewise, cannot insist that, pursuant to Section 35 of IFMA No. R-9-040, it should have been given notice ofits breach of the IFMA and should have been given 30 days therefrom to remedy the breach. It is worthy to note that Section 35uses the word maywhich must be interpreted as granting petitioner the discretion whether or not to give such notice and allow theoption to remedy the breach. In this case, despite the lack of any specific recommendation from the Evaluation Team for thecancellation of the IFMA, DENR Secretary Cerilles deemed it proper to cancel the IFMA due to the extent and the gravity ofrespondents violations.

It is also futile for respondent to claim that it is entitled to an arbitration under Section 36 of IFMA No. R-9-040 before thelicense agreement may be canceled. A reading of the said Section shows that the dispute should be based on the provisions of theIFMA to warrant a referral to arbitration of an irreconcilable conflict between the IFMA holder and the DENR Secretary. In this case,the cancellation was grounded on Section 26 of DAO No. 97-04, particularly respondents failure to implement the approved CDMPand its failure to implement or adopt agreements made with communities and other relevant sectors. The contrary notwithstanding,what remains is that respondent never refuted the findings of the Evaluation Team when given the opportunity to do so but waiteduntil IFMA No. R-9-040 was already cancelled before it made its vigorous objections as to the conduct of the evaluation, harpingonly on its alleged right to due process.

Indeed, respondent was given the opportunity to contest the findings that caused the cancellation of its IFMA when itmoved to reconsider the Order of cancellation and when it filed its appeal and motion for reconsideration before the OP.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, anopportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

What the law prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard; hence, a party cannot feign denialof due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side.94

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 18, 2001 and the Resolution dated July 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59194 are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE, and the Order dated June 7, 1999 of then DENR Secretary Antonio Cerilles,


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and the Resolutions of the Office of the President dated January 12, 2000 and May 8, 2000 affirming the said Order, areREINSTATEDand AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

OLYMPIO REVALDO, G.R. No. 170589

Petitioner,Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,- versus - CORONA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, andBERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. April 16, 2009

x ---------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review by petitioner Olympio Revaldo (petitioner) seeking to reverse the Decision95

dated23 August 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22031 affirming the Decision

96dated 5 September 1997 of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 25, Maasin, Southern Leyte (RTC-Branch 25), in Criminal Case No. 1652, finding petitioner guilty beyondreasonable doubt of illegal possession of lumber in violation of Section 68

97of the Revised Forestry Code (Forestry Code).

98

The Facts

Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of theForestry Code, in an Information

99which reads:

That on or about the 17thday of June 1992, in the (M)unicipality of Maasin, (P)rovince of Southern Leyte,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above -named accused, with intent of gain, didthen and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of the following species of flat lumber:

1. Six (6) pcs. 1x10x7 Molave;2. One (1) pc. 2x6x6 Molave;3. Two (2) pcs. 2x4x6 Molave;4. Two (2) pcs. 1x10x6 Narra;5. Two (2) pcs. 2x8x7 Bajong;6. One (1) pc. 1x6x6 Bajong;7. Four (4) pcs. 1x6x6 Magkalipay; and

8. Three (3) pcs. 1x6x5 Magkalipay;

with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required under existing forestlaws and regulations from proper government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government.


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Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.

The prosecution presented SPO4 Constantino Maceda (Maceda), Sulpicio Saguing (Saguing), and SPO4 Daniel PalomaLasala (Lasala) as witnesses.

Maceda, the person in charge of the operations section of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Maasin, Southern Leyte,testified that on 18 June 1992, at around 11:00 in the morning, he went with Chief Alejandro Rojas (Rojas), SPO3 Melquiades Talisic(Talisic) and SPO3 Nicasio Sunit (Sunit) to the house of petitioner to verify the report of Sunit that petitioner had in his possessionlumber without the necessary documents. They were not armed with a search warrant on that day. They confiscated 20 pieces oflumber of different varieties lying around the vicinity of the house of petitioner. Maceda asked petitioner who the owner of the

lumber was and petitioner replied that he owned the lumber. Petitioner stated that he would use the lumber to repair his house andto make furniture for sale. Maceda also testified that the lumber were freshly cut. Maceda loaded the lumber on the patrol jeep andbrought them to the police station. For coordination purposes, Maceda informed the office of the Department of Environment andNatural Resources (DENR) of the confiscated lumber. The DENR entrusted to the police cust

Documents

Lalican, Villarin,, Republic, Revaldo