Land Reform in India and Pakistan

8/12/2019 Land Reform in India and Pakistan

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Land Reform in India and PakistanAuthor(s): P. C. JoshiSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 52 (Dec. 26, 1970), pp. A145+A147-A149+A151-A152Published by: Economic and Political Weekly

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L a n d R e f o r m n I n d i a a n d akistan

P C Joshi

A general survey of land reform policy and programmes in India and Pakistarn during the tWodecades since Independence suggests that

(i) The social motivation for agrarian policy in both countries was provided by the contendingpressures of the erstwhile semi-feudal landlords on the one hand and the emerging class of medium land-

owners and superior tenants on the other.(ii) Within this common frame the variations between India and Pakistan weree determined by

the relatively greater pull of the old landed class in Pakistan and of the upper layer of the pepsantryin India.

(iii) In both countries the rural poor were neither articulate nor organised at the political level toexercise influence on land reform policy in their favour either at the stage of legislation or of imple-mentation.

(iv) The impact of land reform has been positive for the intermediate classes which have been up-graded and pushed into a position of prominence both in the land and the power structures. On theother hand, the impact has been by and large negative for the rural poor. Land reform has beeninstrumental in disturbing the old framework within which the rural poor had some security withoutcreating for them alternative forms of security.

Against this background, the increasing discontent of the rural poor provides the class motivation

for a new type of land reform in the coming phase. In this new context, the scope for as well as thepowerful impediments to implementing a radical land reform deserve attention.

The fast increasing politicisation of the rural poor is making them deeply dissatisfied with, andintolerant of, their continuing deprivation. On the other hand, any bold initiative in the interests ofthe poor has to reckon now with the formidable economic power of the new landed class and the rami-fications of this power in the political sphere.

The resolution of these contradictory pulls is the most formidable challenge confronting politicalelites in the coming years.

[This paper forms part of a bigger study on 'Land Reforms and Agrarian Change in India andPakistan' done at the Asian Research Centre of the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi.]

A JREVIEW of land reform in Indiaand Pakistan since Independence is sig-

nificant not only as a study of agrarian

history, but also for an understanding

of present economic and political trends

and, more especially, for assessing the

nature of the rural transformation in

these couutries. In India, interest inland reform seems to have revived

again in recent times. The ruling aswell as the non-ruling sections of the

political elite have begun once againto talk. of land reform. What is thesignificance of this trend? What are

the underlying compulsious and moti-

vations for this renewed emphasis onland reform? What, finally, are theprospects of a breakthrough n this vital

sphere?

Any serious attempt to answer these

questions must- begin with a review of

the past two decades. In this paper

a distinction has been made betweencorflmitment,of the political elites to

land reform, as an ideology on the

one hand and as *aprogramme on the

other. In the past, while the agrarianideology of the elites was characterised

by a radicalism and a general orienta-

tion toward the rural poor, the agra-rian programmewas designed to achieve

the limited objective of breaking the

land power and monopoly of the old

landlord class and of promoting themedium landowners and the big pea-sants in the land power structures.These intermediate classes allied twiththe rural poor in order to oust the oldlanded class from its position of domi-nance. Having achieved this aim, how-ever, they allied themselves with theremnants of the old classes to resistthe pressure of the rural poor for con-verting the radical agrarian ideologyinto a radical agrarian programme.

Any programme of radical land re-form today has, therefore, to reckonwith the fornidable power not somuch of the now politically discredit-ed and economically unproductiveerstwhile landlord class but of the newlanded class exercising direct controlover the economic system and wieldingenormous political power, from the vil-lage base, to the top levels of the powerstructure.

At the very very outset it is neces-sary to draw attention to the generalcommitment of the ruling elites inIndia and Pakistan to land reform. In

fact, it is safe to generalise that in the

Asian region the commitment to landreform is independent of the differen-

ces either in the social character of the

rtulingelites or in the form of the poli-

tical regimes. Diverse types of political

elites and political regimes are in fa-

vour of land reform. The compulsions

aud motivations underlying this com-

mitment are also similar. Thus, in the

case of the Indian elite, the commit-

ment to land reform dates back to the

period when the leadership of the

Indian National Congress was struggl-

ing to wrest power from British hands.

It was, therefore, led by the logic of

this struggle to make promises of

change in the agrarian system so as to

win peasant support for the anti-impe-

rialist struggle. There is not much evi-

dence of a similar commitment on the

part of the leadership of the All-India

Muslim League in the pre-independent

period, even though pressure for sulch

commitment was being exercised by

dynamic elements specially at the

lower levels of the Muslim League or-

ganisation. This pressure increased vith

the transformationof the League from

"a coterie of landlords, retired senior

officials, and the lawyers" into a "mass

organisation". The League leadership

could then no longer ignore popular

urges and demands. And, after the for-

mation of Pakistan, these pressurescrystallised into a commitment.-

A-145,

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Thus, in the case of both India a%-,dPakistan, promise of land reform as-sumed the form of a more definiteagrarian programme with the appoint-meint, respectively, of the Congress Ag-rarian Reforms Committee in 1949 andof the Agrarian Committee of thePakistan Muslim League in the sameyear. Commitment to land reform, bythe elites both in India aid Pakistan,

which was earlier part of the politicalstrategy to win power thus became partof a strategy for legitimising power. Itwas necessary that to gain politicallegitimacy the ruling elites should ap-pear to be earnest about remedyingthe hardships and sufferings of thepeasants who constituted the largestsection of the population in both coun-tries. The newly established regi-mes could not expect mass peasantsupport without promise of land reform.

There was also growing agrarian un-rest in several parts of undivided India

at the time of independence. It was re-flected in the widespread tenant-land-lord conflicts which threatened toundermine the very stability of thenewly established regimes in both Indiaand Pakistan. The situation providedanother powerful compulsion for theruling elites to give urgent attention tothe question of agrarian reconstruction.

One more motivating factor was thecritical situation created by the chronic

stignation of agriculture - a stagna-tion which aggravated not only theproblem of feeding an increasing po-pulation but also thwarted the possi-bilities of rapid industrial development.The ruling elites were forced to recog-nise the close interdependence of agri-cultural regeneration and agrarian reno-vation. The replacement of the unpro-ductive landed gentry by a land-owningclass actively interested in farming ap-peared to be one of the most importantpre-conditions of agricultural progress.

ECONOMIC DIsPARIsES

Yet another factor underlying the

promise of land reform was the con-

cern regarding the threat to politicaland social stability arising from the vast

economic disparities between the haves

and the have-nots. In the countries of

Asia, where the overwhelming propor-tion of the population was dependenton land for livelihood, this disparityassumed the form of vast economic and

social distance between the landlords

and the tenants and between the land-

ed and the landless classes. The land

system was one of the main promotersof economic social injustice. Any ad-vance, therefore, towards a just econo-mic and social order, appeared incon-

ceiviable without a reorganisation of

the land system. The ruling elites wereaware that the idea of equality wasfast becoming part of the consciousnessof the exploited classes and that, con-sequently, an economic and social orderwvhich perpetuated social injusticewould not answer the needs of thetimes as it would not be tolerated bythe masses. What might result is socialtension and violent movements led

byextremist political forces. These werethe considerationswhich lay behind theemphasis placed by the ruling elites oneconomic development with social jus-tice. Land reform was regarded funda-mental to both economic developmentas well as social justice. Chapters onland reform in the Five Year Plans ofboth India and Pakistan show an iden-tity of outlook in respect of the impor-tance attached to land reform.

Lastly mention has also to be madeof the international factors which, in

addition to the internal compulsions,motivated the ruling,elites in India andPakistan as in rnany other Asian coun-tries in their commitment to land re-form. Interniationalpressure was exer-cised by various UN Agencies, whichtime and again impressed upon govern-ments in underdeveloped countries thenecessity of land reform. In fact, intoday's world a land reform programmeconstitutes one of the symbols of inter-national respectability.

In short, the compulsions and moti-vations underlying promise of agrarian

reformn y the ruling elites in India andPakistan are fundamentally similar. Itis important also to emphasise the re-semblance in the broad scope of landreform. In both countries, the generalcommitment to land reform finds con-crete expression in the programme for(1) the abolition of intermediary tenu-res, (2) tenancy reforms, (3) fixation ofceiling on agricultural holdings and (4)reorganisation of agriculture -icludingconsolidation of holdings, prevention offragmentation, development of serviceco-operatives, and limited promotion of

co-operative farms.The programme was intended to pro-

vide the basic framework of land re-form in India and Pakista n. Beforeevaluating the potential of this frame-work for promoting the desired changesin the agrarian structure, another com-mon feature of the approach of the rul-ing elites in both countries should behighlighted.

The crux of the land problem inboth India and Pakistan, as in manyother Asian countries, was the landconcentration in the hands of a mino-

rity of landlords who neither managednor cultivated their lands together with

the dissociation from land ownership ofthe vast mass of peasants who were theactual tillers of land. The fundamentalquestion of land policy was of remov-ing this discrepancy between ownership

of land and its actual cultivation. Theruling elites in both countries were of

the view that tenancy was not com-patible either with agricultural effi-ciency or with social justice, and thatit had therefore to be replaced by

owner-cultivation. But owner-cultivationcould be promoted in two different andopposite ways: by transforming actualtillers into owner-cultivators throughlarge-scale redistribution of landlord'slands among small peasants and labour-

ers, or by inducing the landlords them-selves to undertake cultivation throughhired labour instead through leasing out

of their lands to the tenants as was thepractice then. The first type of policy

would lead to the kind of land reformprogramme that has been implemented

in countries like Mainland China afterthe communist victory and in Taiwanand Japan under American occupationafter the Second World War. The se-cond choice would lead to a type ofagrarian transformation resembling the

English Enclosures during the eighteenthcentury or resembling Prussian Junke-rism in the nineteenth century.'

RULING ELITES

It is important to note that the frame-work of policy adopted by the rulingelites both in India and Pakistan

favoured neither of these two courses:neither wholesale exporpriationof land-lordism in the interests of peasant

ownership nor expropriation of tenant

cultivators in the interests of large-scalecultivation by former landlords. In-

stead, the power-elite in both countries

favoured a middle course, reconcilingthe interests of landlords with those ofthe tenants. In other words, it favour-ed a policy of curtailing (not eliminat-

ing) landlordism and of promoting con-version of non-cultivating landlordsinto cultivating landlords. So far as the

peasants were concerned, it favoured apolicy of upgrading the upper layer of

tenants, and of giving some relief to

other tenants. Here then was a policyof promoting a class of owner-culti-vators both from among the former

landlords anld from among the tenant

classes. This was expected to providethe social framework for economic

development and for social and politi-cal stability.

This was the basic orientation of the

land policy laid down in the Five Year

Plans of both India and Pakistan. It

must be emphasised that this policy-framework was sufficiently broad to

A-147







Review of Agriculture December 1970 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

permit both a relatively more radical

or a more conservative direction, a more

tenant-oriented or a more landlord-ori-

ented direction, to ar, agrarian reform

programme, as and when dictated by

the exigencies of a situation.

It may and should be asked why, in

predominantly peasant countrieslike

India and Pakistan, the ruling elites

did not favour a course of thorough-go-

ing agrarian transformation of the

Japanese or the Taiwan type which

held promise of maximum gain to the

peasantry. To raise this question is to

raise the fundamental issue of the ag-

rarian class structure and its determin-

ing influence on the structure of the

ruling elites in India and Pakistan. It

raises the issue of the balance of poli-

tical forces in both these countries. One

of the important scholars on land re-

form in Asia, Hung-Chao Tai,has

suggested that the character of the land

reform programme in the developing

countries is determined by the charac-

ter of the power-elites - more speci-

fically, by "the relation between the

elites and the landed class".2 He has

classified power-elites into two broad

types, viz, the 'separated' and the 'co-

operative'. In the case of the former

the 'separation'of the power-elite from

the landed class enables them to act

more vigorously against the powerful

landed class and in favour of the ten-

antry.In the case of the 'co-operative'

elites, however, the scope of such ini-

tiative against the landed interests and

in favour of the tenants is restricted.

The check on freedom of action of the

power-elites results in a compromise of

the tenant interests and in concessions

to the landed class in the formulation

and implementation of land policy. Co-

operative elites again are subdivided

into two types, the 'dominant' and the

'conciliatory',the 'dominant' elites being

less dependent on the landed class than

the 'conciliatory' elites. The latter

naturally are much more status-quo-

oriented than the former who while

they concessions to the landed class are

not totally identified with it.

Hung Chao-Tai has characterised the

power-elites of both India and Pakistan

as 'co-operative' elites of the 'dominant'

type which stand midway between the

wholly 'separated' and the wholly 'con-

ciliatory'types of elites. The land policy

sponsored by these elites also stands

midway between the wholly radical and

the wholly conservative types of land

policy. In other words, the separation

ofthe elites from the landed classes

in India and Pakistan had not proceed-

ed to such an extent as to permit *a

drastic redistribution of land in favour

of the landless classes. Nor, on the

other hand, were the power-elites in

these two countries iden.iticalwith the

landed class. Enjoying limited inde-

pendence from the landed class, the

elites projected themselves as the, pro-moters of a cautious policy benefiting all

sections of society includiingthe tenants.The separation of the power-elites from

the landed class is expressed in their

resolve to curtail the la-ad monopoly

and the social and political priv4legesof the landlord class. But the absence

of total separation is expressed in the

numerous compromises and concessions

to landlords - above all, in the rejec-

tion of the proposal for drastic redistri-

bution of land.Hung Chao-Tai's analysis provides

only a partial but niot an adequate ex-

planation for the middle-of-the-road

character of land policy in India andPakistan. Its fundamental inadequacy

lies in the failure to identify the class

basis of land policy. The interests of

which economic class does this policy

represent, is the fundamental question

left unanswered by Hung Chao-Tai.

Underlying his analysis is the oversim-

plified view of an agrarian society,

characterised by sharp polarisation of

the landed and the landless classes.

In fact, however, in India and Pak-

istan, neither the landlords nor the te-

nants constituted such monolothic

groups. Further, between big landlords

on the one hand and the poor tenants

and labourers on the other, there ex-

isted intermediate strata of resident

under-proprietorsand superior tenants

who, though they suffered under the

old land system, were relatively better-

off than the small tenants, tenants-at-

will and agricultural labourers. This

intermnediate lass was opposed to the

continuance of the feudal land system

- but not to the principle of large

landownership. It aspired to be free

from the control of big landlords and

to join the privileged class of indepen-dent proprietors. Its attitude towards

the old landed class was therefore am-

bivalent.This intermediate class made a joint

front with the rural poor to oppose the

feudal burdens imposed by the land-

lord class. But it then made common

cause with the landlords in order to op-

pose any interpretation of land reform

which might mean redistributionof land

in favour of the rural poor. This then

was the attitude of an emerging landed

class which was keen to oust the feudal

landed class from its position of unques-tioned dominance. The existence of

this dynamic group provided the social

or class motivation for the unique mid-

dle-of-the-road type of policy in India

a adPakistan. In other words, the con

flict between the old landed class and

the dynamic intermediate class found its

reflction in the battle of ideas relating

to alternativepaths of agrarianreorgani-

sation. It should also be emphasisedthat neither in the pre-independence

period nor after Independence was there

a clear demarcation or articulation of

the interests of the rural poor - either

at the level of political elite formation

or at the intellectual level of crystallisa-

tion of an economic model based on the

interests of the rural poor.

In respect of both India and Pak-

istan, however, a clear distinction

should be drawn between the ideology

of la-adreform on the one hand and the

programmeof land reform on the other,

The ideology of land reform is general-ly anti-landlord and represents an arti-

culation of general peasant interest. The

ruling elites speak of the interests of the

entire peasantry. But the programnie

of land reform serves primarilythe inte-

rests of the superior tenants and pea-

sant proprietors rather than the inte-

rests of the rural poor.

It should be pointed out here that,

at the time of independence, the Indian

power-elite emerged as a representatVve

of the dynamic intermediate groups to

a much greater extent than did the

power-elite ini Pakistan which reflected

the dominant position of the old landed

class. The contrast between the twvo

power elites is fully corroborated by

the relatively more radical land reform

proposals of the Congress Agrarian Re-

forms Committee (1949) compared to

the recommendations of the Agrarian

Committee of the Pakistan Muslim

League (1949). In fact, to use again

Hung Chao-Tai's typology, the Pakistan

Muslim League appears more an elite

of the 'conciliatory-co-operative'type

than of the 'dominant-co-operative'

type.The change in the character of the

Pakistan power-elite from the 'concilia-

tory-co-operative' to the 'dominant-co-

operative' type occurred with the mili-

tary take-over and the installation of

the Ayub Khan regime. This is a de-

velopment emphasised not only by Pak-

istan scholars an land reform but also

by others outside Pakistan. In an im-

portant paper, Mushtaq Ahmad, a Pak-

istan scholar, emphasises this differenc%

between the old and the new power-

elites. Ahmad's characterisation of the

new elite as being completely indepen-dent of the landlord class is highly ex-

A-148







aggerated, but the ide'atificationof this

divergence between the two elites is

important.3

Hung-Chao Tai has also emphasised

the limited independence of the AyulKhan regime from the old landed class.

Similarly, Myrdal has pointed out that

"the upper class statujs of those who

stepped into power was even more`pro-

nounced in Pakistan than in India and

was weighted heavily towards the land-

lord class".4Also, that "the politics pur-

sued in Pakistan during its first decade

of independence was thoroughly inimi-

cal to social change.. .".5 In contrast

to the parliamentary regime the new

regime following the military take-over,

"publicly endorsed the whole aamut of

modernisation deals, including the need

for planning, greater equality in distri-

bution of wealth, the liquidation of feu-

dalism... ". Further, it tried "to work

with commendable speed and relativefreedom from the pressure of special

vested interests". More importantly,

"the problem of land reform in West

Pakistan was also taken up promptly

and its general lines were decreed by

January 1959. As later carried out, thereform was anything but drastic or ra-

dical . .. But the parliamentary regimehad never tackled land reform at all,

and, however mild the present govern-

ment's programme, it may serve as a

beginning for more effective reform in

th& future".7

The emphasis by Hung Chao-Tai any(

Myrdal on the limited independence ofthe Ayub Khan regime from the land-

lords is, no doubt, justified. But, again,

the class basis and class orientation of

the Ayub regime remains unexplained.In our view, the land policy of the Avulb

regime was oriented more towards the

dynamic intermediategroups of mediuim

landlords and superior tenants-in sharp

contrast to the policy of the earlier re-

gimes vhich favoured the big landlords.

In short, that change of political regimesin Pakistanrepresented the shifting class

basis of the power structuire,from lig

landlords to medium landowners andsuperior tenants. It signified the poli-

tical assertion of the classes interme-

diate between the big landlords and the

rural poor against the unquestio-nedpo-

litical dominance of the big feuidal

landed class. It represented the un-

folting of the same political processes

that had occurred irn India, thoughwith a considerable time-lag.

The attempt so far has been to relate

the middle-of-the-roadcharacter of land

policy in India aud Pakistan since inde-

pendence to the class character of the

power-elites,more specifically to the

contending pressures of the old landedlclass and of the dynamic intermediate

groups. Another factor closely relatedto this interaction of the class structure

and the ruling elite structure is the

overall balance of political forces in

these countries. This is -a point that has

been greatly emphasised by many

perceptive analysts of land reform in

underdeveloped countries. Doreen War-riner has stated that "the balance of

political power in each country will

dleterminethe extent of reform."8Simi-

larly, from a survey of land reform in

Asia, Wolf Ladejinsky has drawn the

conclusion that "the content and imple-

men;ttion of agrarian reform are a

reflectionof a particular political balance

of forfcesin a country".9

Ladejinsky shows how, in Taiwan

and Japa-a,"both the forces which were

created as a result of the war favoured

a drastic agrarianreform and a redistri-

bution of income and social and politi-

cal power". Further, the balance of

political forces in these countries wasclearly in favour of reforms which

"were not designed to satisfy the claims

of both contending parties" as in India

and Pakistan. In fact, "the tenant wasto gain at the expense of the landlord".

According to Ladejinsky, one of the

crucial factors determining the absence

of a political balauce favourable to re-forms of the Japanese type, in countries

like India and Pakistan, wNas he weak-

ness of the peasantry as a political

force. Thus, Ladejinsky explains that

"the peasants themselves while discon-

terited have not developed a movement,whether in the form of tenant-u.lions,

like those of Japan before the reforms,

or peasant political parties, like those

of Eastern Europe after the First World

War.... For the most part, the peasantsI)ehaved as if any change in their

condition depended upon somebody

else. By their apathy they disprovedthe reasonable assumption that in an

agricultural country a government must

have peasant support. The fact is that

the niational anid State legislatures in

Asia do niot represent the initerests ofthe peasantry; if they did, reform might

have taken a different character alto-

gether. The reality is that even when

voting is free the peasantry in Asia is

not yet voting its own interests.""'

[Emphasis added].

This weakness of the peasantry as a

political force capable of exerting ad-

equate pressure on political parties and

governments for reforms in their favour

is reported by scholars as a character-

istic common to political systems of

both democratic or authoritariantypes.Doreen Warriner's study of land re-

forms also presents a similar view. 11She has also drawn attentiota o the lackof genuine support from other articulate

classes in countrites ike India and Pak-

istan to the question of agrarianreform 12

Here again the analysis offered by

Ladejinsky and Warriner s only partial-ly correct insofr as it throws light

onvlhe lack of political articulation and

organisation of the ruling poor in India

and Pakistan. The weight attached to

this factor in explainingthe absence of

the Japanese-type land reforms is

also justified. But this analysis is in-

complete, and even defective, insofar

as it is based on an oversimplifiedview

of the class relations and the power

structure in these countries. This

analysis does not take into account the

existence of intermediate classes be-

tween the two extremes of the big

landlords and the rural poor. Nor does

it take account of the resilient middle-

of-the-road (as against the two extremes

of the Right wing and the Left wing)

political forces. This 'middle force

articulated and championed the interests

of the intermediate classes in the name

of the general interests of all the op-pressed classes in the rural areas. As a

result, this analysis presents a generally

negative rather than an objective view

of the land reform policy in India and

Pakistan.

Considered from the standpoint of

the rural poor, the land policy ended

up by and large in a fiasco. But consi-

dered from the standpoint of the inter-

mediate classes, it was a positive suc-

cess and was even a promoterof changefrom an economic and political system

dominated by feudal landlords to

another system dominated by the inter-

mediate classes. Doreen Warrineris not

entirely correct in her statement on the

absence of agrarian unrest or peasant

movements i, India and Pakistan. As

indicated earlier, the rural scene at the

time of independence was in fact cha-

racterised by a general crisis of the

old agrarian system and by widespread

peasant discontent. The discontent,however, did not become the basis of

a peasant movement clearly based on

the interests of the rural poor. On the

contrary, it was skilfully exploited by

the political elites, representing the in-

terests of the intermediate classes, to

make only such demands on the old

landlord class as would yield maximum

benefits for the intermediate classes

themselves rather than for the rural

poor.The class bias of the power-elites

and the nature of power balances in

India and Pakistan discussed above

may thus be said to be important fac-

tors determining he class content ofagrarian reform programmes. The mostimportant characteristics of these pro-

A-149







grammes thus were (1) that they did

not seek to attack land concentration butonly to modify it and (2) that theysought to extend protection not to allthe classes of tenants but to certain

specified sections belonging to the up-per strata of the tenantry. This was in

marked contrast to the dominant ap-proach to land reform in Taiwan and

in Japan, attacking land monopoly and

giving primacy to the interests of alltillers of land.

Another feature (listinguishing theapproach in India and Pakistan fromthat of Japan and Taiwan pertained tothe methods and instruments of enforc-on the enforcement side were twofold.on the enforcement side wvere wo-fold.In Japan and Taiwan "the reformersrecognised not only that the cultivators

had to be made aware of the essenceof the main provisions, but that they -

and only they - had to be the trueimplementors of the reform if it were

to succeed. This attitude led to the

creation of a practical enforcementagency, the local land commissions -

so far shunned by all the other countriesengaged in reforim save Taiwan.'3 InIndia and Pakistan, on the other hand,the enforcement of land reform wasassigned to the normal administrativeagencies of government, without any

time-bound programmes and withoutany obligation on their part to associate

tje peasants with the process of reformimplementation.

The second distinguishing feature ofland reform enforcement in Japan andTaiwan was the readiness of the rulingelites "to use all instruments of govern-ment to attain their goal".'4 In fact,". . .landlords in these countries knew

that overt opposition would have metwith drastic punishment"." But the

situation in India and Pakistan was dif-

ferent. Here, neither peasant mobilisa-tion inor "government coercion whether

practised or clearly threatened" occu-

pied a significant place in the strategyof reform enforcement, though Indiahad a 'parliamentary democratic sys-tem' and Pakistan a 'military regime'.In fact, commitnent to 'peaceful' chan-

ge-over without exercise of coercion

against the lauded class, was common

to the approach adopted in both re-

gimes.Thus, notwithstanding the dissimila-

rity in the character of political re-

gimnes he liberal approach towards the

landed class in both countries amplyjustifies the characterisation of bothIndia and Pakistan, a la Myrdal, as'soft states.'.6 In short, in the courseof reform enforcement the State govern-ments in India and Pakistan, unlikethose in Taiwan and Japan, were not

preparedto decisivelyinterposethem-selves for the enforcement f the rightsof the weakerparty (i e, the peasants)against the machinationand pressureof the stronger arty(i e, the landlords).What made the situation worse fromthe point of the peasantrywas that,while govemments n both countrieswere not prepared o use the instru-ments of authority or preventing the

violationof land laws by the landlords,they were prepared o use all the in-strumentsof coercion and force forsuppressingprotest movementsby thepeasantrywhenever he peasantry riedto stand up for its right. The 'softstate' thus tended to act as a 'strongstate' as reflected n their lack of sym-pathy and in ruthlessnessowardspea-sants protests and agitations.

Takingan overallview, the approachof the power elites both in India andPakistan o the problemof land reformthus suffered from serious inconsisten-cies. While, at the level of enunciatingthe general principles, he power-elitesemphasisethe incompatibility f thetraditionalanded class with the de-mandsof economicdevelopment nd ofsocial justice and political stability,atthe level of concretising he actual re-form programmeshey adopt the poli-cy of balancing the interests of thepeasantry with those of the landedclass.In lying downmethodsof enforc-ing land reforms, oo, they show a re-luctanceto decisivelyintervene in fa-vour of the weak as againstthe strong.They show a naive faith in 'peaceful'methods and 'peaceful change-over'.This inconsistency between 'diagnosis'of the land problemon the one handand the 'operational strategy' or ie-formion the other is inherentin theapproachof the ruling elites in bothcountries. It is not difficult o identifythis inconsistencyn all major reportsof officialcommissions nd committees.Reference an be made in this respectto the UP Zamindari AbolitionCom-mitteeReport 1948)for India,and theWest PakistanLand ReformCommis-

sion Report(1959) for Pakistan.The UP Zamindari AbolitionCom-

mittee Report, in its analytical parts,builds up a formidablecase againstlandlordismand then concludesthat"no solutionwithin the existingframe-workof the land systembeing possible,the landlord must go" 17 Further it

emphasises hat ". . the systemneedscompleteoverhauling.Any attemptonourpartto tinkerwith the problemandsuggest changeshere and there in thesuperstructure is bound to fail"'.18 Inthe next part of the report, however,dealing with recommendations, it pro-poses "modifications"rather than "corn-

plete overhaulin/' of the system. It

recommends the retention of Sir and

Khudkasht lands by the landlords. It

opposes not only redistribution of these

lands but also imposition of a ceiling on

these lands held by landlords. In the

opinion of the Committee, "the results

achieved by redistribution of land

would not be commensurate with the

discontent and hardships resulting from

it. We, therefore, recomnmend hat nolimit be placed wn the maximum area

held in cultivation'either by a landlord

or a tenant.19

Similarly, the West Pakista- Land

Reform Commission presents an insight-

ful analysis of the major defects of

'large estates' from the point of view

of both developmental requirements as

well as of social justice. It makes out a

case for ceilings by emphasising the

unproductive character of large holding

and the productive potentialities of

redibution in favour of small far-

mers.20 While making concrete recom-

mendations, however, it proposes the

fixation of ceilings on land at so high

a level as to reduce land redistribution

into a symbolic gesture rather than

make it into a substantial measure.

Having emphasised in its analytical part

the hardships and injustices to which

the peasants have been exposed under

the overall domination of the landlord,

the Commission recommends in the

operative part that the process of change

should be 'smooth' and "should not in-

volve for the landlord too abrupt a

break with the past making it difficult

for him to adjust to a new way of life

which the change, in the form of a

sudden reduction of income from land,

will impose on him".2' This plea for

caution on the part of elites, both in

India and Pakistan, has been interpret-

ed by Warriner as a reflection-of "the

pressures to compromise".

There is thus a clear inconsistency

between the ideology of the power eli-

tes which, proclaims the objective of

'land to the tiller' and the programme

which provides for land rights for the

only upper section of the peasantry.Ana-

lysts of land reform in India and Pa-

kistan have either not taken ,note of

this inconsistency or have dismiss-

ed this phenomenon as a reflection of

surrender to the landed class by the

power-elites. This inconsistency assumes

definsite ignificance if one interprets it

as a reflection of the dual role of the

intermediate classes of the rural society

and of the power-elites, championing

the interests of these classes. As indi-

cated earlier, these classes try to rally

the entire peasantry behind them under

the slogan of land to the tiller in orderto oust the old landed class from its

A-151







dominant position in the land and power

structure, and then, having broken theland and power monopoly of the oldlanded class, they try to dilute the'land to the tiller' policy into an agra-rian programme suited to their own li-

mited class aims. The anti-landlordbiassoon gives way to compromise with thelandlords for common opposition to anyradical programme of 'land to the tiller'

oriented to the interests of the rural

poor.A general survey of land reform po-

licy and programmes in India and

Pakistan during the two decades afterIndependence therefore suggests that:

(1) The social motivation for agra-rian policy in India and Pakistan was

provided by the contending pressures ofthe erstwhile semi-feudal landlords on

the one hand and the emerging class ofmedium landowners and superior ten-

ants on the other.(2) Within this common frame, the

variations between India and Pakistanwere determined by the relatively grea-ter pull of the old landed class in Pa-

kistan and of the upper layer of the

peasantry in India.

(8) In both countries the rural poorwere neither articulate nor organisedat the political level to exercise influ-

ence on the land reformn policy and

programme in their favour either at

the stage of legislation or of imple-

mentation.

(4) The impact of land reform hasbeen positive for the intermediate clas-ses which have been upgraded andpushed into a position of* prominenceboth in the land and power structure.On the other hand, the impact has

been by and large negative for the ru-ral poor. It has been mainly instrument-

al in disturbing the old frameworkwithin which the rural poor had somesecurity without creating for them al-ternative forms of security.

Against this background, increasingdiscontent of the rural poor provides theclass motivation for a new type of landreform in the coming phase. This is to

be distinguished from the pressure ofthe intermediate classes which originallyprovided the social stimulus as well as

the limits of land reform during the lasttwo decades. In the new context, the

scope as well as the powerful impedi-ments to implementing a radical land

reform deserve attention. The fast-in-

creasing politicisation of the rural pooris making them deeply dissatisfied with,and intolerant of, their continuing de-

privation. On the other hand, any bold

initiative in the interests of the poor has

to reckon now with the formidable

economic power of the new landed

class and the ramificationsof this power

in the political sphere.The resolution of these contradictory

pulls is the mnost ormidable challenge

confronting political elites in the com-

ing years.

Notes

1 See, Mogens Boserup, 'AgrarianStructure and Take-Off' in "TheEconomics of Take-Off iuto Self-Sustained Growth", W W Rostow(ed); 1963; pp 201-24.

2 Hung-Chao Tai, 'The PoliticalProcess of Land Reform: A Com-parative Study', Civilisations, Vo-lume XVIII, No 1, 1968.

3 Mushtaq Ahmad, 'Land Reform iunPakistan',PakistanHorizon, VolumeXII, No 1, March 1959.

4 Gunnar Myrdal, "Asian Drama",Volume I, p 311.

5 Ibid, p 315.

6 Ibid, pp 327-8

7 Ibid, p 329.

8 Doreen Warriner, "Land Reformin Principle and Practice", p 15.

9 Wolf Ladejinsky, 'Agrarian Reform

in Asia', Foreign Affairs, April 1964p 456.

10 Ibid, p 456.11 Doreen Warriuier,op cit, p 14.12 Ibid, p 58.13 Wolf Ladejirsky, p 457.14and 15 Ibid, p 459.16 Myrdal, op cit, p 66 and pp 895-

900.17 and 18 UP Z A C Report, Volume

I, 1948, p 357.19 Ibid, p 389.20 and 21 Land Reforms Commission,

West Pakistan, pp 12-15.

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Land Reform in India and Pakistan