Land Set Aside: Is It Food Security?

Land Set Aside: Is It Food Security?’

Richard Gray and Brian Paddock

Assistant Professor, University of Saskatchewan, and Economic Policy Analysis and Innovation, Agriculture Canada, respectively

Land set aside programs can provide substantial economic benejts in distorted agricultural markets. Their incidence of use is increasing in the US, Canada and particularly in the EC. Voluntary annualprograms have a small negative impact on short run foodsecurity while more permanent programs have slightly larger effects. The long run impact on food security is determined by whether the program leads to soil conservation or not. Most set aside programs used in Canada, the US and EC have some negative implications for food security. A well designed set aside can enhance long term food security with a limited effT’ct short run food security.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Twenty years ago D. Gale Johnson (1973) suggested the world agricultural policy was “in disarray”. Surprisingly, little has changed since then. There are still people starving in the world whle some countries are exploiting non-renewable resources to produce grain and sell the products in the market at prices well below the cost of production Governments and consumers in OECD countries are spend- ing well over 100 billion dollars per year on agricultuxal subsi&es that support agricultural production well in excess of their own domestic needs and well beyond the point that can be economically justdied. Meanwhile, devel- oping countries, which have been subject to food shortages, continue to tax agriculture, or provide heavily subsidized food in competi- tion to locally grown products to meet nutri- tional objectives. Some countries, most notably New Zealand and Australia, have moved toward liberal economic policies, but tlus has left producers to compete in markets dominated by subsidies.

Real grain prices continue to be at record low levels. Yet subsidies encourage producers to use resources to produce grain in order to continue to receive large subsidies. Many studies have shown subsidization creates a situation where the export price of grain is well below the margnal cost of production

( e g Schmitz, A., D. Sigurdson, and D. Doer- ing, (1986)l. Some Canadian studies have taken this argument one step further to show that, given the subsidized structure of the in- dustry, policy changes that would take the land out of production could lead to net economic benefits to the country [Gray and Fur- tan (1991), Guzel, Furtan and Gray (1992), Perlich and Gray (1992)l.

Many countries have adopted land set aside policies that remove land from agricultural production. The recent Blair House Accord (November 20,1992) between the EC and the US contains a provision for a 15% acreage set aside for large producers in the EC. The US has a large Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and annual Acreage Reduction Pro- grams (ARP) that remove 60 million acres from production annually. In Canada, the Per- manent Cover Program (PCP) removes just over 1 million acres from annual crop production and the North American Waterfowl Man- agement Plan has secured agricultural land for waterfowl habitat.

Despite the widespread use and obvious economic gains created by policies that reduce grain production in developed countries, these policies remain a hotly debated topic for two reasons. First of all, there is an issue of compensation Although policy reform creates a potential for Pareto improvement it is difficult

Can. J. Agric. Econ. 41.441-451. 441

442 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

to design a policy where at least some groups do not lose from the policy change. In particular, input suppliers and grain handing compa- nies may experience income losses with reduced grain production These potential los- ers argue against these policies. The second source for opposition to policy reform, is the whole issue of food security. Opponents to land set asides suggest that any measure that Educes grain production is unacceptable from a global perspective given there are starving people in the world.

The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of land set asides in developed countries on global food security. It is obvious that in the short run removing productive resources from food production will reduce the availability of food in the world. The long run impacts of such policies are less clear. These resources can, to some extent, be held in resewe for a time when additional food producing capacity is required to feed the hungry world. In particular, we analyze how the design of policies that remove land from grain production can effect the capacity to produce in thc future.

The paper begins by describing the short run cconomic benefits from land set asides in Section 2.0. Section 3.0 discusses the economic measures of food security defined in a dynamic context under production uncertainty. Section 4.0 outlines the effect of land set sides on supply response. Section 5.0 uses t lus framework to analyze the effect of alter- native set aside policies on food security in- cluding the predominant land set aside policies in Canada, the US, and proposed policies for the EC. Finally, Section 6.0 of the paper draws conclusions from the analysis.

2.0 THE SHORT RUN ECONOMXC BENEFITS FROM LAND SET ASIDES

Economic theory suggests that producers are profit maximizing when the marginal cost of the last unit they produce is just equal to the price. If subsidies increase the price of food above its market value, then the cost of marginal bushels will also be above the market value. In the current period of very low real

grain prices governments in developed countries have responded to low agricultural income by subsidizing grain production far above its market value. Far more resources are in the production and transportation of g m n than it was worth in the world market. f i s process has a negative value-added and de- stroys wealth in these economies. In h s situation removing agricultural land from production can increase the wealth of a nation

Several studies have estimated the average economic gains from land set asides within the distorted Canadian gmns sector. Guzcl, Fur- tan and Gray (1 992) use a CGE model of the Canadian economy to show that an acre of land taken out of the brown soil zone will save the economy $25 per year in economic losses. Gray and Furtan (1 99 1) demonstrate that the gains from trade in wheat for Canada are negative and show that a set aside program can produce gains for the economy. Perlich and Gray (1992) show the Permanent Cover Pro- gram, which pays producers in Saskatchewan to place grain land in a permanent cover crop, has a BenefitKOst ratio exceeding 3/1 over a wide range of assumptions. Finally, Gray and Sulewski (1992) show that the permanent re- moval of land from agricultural production for the purpose of waterfowl habitat saves enough in agricultural subsidies to fund the program.

Many US studies have also identified gains from land set aside. An early study by Floyd (1965) examines the distributional effects of compulsory set aside on farm income and on the demand for other farm inputs. He demon- strated that acreage controls will always result in higher product prices and hgher land val- ues. Furthermore, Floyd concluded that for US agriculture, acreage controls actually increased the demand for labour, capital and other purchased inputs as cultivation intensi- fied on the remaining acreage.

The paper by Schmitz, Sigurdson, and Do- ering (1986) uses the concept of economic surplus to argue that the US grain sector is so distorted by farm policy that the exports from the grains sector are producing no gains from trade. It is interesting to note that in the years following the publication of the paper, the distortions in the grains sector have become

WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS 443

larger and world prices have become even lower suggesting that the gains from trade have remained negative.

The most comprehensive US study that examines land set asides by Hertel and Tsigas (1991) uses a general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy. They found that acreage controls would increase the return to land by 26.8 percent, however, the amount of farm labour and capital services employed in agriculture would decline. Ribaudo et. al., (1990) did a locational benefit analysis of the US Conser- vation Resewe Program (CRP). Positive impacts arising from the CRP found in this study include those affecting the atmosphere, ground and surface water, as well as wildlife habitat. Productivity effects are also evaluated. In all $10 billion worth of natural resource benefits accrue to society from the CRP. Unfortunately costs were not evaluated in the study.

From these studies in both Canada and the US one would have to draw a strong conclusion that land set asides can produce both economic and environmental benefit in the global trade situation of today. The issue of food security was not addressed in these studies. Land set asides will almost certainly affect food security, whch is a very important issue for mankind.

3.0 FOOD SECURITY

Defiiiion: Complete Global Food Security would exist i f it were certain that all the world S people had enough food to provide complete nutrition for today and all points in the future. Using th s definition it is very doubtful complete global food security will ever exist. Thus food security must be measured as a matter of degree. Some of the physical relationships between food and nutrition level place bounds on the measurement, but food security will remain an illusive and somewhat fuzzy concept. How much nutntion is adequate? Can we measure these levels in protein? In calories? The concept also is inherently dynamic. Even for an individual, one period of malnourish- ment could affect the well being of that indi-

vidual for a life time. Food security also involves inter-personal comparisons across society at point in time and across time. Finally, it involves uncertainty. How does one evalu- ate the Merence between a severe food shortage with a low probability to a more certain moderate food shortage.

Pragmatic Measures of Food Security The difficulties in describing and measuring food security does not mean as applied economists we should abandon any attempts to do so. There are two pnmary concepts in the notion of food security. The fmt notion is the “adequacy” of the food supply at a point in time. The second notion is “probability” that food supply will be “adequate” in the future. By separating food security into these two notions we may be able to crudely assess the effect of land set asides on food security.

‘Ydequacy ” o ffood supply Economists measure scarcity in terms of rela- tive prices. Thus, as scarcity of a good increases, the price of the good increases meaning that society is willing to offer more of each other good in exchange for the scarce item. A somewhat inadequate but pragmatic approach may be to measure welfare as a continuous decreasing function of the price of food. By defining food scarcity in terms of food prices we are measuring food scarcity in a very crude global sense.2 Using this measure, reduced availability would result in a higher price of food. The price level would reflect the degree of food shortage. It may not be question of whether a set of policies leads to famine but it may be a question of degree; degree being measured in terms of price level.

The “security ”of thesood supply The other component of food security is the “probability” that food supply will be adequate in the future. Or, put another way, the food security is a large probability that food prices will not rise to extremely high levels.

This probability cannot be fully captured in expected future prices. Unanticipated changes in weather and climate and the economic en-


vironment on the agricultural sector can change prices from anticipated levels. For in- stance, suppose with anticipated technologi- cal improvements and anticipated demand increases real food prices will continue to decline. To draw a conclusion from the analysis that food security is not a problem is a quantum leap in faith. Forecasts will inevita- bility be in e m r (particularly when they are about the future). At tius time we know very little about the potential of the greenhouse effect or the future demand for food in the lesser developed countries. How then is it possible to make projections witha reasonable confidence interval? Furthermore, suppose technology, climate and demand was not changing over time. Is it possible to rule out 5 years of very poor world weather conditions that could threaten food security? The ability to deal of the food production system to deal with unanticipated shocks, rather than being on thc pcriphcry of the issue of food security, are central to the whole concept. If the probability of a disaster (high food prices) is to be reduced perhaps a process that can respond to anticipated changes is of more value than any given plan for future food production.

Storage, Production Flexibility and Food

The economic system has several mechanisms that allow it to respond to food shortages. Storage and flexibility of production are important components of food security. The ability of the economic system to respond to food shortage with increased production will deter- mine to some extent the severity of food shortage. Transitory shocks in food production can to some extent be dealt with through grain storage. If favourable weather increases yields, stocks will increase, limiting the price drop. With adverse weather stocks are drawn down to limit price increases. But, as with any commodity storage there is finite possibility of a ‘stock out’ or a stock shortage when stocks no longer smooth prices. This stock out phenomena creates long periods of low stable

ble prices, (Wright and Williams, 1984).

Security

prices followed by Short period of high un~ta-

Storage alone is not sufficient to provide price stability particularly, if the unanticipated changes in the environment are permanent in nature. Many changes such as population growth, technology changes, environmental changes have tlus permanent effect. If the shocks are permanent in nature, or there has been several transitory shocks in the same d~rection, the agricultural system must respond with greater output and less consumption to avoid hsaster. This ability to respond to the level of scarcity is a natural part of the economic system. In the light of scarcity, or a food price increase, consumers will substitute away from consumption and producers will apply more inputs and adopt new technologies to expand production. Because of its nature, the elasticity of demand for food is small, limiting the ability of consumers to reduce demand with hgh prices. The production response to higher prices, i.e. supply elasticity may therefore be a more relevant indicator of food security. The ability of producers to respond to price increases is to a large extent a function of the technologies and inputs they have at their disposal and their incentives to respond.

4.0 ESTIMATING SUPPLY RESPONSE

It is not necessary to build a complex economic model to describe the effect of land set side on supply. Economic theory tells us that if producers are profit maximixrs that use land as an input in production, supply will be an increasing function of price of food, and thc availability of land. A reduction in the quantity of land available for production will lead to reduction in production for any given price level. If land in one region (e.g. the developed countries) is removed from production, supply will decrease and price will increase. In- creased supply from other countries will offset some of this effect but the net result must be lugher prices and less quantity being pro- d ~ c e d . ~ An increase in the price for any given amount of land will result in a production increase. This simple economic behaviour of producers allows us to develop some straight foward propositions regarding the effect of


land set asides on both short and long run food security. Short run effects are those effects that take place within the first few years that a set aside is in place. The long run effects deal with more distant time periods.

Permanent Set Asides If participation in a set side program results in the permanent retirement of land from food th~s land is not available for food production at any price. This is obviously an extreme form of a land set aside. Th~s might occur in cases where land is set aside for wildlife pur- poses or for urban development.

Proposition 1: Permanent land set asides reduce short term and long term food security. This proposition falls directly from the notion that removing a productive input such as land from food production will mean that pmduc- ers will produce less food for any given price level. The effects of these permanent land set asides are illustrated in Figure 1. The long term effects are some what smaller but similar to short run effects because these resources are permanently removed from production. Obvi- ously even if the set aside is for some fixed term the effect on the short run will be to

reduce production for the period of the contract.

Flexible Land Set Asides Most land set aside programs are either of- fered on an annual basis or have contract of a specific length. In these program the land resource will enter and exit the land set aside program as a function of the price or the re- turns available from producing food versus the return from participating in the program. Gray et. al. 1993 show that under price uncertainty the producer facing some fixed cost for entering and exiting the program will have a range of food prices where it neither pays to enter or exit the program. Above some price of food the producer will exit the set aside program and grow grain, however at a low enough grain price, the producer will partici- pate in the set aside.

Under this scheme the land that is removed from production at lower food prices will be brought back into food production during hgh food prices.

Proposition 2: viand can re-enter production at higher prices set asides have limited negative effect on short term food security.

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As shown in Figure 3 if producers have the option to opt out of the set aside program at tugh price level, the short run productive capacity is only affected at lower prices and is

the same as the unrestricted supply curve at higher prices.


Proposition 3: Ifthe land set aside can re-enter production land conserving set asides enhance long term food security,

Proposition 4: Ifthe land set asides can re-enter production land depleting set asides reduce long term food security. In the long run the quality of the land that is removed from production becomes important. If the land is conserved by placing it in the set aside program this increases the resource that can be brought back into production at hgher prices. Tlus new supply curve is represented as line S” S” in Figure 3. If the set aside accelerates the deterioration of the land base the long run supply curve will shift in through- out its entire range, jeopardizing food security.

Proposition 5: The private sector will respond to oflyet some of the production efects of land set asides on food security, If set asides increase prices in the short run, then other producers responding to the price increase will offset some but not all of tlus price effect. Similarly, if land set asides improve food security the private sector will place less value on those actions that allows them to respond to price increases and therefore they will invest less in these activities. Thus the overall impact of land set asides on food security is likely to be small.

5.0 EXISTING LAND SET ASIDE PROGRAMS AND FOOD SECURITY

There arc many designs for land set aside policies in place in the developed world that can provide examples of how various policies effect both short and long run food security.

The US Acreage Reduction Program The US farm policy has used volunmy annual Acreage Reduction Programs for almost 30 years. This program requires that producers take grain land out of production and place in some conserving use for a growing season in order to be eligible to US farm support payments. In many years participants have received a small “diversion” payment per acre.

These programs have taken 5 to 25 % of the grain land out of production for most of the last twenty five years. This has reduced government outlays for price support and storage programs. In years when p n stocks are low, the set aside requirements are reduced. Th~s, combined with the voluntary nature of the program, would suggest that given Proposi- tion 2, these programs have a small effect on short run food security. In the long run these progmn may reduce food security. The “conserving use” that farmers practice often includes summerfallow, whch has a long run destructive effect on the soils.

The US Conservation Reserve Program During the early 1980’s the US introduced the Conservation Reserve Program. In b s program annual payments were made to producers to remove land for grain production for a ten year period. Participation was voluntary. In each county producers bid an amount they would be willing to accept to set their land aside in some conserving use for a fixed ten year period.

The CRP program reduces short run food security. The land could effectively be locked out of production even during a period of severe food shortage. Thus, the policy reduces short term food security. As shown in Table 1 the long run food security may be enhanced with this policy. The long run effects of ten years ina conserving use will certainly reduce any soil degradation and in most cases enhance soil quality. Thus after the ten year period of reserve the productive capacity of these soils will be enhanced.

The EC land Set Aside Policies The EC has had limited and recent history of land set asides. In the late 1980s the EC introduced a program of voluntary land set asides where producers were paid to convert grain land into some conserving use. Although the program was limited in scope and very costly per hectare removed, the program &d have some positive features for both short and long run food security,

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In the recent Blair House Accord the EC has agreed to implement set aside provisions for grains and oilseeds for the commercial farms in the EC. The accord requires that producers in excess of 20 hectares reduce seeded acres by 15% in order to be eligble to receive compensation payments from the EC Commission. The US is strongly pushing for rotational set asides that will require that each large producers set aside 15% of lus acres in each year and that the same acre cannot be set side more than once in a six year period. ' h s effectively means that the producers must use set aside as part of their cropping rotation.

' h s is a particularly ridiculous policy from an economic, environmental and food security perspective. The rotation set asides will lead to some form of fallow on the idled acres. This will not only increase yield in the subsequent year-leading to substantial yield slippage, but could also have dire environmental consequences. Adding fallow to high rainfall cropping systems will be destructive for the soils and will lead to the leaching of feItilizers and pesticides into the ground water and will lower soil quality. In the short run, this will do little to reduce production and perhaps have only small negative effect on food security. In the long run this is far more destructive. The decline in soil quality will further reduce productive capacity. Obviously a policy with thts many problems is likely to face continued opposition in the EC.

A much preferred option, that is being dis- cussed, is having a non-rotational set aside that would allow producers to keep the same parcel of land in set aside for many years. Producers will set aside their lowest profit acres. Although thts will lead to some slippage in the program these lower productive soils will tend to be soils more subject to degradation. This modification would reduce the re- verse long run environmental and food security consequences. Although this option make a great deal of sense it is currently being opposed by the US. This is because of their concern that if EC farmers set aside their worst acres they will not reduce production by nearly 15%. One could question this US logic if rotational set asides also have a large com-

ponent of slippage due to the introduction of fallow into the rotation.

The Canadian Permanent Cover Program The major conservation policy for the grains sector on the Prairies was the introduction of the 1935 Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act (PFRA). The PFRA was introduced in response to the severe &ought conditions in Mamtoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta in the 1930s. Its mandate was to remove some land from grain production and place it into pasture land as well as to :id farmers in the development of irrigation. This was the first time the Canadian government took direct action aimed at reducing acreage. While the acreage reduction was small, it nevertheless represented a major institutional development.

PFRA is still in place today. It is sdl in- volved with irrigation development but in 1984 the PFRA received the mandate to once again take farmland out of grain production and place the land under permanent cover. This program was called the Permanent Cover Program (PCP). The PCP pays producers to take marginal land out of grain production, (i.e., land at a high risk of erosion or saiiniza- tion, and place the land into forage or pasture production).

The PFRA determines which lands are eligble for PCP using various criteria. Canada Land IFventory maps have been used exten- sively. At a minimum class 5 and class 6 soils are eligible, any land of class 4 or better needs additional assessment before it is allowed into the PCP. As well, soil survey maps, aerial photographs, tax assessment information and crop insurance data, are used in identlfying eligible lands. Crop insurance ratings of M, 0, and P are targeted under the PCP. The pro- portion of eligible land required to be within a targeted parcel, and total acreage are both signifcant in determining eligibility under the PCP. Targeted lands must be at least 40 acres. Only legal subdivisions can be enroled. At least 50% of any subdivision must be targeted lands before it is eligible to parhcipate in the PCP. A cap of $64,000 per land owner has been set.

450 CANADIAN JOURNAL. OF AGRICIJLTURAL ECONOMICS

Money available to the farmer includes a $2O/acre preliminary payment, which is in- tended to offset the cost of seeding the targeted areas and a final payment, which is made to the farmer once the viability of the permanent crop has been venfied and a 10 or 20 year contract signed. Tbs contract, wluch includes an casement on the land title, binds the farmer to ensure maintenance of the permanent cover for thc specified time. It must be emphasized, h s does not mean that the land cannot be put to productive use (the American Conservation Reserve Program, CRP, discourages use of targeted lands in commercial activities). The contract only prohibits the farmer from plow- ing the permanent cover crop under and plant- ing annual crops.

In the original version of the program, a biddmg process was used to establish the final payment. The specified but unpublished amount that guaranteed acceptance into the program was 17% of the targeted land’s value and 35% for a 21 year contract. Under the current program no bidding takes place. Rather, a set final payment of $20 or $50/acre is made, for the 10 and 21 year contracts, respectively.

The economic benefits of the PCP are substantial. The very low cost of changing land use saves the government 3.5 dollars in agricultural subsidies for every dollar it invests in the program (Perlichand Gray, 1992). Despite these obvious benefits the PCP remains over subscribed and under funded. There is cur- rcntly no money allocated for the continuation of this program.

The short run effect of the PCP is to clearly reduce short run production. The land is locked out of production through the contract signed by the producer. Thus the Permanent Cover Program reduces short run food security, The long run effect of the PCP are clearly very positive for food security because the program focuses on highly erodible land that tends to be fallowed every other year. The soil conservation benefits from the program are considerable.

Optimal Program Design from a Food Se- curity Objective None of the major existing programs address long term long run food security without con- siderably reducing short run food security. By combining the desirable attributes of thcse programs it is possible to improve long run food security while having a limited impact on short term food security.

To limit the adverse effect on short run food security the program must allow voluntary participation on an annual basis such that when prices rise to food crisis levels, these resources can freely move back into the sector. From a long term perspective the most important determinant for food security is whether the set aside program conserves the land resource. For many soils, erosion, organic matter depletion, and problems related to excess soil moisture, reduce soil quality. The most conserving practice for most of these soils is apermanent cover of forage crop. One of most destructive practices is fallow. Set asides should be designed to promote permanent cover rather than fallow.

Taking these short and long run effects into account, an ideal land set aside program would be one where annual voluntary participation requires producers to place the land in a permanent forage cover. If prices were to increase the produces would have the flexibility to forgo the set aside payment in favor of crop income. As shown in Table 1, thts enhances long term food security with a limited but negative effect on short term food security.

6.0 CONCLUSIONS

Land set aside programs can provide substantial economic benefits in distorted agricultural markets. Their incidence of use is increasing in the US, Canada and particularly in the EC.

Voluntary annual programs have a small negative impact on short run food security while more permanent programs have slightly larger negative effects. The long run impact on food security is determined by whether the program leads to soil conservation or not. Most set aside programs in used in Canada, the US and EC have some negative implications

WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS 45 1

for food security. A well designed set aside can enhance long term food security with a limited effect short run food security.

NOTES 'A paper presented at the 1993 Annual CAEFMS Workshop on Agricultural Structural Change, M e monal University of Newfoundland, August 19 to 21,1993 2We are not suggesting that a low price of food would result in complete nutrition for the human population. Low incomes, wars and natural disas- ters are likely to cause famine at any price level. We only suggest that higher prices could lead to more famine.

freely in one direction then a geogrcphic redistri- bution of production can have an effect on food security. %ere are currently 915,209 ha. in community pastures held by PFRA. The Canada Land Inventory map classifies land

into six classes. Class 1 land is the highest quality and class 6 the lowest quality land. Any land below class 4 is considered marginal by soil scientists. k r o p insurance also rates land but on a much finer gnd than the Canada Land Inventory map. Crop insvrance classification starts at class A for the best soils and goes to class P for the lowest yielding.

3 I t ismportanttonotethatifproductsarenottraded . .

REFERENCES Floyd, J. E. 1965. The Effects of Farm Price Sup- ports on the Retums to Land and Labour in Agri- culture. Journal ofPolitica1 Economy 73: 148-1 58. Gray, R S. Policy and Tmde Analysis for The Canadian Wheat Sector. Agriculture Canada Working Paper, Forthcoming. Gray, R and H Furtan. 1991. Improving Gains from Trade in Wheat for the Canadian Economy.

in Improving Agricultuml Tmde Under the G A n , T. Becker, R. Gray and A. Schmitz eds., Springer

Gray. R S. and Travis Sulewski 1992. AnAnaly- sis of the Prairie Habitat Joint Venture Initiates on the Prairie Agricultuml Subsidy Requiremenb. A report prepared for the PHJV. GuzeJ, HA., Furtan, W. H and RS Gray, 1992. A Computable Geneml Equilibrium Model of the Canadian Economy: Application to Agricultuml and Environmental Policies. A Report Prepared for the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Adrmnistration. Hertel, T. W. and M. E. Tsigas. 1991. General Equilibrium Analysis of Supply Control in U.S. Agriculture. European Review ofAgricultum1 Eco- nomics 18: 167- 1 9 1. Johnson, D.G. 1973. WorldAgriculture in Disar- my. FontandColins, London. OECD. 1993. Agricultuml Policies, Markets and Trade and Monitoring and Outlook. Perlich, K. and R S. Gray, 1992. An Economic Analysis of the Permanent Cover Program in Sas- katchewan. A paper presented at the Erosion: Causes to Cures Conference, November 2,1992, Regina, Saskatchewan. Ribaudo, M. 0.. Colacicco, D., Langner, L L, Piper, S., and Schaible, G. D. 1990. Natuml Re- sources and [Jser Beneflt f i m the Conservation Reserve Program. (627). Resources and Technol- ogy Division, Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture. Schmitz, A, D. Sigurdson, and D. Doering, 1986. Domestic Farm Policy and the Gains from Trade. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68:

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Land Set Aside: Is It Food Security?