Latin America to 2020a UK Public Strategy Paper

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

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Latin America matters to theUK and the world. The entireprocess of globalisation meanswe are increasingly interlinked.And it is not only about mutualeconomic interests. Wheredemocracy takes hold, we allbenefit. Political stability is avital mutual interest. Wherestates or their institutions fail,

the first beneficiaries are the criminals, the narcotics andpeople traffickers that exploit the space and export theircrimes without regard to borders.

Not least, as more of us travel and enjoy the experience,culture in all its forms has a remarkable impact on theglobal community.

This is all very clear in Latin America. Just considersome examples. Brazil and Mexico are emerging worldpowers. The region has the largest energy reservesoutside the Middle East. The Amazon, a vast freshwater resource, is also the world's largest carbon sink.Brazil itself is the world's largest producer of sugar (andhence ethanol, a crucial clean fuel), soya, beef, chicken,coffee and iron ore. An estimated 65-70% of thecocaine on British streets comes from Colombia andover 40% of all cocaine in Britain comes throughVenezuela. Opportunities and threats demandinternational partnership.

The UK invests more than £11 billion a year in LatinAmerica, an expression of commitment and confidence.Indeed, the continent is in a better position than formany years. Democracy is well established andeconomic growth increasingly evident.

Yet there remains a lot to do to build on this success.Poor governance, insecurity, corruption and the task ofensuring everyone enjoys new wealth and opportunitieschallenge Latin American nations. Levels of violence andthe plight of street children, for example, make the restof the world cautious about Latin America's prospects.

And the tough and effective business communities of theregion also express caution. They observe thecompetition from other regions where growth andprogress are far faster. They are determined to competemore successfully; and the best want to do so fromsocially cohesive countries.

In preparing this paper, I had invaluable help in a seriesof seminars involving leading specialists from UKuniversities, think tanks and expert media commentators.We tested many propositions and challengedconventional thinking. The outcome, though, is theresponsibility of the FCO but that does not lessen mythanks.

My main conclusion is that momentum is critical. Moreprogress is essential if Latin America is not to lose whatit has so far gained. Current and future opportunitiesare simply opportunities. They will be grasped ormissed.

We believe they can be grasped. And Britain remainsready to help.

FOREWORD by Lord Triesman

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Latin America to 2020a UK Public Strategy Paper

Contents

I. Why Latin America matters to the United Kingdom

II. The Latin American context

III. Latin America to 2020

IV. The UK approach

V. UK engagement in the future

1. Latin America2 is a region of some 550 millionpeople, set to rise to around 660 million by 2020.More than 60% is under the age of 30. Itspopulation is hugely diverse, from more than 670indigenous and many immigrant ethnicbackgrounds or, in the case of a majority, a mix ofthe two. But the continent’s history and linguisticlinks also bring a strong sense of cultural andsocial community. The region is home to some ofthe poorest and richest people in the world, butalso with an expanding middle class. It has a landarea of some 7 million square miles, extendingfrom the border with the US to the SouthernOcean, and with an enormously varied geography.It has 20 nation states, with a combined GDP ofsome $2,800 billion3.

2. The British economy and British businesses needLatin America. British investment flows amountedto some £11.2 billion in 2004. The UK is among thetop four investors in many Latin Americancountries, including the region’s two economicgiants, Brazil and Mexico. These are emerging asmajor global economies. British exports to theregion are worth some £2.5 billion each year andthere is a strong demand for British services,including financial services and education. Thecontinent is a major world source of agriculturalproducts and minerals, producing 46% of theworld’s copper, 41% of its silver, 28% of its tin,26% of its bauxite, and 24% of its iron ore4.

3. Britain needs Latin America to contain the riskspresented by climate change and to protect theworld’s environment. The continent includesbiospheres which have a crucial impact on worldclimate, including the Amazon, which spreads oversix Latin American countries. Some countries, suchas Brazil, are also large emitters of greenhousegases, especially through forest fires anddeforestation. As the Stern Review noted,deforestation emissions account for a higherpercentage of global emissions (18%) thantransport. Latin American nations are among themost influential voices in the international debateon climate change, and have a crucial and complexrole to play in encouraging a shared understandingbetween developed and developing countries inbringing about the transition to a global low-carbon

economy. The continent’s economies are also amajor potential player in a carbon bond market,both as buyer and seller. Two Latin Americancountries – Argentina and Chile – have major rolesto play in preserving the environmental security ofAntarctica, and the biological and mineral resourcesof the southern oceans.

4. Britain needs Latin America to help reduce theharm to the UK from drug trafficking. Almost allthe cocaine consumed in Britain comes from thecontinent, an estimated 65-70% from Colombia,and much of it transiting through other countries inthe region. Britain must work with Latin Americanpartners to counter not only the flows of drugs toBritain, but also the great harm the narco businessinflicts on local societies. Britain needs LatinAmerican countries to counter international moneylaundering, which is often associated with the drugstrade, and sometimes with terrorist financing.

5. Britain needs Latin America to ensure stable worldsupplies of energy. The region provides some 14%of the world’s oil and some 5.5% of the world’snatural gas. It is estimated to hold at least 10% ofthe world’s oil and 6% of its natural gas reserves5 .Venezuela holds larger oil reserves than SaudiArabia. The reliability of supply from the regiontherefore has an important impact on the stabilityof the world oil and gas markets, avoiding high riskpremium and market volatility. Brazil is the largestproducer of ethanol, and a world leader in cleanbiofuel technology. Latin America’s contribution istherefore key to the development of a global low-carbon economy.

6. Britain wants to reduce world poverty andinequality, in line with the UN’s MillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs). Of Latin America’s 550million people, 209 million live in poverty, of which81 million live in extreme poverty6.

7. Britain needs active and reliable partners to helpwin the arguments in the wider internationalcommunity. Brazil and Mexico are potential worldpowers, with an opportunity to play a leadershiprole both within Latin America and beyond. Brazilaspires to a permanent seat in the UN SecurityCouncil, and both Brazil and Mexico have been very

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I Why Latin America matters to the United Kingdom1

vocal in the WTO talks. Many other Latin Americancountries have a long record of participation ininternational organisations, including sectoral ortrans-regional organisations such as OPEC(Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries)and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), andare strong supporters of an international systembased on the rule of law.

8. Britain needs friends who share liberal democraticvalues. This is especially true when, as now, thesevalues face an international threat from extremism,violence and undemocratic ideologies. In LatinAmerica there has long been a widespread andenduring aspiration to democracy, enjoyment ofindividual rights and freedoms, and protection bythe rule of law. For many years these values wereeither widely ignored or explicitly threatened byviolence and autocracy, and still are in some places.But the intense resistance to past dictatorship, andrecent rise of democracy, show a strongcommitment to these values.

9. Britain is interested in Latin America because manyof its international partners are active there too. Anumber of EU states – including of course Portugaland Spain - have significant Latin Americaninterests. The US is both a major trading partnerfor Latin America, and an advocate of democratic,economic and social reform. Emerging powers suchas South Africa, India and China are building links,both to secure energy and raw materials, and towork together politically on wider global issuessuch as trade and climate change. This widerinternational interest in Latin America offers Britainthe chance to work in the region with othercountries who share our aims, or alternatively canbe a cause of concern where other countries’interests in the region cut across ours.

10. There are increasing contacts between British andLatin American people, for business, education andtourism. In 2005 the number of tourists from theUK travelling to Central and South America rose by12%, compared to a 3% rise in UK tourist traveloverall7. Some 20,000 Latin Americans come toBritain each year for their education. The UK’sexpanding Latin American community contributesto Britain’s vibrant multicultural society. At any onetime there are between 700,000 to 1,000,000Latin Americans visiting or living in the UK,including around 200,000 Brazilians, around140,000 Colombians, 70-90,000 Ecuadorians and10-15,000 Peruvians.

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1 This paper considers UK interests from the perspective of Latin America as a region,

rather than the cross-cutting thematic approach of the March 2006 White Paper “Active

Diplomacy in a Changing World”. UK interests in Latin America cover some, though not all,

of the range of the Strategic Priorities set out in the White Paper. These are listed at

Annex 1

2 The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC/CEPAL) defines

Latin America as South and Central America, Mexico and Cuba, the Dominican Republic

and Haiti. We are grateful to ECLAC for many of the statistics in this paper.

3 IMF figures

4 ECLAC figures

5 BP world energy review 2005

6 ECLAC figures

7 Latin American Travel Association figures

Some major successes

11. Recent years have seen some importantachievements in Latin America, which have broughtbenefits to people across the continent, and providea platform for further progress. These achievementshave not solved all problems, and in some areas theprogress has been only partial. But they paint amore encouraging picture than for many years. Inmany areas they build on some of the region’straditional strengths, including established stateinstitutions and a strong culture of expert debate.

12. Latin America is now a continent largely at peace.There are no active conflicts between states, whichin general are strongly committed to resolvingtensions peacefully. The Ecuador/Peru borderconflict, which led to the last armed confrontationon the continent in 1995, was finally resolved by the1998 peace treaty and 1999 formal demarcation ofthe border.

13. There has also been major progress in resolving theinternal conflicts which in the past have causedsuch suffering in many parts of Latin America. Thecivil conflicts which blighted Central America in the1980s have long since come to a close, as has thedomestic terrorism which cost 60,000 lives in Peru.There have also been some signs of progress inColombia’s long-running internal violence, withconcrete steps towards demobilisation of theparamilitary groups.

14. The Latin American economy is also healthier thanit has been for many years. In general the picture isone of stable growth across the continent. Over theyears 2003-06 average growth was 4%, up from2.6% in 1990-20028. There has been no repetitionof the regional crises of the 1980s and 1990s, andserious national crises, such as Argentina’s2001/02 crash, have not caused catastrophiccontagion and long-term loss of confidence.Inflation is largely under control. Average levels arestill too high, at around 6.3%, but far below the180% of the 1980s. Central bank reserves arehigher and the economy is better able to resistexternal shock. World energy prices and otherglobal risks have not had a serious impact on

growth, and have fuelled it in some cases. SomeLatin American countries have either signed or arenegotiating Free Trade Agreements with majoreconomies like the EU, US and Japan.

15. Mexico offers a striking example of economicimprovement since the tequila crisis of 1994. It hasbrought its public finances under control; itsinflation in 2005 was lower than that of the US;and it has now begun issuing 30-year fixed ratebonds.

16. Strong commodity prices9, steady foreign directinvestment and increased remittances have turnedLatin America’s two-decade current account deficitinto a four-year surplus. In the last 10 years theoverall external debt/GDP ratio has sunk from 35%to 10%. While the continent is still largelydependent on the export to other regions ofprimary materials and products, a number of highlysuccessful international businesses have emerged,some engaged in services or high-tech sectors, suchas LAN (Chile) and EMBRAER (Brazil).

17. While poverty is widespread, there is no generalfamine or other humanitarian emergency. LatinAmerica has made progress towards theMillennium Development Goals (MDGs) and looks tobe on track to meet 2015 targets for education,access to water and sanitation, and reducinghunger. Chile’s poverty rate has halved, from 38.5%to 18.8%, between 1990 and 2004. Extremepoverty in Mexico fell by half between 1998 and2004, and Brazil’s income distribution is lessunequal than at any time in the past 30 years.Governments in the region have established somesuccessful social support and poverty reductionpolicies, such as the Mexican Oportunidades,Venezuelan Misiones, Argentine Jefes y Jefas deHogar Desocupados and Brazilian Bolsa Familiaprogrammes.

18. Above all, democracy is established in LatinAmerica, with the exception so far of Cuba. This isa major change of the last 20 years. Power istransferred through elections, under constitutionalterms. In the last 2 years 14 heads of governmenthave been replaced, and while some left office as aresult of non-electoral popular protest, all their

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II The Latin American context

successors have been installed in accordance withconstitutional procedures. Citizens are increasinglyusing elections rather than violent protest as theway to make their grievances known, hold theirgovernments to account and secure the changesthey want. Even where there is significant internaltension, such as in Colombia, political leaders haveused the democratic process to secure popularsupport for their actions against violence. And withthe signature of the Inter-American DemocraticCharter in September 2001 governments haveformally committed themselves to defend andstrengthen democracy throughout the region.

19. There is now widespread acceptance among bothpolitical elites and the electorate that parties of left,right and centre can hold power. The poor and thedisadvantaged now use voting as a means to asserttheir identity and their aspirations. The examples ofPresidents Morales (Bolivia), Luis Inácio Lula daSilva (Brazil), Tabaré Vázquez (Uruguay) andBachelet (Chile) show that leaders are emergingfrom the large parts of society traditionally under-represented in politics and government. And therehas been progress to improve the quality ofdemocracy by countering the manipulation of thedemocratic system through patronage. Severalcountries, including Peru and Mexico, have passedfar-reaching legislation for greater transparencyand accountability of government spendingprogrammes.

20. In many places the media have grown moreindependent and vociferous, and are prepared toinvestigate and report corruption, political scandalsand other wrongdoing, although in some countriesat continuing risk to journalists’ safety. This trend isparallelled by increasingly active non-governmentalorganisations, many engaged in indigenous orenvironmental issues, and often with close links tosimilar organisations elsewhere in Latin Americaand beyond.

21. Respect for human rights has increased in manycountries. In large part this is thanks to the end ofthe military dictatorships and the decline indomestic conflict. Within Latin America, only Cubaand Colombia are identified by the FCO's annualHuman Rights Report as major countries ofconcern10. Many countries, such as Chile, Argentina,Guatemala and Peru, have instituted investigationsinto the abuses of earlier regimes, to serve justice,reconciliation, or both. Serious human rights abusesstill occur across Latin America, including excessiveuse of force by police or prison authorities. A fewgovernments also show a worrying tendencytowards more autocratic rule, centralisation ofpower and encroachment into public rights offreedom of expression. But in most countrieshuman rights abuses are neither so widespread asin the past, nor the result of official policy. Themedia are generally free to report such abuses;politicians and NGOs can campaign against them;and in many countries victims may seek redressthrough the legal system.

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Box 1 – Latinobarómetro Polls

Latinobarómetro is a highly respected Chile-based pollingorganisation. Its opinion polls and analysis provide an invaluablemeasure of popular attitudes across Latin America towardsdemocracy and the quality of democracy.

Latinobarómetro’s December 2006 polls show that regional supportfor democracy is at 58%, up 5% on 2005 and the highest levelsince the late 1990s. Overall satisfaction with democracy is now at38%, 7% up on 2005. 73% of the electorate voted in their lastelections. However only 57% said that voting was the best way tochange things, and 14% believed protest or direct action was amore effective path.

Figures such as these underscore that while there is strongersupport for democracy than other models of government, there is anequally strong public demand that it should be better at deliveringresults, and some continued public attraction to popular protest.

22. Latin America is increasingly and constructivelyactive internationally. Latin American countrieswere many of the founder members of the UN.Some have long played a major part in UNoperations. Uruguay is among the top tencontributors to UN peace support operations:although it has the second smallest population inLatin America it deploys more personnel under UNauspices than any other Latin American country –2583 at the last count11 . Recently this trend hascontinued, with Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Chile allincreasingly active in peace support. All fourcooperated in the MINUSTAH operation in Haiti,providing both joint military forces and political andmilitary leadership.

23. These and other countries have also played leadingroles in the Doha Development Agenda Round ofmultilateral trade negotiations, and are leadinginfluences in the Cairns and G20 WTO groups.Brazil has an important development assistanceprogramme in Africa, and its experience in dealingwith HIV/AIDS is used as an international rolemodel.

Causes for concern

24. These are significant achievements, and a majoradvance from the situation in the 1980s. Howeversignificant problems remain, which could eitherprevent Latin Americans from capitalising on theseachievements, or in extreme cases imperil thesuccess so far. The most important are poor qualityof governance, lack of security, endemic corruption,declining economic competitiveness in the face ofcompetition from other parts of the world, andsocial inequality. Failure to deal effectively withthese issues would represent a major threat to thedemocratic system, by destroying confidence inpoliticians and parties and encouraging support forpopulism and autocracy.

25. The poor quality of governance is evident in manyparts of state structures, both in centraladministration and in the lowest level of stateactivity, such as local police and hospitals. It is acombination of the inefficiency, inexperience andpoor training and pay of public employees, and poorpolicy decisions by political leaders. Tax policy is

one clear example: widespread corruption andavoidance of income tax in many countries meansmost government revenues come from business andcustoms duties or taxes on exports of extractives.This is unfair, hampers business and harmscompetitiveness, limits government spending oneducation or healthcare, penalises the law-abiding,and undercuts the social contract between thecitizen and the state.

26. Poor governance is a major contributor to a lack ofsecurity. In most parts of Latin America violentcrime is rising, often linked to the drugs trade. InCentral America there is a major problem withyouth gangs, and Venezuela, Brazil and many othercountries face increasing violence. The problem isnot only one of poor law enforcement, but also ofsocial and economic development and of seriousshortcomings in the legal and judicial systems. Thepolice and courts can be inefficient and corrupt,and can either offer no protection to the citizen orthemselves represent part of the problem.Insecurity not only seriously affects the quality oflife of the individual, but is a major deterrent todomestic or foreign investment and a seriousobstacle to economic growth. Inadequatelegislation and ineffective enforcement make somecountries in the region a venue of choice for moneylaundering.

27. Corruption remains endemic in most parts of thecontinent. With a few exceptions, such as Chile andUruguay, Latin American countries regularly scorepoorly in Transparency International’s corruptionindex. Corruption can make daily life a misery formillions of Latin Americans, frustrate business, andhamstring political, economic and social reformefforts.

28. Despite the broadly positive economic picture, thereare major worries about Latin America’s economiccompetitiveness in comparison with moreconsistently successful parts of the world.

29. GDP growth remains based on too few sectors,chiefly exports of commodities, and is vulnerable toany slowdown in the world economy. There hasbeen insufficient public investment in areas that canadd value and make the region more competitive in

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the future, such as education and research. FDIcontinues to be deterred by inadequate andunreliable legal protection, corruption, over-regulation (in Brazil it takes around 152 days toregister a new company12, more than five times theIDB target of 30 days), and by continued stateinterventionism and protectionism. While the staterole is often presented as a way of protecting thenation from exploitation by foreigners andmultinationals, it often functions in fact as a way ofenriching the domestic elites at the expense ofwider benefits to the general population.

30. In contrast, Asia now receives about double theFDI flowing to Latin America. The Asian debt/GDPratio has not only sunk, as in Latin America, but hasbeen transformed into a surplus figure of +12%.Latin America’s GDP growth, though reasonable,lags behind the 2003-06 average of 5.7% fordeveloping countries. Businesses and investorsbelieve there are opportunities in Latin America,but too often the greater opportunities seem to bein Asia, where it is easier to invest, the returns arehigher and the risk is lower. And low-wagemanufacturing jobs increasingly face competitionfrom Asia, where educational levels can also behigher.

31. Despite healthy GDP figures, much of LatinAmerica’s growth has not translated into greateremployment. Growth has not kept pace withdemographic increase, helping maintain the highestlevels of social inequality in the world. Inequalityof income frequently also means inequality ofaccess to healthcare, justice and education. Ithampers social development, limits economicgrowth and encourages continued politicaldiscontent and tension.

32. There is only limited regional cooperation. This isof concern not because regional integration is anend in itself, but because by not building linkswithin the region Latin America is missingopportunities to increase its trade and tostrengthen its voice in the world.

33. Currently trade within Latin America is much lesssignificant than the continent’s exports to otherparts of the world. It is hampered by poor

transport links within the region – no major roadsyet link the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, for example– and by extensive and complex national tariffregimes. The failure of the Free Trade Agreement ofthe Americas (FTAA) negotiations was not only amissed opportunity to develop regional economiesfurther, but has also given a political banner tothose opposed to trade liberalisation. Efforts toachieve greater economic cooperation throughother regional groupings, such as the SouthernCommon Market (MERCOSUR), the AndeanCommunity (CAN), the Central AmericanIntegration System (SICA) and the Community ofSouth American Nations have so far had limitedsuccess.

34. Latin American countries often work closelytogether on an ad hoc basis in international forasuch as the UN or WTO, and in bi-regionaldialogues such as the EU-Latin America andCaribbean (EU-LAC) process. However, systematicpolitical cooperation within the region is limited.States have often turned to mediators outside theregion rather than resolve disputes with theirneighbours through regional organisations. When anumber of other parts of the world are combiningin regional organisations to represent some of theirinterests internationally, Latin America loses out ifit cannot put forward its own regionalrepresentative to negotiate with them.

35. Latin America suffers no shortage of regionalorganisations. A number have enjoyed somesuccess, such as the OAS’s efforts in the pastdecade to manage political conflicts in Ecuador,Peru and Venezuela, and in the dispute betweenBelize and Guatemala. But there are also many withunclear geographical or thematic mandates,malfunctioning administrations, patchily-appliedtreaties and agreements, and without clear politicalleadership by the larger countries of the region.

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8 IMF figures

9 Between end 2002 and Q3 2003 fuel and non-fuel commodity prices rose by 150% and

80% respectively (IMF).

10 For an assessment of human rights concerns in these countries, see the full report:

http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/hr_report2006.pdf

11 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, November 2006 figure

12 World Bank figures

36. What is then the outlook 10-15 years from now? Itis highly unlikely that Latin America will see areturn to traditional military dictatorships and theorganised political violence of the past. Thechallenges of the future will be different andsometimes more complex. It is possible to imaginea Latin America which follows one of two generaldirections.

37. The first would see the current positive trendscontinue. The results of this would in part be seenin some headline achievements, such as:

➤ GDP growth on a par with or exceeding that ofother emerging economies, and a similar increase in FDI;

➤ achievement of Millennium Development Goals onpoverty reduction and social equality;

➤ a consistent track record of free and fair electionsand constitutional transfers of power, and increasedaccess to political power by non-elites, showing thatdemocratic systems are stable and functioning well;

➤ a significant replacement of coca cultivation byother sustainable crops, a clear reduction in drugtrafficking, and effective criminal justice actionagainst drugs offences;

➤ steady movement up the TransparencyInternational index of corruption.

38. But it would also be seen in terms of the politicaldebate in Latin American countries, and how this isreflected in elections. If positive trends continue, forexample, the debate should not be about whetherthe voter has access to a doctor or school, but thequality of service provided; not whether there areenough jobs, but the sort of job available and thetraining provided; not about whether a citizen ispaying taxes, but whether the level of taxation isright, and what use the government is making ofthe revenues.

39. Internationally, the continent will have helped forma critical mass with other liberal democracies todrive the international agenda towards freer trade,a strengthened international system, morewidespread respect for human rights, and effectiveaction on climate change.

40. The second, less positive direction would see LatinAmerica not only failing to achieve this condition,but moving backwards in some crucial areas. Thiswould mean not only that existing social andeconomic problems would not have been resolved,but that the chances of their being resolved wouldbe slighter. Three dangers in particular are worthemphasising.

41. First, that constitutional democracy is replaced byautocracy. The danger is less of military coups, thanof populist politicians trading on public discontentwith underperforming parties and institutions topresent themselves as a radical ideologicalalternative. This revives the traditional Latin idea ofthe caudillo, or strong man, who claims to solveproblems through personal action and prestigerather than through building enduring institutions.Political opposition would be threatened andelections devalued. However attractive suchconcepts may be in the short term, they do notbring long term benefits, and lead to increaseddomestic and regional tensions.

42. Second, there is a risk of two distinct LatinAmericas emerging. One would represent the moresuccessful economies of today, with more effectivepublic administrations. Their social structures,economies and their political approaches wouldincreasingly resemble those of their main tradingpartners, which would be outside the region. Theother would be made up of countries who hadfailed to build on their achievements so far, whose

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III Latin America in 2020

social indicators would be far below their richerneighbours, and whose public institutions failed tofunction. This divergence within the continent wouldbe a major potential source of economic, social andpolitical instability, which could endanger theprogress of the more successful countries. Thedanger could be particularly acute where there aregreat divergences between regions within a state,potentially leading even to state break-up.

43. Third, there is a danger that while Latin Americadoes reasonably well, it continues to be outstrippedby other regions. Foreign investment would shifteven further away from the continent, jobs woulddrain to more competitive regions, and thecontinent’s economic dependency on the volatility ofthe commodities market would be entrenched. Thecontinent’s international influence would beweakened in comparison with rising powerselsewhere, and its concerns would not be heard atthe UN or WTO. The region would slip down theinternational ratings for social and economicdevelopment; even if there had been some absoluteimprovement, the relative decline vis-a-vis otherregions would encourage international neglect.

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IV The UK approach

44. In reality, Latin America’s future is likely to containelements of both positive and negative directions. ALatin America which as far as possible continuesthe current positive trends is strongly in the UKinterest. The interests set out in part I above arebest served by a region made up of stabledemocracies, with prosperous economies,economically and politically engaged with the widerworld. Such a region is not only likely to sharesimilar concerns with us, but can also offer partnerswho will be ready to listen to our arguments, andact effectively where necessary.

45. The UK enjoys a number of advantages in carryingout its policy towards Latin America.

i) UK policy is in many areas working with the current in Latin America. What we want is in general in line with the aspirations of the people of the continent. And the recent general trend in the region is in line with the UK’s overall aims.

ii) The UK is a world leader in a number of areas which are now of key importance to the region, including public policy reform, counter-narcotics work, criminal justice reform and military peace support operations. Latin American partners value our achievements in these fields, and there is a strong demand for UK experience.

iii) The UK can draw on a strong network to engage with these partners. The network is broad both in its geographical reach – we have17 diplomatic posts across the region – and in its expertise – UK interests are represented by members of the FCO, UKTI, Department for International Development, British Council, Ministry of Defence, DEFRA and Serious Organised Crime Agency. British representatives generally have good access to Latin American leaders, civil society and the general public.

iv) UK-based companies and the City of London are key commercial partners, now or potentially, for businesses in the region.

v) The UK’s voice within the EU gives it strengthened influence in the region. There is strong Latin American interest in building a broader and more intense contact with Europe.

vi) The UK’s leading role in the UN, in the International Financial Institutions, and (through the EU) in the WTO give it influence over global issues which are relevant to Latin America, and where Latin Americans have an interest in working with us.

vii) The UK’s role in supporting the Latin Americanindependence struggle in the 1800s is still widely recognised, as are its cultural, economicand political achievements since then.

46. UK policy seeks to exploit these advantages with arange of activities suited to the local circumstancesand the interests at stake. Unlike in some otherparts of the world, the focus of British effort is noton first helping to meet basic humanitarian needs,or building basic security and institutions ofgovernance, but rather working with existingstructures.

47. There are six main streams of British activity.

Advocacy

48. The first stream is political advocacy in support ofthe reform agenda. Clearly no foreign governmenthas as much influence over the future direction ofLatin America as its own governments and people.But Britain can support a continued Latin Americanreform process by making and repeating thearguments for good governance within ademocratic system, economic liberalism, actionagainst corruption, respect for human rights andinternational engagement.

49. The UK government has a number of differentfunds which can support projects in Latin America,including DFID funding under their RegionalAssistance Plan, the MOD’s defence relations plan,DEFRA funding, FCO funding from the GlobalOpportunities and Public Diplomacy funds, and jointfunding from the Global Conflict Prevention Fund.The UK approach is not to see these funds asmajor sources of direct international developmentassistance for Latin America, which most parts ofthe continent do not need. Rather the funding canbe used to help our wider effort to maintainpolitical support for continued reform, by helpinggovernments implement policies, targetingparticular needs, investing in training or institutionswhich can have a multiplier effect, or usingprogrammes to build up links with new politicalcontacts and give us opportunities for lobbying.

50. Several different sorts of activity are involved in ouradvocacy effort. Where these do not exist or arestill developing, the UK can help establish ordevelop public institutions and democraticpractices. In Colombia, for example, the Embassyhas helped the UNHCR strengthen the offices of theProcurator General, responsible for protecting therights of people displaced by drug-related violence,and the national and regional Ombudsman, whomonitors the state’s support for displaced people.

51. Where institutions are established, the UK arguesfor effective policies. This covers an enormousrange of activity, from meetings between the PrimeMinister and Latin American leaders, to informalsocial contacts or the presentation of Embassywebsites. It is the staple work of our Embassies,who daily lobby Latin American national andregional authorities on behalf of British investors,press for progress on outstanding human rightscases, or argue for Latin American action at theUN.

52. Often this effort is focused on immediate short-term issues. But the UK also hopes to influence theargument in the medium and long term. Oneimportant way of doing this is through theprogramme of Chevening Scholarships andFellowships (see box).

53. We also support the reform process through ourwork to spread recognised best practice andexperience. Although a government may havedecided that it wants to introduce a reform, it mayneed support in deciding how to do it. In recentyears an important industry has grown up in theUK in spreading British experience of public policyreform abroad. The British government role can beto put governments in touch with British experts, ormore actively fund visits by the experts to theregion to advise and train.

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Box 2 – Chevening Scholarships and Fellowships

Each year the British government offers opportunities for around200 of Latin America’s brightest young people to study in the UK,often in cosponsorship with commercial or educationalorganisations. They are chosen for their future leadership potential,and their interest and involvement in fields crucial both to their owncountry and UK interests.

They include actual or potential politicians, businesspeople,journalists, scientists and activists. While Chevening Fellows havealready achieved some success in their chosen field, and promise torise higher, Chevening Scholars are an investment in the moredistant future. The overall aim is that their time in the UK will givethem the skills they need to help develop their own countriesfurther, introduce them to British approaches and networks, andencourage them to keep in touch with Britain once they returnhome.

Box 3 – Prison Reform

One important example of our programme to spread best practicein Latin America is the work of the International Centre for PrisonStudies (ICPS) of Kings College London, which has run FCO-fundedprojects in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Prisons are a major source of concern both to Latin Americangovernments and to the international community. This is partlybecause conditions often breach international human rightsstandards, and partly because they often function as breedinggrounds for wider criminality and violence. Justice authorities inthese five countries recognised the problem, and worked with ICPS,including on establishing and implementing a planning process,assessing and managing the privatisation of prison facilities, andrequirements for human rights training for prison staff andadministrators.

54. The UK has had notable success in the field ofsecurity sector reform, where the FCO and Ministryof Defence has funded programmes to supportcivilian control of the military and help buildprofessional armed forces, including in Argentina,Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia and Peru.

55. Finally, we can provide direct British help toimplement reforms, sometimes in the form of aprogramme directly funded by the UK. This caninclude further training by British experts and visitsto the UK to gain experience. But it also oftenincludes a clear partnership between LatinAmerican and British institutions in the introduction of reform.

Operational cooperation

56. Following on from our advocacy work, a secondstream of British activity is operational cooperationwhere we have particular interests at stake. Oftenprogress on these interests is also linked to widerprogress on reform. But occasionally we need to actmore directly where we would like to see progresson a key short-term interest.

57. The most important example of this is ourcooperation with Latin American countries againstthe drugs trade, which in some regions is a majorcause of the wider problems of poor governance,insecurity and corruption.

58. Anti-drugs work also of course involves an elementof political advocacy, to encourage Latin Americangovernments to pass laws against crime and moneylaundering, to offer alternative sustainablelivelihoods to coca cultivators, and to tackledomestic drug use. Britain has helped implementthese polices with some practical support to buildcapabilities and deal with particular areas ofconcern. The FCO’s Global Opportunities Fund hasfunded programmes in Colombia and Venezuela toraise drugs awareness among children.

59. As well as direct action against the drugs trade,Britain also cooperates with Latin Americancountries against money laundering and in order torecover assets of drugs dealers. The GlobalOpportunities Fund has also helped Britain workwith some key partners to track narco-traffickers’money flows, to help train technical experts andprosecutors, and to establish Financial IntelligenceUnits.

60. Migration is another operational area where Britainmust work closely with Latin American partners.The British government is keen to promote traveland tourism to the UK from Latin Americancountries via managed migration and the PointsBased System. There are also concerns about illegalimmigration from a number of Latin Americancountries. The UK aims to work closely with thesecountries to tackle abuse, particularly in the areasof document security and illegal working.

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Box 4 – Justice Reform in Mexico

Britain has worked to support reform of the justice system inMexico, as a way both of increasing Mexican public confidence inthe rule of law, and to build foreign investor confidence and soprovide market stability. The UK model is now a reference point forthe design and implementation of Mexican justice reform. Throughstudy visits by judges, congressmen and attorney generals to theUK, together with widely-publicised mock trial roadshows in fourstates, previously sceptical government officials were convincedboth of the case for justice reform and the UK’s ability to help.

Several Mexican states have now officially adopted oral trials andopinion formers in Congress now see the English-Welsh legal systemas a model to draw from in pushing for wider justice reform inMexico. Incoming President Calderón has called for a fundamentalreform of the justice system, incorporating oral trials. And as aresult of this programme there is now a greater acceptance in localand federal government and in the media that justice reform is akey driver in tackling corruption and wider crime, improving theMexican business environment, and attracting foreign investment.

Box 5 – Supporting policies to reduce poverty

In Central America, DFID and others have supported an importantinitiative by political parties to make long-term strategies forpoverty reduction central to their policies. Over the last 2 yearsDFID has helped organise a series of workshops and studyexchanges between leading politicians from 50 different parties, andsupported a series of influential studies on poverty in the region. Asa result, politicians from 7 countries have jointly committedthemselves to consistent long-term policies to reduce poverty. Partlyas a result of this initiative, parties are increasingly basing theirelection strategies on a commitment to reduce poverty for themajority of the population rather than just within particular clientgroups.

Cooperation on global issues

61. A third stream of our activity is through our workon global issues which affect both Latin Americaand the UK. A key example of this is climate change(see box), which may affect Latin America evenmore dramatically than the UK, where LatinAmerican support is essential if the world is to takeeffective action, and where we share a commonagenda as major trading partners with an economicinterest in the transition to a global low-carboneconomy. The effects of climate change will hit thepoorest first and hardest, and can seriouslyundermine efforts to achieve sustainabledevelopment and poverty reduction. We need towork increasingly closely with regional partners totackle these issues and will therefore be developinga separate strategy on Latin America and climatechange.

62. Another global issue of particular relevance to LatinAmerica is the question of transparency in theextractives industry. In the past there have beenmany claims that the extractives industry has beencomplicit in encouraging corruption and waste ofnational assets, or reluctant to provide the financialinformation about its operations which will allowindependent monitoring of its relations withgovernment. As noted above, Latin America is bothhighly dependent on the export of oil, gas andminerals, and subject to widespread corruption.

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Box 6 – Anti-drugs work in Colombia

Colombia is a vital ally for our anti-drugs work. Our approach heremust be multifaceted, as the drugs issue stretches beyond lawenforcement to include wider concerns of social development,human rights, and political stability. British antidrugs work withColombia includes gathering information about the drugs trade andits impact in Colombia, so that British policy can be based on asaccurate information as possible; training and support forColombian law enforcement agencies and legal authorities; and lawenforcement operations against shipments of cocaine fromColombia to the UK, including operations with foreign partners andwithin the UK.

Recently the FCO’s Global Opportunities Fund provided computerprofiling equipment to the Colombian customs service, which has ledto a number of detentions. The Ministry of Defence has in additionprovided human rights training the Colombian security forces, andhelped deal with mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) toallow civilians in Colombia to go about their daily lives in peace.

Box 7 – Climate change work with Brazil

Our work with Brazil is central to our global strategy on climatechange, and a further illustration of how we deploy our advocacytools to influence the debate in Latin America. Brazil is importantboth for climate change and wider environmental issues. It has theworld’s largest reserves of biodiversity, and 25% of the world’s flowsof fresh water. It is the fourth largest global emitter of greenhousegases, the biggest contribution coming from deforestation andforest fires. There is also concern that global warming could turnthe Amazon from a major carbon sink into a carbon emitter. Itsproduction and use of bio-fuels provides a model for how to removecarbon from economies while continuing to enjoy growth andenergy security.

Brazil is active in climate change negotiations and has a leading rolein the G77 group of developing nations. Its position reflects many ofthe concerns of other developing economies, who do not want to beunfairly penalised by international agreements on climate changeand who want to see the developed world take the lead in reducingemissions for which they have the greatest historical responsibility.And its status as an emerging world power means that Britain hasa wider interest in building a close relationship with Brazil.

Our approach to dealing with Brazil on this issue has been based onhigh-level political action, which is then followed-up through astructured dialogue and a variety of practical cooperation. ThePrime Minister and President Lula discussed climate change duringthe G8 Gleneagles meeting in July 2005 and the State Visit to theUK by the Brazilian President in March 2006. During the StateVisit, they agreed to establish a process of talks on both sustainabledevelopment and climate change, in which Britain and Brazil candebate the more detailed direction of policy and how to implementit. The British Embassy in Brazil have backed this up with a numberof innovative individual projects, including to study the process ofclimate change in Brazil, and to inform the Brazilian political debateabout the situation.

63. The UK sponsored the foundation of the ExtractivesIndustry Transparency Initiative at a conference inLancaster House in 2003, as a way of providingimproved governance in resource-rich countries. Itprovides for the full publication and verification ofcompany payments and government revenues fromoil, gas and mining. In large part as a result of UKlobbying, Mexico and Peru have signed up to theInitiative, which now gives a better chance thatgood governance of revenues from extractives canfoster economic growth and reduce poverty. Boliviahas in the past expressed an interest, and we hopeshe and other countries in the region will sign up tothe Initiative.

Cooperation in InternationalOrganisations

64. A fourth stream of activity is our work with LatinAmerican countries in international fora such as theUN. This is a way of building both our relationshipswith these countries, and a stronger internationalsystem based on the rule of law. Latin Americancountries have long been strong advocates of theUN and other international organisations. Many ofthe smaller countries see a strong internationalsystem as a guarantee that their interests will beprotected, while for larger countries it is a means ofbringing their influence to bear abroad. Britain andLatin American countries have worked together toreform the UN system, including in the debate toestablish a new Human Rights Council, for which

Mexico provided the first Chairman. We haveworked closely with the Latin American membersof the UN Security Council, most recentlyArgentina, Peru and Panama. Argentina is also akey partner in the international efforts to restrictthe trade in small arms and light weapons, acampaign which owes much to the work ofPresident Arias of Costa Rica.

65. A key area of cooperation is in peace supportoperations (PSOs). Britain is determined that theUN should have access to larger numbers of well-trained and motivated peacekeepers, to provide abetter response to continuing crises around theworld. Latin America is well qualified to providesuch forces, and already has many years ofexperience in doing so. Many Latin Americancountries see involvement in PSOs as a way both ofsupporting the international system and ofdeveloping the expertise and vision of their armedforces. They are keen to cooperate with Britain onthis, viewing our armed forces as effective andexperienced in working with other nations.

Trade development

66. A fifth stream of activity is through ourdevelopment of UK trade with Latin America. Workhere is led by UK Trade and Investment (UKTI), ajoint arm of the FCO and the Department of Tradeand Industry, which has representation inEmbassies and Consulates across the region. UKTI’sstrategy, announced in July 2006, aims to maximisethe UK’s ability to attract foreign direct investment(FDI), win market share in the new high growtheconomies and create the environment in whichbusiness can flourish in a global marketplace.

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Box 8 – Reducing poverty worldwide

Latin America has much to teach the global fight against poverty. InBrazil, the Bolsa Familia programme is a conditional cash transferprogramme that has integrated several social assistance schemesaimed at alleviating chronic poverty, supported by loans from boththe World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Brazilhas hit its 2006 target of reaching 11 million families through BolsaFamilia, providing a cash benefit of R$95 a month, subject to theparticipation of children in school and in vaccination programmes.

This makes Bolsa Familia one of the largest social transferprogrammes in the world. In January 2006, DFID supported a visitby representatives of 6 African countries to Brazil to learn from theprogramme. This has been followed up by a programme of dialogueand learning that will ensure some of Africa's poorest nations canreplicate some of Brazil's success in implementing policies for socialassistance.

Box 9 – Cooperation with Chile in Peace-Support Operations

One example of close cooperation on peace support is with theChilean armed forces, who since 2003 have provided a force tooperate as an integral part of the a British unit in Bosnia. Before theChilean deployment, their soldiers received British training in Chileand the UK, and there is a British officer permanently attached tothe Chilean peace support training centre CECOPAC. Britain is alsosupporting a new regional peace-keeping training centre at Coban inGuatemala.

67. In Latin America, UKTI has identified Brazil andMexico as Emerging Markets. These are expectedto be major sources of both trade and FDI in thefuture and will be the focus of UKTI’s efforts todeepen trade and investment relationships. UKTI istherefore transferring significant resources frommature markets to increase the UK’s impact inthese important high growth economies.

68. In Brazil significant first steps have been taken inthe process to tackle trade barriers in the form of aUK-Brazil Joint Economic and Trade Committee(JETCO). The JETCO provides a high level forum fordeveloping our strategic economic relationship, andenhancing bilateral trade and investment throughaddressing barriers to trade, building relationshipsand highlighting opportunities. It willsystematically examine why UK companies appearto underperform in terms of trade and investmentwith Brazil. It will also seek to agree joint strategiesto tackle the perceived impediments to bilateraltrade and investment.

69. Mexico is taking an ever-increasing role in globaltrade and now has free trade agreements with over30 countries – principally NAFTA and the EU-Mexico Association Agreement. These, togetherwith Mexico’s strategic position as the gateway toNorth and South America, and access to the Pacificand Atlantic coasts, mean Mexico is playing apivotal role in the global arena. UKTI Mexico isdriving forward Mexico-US-Canada cross-bordercooperation looking at ways to help UK businessexploit the opportunities that exist within theNAFTA and EU–Mexico Association Agreements.

70. The oil-dominated economy of Venezuela is the UK’sthird-largest market in the region with UK exportsof £236 million in 2005. The main goods beingexported from the UK are chemicals, beverages andmedicinal and pharmaceutical products. The keyopportunities for UK companies are in the oil sector.Private sector involvement in this sector occurswithin three main frameworks: minority-share jointventures; strategic associations; and profit sharingagreements. UK companies with a presence in themarket include BP, Shell, Wood Group, Holcol,GlaxoSmithKline, Diageo and Unilever.

71. Argentina is the UK’s fourth-largest trading partnerin the region. It has made an impressive recoverysince the 2001-2 crisis and, despite somecontinuing long-term uncertainties about micro-distortions, there are significant trade opportunities,notably in sectors such as agriculture, mining,petrochemicals and creative industries. Argentina,alongside Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela,is a member of the Southern Cone Common Market(MERCOSUR), which aims to facilitate the freemovement of goods, services, people and currencyin the region.

72. Chile is the most stable economy in Latin Americawith low inflation, free market principles andcontinued GDP growth. The UK is the fourth-largestinvestor in Chile after the United States, Spain andCanada. UK investors include Rio Tinto and AngloAmerican in the mining sector, and HSBC andRoyal Sun Alliance in the financial services sector.UK’s exports have been growing steadily over thelast three years. UK’s main exports includebeverages, specialised machinery and powergeneration.

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UK exports to the key markets in the region

£ millions 2004 2005 Jan-Jun 2006

Argentina 179 169 107

Brazil 791 840 420

Chile 135 151 112

Colombia 117 118 58

Mexico 626 638 335

Panama 72 79 46

Peru 42 46 26

Venezuela 187 236 101

UK imports from the key markets in the region

£ millions 2004 2005 Jan-Jun 2006

Argentina 272 291 170

Brazil 1581 1771 895

Chile 484 485 410

Colombia 284 303 134

Mexico 420 455 249

Panama 8 19 9

Peru 135 127 85

Venezuela 213 395 253

73. In addition to assisting UK businesses to developtheir own capabilities to trade abroad, thegovernment has a role in emerging markets inhelping overcome both informal and formal barriersto market access and growth. The UK sees foreigninvestors as vital partners in helping Latin Americato reduce poverty, create employment and achievesustainable economic growth. The UK believes thatit is vital for governments in the region to maintaininvestor confidence and to avoid any action thatmight threaten future investment. Foreign investorsmust be able to operate in a fair and openframework, and both governments and foreigncompanies must honour contractual obligations.The UK is playing a leading role with other EUmember states in encouraging governments in theregion to create as secure a climate as possible forforeign investors.

Work through the EU

74. Boosting Latin America’s international trade is alsoa focus for a sixth stream of activity, ourengagement with Latin America through the EU.EU member states collectively account for around40% of the region’s external trade and 40% of theFDI. The EU’s engagement with Latin Americadraws on most of the areas of EU internationalactivity. The Commission carries out tradenegotiations, both on particular Latin American/EUissues and at the WTO. It also oversees a wide-ranging assistance programme to Latin Americancountries, 17% of it financed by the UK, including topromote social development and cohesion. And EUmember states pursue a diplomatic agenda whichseeks both to deal with significant politicalconcerns such as Cuba, and more generally broadenthe relationship between the EU and Latin America.The UK plays a leading role in all these areas.

75. The EU has negotiated Association Agreementswith Mexico and Chile, which are based around freetrade arrangements, but which go beyond this toinclude commitments to political, cultural andscientific cooperation. Currently the EU is in talkswith MERCOSUR about an Association Agreementwith this regional organisation, and is preparingRegional Trade Association talks with the AndeanCommunity and Central America.

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Box 10 – EU-LAC Cooperation

An increasing focus of activity is the EU-Latin America andCaribbean process, which involves Summits every two years and aseries of senior officials’ meetings in between. The next EU-LACSummit will be held in Lima in 2008. The process is still in itsinfancy, but it has created a forum for regular bi-regional dialogueand helped to encourage worthwhile contacts at expert levelbetween the two regions, including on trade, the environment,energy, science and technology, migration, social cohesion andcounter-narcotics work. Some of these contacts have led to usefulpractical cooperation, for example on counter-narcotics. Thechallenge now is to ensure that the process brings more by way ofconcrete benefits for both regions.

One area where the UK has worked hard to get concrete resultsfrom the EU-Latin America and Caribbean process is the dialogueon drugs. With EU funding, the UK has helped build closer contactsbetween law enforcement officials from the EU, Latin America andthe Caribbean. The resulting exchange of intelligence is bringing realbenefits for operational action against drugs trafficking.

76. The UK and Latin America have been and areintegrally linked. We have no option but to remainclose to Latin America and that corresponds to ourwishes. Making the most of our involvement in partdepends on sustaining our knowledge andengagement; but it also depends on the success orfailure of the reform efforts of the region.

77. The UK understands the continent is heterogeneous.The differences within Mexico, let alone betweenMexico in the north and the peoples of Tierra delFuego in the south, are enormous. Nothing will beunderstood about politics, economics or culturewithout grasping this variety of peoples andaspirations.

78. For example, there is a greatly increased emphasison progressive pro-poor social policies throughoutthe region, some delivered more successfully thanothers. These policies have developed in verydifferent political circumstances. Some haveemerged from populist governments with a highprofile in world fora; others have come fromconcepts of mixed economies and social justicemore familiar in Europe; and still others fromcentre-right governments with social inclusion planscentral to their programmes. These varying policiesare pursued by governments of a range of politicalhues, many of them now better able to exploiteconomic growth to reduce poverty and socialdivision.

79. Our strategic understanding must then have twovital components. One is to understand thecommon dynamic to address inequalities andresulting social instability. The other is to grasp thevariety of values and policy across the region.Naturally, while we seek the widest engagement,some parts of the spectrum will feel closer to UKinterests, entrepreneurial traditions and experience.

80. In the short term our emphasis will change little.The UK will promote democracy and socialinclusion, sound economic policies and openness tointernational trade; action against corruption andpoor government. Our embassies, aid and advicewill flow in this direction and we will avoidtheoretical rhetoric and attempts to divideinternational fora on the issues that should unite

them - trade relations, countering irresponsiblesmall arms trade and proliferation, or the struggleagainst narcotics criminals.

81. But in the medium term, as the region developsand, we hope, builds a viable trading block, the UKwill move away from dealing with the problems ofLatin America towards a new partnership. We aimto build a strong relationship with a developed andinternationally active region. We will togetherexploit these new economic opportunities. Forexample, we will spend less time lobbying forliberalisation of local investment conditions andsensible regulation. We will spend more timeencouraging investment projects. We will spendless time supporting judicial reform in LatinAmerica. We will spend more time working withLatin Americans encouraging such reforms in otherparts of the world. At the UN, our cooperation willbecome closer and deeper because Latin Americawill increasingly assume a greater role in the widerworld.

82. This development in our relationship should befaced with confidence. The first signs are alreadyvisible. We should be engaged in the discussionsthat take us into the new period now. The barriersof the Cold War have all but gone; just onedictatorship survives. In the short-term it is likelythat some strains will continue across the Americasas a whole, but it is worth holding on to the longerview. The US itself will look with real interest atdevelopments in its neighbourhood because it hassuch as obvious stake in progress and stability onits doorstep. By holding a constructive dialoguewith its Latin American partners greater progressis likely. And partners throughout the region needan equally non-confrontational approach in future.For all of us a joint interest in growth, prosperityand social justice is the best route.

83. Our aspiration, the test we apply, is that by 2020the terms of debate will have been transformed.Where today we ask who is doing well or poorly inthe continent, we will be asking what LatinAmerica is doing way beyond its home continent,confident of its place on the international stage.

28 March 2007

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V UK engagement in the future

Annex 1 – UK Strategic Priorities

1. Making the world safer from global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction2. Reducing the harm to the UK from international crime, including drug trafficking, people smuggling and money laundering3. Preventing and resolving conflict through a strong international system4. Building an effective and globally competitive EU in a secure neighbourhood5. Supporting the UK economy and business through an open and expanding global economy, science and innovation and secure energy sup-

plies6. Achieving climate security by promoting a faster transition to a sustainable, low carbon global economy7. Promoting sustainable development and poverty reduction underpinned by human rights, democracy, good governance and protection of the

environment8. Managing migration and combating illegal immigration9. Delivering high-quality support for British nationals abroad, in normal times and in crises10. Ensuring the security and good governance of the UK’s Overseas Territories