Latin American Immigration to the United States...48 Latin American Immigration to the United States Marta Tienda & Susana M. Sánchez MARTA TIENDA, a Fellow of the American Academy

48

Latin American Immigration to the United States

Marta Tienda & Susana M. Sánchez

MARTA TIENDA, a Fellow of theAmerican Academy since 1993, isthe Maurice P. During ’22 Professorin Demographic Studies, Professorof Sociology and Public Affairs,and Director of the Latino StudiesProgram at Princeton University.

SUSANA M. SÁNCHEZ is a grad-uate student in the Sociology De-partment and the Population Re-search Institute at PennsylvaniaState University.

(*See endnotes for complete contributorbiographies.)

Both the size and composition of the U.S. foreign-born population have grown since 1960, risingfrom 9.7 million to nearly 40 million in 2010. LatinAmericans have been a major driver of this trend,as their numbers soared from less than 1 million in1960 to nearly 19 million in 2010.1 The source coun-tries have also become more diverse, especially after1970, when flows from Central America, Cuba, andthe Dominican Republic surged. However, thesecensus-based stock measures, which combine recentand prior immigration as well as temporary andunauthorized residents, reveal little about the path-ways to U.S. residence, the ebb and flow of migrantsfrom speci½c countries, or the forces that produceand sustain those flows.

In this essay, we provide an overview of immigra-tion from Latin America since 1960, focusing onchanges in both the size and composition of themajor flows as well as the entry pathways to lawfulpermanent residence in the United States, with dueattention to policy shifts. We describe the deep his-torical roots of current migration streams andexplain how these flows are related both to changes

© 2013 by Marta Tienda & Susana M. Sánchezdoi:10.1162/DAED_a_00218

Abstract: This essay provides an overview of immigration from Latin America since 1960, focusing onchanges in both the size and composition of the dominant streams and their cumulative impact on theU.S. foreign-born population. We briefly describe the deep historical roots of current migration streamsand the policy backdrop against which migration from the region surged. Distinguishing among the threemajor pathways to U.S. residence–family sponsorship, asylum, and unauthorized entry–we explain howcontemporary flows are related both to economic crises, political conflicts, and humanitarian incidentsin sending countries, but especially to idiosyncratic application of existing laws over time. The concludingsection highlights the importance of investing in the children of immigrants to meet the future labor needsof an aging nation.

49142 (3) Summer 2013

in U.S. immigration policy and to un-equal and inconsistent enforcement ofexisting laws in order to spotlight themyriad unintended consequences forsending and receiving communities. Theconcluding section reflects on the impli-cations of Latin American immigrationfor the future of the nation, highlightingthe growing importance of the children ofimmigrants for the future labor needs ofan aging nation. We also note the thwartedintegration prospects of recent and futureimmigrants in localities where anti-immigrant hostility is on the rise.

Nearly a century before the Englishfounded Jamestown in 1607, Spanish set-tlements peppered the Americas. Even asthey forged indelible Hispanic imprintsin large swaths of the American Southwest,Spanish settlers Hispanicized the SouthAmerican continent, later joined by thePortuguese in creating an “Iberian enter-prise.” Rubén D. Rumbaut, poet and pub-lic intellectual, describes that process as“one of the greatest and deepest convul-sions in history . . . [an] epochal movement. . . that poured the occidental nations ofEurope over . . . the New World.”2 As such,Spain began the ½rst wave of migration towhat would become the United States ofAmerica, and also populated one of itsfuture sources of immigrants.

The long-standing power struggle be-tween Spain and England, which carriedover to the Americas, is also relevant forunderstanding Latin American immigra-tion to the United States. Although mostSpanish colonies had achieved indepen-dence by the middle of the nineteenth cen-tury, the newly independent republics wereweak politically and militarily, vulnerableto external aggression. Given its proximity,Mexico proved an easy target for the ex-pansionist aspirations of the United States.Under the terms of the Treaty of Guada-lupe Hidalgo, which ended the U.S.-Mex-

ican War (1846–1848), combined withthe Gadsden Purchase, the United Statesacquired almost half of Mexico’s land.

The signi½cance of the annexation forcontemporary immigration from Mexicocannot be overstated. Not only were socialties impervious to the newly drawn polit-ical boundary, but economic ties also weredeepened as Mexican workers were re-cruited to satisfy chronic and temporarylabor shortages during the nineteenth andtwentieth centuries–an asymmetricalexchange that was enabled by the main-tenance of a porous border. The BraceroProgram, a guest worker program in forcebetween 1942 and 1964, is a poignantexample of U.S. growers’ dependence onMexican labor facilitated by legal con-tracts combined with growing relianceon unauthorized workers.

Fifty years after the Treaty of Guada-lupe Hidalgo, the United States intervenedin Cuba’s struggle for independenceagainst the Spanish crown, which lost itslast colonies in the Americas and thePaci½c region. As part of the settlement,the United States acquired Puerto Rico,Guam, and the Philippines, and was cededtemporary control of Cuba. Both the U.S.-Mexican War and the Spanish-AmericanWar established foundations for U.S.-bound migration. Mexico and Cuba havebeen top sending countries for most ofthe twentieth century and into the twenty-½rst, with the Philippines ranking secondsince 1980.3 Notwithstanding intermittenttravel barriers imposed by the Castroregime, Cuba was a top source of U.S.immigrants during the last half of thetwentieth century, consistently rankingamong the top three Latin Americansource countries and among the top tenworldwide.

The underpinnings of contemporarymigration from Latin America are alsorooted in policy changes designed to reg-ulate permanent and temporary admis-

MartaTienda &Susana M.Sánchez

50 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

sions, beginning with the ImmigrationAct of 1924. Although widely criticized forestablishing a racist quota system designedto restrict migration from Southern andEastern Europe, the 1924 Act is relevantfor contemporary Latin American immi-gration because it explicitly exempted fromthe quotas the independent countries ofCentral and South America, includingMexico and the Dominican Republic. Bothcountries currently are major sources ofundocumented migration; however, thecircumstances fostering each of theseundocumented streams differ.

Table 1 summarizes key legislation thatinfluences Latin American immigrationtoday, beginning with the most recent com-prehensive immigration law, the Immi-gration and Nationality Act of 1952 (ina).Although the ina retained the quota sys-tem that limited immigration from East-ern Europe (and that virtually precludedimmigration from Asia and Africa), thelegislation established the ½rst preferencesystem specifying skill criteria and imposeda worldwide ceiling. But in the wake ofthe civil rights movement, the 1965 amend-ments to ina dismantled the overtly racistquota system.

Two aspects of the new visa preferencesystem are key for understanding contem-porary Latin American immigration: thehigh priority accorded to family uni½ca-tion relative to labor quali½cations; andthe exemption of spouses, children, andparents of U.S. citizens from the countrycaps, which in effect favored groupsexempted by the 1924 Immigration Act.This included Mexican Americans whoseancestors became citizens by treaty andthe relatives of braceros who had settledthroughout the Southwest during theheyday of the guest worker program; butover time, it came to include the relativesof newcomers who sponsored their rela-tives after naturalization. The terminationof the Bracero Program coupled with the

extension of uniform country quotas forthe Western Hemisphere in 1978 was par-ticularly consequential for Mexico, withthe predictable outcome that unauthorizedmigration climbed.

When an exodus from Cuba began in theaftermath of the Cuban revolution, theUnited States had not yet established acomprehensive refugee policy. Althoughnot a signatory to the un Refugee Con-vention or Protocol, and despite a highlyunbalanced economic and political rela-tionship with the United States, Cuba hasinfluenced the development and execu-tion of U.S. refugee policy in myriad ways.Cuban émigrés instantiated the ideologi-cal war between the United States andCastro’s socialist regime, not only forcingthe U.S. government to de½ne its refugeepolicy, but also beginning a period ofexceptions to of½cial guidelines. The1966 Cuban Adjustment Act (caa) allowsCuban exiles to apply for permanent resi-dence after residing in the United Statesfor only one year. Unlike Haitians, Domini-cans, or other Latin Americans, very fewCubans are repatriated if they land onU.S. soil, even if they enter through landborders.4

Cubans seeking asylum in the UnitedStates are the main Latin American bene-½ciaries of the 1980 Refugee Act, and theyhave enjoyed preferential admissions andgenerous resettlement assistance bothbefore and since the 1980 Act.5 In responseto a third major Cuban exodus during themid-1990s, the U.S. government negotiatedthe Cuban Migration Agreement, whichrevised the caa by establishing what be-came known as the “wet foot/dry foot”policy. By agreement, Cubans apprehendedat sea (that is, with “wet feet”) would bereturned to Cuba (or a third country incases of legitimate fears of persecution);those who successfully avoided the U.S.Coast Guard and landed on U.S. shores(with “dry feet”) would be allowed to re-

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Table 1Major U.S. Legislation Concerning Latin American Immigration, 1952–2001

Source: Michael E. Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel, Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight (Washington,D.C.: Urban Institute, 1994); Guillermina Jasso and Mark R. Rosenzweig, The New Chosen People: Immigrants inthe United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1990); Ruth E. Wasem, Cuban Migration to the United States:Policy and Trends (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009); Ruth E. Wasem, U.S. ImmigrationPolicy on Permanent Admissions (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010); and U.S. Departmentof Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/.

Legislation Date Key Provisions

Immigration and 1952 Establishes the ½rst preference systemNationality Act Retains national-origin quotas favoring Western Europe(ina) Imposes ceiling of 154K plus 2K from Asia-Paci½c Triangle

Immigration Act 1965 Repeals national-origin quotas(Amendments to ina) Sets a maximum limit on immigration from the Western

(120K) and Eastern (170K) HemispheresRevises visa preference system to favor family reuni½cationEstablishes uniform per-country limit of 20K visas for the

Eastern Hemisphere

Cuba Adjustment Act 1966 Allows undocumented Cubans who have lived in the United(caa) States for at least one year to apply for permanent residence

Refugee Act 1980 Adopts un protocol de½nition of refugeeCreates systematic procedures for refugee admissionEstablishes resettlement procedures Eliminates refugees from the preference systemInstitutes the ½rst asylum provision

Immigration Reform 1986 Institutes employer sanctions for hiring undocumentedand Control Act immigrants(irca) Legalizes undocumented immigrants

Increases border enforcementEstablishes “wet foot/dry foot” policy

Cuban Migration 1994– Sets up a minimum of 20K visas annuallyAgreement (cma) 1995 Conducts in-country refugee processing

Illegal Immigration 1996 Strengthens border enforcement and raises penalties forReform and Immigrant unauthorized entry and smugglingResponsibility Act Expands criteria for exclusion and deportation(iirira) Initiates the employment veri½cation pilot programs

Nicaraguan Adjustment 1997 Legalizes Nicaraguans and Cubans; later legalizes abc class and Central American members (Salvadorans and Guatemalans)Relief Act (nacara)

Temporary Protected Grants temporary legal status to nationals of countries that Status (tps) experienced an armed conflict or a major natural disaster

1990 Granted to Salvadorans due to civil war (lasted 18 months)1998 Granted to Hondurans and Nicaraguans due to damages

caused by Hurricane Mitch (expires 2015)2001 Granted to Salvadorans following an earthquake (expires 2013)



main and, in accordance with the provi-sions of the 1966 caa, would qualify forexpedited legal permanent residence.6

A third major amendment to the ina,the 1986 Immigration Reform and Con-trol Act (irca), in principle marks a shiftin the focus of U.S. immigration policytoward a growing emphasis on enforce-ment. irca granted legal status to approx-imately 2.7 million persons residing un-lawfully in the United States, including thespecial agricultural workers who only wererequired to prove part-year residence.Over 85 percent of the legalized popula-tion originated in Latin America, withabout 70 percent from Mexico alone.7The rapid growth of unauthorized immi-gration post-irca also led to increasedenforcement efforts.

The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform andImmigrant Responsibility Act (iirira),which intensi½ed forti½cation of the bor-der, expanded criteria for deportation andmade a half-hearted effort to strengtheninterior enforcement through the employ-ment veri½cation pilot programs. Morethan a decade after irca, Congress ap-proved another legalization program, theNicaraguan Adjustment and Central Amer-ican Relief Act (nacara), which conferredlegal permanent resident (lpr) status toregistered asylees (and their dependents)from Nicaragua, Cuba, El Salvador, Gua-temala, and nationals of former Sovietbloc countries (and their dependents) whohad resided in the United States for atleast ½ve consecutive years before Decem-ber 1, 1995. According to Donald Kerwin,executive director of the Center for Migra-tion Studies, fewer than 70,000 asyleeswere legalized under nacara through2009; but in typical fashion, a patchworkof solutions for speci½c groups have beenenacted since irca was passed in 1986.8

Finally, as part of its humanitarian goals,Congress also enacted legislation offeringTemporary Protected Status (tps) for

Central Americans displaced by civil warsor natural disasters. tps is time-limited;does not offer a pathway to permanentresident status; and requires acts of Con-gress for extension.9 Once the period ofprotection expires, its bene½ciaries are ex-pected to return to their country of origin.Among those displaced by civil conflict,some claim political asylum while otherslapse into unauthorized status along withthe thousands denied asylum.

Collectively, the legislation summarizedin Table 1 represents the major pathwaysto attain lpr status: namely, family uni½-cation, employer sponsorship, and human-itarian protections. Family reuni½cationgives preference to prospective migrantsfrom countries with longer immigrationtraditions, like Mexico, because they aremore likely to have citizen relatives in theUnited States who can serve as sponsors;but over time this pathway has becomemore prominent as earlier arrivals natu-ralize in order to sponsor their relatives.With the exception of Argentineans dur-ing the 1960s and Colombians during theearly 1970s, relatively few Latin Americanimmigrants receive lpr status throughemployment preferences. Rather, themajority of Latin Americans recruited foremployment enter as temporary workersor through clandestine channels. Neitherunauthorized entry nor tps provides adirect pathway to legal permanent resi-dence, but they can evolve into indirectpathways via comprehensive (for example,irca) or targeted (for example, nacara)amnesty programs. In the following sec-tion, we use the three pathways to illus-trate how each differs for speci½c countries,and to identify the economic and politi-cal forces undergirding changes over time.

Figure 1 uses data from the decennialcensus to portray changes in the U.S. LatinAmerican-born population from 1960 to2010 by region of origin. The graphic rep-

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resentation reveals the regional-origindiversi½cation that accompanied thetwelvefold increase in the Latin American-born population since 1970. Despite thecontinuing Mexican dominance amongLatin American-born U.S. residents, flowdiversi½cation resulted in a more balancedsubregional pro½le in 2010 compared withprior decades. The Caribbean share ofLatin American immigrants peaked at 31percent in 1970, fell to 20 percent in 1980,

and has remained at 10 percent since 2000.Over the last ½fty years, the Central Amer-ican share of all Latin American immi-grants rose from about 6 percent in 1960 toaround 16 percent since 1990, when about12 percent of Latin American immigrantsoriginated from South America.

Table 2 reports the major source coun-tries that drove the changes reported inFigure 1. Only countries comprising at least2 percent of the decade total Latin Amer-

Figure 1U.S. Foreign-Born Population (in millions) from Latin America, 1960–2010

“Caribbean” includes Cuba and the Dominican Republic; “Central America” includes Guatemala, Honduras, ElSalvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama; and “South America” includes Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador,Peru, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, and Paraguay. Source: Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statisticson the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850–2000,” Population Division Working Paper No. 81(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006); and American Community Survey, One-Year Estimates for 2010.



Tabl

e 2

Larg

est

Lati

n A

mer

ican

-Bor

n Po

pula

tion

s (b

y pe

rcen

tage

) in

the

Uni

ted

Stat

es, b

y C

ount

ry o

f O

rigi

n, 1

960–

2010

Cou

ntri

es a

re p

rese

nted

in d

esce

ndin

g or

der

for

each

yea

r. S

ourc

e: C

ampb

ell G

ibso

n an

d K

ay Ju

ng, “

His

tori

cal C

ensu

s St

atis

tics

on

the

Fore

ign-

Born

Pop

ulat

ion

of th

e U

nite

d St

ates

:18

50–

2000

,” P

opul

atio

n D

ivis

ion

Wor

king

Pap

er N

o. 8

1 (W

ashi

ngto

n, D

.C.:

U.S

. Cen

sus

Bure

au, 2

006)

; an

d A

mer

ican

Com

mun

ity

Surv

ey, O

ne-Y

ear

Est

imat

es f

or 2

010.

1960

1970

1980

1990

200

020

10

Mex

ico

Mex

ico

Mex

ico

Mex

ico

Mex

ico

Mex

ico

(73.

1)(4

7.6)

(57.

8)(5

8.2)

(63.

6)(6

1.3)

Cub

aC

uba

Cub

aC

uba

Cub

aE

l Sal

vado

r(1

0.0)

(27.

5)(1

6.0)

(10.

0)(6

.1)

(6.3

)

Arg

enti

naC

olom

bia

Dom

inic

an R

epub

lic

El S

alva

dor

El S

alva

dor

Cub

a(2

.1)

(4.0

)(4

.4)

(6.3

)(5

.7)

(5.8

)

Dom

inic

an R

epub

lic

Col

ombi

aD

omin

ican

Rep

ubli

cD

omin

ican

Rep

ubli

cD

omin

ican

Rep

ublic

(3.8

)(3

.8)

(4.7

)(4

.8)

(4.6

)

Arg

enti

naE

l Sal

vado

rC

olom

bia

Col

ombi

aG

uate

mal

a(2

.8)

(2.5

)(3

.9)

(3.5

)(4

.3)

Ecu

ador

Gua

tem

ala

Gua

tem

ala

Col

ombi

a(2

.3)

(3.1

)(3

.3)

(3.3

)

Oth

er C

ount

ries

Oth

er C

ount

ries

Oth

er C

ount

ries

Oth

er C

ount

ries

Oth

er C

ount

ries

Oth

er C

ount

ries

(14.

8)(1

4.3)

(13.

2)(1

3.8)

(13.

0)(1

4.4)

N78

8,06

81,

597,

481

3,80

1,35

17,

385,

479

14,4

18,5

7619

,115

,077

55142 (3) Summer 2013

ican-born population are separately re-ported, which quali½es a maximum of sixcountries after 1970, but only three in 1960.Not surprisingly, Mexicans remain thedominant group throughout the period,but owing to large swings in immigrantflows from the Caribbean and CentralAmerica, the Mexican share fluctuatedfrom a high of 73 percent in 1960 to a lowof 48 percent in 1970. Cubans were thesecond largest group among the LatinAmerican-born population through 2000,but their share varied from a high of 27percent in 1970 to less than 6 percent in2010, when Salvadorans edged out Cubansfor second place.

The decade-speci½c pro½le of mainsource countries also reveals the ascen-dance of Colombians and Dominicansduring the 1960s and 1970s, with CentralAmericans following during the 1980s.Although Argentina ranked among thetop source countries during the 1960s and1970s, when the United States bene½tedfrom the exodus of highly skilled profes-sionals from that country, the “brain drain”was not sustained. Political repression andeconomic crises rekindled Argentineanemigration during the late 1970s, early1980s, and again at the beginning of thetwenty-½rst century, but Spain, Italy, andIsrael were then the preferred destina-tions. Today, unlike Colombia, Argentinais not a major contributor to U.S. immi-gration.

The stock measures reported in Table 2and Figure 1 portray the cumulative impactof immigration, but reflect immigrationtrends imperfectly because they conflatethree components of change: new addi-tions; temporary residents, including thebene½ciaries of protection from deporta-tion; and unauthorized residents. Thus, theforeign-born population based on censusdata overstates the immigrant population,which consists of persons granted lprstatus in any given period, including ref-

ugees and asylees. Therefore, to explain theebb and flow of Latin American immigra-tion over the last half-century, we orga-nize the remainder of this section aroundthe three sources of immigrants: lprs;refugees and asylees; and unauthorizedmigrants granted legal status.

Legal Permanent Residents. Table 3 reportsthe number of new lprs from Latin Amer-ica over the last ½ve decades, with detailsfor the major sending countries from theCaribbean, Mesoamerica, and South Amer-ica. Since the 1960s, Latin Americans havemade up about one-third of new lprs, withthe period share fluctuating between 31percent during the 1970s to 41 percentduring the 1990s. For each period there ishigh correspondence between the domi-nant foreign-stock population countries(Table 2) and the number of new lprsadmitted from those countries (Table 3);therefore, we use these nations to orga-nize our discussion of speci½c streams.

Mexicans comprise the largest share oflegal immigrants from Latin America, typ-ically 40 to 45 percent per cohort exceptfor the 1980s and 1990s, when the ircalegalization was under way. The vast major-ity of Mexicans granted lpr status–88percent in ½scal year 2010, for example–are sponsored by U.S. relatives; less than10 percent quali½ed under the employmentpreferences.10 Mexicans comprised nearly60 percent of all new lprs from LatinAmerica during the 1980s and 1990s, in partdue to the large number of status adjustersunder irca. Moreover, Mexican immigra-tion would have been higher in each decadeif the family-sponsored preferences werenot numerically capped. Along with Fili-pinos, Chinese, and Indians, Mexicans aregreatly oversubscribed in the family-sponsored preference categories, and thusthousands of Mexican family memberswait for years for their visa priority date.For example, in 2010 unmarried Mexicanadult children sponsored by U.S. residents



had waited eighteen years to receive theirentry visa.11

Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are themajor immigrant-sending nations fromSouth America. Although their initial lev-els of immigration differ, all three countrieswitnessed gradual increases during the1970s, but thereafter their immigrationflows diverged. Colombia was the largestsingle source of immigrants from SouthAmerica throughout the period. Stimu-lated by prolonged political instability,armed conflict, and drug violence amidsporadic economic downturns, Colombianemigration gained momentum over thelatter half of the twentieth century. Theearly waves largely involved upper-class

professionals with the resources to flee,but as the internal armed conflict escalated,members of the working classes joinedthe exodus.12 Legal immigration rose 60percent between the 1970s and 1980s, andnearly doubled after 2000.

Ecuadorian immigration has trebledsince 1961, rising from 37,000 during the1960s to more than 110,000 during themost recent decade. Demand for Panamahats produced in the provinces of Azuayand Cañar triggered the early waves ofEcuadoran immigrants during the late1950s, but deteriorating economic condi-tions augmented subsequent flows fromthese regions, which were facilitated bydense social networks established by ear-

Table 3Number of Latin Americans (in thousands) Granted Legal Permanent Resident Status, 1961–2010

Source: For decades 1961–1970 and 1971–1980, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1984; for decades 1981–1990, 1991–2000, and 2001–2010, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics from the years 1990, 1995, 2002, and 2010.

1961– 1971– 1981– 1991– 2001–1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Total 3,321.7 4,493.3 7,338.1 9,095.4 10,501.0(all countries)

Latin America 1,077.0 1,395.3 2,863.6 3,759.8 3,746.1(all countries)

Mexico 443.3 637.2 1,653.2 2,251.4 1,693.2

CaribbeanCuba 256.8 276.8 159.3 180.9 318.4Dominican Republic 94.1 148.0 251.8 340.9 329.1

Central AmericaEl Salvador 15.0 34.4 214.6 217.4 252.8Guatemala 15.4 25.6 87.9 103.1 160.7Honduras 15.4 17.2 49.5 66.8 65.4

South AmericaColombia 70.3 77.6 124.4 131.0 251.3Ecuador 37.0 50.2 56.0 76.4 112.5Peru 18.6 29.1 64.4 105.7 145.7

Rest of Latin America 111.1 99.2 202.5 286.2 417.0

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lier waves.13 The collapse of oil prices inthe 1980s combined with spiraling unem-ployment, wage erosion, and inflation re-kindled emigration, which averaged 17,000annually.

Following the collapse of the bankingsystem in the late 1990s, emigration rosefrom approximately 30,000 annually be-tween 1990 and 1997 to over 100,000annually thereafter.14 However, Spainreplaced the United States as a preferreddestination during the 1990s, hostingnearly half of all Ecuadorian emigrants be-tween 1996 and 2001 compared with about27 percent destined for the United States.15

Hyperinflation and massive underemploy-ment resulting from the 1987 structuraladjustment measures also acceleratedPeruvian out-migration during the 1990s,more than doubling the number of newPeruvian lprs; but the Peruvian share ofthe Latin American-born population neverreached 2 percent. Except for the modestdip between the 1960s and 1970s, immi-gration from the rest of Latin Americamirrors the Peruvian trend: doubling be-tween the 1970s and 1980s and then con-tinuing on an upward spiral that hasexceeded 400,000 since 2001 (Table 3).

Civil wars and political instability trig-gered the formidable influx of Salvadorans,Hondurans, and Guatemalans to the Unit-ed States. Emigration from El Salvador,the smallest but most densely populatedof the Central American republics, is par-ticularly noteworthy because of the sheernumbers that received lpr status: morethan 215,000 during the 1980s and an ad-ditional half-million over the next twodecades. That thousands of Salvadoransarrived seeking asylum largely explains whytheir lpr numbers exceed the annual capsfor several decades. Hundreds of thousandslapsed into undocumented status whenthey were denied asylee status, but a largemajority of Salvadoran asylees successfullyadjusted to lpr status under nacara.

Like El Salvador, Guatemala witnessedprolonged civil conflict, which escalatedafter 1978 and initiated a mass exodus ofasylum seekers during the 1980s and 1990s.Those who arrived before 1982 quali½ed forstatus adjustment under irca, but laterarrivals did not. Although political insta-bility is credited for the surge in Guate-malan immigration, sociologists StevenAlvarado and Douglas Massey claim thatneither violence nor economic factorspredicted the likelihood of out-migration;rather, they portray Guatemalan emigra-tion as a household decision to diversifyincome streams by sending young, skilledmembers to join U.S. relatives. Their inter-pretation is consistent with sociologistJacqueline Hagan’s ethnographic accountthat chronicles how establishment of sistercommunities in U.S. cities enabled fur-ther migration via family uni½cation.16

By 2010, Guatemalans became the fourthlargest Latin American-born group in theUnited States. The increase in Guatemalanlegal resident admissions since 2001 alsoreflects the status adjustments authorizedby nacara.

In contrast to Guatemala and El Salvador,the rise in Honduran immigration has beenmore gradual, except for the 1980s, whenit nearly trebled compared to the priordecade. Unlike Nicaraguans, Salvadorans,and Guatemalans, Hondurans could notclaim asylee status. Rather, skyrocketingpoverty and unemployment during the1980s and 1990s is responsible for the surgein emigration. In 1998, Hurricane Mitchaggravated the country’s economic woes,leaving hundreds of thousands homeless.An estimated 66,000 Hondurans soughtrefuge in the United States and were grant-ed tps, which does not confer a path tolegal permanent residence. Unless renewedin 2015, Hondurans granted tps will jointhe unauthorized population, which, ac-cording to the Of½ce of Immigration Sta-tistics, rose from 160,000 to 330,000 be-



tween 2000 and 2010.17 Currently, familysponsorship is the main pathway to legalpermanent residence for Hondurans, ac-counting for 85 percent of the recent lprs.

The last major lpr flow since 1960 isfrom the Dominican Republic. This out-migration began in the wake of the polit-ical upheaval following dictator Trujillo’sassassination in 1961; but even after thepolitical scene stabilized, failed economicpolicies continued to fuel the flow. Since1961, the number of new lprs more thantrebled, exceeding 330,000 during each ofthe last two decades. Despite modest eco-nomic growth during the 1990s and therevival of tourism, persistently high un-employment buttressed by deep social net-works has maintained a steady exodus.18

Dominicans have been taking full advan-tage of the family uni½cation provisionsof the ina by sponsoring relatives; virtu-ally all Dominicans granted lpr status in2010 bene½ted from the family sponsor-ship provisions of the ina.19

Refugees and Asylees. By de½nition, refugeeand asylee flows precipitated by politicalupheavals and natural disasters are un-predictable in both timing and size, butthe impact they have on immigrant admis-sions also depends on the idiosyncraticapplication of U.S. immigration and ref-ugee policy. Since 1960, Cubans havedominated the refugee flow from LatinAmerica, but armed conflicts in CentralAmerica and Colombia as well as naturaldisasters have also contributed to thegrowth of humanitarian admissions inrecent decades. The Cuban exodus hasbeen highly unpredictable owing to bar-riers imposed by the Cuban governmentand the level of acrimony between Havanaand Washington.

Cuban emigration began shortly afterFidel Castro took up the reins of the islandnation. By 1974, 650,000 Cubans had leftfor the United States.20 Dubbed the“golden exile” because the vast majority

of the ½rst-wave migrants were profes-sionals, entrepreneurs, and landowners,Cuban émigrés were granted visa waiversand parolee status, and were offered arange of services to facilitate their labormarket integration, including certi½cationof professional credentials, a college loanprogram, and bilingual education.21 Partlybecause they were fleeing a socialist stateand partly because they did not ½t the unde½nitions of refugee, Cubans enjoyed aprivileged position among the U.S. foreign-born population. Indeed, the 1966 caaput Cubans on a fast track to citizenship.

A second major exodus occurred in April1980, when the Cuban government openedthe port of Mariel to anyone who wantedto leave, including prisoners and lunatics.About 125,000 “Marielitos” arrived on U.S.shores in a few short months, joined by35,000 Haitians.22 Although Marielitos didnot formally qualify as refugees accord-ing to the guidelines of the newly enactedRefugee Act and were technically ineligi-ble for federal funds, they were accordedrefugee status by congressional decree,illustrating yet again the idiosyncraticapplication of U.S. immigration law.

A third migration wave occurred in themid-1990s, when the Cuban governmentlifted the ban on departures. Rather thanextend the welcome gangplank as in prioryears, the U.S. government interdictedCuban fugitives attempting to circumventlegal immigration channels and returnedthem to Guantánamo. Within a year,33,000 Cubans were encamped at Guan-tánamo, but in yet another predictableexception to immigration law, the majoritywere paroled and granted lpr status.23

Although accompanied with less mediafanfare than the 1980 Mariel boatlift, thelargest number of Cubans to arrive in asingle decade came after 2001; since thatdate, nearly 320,000 Cubans have beengranted lpr status. Under the provisionsof the wet foot/dry foot agreement,

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Cubans interdicted at sea or apprehendedon land are deportable; but in practice veryfew are returned because they are enti-tled to request asylum, and most do so.

Central Americans and Colombians alsohave used the humanitarian pathway toacquire legal permanent residence, albeitwith far less success than Cubans. Salva-doran and Guatemalan asylee approvalrates were less than 3 percent between1983 and 1990 compared with 25 percentfor Nicaraguans.24 Alleging discriminationagainst Central Americans, religious orga-nizations and immigrant rights advocates½led a class action lawsuit on their behalf,American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh. Aspart of the 1991 settlement, Congressallowed Central Americans who had beendenied asylum to reapply for review, andthey achieved much higher success rates.However, the 1996 iirira made the asy-lum rules even more dif½cult by addingprovisions to resettle asylum seekers tothird countries; by requiring asylees to½le applications within a year of arrival inthe United States; by precluding appealsto denied applications; and by imposinghigh processing fees. After 1997, the classmembers in American Baptist Churches v.Thornburgh were allowed to adjust theirstatus through nacara; as a result, ap-proval rates grew to over 95 percent.25

Two major natural disasters rekindledasylees from Central America at the turnof the twenty-½rst century, when HurricaneMitch (1998) displaced thousands of Nica-raguans and Hondurans, and a massiveearthquake (2001) left more than a millionSalvadorans homeless. Drawn by a sizableexpatriate community, thousands of dis-placed Salvadorans made their way to theUnited States. In a humanitarian gesture,Congress granted tps to Salvadorans re-siding in the United States as of 2001, andit has renewed the protection several times.As of 2010, more than 300,000 individuals–70,000 Hondurans, 3,500 Nicaraguans,

and 229,000 Salvadorans–had bene½tedfrom tps.26 The status protections accord-ed to the victims of Hurricane Mitch andthe Salvadoran earthquake are set to expirein 2015 and 2013, respectively. In the currentpolitical climate, it is uncertain whetherthese temporary protections will be extend-ed; if they are not, many will probably joinmillions of others as undocumented resi-dents.

Unauthorized Migration. The growth ofundocumented immigration since 1960 isnot only a distinctive feature of the currentwave of mass migration, but also a directconsequence of selective enforcement ofU.S. immigration laws. As of March 2010,an estimated 11 million undocumentedimmigrants resided in the United States,down from a peak of nearly 12 million in2007, but 29 percent higher than the 2000estimate of 8.5 million.27 Latin Americansmake up over three-fourths of undocu-mented residents, with 60 percent fromMexico alone. The collapse of the housingand construction industries during thegreat recession fostered the ½rst signi½cantdecline in the size of the undocumentedpopulation, reversing two decades of con-tinuous growth. Removals from LatinAmerica since 2001 more than quadrupledrelative to the prior decade, which partlyexplains the shrinking unauthorized pop-ulation, albeit less than changes in labordemand.

Several factors have fueled the growthof unauthorized migration from LatinAmerica, beginning with the abrupt ter-mination of the Bracero Program in 1964,following a 22-year period during whichU.S. growers became dependent on pliableMexican labor. In some ways, the 1965amendments to the ina constructed anillegal immigration system by default be-cause the disproportionate focus on fam-ily visas gave short shrift to labor needs;because the Texas proviso protected em-ployers who willfully hired undocumented



workers until irca imposed employersanctions; and because the cap on familyvisas (except for immediate family mem-bers of U.S. citizens) produced long waitlists for countries with established immi-gration traditions. Furthermore, the inte-gration of separate hemispheric ceilingsinto a single worldwide total in 1978 dra-matically curtailed the number of visasavailable to Mexico, the largest single send-ing nation. As occurred when the BraceroProgram ended, unauthorized entry pro-vided an alternative pathway to the UnitedStates, one greatly facilitated by the exis-tence of strong social networks that wereforti½ed over decades of relatively unre-stricted migration.

Finally, decades of lax and inconsistentenforcement enabled millions of personsto enter without inspection, while shoddymonitoring of temporary visitors permit-ted hundreds of thousands of legal entrantsto overstay their visas. Since 1986, how-ever, U.S. immigration policy has beendominated by a growing emphasis onborder enforcement, with heightenedpenalties for persons who enter withoutauthorization as well as for non-immi-grants who remain in the country after theirvisas expire. Because irca’s employersanctions provisions were never seriouslyenforced, unauthorized immigration roseduring the 1990s, when the housing andconstruction industries–both dominatedby unskilled workers–expanded. Weakinterior enforcement basically left in placethe lynchpin of unauthorized migration,namely, employers’ ability to hire unau-thorized foreign workers essentially with-out reprisal.

Even as irca’s comprehensive amnestyprogram was winding down, unauthorizedmigration was on the rise. In fact, duringthe 1990s, between 70 and 80 percent ofall new migrants from Mexico were un-documented, and this share rose to 85 per-cent between 2000 and 2004.28 In a feeble

attempt to reduce employment of unau-thorized workers, the 1996 iirira autho-rized three pilot programs to verify em-ployment eligibility, but it protectedemployers from ½nes for declared “goodfaith” efforts to comply with veri½cationrequirements. Not surprisingly, iirira didlittle to restrict the unauthorized flow fromLatin America because interior enforce-ment remained weak; because the socialnetworks sustaining the flows were alreadyvery deeply entrenched; and because thepeople-smuggling networks and fraudu-lent-document industries developed newavenues to circumvent the laws.

Migration is part of a multiphase demo-graphic response to unequally distributedsocial and economic opportunities that issimultaneously determined by micro- andmacro-level forces. Many of these forcescannot be predicted, such as sudden flowstriggered by civil wars or natural disas-ters, nor can they be rigorously managedthrough policy measures, as demonstratedby the failure to seal the U.S.-Mexico bor-der. Like most nations with long immi-gration traditions, the United States strivesto balance economic, social, and human-itarian goals through its admission pref-erences while also ensuring compliancewith the laws. But an appraisal of LatinAmerican immigration exposes numer-ous instances where extant laws havebeen systematically disregarded or ap-plied in a capricious or discriminatorymanner. Striking examples include thepreferential treatment accorded to Cubanémigrés compared with Haitians whoarrive on U.S. shores in similar situations;the explicit protection of employers whohire unauthorized workers by not holdingthem accountable for violating the law; anddifferential treatment of asylum applicantsaccording to national origin. Fairness isnot a de½ning feature of U.S. immigrationpolicy toward Latin Americans.

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Historically and in the present, LatinAmerican immigration has afforded theUnited States myriad economic bene½ts,including lower prices for goods pro-duced in industries that employ immi-grant workers, increased demand for U.S.products, and higher wages and employ-ment for domestic workers. That new im-migrants accounted for half of the growthin the labor force during the 1990s addedsigni½cantly to the economic prosperityenjoyed by average Americans. Neverthe-less, it is doubtful that the current admis-sion criteria that favor family uni½cationover employment needs are well alignedwith future economic needs of an agingnation. Suggestions to adjust employmentvisas with fluctuations in labor needs,while intuitively compelling, ignore thattwo-thirds of U.S. immigrants enter underfamily preferences and that the momen-tum for future flows is already baked intothe system in the form of visa backlogsfor Mexicans and others. Beyond imme-diate family relatives of U.S. citizens, how-ever, it is worth reconsidering the socialand economic value of maintaining theextended family preferences, which havebecome a key driver of Dominican andSalvadoran immigration in recent years.

Notwithstanding the visa backlogs forfamily-sponsored relatives of Mexicans,there is some evidence that net migrationfrom Mexico has slowed and may haveeven reversed.29 Bleak job prospects fol-lowing the great recession are a key rea-son for the slowdown, but record highdeportations under the Obama adminis-tration, a militarized border, and steppedup interior enforcement are contributingfactors. Whether this slowdown in Mex-ican migration is a temporary blip or thebeginning of a long-term reversal is yetunclear, and likely will depend on boththe future pace of the U.S. recovery fromthe recession as well as the Mexican gov-ernment’s success in sustaining economic

growth and dealing with its plague ofdrug-related violence. Lower fertilitythroughout Latin America also portendsless surplus labor in the years to come.

Equally uncertain are the integrationprospects of Latin American immigrantsand their offspring. The rise of anti-immigrant sentiment in response to anunprecedented geographic dispersal ofLatin American immigrants highlights theformidable integration challenges facingthe nation–challenges that can thwart eco-nomic prospects in the years ahead whilealso fomenting ethnic conflict. Severalworrisome trends warrant consideration.The recent Supreme Court decision up-holding a state’s right to empower localpolice to check the immigration status ofanyone suspected of being in the countryillegally bodes ill for the integration ofLatin American immigrants, particularlythose with indigenous roots who poseready targets for racial pro½ling.

Another concern is the persistentachievement gap between the offspringof Latin American immigrants and theirAmerican-born counterparts. After theyear 2000, births outpaced immigrationas a component of Hispanic populationgrowth in the United States; this fact un-derscores the urgency of closing the edu-cation gap so that the children of LatinAmerican immigrants can become pro-ductive replacement workers for the agingwhite majority. Recent trends are not en-couraging, however. State and local gov-ernments have gouged education budgetsin the interest of ½scal restraint, which notonly reduces educational investments infuture workers–large majorities of themchildren of immigrants–but also compro-mises the nation’s competitive advantageover the medium and long term.

Finally, the unresolved status of 11 mil-lion unauthorized immigrants–of whichthree-quarters are from Latin America–remains a thorny social, political, and



moral issue. Legal status profoundly affectsprospects for economic and social mobility.Economists Sherrie Kossoudji and Debo-rah Cobb-Clark estimated wage penaltiesfor unauthorized status at 14 to 24 percent,and they ½nd a bene½t of legalization of 6 percent.30 This represents a formidableeconomic stimulus that can generate sub-stantial multiplier effects via consumption.Our review of Latin American immigra-tion reveals that thousands have bene½ted

from status adjustments through severalgroup-speci½c congressional acts. In theinterest of transparency and uniformityin the application of immigration laws, ablanket amnesty will advance U.S. eco-nomic interests while promoting socialcohesion. Another blanket amnesty willgo a long way toward aligning our liberaldemocracy with the realities of LatinAmerican immigration.

endnotes* Contributor Biographies: MARTA TIENDA, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1993, is

the Maurice P. During ’22 Professor in Demographic Studies, Professor of Sociology andPublic Affairs, and Director of the Latino Studies Program at Princeton University. Her pub-lications include Hispanics and the Future of America (edited with Faith Mitchell, 2006), Eth-nicity and Causal Mechanisms (edited with Michael Rutter, 2005), and The Hispanic Populationof the United States (coauthored with Frank D. Bean, 1987).

SUSANA M. SÁNCHEZ is a graduate student in the Sociology Department and the Popula-tion Research Institute at Pennsylvania State University. Her research focuses on the childrenof Mexican immigrants and health disparities by social class and ethnicity.

1 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Populationof the United States: 1850–2000,” Population Division Working Paper No. 81 (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). The 2010 estimate is our calculation based on the AmericanCommunity Survey.

2 Rubén D. Rumbaut, “The Hispanic Prologue,” in A Hispanic Look at the Bicentennial, ed. DavidCardús (Houston: Institute of Hispanic Culture of Houston, 1978), 5–22.

3 Ruth E. Wasem, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions (Washington, D.C.: Con-gressional Research Service, 2010), Figure 4.

4 Ruth E. Wasem, Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends (Washington, D.C.:Congressional Research Service, 2009). The difference between asylees and refugees is theirphysical location when requesting protection: asylees apply after arriving in the United Stateswhereas refugees apply from abroad, often a third country, and request resettlement in theUnited States.

5 The current annual ceiling for refugee admissions is 80,000 per year, with 5,500 allocated forLatin America and the Caribbean. See Daniel C. Martin and James E. Yankay, Refugees andAsylees: 2011 (Washington, D.C.: Of½ce of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Department of Home -land Security, 2012).

6 Furthermore, in an effort to discourage random surges in Cuban migration, the U.S. govern-ment set aside a minimum of 20,000 visas (excluding the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens)for Cubans seeking to immigrate and instituted a “visa lottery” to allocate the visas.

7 Marta Tienda, George J. Borjas, Hector Cordero-Guzman, Kristin Neuman, and ManuelaRomero, “The Demography of Legalization: Insights from Administrative Records of LegalizedAliens,” Final Report to the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation of the Depart-ment of Health and Human Services (Chicago: Population Research Center, University ofChicago, September 1991).

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8 See Donald M. Kerwin, More than IRCA: U.S. Legalization Programs and the Current Policy Debate(Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, December 2010). Unlike irca, which was acomprehensive program, nacara and other population-speci½c programs receive less mediaattention.

9 Ruth E. Wasem and Karma Ester, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy andIssues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010).

10 Of½ce of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010 (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011), Table 10.

11 Wasem, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions, Table 4.12 Alexandria Murnan, “Colombian Immigrants,” in Encyclopedia of Immigration, 2011; available

at http://immigration-online.org/441-colombian-immigrants.html (accessed July 6, 2011).13 Brad Jokisch and David Kyle, “Las transformaciones de la migración transnacional del

Ecuador, 1993–2003,” in La Migración Ecuatoriana Transnacionalismo, Redes e Identidades, ed.Gioconda Herrera, Maria Cristina Carillo, and Alicia Torres (Quito, Ecuador: flacso, PlanMigración, Comunicación y Desarrollo, 2005), 57–70; Brad Jokisch, “Ecuador: Diversity inMigration,” in Migration Information Source (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute,2007), http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=575 (accessed May 1,2012).

14 Franklin Ramírez Gallegos and Jacques Paul Ramírez, La Estampida Migratoria Ecuatoriana:Crisis, Redes Transnacionales y Repertorios de Acción Migratoria (Quito, Ecuador: unesco,ciudad: Centro de Investigaciones, 2005), 41–42.

15 Brian Gratton, “Ecuadorians in the United States and Spain: History, Gender and Niche For-mation,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33 (4) (2007): 581–599.

16 Steven E. Alvarado and Douglas S. Massey, “In Search of Peace: Structural Adjustment, Vio-lence, and International Migration,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci-ence 630 (1) (2010): 137–161; Jacqueline M. Hagan, Deciding to be Legal: A Maya Community inHouston (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994).

17 Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, Estimates of the Unauthorized ImmigrantPopulation Residing in the United States: January 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Of½ce of Immigra-tion Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011).

18 Ramona Hernández, The Mobility of Workers under Advanced Capitalism: Dominican Migrationto the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Peggy Levitt, “DominicanRepublic,” in The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration since 1965, ed. Mary C. Waters andReed Ueda (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 399–411.

19 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010, Table 10. 20 Alejandro Portes and Robert L. Bach, Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United

States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Rubén D. Rumbaut and Rubén G.Rumbaut, “The Family in Exile: Cuban Expatriates in the United States,” American Journal ofPsychiatry 133 (4) (1976): 395–399.

21 Portes and Bach, Latin Journey, 86.22 Lisandro Perez, “Cuba,” in The New Americans, ed. Waters and Ueda, 386–398.23 Ibid.; and Wasem, Cuban Migration to the United States.24 Sarah J. Mahler, American Dreaming: Immigrant Life on the Margins (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

University Press, 1995), 174.25 Susan B. Coutin, “Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American Asylum

Seekers,” Law & Social Inquiry 36 (3) (2011): 585.26 Wasem and Ester, Temporary Protected Status.



27 Hoefer et al., Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States,Table 3.

28 Jeffrey Passel, “Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population”(Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Hispanic Center, 2005), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2005/03/21/estimates-of-the-size-and-characteristics-of-the-undocumented-population/(accessed July 10, 2012).

29 Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, “Net Migration from Mexico Fallsto Zero–and Perhaps Less” (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Hispanic Center, 2012),http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/23/net-migration-from-mexico-falls-to-zero-and-perhaps-less/ (accessed July 5, 2012).

30 Sherrie Kossoudji and Deborah A. Cobb-Clark, “Coming Out of the Shadows: Learning aboutLegal Status and Wages from the Legalized Population,” Journal of Labor Economics 20 (3)(2002): 598–628.

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Documents

Latin American Immigration to the United States...48 Latin American Immigration to the United States Marta Tienda & Susana M. Sánchez MARTA TIENDA, a Fellow of the American Academy