Latin America's New Security Reality: Irregular Asymmetric Conflict and Hugo Chavez

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LATIN AMERICAS NEW SECURITY REALITY:IRREGULAR ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

AND HUGO CHAVEZ

Max G. Manwaring

August 2007

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FOREWORD

In 2005, Dr. Max Manwaring wrote a monographentitled Venezuelas Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism,and Asymmetric Warfare. It came at a time whenthe United States and Venezuela were acceleratinga verbal sparing match regarding which countrywas destabilizing Latin America more. The rhetoriccontinues. Moreover, President Chavez shows nosign of standing down; he slowly and deliberatelycentralizes his power in Venezuela, and carefully andadroitly articulates his Bolivarian dream (the idea ofa Latin American Liberation Movement against U.S.economic and political imperialism). Yet, most NorthAmericans dismiss Chavez as a nut case, orevenif he is a threat to the security and stability of the

Hemispherethe possibilities of that threat coming tofruition are too far into the future to worry about.

Thus, Dr. Manwarings intent in this new mono-graph is to explain in greater depth what PresidentChavez is doing and how he is doing it. First, he ex-plains that Hugo Chavezs threat is straightforward,and that it is being translated into a consistent, subtle,ambiguous, and ambitious struggle for power that isbeginning to insinuate itself into political life in muchof the Western Hemisphere. Second, he shows howPresident Chavez is encouraging his Venezuelan andother followers to pursue a confrontational, populist,and nationalistic agenda that will be achieved onlyby (1) radically changing the traditional politics of theVenezuelan stateand other Latin American statesto

that of direct (totalitarian) democracy; (2) destroyingNorth American hegemony throughout all of LatinAmerica by conducting an irregular Fourth-Generation


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War Super Insurgency; and, (3) country-by-country,building a great new Bolivarian state out of a phased

Program for the Liberation of Latin America.This timely monograph contributes signicantly to

understanding the new kinds of threats characteristicof a world in which instability and irregular conict areno longer on the margins of global politics. For thoseresponsible for making and implementing nationalsecurity policy in the United States, the rest of theWestern Hemisphere, and elsewhere in the world, thisanalysis is compelling. The Strategic Studies Institute ispleased to offer this monograph as part of the ongoingdebate on global and regional security and stability.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MAX G. MANWARING is Professor of MilitaryStrategy and holds the General Douglas MacArthurChair of Research at the U.S. Army War College, and isan Adjunct Professor of Political Science at DickinsonCollege. He is a retired U.S. Army colonel and hasserved in various military and civilian positions,including at the U.S. Army War College, U.S. SouthernCommand, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and theUniversity of Memphis. Dr. Manwaring is the authorand co-author of several articles, chapters, and reportsdealing with political-military affairs, and globaland regional security concerns. He is the editor orcoeditor of inter alia, El Salvador at War, 1988; Gray AreaPhenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder,1993;

Managing Contemporary Conict: Pillars of Success,1996 ; Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: TheChallenges of Peace and Stability Operations, 2000 ; andThe Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for theTwenty-First Century, 2003; and co-author, with JohnT. Fishel, of Uncomfortable Wars Revisited, University ofOklahoma Press, 2006. Dr. Manwaring holds a Ph.D. inPolitical Science from the University of Illinois and is agraduate of the U.S. Army War College.


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submerged nomenklaturas worldwidewith a relative-ly orthodox and sophisticated Marxist-Leninist-Maoist

model for the conduct and implementation of anirregular Super Insurgency. Interestingly, this kindof war is the only type of conict the United States hasever lost. It is surprising and dismaying that the worldsonly superpower does not have a unied political-military strategy and a multidimensional interagencyorganizational structure to confront Chavezs chal-lenge. It is time to make substantive changes to dealbetter with irregular contemporary conict.


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LATIN AMERICAS NEW SECURITY REALITY:IRREGULAR ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

AND HUGO CHAVEZ

War no longer exists. Confrontation, conict, andcombat undoubtedly exist all around the worldmostnoticeably, but not only, in Iraq, Afghanistan, TheDemocratic Republic of the Congo, and the PalestinianTerritoriesand states still have armed forces whichthey use as a symbol of power. Nonetheless, war ascognitively known to most noncombatants, war as a battle ina eld between men and machinery, war as a massive decidingevent in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longerexists.1

The author of this statement, General Sir RupertSmith (United Kingdom [UK]), has the experience andunderstanding to explain further: The old paradigm

was that of interstate industrial war. The new one isthe paradigm of war amongst peoples. . . .2 This newparadigm involves strategic confrontation among arange of combatants, not all of which are armies. Inthese terms, war among peoples reects some hardfacts:

Combatants are not necessarily armies; they

tend to be small groups of armed soldiers whoare not necessarily uniformed, not necessarilyall male but also female, and not necessarily alladults but also children;

These small groups of combatants tend tobe interspersed among ordinary people andhave no permanent locations and no identity

to differentiate them clearly from the rest of agiven civil population;

There is no secluded battleeld far away frompopulation centers upon which armies engage;


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Armed engagements may take place anywherein the presence of civilians, against civilians, and

in defense of civilians; Combatants use differing types of low-tech

weapons that are sometimes improvised yetalways effective;

Combat or confrontation uses not only coercivemilitary force but also co-optive political andpsychological persuasion;

Conicts are conducted at four levelspolitical,strategic, operational (theater), and tacticalwith each level sitting within the context of theother in descending order from the political;

Contemporary conict is now lengthy andevolves through two or three or more noncoer-cive organizational stages before serious coer-

cion and confrontation come into play; Even then, military operations are only one of

the many instruments of power employed bythe combatants;

Conict is often transnational, in that combat-ants use legal political frontiers and other coun-tries territories for sanctuary, staging areas, and

rest and recuperation;

The major military and nonmilitary battles inmodern conict take place among the people;when they are reported, they become mediaevents that may or may not reect socialreality;

All that is done is intended to capture theimaginations of the people and the will of theirleaders, thereby winning a trial of moral (notmilitary) strength; and,


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The struggle is total, in that it gives the winnerabsolute power to control or replace an entire

existing government or other symbol ofpower.3

These are the principal characteristics of whatPresident Hugo Chavez of Venezuela now calls 4thGeneration War (4GW), Asymmetric War, Guerrade todo el pueblo (War of all the People, PeoplesWar, or War Among Peoples).4 President Chavezasserts that this type of conict has virtually unlimitedpossibilities for a Super Insurgency against the UnitedStates in the 21st century. It appears that Chavezsrevolutionary (Bolivarian) ideas are developing andmaturing, and that he and Venezuela, at a minimum,are developing the conceptual and physical capabilitiesto challenge the status quo in the Americas. This

challenge is straightforward and is being translatedinto a constant, subtle, ambiguous struggle for powerthat is beginning to insinuate itself into political life inmuch of the Western Hemisphere.5

In pursuit of his Bolivarian dream, Chavez hasstirred the imaginations of many Latin Americansespecially the poor. Additionally, he has aroused theimaginations of many other interested observers aroundthe world. And, now, Chavez is providing politicalleaderspopulists and neo-populists, new socialistsand disillusioned revolutionaries, and submergednomenklaturas worldwidewith a relatively orthodoxand sophisticated Marxist-Leninist-Maoist modelfor the conduct and implementation of a successful,regional 4GW Super Insurgency.6 Interestingly and

importantly, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes reminds usthat this is the only kind of war the United States hasever lost.7


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protection of national territory, citizens, and vitalinterests abroad against external military aggression.9

Accordingly, the legal-traditional concept tends todene threats to national security and sovereignty inrelatively narrow, obvious, nation-state, and militaryterms. The more contemporary, nontraditionalsecurity dialogue tends to dene threats in broader,subtler, more ambiguous terms that enhance realand popular perceptions of relative stability andwell-being. Stability and well-being tend to refer tothe use of a variety of meansonly one of which ismilitaryin the pursuit of political, economic, andsocial objectives. In turn, enemies can be traditionalnation-states; nontraditional, external nonstate (smallgroups and individuals) actors or proxies; and/orviolent nontraditional intrastate actors that mightthreaten the achievement of those broader objectives

and the vitality of the state. As a result, the enemyis not necessarily a recognizable military entity thathas an industrial/technical capability to make war.At base, the enemy now becomes any individualor group, state or nonstate political actor who plansand implements (1) the kinds of violence that createor exploit instability, (2) actions that inhibit legitimategovernmental control of the national territory andthe people in it, and (3) other threats to the nationalwell-being. As a result, threats to national security andsovereignty are now being dened in more complex,ambiguous, and multidimensional terms.10

Where the Complex, Ambiguous, andMultidimensional Threat Environment Leads.

Contemporary threats to national stability,sovereignty, and well-being are not necessarily directattacks on a government. They are, however, proven


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means for weakening governing regimes. These newthreats reect a logical progression from the problems

of institutional and state weaknesses, and, in turn,move the threat spectrum from traditional state tonontraditional nonstate actors.11 That progressionfurther infers that several small, weak states in theCaribbean and Latin America are at serious risk offailure to perform their sovereign governance andsecurity functions. Colombias Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia (FARC), Perus Sendero Luminoso,and other insurgents call activities that facilitate oraccelerate the processes of state failure and generategreater freedom of movement and action for themselvesarmed propaganda. Drug cartels operating in theAndean Ridge of South America and elsewhere callthese kinds of activities business incentives. Thus,in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to

further their causes, insurgent and other violentnonstate actors armed propaganda and businessincentives are aimed at lessening a regimes credibilityand capability in terms of its ability and willingness togovern, to develop its national territory and populace,and to provide general well-being.12 The problemsof governance take us to the real threat engenderedby personal and collective insecurity together withdiminishing national stability and sovereigntythatis, state failure.

The state failure (destabilization) process tends tomove from personal violence to increased collectiveviolence and social disorder to kidnappings, bankrobberies, violent property takeovers, murders/assassinations, personal and institutional corruption,

criminal anarchy, and internal and external populationdisplacements. In turn, the momentum of this processof violence tends to evolve into more widespread social


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violence, serious degradation of the economy, anddiminished governmental capabilities of providing

personal and collective security and guaranteeingthe rule of law to all citizens. Then, using complicity,intimidation, corruption, and indifference, an irregularpolitical actor or nonstate group can quietly and subtlyco-opt politicians, bureaucrats, and security personnelto gain political control of a given piece of the nationalterritory. The individual or nonstate group thattakes control of a series of networked pieces of suchungoverned territory can then become a dominantpolitical actor (warlord) and destabilizer, and/or astate within a state or a group of states.13

Somewhere near the end of the destabilizationprocess, the state will be able to control less and less ofits national territory and fewer and fewer of the peoplein it. Nevertheless, just because a state fails does not

mean that it will simply go away. The diminishmentof responsible governance and personal securitygenerate greater poverty, violence, and instabilityand a downward spiral in terms of development andwell-being. It is a zero-sum game in which nonstateor individual actors (such as insurgents, transnationalcriminal organizations, or corrupt public ofcials) arethe winners, and the rest of the targeted society arethe losers. Ultimately, failing or failed states becomedysfunctional states, dependent on other states orinternational organizations, tribal states, rogue states,criminal states, narco-states, new peoples republics,draconian states (military dictatorships), or neo-populist states (civilian dictatorships). Moreover,failing or failed states may dissolve and become parts

of other states or may recongure into entirely newentities.14

However, if misguided political dreams were tocome true, Osama bin Laden would see the articial


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boundaries of the Muslim Middle East and NorthAfrica turn into caliphates reminiscent of the glory

days of the 12th and 13th centuries.15

And HugoChavez would witness the metamorphosis of 15 or20 Latin American republics into one great Americannation.16 Experience demonstrates, however, that mostof these political dreams never come true. Ultimately,the international community must pay the indirectsocial, economic, and political costs of state failure.Accordingly, the current threat environment in theWestern Hemisphere is not a traditional securityproblem, but it is no less dangerous. The consistencyof these kinds of experiences throughout the world,and over time, inspires condence that these lessonsare valid.17

Linking Security, Stability, Development,

Responsible Governance, and Sovereignty.

In terms of national security and sovereigntyequating national well-being, it is helpful to examinethe linkage among security, stability, development,democracy, and sovereignty. This linkage involvesthe circular nature of the interdependent relationshipsamong security, stability and development, governanceand peace, and effective sovereignty. Finding solutionsto this set of issues takes the international community orindividual intervening actors beyond providing someform of humanitarian assistance in cases of humanmisery and need. It takes international political powersbeyond traditional monitoring of bilateral agreementsor protecting a people from another group of people

(nonstate actor) or from a government. It takes nation-state actors and international organizations beyondcompelling one or more parties to a conict to cease


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human rights abuses and other morally repugnantpractices or repelling some form of conventional

military aggression.An elaboration on the security-insecurity process

will establish two things. First, it will clarify thefact that some issues now considered singular lawenforcement problems are broader threats to thenation and its sovereignty. Second, such an analysiswill provide a logical foundation for an examinationof the nontraditional notion of conict. However, mostdirectly, solutions to the problems of stability and well-being take us to ve highly interrelated and reinforcinglessons that the international community should havelearned by now.18

The Relationship of Security to Stability. Securitybegins with the provision of personal protection toindividual members of the citizenry. It then extends

to protection of the collectivity from violent, internalnonstate actors, and external nonstate and stateenemies (including organized criminals, self-appointedreformers, vigilante groups, and external enemies,and, in some cases, from repressive local and regionalgovernments). Additionally, security depends onthe continued and expanded building of a countryssocioeconomic infrastructure. Then, in the contextof socioeconomic development, facilitated by theestablishment and maintenance of legitimate law andorder (political development), a governing regime candeliberately begin to build the political-socioeconomicinfrastructure that will generate national well-beingand stability. In turn, through providing personal andcollective security to the citizenry, the state can begin

to exercise de facto as well as de jure sovereignty (theeffective legal authority over a body politic).19 Thereasoning is straightforwardthe security that enables


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political and economic development has a decisivebearing on establishing internal order, enhancing

national well-being and stability, developing nationaland regional power, and, therefore, securing internaland external peace.20

The Relationship of Stability to Development. In thepast, developed countries generally provided economicand nancial aid to developing countries, under theassumption that personal and collective securityand political development would automaticallyfollow. That has not happened. Experience teachesthat coherent, long-term, multilevel, and multilateralcapability-building measures must be designed tocreate and strengthen human and state infrastructure.At the same time, these measures must generate thetechnical, professional, and ethical bases throughwhich competent and honest political leadership can

effectively provide individual and collective well-being.In the context of political-socioeconomic development,facilitated by the establishment of legitimate law andorder, a responsible governing regime can begin todevelop sustainable peace and prosperity.21

The Relationship of Development to Responsible Gov-ernance. The relationship of sustainable developmentto responsible governance relies on morally legitimategovernment. Legitimate government is essential forgenerating the capability to manage, coordinate, andsustain security, stability, and development effectively.This capability implies competent, honest leaderswho can govern responsibly and who also have thepolitical competence to engender a national andinternational purpose to which citizens can relate and

support. Clearly, the reality of corruption at any levelof government favoring any special interest militatesagainst responsible governance and the public well-


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being. Unless and until a population perceivesthat its government deals with issues of personal

security, well-being, and development fairly andeffectively, the potential for internal or external forcesto destabilize and subvert a regime is considerable.Regimes that ignore this lesson often nd themselvesin a crisis of governance. They face increasing socialviolence, criminal anarchy, terrorism, insurgency, andoverthrow.22

The Relationship of Responsible Governance to Sov-ereignty. Responsible democracy and political legiti-macy are based upon the moral right of a government togovern and the ability of the regime to govern morally.The operative term here is to govern morally. Thisdepends on the culture and mores of the communityof people being governed and, basically, depends onpeoples perceptions. Globally, when people perceive

their governments to be corrupt and their countriessocioeconomic conditions as disenfranchisement,poverty, lack of upward social mobility, and lack ofpersonal security, those governments have limitedrights and abilities to conduct the business of the state.As a government loses the right and ability to governfairly and morallyaccording to the local cultureitloses legitimacy. In turn, the loss of moral legitimacyleads to the degeneration of de facto state sovereignty.That is, the state no longer exercises effective control ofthe national territory and the people in it.23

From Sovereignty Back to Security. Again, a fundamen-tal societal requirement for acceptance and approvalof state authority (sovereignty) is that a governmentmust ensure individual and collective security. The

security problem ends with the establishment of rmbut fair control of the entire national territory andthe people in it, which takes us back to the concept


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of sovereignty. That is, without exercising completecontrol of the national territory, a government cannot

provide the elements that dene the notion of effectivesovereignty. In this context, a governments failure toextend an effective sovereign presence throughout itsnational territory leaves a vacuum in which gangs, drugcartels, leftist and religious insurgents, the political andnarco-Right, warlords, another 1,000 snakes, andvarious alternative governments may all compete forpowerand contribute substantially to the processesof state failure. In that connection, a governmentsfailure to control the national territory precludes itsability to protect citizens against violence, conduct aneffective judicial system, uphold the rule of law, planlong-term development, carry through responsiblepolitical processes, and maintain sustainable peace.24

Linking the various elements of stability and

sovereignty is a matter of combining different effortswhose only common trait is that they cannot beresolved by a single instrument of state power, or evenby a single government. This analysis gives substantivemeaning to the argument that contemporary conict(such as Chavezs 4GW) is more than a military-to-military confrontation and that all instruments of stateand international power must be utilized to achieve aresult or end-state that equates to sustainable peace.In this new global security environment, war can beeverywhere and can involve everybody and everything.This represents a sea change in warfare and requiresnothing less than a paradigm change in how conictis conceived and managed. But, rst, it is useful toexamine the transformation of conict.


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THE TRANSFORMATION AND BROADENINGOF THE NOTION OF CONFLICT

Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida abruptly andviolently contradicted the traditional ideas that war isthe purview of the state and that nonstate and irregularways and means of conducting contemporary warwere simple aberrations.25 In these terms, al-Qaidademonstrated that a nonstate actor could effectivelychallenge a traditional nation-stateand indeed thesymbols of power in the global systemand pursueits strategic political objectives without conventionalweaponry or manpower. At the same time, al-Qaidaillustrated that nonstate actors and their actions can beconstantly mutating. As a result, adversaries in conicthave changed, purposes and motives of conict havechanged, and means to pursue conict have changed.

Moreover, as the means of conducting war (conict)have changed, the battleelds expand, overlap,move about, and become increasingly complex andanarchical. Thus, conict is now without frontiersor enforceable controls. Additionally, the center ofgravity is no longer an enemy military formationor the industrial-logistical ability to conduct conict;instead, it is public opinion and leadership, a lessonfrom Clausewitz.26 This takes us to General Smithsconclusion that conict, the power to conduct conict,and the power to destroy or radically change nation-states are not so much based upon military poweras on political and psychological power.27 FormerLieutenant Colonel Chavez understands all thisandmore. Understanding this new sociology of conict

takes us to another ve lessons that other strategicleaders should have learned by now.


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Adversaries Have Changed.

Conict is no longer only an instrument of stateaction, but also of small groups and individualactors (nonstate actors). Thus, we understand that anaggressor may not necessarily be a traditional nation-state that has forcefully moved into the nationalterritory of another. The enemy may now becomea nonstate actor and/or a surrogate or proxy whoplans and implements the kind of direct or indirect,lethal or nonlethal, or military or nonmilitary activitythat exploits instabilities within their own countryor between their and other countries. Many of theWars of National Liberation and Peoples Warsthat were fought all over the world during the ColdWar are good examples of this phenomenon. Today,in this context, the international community should

consider the implications for national stability,security, and sovereignty, given the high probabilityof state and nonstate entities (including transnationalcriminal organizations [TCOs]) providing money,arms, technology, training, sanctuaries, and otherassets to radical populist movements and to insurgent,terrorist, or criminal groups throughout Central andSouth America and the Caribbean. At the same time,we should consider the implications of all kinds ofweaponry becoming more and more available and lessand less expensive to anyone with a will to use violenceagainst a given political target.28

Purpose and Motive Have Changed.

The circular logic that links stability to developmentand to sovereignty and societal peace takes us back towhere we beganto purpose and motive. Combatant


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enemies are no longer opponents who pose absoluteand clear threats to the national territory or society in

recognizable military formations. One can no longertake, hold, or destroy a geographical objective and/oran enemy military formation. Enemies now concealthemselves among the population in small groups andmaintain no xed address. Thus, the nontraditionalcontemporary purpose of becoming involved ina conict is to establish conditions for achieving apolitical objective. Irregular enemies now also seekto establish conditions that drain and exhaust theirstronger opponents. In seeking to establish theseconditions, opponents political objectives center oninuencing public opinion and political leadership.Ultimately, the primary motive is to impose ones willon the other.29

Yet, in this new global security environment,

secondary and tertiary motives for conict havechanged dramatically from the traditional goalsof (1) gaining or denying access to populations,markets, resources, territories, choke points, or linesof communication, or (2) compelling adherenceto an ideology. Newly recognized motives wouldinclude attaining commercial advantage and gainingwealth.30 To be sure, however, ideological motives forpursuing conict have not gone away, in spite of thelong-standing commercialization of conict. As oneexample, al-Qaidas Osama bin Laden represents amilitant, revolutionary, and energetic commitmentto a long-term approach to a renewal of an extremistinterpretation of Islamic governance, social purpose,and tradition.31

In the nal analysis, the central idea in contemporaryconict is to inuence and control people. Thus,the primary center of gravity (the hub of all power


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and movement) is not military. It is public opinionand leadership.32 In these terms, public opinion and

leadership provide the basic architecture from whichto develop a viable ends, ways, and means strategy.The intent of such a strategy is to capture the will ofthe people and their leaders and, by that means, winthe trial of moral strength.33

Means Have Changed.

The ways and means of achieving ones purposes/motives have changed from primarily militarymeans to a combination of all available methodsof conducting conict. Generally, that suggests (1)military and nonmilitary, (2) lethal and nonlethal, and(3) direct and indirect ways and means. As only a fewexamples, combinations of military, trans-military, and

nonmilitary operations would include the following: Conventional war/Network war/Sanctions war;

Guerrilla war/Drug war/Media war;

Bio-chemical war/Intelligence war/Resourceswar;

Terrorist war/Financial war/Ideological war;

and, Limited Atomic war/Diplomatic war/Trade

war.34

The idea of utilizing combinations of operationsbroadens the idea of a nation-stateor a hegemonicnonstate actoremploying all available instruments ofnational and international power to protect, maintain,or achieve its vital interests. Regardless of what forma given conict may takefrom indirect nancial war,to indirect media war, to direct military warwar


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is war, or conict is conict. Any of the above typesof operations can be combined with others to form

completely new ways and means to conduct conict.There is no instrument of power that cannot be mixedand matched with others. The only limitation wouldbe ones imagination. Self-interest would be the onlyconstant. That is why Qiao and Wang call this typeof conict Unrestricted War.35 And, it must beremembered that war (conict) is still the means tocompel an enemy to accept ones will.

Battlefelds Have Changed.

As the purposes, parties, and means that pertainto contemporary conict have changed, so have thebattleelds changed and expanded. Metz and Millenargue that four distinct yet highly interrelated battle

spaces exist in the contemporary security arena: (1)traditional, direct interstate war; (2) unconventionalnonstate war, which tends to involve gangs,insurgents, drug trafckers, other transnationalcriminal organizations, and warlords who thrive inungoverned space between and within various hostcountries; (3) unconventional intrastate war, whichtends to involve direct vs. indirect conict betweenstate and nonstate actors; and (4) indirect interstatewar, which entails aggression by a nation-state againstanother, through proxies.36

Regardless of the analytical separation of the differ-ent battleelds, all state and nonstate actors involvedare engaged in one common political actpolitical war,to control and/or radically change a governmentto

institutionalize the acceptance of ones will.37 Addi-tional strategic level analytical commonalities in themodern battleelds include (1) no formal declarations


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or terminations of conict, (2) no easily identiedhuman foe to attack and defeat, (3) no specic territory

to attack and hold, (4) no single credible government orpolitical actor with which to deal, and (5) no guaranteethat any agreement between or among contendingactors will be honored.38 In this fragmented, complex,and ambiguous political-psychological environment,conict must be considered and implemented as awhole. The power to deal with these kinds of situationsis no longer combat repower or more benign policepower. Rather, it is the multilevel, combined political,psychological, moral, informational, economic, social,police, and military activity that can be brought tobear holistically on the causes and consequencesaswell as the perpetratorsof violence.39 In turn, thatkind of response will generate security and protect theindividual and collective well-being, which can lead to

durable societal peace.40

Conclusions.

The military transformation necessary to beginto achieve this kind of holistic approach to the use ofpower is not only a modernization of technology andrepower; it also requires changes in doctrine andforce structure, and the development of new forms ofindirect confrontation (combat). Clearly, in rethinkingthreat and response in contemporary irregular conict,vastly more important than manpower, weaponry, andtechnology are the following leadership capabilities:lucid and incisive thinking, resourcefulness, deter-mination, imagination, and a certain disregard for

convention. In this context, it must be rememberedthat, more than anything, this kind of holistic conict isbased on perceptions, beliefs, expectations, legitimacy,


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and the political will to challenge an opponent. Inshort, this kind of conict is based primarily on words,

images, and ideas. It will not be won simply by seizingspecic territory militarily or destroying specicbuildings, cities, or industrial capabilities. This kind ofconict is won by altering, indirectly and directly, thepolitical-psychological factors that are most relevant ina targeted culture in ones own favor.41

This is the contextual beginning point forunderstanding where Hugo Chavez intends to go andhow he expects to get there. Whether he eventuallyachieves his aims or not is irrelevant. This is the startingpoint from which to understand the rst, second,and third order effects that will shape the securityenvironment in which Latin America and much of therest of the world must struggle and survive over thenext several years. This is also the point from which

to develop the strategic vision to counter radicalpopulism, caudillismo, and the purposeful oppositionist(revolutionary) instability, violence, and chaos theyengender. It is also the starting point from which todevelop strategies and principles of action that eitherwill support or attempt to counter an unconventional4GW Super Insurgency policy; in other words, twosides of the same proverbial coininsurgency andcounterinsurgency.

IMPLICATIONS: LATIN AMERICAN SECURITYAND SOVEREIGNTY UNDER SIEGE

President Chavez is encouraging his Venezuelanand other Latin American followers to pursue a

confrontational, defensive, populist, and nation-alistic agenda that will supposedly liberate LatinAmerica from economic dependency and the


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political imperialism of the North American (UnitedStates) Colossus.42 Chavez argues that liberation,

New Socialism, and Bolivarianismo (the dream of aLatin American Liberation Movement against U.S.hegemony) will only be achieved by (1) radicallychanging the traditional politics of the Venezuelanstate to that of direct (totalitarian) democracy;43 (2)destroying North American hegemony throughout allof Latin America; (3) conducting a Super Insurgencyor War of All the People (Peoples War) to deposethe illegitimate external enemy (North America); and(4) building a new Bolivarian state, beginning withVenezuela and extending eventually to the whole ofLatin America.44 The creation, protection, and theexpansion of that Bolivarian dream depends on threeenabling concepts: rst, a radical restructuring of theVenezuelan state; second, a 4GW Super Insurgency;

and, third, a broad Program for the Liberation of LatinAmerica from North American hegemony.

The Radical Restructuring of the Venezuelan State.

The political, economic, social, informational,and security bases for the achievement of PresidentChavezs Bolivarian state are ambitious, vast, andamorphous. They include, however, four generalpolitical-economic, social, informational, and military/security concepts or programs. Political-Economic Concepts. The system of powerupon which internal and external Bolivarianobjectives will be achieved is based on the conceptof direct democracy. The main tenets dictate that: (1)

the new authority in the state must be a leader whocommunicates directly with the people, interpretstheir need, and emphasizes social expenditure to


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guarantee the legitimate needs and desires of the people;(2) elections, Congress, and the courts will provide

formal democracy and international legitimacy, butwill have no real role in governance or in controllingthe economy; (3) the state will own and control all themajor means of national production and distribution;and (4) the national and regional political-economicintegration function will be performed by the leader(Hugo Chavez) by means of his nancial, material, andpolitical-military support of peoples movements.45

Social Programs. To strengthen his personalposition and internal power base, President Chavez isspending large amounts of money on an amorphousPlan Bolivar 2000 that builds and renovates schools,clinics, day nurseries, roads, and housing for the poor.Additionally, the President is developing educationand literacy outreach programs, agrarian reform

programs, and workers cooperatives. At the sametime, he has established MERCAL, a state company thatprovides subsidized foodstuffs to the poor. Chavez hasalso imported 16,000 Cuban doctors to help take careof the medical needs of the Venezuelan underclasses.Clearly, these programs offer tangible benets to themass of Venezuelans who were generally neglected byprevious governments.46

Communications and Information. The intent, in thiseffort, is to generate mass consensus. Bolivarianismo willrequire maximum media (radio, TV, and newspapers/magazines) support to purvey ideas, develop publicopinion, and generate electoral successes. Ampleevidence exists that Chavez-controlled media areusing emotional arguments to gain attention, to exploit

real and imagined fears of the population and createoutside enemies as scapegoats for internal failures, andto inculcate the notion that opposition to the regime


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equates to betrayal of the country. President Chavezspersonal involvement in the communications effort

is also clear and strong. Reportedly, statements,speeches, and interviews of Chavez are being broadcastthroughout Venezuela, the Caribbean Basin, and largeparts of Central and South America every day on thestate-owned and controlled Television del Sur.47

The Military/Security Program. First, the VenezuelanConstitution of 1999 provides political and institutionalautonomy for the armed forces, under the centralizedcontrol of the president and commander-in-chief.President Chavez has also created an independentnational police force, outside the traditional control ofthe armed forces, which is responsible to the president.At the same time, efforts have gone forward to establisha 1.5 million-person military reserve and two additionalparamilitary organizationsthe Frente Bolivariano de

Liberacion (Bolivarian Liberation Front) and the Ejercitodel Pueblo en Arms (Army of the People in Arms). Thearmed forces and the police perform traditional nationaldefense and internal security missions, within thecontext of preparing for what President Chavez calls4GW war of all the people. The military reserve andthe paramilitary are charged to (1) protect the countryfrom a U.S. and/or Colombian invasion, or resist suchan invasion with an Iraqi-style insurgency; and (2)act as armed, anti-opposition forces. The institutionalseparation of the various security organizationsensures than no one institution can control the others,but the centralization of those institutions under thePresident ensures his absolute control of security andsocial harmony in Venezuela.48

Reportedly, Venezuelan security forces are beingtrained for their mandated roles and are conductingmaneuvers that demonstrate their prociency at


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repelling an external invasion force, and show theircapability to conduct irregular war. In that connection,

specically, the Chinese are training Venezuelancommandos, and the regular Venezuelan military istraining unconventional forces in counterinvasionresistance tactics.49 Lastly, light arms, ammunition, airand naval transport, and other equipment appropriatefor 4GW and armed propaganda are being purchasedfrom Russia, Spain, and other countries at a reportedcost of over $3 billion.50

Conclusions. All these programs together providethe President of Venezuela with the unied political-economic-social-informational-military instruments ofpower of the nation-state. In turn, that can allow him thesingular pursuit of his political-strategic objectives. Ata minimum, then, Venezuela may be becoming capableof helping to destabilize large parts of Latin America.

The political purpose of any given destabilizationeffort would be to prepare the way to force a radicalrestructuring of a target countrys government andeconomyand bring it under Venezuelan political-economic inuence.

Hugo Chavez understands that war is no longerlimited to using military violence to bring about desiredpolitical-economic-social change. Rather, all means thatcan be brought to bear on a given situation must beused to compel a targeted government to do ones will.He will tailor his campaign to his adversaries political-economic-cultural-military vulnerabilities, and to theirpsychological precepts. This is the basis of Chavezsinstruction to the Venezuelan armed forces, and theirinvited foreign guests, at the 1st Military Forum on

Fourth Generation War and Asymmetric War in 2004.The charge to the forum was to develop a doctrinalparadigm change from conventional military to


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peoples war. He said: I call upon everybody to startan . . . effort to apprehend . . . the ideas, concepts, and

doctrine of asymmetric war.51

Irregular 4GW and Super Insurgency.

Since 1648 and the Treaty of Westphalia, a morerealistic denition of aggression and war has beendeveloped that allows a way out of the intellectualvice lock imposed by Westphalian legalism. This new,broader concept of conict takes us toward a fullspectrum of closely related, direct and indirect, lethaland nonlethal, military and nonmilitary, national,subnational, and individual sovereignty and securityconcerns (threats). In the broadest possible terms,whoever impinges on state control of national territoryand the people in it is a threat to that countrys national

sovereignty and security. Whatever the specic threat,its logical conclusion can lead either to violent radicalpolitical change or the failure of a traditional nation-state.52

Former Lieutenant Colonel Chavez knows this.Lacking the conventional power to challenge the UnitedStates or virtually any one of his immediate neighbors,Chavez understands that irregular asymmetric warfareis the logical means for his Bolivarian expression andself-assertion. As a result, in May 2005, he provided allVenezuelan military ofcers (and others who wantedit) with a new book written by a Spanish Marxist-oriented New Socialist, Jorge Verstrynge Rojas.Entitled, La Guerra Perifrica y el Islam Revolucionario:Origines, reglas, y tica de la Guerra asimtrica (Peripheral

[Indirect] War and Revolutionary Islam: Origins,Regulations, and Ethics of Asymmetric War),53 thisbook provides a theoretical and doctrinal basis for the


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conduct of indirect, irregular, political-psychologicalwar in the 21st century. Nothing in the book is really

new, but it is a well-conceived and well-written piece ofwork by an experienced practitioner and oppositionist.It reminds the reader of the indirect applications ofUnrestricted Warfare, written by Qiao Liang and WangXiangsui, two Chinese colonels, in 1999.54

The main themes that run through these booksstress the use of all available networksdirect andindirect political, economic, social, informational,and militaryto dominate the nontraditional humanterrain (vs. the conventional geographical terrain).By using the full spectrum of the multidimensionalcomponents of indirect and unrestrictedtotalwar,a protagonist can produce what Qiao and Wang calla Cocktail Mixture of unconventional ways andmeans of confronting a stronger opponent. This kind

of irregular warbased on the notion that the humanterrain is the main contemporary center of gravityis based primarily on words, images, and ideas.Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the ideaof unrestricted war does not preclude direct militaryoperations. In any event, the only ethics are those thatcontribute directly to the achievement of the ultimatepolitical objective of forcing a stronger opponent toacquiesce to his weaker adversarys will. The only ruleis that there are no rules.55 However, before elaboratingon the strategic aspects of 4GW Super Insurgency, it ishelpful to look briey at its antecedents.

First- Through Third-Generation Conict. First-generation war is characterized by the low-tech attritionwar that has been the principal means of conducting

conict from the beginning of time. The basic idea isthat the more opponents killed or incapacitated relativeto ones own side, the better. Historically, attrition


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war appears to serve only those protagonists with thelargest numbers of human resources. When facing a

numerically superior opponent, it has been importantto nd other means to compensate for numericalinferiority.56

As a result, second-generation warfare was intendedto provide the numerically inferior combatant withthe means to outperform more numerous opponents.The basic concept is to employ surprise, speed, andlethality to bring pressure to bear on an enemys weakspots. In essence, the military force that can move,shoot, and communicate more effectively relative tothe opponent has the advantage and is more likely toprevail.57 The German blitzkrieg of World War II andthe American shock and awe approach in the PersianGulf and Iraqi wars are examples of these methods andexemplify second-generation warfare.

Third-generation conict moves from the blatantuse of physical force toward the employment ofbrainpower to achieve success against an enemy. Thisentails a transition from hard power to a combinationof hard and soft power. In addition to using rst- andsecond-generation methods, third-generation conictmethodology tends to take advantage of intelligence,psychological operations, other knowledge-basedmeans, technologies, and cultural programming(manipulation) as force multipliers. The basic intent ofsoft power is to provide more effective and efcientmeans than hard power through which to paralyzeenemy action.58 It should be noted, however, that whilethe use of soft brain power is less bloody than the useof hard-power assets, such as infantry, artillery, armor,

and aircraft, the ultimate objective of war remains thesamethat is, to force the enemy to accede to onesown interests. The Strategic Characteristics of 4GW Super Insurgency.


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Rather than thinking of each generation of conictas an independent form of warfare, it is more useful

to think of them as parts within the concept ofunrestricted and peripheral (indirect) war.59 In essence,4GW is a long-standing methodology of the weakagainst the strong. The primary characteristic is that ofasymmetry (the use of disparity between contendingopponents to gain relative advantage). Chavez knowsthis. Moreover, he understands that contemporarynontraditional (peripheral) war is not a kind of lesseror limited appendage to the more comfortable attritionand maneuver warfare paradigms. It is a great dealmore.60

First, the battleeld is everywhere. Second, 21stcentury conict is intended to resist, oppose, gaincontrol of, and/or overthrow an existing governmentor symbol of power.61 Third, Chavez also understands

that battles are won at the tactical and operationallevels, but wars are won at the strategic level.62 In thatcontext, the most salient strategic-level characteristicsof 4GW include the notions that (1) the struggle ispredominantly political-psychological; (2) the conictis normally lengthy and evolves through three, four,or more stages; (3) 4GW is fought between belligerentswith asymmetrical capabilities and varying levelsof responsibility to their constituencies; (4) 4GWis very likely to have transnational dimensionsand implications; and (5) in the nal analysis, thestruggle is total, in that it gives the winner absolutepower to control or replace an existing order.63 As aconsequence, there is one more set of lessons that mustbe taken into account when dealing with insurgency

and counterinsurgency. 4GW Super Insurgency is primarily political-psychological. Experience and the data show that themoral right of an incumbent regime or challenger re-


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gime to govern is the most important single dimen-sion in contemporary conict. The principal tool in

achieving and maintaining the right to govern islegitimacy. Legitimacy of cause and behavioralrectitude, on one hand, and the illegitimacy of theopponent, on the other, are key. In virtually any givenconict situation, the opposition is offering a redress ofreal or perceived grievances and a better way of life.64On the behavioral side of the Latin American situation,President Chavez is putting forward the idea of liberationfrom the politically and economically dominating andexploitive Colossus of the North. Under these terms,he is persuading and co-opting people rather thancoercing them. The primary instruments of powernow include dialogues on ideology, debates on Latinvs. North American cultural values, the attempt toinuence through the example of compassion, and the

Bolivarian appeal to the potential of Latin Americangrandeza (greatness). Military instruments of power areused to achieve political and psychological objectives,rather than purely military objectives.65

4GW is lengthy. Because insurgency-rooted conictis generally political-psychological, the protagonistsmust understand that it takes time to change peoplesminds and prepare them for phased, progressivemoves toward short- and mid-term as well as long-termobjectives. Clearly, the better one protagonist is at thatpersuasive effort, the more effective he will be relativeto the opposition.66 Again, this takes time. As examples,Mao and his Chinese communists fought for 28 years(1921-49); the Vietnamese communists fought for 30years (1945-75); the Nicaraguan Sandinista insurgents

fought for 18 years (1961-79); and the Peruvian SenderoLuminoso insurgents claim that they are prepared toght for 75 years (1962-?) to achieve their revolutionary


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goals.67 A Dutch colonel in Afghanistan describes thelengthiness of contemporary conict in terms that are

less precise yet quite accurate and realistic. He argues,We are not here to ght the Taliban. Were here to makethe Taliban irrelevant.68 President Chavez knows thatthe key function of an irregular 4GW protagonist is tosustain his ideas and organizationand outlast theopponent. As a consequence, anything except defeat indetail is victory.69

4GW is fought among belligerents with varying levelsof responsibility to their constituents. This aspect ofSuper Insurgency equates not only to the issue ofresponsibility, but also to organizational effectiveness.Challenger protagonists in this type of war generallyhold the decisionmaking power in their own self-appointed hands. These leaders do not normallyhave to consult with constituents before making

decisions and do not have to explain their actionsafter the fact. No formal ofcials have to be elected,no national laws or boundaries must be respected,and no responsibility is owed to anyone outside theorganization. Thus, the principal tool in this situationis organization to generate as complete a unity of effortas possible. Thus, nonstate organization for unity ofeffort is atter, smaller, and more effective than mostgovernmental and traditional military bureaucracies.Decisions can be made and implemented faster thanthose of traditional governmental opposition, and theasymmetric protagonist can be generally proactivewhile forcing the foe to be merely reactive.70 PresidentChavezs centralization of the Venezuelan governmentand creation of what is essentially a one-party state

himself at the head of it alldemonstrates a clearsense of the utility and continuity of organizationalunity of effort. That centralizing reorganization of the


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Venezuelan government also claries the purpose ofChavezs moves to change the Constitution to allow

his continuation in ofce.71

Transnational dimensions and implications of irregularwar. At least three transnational aspects are associatedwith contemporary 4GW conict. First, experienceand the data show that insurgencies require resourcesthat they cannot produce for themselvesmoney,equipment, training, and political-psychologicalsupport at regional and international (supra-national)levels. As a result, these implementing resources andsupport must be provided by other actorsstate ornonstate. Second, most, if not all, successful insurgency-rooted movements have had access to sanctuariesacross international borders to recuperate, reequip,retrain, and maintain their offensive capabilities. Third,in that connection, insurgents constantly cross borders

to evade pursuit and to expand their freedom of actionand movement.72

The principal tools, in this situation, include foreignalliances, public diplomacy at home and abroad,intelligence, information and propaganda operations,and cultural manipulation measures to inuenceand/or control public opinion and decisionmaking ina targeted country and abroad. Accordingly, severalcasesfrom the Algerian War (1954-62); the SalvadoranInsurgency War (1980-89); the (Russian) Afghan War(1979-89); to the past and present situations in the formerYugoslaviaprovide examples of this phenomenon.73Again, Hugo Chavez understands these things. Thiswise competitor knows exactly what General VoNguyen Giap meant when he said, If the peoples war

of liberation [in Vietnam] ended in a glorious victory, itis because we did not ght alone. That victory cannot beisolated from the sympathy and support of progressive


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peoples throughout the world.74 This reality takes usback to where we began, to the centrality of behavioral

rectitude and moral legitimacy.Asymmetric 4GW is Total War. At base, people wantthings that may be divided into freedom from andfreedom to. They want freedom from fear, intimida-tion, hunger, poverty, and uncertainty. They wantfreedom to prosper and do what they reasonably wantto do. And, they want a society and political structurethey can understand and relate to. They will attributemoral legitimacy to and follow the political or militaryleader whoin the circumstancesis considered to bethe most likely to provide these things.75By transformingthe emphasis of war from military violence to the levelof a struggle for moral legitimacy, the insurgents canstrive for total objectivesthe control or overthrowof a government. The use of indirect moral and other

nonlethal force permits a protagonist to engage ina secret and prolonged war, while purporting topursue altruistic purposes. Accordingly, war is notan extension of politics. War is politics. Because it is azero-sum game, there can only be one winner. It is, asnoted above, total war.76

Conclusions. Clearly, the United States, Canada,Europe, Latin America, and those other parts ofthe global community most integrated into theinterdependent world economy are embroiled in asecurity arena in which time-honored concepts ofnational security and the classical military means toattain it, while still necessary, are no longer sufcient.In addition to traditional regional security issues, anarray of nontraditional threats challenges the global

community. Wise nontraditional competitors willalways seek to shift the playing eld away fromconventional military confrontations and tend to


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employ terrorist tactics and strategies and otherunconventional forms of assault on enemy nations

and undesirable global institutions. Again, theseinclude state and nonstate, military and nonmilitary,lethal and nonlethal, direct and indirect, and a mixtureof some or all of the above kinds of threats.

The Chavez Program for the Liberationof Latin America.

Hugo Chavez consistently identies the originsof the Bolivarian Revolution and denes the centralstrategic problem in Latin America as the lack oflegitimacy of the U.S.-dominated governments in theregion. He further identies the primary objective ofthe revolution as power. Power is generated by anintelligent, motivated, and disciplined leader and his

organization for achievement of direct democracy,with a vision of Latin American greatness. In thatconnection, and as noted at the outset, President Chavezis pursuing a Super Insurgency with a confrontational,defensive, populist, and nationalistic agenda that isintended eventually to liberate Latin America fromU.S. economic dependency and political domination.That is a Herculean task, but he appears to be preparedto take his time, let his enemies become accustomedto a given purposeful action, and then slowly movetoward new stages of the revolution in a deliberate,slow, and phased manner. Thus, by staying under hisopponents threshold of concern, Chavez says thathe expects to put his enemies to sleepto later wakeup dead.77

This is not the rhetoric of a nut case. It is,importantly, the rhetoric of an individual who isperforming the traditional and universal Leninist-


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Maoist function of providing a strategic vision andthe operational plan for gaining revolutionary power.

Chavez is planning for a protracted struggle, usinga long-term, three-stage, multiphase program forgaining power. His notional three stages use differentterminology but are similar to those of Lenin and Mao:(1) Establishment of an Organization, (2) Developmentof Political and Limited Military Power, and (3) Captureof a Targeted Government. Stage 1: Establishment of an Organization (Lenin: Devel-opment of a Cadre; Mao: Strategic Defensive). This is theessential rst effort. It requires taking the time necessaryto lay the strongest possible organizational foundationsfor the subsequent political-psychological-militarystruggle. In this stage, the revolutionary leadership mustconcentrate on doctrine and leadership development,expansion of the organizations relationship with other

political movements, and, generally, the creation of areceptive political-psychological environment for therevolutionary movement.

More specically, one of Chavezs mentors,Abraham Guillen, teaches that the Bolivarian leadershipmust (1) propagate Latin American nationalism; (2)educate and prepare several hundred professionals forcombat, organizational duties, and governance whoare prepared to lead the masses through a Revolutionand into the proverbial halls of power; and (3) create apopular front not just of a few true believers but fora combination of Christians, Socialists, trade unionists,intellectuals, students, peasants, and the debourgeoisedmiddle class who will march together to defeat sepoyan(regional) militarism and U.S. imperialism.78

Guillen, a strong advocate of contemporary urbaninsurgency, argues that from these beginnings, therevolutionary Bolivarian leadership must expand


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organizational and training efforts from the urbancenters into the countryside and begin to mobilize the

energy of all the people of Latin America. But, in thatconnection, he says that it is better to wait for economicand social crises to discredit incumbent Latin Americanregimes than to ght them militarily, in that defeatingsepoyan security forces will not resolve all problems.Moreover, in that connection, Guillen believes thatrevolutionary politics must not be sectarian, dogmatic,or intolerant, but, rather, exiblefreed from semanticisms and operating in the name of the general interest:[Revolutionary leadership] must formulate its ownprogram . . . which stresses whatever unites rather thandivides [the people]. The intent, according to Guillen,is to win the support of and awaken the admiration ofthe vast majority of the targeted population (humanterrain).79

Stage 2: Development of Political and Military Power(Lenin: Create Political Infrastructure and Form andDeploy a Military Arm; Mao: Strategic Stalemate). Aswith the organizational stage, the second stage of therevolution is preparatory and long term. And, again,the leadership must take the time necessary to developand nurture popular support while increasing the sizeof the organization, while establishing and defendingliberated zones. This kind of effort allows theconsolidation and expansion of political and logisticalsupport bases, the extension of inuence throughoutthe various Latin American countries, and theestablishment of de facto control in areas uncontrolledor abandoned by the state.

More specically, the political effort requires the

formation and nurturing of a number of ancillarymultinational organizations. The most importantwould include (1) a united Anti-Imperialist Political


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Party (Front), (2) a united central Trade UnionOrganization, (3) a united Latin American Youth

Federation, (4) a united Labor Party, and (5) a unitedArmy of Unity and Liberation. The general purposesof these organizations would be to continue to raisethe level of direct popular action against indigenousfeudalism, aboriginal capitalism, sepoyan militarism,and yanqui imperialism. These organizations wouldalso provide leadership experience and human skillsthat will be necessary when it is time to form a directgovernment of people and install a socialist mode ofproduction and distribution.80

As might be expected, Guillen and othercontemporary revolutionary theorists, argue that themilitary effort is more political and psychological thanmilitary. Revolutionary war does not propose to decideanything by means of battles or by occupying foreign

soil. Nevertheless, an Army of National Liberation musteventually be formed in each Latin American country,with a central Latin American strategic command. TheArmy would be further organized into (1) local militiasthat ght only in their own zones, (2) provincial ordistrict militias that would ght in their own zones,and (3) an army that ghts in all parts of the countrywith the cooperation of local and provincial militias.81

Operations to further a Bolivarian Super Insur-gency would consist of scattered surprise attacksat the enemys weakest points by quick and mobileunits superior in arms and numbers. The army andthe militias must cede territory and human terrainif necessary but must continually harass the enemyuntil his morale is broken. The popular army also

coordinates mass actions (demonstrations), strikes,mutinies, occupation of factories, and seizures ofschools and universities. Additionally, the army


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coordinates sabotage, kidnapping, robberies, terroristacts, and armed propaganda throughout the country.

Then, in the latter phases of Stage 2, the military armof the revolutionary movement can entice an enemyinto territory where the population is supportive andwhere the enemy may be exhausted, demoralized, andultimately defeated in a prolonged struggle. Finally,in Maoist terms, a National Liberation Army mustprepare for Stage 3 of the Revolution by organizing,training, and equipping itself to confront directly butgradually a demoralized conventional enemy force andbring about the nal military collapse of its adversary.Again, the intent is not to destroy the enemy but to wearhim down over time to the point where his resolve isdead. As a result, political and moral factors are moredecisive for victory than heavy armament and ironcladunits.82

Stage 3: Capture of a Targeted Government. (This isbasically the same terminology as that of Lenin and similar toMaos Strategic Offensive.) This stage of the liberationprocess (revolution) is reached only when the enemyis completely demoralized, and it requires the effortsof a relatively small military force to nalize the totalcollapse of the state. This collapse will not be the resultof any one spectacular action, but the result of severalsmall, deadly, and successive actions. Theoretically,the collapse will not be allowed to take place until (1)interior and urban support bases are consolidated, (2)the Bolivarian leadership cadre is sufciently preparedand large enough to administer and govern the stateeffectively, and (3) the revolutionary organization isprepared to (a) hold its ground against a concerted

imperialist counter-attack from outside the country,and (b) move against the next targeted state in asubsequent subphase of the general Latin American


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Liberation effort.83

Conclusions.

At present, Chavez is only in the beginning phases ofhis rst Organizational Stage of the long-term programfor the Liberation of Latin America. The culmination ofStage 1 is still a long time away. Stages 2 and 3 mustbe several years down the revolutionary path. At thestrategic level, then, President Chavez appears to beconsolidating his base position in Venezuela through theestablishment of personal political control through thetotalitarian mechanisms of direct democracy, takinga relatively low revolutionary prole, and waiting for apropitious time to begin the expansion of the revolutionon a Supra-National Latin American scale. He will likelycontinue to focus his primary attack on the legitimacy

of the U.S. economic and political domination of theAmericas, as well as any other possible rival. And,he will likely continue to conduct various rhetoricalattacks on adversaries; cultivate diverse allies in LatinAmerica, the Middle East, and Asia; and continue toengage in organizational seeding operations for thecreation of a receptive political climate throughoutLatin America.84 Until the last moment in Stage 3when the targeted government is in the process ofcollapsingevery action is preparatory work and notexpected to provoke much immediate concern fromthe enemy.85

The seriousness of this nal stage and thepreliminary organizational stages of Chavezs 4GWprogram to liberate Latin America cannot be dismissed

as too difcult, too ambiguous, or too far into the futureto deal with. In 2005, we emphasized this adaptationof 4GW and summarized its consequences by taking


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a page from a Harry Potter adventure. We called itWizards Chess. We further characterized Chavez

as a Master of this deadly game, as a metaphoricalexample of contemporary asymmetric conict. Theanalogy is still instructive and sobering:

In that game, protagonists move pieces silently andsubtly all over the game board. Under the playersstudied direction, each piece represents a different typeof direct and indirect power and might simultaneouslyconduct its lethal and non-lethal attacks from differingdirections. Each piece shows no mercy against itsfoe and is prepared to sacrice itself in order to allowanother piece the opportunity to destroy or control anopponentor to checkmate the king. Over the long-term, however, this game is not a test of expertise increating instability, conducting illegal violence, orachieving some sort of moral satisfaction. Ultimately, itis an exercise in survival. Failure in Wizards Chess isnot an option.86

This cautionary tale reminds us that irregularasymmetric 4GW is the only type of conict that amodern power has ever lost.87 It is surprising anddismaying that the worlds only superpower doesnot have a unied strategy and a multidimensional,interagency organizational structure to deal with 4GW

Super Insurgency.

RETHINKING THREAT AND RESPONSE:MOVING FROM A MILITARY TO A POPULACE-ORIENTED CONFLICT MODEL

In rethinking threat and response in the new global

security environment, one must realize that the UnitedStates, Europe, and those other parts of the globalcommunity most integrated into the interdependentworld economy are embroiled in a complex security


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arena thatwhile possibly less bloody in soft powertermsis ultimately no less brutal. Given this reality,

failure to prepare adequately for present and futureirregular contingencies is unconscionable. The rstorganizational step in developing an appropriateresponse to contemporary conict is to become awareof global disequilibrium and popular sovereignty andto begin to deal with the relationship of instability tolegitimate governance. The cognitive second step isto realize, whether one likes it or not or whether oneis prepared for it or is not, that a populace-orientedmodel describes accurately the contemporary securityarena.88 Taking these steps would set the foundationfor a better understanding of and a more effectiveresponse to contemporary irregular, people-oriented,asymmetric conict.

A Populace-Oriented (Personal Security) Model.

A populace-oriented extension of the SWORDModel for taking responsibility for unconventionalintranational, nonstate, and indirect interstate conicts,going beyond declaring victory and coming home,depicts the activities and efforts of the various playersinvolved (see Figure 1).89 This model portrays theallegiance of a population as the primary center ofgravity. Persuasive, co-optive, and coercive measureswill determine success or failure in the achievementof a just civil society and a durable peace. Thus, boththe government and its external allies and the internalillegal opposition and its external allies can coerce, co-opt, and persuade the populace into actions on behalf

of either side. Then, in addition, the people can coerceand persuade the government or opposition to changethe conditions in society to meet their demands and to


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undertake the types of behavior and actions that thecitizenry perceives to be legitimate.

(1) Populace (1)

persuade (3) persuade

coerce coerce

(2) (2)

Government persuade Opposition

coerce

(4)

(1) Overall goal: gain popular support.

(1) Overall goal: gain popular support.

(2) Development and other activities designed togain popular support.

(3) Indirect activities designed to isolate governmentand opposition forces from the populace.

(4) Direct attacks by the government and oppositionon each other, intended to discourage popularsupport for the other.

Figure 1. Populace-Oriented Modelof the Movement of Popular Support between an

Incumbent Government and an Illegal Internal Foe.

The application of this model for contemporaryirregular populace-oriented conict requires, at aminimum, some additional conceptual and organi-


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zational efforts: (1) a new concept of the center of gravity;(2) a new concept of deterrence; (3) an unconventional

strategic objective, along with a redenition of enemy,power, and victory; and (4) end-state planning and anintegrated strategic implementing process. A New Concept of Center of Gravity. The idea ofrethinking the notion of center of gravity intrudes onthe comfortable, conventional vision of war in which anobvious enemy military formation poses a clear threatto national boundaries, resources, and other interests.As mentioned earlier, Clausewitz reminds us that inplaces subject to internal strife (intranational, indirectinternational, and nonstate conicts), the hub of allpower and strength (center of gravity) is the people.90Thus, in contemporary unconventional conict, theprimary center of gravity changes from a familiarmilitary concept to an ambiguous, unconventional,

and uncomfortable populace-oriented paradigm.This analysis helps to explain, for example, what

happened in Vietnam. Americans thought theywere ghting a limited war of attrition against atraditional military enemywhose uniform wasfunny-looking black pajamas. However, the threatthe South Vietnamese government and the UnitedStates had to deal with was not limited, conventional,or comical. Rather, the Vietcong enemy was makingunconventional, coercive, populace-oriented, political-psychological preparations to take complete controlof the state.91 That nontraditional enemy focusedits primary political-psychological attack on thelegitimacy of the corrupt, U.S.-dominated SouthVietnamese government. The main military effort was

conducted in support of that objective in the form ofarmed propaganda. That terrorist strategy was notconducted to win the war but to convince the people


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of Vietnam, other parts of the world, and even theUnited States that the South Vietnamese government

and its foreign ally could not and would not providethe security and other legitimizing functions thatresponsible government is supposed to provide itspeople.92

A major implication here is that it is necessaryto determine correctly and attack aggressively theprimary sources of an enemy political actors physical,psychological, and moral strength. In that connection,centers of gravity must be attackedand defended.This reects the two sides of the proverbial insurgency-counterinsurgency struggle. Thus, it is as importantfor an attacker to take the necessary measures todefend his own centers of gravity as it is for him todeal with those of his opponents. In this context, U.S.leadership failed to defend American public opinion

against the full-scale media war that was conductedby North Vietnam and its external allies throughoutthe world. American leadership failed to understandthat the streets of Peoria and the halls of Congress weremore decisive in determining the outcome of a warthousands of miles away than the military battleeldsin Vietnam.93

A New Concept of Deterrence. Deterrence is notnecessarily militaryalthough that is important. It isnot necessarily negative or directly coercive, althoughthat, too, is important. Deterrence is much broaderthan any of these elements. Deterrence can be directand/or indirect, political-diplomatic, socioeconomic,psychological-moral, and/or militarily coercive. Inits various forms and combinations of forms, it is

an attempt to inuence how and what an enemy orpotential enemy thinks and does. That is, deterrence isthe creation of a state of mind that either discourages


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one thing or encourages something else. Motive andculture, thus, become crucial.94 In this context, political-

military communication and preventive diplomacybecome a vital part of the deterrence equation.

As a result, the deterrence rule of thumb must movefrom U.S.-centric values and determine precisely what ahostile leadership values most, and identify exactly howthat cultural valuewhatever it iscan realisticallybe manipulated and held at risk. Conversely, a newdeterrence rule of thumb must also consider what ahostile leadership values most andas opposed to theproverbial stickidentify precisely what carrots mightalso be offered as deterrents. In these terms, we mustthink of ourselves not so much as warghters as warpreventers.95

Thus, it is incumbent upon the United States andthe rest of the global community to understand and

cope with the threats imposed by contemporary,nontraditional actors, think outside the conventionalbox, and replace the old nuclear theology with abroad deterrence strategy, as it applies to the chaosprovoked by the diverse state, nonstate, intrastate,and transnational nuclear and nonnuclear threats andmenaces that have heretofore been ignored or wishedaway. The deterrence task, then, is straightforward.Culturally effective ways and means must be foundto convince nontraditional players that it is not intheir interestswhatever they may beto continue toengage in negative behavior.96

An Unconventional Strategic Objective and Redenitionof Power, Enemy, and Victory. Given that the enemy isno longer an easily identied military entity and given

the essentially political-psychological-moral-coercivenature of the linkages among security, stability,development, legitimate governance, and sovereignty,


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the contemporary security environment requiresa new strategic objective. In the past, the strategic

objective has been dened variously as unconditionalsurrender, peace with honor, doing the rightthing, drawing a line in the sand, showing wemean business, being credible, and rendering theenemy powerless.97 Also, in the past, U.S. leadershipfound that it was easier to deal with tactical- andoperational-level nodes of vulnerability.98 Yet, dataand experience continually reinforce the political,strategic, holistic, and multidimensional aspects ofcontemporary conict.99

Power is no longer simply combat repowerdirected at a uniformed soldier or an enemys military orindustrial complex. Power is multilevel and combinespolitical, psychological, moral, informational, eco-nomic, social, military, police, and civil-bureaucratic

activities that can be brought to bear appropriately onthe causes as well as the perpetrators of violence. Andvictory is no longer the obvious and acknowledgeddestruction of military capability, and the resultantunconditional surrender. Victory or success is nowmore frequently, with perhaps with a bit of spincontroldened as the achievement of peace. Whatthe world appears to be looking for and what thePopulace-Oriented Model can lead to is a sustainablepeacewith justice.100

Analysis of the problems of generating a sustainablepeace with justice takes us beyond providing someform of humanitarian assistance or refugee assistancein cases of human misery and need. Analysis of theproblems of stability and peace takes us back to where

we began. The core strategic problem is responsiblepolitical leadership in the post-Cold War world.Foreign policy and military asset management must


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address this central issue.101 Additionally, the enormityand the logic of the establishment of a durable and

just peace demand a carefully thought-out, phased,long-term planning and implementation process forsustainable peace with justice. British General Smithreminds us that contemporary combatants must seekto establish conditions that create a conceptual spacefor diplomacy, economic incentives, political pressure,and other measures to create a desired political [end-state].102 [Otherwise], our military forcesand theforce they applywill lack utility.103

End-State Planning and an Integrated StrategicImplementing Process. The key to the implementationof a viable political stability strategy and strategicclarity is planning. This depends on a clear strategicvision, based upon the Populace-Oriented Model asa starting point. A viable strategy also depends on an

organizational management structure and adequateresources to apply the vision on the basis of realisticcalculations of ends, ways, means, and long-termtiming. This takes us to end-state planning, unity ofeffort, and strategic clarity.

End-state planning starts from the truism thatconict is a continuation of politics by other means butwith two qualifying arguments. First, military violenceis required only when the conditions or changes soughtcannot be achieved through political-diplomatic,socioeconomic, or informational-psychological waysand means.104 Second, end-state planning advocatessynchronization of all national and internationalcivilian and military instruments of power so that themost synergism can be gained from the interaction

of the variables selected for action.105 The end-stateplanning argument concludes that if the United Nationsor the United States or any other international player is


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going to succeed in future conicts, civil and militaryforces must be structured and employed in ways that

respond to the dynamic political, economic, social, aswell as military variables at work in the stability-peaceparadigm. And, as logic and experience demand, theinteragency community must base its decisions on aclear, mutually agreed denition of what ultimatesuccess looks likethat is, share a vision of strategicclarity.106

Attempts to achieve political and strategicobjectives cannot be based on the ad hoc use of nationaland international instruments of power. Withoutorganizations that can establish, enforce, and continuallydene a holistic plan and generate consistent nationaland international support, authority is fragmentedand ineffective in resolving the myriad problemsendemic to survival in contemporary conictand

thus, operations can become increasingly incoherent.Requiring a high level of planning and coordinationis not a matter of putting the cart before the horse. Itis a matter of knowing where the horse is going andprecisely how it is going to get there. Decisionmakers,policymakers, and planners should never lose sight ofthat bigger unity of effort picture.107

Conclusions.

These cooperative and cognitive efforts will notbe easy to implement. However, they should provein the medium to long term to be far less demandingand costly in politi

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