ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS 1987 Philippine Constitution

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ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS

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1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

2 34

BILL OF RIGHTS

It is a charter of liberties for the individual

and a limitation upon the power of the State

A. PURPOSE

To protect the people against arbitrary and

discriminatory use of political power.

B. TWO KINDS OF RIGHTS embodied in

Article III:

1. POLITICAL RIGHTS

Those that are in relation to the participation of the

individual, directly or indirectly, in the establishment

or administration of government.

Ex. Freedom of Speech and assembly

2. CIVIL RIGHTS

These are non-political rights of all citizens,

especially those relating to personal liberty

Ex. Right against Involuntary Servitude, Right

against Unreasonable searches and seizures

RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE III:

Sec. 1 – Right to due process and equal

protection of the laws.

Sec. 2 – Right against unreasonable

searches and seizures

Sec. 3 – Right to privacy of communication

and correspondence

Sec. 4 – Freedom of expression

Sec. 5 – Freedom of religion

Sec. 6 – Liberty of abode and right to

travel

Sec. 7 – Right to information

Sec. 8 – Right to form associations

Sec. 9 – Just compensation

Sec. 10 – Non-impairment of obligations

and contracts

Sec. 11 – Free access to courts

Sec. 12 – Rights of persons under custodial

investigation

Sec. 13 – Right to bail

Sec. 14 – Rights of the accused

Sec. 15 – Privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus

Sec. 16 – Right to a speedy disposition of

cases

Sec. 17 – Right against self-incrimination

Sec. 18 – Right against involuntary

servitude

Sec. 19 – Right against excessive fines and

cruel and degrading punishments

Sec. 20 – Right against imprisonment for

non-payment of debt or poll tax

Sec. 21 – Right against double jeopardy

Sec. 22 – Right against ex post facto law

and bill of attainder

RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

OF THE LAWS

SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived

of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law, nor shall any

person be denied the equal

protection of the laws.

A. DUE PROCESS OF LAW

It is a law that hears before it condemns,

which proceeds upon inquiry and renders

judgment only after trial.1

1. ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS:

a) Substantive due process

b) Procedural due process

2. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

a) This serves as a restriction on the

government’s law and rule-making

powers. It requires the intrinsic validity of

the law2 in interfering with the rights of

the person to his life, liberty, or property.

b) It must be a guarantee against the

exercise of arbitrary power even when

the power is exercised according to

proper forms and procedure.

c) REQUIREMENTS:

(1) The interests of the public in general,

as distinguished from those of a

particular class, require the

intervention of the State; and

(2) The means employed are reasonably

necessary for the accomplishment of

the purpose and not unduly

oppressive on individuals.

1 Ermita Hotel and Motel Operators Assn. vs. City of

Manila, 20 SCRA 849; Perez vs. People, G.R. No. 164763,

12 Feb. 2008 2 Intrinsic validity of the law requires that the law itself

must be constitutional and legally binding.

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

By: TZRT 3 34

Publication of laws is part of substantive

due process.3

3. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

a) This serves as a restriction on actions of

judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of

the government.

b) It concerns about the legal processes

itself that requires notice and hearing

before judgment.

c) REQUIREMENTS:

(1) Impartial court or tribunal clothed

with judicial power to hear and

determine the matters before it;

(2) Jurisdiction properly acquired over

the person of the defendant and

over property which is the subject

matter of the proceeding;

(3) Opportunity to be heard; and

To be heard does not mean verbal

arguments in court; one may be heard

also through pleadings. Where

opportunity to be heard, either through

oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded,

there is no denial of due process.4

(4) Judgment rendered upon lawful

hearing and based on evidence

adduced5.

4. LIFE

It refers to the right of an individual to his

body in its completeness, and extends to the

use of God-given faculties which make life

enjoyable. It also includes the right to a good

life and have a dignified and decent

standard of living.

5. LIBERTY

It includes the right to exist and the right

to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or

servitude.

6. PROPERTY

It means anything that can come under

the right of ownership and be the subject of

contract. It represents more than the things

3 Tañada v. Tuvera, No. L-63915, December 29, 1986 4 Sandoval v. HRET, G.R. No. 19006, March 9, 2010 5 Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca, G.R. No. L-11390,

March 26, 1918

that a person owns, it includes the right to

procure and dispose of them.

7. RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAIVABLE

The right to be heard may be waived as it

may be invoked, and validly so, as long as

the person is given the opportunity to be

heard on his behalf. It is sufficient that he

was given the opportunity to be heard.

He need not be heard.6

8. DUE PROCESS DOES NOT ALWAYS

REQUIRE TRIAL-TYPE PROCEEDINGS

a) The essence of due process is found in

the opportunity to be heard and the

submission of evidence. To be heard

does not necessarily mean verbal

arguments in court; one may be heard

also through pleadings.7/8

b) What the law prohibits is not the absence

of previous notice but the absolute

absence thereof and the lack of

opportunity to be heard.9

B. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

It requires that all persons or things similarly

situated should be treated alike, both as

to the rights conferred and liabilities

imposed.

1. What the Constitution requires is equality

among equals. If the classification is

reasonable, the law may operate only

on some and not all of the people

without violating the equal protection

clause.

2. The guaranty of the equal protection

clause is not violated by a legislation

based on a reasonable classification.10

3. A law is NOT invalid simply because of

simple inequality. In the exercise of its

power to make classifications for the

purpose of enacting laws over matters

within its jurisdiction, the State is

6 Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 88050,

Jan. 30, 1992 7 Zaldivar vs. SB; Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, Oct. 7, 1988 8 PLEADINGS – are the written statements of the

respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted

to the court for appropriate judgment. 9 Samalio vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 140079, March 31, 2005 10 People v. Cayat, No. 45987, May 5, 1939

ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS

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1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

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recognized as enjoying a wide range of

discretion.

a) CLASSIFICATION

The grouping of persons or things similar

to each other in certain particulars and

different from all others in these same

particulars.

b) REQUIREMENTS for a VALID

CLASSIFICATION:

(1) Such classification rests upon

substantial distinctions;

(2) It is not confined to existing conditions

only;

(3) It applies equally to all members of

the same class; and

(4) It must be germane to the purposes

of the law11

RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND

SEIZURE

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures

of whatever nature and for any

purpose shall be inviolable, and no

search warrant or warrant of arrest

shall issue except upon probable

cause to be determined personally

by the judge after examination

under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he

may produce, and particularly

describing the place to be searched

and the persons or things to be

seized.

A. The right against unreasonable search

and seizure is a restraint upon the

government. It does not apply so as to

require exclusion of evidence which

came into the possession of the

Government through a search made by

a private citizen12.

11 People v. Cayat, No. 45987, May 5, 1939 12 People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

B. SCOPE

1. It is a popular right, hence, protects all

persons, including aliens 13 and, to a

limited extent, artificial persons 14.

2. Available to all persons, including aliens

whether accused of crime or not.

3. Artificial persons are entitled to the

guaranty but they may be required to

open their books of accounts for

examination by the State in the exercise

of the police power or the power of

taxation. Their premises may be not be

searched nor may their papers and

effects be seized except by virtue of a

valid warrant.

Not all searches and seizures are

prohibited. Those which are reasonable

are not forbidden15.

The term "unreasonable search and

seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or

in General Orders, No. 58, and it is said to

have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable

meaning, although the term has been

defined in general language. All illegal

searches and seizures are unreasonable

while lawful ones are reasonable. What

constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable

search or seizure in any particular case is

purely a judicial question, determinable

from a consideration of the circumstances

involved, including the purpose of the

search, the presence or absence of

probable cause, the manner in which the

search and seizure was made, the place

or thing searched, and the character of

the articles procured16.

4. The right is personal; it may be invoked

only by the person entitled to it17. Such

right may be waived either expressly or

impliedly.

5. Waiver must be made by the person

whose right is invaded, not by one who

13 Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, No. L-10280,

September 30, 1963 14 Bache & Co., Inc. v. Ruiz, No. L-32409, February 27, 1971 15 Valmonte v. De Villa 173 SCRA 211 Sept. 29, 1989 16 Alvarez vs. CFI, G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937 17 Stonehill v. Diokno, No. L-19550, June 19, 1967

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

By: TZRT 5 34

is not duly authorized to effect such

waiver.18

6. The constitutional viability of the

mandatory, random, and suspicionless

drug testing for students emanates primarily from their waiver of their right

to privacy when they seek entry to the

school, and from their voluntary

submitting their persons to the parental

authority of school authorities19.

7. In case of private and public

employees, the constitutional

soundness of the mandatory, random

and suspicionless drug testing proceeds

from the reasonableness of the drug

test policy and requirement20.

8. However, there is no valid justification for

mandatory drug testing for persons

accused of crimes. As they are singled

out and impleaded against their will.

Thus, to impose mandatory drug testing

on the accused is a blatant attempt to

harness a medical test as a tool for

criminal prosecution21.

9. Persons may lose the protection of the

search and seizure clause by exposure

of their persons or property to the

public in a manner reflecting a LACK

OF SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATION of

privacy22.

C. ARREST

It is the taking of a person into custody in order that

he may be bound to answer for the commission of

an offense.

D. Requisites of Valid Warrant:

1. PROBABLE CAUSE

Such facts and circumstances

antecedent to the issuance of a warrant that

in themselves are sufficient to induce a

cautious man to rely on them and act in

pursuance thereof;23

18 People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, August 12, 1992 19 Laserna v. DDB, G.R. No. 158633, Nov. 3, 2008 20 Laserna v. DDB, G.R. No. 158633, Nov. 3, 2008 21 Laserna v. DDB, G.R. No. 158633, Nov. 3, 2008 22 People v. Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, Dec. 18, 2000 23 People v. Syjuco, No. 41957, August 28, 1937

Must refer to one specific offense24.

a) For a search warrant:

Such facts and circumstances which would

lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man

to believe that an offense has been committed

and that the objects sought in connection with

the offense are in the place sought to be

searched25.

b) For a warrant of arrest:

Such facts and circumstances which

would lead a reasonably discreet and

prudent man to believe that an offense

has been committed by the person sought

to be arrested.26

2. Determination of probable cause

personally by the judge;

a) For a search warrant

The judge must, before issuing a search

warrant, determine whether there is

probable cause by examining the

complainant and witnesses through

searching questions and answers. His

failure to comply with this requirement

constitutes grave abuse of discretion27.

b) For a warrant of arrest:

What the Constitution underscores is the

exclusive and personal responsibility of the

issuing judge to satisfy himself of the

existence of probable cause. In satisfying

himself of the existence of probable cause

for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the

judge is not required to personally

examine the complainant and his

witnesses. Following established doctrine

and procedure, he shall:

Personally evaluate the report and the

supporting documents submitted by the

fiscal regarding the existence of probable

cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a

warrant of arrest; or

24 Asian Surety v. Herrera, No. L-25232, December 20, 1973 25 Burgos v. Chief of Staff, No. L-64261, December 26, 1984 26 Webb v. De Leon G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995 27 Silva vs. Presiding Judge of RTC, Negros Oriental, G.R.

No. 81756, October 21, 1991

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1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

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If on the basis thereof he finds no probable

cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report

and require the submission of supporting

affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving

at a conclusion as to the existence of

probable cause28.

c) Distinction between the objectives of the

prosecutor and the judge in determining

the existence of a probable cause:

(1) Prosecutor

determines whether there is reasonable

ground to believe that the accused is

guilty and should be held for trial.

(2) The Judge

determines if a warrant of arrest should be

issued to place the accused in immediate

custody so as not to frustrate the ends of

justice29

3. After personal examination under oath

or affirmation of the complainant and

the witnesses he may produce;

a) The personal examination must not be

merely routinary or pro forma, but must

be probing and exhaustive. The purpose

of this rule is to satisfy the examining

judge as to the existence of probable

cause.

b) Witnesses are not necessary when the

affidavit of the applicant or complainant

contains sufficient facts within his

personal and direct knowledge, it is

sufficient if the judge is satisfied that

there exists probable cause; however

when the applicant's knowledge of the

facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of

one or more witnesses having a personal

knowledge of the facts is necessary30.

(1) Test of Sufficiency of Oath: Whether it

had been drawn in such a manner

that perjury could be charged

thereon and affiant be held liable for

damages caused.31

4. On the basis of their personal knowledge

of the facts they are testifying to;

28 Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988 29 Ho v. People, GR No. 106632 October 9, 1997 30 Alvarez vs. CFI, G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937 31 Alvarez v. Court of First Instance,64 Phil 33, 1937

Hearsay is not allowed. It must not be

based on mere information or belief.

5. The warrant must describe particularly

the place to be searched and the

persons or things to be seized.

a) A description of the place to be

searched is sufficient if the officer with

the warrant can, with reasonable effort,

ascertain and identify the place

intended.

b) Sufficiency of the description of the

object is closely related with the

sufficient particularity of the averments

of the offense.

c) However, it is not required that a

technical description be given32.

Search Warrant Warrant Of Arrest

The judge must

personally examine in

the form of searching

questions and answers,

in writing and under

oath, the complainant

and any witnesses he

may produce on facts

personally known to

them33;

The determination of

probable cause

depends to a large

extent upon the

finding/opinion of the

judge who conducted

the required

examination of the

applicant and the

witnesses34.

It is not necessary that

the judge should

personally examine the

complainant and his

witnesses35;

he would simply

personally review the

initial determination of

the prosecutor to see if it

is supported by

substantial evidence;

he merely determines

the probability, not the

certainty of the guilt of

the accused and, in so

doing, he need not

conduct a de novo

hearing36.

(De Novo) – a new

The description of

property to be seized

need not be

technically accurate

nor necessarily precise,

and its nature will

necessarily vary

according to whether

the identity of the

“General warrants” are

proscribed and

unconstitutional

(Nolasco v. Puno, No. L-

69803, October 8, 1985);

but, a John Doe Warrant

(where true name of the

person to be arrested is

unknown) satisfies the

32 People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 118315, June 20, 1996 33 Sec. 4, Rule 126, Rules of Court 34 Kho v. Judge Makalintal G.R. No. 94902-06, April 21,

1999 35 Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, 14 November 1998 36 Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

By: TZRT 7 34

property or its

character is a matter of

concern; it is required

to be specific only in so

far as the

circumstances will

allow37.

constitutional

requirement if there is

some descriptio

personae which will

enable the officer to

identify the accused38.

E. General Rule:

Only the judge has the power to issue a

warrant after the proper procedure has

been duly taken.

F. Exceptions:

1. The Commissioner of Immigration and

Deportation may issue warrants only for

the purpose of carrying out a final

decision of deportation39. In such case,

probable cause is not necessary.

a) The constitutional guarantee set forth in

Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution

aforesaid, requiring that the issue of

probable cause be determined by a

judge, does not extend to deportation

proceedings40.

b) Warrant of arrest may be issued by

administrative authorities only for the

purpose of carrying out a final finding of

a violation of law and not for the sole

purpose of investigation or prosecution.

It may be issued only after the

proceeding has taken place as when

there is already a final decision of the

administrative authorities.

G. What may be subject to search and

seizure?

1. Property subject of the offense

2. Property stolen or embezzled and other

proceeds or fruits of the offense

3. Property used or intended to be used as

the means of committing an offense

H. SEARCH WARRANT

37 Kho v. Judge Makalintal, G.R. No. 94902-06, April 21,

1999 38 Pangandaman v. Casar, No. L-71782, April 14, 1988 39 CID v. Judge De la Rosa, G.R. No. 95122-23, May 31,

1991 and Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, G.R. No.

L-10280,September 30, 1963 40 Morano vs. Vivo, G.R. No. L-22196, June 30, 1967

It is an order in writing issued in the name

of the People of the Philippines, signed by a

judge, and directed to a peace officer,

commanding him to search for personal

property described therein and bring it

before the court.

1. A search warrant, to be valid, must

particularly describe the place to be

searched and the things to be seized.

2. A search warrant is NOT a sweeping

authority empowering a raiding party to

undertake a fishing expedition to

confiscate any and all kinds of

evidence or articles relating to a crime.

3. The search is limited in scope so as not

to be general or explanatory.

4. Nothing is left to the discretion of the

officer executing the warrant.41

5. Although the properties may have been

seized in violation of the Constitution, it

does not follow that its owner shall be

entitled to recover it immediately. If

the said property is the subject of

litigation, like a prosecution for illegal

possession of firearms, it will remain in

custodia legis 42 until the case is

terminated.

6. If the property is prohibited by law like

illegal drugs, it shall be confiscated and

destroyed.

7. Seizure is limited to those items

particularly described in a valid search

warrant. Searching officers are without

discretion regarding what articles they

shall seize. Evidence seized on the

occasion of such an unreasonable

search and seizure is tainted and

excluded for being the proverbial "fruit

of a poisonous tree." In the language

of the fundamental law, it shall be

inadmissible in evidence for any

purpose in any proceeding.43

I. PROPER DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE TO BE

SEARCHED

1. The executing officer’s prior knowledge

as to the place intended in the warrant

is relevant.

41 United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip, et al., G.R. No. 163858,

June 28, 2005 42 Custodia legis – legal custody 43 Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 142295, May 31, 2001

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In Yao, Sr., et al. vs. People, et al.,44 even if

there are several structures inside the

MASAGANA compound, there was NO

NEED to particularize the areas to be

searched because the compound is

owned and used solely by MASAGANA.

What the law merely requires is that the

place to be searched can be

distinguished in relation to the other places

in the community. Indubitably, the

requisite of particularity as to description of

the place to be searched was complied

with in the instant case.

2. SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT

a) A general or scatter-shot warrant is a

search warrant issued for more than one

(1) specific offense.

b) It is void because it violates the

constitutional requirement that there

must be particularity of the things to be

seized and the places to be searched.45

c) It is a search warrant which vaguely

describes and does not particularize the

personal properties to be seized without

a definite guideline to the searching

team as to what items might be lawfully

seized.

J. When searches WITHOUT WARRANT are

permissible:

1. In times of war and within the area of

military occupation;

2. As an incident to a lawful arrest,

provided the search is

contemporaneous to arrest and within

permissible area of search46

a) REQUISITES:

(1) The arrest must be lawful;

(2) The search and seizure must be

contemporaneous with arrest; AND

(3) The search must be within permissible

areas of search.47

44 G.R. No. 168306, June 19, 2007 45 Leon Tambasen vs. People, et al., G.R. No. 89103, July

14, 1995 46 see Sec. 13, Rule 126, Revised Rules on Criminal

Procedure 47 Nolasco vs. Paño, 139 SCRA 541

b) A valid arrest must precede the search;

the process cannot be reversed48.

c) A warrantless search incidental to a

lawful arrest may be made only within

the permissible area of search, or the

place within the immediate control of

the person being arrested49.

3. Plain View Doctrine

When there are prohibited articles open

to eye and hand;50

4. When there is consent51, subject to the ff.

requirements:

a) There is a right;

b) There must be knowledge of the

existence of such right; and

c) There must be intention to waive.52

5. When it is an incident of inspection.53

a) Searches of vessel and aircraft for

violation of fishery, immigration and

customs laws54;

b) Searches and seizures without warrant of

vessels and aircraft for violation of

customs laws have been traditional

exception to the constitutional

requirement because the vessel can be

quickly moved out of the locality or

jurisdiction in which the search must be

sought before the warrant could be

secured.

c) Searches of automobiles at borders or

constructive borders for violation of

immigration and smuggling laws.

Customs searches however are not

available in dwelling places55;

d) Inspection of buildings and other

premises for the enforcement of fire,

sanitary and building regulations;

e) Visual search at checkpoints56;

48 People v. Chua Ho San, G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999 49 Espano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120431 April 1,

1998 50 Chia v. Actg. Collector of Customs, G.R. No. L-43810,

September 26, 1989); 51 People v. Malasugui, No. 44335, July 30, 1936 52 People vs. Cruz, Aug. 30, 1988 53 People vs. Peralta, et al., G.R. No. 145176, Mar. 30, 2004 54 Roldan v. Arca, No. L-25434, July 25, 1975 55 Papa v. Mago, No. L-27360, February 28, 1968 56 Valmonte v. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, September 29,

1989

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

By: TZRT 9 34

f) Conduct of “aerial target zoning” and

“saturation drive” in the exercise of

military powers of the President57;

g) When there is a genuine reason to “stop-

and-frisk” in the light of the police

officer’s experience and surrounding

conditions to warrant a belief that the

person detained has weapons

concealed (Malacat v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 1,

1997 citing Terry vs. Ohio); and

h) Doctrine of exigent circumstances

Under such urgency and exigency of

the moment where a search warrant should

be lawfully dispensed with58

K. KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE PRINCIPLE

1. Police officers are obliged to give

notice, show their authority and

demand that they be allowed entry.

They may only break open any outer or

inner door or window of a house to

execute the search warrant if, after

such notice and demand, such officers

are refused entry to the place of

directed search.

2. Exceptions:

a) Intrusion into the premises is permissible

when:

b) A party whose premises or is entitled to

the possession thereof refuses, upon

demand, to open it;

c) When such person in the premises

already knew of the identity of the

officers and of their authority and

persons;

d) When the officers are justified in the

honest belief that there is an imminent

peril to life or limb; and

e) When those in the premises, aware of the

presence of someone outside (because,

for example, there has been a knock at

the door), are then engaged in activity

which justifies the officers to believe that

an escape or the destruction of

evidence is being attempted.59

L. MOVING VEHICLES

57 Guanzon v. de Villa, G.R. No. 80508, January 30, 1990 58 People v. De Gracia, G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 6, 1994 59 People v. Huang Zhen Hua and Jogy Lee, G.R. No.

139301, September 29, 2004

1. A warrantless search of a moving

vehicle is justified on the ground that it

is not practicable to secure a warrant

because the vehicle can be quickly

moved out of the locality or jurisdiction

in which the warrant must be sought.

2. However, the exception from securing a

search warrant when it comes to

moving vehicles does NOT give the

police authorities unbridled discretion

to conduct a warrantless search.

M. “STOP AND FRISK”

1. Where a police officer observes unusual

conduct which leads him reasonably to

conclude that in light of his experience

that criminal activity may be afoot and

that the person with whom he is dealing

may be armed and presently

dangerous, where in the course of

investigating this behavior he identifies

himself as a policeman and makes

reasonable inquiries, and where

nothing in the initial stages of the

encounter serves to dispel his

reasonable fear for his own or other’s

safety, he is entitled for the protection

of himself and of others in the area to

conduct a carefully limited search of

the outer clothing of such persons in an

attempt to discover weapons which

might be used to assault him.

2. While probable cause is NOT required to

conduct stop-and-frisk, it nevertheless

holds that suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine

reason must exist, in light of the police

officer’s experience and surrounding

circumstances, to justify the belief that

the person detained has weapons

concealed.

N. Checkpoints are NOT illegal per se

1. Under exceptional circumstances, as

where the survival of organized

government is on the balance, or

where the lives and safety of the

people are in grave peril, checkpoints

may be allowed and installed by the

government.

2. Although the general rule is that

motorists and their vehicles as well as

pedestrians passing through

checkpoints may only be subjected to

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1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

10 34

routine inspection, vehicles may be

stopped and extensively searched

when there is probable cause that

which justifies a reasonable belief of the

men at the checkpoints that either the

motorist is a law offender or the

contents of the vehicle are or have

been instruments of some offense.

O. PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

It merely serves to supplement the prior

justification – whether it be a warrant for

another object, hot pursuit, search as an

incident to a lawful arrest or some

legitimate reason.

The objects within the sight of an officer

who has a right to be in a position to have

that view are subject to seizure and may

be presented as evidence (open to the

eye and hand).

1. The plain view doctrine is usually applied

where the police officer is not searching

for evidence against the accused, but

nonetheless inadvertently comes upon

an incriminating object60.

2. Elements:

a) A prior valid intrusion based on a valid

warrantless arrest in which the police are

legally present in the pursuit of their

official duties;

b) The evidence was inadvertently

discovered by the police who have the

right to be where they are;

c) The evidence must be immediately

apparent; and

d) Plain view justified mere seizure of

evidence without further search61.

P. WARRANT OF ARREST

It is an order in writing issued in the name

of the People of the Philippines, signed by a

judge, and directed to a peace officer,

commanding him to arrest the person

designated therein and bring him before the

court.

Q. WARRANTLESS ARRESTS, when valid:

60 People v. Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993 67 People v. Bolasa, GR No. 125754, December 22, 1999

1. In Flagrante Delicto (Caight in the Act) -

When person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is

attempting to commit an offense;

2. Doctrine of Hot Pursuit - When:

a) An offense has just been committed; and

b) He has probable cause to believe based

on personal knowledge of facts or

circumstances that the person to be

arrested has committed it;

3. When a person to be arrested is an

escapee or detention prisoner62.

The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction,

applied with a great degree of

consistency, is that "reliable information"

alone is not sufficient to justify a

warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule

113. The rule requires, in addition, that the

accused perform some overt act that

would indicate that he "has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to

commit an offense." The officer arresting a

person who has just committed, is

committing, or is about to commit an

offense must have personal knowledge of

that fact. The offense must also be

committed in his presence or within his

view63.

(1) Membership in organizations like NPA

is a continuing offense, thus, a person

can be arrested anytime.64

(2) When the right is waived by the

person arrested, provided he knew of

such right and knowingly decided not

to invoke it.

(3) An application for or admission to

bail shall not bar the accused from

challenging the validity of his arrest,

provided that he raises them before

entering his plea.65

R. WAIVER OF RIGHT AGAINST

UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE

When one voluntarily submits to a search

or consents to have it made on the person

62 Sec. 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 63 People v. Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong. G.R. NO.

144037, September 26, 2003 64 Umil v. Ramos, G.R. No. 79731, July 9, 1990 65 Sec. 26, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

By: TZRT 11 34

or premises, he is precluded from later

complaining thereof.

The right to be secured may, like every

right, be waived and such waiver may be

made either expressly or impliedly.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND

CORRESPONDENCE

Section 3. (1) The privacy of

communication and

correspondence shall be inviolable

except upon lawful order of the

court, or when public safety or order

requires otherwise, as prescribed by

law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in

violation of this or the preceding

section shall be inadmissible for any

purpose in any proceeding.

A. Section 3 means the right to be alone

and to be left alone in his personal

dealings.

B. Limitations:

1. By lawful order of the court;

2. Public safety or public order requires

otherwise, as may be provided by law

(Sec. 3, Art. III).

C. The law insures absolute freedom of

communication between the spouses by

making it privileged.

1. Neither husband nor wife may testify for

or against the other without the

consent of the affected spouse while

the marriage subsists.

2. Neither may one be examined without

the consent of the other as to any

communication received in confidence

by one from the other during the

marriage, save for specified exceptions.

3. But one thing is freedom of

communication; quite another is a

compulsion for each one to share what

one knows with the other66.

D. ANTI-WIRE TAPPING ACT (R.A. 4200)

1. This Act prohibits any person, not being

authorized by all the parties to any

private communication or spoken word

to tap any wire or cable, or by using

any other device or arrangement, to

secretly overhear, intercept or record

the same, or to communicate the

content thereof to any other person.

2. It is illegal for any person not authorized

by all parties to any communication, to

secretly record such communication by

means of tape recorder.

a) The law does not make any distinction,

and as such, RA 4200 may be violated

even by a party to the communication.67

3. A telephone extension line is not among

the devices covered by RA 420068.

4. The law prohibits the overhearing,

intercepting, or recording of private

communications but not those which

are public in character69.

5. The right to privacy of those detained is

subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, stating

in part that any security officer with

custodial responsibility over a detainee

may undertake such measures

reasonable measures to secure his

safety and prevent his escape. By the

very fact of their detention. Pre-trial

detainees and convicted prisoners

have a diminished expectation of

privacy rights.70

The authorities may, upon a written order

of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept

and record, with the use of any mode,

form, kind or type of electronic or other

surveillance equipment or intercepting

and tracking devices, or with the use of

any other suitable ways and means for

that purpose, any communication,

66 Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383 February

20, 1996 67 Ramirez v. Ca, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995 68 Gaanan v. IAC, No. L-69809, October 16, 1986 69 Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121087, August

26, 1999 70 Trillanes III v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, Aug. 25, 2005

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message, conversation, discussion, or

spoken or written words between

members of terrorist group as defined in

the Human Security Act of 2007. Provided,

That surveillance, interception and

recording of communications between

lawyers and clients, doctors and patients,

journalists and their sources and

confidential business correspondence shall

not be authorized71.

E. FRUIT FROM THE POISONOUS TREE

DOCTRINE [Sec. 3, (2)]

This means that illegally obtained

documents, articles, or effects are

inadmissible as evidence in court.

1. EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Evidence obtained in violation of Sec. 2,

Art. III, shall be inadmissible for any

purpose in any proceeding (Fruit of

Poisonous Tree Doctrine)72.

2. Evidence obtained in violation of the

search and seizure clause, whether or

not it is also self-incriminating

testimonial evidence, is inadmissible.

3. The illegally seized object must be

returned if it is not a prohibited object73;

but if contraband, it can be

confiscated74

F. What are the tests to determine

reasonableness of person's expectation

of privacy?

1. Whether by his conduct, the individual

has exhibited an expectation of privacy

2. Whether this expectation is one that

society recognizes as reasonable75.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Section 4. No law shall be passed

abridging the freedom of speech, of

expression, or of the press, or the

71 Sec. 7, Human Security Act of 2007 72 Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967 73 Bagalihog v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 92270, June 27, 1991 74 Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. L-59495-97, June 26, 1987 75 Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

right of the people peaceably to

assemble and petition the

government for redress of

grievances.

All the rights mentioned under this section,

while not identical, are inseparable. In

every case, therefore there is a limitation

placed on the exercise of this right, the

judiciary is called upon to examine the

effects of the challenged governmental

actuation76.

A. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

1. Speech, expression and press include

every form of expression, whether oral,

written, tape or disc recorded. It also

includes movies as well as symbolic

speech such as the wearing of an arm

band as a symbol of protest, as well as

peaceful picketing.

2. Sovereignty would be negated if they

were denied the opportunity to

participate in the shaping of public

affairs through the arbitrary imposition

upon them of the ban of silence.

3. The Constitutional right guaranteeing

the freedom of expression is available

only against government intrusion. This is

apparent in the provision since it says

“no law” shall be passed abridging the

freedom.

B. Scope

1. The Constitution guarantees the liberty

to utter what is in his mind and also

guarantees him the liberty not to utter

what is not in his mind.

2. The Freedom also includes the right to

an audience, in the sense that the state

cannot prohibit the people from

hearing what a person has to say,

whatever be the quality of his thoughts.

C. ELEMENTS OR ASPECTS OF FREEDOM OF

EXPRESSION:

1. Freedom from censorship or prior

restraint

76 Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

By: TZRT 13 34

Means freedom from official

governmental restrictions on the press or

other forms of expression in advance of

actual publication or dissemination

a) Live TV coverage may be prohibited

since the right of the accused must

prevail over the right of the public to

information and freedom of the press77

b) The doctrine of freedom of speech was

formulated primarily for the protection of

the “core speech,” speech which

communicates political, social or

religious ideas.

c) It does not apply to commercial speech

or the communication which no more

than proposes a commercial

transaction.

(1) For commercial speech to enjoy

protection, it must not be false or

misleading and should not propose

an illegal transaction78

(2) However, even truthful and lawful

commercial speech may be

regulated if:

(a) Government has substantial

interest to protect;

(b) The regulation directly

advances that interest; and

(c) It is not more extensive than is

necessary to protect that

interest (Central Hudson Gas

and Electric Corp v. Publifc

Service Commission of NY, No.

79-565, June 20, 1980)

D. Freedom from subsequent punishment

1. A limitation on the power of the State to

impose a punishment after publication

or dissemination.

E. Tests for Valid Government Interference

to Freedom of Expression:

1. Clear and present danger rule

When words are used in such

circumstance and of such nature as to

create a clear and present danger that will

77 A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC 78 Friedman v. Rogers, G.R. No. 77-1163, February 21, 1979

and Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission,

G.R. No. 72-419, June 21, 1973

bring about the substantive evil that the

State has a right to prevent79;

a) Clear – causal connection with the

danger of the substantive evil arising

from the utterance questioned; and

b) Present – time element, identified with

imminent and immediate danger; the

danger must not only be probable, but

very likely inevitable80.

2. Dangerous tendency rule

Words uttered create a dangerous

tendency of an evil which the State has a

right to prevent81.

It is sufficient if the natural tendency and

probable effect of the utterance be to

bring about the substantive evil which the

legislative body seeks to prevent.

3. Balancing of interest rule

When a particular conduct is regulated

in the interest of public order, and the

regulation results in an indirect, conditional

and partial abridgment of speech, the duty

of the court is to determine which of the two

conflicting interests demands the greater

protection under the particular

circumstances presented82.

When “speech” and “non-speech”

elements are combined in the same course

of conduct, a sufficiently important

governmental interest in regulating the non-

speech element can justify incidental

limitations on free speech.

(1) A governmental regulation is

sufficiently justified if:

(a) it is within the constitutional

power of the Government,

(b) furthers an important or

substantial governmental

interest unrelated to the

suppression of free expression,

and

79 Schenck v. U.S., No. 437, 438, March 3, 1919 80 Gonzales v. Comelec, No. L-27833, April 18, 1969 81 Cabansag v. Fernandez, No. L-8974, October 18, 1957 82 American Communications Association v. Douds, No.

10, May 8, 1950

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(c) if the incidental restriction on

alleged freedom is no greater

than what is essential to that

interest.

F. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT TO SPEECH:

1. Clear and present danger that the

Congress has the right to prevent;

2. Prohibition regarding certain forms of

propaganda “to prevent distortion and

prostitution of electoral process;”

3. Demonstrations within a radius of 200

meters from the boundary of any hall of

justice to ensure the people to an

impartial and orderly administration of

justice.83

4. Persons organizing public meetings using

public streets must procure a special

permit from the local authorities to

conduct the said meeting, parade,

procession, etc.

Clear and Present

Danger and Dangerous

Tendency Rules

Balancing of Interests

Rule

Couched in terms of

degree of evil and

proximity of evil

For legislation whose

object is not the

prevention of evil

measurable in terms of

proximity and degree

Evolved in the context

of prosecution for

seditious speech

Used for commercial

speech.

G. ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

1. The right to assemble is not subject to

prior restraint and may not be

conditioned upon the prior issuance of

a permit or authorization from the

government authorities.

2. However, the right must be exercised in

such a way that it will not prejudice the

public welfare.

3. When such rights were exercised on

regular school days instead of during

the free time of the teachers, the

83 Administrative Matter 98-7-02 SC

teachers committed acts prejudicial to

the best interests of the service84.

H. EXTENT OF AUTHORITY OF THE STATE TO

REGULATE PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES

1. Primacy of human rights

a) freedom of expression, of peaceful

assembly and of petition for redress of

grievances—over property rights has

been sustained85

b) To justify limitations on freedom of

assembly there must be proof of

sufficient weight to satisfy the clear and

present danger test86

c) The Philippine obligation under the

Vienna Convention to protect the

premises of embassies must be honored

but it does not preclude application of

the clear and present danger rule.

d) If assembly is to be held at a public

place, permit for the use of such place,

and not for the assembly itself, may be

validly required. Power of local officials is

merely for regulation and not for

prohibition87.

I. RULES ON ASSEMBLY AND PETITION88

1. The applicant for a permit to hold an

assembly should inform the licensing

authority of the date, the public place

where and the time when it will take

place.

2. If it is a private place, only the consent

of the owner or of the one entitled to its

legal possession is required.

3. Such application should be filed ahead

in time to enable the public official

concerned to appraise whether there

may be a valid objections to the grant

of the permit or to its grant but to

another public place

a) It is an indispensable condition to such

refusal or modification that the clear and

84 De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 126183 &

129221, March 25, 1999 85 Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Phil.

Blooming Mills Co. Inc., G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973 86 JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366

November 9, 1983 87 Primicias v. Fugoso, No. L-1800, January 27, 1948 88 J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366 November 9,

1983)

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

By: TZRT 15 34

present danger test be the standard for

the decision reached.

4. The decision of the public authority,

favorable or adverse, must be

transmitted to the applicant at the

earliest possible opportunity so they can

have recourse to the proper judicial

authority.

J. Permit for public assembly is NOT

necessary if meeting is to be held in:

1. Private places;

2. The campus of a government-owned or

operated educational institution; and

3. Freedom parks89.

K. Tests of a lawful assembly

1. Purpose for which it is held regardless of

the auspices under which it is organized

2. Auspices test

Nature of the people composing the

assembly

L. The provisions of BP No. 880 are not an

absolute ban of public assemblies but a

restriction that simply regulates the time,

place and manner of the assemblies.

The Court referred to it as a “content-

neutral” regulation.

1. In view of the maximum tolerance

mandated by BP No. 880, Calibrated

Pre-emptive Response serves no valid

purpose if it means the same thing as

maximum tolerance and is illegal if it

means something else. Accordingly,

what is to be followed is and should be

that mandated by the law itself,

namely, maximum tolerance, which

specifically means “the highest degree

of restraint that the military, police and

other peace keeping authorities shall

observe during a public assembly or in

the dispersal of the same.”90

M. Procedure under BP 880

89 B.P. Blg. 880: The Public Assembly Act of 1985 90 Bayan, et al. v. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25,

2006

1. An application for the permit to

assemble shall be filed before the

Office of the Mayor within 5 working

days before the scheduled public

assembly.

2. Upon receipt, the same shall

immediately be posted at a

conspicuous place in the city or

municipal building.

3. The mayor shall act on the application

within 2 working days from the date the

application was filed, failing which, the

permit shall be deemed granted.

4. Should for any reason the mayor or any

official acting in his behalf refuse to

accept the application for a permit,

said application shall be posted by the

applicant on the premises of the office

of the mayor and shall be deemed to

have been filed.

5. If the mayor or any official acting in his

behalf denies the application or

modifies the terms thereof in his permit,

the applicant may contest the decision

in an appropriate court of law.

a) While prudence requires that there be a

realistic appraisal not of what may

possibly occur but of what may probably

occur, given all the relevant

circumstances, still the assumption –

especially so where the assembly is

scheduled for a specific public place – is

that the permit must be for the assembly

being held there. The exercise of such a

right, in the language of Justice Roberts,

speaking for the American Supreme

Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea

that it may be exercised in some other

place.”91

b) It is an indispensable condition to such

refusal or modification that the clear and

present danger test be the standard for

the decision reached. If he is of the view

that there is such an imminent and grave

danger of a substantive evil, the

applicants must be heard on the

matter.92

N. DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF

COURTS

91 IBP v. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241,February 24, 2010 92 Ibid.

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Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and all

other similar persons are enjoined from

holding any activity on the sidewalks and

streets adjacent to, in front of, or within a

radius of 200 meters from, the outer

boundary of the Supreme Court Building,

any Hall of Justice, and any other building

that houses at least 1 court sala93.

1. Academic freedom enjoyed by

institutions of higher learning includes

the right to set academic standards to

determine under what circumstances

failing grades suffice for the expulsion

of students. It cannot be utilized to

discriminate against those students who

exercise their constitutional right to

peaceable assembly and free speech.

O. RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

1. This is embraced in the freedom of

expression because it can be used as

vehicle for expression of views that has

a bearing on the public welfare.

2. The right to association also includes the

right not to join any organization94

3. The constitutional right to association

does not preclude the imposition of

relevant qualifications for membership

in any organization. As such, any

person who does not meet the

qualifications of a particular

organization cannot invoke his right to

association if membership is denied.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Section 5. No law shall be made

respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free

exercise thereof. The free exercise

and enjoyment of religious

profession and worship, without

discrimination or preference, shall

forever be allowed. No religious test

shall be required for the exercise of

civil or political rights.

93 In re Petition to Annul 98-7-02 SC 94 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, G.R. No. L-

25246, September 12, 1974

A. TWO-FOLD ASPECTS:

FREEDOM OF BELIEF FREEDOM TO ACT ON

ONE’S BELIEF

The State CANNOT

exercise control over

one’s belief

The State CAN regulate

the acts done because

of one’s belief

Freedom is absolute NOT absolute

Need not be contrary

to law, public morals,

public safety, public

policy, public health, or

national interest.

Reason:

Cogitationis Poenam

Nemo Emeret

(No one commits a

crime in his thoughts)

It must not be contrary

to law, public morals,

public safety, public

policy, public health, or

national interest.

B. RELIGION

1. Any specific system of belief, worship,

conduct, etc. often involving a code of

ethics and philosophy; profession of

faith to an active power that binds and

elevates man to his Creator95

a) Separation of church and state delineate

the boundaries between two institutions

to avoid encroachment by one against

another.

C. NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

1. Scope:

a) State cannot set up a church;

b) Cannot pass laws which aid one or all

religions or prefer one over another;

c) Cannot influence a person to go to or

remain away from church against his will;

or

d) Force him to profess a belief or disbelief in

any religion.

2. Neither the state nor the government

can set up a church, pass laws which

aid one religion, aid all religions, or

prefer one religion over another.

Neither can openly nor secretly

participate in the affairs of the religious

organizations or groups and vice

versa96.

95 Aglipay v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937) 96 Everson v. Board of Education, No. 52, February 10,

1947

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By: TZRT 17 34

D. Tests to determine when there is no

violation of establishment clause:

1. The statute has a secular legislative

purpose;

2. Its principal or primary effect is one that

neither advances nor inhibits religion;

3. It does not foster an excessive

government entanglement with religion

E. Constitutionally Created Exceptions to

the Non-Establishment Clause:

a) Article VI Sec. 29;

b) Article VI Section 28 (3);

c) Article XIV Section 3 (3).

F. FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND

WORSHIP

1. Dual aspect of freedom of religious

belief and worship:

a) FREEDOM TO BELIEVE

(1) absolute as long as it is confined in

the realm of thought

b) FREEDOM TO ACT ON ONE’S BELIEF

(1) Subject to regulation where the

belief is translated into external acts

that affect the public welfare.

G. Freedom to believe carries with it the

corollary expectation that the

government, while it may look into the

good faith of a person, cannot inquire

into a person’s religious pretensions.

However, the moment belief flows into

action, it becomes subject to

government regulation.

1. To compel students to take part in a flag

ceremony when it is against their

religious beliefs will violate their religious

freedom`97.

2. Expulsion/excommunication of members

of a religious institution/organization is a

matter best left to the discretion of the

officials, and the laws and canons, of

said institution/organization. It is not for

97 Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of

Cebu, G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993

the courts to exercise control over

church authorities in the performance

of their discretionary and official

functions. Rather, it is for the members

of religious institutions/organizations to

conform to just church regulations98

3. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that

government must pursue its secular

goals and interests but at the same

time strive to uphold religious liberty to

the greatest extent possible within

flexible constitutional limits. Thus,

although the morality contemplated by

laws is secular, benevolent neutrality

could allow for accommodation of

morality based on religion, provided it

does not offend compelling state

interests.

H. The COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST

involves a three-step process. The Court

explained this process in detail, by

showing the questions which must be

answered in each step, viz:

1. “Has the statute or government action

created a burden on the free exercise

of religion?” The courts often look into

the sincerity of the religious belief, but

without inquiring into the truth of the

belief because the Free Exercise Clause

prohibits inquiring about its truth.

2. The court asks: “Is there a sufficiently

compelling state interest to justify this

infringement of religious liberty?” In this

step, THE GOVERNMENT HAS TO

ESTABLISH THAT ITS PURPOSES ARE

LEGITIMATE FOR THE STATE AND THAT

THEY ARE COMPELLING.

3. The court asks: “Has the state in

achieving its legitimate purposes used

the least intrusive means possible so

that the free exercise is not infringed

any more than necessary to achieve

the legitimate goal of the state?” The

analysis requires the state to show that

the means in which it is achieving its

legitimate state objective is the LEAST

INTRUSIVE MEANS, i.e., it has chosen a

way to achieve its legitimate state end

98 Dominador L. Taruc, et al. v. Bishop Porfirio dela Cruz,

G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005

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that imposes as little as possible on

religious liberties 99.

I. This freedom is not absolute as it is subject

to the police power of the State.

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM TO TRAVEL

Section 6. The liberty of abode and

of changing the same within the

limits prescribed by law shall not be

impaired except upon lawful order

of the court. Neither shall the right to

travel be impaired except in the

interest of national security, public

safety, or public health, as may be

provided by law.

A. Concept

1. Includes the right to choose one’s

residence, to leave whenever he

pleases and to travel wherever he wills.

B. The right to travel

It is the right to move from one place to another100

C. LIMITATIONS:

1. Liberty of abode – upon lawful order of

the court.

2. Right to travel

a) In the interest of national security, public

safety or public health, as may be

provided by law;

b) Any person on bail101.

Liberty of Abode Right to Travel

May be impaired only

upon lawful order of

the court and within

the limits prescribed by

law

May be curtailed even

by administrative

authorities, in the interest

of national security,

public safety or public

health as may be

provided by law

99 Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006

and August 4, 2003 100 Reyes v. Razon G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009 101 Silverio vs. CA, G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991

3. Under the Human Security Act, cases

where EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS NOT

STRONG, and the person charged with

the crime of terrorism as therein defined

is entitled to bail and is granted the

same, the court, upon application by

the prosecutor, shall limit the right of

travel of the accused within the

municipality or city where he resides or

where the case is pending, in the

interest of national security and public

safety.102

D. The right to return to one’s country is not

included in the right to travel. The right

to travel only includes:

1. The right to travel from the Philippines to

another country; and

2. The right to travel within the

Philippines.103

While the right to travel of citizens covers both

exit from and entry into the country, aliens

cannot claim the same right. Every sovereign

nation has the power to forbid the entrance of

foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them

only in such cases and upon such conditions as

it may see fit to prescribe.104

A court has the power to prohibit a person

admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.

This is a necessary consequence of the nature

and function of a bail bond.105

E. GENERAL RULE:

Every person has the right to establish his home

and to travel to a place anywhere he likes.

F. EXCEPTIONS:

1. National interest;

2. Public safety; OR

3. Public health.

G. Watch-list and Hold-departure Orders

1. These do not circumvent the right to

travel as it is in the exercise of the

police power of the State.

102 See Sec. 26 of the Human Security Act of 2007 103 Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, October 27,

1989 104 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, No. 1393, January 18,

1892 105 Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100, May

30, 1986

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By: TZRT 19 34

2. Provided, however, that these orders are

not issued arbitrarily, whimsically, and

exercised with grave abuse of

discretion.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Sec. 7. The right of the people to

information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized.

Access to official records, and to

documents and papers pertaining

to official acts, transactions, or

decisions, as well as to government

research data used as basis for

policy development, shall be

afforded the citizen, subject to such

limitations as may be provided by

law.

A. Rights guaranteed

1. Right to information on matters of public

concern, as well as to government

research data used as basis for policy

development; and

2. Corollary right of access to official

records and documents.

B. These are political rights that are

available to citizens only106.

The law may exempt certain types of

information from public scrutiny, such as those

affecting national security. Availability of access

to a particular public record must be

circumscribed by the nature of the information

sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one

that involves public interest, and, (b) not being

exempted by law from the operation of the

constitutional guarantee. The threshold

question is, therefore, WHETHER OR NOT THE

INFORMATION SOUGHT IS OF PUBLIC INTEREST OR

PUBLIC CONCERN.107

C. RESTRICTIONS ON THE ACCESS OF TO

INFORMATION

1. National security matters and

intelligence information

2. Trade secrets and banking transactions

106 Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution, p. 91, 2006 ed. 107 Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. L-72119,

May 29, 1987

3. Criminal matters

4. Other confidential information

D. Scope

1. Contemplates inclusion of negotiations

leading to the consummation of the

transaction. Otherwise, the people can

never exercise the right if no contract is

consummated, or if one is

consummated, it may be too late for

the public to expose its defects.108

E. Exceptions:109

1. The exercise is subject to reasonable

regulations to project the integrity of

public records and to minimize

disruption of government operations.

2. National Security matters. These include

state secrets regarding military,

diplomatic and other national security,

and information on inter government

exchanges prior to the conclusion of

treaties and executive agreements.

3. Trade secrets and banking transactions,

pursuant to the Intellectual property

Law, and other related laws, and to the

secrecy of bank deposits act.

4. Criminal matters or classified law

enforcement matters, such As those

relating to the apprehension,

prosecution and detention of criminals,

which courts may not inquire into prior

such arrest, detention and prosecution,

5. Other confidential matters.

a) Parties to a government contract cannot

stipulate that the terms thereof should be

considered confidential and should be,

open for examination by the public.110

b) The right to information does not extend

to matters recognized as “privileged

information” under the separation of

powers, by which the Court meant

Presidential conversations,

correspondences, and discussions in

closed-door Cabinet meetings."111

F. As to Public Documents

108 Chavez v. PEA and Amari, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002 109 Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998 110 AKBAYAN v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 111 Neri v. Senate G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008

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1. The right of the people to information on

matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records,

and to documents and papers

pertaining to official acts, transactions,

or decisions, as well as to government

research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the

citizen, subject to such limitations as

may be provided by law.

2. Except perhaps when it is clear that the

purpose of the examination is unlawful

or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not

believe it is the duty under the law of

registration officers concern themselves

with the motives, reasons, and objects

of the persons seeking access to the

records. The authority to regulate the

manner of examining public records

does not carry with it the power to

prohibit.112

RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION

Sec. 8. The right of the people,

including those employed in the

public and private sectors, to form

unions, associations, or societies for

purposes not contrary to law shall

not be abridged.

A. This general provision is fortified by

Article IX-B, Section 2(5) which affirms

that “the right to self-organization shall

not be denied to government

employees”.

1. While there is no question that the

Constitution recognizes the right of

government employees to organize, it is

silent as to whether such recognition

also includes the right to strike. A

reading of the proceedings of the

Constitutional Commission shows that in

recognizing the right of the government

employees to organize, the

commissioners intended to limit the right

to information of unions or association

112 Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 1948

only, without including the right to

strike.113

B. Also guarantees the right not to join an

association.114

EMINENT DOMAIN

Sec. 9. Private property shall not be

taken for public use without just

compensation.

A. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

It is the power of the State to take private property

for public use following the payment of just

compensation to the owner of that property.

B. JUST COMPENSATION

It is “the full and fair equivalent of the property

taken from its owner by the expropriator”, and that

the gauge for computation is not the taker’s gain

but the owner’s loss. In order for the payment to be

“just,” it must be real, substantial, full and ample.

NON-IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATIONS OF

CONTRACTS CLAUSE

Section 10. No law impairing the

obligation of contracts shall be

passed.

A. When is there impairment of the

obligations of contracts?

When a right is taken OR when a person is

deprived of the means of enforcing such right,

there is impairment.

B. CONTRACT

Any lawful agreement on the property or property

rights, whether real or personal, tangible or

intangible but does not cover licenses, marriage

contract, and public office.

C. IMPAIRMENT

Anything that diminishes the efficacy of a contract.

113 SSS Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R.

No. 85279 July 28, 1989 114 Sta. Clara Homeowners Assoc. v. Gaston, G.R. No.

141961, January 23, 2002

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

By: TZRT 21 34

1. When is there impairment

a) There is impairment when there is a

change in the terms of a legal contract

between parties, either in the time or

mode of performance, or imposes new

conditions, or dispenses with those

expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction

something different from that provided in

its terms.115

2. Degree of diminution is immaterial. As

long as the original rights of either

parties are changed to their prejudice,

there is already impairment of the

obligation of contract.

D. NO IMPAIRMENT

As long as a substantial and efficacious

remedy remains; holds true even if there is

remedy remained but it is the most difficult

to employ, the easy ones are withdrawn

E. EXCEPTIONS

1. Police power – public welfare is superior

to private rights116

2. Eminent Domain

3. Taxation

In every contract, there is an implied reservation

that it is subject to the police power of the

State117.

LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND FREE ACCESS TO COURTS

Section 11. Free access to the

courts and quasi-judicial bodies and

adequate legal assistance shall not

be denied to any person by reason

of poverty.

A. The IBP provides deserving indigents with

free legal aid, including representation

in court, and similar services are

available from the Department of

Justice to litigants who cannot afford

retained counsel.

115 Clemons v. Nolting, No. 17959, January 24, 1922 116 PNB v. Remigio, G.R. No. 78508, March 21, 1994 117 Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. L-

24670, December 14, 1979

B. There are also private legal assistance

organizations functioning for the benefit

of penurious clients who otherwise might

be unable to resort to the courts of

justice because only of their misfortune

of being poor.

C. Free access to the court does not mean

that the courts cannot impose filing

fees..

RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS/ RIGHT OF PERSONS UNDER

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Section 12. (1) Any person under

investigation for the commission of

an offense shall have the right to be

informed of his right to remain silent

and to have competent and

independent counsel preferably of

his own choice. If the person

cannot afford the services of

counsel, he must be provided with

one. These rights cannot be waived

except in writing and in the

presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence,

threat, intimidation, or any other

means which vitiate the free will

shall be used against him. Secret

detention places, solitary,

incommunicado, or other similar

forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission

obtained in violation of this or

Section 17 hereof shall be

inadmissible in evidence against

him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal

and civil sanctions for violations of

this section as well as compensation

to and rehabilitation of victims of

torture or similar practices, and their

families.

A. Custodial Investigation

Questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has

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been taken into custody or otherwise

deprived of his freedom of action in any

significant way118.

Time when the investigation is no longer a

general inquiry into an unsolved crime but

has begun to focus on a particular

suspect, the suspect has been taken into

police custody, the police carryout a

process of interrogations that lender itself

to eliciting statements119.

B. RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL

INVESTIGATION

1. Right to be informed of his right to

remain silent and to counsel;

2. Right to be reminded that if he waives

his right to remain silent, anything he

says can and will be used against him;

3. Right to remain silent;

4. Right to have competent and

independent counsel preferably of his

own choice;

5. Right to be provided with counsel, if the

person cannot afford the services of

one;

6. No torture, force, violence, threat,

intimidation or any other means which

vitiate the free will shall be used against

him;

7. Secret detention places, solitary,

incommunicado, or other similar forms

of detention are prohibited;

8. Confessions or admissions obtained in

violation of these rights are inadmissible

as evidence.

C. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO

REMAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL

1. It carries the correlative obligation on

the part of the investigator to explain,

and contemplates effective

communication which results in the

subject understanding what is

conveyed120.

2. As a rule, therefore, it would not be

sufficient for a police just to repeat the

person under investigation the

118 Cruz, 2003 119 Escobedo v. Illinois, 387 U.S. 478, 1964 120 People v. Agustin, G.R. No. 110290, January 25, 1995

provisions of the constitution. He is not

only duty bound to tell the person the

rights to which the latter is entitled, he

must also explain their effects in

practical terms121.

D. RIGHT TO HAVE COMPETENT AND

INDEPENDENT COUNSEL PREFERABLY OF

HIS OWN CHOICE

1. "Preferably of his own choice"

Does not mean that the choice of a

lawyer is exclusive as to preclude other

equally competent and independent

attorneys from handling the defense.122

E. RIGHT TO BE PROVIDED WITH COUNSEL, IF

THE PERSON CANNOT AFFORD THE

SERVICES OF ONE

While the choice of the lawyer is naturally

lodged in the police investigators, the

suspect has the final choice as he may

reject the counsel chosen for him and ask

for another one.123

F. CONFESSIONS OR ADMISSIONS OBTAINED

IN VIOLATION OF THESE RIGHTS ARE

INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE

1. Requisites of admissible extrajudicial

confession

a) Voluntary

b) With assistance of a counsel

c) In writing

d) Express

2. What is sought to be avoided by the rule

is the evil of extorting from the very

mouth of the person undergoing

interrogation for the commission of an

offense the very evidence with which to

prosecute and thereafter to convict

him.124

G. MIRANDA DOCTRINE

121 People v. Roxas, GR.No. L-16960-62, January 8, 1987 122 People v. Barasina, G.R. No. 109993, January 21, 1994 123 People v. Jerez, G.R. No. 114385, January 19, 1998 124 People v. Bonola, G.R. No. 116394, June 19, 1997

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

By: TZRT 23 34

1. Person in custody must be informed at

the outset in clear and unequivocal

terms that he has a right to remain

silent.

2. After being so informed, he must be told

that anything he says can and will be

used against him in court.

3. The right to consult with a lawyer and to

have a lawyer with him during the

interrogation.

4. If he is indigent, a lawyer will be

appointed to represent him.

5. Even if he consents to answer questions

without the assistance of counsel, the

moment he asks for a lawyer at any

point in the investigation, the

interrogation must cease until an

attorney is present.

6. If the foregoing are not demonstrated,

no evidence obtained cannot be used

against.

a) When available:

The rights under Sec. 12, Art. III are

available when the investigation is no

longer a general inquiry unto an unsolved

crime but has begun to focus on a

particular suspect, as when the suspect

has been taken into police custody and

the police carry out a process of

interrogation that lends itself to eliciting

incriminating statements .125

H. The constitutional safeguards on

custodial investigation do not apply to

spontaneous statements, or those not

elicited through questioning by law

enforcement authorities but given in an

ordinary manner whereby the appellant

verbally admits to having committed the

offense.126

I. A municipal mayor has "operational

supervision and control" over the local

police and may arguably be deemed a

law enforcement officer for purposes of

125 People v. Mara, G.R. No. 108494, September 20, 1994 126 People of the Philippines v. Eric Guillermo, G.R. No.

147786, January 20, 2004

applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article

III of the Constitution127.

J. Sec. 2 of RA No. 7438 provides that

custodial investigation shall include the

practice of issuing an invitation to a

person who is under investigation in

connection with an offense he is

suspected to have committed.

K. The rights under custodial investigation

are not available in administrative

proceedings128.

L. What rights may be waived:

1. Right to remain silent;

2. Right to counsel

Waiver must be in writing and in the

presence of counsel.

M. What rights cannot be waived:

1. Right to be informed of his right to

remain silent and to counsel;

2. Right to counsel when making the

waiver of the right to remain silent or to

counsel.

N. Rights of Person Suspected and

Subsequently Charged:

1. Before case is filed for preliminary

investigation but after being put into

custody or otherwise deprived of liberty,

and on being interrogated by police:

a) The continuing right to remain silent and

counsel;

b) To be informed thereof;

c) Not to be subjected to force, violence,

threat or intimidation which vitiates free

will;

d) To have evidence obtained in violation of

these rights inadmissible as evidence.

2. After the case is filed in court:

a) To refuse to be witness against himself;

b) Not to have prejudice imputed on him as

a result of such refusal;

c) To testify on his behalf;

127 People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997 128 People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989

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d) To cross-examination; while testifying, to

refuse questions which tend to

incriminate him for some crime other

than the present charge.129

O. It was, therefore, wrong for the trial court

to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of

the Constitution is strictly limited to

custodial investigation and that it does

not apply to a person against whom a

criminal complaint or information has

already been filed because after its filing

he loses his right to remain silent and to

counsel. If we follow the theory of the

trial court, then police authorities and

other law enforcement agencies would

have a heyday in extracting confessions

or admissions from accused persons

after they had been arrested but before

they are arraigned because at such

stage the accused persons are

supposedly not entitled to the

enjoyment of the rights to remain silent

and to counsel130

P. A police line-up is not considered part of

any custodial inquest because it is

conducted before that stage of

investigation is reached 131 and because

the process has not yet shifted from

investigatory to accusatory stage and it

is usually the witness or complainant who

is interrogated and who gives statement

in the course of the line up132.

Q. However, after the start of the custodial

investigation, any identification of an

uncounseled accused made in a police

line-up is inadmissible.133

129 People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989 130 People v. Maqueda, G.R. No. 112983 March 22, 1995 131 People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 135562, November 22, 1999 132 People v. Amestuzo, G.R. No. 140383, July 12, 2001 133 People vs. Macam, G.R. Nos. 91011-12, November 24,

1994

RIGHT TO BAIL

Section 13. All persons, except

those charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua

when evidence of guilt is strong,

shall, before conviction, be bailable

by sufficient sureties, or be released

on recognizance as may be

provided by law. The right to bail

shall not be impaired even when the

privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus is suspended. Excessive bail

shall not be required.

A. BAIL

The security given for the release of a person in

custody of law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to

guarantee his appearance before any court as

required under conditions specified under the Rules

of Court134.

B. The right to bail may be invoked once

detention commences even if no formal

charges have yet been filed.135

C. Suspension of the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus does not suspend right to

bail136.

D. Even when the accused has previously

jumped bail, still he cannot be denied

bail before conviction if it is a matter of

right. The remedy is to increase the

amount of bail137.

E. An extraditee has also the right to apply

for bail.

F. Forms of Bail:

1. Corporate surety;

2. Property bond;

3. Cash deposit;

4. Recognizance

134 see Sec. 1, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure 135 Teehankee v Rovira, No. L-101, December 20, 1945 136 Sec.13, Art.III 137 Sy Guan v. Amparo, G.R. No. L-1771. December 4,

1947

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By: TZRT 25 34

G. Bail is a matter of right if a person is

charged with an offense NOT punishable

by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment

or death.

BAIL, A MATTER OF RIGHT138

All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a

matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be

released on recognizance as prescribed by law or

this rule:

(a) Before or after conviction by

the MTC; and

(b) Before conviction of the RTC of

an offense not punishable by

death, reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment. (Note that RA

9346 prohibited the imposition of

death penalty).

H. Bail is discretionary when a person is

charged with an offense punishable by

reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or

death.

BAIL, WHEN DISCRETIONARY139 Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not

punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or

life imprisonment, the court, on application,

may admit the accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the

accused to continue on provisional liberty

after the same bail bond during the period to

appeal subject to the consent of the

bondsman.

If the court imposed a penalty of

imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more

than 20 years, the accused shall be denied

bail, or his bail previously granted shall be

cancelled, upon showing by the prosecution,

with notice to the accused, of the following

or other similar circumstances: that the accused is a recidivist, quasi-

recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has

committed the crime aggravated by the

circumstance of reiteracion;

that the accused is found to have

previously escaped from legal

confinement, evaded sentence, or has

violated the conditions of his bail without

138 Sec. 4, Rule 114 Sec. 4, Rule 114 139 Sec. 5, Rule 114

valid justification;

that the accused committed the offense

while on probation, parole, or under

conditional pardon;

that the circumstances of the accused or

his case indicate the probability of flight if

released on bail; or

that there is undue risk that during the

pendency of the appeal, the accused

may commit another crime.

The exercise of discretion of the court is only

limited in the determination of the gravity of

guilt of the accused. If after summary hearing, it

is determined that the evidence of guilt of the

accused is strong, the court has no choice but

to deny the application for bail. Inversely, if the

court finds that the evidence of guilt of the

accused is weak, the court has no discretion but

to grant bail.

I. BAIL vs. RECOGNIZANCE

BAIL BOND RECOGNIZANCE

An obligation under

seal given by the

accused with one or

more sureties, and

made payable to the

proper officer with the

condition to be void

upon performance by

the accused of such

acts as he may legally

be required to perform.

An obligation of record,

entered into before

some court or

magistrate duly

authorized to take it,

with the condition to do

some particular act.

J. Hearing

Whether bail is a matter of right or of

discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is

required to be given the prosecutor, or at

least he must be asked for his

recommendation, because in fixing the

amount of bail, the judge is required to

take into account a number of factors140.

K. WHEN BAIL SHALL BE DENIED141

1. No person, regardless of the stage of the

criminal prosecution, shall be admitted

to bail if:

140 Cortes v. Judge Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387,

September 10, 1997 141 SEC. 7, RULE 114

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a) Charged with a capital offense, or an

offense punishable by reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment or death;

AND

b) evidence of guilt is strong.

L. Standards for fixing amount of bail:

1. Financial ability of accused;

2. Nature and circumstances of offense;

3. Penalty for offense;

4. Character and reputation of accused;

5. Age and health of accused;

6. Weight of evidence against him;

7. Probability of his appearance at trial;

8. Forfeiture of other bail;

9. Whether he was a fugitive from justice

when arrested ; and

10. Pendency of other cases where he is

on bail142.

M. Excessive bail shall not be required143

N. When the accused is charged with an

offense punishable by reclusion

perpetua or higher, a hearing on the

motion for bail must be conducted by

the judge to determine whether or not

the evidence of guilt is strong144.

O. Since bail is constitutionally available to

all persons, it must be available to one

who is detained even before formal

charges is filed145. It is sufficient that the

person claiming the right must be under

the custody of the law either when he

has been arrested or has surrendered

himself to the jurisdiction of the court.

P. As a general rule, the constitutional right

to bail is available only in criminal

proceedings. Thus, it has been

repeatedly held that respondents in

deportation proceedings, which are

administrative in nature, do not enjoy

the right.

142 Sunga v. Judge Salud, Adm. Matter No. 2205-MJ,

November 19, 1981 143 Sec. 9, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 144 Baylon v. Judge Sison, AM No. 92-7360-0, April 6, 1995 145 Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil 634, 1945

Q. Traditionally, the right to bail has not

been recognized and is not available to

the military, as an exception to the Bill of

Rights146.

R. When an alien is detained by the Bureau

of Immigration for deportation pursuant

to an order of deportation by the

Deportation Board, the Regional Trial

Courts have no power to release such

alien on bail even in habeas corpus

proceedings because there is no law

authorizing it.147

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED DURING TRIAL

Section 14. (1) No person shall be

held to answer for a criminal offense

without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall be presumed

innocent until the contrary is proved,

and shall enjoy the right to be heard

by himself and counsel, to be

informed of the nature and cause of

the accusation against him, to have

a speedy, impartial, and public trial,

to meet the witnesses face to face,

and to have compulsory process to

secure the attendance of witnesses

and the production of evidence in

his behalf. However, after

arraignment, trial may proceed

notwithstanding the absence of the

accused provided that he has been

duly notified and his failure to

appear is unjustifiable.

A. Criminal Due Process

1. Requisites:

a) Accused is heard by a court of

competent jurisdiction;

b) Accused is proceeded against under the

orderly processes of law;

146 Comendador v. de Villa, G.R. No. 93177, August 2,

1991 147 Go. v. Ramos G.R. No. 167569, Sept. 4, 2009

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By: TZRT 27 34

c) Accused is given notice and opportunity

to be heard; and

d) Judgment rendered was within the

authority of a constitutional law148.

2. To warrant a finding of prejudicial

publicity there must be allegation and

proof that the judges have been unduly

influenced, not simply that they might

be, by the barrage of publicity.149

B. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

1. Every circumstance favoring the

innocence of the accused must be

taken into account;

2. The proof against him must survive the

test of reason; the strongest suspicion

must not be permitted to sway

judgment150.

3. Reasonable doubt

It is meant that which of possibility may

arise, but it is doubt engendered by an

investigation of the whole proof and an

inability, after such investigation, to let the

mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.151

4. Equipoise Rule

It is the evidence of both sides are

equally balanced, in which case the

constitutional presumption of innocence

should tilt the scales in favor of the

accused152.

C. RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND

COUNSEL

The right to be heard can be understood

to mean the totality of the rights

embodied in an adequate criminal

procedural system, which can be viewed

as expressing both the qualities of the

hearer and the manner of the hearing.

D. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED DURING TRIAL

1. Right to present evidence and to be

present at the trial

148 Mejia v. Pamaran, No. L-56741, April 15, 1988 149 Martelino v. Alejandro, G.R. Np. L-20707, March 30,

1970 150 People v. Austria, G.R. No. 55109, April 8, 1991 151 People v. Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971 152 Corpus v. People, G.R. No. 74259, February 14, 1991

2. Right to present evidence includes the

right to testify in one’s favor and the

right to be given time to call witnesses. 3. If accused of two offenses, he is entitled

to a trial of each case, and it is error for

the court to consider in one case the

evidence adduced against him in

another.

4. Right to be assisted by counsel

5. Right to counsel during the trial is not

subject to waiver153.

6. Right to compulsory process to compel

the attendance of witnesses in his

behalf.

7. Right to be informed of the nature and

cause of the accusation against him

8. Right to speedy, impartial and public

trial

9. Right to meet the witnesses face to face

(Right to confrontation)

10. Right to compulsory process to secure

attendance of witnesses and

production of evidence

E. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE

AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION

AGAINST HIM

1. Description, not designation of the

offense, is controlling.

2. Purposes:

a) To furnish the accused with such a

description of the charge against him as

will enable him to make his defense;

b) To avail himself of his conviction or

acquittal for protection against a further

prosecution for the sane cause; and

c) To inform the court of the facts alleged,

so that it may decide whether they are

sufficient in law to support a conviction, if

one should be had154.

3. In Soriano v. Sandiganbayan 155 , the

petitioner claims that he cannot be

convicted of bribery under the Revised

Penal Code because to do so would be

violative of as constitutional right to be

informed of the nature and cause of

the accusation against him. The

Supreme Court held that the contention

is wrong because a reading of the

153 Flores v. Ruiz, No. L-35707, May 31, 1979 154 U.S. v. Karelsen, No. 1376, January 21, 1904 155 G.R. No. L-65952, July 31, 1984

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information which has been

reproduced clearly makes out a case

of bribery so that the petitioner cannot

claim deprivation of the right to be

informed.

F. RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC

TRIAL

1. Purpose

To serve as safeguard against attempt to

employ our courts as instruments of

persecution. The knowledge that every

criminal trial is subject to

contemporaneous review in the forum of

public opinion is an effective restraint on

possible abuse of judicial power.

2. Speedy

It means free from vexatious, capricious

and oppressive delays;

The concept of speedy trial is necessarily

relative. A determination as to whether the

right has been violated involves the

weighing of several factors such as the

length of the delay, the reason for the

delay, the conduct of the prosecution and

the accused, and the efforts exerted by

the defendant to assert his right, as well as

the prejudice and damage caused to the

accused156.

3. Impartial

The accused entitled to cold neutrality of

an impartial judge;

4. Public

To prevent possible abuses which may be

committed against the accused.

Public trial is when anyone interested in

observing the manner a judge conducts the

proceedings in his courtroom may do so.

There is to be no ban on such attendance.

The reason for this safeguard is the belief that

the accused is afforded further protection,

that his trial is likely to be conducted with

156 People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003

regularity and not tainted with any

impropriety157.

General public may be excluded when

the evidence to be presented in the

proceeding may be characterized as

offensive to decency or public morals.

A public trial is not synonymous with a

publicized trial; it only implies that court

doors must be open to those who wish to

come, sit in available seats, and conduct

themselves with decorum and observe the

trial process.158

The right may be waived. But waiver is not

to be inferred from mere failure of the

accused to urge the trial of the case. Such

waiver or abandonment may be

presumed only when the postponement of

the trial has been sought and obtained by

the accused himself or by his attorney. The

presumption is always against the waiver

of constitutionally protected rights.

G. RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO

FACE (RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION)

1. Two-fold purpose:

a) To afford the accused an opportunity to

test the testimony of the witness by cross-

examination; and

b) To allow the judge to observe the

deportment of the witness .159

2. Right to cross-examination may be

waived.

3. Testimony of witness who was not cross-

examined is not admissible as evidence

for being hearsay160.

4. If cross-examination actually

commenced, but, for lack of material

time, was not completed, and the

witness in the meantime died before

cross-examination could be resumed,

so much of the testimony as had

157 Garcia v. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30104, July 25, 1973 158 Re: Request for Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the

Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former

President Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001 159 U.S. v. Javier, No. 12990, January 21, 1918 160 U.S. v. Javier, G.R. No. L-8781, March 30, 1914

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By: TZRT 29 34

already been covered by cross-

examination is admissible.161

5. An accused is not entitled, as a matter

of right, to be present during the

preliminary examination nor to cross-

examine the witnesses presented

against him before his arrest, the

purpose of said examination being

merely to determine whether or not

there is sufficient reason to issue a

warrant of arrest. A preliminary

examination is generally a proceeding

ex parte in which the person charged

has no right to participate or be

present.162

H. RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS TO

SECURE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES AND

PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE

1. The accused is entitled to the issuance

of subpoena ad testificandum and

subpoena duces tecum for the purpose

of compelling the attendance of the

witnesses and the production of

evidence that he may need for his

defense.

2. Failure to obey the process is punishable

as contempt of court; if necessary, the

witness may even be arrested so he

can give the needed evidence163.

3. Requirements164:

a) That the witness is really material;

b) That he is guilty of no neglect in previously

obtaining attendance of said witness;

c) That the witness will be available at the

time desired; and

d) That no similar evidence could be

obtained.

I. TRIAL IN ABSENTIA

1. This is mandatory upon the court

whenever the accused has been

arraigned, notified of date/s of hearing,

and his absence is unjustified165.

2. The right to be present during the trial

may be waived provided that after

arraignment he may be compelled to

161 People v. Seneris, G.R. No. L-49933. August 6, 1980 162 Marinas v. Siochi, G.R. No. L-25707, May 14, 1981 163 Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003 ed., p 348 164 People v. Sandal, No. 32394, September 5, 1930 165 People v. Judge Salas No. L-66469, July 29, 1986

appear for the purpose of identification

by the witnesses of the prosecution,

unless he unqualifiedly admits in open

court after his arraignment that he is

the person named as the defendant in

the case on trial.

J. The presence of the accused is

mandatory:

1. During arraignment and plea;

2. During trial, for identification, unless the

accused has already stipulated on his

identity during the pre-trial and that he

is the one who will be identified by the

witnesses as the accused in the criminal

case; or

3. During promulgation of sentence, unless

for a light offense.

PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Section 15. The privilege of the writ

of habeas corpus shall not be

suspended except in cases of

invasion or rebellion when the public

safety requires it.

A. Writ of Habeas Corpus

issued by the court directed to a person

detaining another, commanding him to

produce the body of the prisoner at

designated time and place, with the day

and cause of his capture and detention, to

do, to submit to, and to receive whatever

the court or judge awarding the writ shall

consider in his behalf166.

1. When Available:

a) In cases of illegal detention or restraint; or

b) In custody cases

2. Primary requisite for its availability is

actual deprivation of personal liberty,

or deprivation of right of custody.

3. Habeas corpus lies only where the

restraint of a person’s liberty has been

judicially adjudged to be illegal or

unlawful167.

166 Nachura, Reviewer in Political Law, 2006 ed., p. 199 167 In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S.

Sumulong-Torres, G.R. No. 122338, December 29, 1995

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4. Once a person detained is DULY

CHARGED in court, he may no longer

question his detention through a

petition for issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus. His remedy would be to quash

the information and/or the warrant of

arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas

corpus should not be allowed after the

party sought to be released had been

charged before any court. The term

“court” in this context includes quasi-

judicial bodies of governmental

agencies AUTHORIZED TO ORDER THE

PERSON’S CONFINEMENT, like the

Deportation Board of the Bureau of

Immigration168

B. Purpose of the Suspension of the Writ of

Habeas Corpus:

To enable the government to deal with

situation of an invasion or a rebellion and

the government must charge JUDICIALLY

those who are involved in the rebellion or

invasion.

RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

Section 16. All persons shall have the

right to a speedy disposition of their

cases before all judicial, quasi-

judicial, or administrative bodies.

A. The constitutional right to a speedy

disposition of cases is not limited to the

accused in criminal proceedings but

extends to all parties in all cases,

including civil and administrative cases,

and in all proceedings, including judicial

and quasi-judicial hearings169.

B. In case of violation of the right to a

speedy trial, the remedy for violation of

said right is dismissal obtained through

mandamus.170

See notes under Rights of the Accused During

Trial

168 Go v. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569, Sept. 4.2009 169 Lopez, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 140529, September

6, 2001 170 Roque v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129978, May 12, 1999

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Section 17. No person shall be

compelled to be a witness against

himself.

A. Availability

Not only in criminal proceedings, but also

in all other government proceedings,

including civil actions and administrative

or legislative investigations. May be

claimed not only by the accused (when

called to testify) but also by the witness to

whom an incriminating question is

addressed.

B. Effect of Violation

In People v. Alicando 171 , declared that

once the primary source is shown to have

been unlawfully obtained, any secondary

or derivative evidence derived from it is

inadmissible.

C. Scope

1. Applies only to testimonial compulsion

and production of documents, papers

and chattels in court except when

books of account are to be examined

in the exercise of police power and the

power of taxation. An accused may be

compelled to be photographed or

measured, his garments may be

removed, and his body may be

examined.

2. An order requiring the accused to write

so that his handwriting may be

validated with the documentary

evidence is covered by the

constitutional proscription against self-

incrimination.172

D. Waiver of the right against self-

incrimination

1. Either directly or by failure to invoke it,

provided the waiver is certain and

unequivocal and intelligently,

understandingly and willingly made.

171 G.R. No. 117487, December 2, 1995 172 Samson v. Beltran, No. 32025, September 23, 1929

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By: TZRT 31 34

2. The witness may be cross examined and

asked incriminating questions on any

matter he testified to on direct

examination.

E. Transactional Immunity Statute

The testimony of any person or whose

possession of documents or other evidence

necessary or convenient to determine the

truth in any investigation conducted is

immune from criminal prosecution for an

offense to which such compelled testimony

relates.173

F. Use and Fruit Immunity Statute

This prohibits the use of the witness’

compelled testimony and its fruits in any

manner in connection with the criminal

prosecution of the witness.174

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

Section 18. (1) No person shall be

detained solely by reason of his

political beliefs and aspirations.

(2) No involuntary servitude in any

form shall exist except as a

punishment for a crime whereof the

party shall have been duly

convicted.

A. Non-Detention by Reason of Political

Beliefs or Aspiration

No man is to be interfered with because of

his opinions, provided his avowal of them

does not disturb public order or

established law.

B. Involuntary Servitude

Condition where one is compelled by

force, coercion, or imprisonment, and

against his will, to labor for another, whether

he is paid or not.

1. General Rule:

173 Sec. 18 (8), Art. XIII 174 Galman v. Pamaran, No. L-71208-09, August 30, 1985

No involuntary servitude shall exist.

2. Exceptions:

a) As punishment for a crime whereof one

has been duly convicted;175

b) Service in defense of the State176;

c) Naval enlistment177;

d) Posse comitatus;178

e) Return to work order in industries affected

with public interest;179 and

f) Patria Potestas.180

C. Slavery

The civil relation wherein one man has

absolute power over the life, fortune and

liberty of another.

D. Peonage

A condition of enforced servitude by

which the servitor is restrained of his liberty

and compelled to labor in liquidation of

some debt or obligation real or pretended,

against his will.

E. Restraint of the individual so he can be

compelled to work for another, be it the

government or a private party, violates

the constitutional guaranty, subject to

certain exceptions.

PROHIBITED PUNISHMENT

Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall

not be imposed, nor cruel,

degrading or inhuman punishment

inflicted. Neither shall the death

penalty be imposed, unless, for

compelling reasons involving

heinous crimes, the Congress

hereafter provides for it. Any death

penalty already imposed shall be

reduced to reclusion perpetua.

175 Sec. 18(2), Art. III 176 Sec 4, Art. II 177 Robertson v. Baldwin, No. 334, January 25, 1897 178 U.S. v. Pompeya, No. 10255, August 6, 1915 179 Kaisahan ng Mangagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco

Sawmills, G.R. No. L-1573, March 29, 1948 180 Art. 211, par.(2), FC

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(2) The employment of physical,

psychological, or degrading

punishment against any prisoner or

detainee or the use of substandard

or inadequate penal facilities under

subhuman conditions shall be dealt

with by law.

A. Mere severity does not constitute cruel

or unusual punishment. To violate

constitutional guarantee, penalty must

be flagrant and plainly oppressive,

disproportionate to the nature of the

offense as to shock the senses of the

community.181

B. To be CRUEL AND UNUSUAL OR

EXCESSIVE, the penalty must be

flagrantly disproportionate to the

offense no matter under what

circumstances the offense may be

committed.

C. Mere fines and imprisonment are not

violative. To be so, the penalty must be

inhuman and barbarous and shocking to

the conscience.

D. RA 9346 prohibited the imposition of

death penalty.

NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT

Section 20. No person shall be

imprisoned for debt or non-payment

of a poll tax.

A. Coverage:

1. Debt

Any civil obligation arising from a

contract. It includes even debts obtained

through fraud since no distinction is made in

the Constitution.182

2. Poll Tax

181 People v. Estoista, G.R. No. L-5793, August 27, 1953 182 Ganaway v. Quillen, G.R. No. L-18619, February 20,

1922

A specific sum levied upon any person

belonging to a certain class without regard

to property or occupation (e.g. Community

Tax )

B. A tax is not a debt since it is an

obligation arising from law. Hence, its

non-payment maybe validly punished

with imprisonment.

C. While debtor cannot be imprisoned for

failure to pay his debt, he can be validly

punished in a criminal action if he

contracted his debt through fraud183.

RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Section 21. No person shall be twice

put in jeopardy of punishment for

the same offense. If an act is

punished by a law and an

ordinance, conviction or acquittal

under either shall constitute a bar to

another prosecution for the same

act.

A. The rule of double jeopardy means that

when a person was charged with an

offense and the case was terminated by

acquittal or conviction or in any other

manner without his consent; he cannot

again be charged with the same or

identical offense.184

B. An acquittal is final and unappealable

on the ground of double jeopardy,

whether it happens in the trial court level

or before the Court of Appeals. Only

when there is a finding of a sham trial

can the doctrine of double jeopardy be

not invoked because the people, as

represented by the prosecution, were

denied due process.185

C. Two types:

183 Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. L-63419, 18 December 1986 184 Melo v. People, No. L-3580, March 22, 1950 185 People v. Tria- Tirona, G.R. No. 130106, July 15, 2006

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

By: TZRT 33 34

1. Double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense; and

2. Double jeopardy of punishment for the same act

D. DISMISSAL OF ACTION, when made at

the instance of the accused, DOES

NOT put accused in first jeopardy,

EXCEPT:

1. When the ground for dismissal is

insufficiency of evidence; or

2. When the proceedings have been

unreasonably prolonged as to violate

the right of the accused to a speedy

trial.186

E. Requisites for double jeopardy for the

same offense:

1. Valid complaint or information;

2. Filed before a competent court;

3. To which defendant has pleaded; and

4. Defendant was previously acquitted or

convicted or the case dismissed or

otherwise terminated without his

express consent.187

F. Crimes covered:

1. Same offense; or attempt to commit or

frustration thereof or for any offense

which necessarily includes or is

necessarily included in the offense

charged in the original complaint or

information; and

2. When an act is punished by a law and

an ordinance, conviction or acquittal

under either shall bar another

prosecution for the same act.

G. Where the offenses charged are

penalized either by different sections of

the same statute or by different statutes,

the important inquiry relates to the

IDENTITY OF OFFENSES CHARGED: the

constitutional protection against double

jeopardy is available only where an

identity is shown to exist between the

186 Cue v. IAC, G.R. No. 74989-90, November 6, 1989 187 People v. Ylagan, No. 38443, November 25, 1933

earlier and the subsequent offenses

charged.188

H. Where one is punished by law and an

ordinance, the inquiry is on the identity

of the act.

I. Doctrine of Supervening Event

It allows the prosecution for another

offense if subsequent development changes

the character of the first indictment under

which he may have already been charged

or convicted.189

J. Double jeopardy for the same act does

not require prior conviction or acquittal

or dismissal of the first information, as

long as the first jeopardy has already

attached.190

K. Double jeopardy DOES NOT attach in

preliminary investigations.191

L. Conviction of accused shall NOT bar

another prosecution for an offense

which necessarily includes the offense

originally charged when:

1. Graver offense developed due to

supervening facts arising from the same

act or omission;

2. Facts constituting the graver offense

arose or discovered only after the filing

of the former complaint or information;

and

3. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense was

made without the consent of

prosecutor or offended party.192

M. Inseparable offenses

1. Where one offense is inseparable from

another and proceeds from the same

act, they cannot be the subject of

separate prosecutions.

2. However, it is possible for one act to give

rise to several crimes: separate

188 People v. Relova, G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987 189 People v. Villarama, G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992 190 People v. Relova, G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987 191 People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 44205, February 16, 1993 192 People v. Judge Villarama, G.R. No. 99287, June 23,

1992

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prosecutions for each crime may be filed provided the elements of the

several crimes are not identical.

EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER

Section 22. No ex post facto law or

bill of attainder shall be enacted.

A. Ex Post Facto Law

It is one that would make a previous act

criminal although it was not so at the time it

was committed.

A law can never be considered ex post

facto as long as it operates prospectively

since its strictures would cover only

offenses committed after and not before

its enactment.

1. Kinds193

a) Law making an act criminal which was

not so before its passage;

b) Law aggravating the penalty for a crime

committed before its passage;

c) Law inflicting a greater or more severe

penalty;

d) Law altering the legal rules of evidence

and allowing the receipt of less or

different testimony than what the law

required at the time of commission, in

order to convict accused;

e) Law assuming to regulate civil rights and

remedies only, in effect imposes a

penalty of deprivation of right for

something which when done was lawful;

and

f) Law depriving accused of some lawful

protection to which he had been

entitled, such as protection of a former

conviction or acquittal, or a

proclamation of amnesty.

2. Characteristics:

a) Refers to criminal matters;

b) Retroactive; and

c) Prejudicial to the accused.

3. Application:

193 U.S. v. Diaz-Conde, No. 18208, February 14, 1922

Prohibition applies only to criminal

legislation which affects the substantial

rights of the accused. It also applies to

criminal procedural law prejudicial to the

accused. But it is improper to apply the

prohibition to an executive proclamation

suspending the privilege of writ of habeas

corpus.

4. Even if the law be penal and

retroactive, it will still not be ex post

facto if it does not operate to the

disadvantage of the accused.

5. If the punishment originally imposed is

retroactively made heavier, or the

method of its execution made more

severe, then the law will be subject to

the constitutional prohibition.

B. Bill of Attainder

It is legislative act that inflicts

punishment without trial.194

1. It substitutes legislative fiat for a judicial

determination of guilt. Thus, it is only

when a statute applies either to named

individuals or to easily ascertainable

members of a group in such a way as

to inflict punishment on them without

judicial trial that it becomes a bill of

attainder.

2. The provision prevents the legislature

from assuming judicial magistracy. It is

thus a general safeguard against

legislative exercise of the judicial

function, or more simply – trial by

legislature.

194 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall 277