Law Statutory Construction

8/10/2019 Law Statutory Construction

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G.R. No. L-26100 February 28, 1969

CITY OF BAGUlO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION,FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J. BUCHHOLZ petitioners,vs.HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio,BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.

1st Assistant City Fiscal Dionisio C. Claridad, Augusto Tobias and Feria, Feria, Lugtu and La'O for petitioners.

Bernardo C. Ronquillo for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio to reopen cadastral proceedings under Republic Act931. Private petitioner's specifically question the ruling of the Court of Appeals that they have no personality to opposereopening. The three-pronged contentions of all the petitioners are: (1) the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-yearperiod next preceding the approval of Republic Act 931; (2) said petition was not published; and (3) private petitioners, aslessees of the public land in question, have court standing under Republic Act 931. The facts follow:

OnApril 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened, Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211,Baguio Townsite, were instituted by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio. It is not disputed that theland here involved (described in Plan Psu-186187) was amongst those declared public lands by final decision rendered inthat case on November 13, 1922.

On July 25, 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as tothe parcel of land he claims. His prayer was that the land be registered in his name upon the grounds that: (1) he and hispredecessors have been in actual, open, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession and cultivation of the land sinceSpanish times, or before July 26, 1894, paying the taxes thereon; and (2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots withoutpersonal notice of the cadastral proceedings aforestated and were not able to file their claim to the land in question within thestatutory period.

On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J. Buchholzregistered opposition to the reopening. Ground: They are tree farm lessees upon agreements executed by the Bureau ofForestry in their favor for 15,395.65 square meters on March. 16, 1959, for 12,108 square meters on July 24, 1959, and for

14,771 square meters on July 17, 1959, respectively.

On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise opposed reopening.

On May 8, 1962, upon Lutes' opposition, the cadastral court denied private petitioners' right to intervene in the case becauseof a final declaratory relief judgment dated March 9, 1962 in Yaranon vs. Castrillo [Civil Case 946, Court of First Instance ofBaguio] which declared that such tree farm leases were null and void.

On May 18, 1962, private petitioners moved to reconsider. They averred that said declaratory relief judgment did not bindthem, for they were not parties to that action.

On September 14, 1962, the cadastral court reversed its own ruling of May 8, 1962, allowed petitioners to cross-examine thewitnesses of respondent Lutes.

On October 16, 1962, Lutes replied to and moved to dismiss private petitioners' opposition to his reopening petition. OnOctober 25, 1962, private petitioners' rejoinder was filed.

On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners' opposition to the reopening. A motion to reconsider wasrejected by the court on November 5, 1963.

On January 6, 1964, it was the turn of the City of Baguio to lodge a motion to dismiss the petition to reopen. This motion wasadopted as its own by the Reforestation Administration. They maintained the position that the declaratory judgment in CivilCase 946 was not binding on those not parties thereto. Respondent Lutes opposed on February 24, 1964. On April 6, 1964,private petitioners reiterated their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.


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On September 17, 1964, the court denied for lack of merit the City's motion as well as the April 6, 1964 motion to dismissmade by private petitioners.

On November 13, 1964, all the petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus withpreliminary injunction.1 They then questioned the cadastral court's jurisdiction over the petition to reopen and the latter'sorder of August 5, 1963 dismissing private petitioners' opposition. The appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunctionupon a P500-bond.

Then came the judgment of the Court of Appeals of September 30, 1965. The court held that petitioners were not bound by

the declaratory judgment heretofore hated. Nevertheless, the appellate court ruled that as lessees, private petitioners had noright to oppose the reopening of the cadastral case. Petitioners moved to reconsider. It was thwarted on May 6, 1966.

Petitioners now seek redress from this Court. On July 6, 1966, respondents moved to dismiss the petition before us. OnAugust 5, 1966, petitioners opposed. On August 12, 1966, we gave due course.

1. Do private petitioners have personality to appear in the reopening proceedings?

First, to the controlling statute, Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953.

The title of the Act reads

AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS

OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONSRENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.

Section 1 thereof provides

SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings, who atthe time of the survey were in actual possession of the same, but for some justifiable reason had been unable to filetheir claim in the proper court during the time limit established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account oftheir failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicialproceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the rightwithin five years2 after the date on which this Act shall take effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicialproceedings under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, only withrespect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, orotherwiseprovisionally orpermanently disposed of by the Government, and the competent Court of First Instance,upon receiving such petition, shall notify the Government through the Solicitor General, and if after hearing theparties, said court shall find that all conditions herein established have been complied with, and that all taxes,interests and penalties thereof have been paid from the time when land tax should have been collected until the daywhen the motion is presented, it shall order said judicial proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken onsuch parcels.3

We concede that in Leyva vs. Jandoc, L-16965, February 28, 1962, a land registration case where oppositors were"foreshore lessees of public land", a principle was hammered out that although Section 34, Land RegistrationAct,4 "apparently authorizes any person claiming any kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for registration, ...nevertheless ... the opposition must be based on a right of dominion or some other real right independent of, and not at allsubordinate to, the rights of the Government."5 The opposition, according to the Leyva decision, "must necessarily bepredicated upon the property in question being part of the public domain." Leyva thus pronounced that "it is incumbent uponthe duly authorized representatives of the Government to represent its interests as well as private claims intrinsicallydependent upon it."

But the Leyva case concerned an ordinary land registration proceeding under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.Normally and logically, lessees cannot there present issues of ownership. The case at bar, however, stands on a differentfooting. It involves a special statute R.A. 931, which allows a petition for reopening on lands "about to be declared"or already "declared land of the public domain" by virtue of judicial proceedings. Such right, however, is made tocover limited cases, i.e., "only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased,granted, or otherwiseprovisionally orpermanently disposed of by the Government."6 The lessee's right is thus impliedlyrecognized by R.A. 931. This statutory phrase steers the present case clear from the impact of the precept forged by Leyva.


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So it is, that if the land subject of a petition to reopen has already been leased by the government, that petition can no longerprosper.

This was the holding in Director of Land vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31, 1966. The reopening petition there filed wasopposed by the Director of Lands in behalf of 62 lessees of public land holding revocable permits issued by the government.We struck down the petition in that Case because the public land, subject-matter of the suit, had already been leased by thegovernment to private persons.

Of course, the Benitez ruling came about not by representations of the lessees alone, but through the Director of Lands. But

we may well scale the heights of injustice or abet violations of R.A. 931 if we entertain the view that only the Director ofLands7 can here properly oppose the reopening petition. Suppose the lands office fails to do so? Will legitimate lessees beleft at the mercy of government officials? Should the cadastral court close its eyes to thefact of lease that may be proved bythe lessees themselves, and which is enough to bar the reopening petition? R.A. 931 could not have intended that thissituation should happen. The point is that, with the fact of lease, no question of ownership need be inquired into pursuant toR.A. 931. From this standpoint, lessees have sufficient legal interest in the proceedings.

The right of private petitioners to oppose a reopening petition here becomes the more patent when we take stock of theiraverment that they have introduced improvements on the land affected. It would seem to us that lessees insofar as R.A. 931is concerned, come within the purview of those who, according to the Rules of Court, 8 may intervene in an action. For, theyare persons who have "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties." 9 In the event hereinprivate petitioners are able to show that they are legitimate lessees, then their lease will continue. And this because it issufficient that it be proven that the land is leased to withdraw it from the operation of Republic Act 931 and place it beyondthe reach of a petition for reopening. 10

In line with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, not disputed by respondent Lutes herein, the cadastral court should have ruledon the validity of private petitioners 'tree farm leases on the merits. Because there is need for Lutes' right to reopen andpetitioners' right to continue as lessees to be threshed out in that court.

We, accordingly, hold that private petitioners, who aver that they are lessees, have the necessary personality to intervene inand oppose respondent Lutes' petition for reopening.

2. Petitioners next contend that the reopening petition below, filed under R.A. 931, should have been published inaccordance with the Cadastral Act.

To resolve this contention, we need but refer to a very recent decision of this Court in De Castro vs. Marcos, supra, involvingexactly the same set of facts bearing upon the question. We there held, after a discussion of law and jurisprudence, that: "Insum, the subject matter of the petition for reopening a parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia was alreadyembraced in the cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of Lands. Consequently, the Baguio cadastral court alreadyacquired jurisdiction over the said property. The petition, therefore, need not be published." We find no reason to break awayfrom such conclusion.

Respondent Lutes attached to the record a certified true copy of the November 13, 1922 decision in the Baguio TownsiteReservation case to show, amongst others, that the land here involved was part of that case. Petitioners do not take issuewith respondent Lutes on this point of fact.

We here reiterate our ruling in De Castro, supra, that the power of the cadastral court below over petitions to reopen, as in

this case, is not jurisdictionally tainted by want of publication.3. A question of transcendental importance is this: Does the cadastral court have power to reopen the cadastral proceedingsupon the application of respondent Lutes?

The facts are: The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision wasrendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July 25, 1961.

It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931, heretofore transcribed, authorizes "the filing in the proper court, under certainconditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisionsrendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." The body of the statute, however, in its Section 1,speaks of parcels of land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial


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proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." There thus appears to be a seeminginconsistency between title and body.

It must be stressed at this point that R.A. 931 is not under siege on constitutional grounds. No charge has been made hero orin the courts below that the statute offends the constitutional injunction that the subject of legislation must be expressed inthe title thereof. Well-entrenched in constitutional law is the precept that constitutional questions will not be entertained bycourts unless they are "specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued." 11 At any rate it cannot be seriouslydisputed that the subject of R.A. 931 is expressed in its title.

This narrows our problem down to one of legal hermeneutics.

Many are the principles evolved in the interpretation of laws. It is thus not difficult to stray away from the true path ofconstruction, unless we constantly bear in mind the goal we seek. The office of statutory interpretation, let us not for amoment forget, is to determine legislative intent. In the words of a well-known authority, "[t]he true object of all interpretationis to ascertain the meaning and will of the law-making body, to the end that it may be enforced." 12 In varying language, "the,purpose of all rules or maxims" in interpretation "is to discover the true intention of the law." 13 They "are only valuable whenthey subserve this purpose." 14 In fact, "the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof." 15 A statute "shouldbe construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law." 16 By this, we do not"correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to" its true intent. 17

It should be certain by now that when engaged in the task of construing an obscure expression in the law 18 or where exact or

literal rendering of the words would not carry out the legislative intent, 19 the title thereof may be resorted to in theascertainment of congressional will. Reason therefor is that the title of the law may properly be regarded as an index of orclue or guide to legislative intention. 20 This is especially true in this jurisdiction. For the reason that by specific constitutionalprecept, "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title ofthe bill." 21 In such case, courts "are compelled by the Constitution to consider both the body and the title in order to arrive atthe legislative intention." 22

With the foregoing guideposts on hand, let us go back to the situation that confronts us. We take another look at the title ofR.A. 931, viz: "AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OFCERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OFJUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT."Readily to be noted is that the title is not merely composed of catchwords. 23 It expresses in language clear the very

substance of the law itself. From this, it is easy to see that Congress intended to give some effect to the title of R.A. 931.To be carefully noted is that the same imperfection in the language of R.A. 931 aforesaid from which surfaces a seeminginconsistency between the title and the body attended Commonwealth Act 276, the present statute's predecessor. Thatprior law used the very same language in the body thereof and in its title. We attach meaning to this circumstance. Had thelegislature meant to shake off any legal effects that the title of the statute might have, it had a chance to do so in thereenactment of the law. Congress could have altered with great facility the wording of the title of R.A. 931. The fact is that itdid not.

It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly read than the act itself,and in many states is the subject of constitutional regulation." 24 The constitutional in jurisdiction that the subject of the statutemust be expressed in the title of the bill, breathes the spirit of command because "the Constitution does not exact ofCongress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill." 25Reliance, therefore, may be placed on thetitle of a bill, which, while not an enacting part, no doubt "is in some sort a part of the act, although only a formalpart." 26 These considerations are all the more valid here because R.A. 931 was passed without benefit of congressionaldebate in the House from which it originated as House Bill 1410, 27 and in the Senate. 28

The title now under scrutiny possesses the strength of clarity and positiveness. It recites that it authorizes court proceedingsof claims to parcels of land declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next precedingthe approval of this Act." That title is written "in capital letters" by Congress itself; such kind of a title then "is not to beclassed with words or titles used by compilers of statutes" because "it is the legislature speaking." 29 Accordingly, it is nothard to come to a deduction that the phrase last quoted from R.A. 931 "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" was butinadvertently omitted from the body. Parting from this premise, there is, at bottom, no contradiction between title and body. Inline with views herein stated, the title belongs to that type of titles which; should be regarded as part of the rules or provisions


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expressed in the body. 30At the very least, the words "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" in the title of the law stand inequal importance to the phrase in Section 1 thereof, "by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted."

Given the fact then that there are two phrases to consider the choice of construction we must give to the statute does notneed such reflection. We lean towards a liberal view. And this, because of the principle long accepted that remediallegislation should receive the blessings of liberal construction. 31 And, there should be no quibbling as to the fact that R.A.931 is a piece of remedial legislation. In essence, it provides a mode of relief to landowners who, before the Act, had no legalmeans of perfecting their titles. This is plainly evident from the explanatory note thereof, which reads:

This bill is intended to give an opportunity to any person or claimant who has any interest in any parcel of land whichhas been declared as public land in cadastral proceeding for failure of said person or claimant to present his claimwithin the time prescribed by law.

There are many meritorious cases wherein claimants to certain parcels of land have not had the opportunity toanswer or appear at the hearing of cases affecting their claims in the corresponding cadastral proceedings for lackof sufficient notice or for other reasons and circumstances which are beyond their control. Under C.A. No. 276, saidpersons or claimants have no more legal remedy as the effectivity of said Act expired in 1940.

This measure seeks to remedy the lack of any existing law within said persons or claimants with meritorious claimsor interests in parcels of land may seek justice and protection. This bill proposes to give said persons or claimantstheir day in court. Approval of this bill is earnestly requested.

In fine, we say that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be permitted to hamstring judicial search forlegislative intent, which can otherwise be discovered. Legal technicalities should not abort the beneficent effects intended bylegislation.

The sum of all the foregoing is that, as we now view Republic Act 931, claims of title that may be filed thereunder embracethose parcels of land that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within theforty years nextpreceding the approval of this Act." Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes toreopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which wasrendered on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.lawphi1.nt

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted; the cadastral court's orders of August 5, 1963,November 5, 1963 and September 17, 1964 are hereby declared null and void and the cadastral court is hereby directed to

admit petitioners' oppositions and proceed accordingly. No costs. So ordered.


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CENTRAL CAPIZ, a corporation,petitioner, vs.ANA RAMIREZ,respondent.(G.R. No. L-16197; March 12, 1920)

JOHNSON, J.:

This is an original action brought in the Supreme Court. Its purpose is to obtain an interpretation and application of the intent,purpose and scope of Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the "Public Land Act," so far as it affectsagricultural lands, privately owned.

The only question presented is, whether or not said Act No. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine Islands

which are privately owned.There is not dispute about the facts. They are admitted. The petitioner alleges and respondent admits that on or about July 1,1919, the latter contracted with the petitioner to supply to it for a term of thirty years all sugar cane produced upon herplantation, which said contract, by agreement, was to be converted later into a right in remand recorded in the Registry ofProperty as an encumbrance upon the land, and to be binding upon all future owners of the same. In the interimtheexecution of said contract and its conversion into a right in remupon the respondent's property, said Act No. 2874 becameeffective. The respondent, while admitting said contract and her obligation thereunder to execute a deed pursuant thereto,bases her refusal so to do upon the fact that more than 61 per cent of the capital stock of the petitioner is held and owned bypersons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States.

It is conceded by the parties that the land involved is private agricultural land, that is, land which is held and owned by therespondent, for which she holds a Torrens title.

The defendant answered the petition. To the defendant's answer the petitioner demurred. From an examination of thepetition, the answer and the demurrer, it appears that the real issue presented is, whether the said Act (No. 2874) is limited inits application to agricultural lands of the public domain, or whether its provisions also extend to agricultural lands held inprivate ownership.

Inasmuch as the wording of certain sections of said Act (secs. 23, 24, 121 and 122) give rise to a possible construction thatprivate lands are included within its terms, and inasmuch as said Act specifically provides that any land coming within itspurview cannot be encumbered, alienated or transferred to corporations in which at least 61 per cent of the capital stockdoes not belong wholly to citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, the respondent, while not desiring toevade her contract, fears to assume the risk of giving effect to her said contract in view of the drastic penalty prescribed,should her action prove unlawful. The penalty provided in section 122 of said Act includes not only a nullity of the contract but

also a reversion of the property and its improvements to the Government.

On behalf of the plaintiff it is argued, first, that the intent of the Legislature, gathered from a reading of Act No. 2874 in itsentirety, is to provide simply for the sale, lease and other disposition of lands of thepublic domain; that lands held in privateownership are not affected thereby; and, second, that even had the Legislature intended to include private as well as publicland within the scope of the Act, this intent fails because under the Act as entitledsuch attempt would be in direct violation ofsection three of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, which provides that: "No bill which may be enacted into law shallembrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."

Examining Act No. 2874 in detail, there can be little question but that it was intended to apply to and regulate the sale, leaseand other disposition ofpublic lands only. The titleof the Act, always indicative of legislative intent, reads: "an Act to amendand compile the laws relating to lands of the public domain, and for other purposes." Section one of such act provides: "That

short title of this Act shall be 'The public Land Act.' " Section two, wherein the purpose of the Act is expressly stated, reads: "The provisions of this Act shall apply to lands of the public domain." Section three provides:

While title to lands of thepublic domain remains in the Government, the Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act, through the Director ofLands, who shall act under his immediate control.

It cannot be contemplated that these officers, charged "with carrying out the provisions of the Act," were intended to exerciseauthority and control over the sale or other disposition of lands hold in private ownership.

To the same effect are sections four, five, and eighty-seven of the Act, wherein executive control is vested in the Director ofLands with respect to the survey, appraisal, classification, etc., of lands of the public domain, with authority to prepare rulesand regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Act, and to receive all applications filed pursuant thereto, etc.


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Sections 105 contains another indication that said Act does not apply to privately owned agricultural lands. Said sectionprovides: "All patents or certificates for lands granted under this Act . . . shall issue in the name of the Government of thePhilippine Islands, under the signature of the Governor-General, countersigned by the Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources." The Legislature certainly did not intend that all sales, leases, etc. of privately owned agricultural lands shouldhereafter be "issued in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands, under the signature of the Government of thePhilippine Islands, under the signature of the Governor-General," etc.

Section 23, after describing the persons and corporations authorized to purchase any tract ofpublic agricultural

lands "disposable under this Act," proceeds:Provided, further, That citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the sameright to acquirepublic lands as to their own citizens, may, while such laws are in force, but not thereafter . . .purchase any parcel of agricultural land . . . available under this Act.

In other words, it is only necessary for other countries to grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the right to acquire "publiclands," in order that their citizens may have the right to acquire any land available under this Act. This provision would bealtogether anomalous had it been the intent to apply Act No. 2874 to lands held in private ownership.

Referring again to section two of said Act, we find the following:

That nothing in this Act provided shall be understood or construed to change or modify the government anddisposition of the lands commonly known as "friar lands" and those which, being privately owned, have reverted toor become the property of the Philippine Government, which administration and disposition shall be governed by thelaws at present in force or which may hereafter be enacted by the Legislature.

The purpose of said provision is obvious. Inasmuch as these friar estates and other real property purchased or owned by theGovernment are subject to its control and disposition equally with lands of the public domain, it could be reasonably arguedthat they should be subject to and governed by the laws applicable to public lands. Through the insertion of the provisionabove quoted, however, this construction of the Act is avoided. If said Act, by express provisions, does not apply tolandsprivately owned by the Government, it could hardly have been the intent of the Legislature to make the Act applicableto lands held in private ownership by individuals.

The Act nowhere contains any direct or express provision applying its terms to privately owned lands. The doubts ofdefendant in that regard are caused by inferences drawn from the language used in sections 24 and 121 of the Act. The first

paragraph of section 24 provides:

No . . . corporation . . . other than those mentioned in the last preceding section may acquire or own agriculturalpublic land or land of any other denomination or classification, not used for industrial or residence purposes, that isat the time or was originally, really or presumptively, of the public domain, or any permanent improvement thereon,or any real right on such land and improvement.

Said section as worded, and standing alone, presents come question as to the character of land sought to be includedtherein. This doubt is dispelled, however, when its provisions are read in connection with other sections of the same chapter.Chapter five, in which section 24 is found, deals with "Sales," and section 25 thereof specifically provides that: "Lands soldunder the provisions of this chapter must be appraised in accordance with section 114 of this Act." Section 114 confersauthority upon the Director of Lands, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to appraise

lands or improvements subject to concession or disposition under the provisions of this Act. Inasmuch as the Legislaturecannot vest authority in the Director of Lands to "appraise" or "sell" lands held in private ownership, it is not presumed it wasthe intention to include private lands in the Act or subject them in the manner indicated to any such authority. The sameobservations and the same conclusions apply to section 121 of the Act, where much the same language is used as found insection 24 above quoted.

Whatever interpretation said sections 24 and 121 might receive if standing alone, it is clear they cannot prevail against thegeneral intent of the Act, derived not only from the language used but from the machinery adopted for giving effect to itsprovisions. (See secs. 87, 88, 90, 93, 94, 99, 103, 105, and 115.)


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We hold, therefore, that the purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands ofthepublic domain, and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any mannerwhatsoever thereby.

Even should the holding of the court upon this question of intent be different, it would not affect the final outcome of the case.Under the Act as entitled, any attempt by the Legislature to insert provisions in the body thereof relating to lands of privateownership would be in violation of the provisions of the Jones Law and therefore, null and void.

It is provided in section 3 of the Jones Law (Act of Congress of August 29, 1916): "That no bill which may be enacted into law

shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."

Identical provisions to the above are contained in most of the State Constitutions, and have been repeatedly construed. Inthe States of Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming, identical provisions are found in the Constitution.

The purpose of this legislative restriction, and the evils sought to be remedied thereby, are clearly stated by Surtherland inhis valuable work on Statutory Construction. In Section 111 he says that:

In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction the courts have kept steadily in view the correctionof the mischief against which it was aimed. The object is to prevent the practice, which was common in all legislativebodies where no such restrictions existed, of embracing in the same bill incongruous matters having no relation toeach other or to the subject specified in the title, by which measures were often adopted without attracting attention.Such distinct subjects represented diverse interests, and were combined in order to unite the members of thelegislature who favor either in support of all. These combinations were corruptive of the legislature and dangerous tothe State. Such omnibus bills sometimes included more than a hundred sections on as many different subjects, witha title appropriate to the first section, "and for other purposes."

The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by the legislation often resulted inmembers voting ignorantly for measures which they would not knowingly have approved; and not only werelegislators thus misled, but the public also; so that legislative provisions were steadily pushed through in the closinghours of a session, which, having no merit to commend them, would have been made odious by popular discussionand remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably announced. The constitutional clause under discussion isintended to correct these evils; to prevent such corrupting aggregations of incongruous measures, by confining eachact to one subject or object; to prevent surprise and inadvertence by requiring that subject or object to be expressedin the title.

In the case of Walker vs.State (49 Ala., 329), the Supreme Court of Alabama stated the proposition as follows citing andquoting from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations; p. 143:

The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this provision are well known.Legislative assemblies, for the dispatch of business, often pass bills by their titles only without requiring them to beread. A specious title sometimes covers legislation which, if real character had been disclosed, would not havecommanded assent. To prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this provision wasintended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision the title of a statute was often no indication of itssubject or contents.

An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the same statute of suchthings as were diverse in their nature, and were connected only to combine in favor of all the advocates of each,thus often securing the passage of several measures no one of which could have succeeded on its own merits. Mr.Cooley thus sums up in his review of the authorities defining the objects of this provision: "It may therefore beassumed as settled that the purpose of this provision was: First, to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave noinformation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and , third, tofairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects oflegislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition orotherwise if they shall so desire.' (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 143.)


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To the same effect, in the case of Lindsay vs.U. S. Say.& Loan Ass'n. (120 Ala., 156 [42 L.R. A., N. S., 783]), the court said:

The purposes of the constitutional requirement must be borne steadily in mind when it becomes necessary todetermine whether there has been legislative observance of it. The exposition of these purposes by Judge Cooley isaccepted, we believe, in all the states in which alike limitation prevails. (Then follows quotation from Cooley, supra.)

In the case of People vs. Parks(58 Cal., 624) where, in the body of an act, provision was made for something not included inthe title, the Supreme Court of California said:

At least, then, two heterogeneous subjects are embraced in the act, one of which is not expressed in the title, andthey cannot be segregated. The title does not express the objects of legislation embodied in the provisions of theact. It is, therefore, narrower than the body of the act, and fails to impart that notice of the measures enacted, whichthe Constitution requires. To prohibit such legislation was the sole end and aim of the constitutional requirement.'The practice,' says the Supreme Court of Missouri, 'of comprising in one bill subjects of a diverse and antogonisticnature, in order to combine in their support members who were in favor of particular measures, but neither of whichcould command the requisite majority on its own merits, was found to be not a corruptive influence in the Legislatureitself, but destructive of the best interests of the State. But this was not more detrimental than that other perniciouspractice, by which, through dexterous and unscrupulous management, designing men inserted clauses in the bodiesof bills, of the true meaning of which the titles gave no indication, and by skillful maneuvering urged them on to theirpassage. These things led to fraud and injury, and it was found necessary to apply a corrective in the shape of aconstitutional provision.' (City of St. Louis vs.Tiefel, 42 Mo., 590.) This provision has been framed in the

constitutions of may of the States of the Union; and courts, whenever it has come before the, have liberallyconstrued it as the will of the people in the interests of honest legislation.

The authorities are to all intents uniform that this constitutional requirement is mandatory and not directory. Sutherland onStatutory Construction, section 112, states the rule correctly as follows:

The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to cure the evil and mischief which has been pointed out, depends onjudicial enforcement; on this constitutional injunction being regarded as mandatory, and compliance with it essentialto the validity of legislation. The mischief existed notwithstanding the sworn official obligation of legislators; it mightbe expected to continue notwithstanding that that obligation is formulated and emphasized in this constitutionalinjunction if it be construed as addressed exclusively to them and only directory. It would in a general sense be adangerous doctrine to announce that any of the provisions of the constitution may be obeyed or disregarded at the

mere will or pleasure of the legislature unless it is clear beyond all question that such was the intention of theframers of that instrument. It would seem to be a lowering of the proper dignity of the fundamental law to say that itdescends to prescribing rules of order in unessential matters which may be followed or disregarded at pleasure. Thefact is this: That whatever constitutional provision can be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treatedby the legislature as if it was devoid of moral obligation, and to be therefore habitually disregarded.

In the case of Cannon vs. Mathes (8 Heisk. [Tenn.], 504) Nicholson, C. J., referring to the provision that "No bill shall becomea law which embraces more than one subject," said:

This is a direct, positive and imperative limitation upon the power of the legislature. It matters not that a bill haspassed through three readings in each house on three different days and has received the approval of the governor,still it is not a law of the State if it embraces more than one subject.

In the case of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329) supra, the court said:

It is the settled law of this court, founded on reasoning which seems to us unanswerable that this provision of theconstitution is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to the general assembly, but that it is mandatory,and it is the duty of courts to declare void any statute not conforming to it.

Justice Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations (pp. 179-180) states that our courts have held, without exception,that such constitutional provision is mandatory.

As heretofore noted, the title of Act 2874, here under constructions, reads: "An Act to amend and compile laws relative tolands of thepublic domain, and for other purposes."


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In our interpretation of said Act, the words "and for other purposes" contained in its title, must be treated as non-existent.Under all the authorities wherein the requirement "That no bill shall embrace more than one subject, which subject shallbe expressed in the title of the bill" has been considered, the words "and for other purposes" when found in the title, havebeen held to be without force or effect whatsoever and have been altogether discarded in construing the Act.

Upon this point, Justice Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., pp. 173 - 173, states as follows:

One thing, however, is very plain: That the use of the words "other purposes," which has heretofore been socommon in the title to acts, with a view to cover any and everything whether connect with the main purpose

indicated by the title or not, can no longer be of any avail where these provisions exist. As was said by the SupremeCourt of New York in a case where these words had been made use of in the title to a local bill: "The words "forother purposes" must be laid out of consideration. They express nothing & amount to nothing as a compliance withthis constitutional requirement. Nothing w/c the act could not embrace without them can be brought in by their aid."

Sutherland on Statutory Construction, section 122 says:

The phrase "and for other purposes" expresses no specific purpose and imports indefinitely something different fromthat which precedes it in the title. It is, therefore, universally rejected as having no force or effect wherever thisconstitutional restriction operates. (Citing numerous cases).

In the case of Ryerson vs. Utley (16 Mich., 269), an Act was construed by the court reading: "An Act to provide for thepreservation of the Muskegon river improvements, and for other purposes." Cooley, C. J., who wrote the opinion, said:

The Constitution (of Michigan) provides that no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressedin its title. We have heretofore had occasion to consider this section, and have said of it that it ought to be construedreasonably and not in so narrow and technical a sense as unnecessarily to embarrass legislation. But the onlyobject mentioned in the title of this Act is the preservation of the Muskegon River Improvements, for which purposethe act authorizes tools to be levied and expended.

The payment of Beard's claim is in no way connected with this object and the title to the act would apprise neitherthe legislature nor the public that it covered provisions under which a large sum was to be collected and disbursed topay for the original construction of the work. The words "other purposes" in the title can have no forcewhateverunder the constitutional provision which has been quoted.

In the case of Board of Education vs. Barlow(49 Ga., 232) the title of the Act under consideration read: "An Act to establish apermanent Board of Education for the City of Americus and to incorporate the same, and for other purposes." The Stateconstitution prohibited any law which referred to more than one subject, or contained matter different from that expressed inthe title of the act. The court said:

Does this not close the door to any force and effect being given the words "for other purposes?" If these words wereonce necessary to permit the introduction of matter in the bill, different from what was expressed in the order portionof the title, would not that every thing show now that the bill would thereby become obnoxious to the other clauseprohibiting more than one subject matter? The necessity of such words under the provision as it formerly stood toprevent the bill from containing matter different from the title could only arise because such matter is somethingdifferent from what had already been expressed. It shows that something more than one subject-matter is intended.If so, although it was allowed under the clause as it was formerly, it cannot now be done.

Equally may it be said of the Act of the Philippine Legislature here involved, the addition of the words "and for otherpurposes," contained in its title, can only be explained on the theory that something differentwas to be included therein fromthat previously expressed, i. e., "lands of the public domain."

Another case where the same conclusion is forcibly expressed is that of Spier vs. Baker, (120 Ca., 370). There the courtconstrued an Act reading: "An Act providing for general primary elections within the State of California and to promote thepurity thereof by regulating the conduct thereof, and to support the privileges of free suffrage thereat, by prohibiting certainacts and practices in relation thereto, and providing for the punishment thereof, and for other purposes." the California StateConstitution provides: "Every Act shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title; but, if any subject shallbe embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in its title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall notbe expressed in its title." The court, after citing this constitutional provision, said:


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Let us test the title of this act in the crucible furnished by the foregoing provision of the constitution. The legislature,in framing this title, was above all things candid. Upon its very face the law-making power challenged the soundpolicy of this provision of the constitution, and avowedly disregarding it, declared that the purpose of the act was thecreation of a primary election law and "other purposes." Under the cloak of "other purposes," all and everyconceivable kind of legislation could hide and thrive in the body of the act, and thus the constitutional provision beset at naught. In this state, when these words "for other purposes" are found in the title of an act of the statelegislature they accomplish nothing, and in reading the title our eyes are closed to them. We then have before us,tested by its title, an act dealing solely with general primary elections, and providing penalties for violating the law

relating thereto. Any matters of legislation contained in the body of the act not bearing upon primary elections mustgo out; the constitutional provision quoted so declares. Weighing and measuring the legislation found in the act bythis test, very many provisions have no place there. It would seem that the legislature, in using the words "for otherpurposes" in the title, used those words advisedly, and in good faith lived up to them fully. For the legislation found insection after section of the act can find no justification in its title, save under these words of boundless meaning, "forother purposes."

The court, after referring to various matters included in the bill but not specified in the title, said:

Many of these things are totally foreign to any question relating to primary elections, and others are so remotelyconnected with that subject as to clearly come within the prohibition of the constitutional provision. These matters oflegislation, not being embraced within the purview of the title, are void and fall to the ground.

Applying the doctrine of the above cases to the Act before us for interpretation, its title must be considered and treated asthough reading: "An Act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain."

Inasmuch as agricultural landsin the Philippine Islands held in private ownership, under fee title, constitute no part of " thepublic domain." they cannot come within the purview of Act No. 2874 as it is entitled.

The words "public land" are habitually used in our legislation to described such as are subject to sale or other disposal undergeneral laws.

In the case of Wilcox vs. Jackson(13 Peters, 498 [10 L. ed., 264]) the court, in dealing with the matter of public lands, stated:

Whensoever a tract of land shall have once been legally appropriated to any purpose, from that moment the landthus appropriated becomes severed from the mass of public lands; and no subsequent law, or proclamation, or sale,

would be construed to embrace it, or to operate upon it, although no reservation were made of it.

The above case is quoted and applied in the case of United States vs. Blendoner (122 Feb. Rep., 703, 708). In U.S. vs.Garreston (42 Feb., 22), the court said:

Such lands comprise the general public domain; unappropriated lands; lands not held back or reserved for anyspecial governmental or public purpose.

In the case of Yakima County vs. Tuller(3 Wash., T., 393), the court said that the term "public lands" in a grant of publiclands for roads, etc., shall be construed to mean strictly public lands, such as are open to entry and settlement, and not thosein which the rights of the public have passed and which have become subject to some individual right of a settler.

In the case of Bardon vs. Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. (145 U. S., 535), the court said:

. . . It has long been settled . . . that all land to which any claims or rights of others have attached does not fall withinthe designation of public lands.

The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands, in a very elucidated opinion in which the Attorney-General of the UnitedStates agreed, held that "friar lands" purchased by the Insular Government formed no part of the "public domain" and werenot affected by nor subject to the restrictions of the Act relating to public lands.

Section 2 of the Act before us exempts not only "friar lands" from its operation but also all lands which have reverted to, orbecome the property of, the Philippine Government.

It is clearly evident, therefore, that under no possible construction of the law can the words "lands of thepublic domain," usedin the title of Act No. 2874, be held to include, or be authorized to include, lands held in freehold. While this is true generally,


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it is peculiarly applicable to lands held and owned under Torrens title as are the lands of the defendant herein in whichall interest of the Government is expressly eliminated. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496) provides that suchregistered title "shall be conclusive upon & against all persons, including the Insular Gove t & all branches thereof, whethermentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may concern.' "

The judicial department of the govnt hesitates to pronounce invalid the Acts of the legislative department, and will not do sountil and unless it is shown that the same exceed the authority conferred upon said department or contravene some expressor necessarily implied provision of the Organic Law of the state. (Case vs.Board of Health, and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250; U.

S. vs.Joson, 26 Phil., 1, 64; U. S. vs.Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218, 225, 228; Tajanlangit vs.Pearanda, 37 Phil., 155.)In the interpretation and construction of statutes the court should give them the meaning and effect which the legislatureintended, unless that meaning and effect is in conflict with the organic law of the land. The question of the validity of thestatutes is first determined by the legislative department of the government, and the courts will resolved every presumption inits favor. The wisdom or advisability of a particular statute is within the constitutional powers of the legislature, it will besustained, whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of its enactment. If the statute covers a subject not authorized bythe fundamental laws of the state, or by the constitution, then the courts are not only authorized but are justified inpronouncing the same illegal and void, no matter how wise and beneficent such legislation may seem to be. The courts arenot justified in measuring their opinion with the opinion of the legislative department of the government, as expressed instatutes, upon the question of the wisdom, justice and advisability of a particular law. The courts have no right to dictate whatlaw shall be adopted by the legislative department of the government, so long as a well defined public policy or an organic

act is not violated. (Case vs.Board of Health, and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250; U. S. vs.Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218.)Our conclusions, therefore, from all of the foregoing are:

1. That it was the purpose and intent of the legislature to comply with the provisions of the Jones Law and to limit theapplication of Act No. 2874 to lands of the public domain;

2. That the phrase "and for other purposes," found in the title of said Act (No. 2874), by virtue of the provisions of section 3 ofthe Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (the Jones Law), cannot be interpreted to include, nor be made applicable to anylands not public;

3. That eliminating the phrase 'and for other purposes" from the title of said Act, the same must be considered and treated asthough reading: "An Act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain;"

4. That lands held in freehold or fee title, or private ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and cannot possiblycome within the purview of said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not embraced innay manner in the title of the Act.

5. That it is the uniform holding of the United States Supreme Court, and of other courts interpreting the phrase "publiclands," that once such lands have been "legally appropriated" by the Gov t or by individuals, they become segregated fromthe mass of public lands, and no law or proclamation thereafter made or issued relating to "public lands" operate upon them.

6. That whatever right or authority the Government of the Philippine Islands may have had at any time to assert any right,title, or interest in and to the lands involved in this proceeding, whether as a part of the "public domain" or otherwise, wasabsolutely divested by virtue of the provisions of section 38 of Act No. 496, after such lands were registered in the court ofland registration under the Torrens system.

7. That under said Act (No. 2874) as entitled any provisions or provisions in the body thereof applicable to lands held underfee title is null and void and of no effect.

8. That inasmuch as said Act (No. 2874) cannot be interpreted to apply to, nor include, lands held in fee title, the penalprovisions thereof cannot be held to apply to leases, sales, concessions, nor any other transaction by the holders.

9. That by virtue of the provisions of section 127, as well as the general jurisprudence upon that subject our conclusionsherein shall not be held to affect any of the provisions of said Act No. 2874 except those provisions which relate to privateagricultural lands, or lands held in private ownership, in contradistinction to lands of the public domain.

Therefore, having demonstrated that said Act No. 2874 does not apply to lands of the respondent, and there being noobjection to the form of the remedy prayed for, the same is hereby granted, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.


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G.R. No. L-33628 December 29, 1987

BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, SANTIAGO EISMA, MIRUFO CELERIAN, JOSE SAYSON, CESAR TABILIRAN, and MAXIMOADLAWAN, petitioners,vs.HON. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. SUCALDITO, RUFINO LABANG, MENELEO MESINA, ARTURO GUILLERMO, IN THEIRRESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITYFISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE PROSECUTOR, and ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

INC., respondents.No. L-34162 December 29, 1987

BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, petitioner,vs.HON. JUDGE ASAALI S. ISNANI, RUFINO LABANG, ALBERTO S. LIM, JR., JESUS ACEBES, IN THEIR RESPECTIVECAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL OFPAGADIAN CITY AND STATE PROSECUTORS, ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., and ARTEMIOROMANILLOS, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971,seeks injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCCXVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the then Circuit Criminal Court sitting in Pagadian City, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of prosecutions for violation ofcertain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) and various provisions of the RevisedPenal Code, commenced by the respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc.

On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971, respectively, we issued temporary restraining orders directing the respondents (inboth petitions) to desist from further proceedings in the cases in question until further orders from the Court. At the sametime, we gave due course to the petitions and accordingly, required the respondents to answer.

The petitions raise pure question of law. The facts are hence, undisputed.On September 26, 1970, the private respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., filed a complaint with therespondent City Fiscal, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1-70 thereof, for violation of the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law aswell as Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

SPECIFICATION NO. I

That on or about October 10, 1969, above-named respondents, conspiring and confabulating together,allegedly conducted a bidding for the supply of gravel and sand for the Province of Zamboanga del Sur: thatit was made to appear that Tabiliran Trucking Company won the bidding; that, thereafter, the award and

contract pursuant to the said simulated bidding were effected and executed in favor of Tabiliran TruckingCompany; that, in truth and in fact, the said bidding was really simulated and the papers on the same werefalsified to favor Tabiliran Trucking Company, represented by the private secretary of respondentBienvenido Ebarle, formerly confidential secretary of the latter; that said awardee was given whollyunwarranted advantage and preference by means of manifest partiality; that respondent officials are herebyalso charged with interest for personal gain for approving said award which was manifestly irregular andgrossly unlawful because the same was facilitated and committed by means of falsification of officialdocuments.

SPECIFICATION NO. II

That after the aforecited award and contract, Tabiliran Trucking Company, represented by respondentCesar Tabiliran, attempted to collect advances under his trucking contract in the under his trucking contract


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in the amount of P4,823.95 under PTA No. 3654; that the same was not passed in audit by the ProvincialAuditor in view of the then subsisting contract with Tecson Trucking Company; which was to expire onNovember 2, 1969; that nevertheless the said amount was paid and it was made to appear that it wascollected by Tecson Trucking Company, although there was nothing due from tile latter and the voucherwas never indorsed or signed by the operator of Tecson Trucking; and that in facilitating and consummatingthe aforecited collection, respondent officials, hereinabove cited, conspired and connived to the greatprejudice and damage of the Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur. 1

xxx xxx xxxOn the same date, the private respondent commenced Criminal Case No. 2-71 of the respondent City Fiscal, anotherproceeding for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 as well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint reads asfollows:

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about April 8, 1970, a bidding was held for the construction of the right wing portion of the CapitolBuilding of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, by the Bidding Committee composed of respondents citedhereinabove; that the said building was maliciously manipulated so as to give wholly unwarrantedadvantage and preference in favor of the, supposed winning bidder, Codeniera Construction, allegedlyowned and managed by Wenceslao Codeniera, brother-in-law of the wife of respondent Bienvenido Ebarle;

that respondent official is interested for personal gain because he is responsible for the approval of themanifestly irregular and unlawful award and contract aforecited; and that, furthermore, respondent, being aMember of the Bidding Committee, also violated Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, by making itappear in the very abstract of bids that another interested bidder, was not interested in the bidding, when intruth and in fact, it was not so. 2

xxx xxx xxx

On January 26, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 4-71 of the respondent Fiscal, a prosecution for violation ofArticles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about April 4, 1967, in Pagadian City, said respondent testified falsely under oath in CadastralCase No. N-17, LRC CAD REC. NO. N-468, for registration of title to Lot No. 2545 in particular;

That respondent BIENVENIDO EBARLE testified falsely under oath during the hearing and reception ofevidence that he acquired said lot by purchase from a certain Brigido Sanchez and that he is the owner,when in truth and in fact Lot 2545 had been previously acquired and is owned by the provincial Governmentof Zamboanga del Sur, where the provincial jail building is now located.

2. That aforesaid deceit, false testimony and untruthful statement of respondent in said Cadastral case weremade knowingly to the great damage and prejudice of the Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur inviolation of aforecited provisions of the Revised Penal Code. 3

On February 10, 1971, finally, the private respondent filed a complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 5-71 of the respondent Fiscal,

an action for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and Articles 171 and 213 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:xxx xxx xxx

We hereby respectfully charge the above-named respondents for violation of Sec. 3, R.A. No. 3019,otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Articles 171 and 213, Revised Penal Codeand the rules and regulations of public bidding, committed as follows:

1. That on June 16, 1970, without publication, respondents conducted the so-called"bidding" for the supply of gravel and sand for the province of Zamboanga del Sur; thatsaid respondents, without any valid or legal ground, did not include or even open the bid ofone Jesus Teoson that was seasonably submitted, despite the fact that he is a registeredduly qualified operator of "Teoson Trucking Service," and notwithstanding his compliance


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with all the rules and requirements on public bidding; that, instead, aforecited respondentsillegally and irregularly awarded said contract to Cesar Tabiliran, an associate ofrespondent Governor Bienvenido Ebarle; and

2. That in truth and in fact, aforesaid "bidding" was really simulated and papers werefalsified or otherwise "doctored" to favor respondent Cesar Tabiliran thereby giving himwholly unwarranted advantage, preference and benefits by means of manifest partiality;and that there is a statutory presumption of interest for personal gain because the

transaction and award were manifestly irregular and contrary to applicable law, rules andregulations.4

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner initially moved to dismiss the aforesaid preliminary investigations, but the same having been denied, he wentto the respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable Melquiades Sucaldito presiding, onprohibition and mandamus (Special Case No. 1000) praying at the same time, for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoinfurther proceedings therein. The court granted preliminary injunctive relief (restraining order) for which the Anti-Graft Leaguefiled a motion to have the restraining order lifted and to have the petition itself dismissed.

On May 14, 1971, the respondent, Judge Sucaldito, handed down the first of the two challenged orders, granting Anti-GraftLeague's motion and dismissing Special Case No. 1000.

On June 11, 1971, the petitioner came to this Court on certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order (G.R. No.33628). As we said, we issued a temporary restraining order on June 16, 1971.

Meanwhile, and in what would begin yet another series of criminal prosecutions, the private respondent, on April 26, 1971,filed three complaints, subsequently docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pagadian City for violation of various provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article171(4) of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and

feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH EBARLE MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, hisrelative by consanguinity within the third degree, and appointment as Private Secretary in the Office of theProvincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know that the latter is related with him withinthe third degree by consanguinity.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statements in a

narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit: ,c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been observed.

required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to ELIZABETH EBARLE-MONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur,although he well know that the latter is related with him within the third degree of consanguinity.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx


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That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statements in anarration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit:

c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been observed.

required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to TERESITOMONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece Elizabeth Ebarle, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of theProvincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well knew that the latter is related with him within

the third degree affinity.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 7

xxx xxx xxx

Subsequently, on August 23, 1971, the private respondent brought I.S. No. 6-71 of the respondent Pagadian City Fiscalagainst the petitioner, still another proceeding for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and Article 171 (4) of the Revised PenalCode, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

First Count.

That on or about December 1, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor ofZamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave MARIO EBARLE,son of his brother, his relative by consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment as SECURITYGUARD in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur although he well knew that the latteris related with him in the third degree by consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law.

Second Count.

That in January, 1970, at Pagadian City, Gov. BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE replaced JOHNNY ABABONwhowas then the incumbent Motor Pool Dispatcher in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga delSur with his nephew-in-law TERESITO MONTESCLAROS relative by affinity within the third Civil degree, inviolation of the Civil Service Law, this knowingly causing undue injury in the discharge of his administrative

function through manifest partiality against said complaining employee.Third Count:

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor ofZamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETHEBARLE MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative by consanguinity within the third degree,an appointment as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur,although he well know that the latter is related with him within the third degree of consanguinity, and saidappointment is in violation of the Civil Service Law.

Fourth Count.

That on or about January 22, 1970, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor ofZamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ZACARIAS UGSOD,JR., son of the younger sister of Governor Ebarle, his relative by consanguinity within the third degree, anappointment as Architectural Draftsman in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Suralthough he well know that the latter is related with him in the third degree of consanguinity.

Fifth Count.

That on February 5, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboangadel Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave TERESITO MONTESCLAROS,husband of his niece ELIZABETH EBARLE, his relative by affinity within the third degree, an appointmentas Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he wen knew


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then that the latter was not qualified to such appointment as it was in violation of the Civil Service Law,thereby knowingly granting and giving unwarranted advantage and preference in the discharge of hisadministrative function through manifest partiality.

II. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 (b), R.A. 3019

That on August 19, 1967, respondent BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, takingadvantage of his position caused, persuaded, induced, or influence the Presiding Judge to perform irregularand felonious act in violation of applicable law or constituting an offense into awarding and decreeing Lot

2645 of the Pagadian Public Lands subdivision to him who, according to the records of the case, failed toestablish his rights of ownership pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration law and the Public LandAct, it appearing that the Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur as and is a claimant and in adversepossession of Lot 2545 whereon the Provincial Jail Building thereon still stands.

III. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 171 (4), REVISED PENAL CODE

First Count.

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and thereunlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statement in a narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing acertificate, to wit:

c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been observed.required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to TERESITOMONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece ELIZABETH EBARLE, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of theProvincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he wen knew that the latter is related with him withinthe third degree of affinity and is in violation of the Civil Service Law.

Second Count.

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and thereunlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statements a certificate, to wit:

c. That the provisions of the law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been observed.

required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to ELIZABETH EBARLE-MONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur,although he well knew that the latter is related with him within the third degree of consanguinity, and is inviolation of the Civil Service Law. CONTRARY to aforecited laws. 8

xxx xxx xxx

On September 21, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 7-71 of the said City Fiscal, again charging the petitionerwith further violations of Republic Act No. 3019 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

First Count.

That on or about December 2, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial Governor ofZamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefitsand privileges BONINDA EBARLE, wife of his brother Bertuldo Ebarle, the former being his relative byaffinity within the second civil degree, an appointment as LABORATORY TECHNICIAN in Pagadian City,although he well knew that the latter is related to him in the second degree by affinity and is not qualifiedunder the Civil Service Law.

Second Count.

That on or about January 1, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial Governor ofZamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits


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and privileges JESUS EBARLE, nephew of said respondent, an appointment as DRIVER of the ProvincialEngineer's Office, Pagadian City, although he well knew that Jesus Ebarle is related to him within the thirdcivil degree by consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law.

Third Count.

That on or about November 1, 1969, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial Governor ofZamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefitsand privileges PHENINA CODINERA, sister-in-law of said respondent, an appointment as CONFIDENTIAL

ASSISTANT in the Office of the Provincial Governor, Pagadian City, although he well knew that PheninaCodinera is related to him in the second civil degree of consanguinity and is not qualified under the CivilService Law.

ALL CONTRARY TO AFORECITED LAW.

Please give due course to the above complaint and please set the case for immediate preliminaryinvestigation pursuant to the First Indorsement dated August 27, 1971 of the Secretary of Justice, and in theparamount interest of good government. 9

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner thereafter went to the respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable Asaali Isnani

presiding, on a special civil action (Special Civil Case No. 1048) for prohibition and certiorariwith preliminary injunction. Therespondent Court issued a restraining order. The respondent Anti-Graft League moved to have the same lifted and the caseitself dismissed.

On September 27, 1971, Judge Isnani issued an order, dismissing the case.

On October 6, 1971, the petitioner instituted G.R. No. 34162 of this Court, a special civil action for certiorari with preliminaryinjunction. As earlier noted, we on October 8, 1971, stayed the implementation of dismissal order.

Subsequently, we consolidated both petitions and considered the same submitted for decision.

Principally, the petitioner relies (in both petitions) on the failure of the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League tocomply with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS

CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BEGUIDED," 10preliminary to their criminal recourses. At the same time, he assails the standing of the respondent Anti-GraftLeague to commence the series of prosecutions below (G.R. No. 33628). He likewise contends that the respondent Fiscal (inG.R. No. 34162), in giving due course to the complaints notwithstanding the restraining order we had issued (in G.R. No.33628), which he claims applies as well thereto, committed a grave abuse of discretion.

He likewise submits that the prosecutions in question are politically motivated, initiated by his rivals, he being, as we said, acandidate for reelection as Governor of Zamboanga del Sur.

We dismiss these petitions.

The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions of Executive Order No. 264 has no merit. We reproduce the Order in toto:

MALACAANGRESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT

OF THE PHILIPPINES

MANILA

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264

OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALSAND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED.


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WHEREAS, it is necessary that the general public be duly informed or reminded of the procedure providedby law and regulations by which complaints against public officials and employees should be presented andprosecuted.

WHEREAS, actions on complaints are at times delayed because of the failure to observe the form.91requisites therefor, to indicate with sufficient clearness and particularity the charges or offenses being airedor denounced, and to file the complaint with the proper office or authority;

WHEREAS, without in any way curtailing the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, the

Administration believes that many complaints or grievances could be resolved at the lower levels ofgovernment if only the provisions of law and regulations on the matter are duly observed by the partiesconcerned; and

WHEREAS, while all sorts of officials misconduct should be eliminated and punished, it is equallycompelling that public officials and employees be given opportunity afforded them by the constitution andlaw to defend themselves in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and regulations;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powersvested in me by law, do hereby order:

1. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be in writing, subscribed and sworn to by thecomplainants, describing in sufficient detail and particularity the acts or conduct complained of, instead ofgeneralizations.

2. Complaints against presidential appointees shag be filed with the Office of the President or theDepartment Head having direct supervision or control over the official involved.

3. Those against subordinate officials and employees shall be lodged with the proper department or agencyhead.

4. Those against elective local officials shall be filed with the Office of the President in case of provincialand city officials, with the provincial governor or board secretary in case of municipal officials, and with themunicipal or city mayor or secretary in case of barrio officials.

5. Those against members of police forces shall be filed with the corresponding local board of investigatorsheaded by the city or municipal treasurer, except in the case of those appointed by the President whichshould be filed with the Office of the President.

6. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be promptly acted upon and disposed of by theofficials or authorities concerned in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations so that the erringofficials or employees can be soonest removed or otherwise disciplined and the innocent, exonerated orvindicated in like manner, and to the end also that other remedies, including court action, may be pursuedforthwith by the interested parties after administrative remedies shall have been exhausted.

Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President of the Philippines

By the President:

(Sgd.) ALEJANDRO MELCHOR

Executive Secretary 11

It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints. TheOrder itself shows why.


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The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal"offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could have very wellreferred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto.

The first perambulatory clause states the necessity for informing the public "of the procedure provided by law and regulationsby which complaints against public officials and employees should be presented and prosecuted. 12 To our mind, the"procedure provided by law and regulations" referred to pertains to existing procedural rules with respect to the presentationof administrative charges against erring government officials. And in fact, the aforequoted paragraphs are but restatements

thereof. That presidential appointees are subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, for instance, is a reecho ofthe long-standing doctrine that the President exercises the power of control over his appointees. 13Paragraph 3, on theother hand, regarding subordinate officials, is a mere reiteration of Section 33 of Republic Act No. 2260, the Civil Service Act(of 1959) then in force, placing jurisdiction upon "the proper Head of Department, the chief of a bureau or office" 14toinvestigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary action.

Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against elective local officials, reiterates, on the other hand, theDecentralization Act of 1967, providing that "charges against any elective provincial and city officials shall be preferred beforethe President of the Philippines; against any elective municipal official before the provincial governor or the secretary of theprovincial board concerned; and against any elective barrio official before the municipal or secretary concerned. 15

Paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction of the provisions of the Police Act of 1966, vesting upon a "Board ofInvestigators" 16the jurisdiction to try and decide complaints against members of the Philippine police.

Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and streamlines the administrative apparatus in thematter of complaints against public officials. Furthermore, the fact is that there is no reference therein to judicial or prejudicial(like a preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal) recourse, not because it makes such a resort a secondary measure,but because it does not intend to serve as a condition precedent to, much less supplant, such a court resort.

To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s] [being] pursued forthwith by the interested parties, " 17but that doesnot, so we hold, cover proceedings such as criminal actions, which do not require a prior administrative course of action. Itwill indeed be noted that the term is closely shadowed by the qualification, "after administrative remedies shall have beenexhausted," 18which suggests civil suits subject to previous administrative action.

It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific reference to "erring officials or employees ...removed or otherwise vindicated. 19 If it were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would have employed suchtechnical terms as "accused", "convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases, itis here material in construing the intent of the measure.

What is even more compelling is the Constitutional implications if the petitioner's arguments were accepted. For ExecutiveOrder No. 264 was promulgated under the 1935 Constitution in which legislative power was vested exclusively in Congress.The regime of Presidential lawmaking was to usher in yet some seven years later. If we were to consider the Executive Orderlaw, we would be forced to say that it is an amendment to Republic Act No. 5180, the law on preliminary investigations thenin effect, a situation that would give rise to a Constitutional anomaly. We cannot accordingly countenace such a view.

The challenge the petitioner presents against the personality of the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines to bring suit isequally without merit. That the Anti-Graft League is not an "offended party" within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 110, of theRules of Court (now Section 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), cannot abate the complaints in question.

A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the "offended party." The rule hasbeen that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, forpreliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person. 20The "complaint" referred to in the Rule 110 contemplatesone filed in court, not with the fiscal, In that case, the proceeding must be started by the aggrieved party himself. 21

For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by complaint or information, both of which are filed in court. In case ofa complaint, it must be filed by the offended party; with respect to an information, it is the fiscal who files it. But a "complaint"filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person.

The next question is whether or not the temporary restraining order we issued in G.R. No. 33628 embraced as well thecomplaint subject of G.R. No. 34162.


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It is noteworthy that the charges levelled against the petitioner whether in G.R. No. 33628 or 34162 refer invariably toviolations of the Anti-Graft Law or the Revised Penal Code. That does not, however, make such charges Identical to oneanother.

The complaints involved in G.R. No. 34162 are, in general, nepotism under Sections 3(c) and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019;exerting influence upon the

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