G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES, Petitioner, vs.RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the secretary of the COURT OF APPEALS, secretary DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.D E C I S I O NLEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:For resolution is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 4, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 00011 which dismissed the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, as amended. It also assails the CAs Resolution dated March 25, 2008, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid February 4, 2008 Decision.The undisputed facts as found by the CA are as follows:Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause must be made personally by a judge.On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. The trial court ratiocinated that the evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors failed to show that petitioner and the other accused-civilians conspired and confederated with the accused-soldiers in taking arms against the government; that petitioner and other accused-civilians were arrested because they ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to them to come out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit themselves to the police authorities; that mere presence at the scene of the crime and expressing ones sentiments on electoral and political reforms did not make them conspirators absent concrete evidence that the accused-civilians knew beforehand the intent of the accused-soldiers to commit rebellion; and that the cooperation which the law penalizes must be one that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.On December 18, 2007, petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126.On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioners letter stating that the DOJ could not act on petitioners request until Atty. Chavezs right to represent petitioner is settled in view of the fact that a certain Atty. J. V. Bautista representing himself as counsel of petitioner had also written a letter to the DOJ.On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for the timely intervention of petitioners counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled flight to Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007, petitioner was able to fly back to the Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner would present himself at the NAIA for his flights abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued inclusion of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioners right to travel is illegal.On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed the Return of the Writ raising the following affirmative defenses: 1) that the Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue Hold Departure Orders under the DOJ Circulars No. 17, Series of 19982 and No. 18 Series of 20073 pursuant to his mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987 as ahead of the principal law agency of the government; 2) that HDO No. 45 dated December 1, 2007 was issued by the Sec. Gonzales in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case against herein petitioner upon the request of the DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public respondents pending Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008 filed by the respondents of the Order dated December 13, 2007 of the RTC dismissing Criminal Case No. 07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of probable cause; 4) that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO No. 45 before the DOJ; and 5) that the constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and 18 can not be attacked collaterally in an amparo proceeding.During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of the Court of Appeals, counsels for both parties appeared. Petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez manifested that petitioner is currently in Hong Kong; that every time petitioner would leave and return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutes because of the existing HDO; that the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis; and that petitioner did not file a motion to lift the HDO before the RTC nor the DOJ because to do so would be tantamount to recognizing the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO.For respondents part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained that the Secretary of the DOJs power to issue HDO springs from its mandate under the Administrative Code to investigate and prosecute offenders as the principal law agency of the government; that in its ten-year existence, the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17 has not been challenged except now; and that on January 3, 2008, the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors had filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of Dismissal of the trial court.On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching thereto a copy of the Order dated January 31, 2008 of the trial court denying respondent DOJs Motion for Reconsideration for utter lack of merit. The trial court also observed that the said Motion should be dismissed outright for being filed out of time. 4The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioners constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and denying the privilege of the writ of amparo.Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration5 thereon was also denied in the assailed Resolution6 dated March 25, 2008.Hence, the present petition which is based on the following grounds:I.THE DOJ SECRETARYS ARROGATION OF POWER AND USURPATION OF AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED THROUGH A RATIONALE THAT IT HAS SUPPOSEDLY BEEN "REGULARLY EXERCISED IN THE PAST" OR HAS "NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED (IN THE PAST).II.THE DOJ HAS CLAIMED A POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO INDEPENDENT OF THAT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, HENCE, PETITIONER CANNOT MERELY RELY ON THE RESIDUAL POWER OF THE RTC MAKATI IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-3126 TO ASSAIL SUCH CLAIMED POWER.III.THE UTMOST EXIGENCY OF THE PETITION IS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE CONTINUING ACTUAL RESTRAINT ON PETITIONERS RIGHT TO TRAVEL THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE OF HIS NAME IN THE HDO LIST AND DOES NOT SIMPLY HINGE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL DESPITE SUCH A RESTRAINT.IV.DOJ CIRCULAR 17 SERIES OF 1998 PROVIDES NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE DOJ SECRETARYS CLAIMED POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO FOR IT IS NOT A STATUTE. THE CIRCULAR ITSELF APPEARS NOT TO BE BASED ON ANY STATUTE, HENCE, IT DOES NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW AND NEED NOT BE ATTACKED IN A DIRECT PROCEEDING.7Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut of liberties protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that "[liberty] includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways." Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is the right of a person to travel. In their Comment,8 both respondents Secretary Gonzalez and Commissioner Libanan argue that: 1) HDO No. 45 was validly issued by the Secretary of Justice in accordance with Department of Justice Circular No. 17, Series of 1998,9 and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007,10 which were issued pursuant to said Secretarys mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987, as head of the principal law agency of the government, to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide immigration regulatory services; and; 2) the issue of the constitutionality of the DOJ Secretarys authority to issue hold departure orders under DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18 is not within the ambit of a writ of amparo. The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.The petition must fail.Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,11 made a categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," or to threats thereof, thus:x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."12 In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,13 the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule on the writ of amparo as follows:To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit: "(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and(f) The relief prayed for.The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."14 The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. (Emphasis supplied)Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,15 the Court explained the concept of right to life in this wise:While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of mans existence." In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."16The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,17 in this manner: Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." x x x Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.18 thoroughly expounded on the import of the right to security, thus:A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. x x xThe Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision. Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.x x xThird, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. x x x (emphasis supplied) 19The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another.20 As we have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,21 "xxx a persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound discretion." 22Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I XIII, Inc. et al.,23 this Court ruled that:This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ. We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.1avvphi1The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo.Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJs HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of the HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an HDO.24 We quote with approval the CAs ruling on this matter:The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of its pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul25 that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of respondents MR of the dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over Criminal Case No. 07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual power, the court a quo retains the authority to entertain incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even this Court. The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the criminal case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra).26Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz v. Del Rosario,27 thus:Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or securitythe personal concern that the writ is intended to protectis immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case. Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO.28 Petitioners apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes).WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated February 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs.HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.CORTES, J.:Before the Court is a contreversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of national life.We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consilidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unseccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the same a split in the ranks of the military establishment that thraetened civilian supremacy over military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious military.But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their own on the areas they effectively control while the separatist are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up on this groups' determination to wrest power from the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms but also to through the use of propaganda have they been successful in dreating chaos and destabilizing the country.Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.The PetitionThis case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.The IssueTh issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of the following issues:1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and family to the Philippines?a. Is this a political question?2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines, in the interest of "national security, public safety or public healtha. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety or public health? b. Assuming that she has made that finding(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding?(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners? (3) Has there been a hearing? (4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the President's decision, including the grounds upon which it was based, been made known to petitioners so that they may controvert the same?c. Is the President's determination that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a political question?d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of former President Marcos and his family is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have respondents established such fact?3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision to bar the return of former President Marcos and his family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.1The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. xxx xxx xxxSection 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect. The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:Article 121) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. 2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political question which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo without reference to attendant circumstances.Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination by the President that such return and residence will endanger national security and public safety.It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a political question as it involves merely a determination of what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the more primordial and transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court can not consider it.There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here even if their return and residence here will endanger national security and public safety? this is still a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to the Philippines and establish their residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court can not decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the President of the Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.] The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and its limits. We, however, view this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties' formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the controversy. At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to travel and the import of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively. It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).] Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence. Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited. Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.Executive PowerThe 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official the President. As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23]. The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius[Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument brings to mind the institution of the U.S. Presidency after which ours is legally patterned.** Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same problem. He said:Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution ought to settle everything beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision realized. We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words: "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers, 17871957, pp. 3-4.]Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the office from Washington to the early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's dictatorship, he concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important measure on who is President." [At 30.] This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it remained of course, an agency of government subject to unvarying demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than most agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in charge. Each President's distinctive temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his habits, expectations, Idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast the WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire government. The executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color from the character and personality of the President. The thrust of the office, its impact on the constitutional order, therefore altered from President to President. Above all, the way each President understood it as his personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to the nation and posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened the constitutional order. [At 212- 213.]We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances. It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated, It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the Government to elect directors in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-General to do so, said:...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board" and "committee" respectively, are not charged with the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether the duties devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the authority of either of these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one among which the powers of government are divided ....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. .... xxx xxx xxxIt does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. [At 210- 211.]The Power InvolvedThe Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.] The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and ofexpression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.]To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President]. More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. Rossiter The American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security. That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been recognized by memembers of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country. What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.The Extent of ReviewUnder the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the people. There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision..The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos. As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice. The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs.HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.R E S O L U T I O NEN BANC:In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said: In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.] On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following major arguments: 1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily; and 3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit. We deny the motion for reconsideration.1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court.2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's decision. The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world." [Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers among three (3) separate branches. Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific executive authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed the difference between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the conditional language of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of execution power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in confomity with other parts of the Constitution...In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court accepted Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the federal executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the constitutional concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution are themselves exhausted by internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is implied unless there or elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).] And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which provides: Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land, There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit." Separate OpinionsCRUZ, J., dissenting: Nothing important has happened to change my vote for granting the petition. The death of Marcos has not plunged the nation into paroxysms of grief as the so-called "loyalists" had hoped. By and large, it has been met with only passing interest if not outright indifference from the people. Clearly, the discredited dictator is in death no El Cid. Marcos dead is only an unpleasant memory, not a bolt of lightning to whip the blood.This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the national security when he was already moribund that feeble threat has died with him. As the government stresses, he has been reduced to a non-person (which makes me wonder why it is still afraid of him). His cadaver is not even regarded as a symbol of this or that or whatever except by his fanatical followers. It is only a dead body waiting to be interred in this country. This is a tempest in a teapot. We have more important things to do than debating over a corpse that deserves no kinder fate than dissolution and oblivion. I say let it be brought home and buried deep and let us be done with it forever. PARAS, J., dissenting on the Motion for Reconsideration: I find no reason to deviate from the dissenting opinion I have already expressed.Firstly, the former President, although already dead, is still entitled to certain rights. It is not correct to say that a dead man, since he is no longer a human being, has ceased to have rights. For instance, our Revised Penal Code prohibits the commission of libel against a deceased individual. And even if we were to assume the non- existence anymore of his human rights what about the human rights of his widow and the other members of his family?Secondly, up to now, the alleged threats to national security have remained unproved and consequently, unpersuasive. Our Armed Forces can easily control any possible uprising or political and military destabilization. In fact, the converse appears to be nearer the truth, that is, if we do not allow the remains to come, more trouble may be expected.Thirdly, reconciliation can proceed at a much faster pace if the petition for the return is granted. To refuse the request can mean a hardening of resistance against the well-intentioned aim of the administration. Upon the other hand, to grant the petition may well soften the hearts of the oppositionists; paving the way for a united citizenry. Finally, the entire world will surely applaud our government's act of mercy. As Shakespeare once wrote "the quality of mercy is not strained." Surely, compassion is the better part of government. Remove mercy, and you remove the best reason against civil strife, which if not abated can turn our country into a mainstream of fiery dissent and in the end, as one great man has put it, the question will no longer be what is right, but what is left. PADILLA, J., dissenting: The death of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which supervened after decision in this case had been rendered, was pre-empted and foreseen in my original dissenting opinion. There I said that the first cogent and decisive proposition in this case is that "Mr. Marcos is a Filipino and, as such, entitled to return to, die and be buried in this country." I have only to add a few statements to that dissenting opinion.Respondents have succeeded in denying Mr. Marcos the first two (2) rights, i.e. to return to and die in this country, The remaining right of this Filipino that cries out for vindication at this late hour is the right to be buried in this country. Will the respondents be allowed to complete the circle of denying the constitutional and human right of Mr. Marcos to travel which, as stated in my dissenting opinion, includes the right to return to, die and be buried in this country? The answer should be in the negative if the Constitution is to still prevail; the answer should be in the negative if we are to avoid the completely indefensible act of denying a Filipino the last right to blend his mortal remains with a few square feet of earth in the treasured land of his birth.Those who would deny this Filipino the only constitutional and human right that can be accorded him now say that the constitutional and human right to be buried in this country would apply to any Filipino, except Mr. Marcos, because he was a dictator and he plundered the country. This is the most irrelevant argument that can be raised at this time. For, our democracy is built on the fundamental assumption (so we believe) that the Constitution and all its guarantees apply to all Filipinos, whether dictator or pauper, learned or ignorant, religious or agnostic as long as he is a Filipino.It is said that to accord this Filipino the right to be buried in this country would pose a serious threat to national security and public safety. What threat? As pointed out in my dissenting opinion, the second cogent and decisive proposition in this case is that respondents have not presented any "hard evidence" (factual bases) or convincing proof of such threat. "All we have are general conclusions of national security and public safety' in avoidance of a specific, demandable and enforceable constitutional and basic human right to return." Recent events have, to my mind, served to confirm the validity of such dissenting statement.If a live Marcos returning to this country did not pose a serious threat to national security, the situation cannot be any worse with a dead Marcos returning. For, a dead Marcos will return to be buried into mother earth, where there are no protests, "demos", or even dissents, where the rule that reigns, in the language of Mr. Justice Jackson in Barnette is the "unanimity of the graveyard." It is said that, while a dead Marcos has been rendered impotent to threaten national security, his supporters would pose that threat to national security. This argument is untenable as it is without merit. As I see it, Marcos' supporters pose a greater threat to peace and order, with Marcos deprived of his right to burial in this country. On the other hand, if the remains of Mr. Marcos are brought to the country and allowed the burial to which he is constitutionally and humanly entitled, Marcos' supporters would be deprived of an otherwise potent argumentso conducive to mass protests and even violencethat their Idol has been cruelly denied the right to be buried in his homeland.It is also said that Mr. Marcos, in cadaver form, has no constitutional or human rights, to speak of. This contention entirely begs the issue. In the first place, one cannot overlook that the right of Mr. Marcos, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country, is asserted not for the first time after his death. It was vigorously asserted long before his death. But, more importantly, the right of every Filipino to be buried in his country, is part of a continuing right that starts from birth and ends only on the day he is finally laid to rest in his country.This dissenting opinion does not pretend to deny the Philippine government the right to lay down conditions for the burial of Mr. Marcos in this country, but I submit that these conditions must, as a fundamental postulate, recognize the right of the man, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country NOW.The majority resolution, in effect, bans Mr. Marcos' burial in this country now. Without in any way affecting my respect and regard for my brethren and sisters in the majority, I am deeply concerned and greatly disturbed that, with their decision banning a dead Marcos from burial in this country, they have passed an opportunity to defuse a constitutional crisis that, in my humble assessment, threatens to ignite an already divided nation, Regrettably, they have ignored the constitutional dimension of the problem rooted in the ageless and finest tradition of our people for respect and deference to the dead. What predictably follows will be a continuing strife, among our people, of unending hatred, recriminations and retaliations. God save this country!My vote is for this Court to ORDER the respondents to allow the immediate return and burial in the Republic of the Philippines of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, subject to such conditions as the Philippine government may impose in the interest of peace and order. SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting: The case has curious trappings of a deja vu, the shoe being on the other foot, yet, as I stated before, I can not allow personal emotions to soften my "hardened impartiality" and deny, as a consequence, the rights of the ex-President's bereaved to bury his remains in his homeland, and for them to return from exile. As I had, then, voted to grant the petition, so do I vote to grant reconsideration.I have gone to lengths to locate in the four comers of the Constitution, by direct grant or by implication, the President's supposed "residual" power to forbid citizens from entering the motherland reiterated in the resolution of the majority. I have found none. I am not agreed, that: 3. Contrary to petitioners view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. It is a nice word game, but it is nothing else. For, if the Constitution has imposed limitations on specific powers of the President, it has, a fortiori, prescribed a diminution of executive power. The Charter says that the right may only be restricted by: (1) a court order; or (2) by fiat of law. Had the fundamental law intended a presidential imprimatur, it would have said so. It would have also completed the symmetry: judicial, congressional, and executive restraints on the right. No amount of presumed residual executive power can amend the Charter.It is well to note that the Bill of Rights stands primarily, a limitation not only against legislative encroachments on individual liberties, but more so, against presidential intrusions. And especially so, because the President is the caretaker of the military establishment that has, several times over, been unkind to part of the population it has also sworn to protect.That "[t]he threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased" (Res., 3) is the realm of conjecture, speculation, and imagination. The military has shown no hard evidence that "the return of the Marcoses" would indeed interpose a threat to national security. And apparently, the majority itself is not convinced ("has been viewed..."). That Mrs. Marcos has referred to President Corazon Aquino as an illegitimate President, does not, so I submit, reinforce alleged fears of a massive destabilization awaiting the nation. The military has said over and over that Marcos followers are not capable of successful destabilization effort. And only this morning (October 27, 1989), media reported the assurances given to foreign investors by no less than the President, of the political and economic stability of the nation, as well as the Government's capability to quell forces that menace the gains of EDSA.I have no eulogies to say on the passing of Mr. Marcos. My personal impressions, however, are beside the point. I reiterate that the President has no power to deny requests of Marcos relatives to bury Marcos in his homeland. As for the former, let them get their just deserts here too. And let the matter rest.Separate OpinionsCRUZ, J., dissenting: Nothing important has happened to change my vote for granting the petition. The death of Marcos has not plunged the nation into paroxysms of grief as the so-called "loyalists" had hoped. By and large, it has been met with only passing interest if not outright indifference from the people. Clearly, the discredited dictator is in death no El Cid. Marcos dead is only an unpleasant memory, not a bolt of lightning to whip the blood.This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the national security when he was already moribund that feeble threat has died with him. As the government stresses, he has been reduced to a non-person (which makes me wonder why it is still afraid of him). His cadaver is not even regarded as a symbol of this or that or whatever except by his fanatical followers. It is only a dead body waiting to be interred in this country. This is a tempest in a teapot. We have more important things to do than debating over a corpse that deserves no kinder fate than dissolution and oblivion. I say let it be brought home and buried deep and let us be done with it forever. PARAS, J., dissenting on the Motion for Reconsideration: I find no reason to deviate from the dissenting opinion I have already expressed.Firstly, the former President, although already dead, is still entitled to certain rights. It is not correct to say that a dead man, since he is no longer a human being, has ceased to have rights. For instance, our Revised Penal Code prohibits the commission of libel against a deceased individual. And even if we were to assume the non- existence anymore of his human rights what about the human rights of his widow and the other members of his family?Secondly, up to now, the alleged threats to national security have remained unproved and consequently, unpersuasive. Our Armed Forces can easily control any possible uprising or political and military destabilization. In fact, the converse appears to be nearer the truth, that is, if we do not allow the