Laws and Values Reflections on the Method

Laws and Values: Reflections on Method

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InstitutionsofLaw:AnEssayinLegalTheoryNeilMacCormick

Printpublicationdate:2007PrintISBN-13:9780198267911PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:January2009DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198267911.001.0001

LawsandValues:ReflectionsonMethod

NeilMacCormick

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198267911.003.0017

AbstractandKeywords

Thischapterconsidersandseekstorebutpossibleobjectionsthatmightberaisedtothemethodsadoptedinthisbookinrelationtothestudyoflawandlegalconcepts,andtothelineittakesconcerningthepossibilityofascribinganykindofscientificstatustolegalscholarship.Acaseisdevelopedthatsupportsthemethodologyofinterpretativeanalyticalinquiryintrinsictothepresentversionoftheinstitutionaltheoryoflaw.

Keywords:theoryoflaw,institutionalnormativeorder,legalpluralism,legalknowledge,methodology

16.1IntroductionTheopeningchapterofthisbookgaveashortaccountofthegroundtobecoveredinit,andabriefdescriptionofthewaytheinquirywouldproceed.Itconcluded:

Whetheraninterpretative-analyticalstudyofthepresentkindisofanyvalueisadebatablequestion.Ratherthanenterintothisdebatehere,however,itseems


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wiserfirsttopresentouraccountoflawandletreadersjudgeforthemselveswhethertheyfinditilluminatingforwhateverpurposestheybringtothereadingofit.

Thepromisethenmadewastopickupintheconcludingchapteradiscussionoftheassumptionsaboutmethod—indeedaboutmethodology—thatunderliethemainthesesofthebook.Thetimehascometoredeemthispromise.

Thediscussionoftheseassumptionshassixmainparts.Thefirstdealswithwhetheritisappropriatetostartoutwithadefinition,whetherthisentailsastronglyconventionalistapproachtolegaltheoryand,ifso,whetheronenecessarilyfallspreytothe‘semanticsting’.Thesecondtriestoshowhowanalysiscontributestotheexplanatorygoalsofexplanatorydefinition,andconfrontsthequestionwhetherthetheorythatemergesisinsomeundesirablewayanti-pluralistic.Thethirdadvancesanaccountofthevalidityoflegalknowledgeasknowledgeofinstitutionalfacts.Thefourthdevelopsthethesisthatinstitutionalfactsarealsointerpretativefacts,andrequireanaccountofinterpretationthatdrawsontheoriesaboutfocalmeaningandconstructiveinterpretation.Thefifthreturnstotheissueofthegapbetweenideallawandsocialrealityandtheneedforawarenessofthefindingsofempiricalsocialsciencesinrelationtolegalinstitutions.Thesixthrebutsapossiblechargeconcerningeclecticismorsyncretisminmethodsadvocatedintheprecedingfivesections.Thewayisthenclearforastatementoffinalconclusions—andthenforacodaaboutthepersistingself-doubtsoflegalscholarship.

16.2Definition,Conventionalism,andthe‘SemanticSting’Thestartingpointofthepresentworkwasan‘explanatorydefinition’:‘lawisinstitutionalnormativeorder’.Somemightsaythatstartinginthiswayisstartingfromagravemistake.HLAHart,forexample,warnedseveraltimesagainst(p.282) relianceondefinitionasastartingorafinishingpointforlegaltheory.Hisinaugurallecture‘DefinitionandTheoryinJurisprudence’1deprecated‘traditional’definitionpergenusetdifferentiam,thatassignsthedefinedtermtoamoregeneralclassandthenaccountsforitsspecificfeaturesseparatingitformothermembersoftheclass.Thisdoesnotwork,hesays,forconceptsthatarethemselveshighest-levelclasses(summagenerainLatin),norfortypicalnormativetermsinlegalusage,andyetotherwaysofelucidatingourtermsmightbeavailable,suchastheBenthamiteapproachofdefiningby‘paraphrasis’,explainingthewayatermisusedbyparaphrasingitratherthandefiningitdirectly.InTheConceptofLawhereturnedtothesamethemeinaslightlydifferentway.Hearguedthatoneshouldgiveanaccountofcertainveryimportantfeaturesthatarepresentinmostcasesofwhatwecalllaw,orcentralcases,andusethesetoclarifyratherthanstrictlytodefinetheconcept,allowingfortheinevitablevaguenessandopentextureofatermlike‘law’andthepresenceof‘borderlinecases’suchasinternationallaw,primitivelaw,orcustomarylaw.2Withatleastonenotableexception,3thisHartianoppositiontodefinitionseemstohaveestablishedabroadlyacceptedmethodologicalpracticeamongEnglish-speakingjuristsinthelastfiftyyears.Yetitisopentochallenge.

Thegenus‘normativeorder’4isclearlyamoregeneralcategorythan‘law’,andtodefinelawasaparticularkindofnormativeorderisthereforeanobviouspossibility.Ifthe


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differentiatingfeatureofbeing‘institutional’isalsosusceptibleofsatisfactoryexplanation,itwouldseemthatthewayforwardisperfectlyclear.Certainly,theapproachtoexplanationofnorms,normativeorder,andinstitutionalitymightbeobscure,orcircular,orinsomewayconfusedorconfusing.Ifso,thatwouldbeaflawintheexecutionoftheexplanationsatwhichapracticeofexplanatorydefinitionaims,notaproofofitsunsuitabilityasamethod.Anyway,chapters1and2abovedonotseemtobeflawedinanyofthoseways.

Theexistenceofborderlinecasesishardlyanobjection,forjustastheremaybewhatseemtobeborderlinecasesof‘law’sotoothesemayprovetobeborderlinecasesofinstitutionalnormativeorder.Opentextureisasmuchafeatureoftheexplanatorytermsasofthetermexplained.Moreover,sinceexplanatorydefinition(p.283) isalsopartlystipulative5—choosingoneparticularsenseofthetermtobedefinedandofferinganexplanationonlyofthat—itiseasytoaccountforothersensesofthetermthatrelatetothestipulatedsense,butfalloutsideit.AsnotedintheIntroduction,andasarguedinchapter14,‘law’inthesenseof‘morallaw’concernsnormativeorder,butnotinstitutionalnormativeorder.‘Law’inthesenseofscientificlawconcernssomediscernedcausalorderinnature,notanormativeorder.Agoodexplanatorydefinitionmayinthiswayhelpratherthanhinderasensitiveunderstandingofrelatedbutdifferentsensesofthetermoneseekstoexplain.Itacknowledges,butisnotboundby,thealwaysfluidconventionsaboutthemeaninganduseofconceptualtermslike‘law’foundinnaturallanguageslikeEnglish.

Orderinthesenseoforderlinessisnotparticularlyproblematicasanelementoftheexplanation.Itisonceonecomesdowntothenormortheconceptofthenormativethatabedrockisreachedofthatwhichcanbeunderstoodbyacquaintance,andpickedoutbysomethinglikeostensivedefinition,butnotmadethesubjectofafurtherlevelofexplanatorydefinition.Thisisapointtowhichweshallreturnin16.3,below.

Meanwhile,letitbeobservedhowanexplanatorydefinitionrelatestoa‘Whatis?’question.‘Whatislaw?’—‘Itisinstitutionalnormativeorder,andnowIshallexplaintoyouwhatthesetermsmean.’Ofthesetwosentencestheformerisanintelligiblequestion,andthelatteranintelligible,relevant,andpotentiallyilluminatinganswer.Iftheexplanationproceedssuccessfully,thequestionerwillhaveacquiredaninsightintotheelementsthatmakeupalegalsystem.Heorshewillhaveacquiredaneworanimprovedcapabilitytopickoutandperceivefeatures—lawandlegalsystem—thatarecommontomanystates,thoughwithmanylocaldifferences.Theywillalsobeabletounderstandthattheseelementsarealsocommontomanyorganizationsthatarenotstates,butmaybeinvariouswaysstate-like.Thisisnotaveryexaltedcapability,butiftheexplanationisarichlytexturedone,itmayyieldquitealotofnewinsightandwisdom.6

(p.284) Wemaycontrastadifferentkindof‘Whatislaw?’question.‘MrsVohashadherpregnancyterminatedbywrongfulnegligence,andseeksaremedyassertingtherighttolifeofherlostchild—whatisthelawonthat?’7Here,thequestionerseeksananswertoaconcretelegalprobleminsomepostulatedjurisdiction.Thisquestionercangetasatisfactoryansweronlyfromsomeonewhoknowsorcanfindoutrelevantconventions,


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statutes,precedents,principles,andthelike,whocanofferacompellinglygoodoratleastreasonablypersuasiveinterpretationoftheseinrelationtotheactualorhypotheticalcase,andputthatforwardastheanswertothequestion.RonaldDworkinhasarguedthatthereisnosensibleorinteresting‘Whatislaw?’questionthatisnotamoreorlessdisguisedversionofthissecond,practical,typeofquestion.8Surelythisismistaken.OnceIunderstandwhatinstitutionalnormativeorderis,Icanunderstandhownormscontainedwithinitbearuponconcretepracticalquestions.Icanthen,indeed,proceedtoraisingandansweringsuchquestions.Butthetheoreticalbackgroundtothepracticalquestionsisdifferent,andagoodanswertothetheoreticalquestionneitherentailsnorisentailedbyagoodanswertoanyoneofthemoreorlessinfinitenumberofpracticalquestionsalifeunderlawcanthrowup.9

Itisimportanttoemphasizethedifferencebetweenthepresentapproachandaconventionalistone.Doingsowillalsoenableustoavoidfallingpreytothe‘semanticsting’.10Manifestly,anydefinitionisaboutsemantics,aboutwhatthedefinedwordistakentosignify.Wheredefinitionsareproposedasamatterofconventionalsemantics,being‘lexicaldefinitions’,11theyhaveaconversation-stoppingquality.‘Whydoyoucalltheskyblue?’‘That'sjustwhatbluemeans—thereisarangeofcoloursthatitiscorrecttocallblueinEnglish,andacloudlessskyindaytimeisoneofthese.’Endofargument.Thisconversation-stopping(p.285) qualityapplieswheneveroneengages,orattemptstoengage,inrecordingandaccuratelyreportinglinguisticconventions,asdictionary-makersdo.Iftheyarerightaboutagivenword,thenthatisjustwhatthewordmeans(ormeansinoneofitssenses)andthereisnothingfurthertodiscuss.Wemightwanttostudythephenomenatowhichthetermconventionallyrefers,andtoseekabetterunderstandingofthesephenomena.Buttheconventional(or‘lexical’)definitioncannotcontributeanythingtothat,andthereasonwhythephenomenacanbecalled‘law’(orwhatever)isalreadygiven—thatiswhatthewordmeansinEnglish.

Torepeat,explanatorydefinitionsarenotinthatwayconventionalist.12Asanexplanatorydefinition,‘lawisinstitutionalnormativeorder’doesnotpurporttorestuponconventionalsemanticsortoreportsomefindingaboutthelanguage-useoftheaverageEnglishspeakeroreventheaveragelegallywell-informedEnglishspeaker.Explanatorydefinitionsarebynomeansconversation-stopping.Theystandorfallonthequalityofexplanationthatisofferedtobackthemup.Toproposesuchadefinitionistoessaythebest,mostattractiveandmostilluminatingaccountavailableofthesubjectmatterinview,andtoproposeonthataccountthatforthepurposesoftheongoingtheoreticalinquirythetermbeusedinthiswayratherthansomedifferentone.Anaudience'sabilitytocomprehendandevaluatetheexplanationdependsuponitsmembersalreadyhavingsomeconvention-based(butperhapsforanygivenpersonmoreorlessidiosyncratic)pre-understandingofthetermdefined.Foreachsuchperson,theissueiswhethertheexplanatorydefinitionandtheback-upexplanationdoofferanenriched,andperhapssomewhataltered,understandingcomparedwithher/hisstartingpoint,orpre-understanding.Suchanenhancedunderstandingisnotthesameasanenhancedcapabilityforinsightful,skilful,andpersuasiveworkinansweringpracticalquestionswithinthelegaldomain,thoughitisnotlikelythatunderstandingandskillwillprovetobe


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completelyindependentofeachother.

16.3AnalyticalExplanationandLegalPluralismThemethodofexplanationusedinthisbookhasbeenananalyticalone.Sincelawissupposedtobeakindof‘normativeorder’,theexplanationwegiveofitmustfirstexplaintheelementsofnormativeorder.Theseelementsarethenormswhoseobservance(tosomeextent)rendersinterpersonalconducttosomeextentorderly.Next,itmustproceedtoanexplanationofinstitutionsandinstitutionalization,thusbuildinguptheconcept‘institutionalnormativeorder’.Allthiswouldfailasanexplanationiftheunderlyingideaofthe‘norm’wereunintelligible,forsothenwouldbe‘normativeorder’.‘Norm’isheretheproblematicterm,not‘order’asdistinctfrom‘disorder’.Wedoindeedconfrontinthissomethingthatisusedin(p.286) explanationbutthatcannotitselfbeexplainedinthesameway.Chapter1facedthatproblembyinvitingthereadertoreflectuponapracticewithwhichsheorheisassumedtobefamiliarinsomecontextoranotherofeverydaylife.Thepracticewasthatofqueuingatsomepointofservice,andwaitingtobeservedonthe‘firstcome,firstserved’basis.Thisisamatterofmutualco-ordinationthatinitsownnarrowcompassmakesinteractionmoreorderly,lessthreateningorchaoticthanitmightotherwisebe.

Humanbeingsarethrough-and-throughnorm-users,capableofachievingakindofvoluntaryorderamongthemselvesbycommonobservanceofcommonnorms.Theyarealsocapableofunderstandingthisandreflectinguponthewaytheydothis.Thebestexplanationthatcanbeofferedistobringasufficientlyvividexampleintotheconsciousnessofone'sreadersorhearers,sothattheycanconfirmfromtheirownexperiencethisspecialaspectofuniversalhumanexperience.Anyonewhohasreadthisbookuptothepresentpointmustatleastbeconsciousofbeingabletoreadabookandappraiseanargument.Letsuchapersonreflectalsoonthenormsthatstructurelanguage,orthecriticalreadingofatext,aswellasonthequeue.

DavidHumefamouslyintroducedintophilosophicaldiscussionthedistinctionbetween‘is’and‘ought’,andthedifficultyofexplainingjustwhatthedifferenceis.13ThomasReidacknowledgedthepoint,butdeclaredroundlythatanypersonwhounderstandstheEnglishlanguagestandsinnoneedofanexplanationhowtousetheword‘ought’,orindeedtheword‘is’.Itisadistinctionimmediatelyobvioustous.14Certainly,thisseemssowhenweconsiderpracticalexampleslikequeuingorspeaking.Onecanbringtogetheranassemblageofremindersthatonehopeswilldrawtoanother'sattentionthatofwhichshe/heisalreadyaware,inwhatmaynotyetbeanarticulateway.Sofarasconcernsnorms,Iofferthestill-puzzledreadernothingbetterthanafurtherreadingofchapter1,consideredyetmoreattentivelythanbefore.

Whatthenofinstitutionalization?This,accordingtothesuggestioninchapter2,occurswheneverweencounteratwo-ormoretiernormativepractice.Notmerelyisthereaqueue,butthereisasystemformanagingthequeue(forexample,thenumberedticket-roll)andtherearequeuemanagerswhoensurethatcustomersgetservedintheirproperturnaccordingtorulesadoptedaboutthemanagedqueue.Theexistenceofnormsauthoritativelyissuedasrulesdependsonthiskindoftieredpractice,andinthis


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settingwethereforefindnorm-giversaswellasnorm-users.Nevertheless,themostbasicunderstandingofnormsoughttobein(p.287) termsofthenorm-user,forwecanconceiveofmanycontextsofnorm-usewithoutthepresenceofanynorm-givingauthority,buttheconverseisinconceivable—norm-giverswithoutnorm-users.HansKelsen,aftertacklingheroicallythe‘greatmystery’oftheought,15increasinglyfellawayfromhisinitialinsightandinhislaterworksoughttoexplainnormsasspeciesofimperatives,16seekingtore-openoneofthegreatblindalleysinthehistoryofpracticalphilosophygenerallyandlegalphilosophymoreparticularly.Intheworkhedidaboutthe‘internalaspect’ofrule-governedconduct,HLAHartcontributedimmeasurablytoauser-orientedunderstandingofnorms.Perhapshislaterworkon‘peremptoryreasons’17representedaturning-awayfromhisownbestinsights,butnevertotheextentofKelsen'sapostasyonthispoint.

Anyway,institutionalizationcanbeviewedonthesmallscaleoronthegrandscale,asgrand,forexample,asinthecaseofastate'sconstitutionorthefoundingtreatyorcharterofagreatinternationalorsupranationalorganization.Thereisnoneedtorepeatthedetailofchapter3here.Whatisworthstressing,however,isthecentralplaceheldbytheconstitutionastheadoptedor,insomefewcasessuchasthatoftheUnitedKingdom,evolved,18setofframeworknormsthatdefineandempowerthevariousinstitutionalagenciesofstate,andsetlimitsonthepowerstheycanexercise.Thisisnota‘ruleofrecognition’,thoughcourtsempoweredbyaconstitutionmayeachbeenvisagedasworkingaccordingtosomecriteriasettlingwhatrulesandprinciplestheyshouldapplyaslaw.Aconstitutionisacompendiouslyinstituting-and-empoweringsetofinterlockingnorms,usuallyintheformofexplicitrulesbackedupbyalwayscontestableideologicalunderpinningsofthekindthatjudgesandjuristsarticulateintheformof‘constitutionalprinciples’or‘fundamentalvaluesoftheconstitution’.

Whyaresomeformallyadoptedconstitutionsactuallyfunctionalones?Whatmakesconstitutionswork,whentheydowork?Obviously,whatmakesthemworkisthewillofwhicheverpeopleconceivetheconstitutiontobetheirconstitution,whenthereareenoughsuchpeople,sufficientlyagreed(thoughcertainlyneverunanimous)abouttheideologicalunderpinnings.Whattheyagreeon,howeverarticulatelyortacitly,isacommonnormthattheyoughttorespecttheconstitutionthusunderpinned,andthatanyonepurportingtoexercisepublicpowermustdosoonlyinthetermspermittedbytheconstitution.Self-awaresharingofsuchanorm(notnecessarilymadeexplicitatall,orinthesametermsbyallparticipants)amountstoacustom(liketheinarticulatequeuingnormconsideredinchapter1).Thecustomcanbeformulatedinsomesuchtermsas:‘everyoneinstateSoughttoco-operateinensuringthestatefunctionsintermsof(p.288) constitutionCaccordingtoestablishedprinciples’,andonecanveryproperlycallthisabasicnorm.Kelsen,whobecameboggeddowninthe‘actofwill’approachtoexplainingnorms,arguedthatcustomitselfcanbenorm-creatingonlyifitisauthorizedbysomenorm.19Adoptionofthenorm-user'sperspectiveasfundamentaltotherealityofnormsandthenormativepurgesthiserror.Italsomakesitclearthatalthoughabasicnormisindeedpresupposedinthecaseofanyworkingconstitution,itisnotamerepresupposition.Itisthecontentofalivingcustom,aconventionthatcanbearticulatedas


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anexplicitnorm.

Thesereflectionsonconstitutionandbasicnormmaygiverisetoafreshcriticism.Thetheoryputforwardmightbecharacterizedasanti-pluralist,beinghopelesslynarrowlyfocusedonthewriter'sownstate-law,orsub-state-law,takeninjuxtapositionwithcloselysimilarformsoflawfromotherstatesinthesame‘western’legaltradition?20IsthisjustanotherversionofwhatWilliamTwininghasjustlycastigatedasthe‘countryandwestern’approachtojurisprudence?Shouldonenot,atatimeofacknowledgedglobalizationoflegalandeconomicactivity,entertainabroaderpicture?Shouldonecontinuetotreatstatesasthenaturalandnecessaryfocusofconcernforlawyers,andignorethemanyotherformsofnormativeorderingwhicharealiveintheworldtoday?Itwouldbedistressingifsuchcriticismswerefoundtobejust,forthepresentworkbelongstoaserieson‘Law,State,andPracticalReason’whichaims(amongotherthings)tocontributetoarecognitionoftheextenttowhichlegalorderhasshifted‘beyondthesovereignstate’.Inthiswayitseekstocontributetothetideofcontemporaryopinioninfavouroflegalpluralism,nottoobstructit.21Onepointwhichhasbeenrepeatedthroughoutthisbookisthatlawasinstitutionalnormativeordercanbefoundinmanycontextsotherthanthatofeachsinglestate.Thisisso,bothbecauseofthewayinternationalandtransnationalorganizationshavedevelopedlawbeyondstateboundaries,andbecausemanyoftheorganizationsactiveincivilsocietyhavetheirowninternalinstitutionalordering.Statesmayindeedclaimprimacyoversuchorganizations(eg,churches,internationalsportingassociations),buttheorganizationsneednotinturn,andsometimesdonot,acknowledgethatprimacyintheforminwhichitisassertedbyoneoranotherstate.Statesrepresentoneformofinstitutionalnormativeorderarrangedaroundandthroughatypicalrangeofinstitutionsofthekinddiscussedinchapter3.Empiresancientandmodern,feudalkingdoms,absolutemonarchies,andtribalsocietiesdidnothavethesameinstitutionalframework,butthatisnottosaytheyhadno(p.289) institutionalframework,andnoinstitutionalnormativeorder.Thesamegoesforcontemporarytheocraticstates.

Lawasinstitutionalnormativeordercomeswithmanyvariationsofformandcontent.Moreover,ashasbeensaidrepeatedly,noadvocacyishereofferedinfavourofabandoningtheuseoftheword‘law’incontextsofnon-institutionalordering,orindeed(inthecaseofscientificlaws)non-normativeordering.Theauthorofaworkofjurisprudencecannot,andshouldnottryto,placesomekindofbanontherichnessandcreativeambiguityofafluidandalwaysevolvingnaturallanguagelikeEnglish.Thereareinterestinganalogiesaswellastraceabledifferencesbetweendifferentkindsof‘law’recognizedbothineverydayspeechandinmoretechnicalliterature.

Itremainsthecase,however,thatintheworldthatwecurrentlyinhabitstateshaveaveryprominentroleinthearticulationandadministrationofpublicforce.Enforceablelawandthusenforceablerightstendthereforetobethosethatbelongto,orarerecognizedandinsomewayadoptedby,statetribunalsandagencies.Thismeansthatstate-lawstillmattersveryacutelytoverymanypeopleandisnaturallyacentralpointofattentionformostpeoplewhoengageinprofessionalpracticeofthelaw.Thatjustifiestheapproach


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takenhere,notofarrogatingtheterm‘law’ortheconceptoflawsolelytothemasteryofonestateorallstates,butofpresentingatheoryinwhichthecomparativepracticalimportanceofstatelawcanbeseenforwhatitis.

16.4LegalKnowledgeandInstitutionalFactsThisbookhasatseveralpointsacknowledgedthepowerofNiklasLuhmann'ssystem-theoreticalthesisthatanysystemofcommunicationandcommunicativeactionoperateswithsomefundamentalbinarydistinctionthatitusesinallitsoperations.Theinstitutionaltheoryadvancedhereproposesthedistinctionbetweenrightandwrong,morestrictly,betweenwrongandnot-wrong,asthefundamentaloneinanormativeorder.Indevelopedlaw,ofcourse,thisfurtherbifurcatesbetweencriminalwrongsthatarepunishableandthevariousformsofcivillywrongfulconductthatcanleadtotheimpositionofcivilremediesofvarioussorts.Moreover,inthecontextoftwo-ormoretierinstitutionalorder,therearepowersaswellasrightsandwrongs.Thisintroducesthevalid/invalidoppositionasadistinctdimensionofnormativejudgment.

‘Wrong’enablesustodefine‘duty’,thedutytorefrainfromanywrongfulactandtodoeachthingthatitiswrongnottodo.Theconceptofaduty'sbeingingivencircumstancesowedtoanotherperson,equivalenttotheideathatitwouldbeawrongtothatpersontobreachthisduty,enablesustounderstand‘passiverights’.Sinceonemaydowhatisnotwrong,theideaofanactiverightorlibertycanbepresentedbysimplenegationof‘duty’.Allthispresupposesthatwecanidentifythebearersofrightsandduties,potentialexercisersofpowers,those(p.290) whomthelawclotheswithpersonality,andendowswithvariouscapacitiesaccordingtovariouskindsandconditionsofpersons.Lawcanalsodefinewhatare‘things’foritspurposesandregulateextensivelyrightstothings,rightsoverthem,andrightsinthem.Fromallthisweconstructtheconceptsofpropertyandownership,andrelatedideas.

Butdowe‘have’rights,orduties,orpowersreally?Whatisgoingonwhenweascribetopersonsduties,rights,liberties,immunities,powers,andthelike?Ascriptionsofsuchpositionsorrelations(orrelationalattributes)topersonsexpressjudgmentsoffact—thatis,of‘institutionalfact’asdefinedattheverybeginningofthebook.Each‘person’issomekindofindividualorcollectiveentitywhichweconsidertosatisfytheconditionsthelawlaysdownforbeingapersonofsomerelevantstatus.Eachtimeweascribetosomesuchbeingsomelegalposition,orsomelegalrelationship(eg,anobligation)withanotherperson,orsomemorecomplexproprietaryrelationshipinvolvingbothascertainedpersonsandascertained‘things’,weareinterpretingandapplyingrelevantnorms.Wearealsorelyingonanunderstandingofthefactualsituationthatisinformedbyourinterpretationofthenorms.

Thusdoweansweroneofthebasicquestionsofthisbook,namely,thequestionwhetherlegalknowledgeispossibleandwhetherlawschoolshaveagenuinerighttoaplaceingreatinstitutionsoflearningandscience.Theansweris‘Yes’inbothcases.Legalknowledgeresultsfrominterpretativeinquiryintolawasaconceptualcategoryandintodifferentdepartmentsandsub-departmentsoflaw.Theseincludepubliclaw(includingEuropeaninstitutionallaw,stateconstitutionallaw,regionalconstitutionallaw,local


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governmentlaw,andadministrativelaw),criminallaw(boththegeneralpartandthelawsrelativetoparticularkindsofcrime,andthelawoncriminalevidenceandprocedure),privatelaw(includingthelawofpersons,thelawofsuccession,thelawofobligations—tort,contract,andrestitution—thelawofproperty,thelawoftrusts,companylawandcommerciallaw,aswellascivilevidenceandprocedure).Chapters10to13havealreadyindicatedinanabstractandgeneral-theoreticalwaythecharacteroftheknowledgedevelopedinthesedomains.

RonaldDworkinofferedachallengetoanalyticaljurisprudenceinhisHartlectureof2001—‘ifthisisdescriptive,ofwhatisitadescription,andinwhatway?’22Statementsaboutinstitutionallaw,orstatementsoflawofferedinajudicialorlaw-advisingorlegal-doctrinalcontext,describethestateanditsinstitutionsinsomespecificplace—orsomeothernon-stateinstitutionalentityaccordingtocontext.AdescriptionofFrenchlaw,ifaccurate,tellsushowthingscurrentlystandinFranceinrespectofwhateverlegalsubject-matterwearediscussing.Thesamegoes,mutatismutandis,foradescriptionofScotslaw(Scotlandbeinga(p.291) sub-statepolity),ofEUlaw(theEuropeanUnionbeingatrans-statalpolityorcommonwealth).OrforadescriptionofthecanonlawoftheRomanCatholicChurch(theChurchbeinganon-statereligiousorganization).

ThisneitheramountstonordependsonatheoryaboutlanguageuseinFrenchorEnglishorChurchLatinorwhatever.Theinstitutionaltheoryoflawisonethatshowshowitispossibletodescribeaccuratelyorconvincinglyinstitutionalfactsthatbelonginthecontextoftherelevantstateorotherpolityororganization.Itisatheorythatcannotbeadvancedwithoutsomeseriousassessmentofthevaluestowhichinstitutionsofthiskindareoriented,andthismustindeedinvolveconsiderationofthebestpossiblerepresentationofthesevaluesforthecontextthatisassumed.Buthere‘law’isnottheonlyinterpretativeconceptinissue.Lawisasupremepracticalcategoryforthoseengagedinlegaldecision-makingoradvocacy.Butscholarship(or‘science’insomecultures)isthesupremepracticalcategoryforthoseengagedindoctrinalorjurisprudentialstudyandinadvancinganaccountofitsepistemologicalfoundations.23Whileitistruethatthevaluesimplicitinlawhaveanecessaryandpropermotivatingandjustifyingforceforjudgesandadvocates,theidealofobjectivelyunderstandingthesubject-matterofabranchofscholarlyorscientificstudysupremelyguidesandjustifiesgoodscholarship.Ajudge'svocationistojusticeinconcretecases,ascholar'sistounderstanding.

Theunderstandingofapracticalcategorylikelawisvalue-laden,forreasonsthathaveyettobethoroughlyexplored.Toconstructorrationallyreconstructanaccountofsomebranchoflawinsomejurisdiction,onemustofcourseexpoundthevalue-elementsessentialtothatbodyoflaw,andonemustindicatewhatarethepossibilitiesfordevelopingnewargumentsthatwouldfurtherdevelopthesevalues.Onemustbecandidaboutdeficienciesandaboutthepossibilityoftheirameliorationorrectification.Thetruthaboutthelawconcerningrestitution,orjudicialreviewofadministrativeaction,orcorporatecriminalliability,totakebutasmallrandomsetofexamples,cannotbedisclosedsimplybyactingasananimatedindextothelawreportsorthestatutebook,


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andbycopyingoutrelevanttexts.Onehastoelucidateessentialconceptsinamannercompatiblewith,butfarmorefine-grainedthan,thatindicatedinpart3ofthepresentwork.Onehastoconsiderstatutesandpreparatorymaterials—reportsofcommissionsorparliamentarycommittees,explanatorymemorandabygovernmentministries,eventhetextsoflegislativedebates.Onehastoconsiderjudicialdecisionsandthedictaofjudgesexpoundingprinciplesandvaluestheyconsidertobeessentialinthejustificationsofferedfortheirdecisions.Onehasto,oratleastonemay,seektoprovideamoresympatheticorcomprehensiverationaleforthelegalmaterialsdevelopedsofarinthisdomain.Onemaycertainlydrawattentiontocomparativematerialsfromotherlegalsystemsthatexpress,orperhapsbetterexpress,aconvincingviewoftheunderlyingrationalityforthematterinhand.Relevantlessonsmayalsobederivedfromlegalhistory.Giventhisrichrangeofmaterials,a(p.292) rationalreconstructionyieldsacriticalaccountofthegoverningrulesinthelightoftheprinciplesandvalueswhichunderpinthem.24Thismayindicatethescopeforfutureinterpretationsoflawthatwillrectifyanomaliesincurrentunderstanding,includingcurrentjudicialpractice.Thisiscertainlyworkthatcallsforapplicationofcreativeintelligence,developingpersuasiveconceptionsoftheconceptsdeployedinthegivenbranchoflaw.Nevertheless,itstilldemandsadegreeofdetachment.

Thusthefruitsofscholarlyinquiriesintolawareknowledgeoflegalnorms(regulationsrules,principles,etc)andlegalrelations,andthevaluestowhichtheyareoriented,bothingeneralandinparticular.Suchknowledgerelatestosomestateorpolityororganization.Legalnorms,likenormsofallkinds,arewhatOtaWeinbergerclassesas‘thought-objects’,25notitemsamongthephysicalfurnitureoftheuniverse.TheybelonginwhatKarlPopperdesignatedas‘WorldIII’.26Thatis,theyhaverealexistencethoughtheyarenotpartofthematerialworldthatisapprehendedthroughnaturalsciencessuchasphysics,chemistry,physiology,andthelike.Theyexistaselementsofinter-subjectivemeaningsavailabletohumanunderstandingthroughinterpretation.Theyarenotpartofthepsychicstateofanyparticularpersonatanygiventime.Noraretheythephysicalsubstratumwhichisnecessarilyusedforstorageofthatwhichisinterpreted.Shakespeare'splayHamletisnotidenticalwithanyparticularbookinwhichitisprinted,norisIsaacNewton'sPrincipiaorAlbertEinstein'sGeneralTheoryofRelativity.Eachoftheseexists(asaplay,asascientificexpositionofaphysicaltheory)inthesamewaywhetherornotanyoneisatagivenmomentreadingorthinkingaboutit,orpresentingaproductionoftheplayordoinganexperimenttoillustratethetheory.ThesamegoesfortheFinanceAct1953,orforthecasereportedatpage37oftheLawReports,AppealCasesfor1977.Thestatuteandthelawreportarenotidenticalwithanyofthebooksinwhichtheyarerecorded,andexistwhetherornotanyoneisthinkingaboutthemoractingasrequiredorauthorizedbythem,orapplyingtheprecedentinacurrentcase.Theydonotoccupyanysegmentofspace,buttheyhaveacontinuousexistenceintime,orhadsuchanexistence,inthecase,say,ofanow-repealedstatuteoranoverruledprecedent.

Howcansuchfigmentsthenbeconsideredreal?Onepartoftheansweristoreflectonchangesinthephysicalworld,eventsthatreallyoccur,andthatareexplicableonlyon


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accountofepisodesinwhichsomeperson'sactingcanbe(p.293) imputedtothefollowingofanorm,orthepresentingofaplay,orthecarrying-outofanexperimenttotestatheory.Withoutreferencetothe‘WorldIII’object,thereasonfortheoccurrence,indeedthecharacteroftheoccurrence,ofthe‘WorldI’eventwouldbewhollyunintelligible.

Implicitinalltheforegoingisthisimportanttruth:institutionalfactsarealsointerpretativefacts.27Assertionsoftheminindividualcasesandingeneralcanbecontroversial,andresolutionofcontroversycallsforjudgmentsabouttheunderlyingvaluestowhichlegalnorms—rulesandprinciples—giveconcreteform.Thuswecometothepointatwhichitisnecessarytoattendtothekindofinterpretationthatisatstakewhenweseektounderstandthelegalsignificanceoffactsandevents,interpretingthembyreferencetolawassomekindof‘institutionalfact’.

16.5Law,State,CivilSociety—‘FocalMeaning’and‘ConstructiveInterpretation’Part3ofthisbookrepresentsthemomentofsynthesis,followingtheanalyticalworkdoneinparts1and2.There,indiscussinglaw,state,andcivilsociety,Isuggestedthatanaccountoflaw,andinparticularadiscussionofanybranchoflawsuchaspubliclaw,criminallaw,orprivatelawhastobecastintermsofcertainunderlyingvalues.Astatewhoseofficialsconductaffairswithaviewtothegeneralgoodratherthantheirprivatebenefitisofrealvalue.Oneinwhichtherearefunctioningchecksandbalancesamongthosewhoexercisepublicpowersisabletosecuretheruleoflawasaconditionofhumanliberty.Publiclawbecomesintelligibleonlyfromthisperspective.Respectforinstitutionalizedhumanrightsisaconditionofjusticeamongpersons,thoughitisnotallthatisrequiredinordertoachievejusticewithinoneoranotherreasonableconceptionofthatvirtue.Constitutionalorotherentrenchmentoffundamentalrightsbecomesfullyintelligibleonlyfromthisperspective.Aneffectiveandproperlyfunctioningsystemofcriminallawandcriminaljusticeisessentialforthatrelativesecurityofmutualexpectationswhichisaconditionofthecivilityofcivilsociety.Criminallawbecomesfullyintelligibleonlyfromthisperspective.Privatelawbothsecuresthebasesofprivateandfamilylife,andmakespossibleanexchange-basedmarketeconomy.Privatelawbecomesfullyintelligibleonlyfromthisperspective.

Publiclawschemesaimedatachievingdistributivejusticethroughthetaxsystemandregulatoryregimesthatestablishmalaprohibitadeterminetheextenttowhichamarketeconomycanbecharacterizedasa‘socialmarketeconomy’.Much(p.294) ofpoliticaldebateandconflictconcernstheissueofsocialordistributivejustice,andhowfaritisproperorwisetosuperimposepubliclyenforcedconditionsonwhateverobligationscitizensfreelycontractamongthemselves.Inabroadsenseitmightberighttoclaim,asdidLordStairinoneofthemostimpressiveinstitutionalessaysoftheearlymodernlaw,thatthe‘threeprinciplesofpositivelaw[are]society,propertyandcommerce’.28Butweneedtoobservethatthebalancebetweenthedemandsofsociety(socialsolidarity)andthoseofcommerce(commercialliberty)isalwayscontested,sothepropertyregimethatemergesiscolouredbythebalancethusstruck—andthesamegoesforthelawofobligations.Allmarketeconomiesarealsosocial;buttheyarenotallsotothesame


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extent.

Ifallthatiscorrect,acoherentaccountofthenatureoflaw,andacoherentaccountofthecharacterofanymodernlegalsystem,havetotakeseriouslytheverygeneralvaluesthatareinherentinthecharacterofthelegalenterprise.Thismay,however,seemtocallinquestionthepretensionofthelegalscholarorlegalphilosophertobedevelopingabodyofobjectiveknowledge.Objectiveknowledge,itmaybeclaimed,hastobevalue-free,becauseallvaluesareanexpressionofhumansubjectivity.Sinceanyjurist'svaluesaresubjective,theorientationofhisorheraccountoflawtocertainvaluesmustdefeatanyclaimtoobjectivityinthejurist'soutput.

Suchachallengeneedstobemethead-on,foritappliestothestudyofanyhumanactivityorinstitutioninsidethelaworoutsideit.Economicsonlymakessenseonthebasisofassumptionsaboutrationalityinthepursuitofvalue.Rationalityisthenavalue,evenifeconomistsarecontenttotreattheothervaluesthatrationalpeoplepursueasexpressiblesimplyintermsofthepreferencestheyhappentohave.Artisnotexplicablesimplyintermsofobjectsthathappentobegatheredininstitutionsthatwecallartgalleries,norareartistssimplythosewhoconcernthemselveswithproducingobjectsofthatkind.Artisanexpressionofaestheticvalue,andonlybyreflectingonwhatisormightreasonablybepresentedasaestheticvaluecanonegetthepointofart.Educationisnotjustwhateversystemofdrillingandlesson-impartinghappenstogoonin‘schools’or‘universities’,itisessentiallyaboutthedevelopmentandtransmissionofknowledgeandunderstandingofthehumanandnaturalworld,suchknowledgeandunderstandingbeingofvaluetohumans.Goodeducationimpartsitsuccessfully,badteachingfallsshortofachievingthis.Wecannotknowwhatcountsasacar,orapainting,orageographylessonexceptintermsofwhatwouldbeagood,well-functioning,instanceoftheobjectofourinquiry.If‘intelligentdesign’isanexampleofareasonablytenablescientificpositionthatoffersaseriousapproachtounderstandingthelifesciences,thenitcanproperlybeincludedinaschoolsciencesyllabus.Ifitisabogusscience,wrappingupdogmatictheologyintheappearanceofaseriousrivaltoDarwinianevolutionism,itcouldproperlybethesubjectofaclassinthe(p.295) historyofideasbutcouldnotbeproperlyincludedinasciencesyllabusinarespectableschooloruniversity.Wecannotdecidewhichitiswithoutmakingavaluejudgment,andofferingreasonsforit.29Differentpeoplemaydisagree,eveningoodfaith,abouttheweightofthesereasons,butitdoesnotfollowthatthereisnothingtochoosebetweenthem.

ThisrepresentationofthecharacterofexplanationandunderstandinginthehumansocialrealmisvastlyindebtedtotheworkofJohnFinnis,whointurnacknowledgedadebttoMaxWeber.30ExplanationofconceptualtermshastogoforwardonthebasisofwhatFinniscallstheir‘focalmeaning’.Anyhumanactivityorenterprisemanifestsitselfinmanyformsandinstances.Someseemclearerormorecentral,more‘focal’examplesoftheactivityorenterprisethanothers.Thisisbecausesomeinstancesbetterexemplifythevaluestowhichtheenterpriseisproperlyconsideredtobeoriented.ThereisatleastananalogyofthistobefoundinRonaldDworkin'sdeploymentoftheideaof‘interpretiveconcepts’.31Theseareconceptsthatcannotbeputintooperationsavebyinvokingsome


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valueorvalueswhichenableustousetheminawaythatilluminatesormakesintelligiblesomefeatureofoursocialandpoliticalworld.Itfollows,accordingtoDworkin,thatonlythetheorythatcanproducethemostsatisfactoryorattractiveholisticaccountofallthatisofrealvaluetohumanbeingscanfinallyachievetrueknowledgeofthesocialworld.32Objectivitydependsonvaluesandongivingthebestandmostcoherentaccountofthese.Elucidationofvaluesisnottheantithesisofobjectivity,butitsprecondition.Indeed,objectivityitselfmattersonlyasavalueinthecontextofsomepursuitofunderstandingandtruth.

TodefendtheapproachtoexplanationtakeninthisbookrequiresacceptanceoftheelementssharedbyDworkinandFinnis,despitemuchthatdividesotherpartsoftheirtheoreticalapproaches.Themethodologyofthekindofexplanationofferedherehastobeinterpretativeorhermeneutic.Thatis,itmustseektounderstandthepracticesandinstitutionsofhumanbeingsintermsofwhatmakesthemintelligibleandworthwhile,oratleastonbalanceworthwhile,totheirhumanparticipants.33Itdoesnotfollowthatadegreeofdetachmentshouldnot(p.296) alsobesoughtbythesocialscientist,or(inthepresentcase)thejurist.34Tounderstandlawisnotmerelytostudycloselyanddeeplywhatlawexistsinanyonecountryortradition.Recognitionthatstates,andnotonlystates,normallyhavelawmakesdifferentstate-societiesmutuallyintelligible.Thisamountstothediscoveryorthesimpleawarenessthattheyeachrealizeacertaindegreeofnormativeorderupheldorsupervisedinvariouswaysbylegalinstitutionsthatarethesupremegoverninginstitutionsofthestate.Thestatesinquestionbelongtothesamegenusoflaw-stateseventhoughtheymayhaveverydifferentmodesofinstitutionalorganizationand(certainlyinthedetails)differencesinthenormativecontentoftheirlegalrulesandprinciples.FrenchlawisemphaticallynotEnglishlawnorAmericanlaw,SwedishisnotGermanandsoonandsoon.Frenchlawseparatespublicfromprivatelawinaquitedistinctivewayandwithconsequencesthathavehistoricallyledsomecommentatorsfromothertraditionstodoubtwhether‘droitadministratif’reallymeritstheappellation‘law’atall35—yetitobviouslydoes,andcanquiteproperlybetranslatedas‘administrativelaw’.SupportersoftheFrenchorItalianconceptionofseparationofpowersfindunacceptabletheviewthatjudgescanthroughtheirprecedentseffectivelymakelaw,andcannotregardexecutiverule-makingpowersdelegatedbythelegislatureasinvolving‘legislation’properlyso-called.Nevertheless,tosaythatthedifferentcountrieswehavementioneddonotallhavelawinthesamesenseaseachotherwouldbeasmisleadingastosaythatEnglish,Italian,Swedish,andFrencharenotalllanguagesinthesamesenseoftheterm‘language’notwithstandingthedifferencesofvocabulary,inflection,syntax,etcthatdifferentiatethemaslanguages.36

ThisisonereasonwhyweshoulddoubtatleastoneoftheimplicationsDworkinderivesfromhisinterpretationofthecharacterof‘interpretive’concepts.Ininterpretinglaw(orininterpretingaShakespeareplay),saysDworkin,ourtaskistomakeitthebestofitskindthatitcanpossiblybe.37ButsurelyIdonothavetobethinkinghowtomakeFrenchlawbeseeninthebestpossiblelightwhen(p.297) IamseeingthatFrancereallyhaslawthatisinterestingandperhapsfruitfullycomparablewithScots,orAmerican,orEnglishlaw.SomeonemightsharesomeoftheattitudesDiceybroughtto


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bearinhiscritiqueofdroitadministratifwithoutbeingeventemptedtoconcludethatthisisanythingotherthanakindof‘law’,andanimportantpartofthelawoftheFrenchRepublic.Usedcomparativelyandasatoolforunderstandingcommonelementsamongdifferentstates,lawcanindeedonlybeunderstoodintermsoftheorientationofthoseengagedinlaw-worktowardspeace,justice,andrelatedvalues,albeitoftenineptlyandsometimeswithdeeplyundesirableside-effects.Buttherecanandshouldbenoassumptionforthispurposethatourdutyistodepictanyparticularlegalorderinthebestlightpossible,showinghowitcanbestrealizejusticewithleastadverseside-effects.

Thatisindeedasignificantelementinpracticallaw-applyingactivitywithinthesystem,butitisnotapartoftheconceptoflawitself.Becauselawimplicatesthekindofvaluesitimplicates,itguidesinaparticulardirectionthepracticalapplicationoflegalrulesandtheirinterpretationforthepurposesofapplication.Butthatfollowsfrom,ratherthanconstituting,themeaningoftheterm‘law’.Asinstitutionalnormativeorder,lawisanomnipresentfeatureofstatesandofsub-andsuper-orinter-statepolities.Ourunderstandingofithastobeintermsofitsfunctionalitytowardscertainvalues.Thishas,however,tobequalifiedwithacertaingrimrealismabouttheomnipresentpossibilityoffailure,andthehighlikelihoodthatanyrealsystemwillhaveseriousblemishesjudgedinthelightoftheveryvalueswhicharethefinalcausesofinstitutionalnormativeorder.38Someworkoflegalinterpretationcanbeputforwardwithaviewtoexhibitinginaruthlesslyclearwaywhataretheincoherencesandinjusticesinacurrentbodyoflaw,hopingtherebytobringaboutrecognitionofdefectsandpoliticalpressureforreforms.39

Moreover,mostpeopleengagedwiththelawaremercenaries.Lawyers,judges,andpoliceandprisonofficersworkforpayment—andsodolawprofessors.Inworkingwithlaw,weworkwiththatwhichhasanin-builtvalue-orientationofthekinddescribedhere.Butwedonotdosoonlyforthesakeofthesevalues.Itisaperversionofthevocationtolawifapersonsoemployedpursuespersonalgainatthecostofjustice,peace,andthelike,asdistinctfromacceptinglegitimatepaymentforfaithfullyplayinghisorherpartintheadministration,enforcement,orstudyofthelaw.Thatsuchperversionexistsinsomemeasurewhereverlawispractised,enforced,andstudiedweneednotdoubtforamoment.Itisnot(p.298) evincedinthecaseofalawyerwho,asadvocate,presentsher/hisclient'scaseinthebestpossiblelight,evenwhentheadvocate'sprivateopinionisthatactuallytheotherside'scaseisthestronger—foritisthejudge'sroletodecidethat,nottheadvocate's.

16.6‘MindtheGap!’—AgainPredictably,therewillbereadersofthisbookwhowillconsiderthattheaccountoflawasinstitutionalnormativeorderisbuiltaroundanaïveandundulyoptimisticsetofvalues.Thesecontraststartlinglywiththestateoftherealworldandtherealsocialcircumstancesinwhichlegalsystemsaretobefound.Confrontingthesqualorandmiseryofprisonlife,theglaringinequalitiesoflifeincontemporarycitieseveninwealthycountries,thecynicismandcallousnessexhibitedbymanyofficials,thebrutishindifferencetocivilizedvaluesexhibitedbymanyyoungpeoplehighondrinkordrugs,


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howdareoneutterplatitudesaboutcriminallawsecuringthecivilityofcivilsociety?Givenhugeandgrowinginequalitiesofincomeandwealthbetweenthecapitalisteliteandtherest,alikeinrichandpoorcountries,whygoonaboutlawasasystemgearedtojustice,whetherdistributivejusticeviapubliclaworcorrectivejusticeviaprivatelaw?AsRogerCotterrellhasargued,philosophicaljuristsneedtogetoutoftheirarmchairsoccasionallyandtakealookattherealworkingofreallegalinstitutionsinactualpresentsocieties.40Attheveryleast,theyneedtotakemoreseriouslythefindingsofthosewhohavepursuedempiricalsociologyoflawinthisway.Legalsystemsandlegalpracticesareperhapsasoftencausesofrealsufferingandindeedrealinjusticeasthereverse.Whyprivilegejusticeasaspecialvirtueoflaw,ifreallawisoftenwantinginjustice?

Yetanotheranalogymayhelptowardsananswer.Itisclearlythecasethatthedrivingofmotorcarsisamajorcauseofdeathandinjuryincontemporarysocieties.Accidentratesareinterestinglyvariablefromonecountrytoanother,butnoneissparedthefrequentlyrecurringgriefandmiseryinflictedonpeoplebycaraccidents.Manyprofessionals,fromtrafficpolicetoaccidentandemergencysurgeons,arekeptinemploymenttryingtodealwiththismenace.Therewould,however,besomethingobviouslyperverseaboutdevelopingatheoryconcerningcarsaccordingtowhichtheyaretobeconsideredefficientinstrumentsforkillingandmaimingpeople,andareaccordinglytobeappraisedascontributingtotheemploymentprospectsofpoliceofficersandsurgeons.Cars,unliketanks,aretobevaluednotfortheirlethalpotentiality,butdespiteit.Theyareforefficient,comfortable,speedy,andsafepersonaltransportation—withnodoubtanelementofthe‘statussymbol’thrownin.Manufacturingdevelopmentswhichcanmake(p.299) carssafer,atleastfortheiroccupants,areprized,andadvertisementsstresssuchfeatures.Legislators,andministerswithdelegatedpowersofexecutiverule-making,developabatteryofregulatoryrulesandstandards,sometimesenforcedunderstrictliabilityregimes,totrytoensurethatdangersarisingfromcarusearekeptdowntosomeacceptablelevelinbalancewiththeothervalueswehavenoted.Carsaredesirablepersonaltransportationfacilitieswithdangerousside-effects.Theyarenotlethalweaponswithdesirableperson-transportingside-effects.Thisisanobjectivefactaboutcarsincontemporarysocieties.Itisanobjectivefactmirroredintheattitudesandpreferencesofmotorists,pedestrians,manufacturers,cardealers,law-makers,andothers.Itisnotafactabouttheseattitudes,butonethatdependsuponthem.Itisafactthatisnotcontradictedbytheoccasionaluseofcarstoinflictwilfulanddeadlyinjuries,orasgetawayvehiclesfromrobberiesorthelike.Youdonothavetobeageniustodifferentiatetheabuseofsomethingfromitsproperuse,eventhoughthepossibilityofabuseisbuiltintothefeaturesthatfacilitateproperuse.

Inthesameway,butwithmuchgreatercomplexity,wecancontrasttheharmfulandunjusteffectsofmanylawsandmuchadministrationandenforcementoflawwiththeaspirationtocivilityandjusticethatisintrinsictolegalinstitutions.Theharmandinjusticeareundesirable(thoughperhapsinsomedegreeunavoidable)side-effectsofinstitutionswhoseproperend(or‘finalcause’)isthesecuringofpeaceandcivilityincircumstancesofjusticewhichenablefairandfreemarketstofunction.Toputittheotherwayroundistosaywhatcannotbeseriouslymaintained—thatlegalsystemsfunctionproperlytothe


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extentthattheyfacilitatetyrannyandexploitation,thoughsometimestheyproducejusticeandcivilityasside-effects.Inthesameway,onemightpointoutthatonlysomeonewhocanspeakalanguagecandeceivepeoplebytellingthemlies.Butifwesupposedthatdeceitwerethefunctionofhumanlinguisticcommunicationasdistinctfromanormallyundesirableside-effect,wewouldsaywhatcannotbetakenseriously.For,asThomasReidlongagopointedout,noonewouldthenbeabletolearnalanguage,anddeceitbymeansofspokenlieswouldinfactbeimpossible.41

‘Mindthegap!’isthemoralofthestorysofar.Itishardlydisputablethataconceptuallysatisfactoryunderstandingoflawthatlookstoitsfocalmeaningandacknowledgesthecharacterofaninterpretativeconceptlikelawmusttakefullyintoaccountthevaluestowhichlegalactivityisessentiallyoriented.Butthismakesurgentattentiontothegapbetweenlawgraspedconceptuallyandlawinitsactualsocialimplementationandimpact.Itisthusanimportantquestiontoaskwhatlawyers,judges,andlaw-enforcementofficersactuallydo.Systematicaccountsofanswerstothisandlikequestionsthatarethefruitsofresearchinthesociologyoftheprofessionsoroflaw,orofcriminologicalstudy,orofapplied(p.300) economics,commandtheseriousattentionofanyonewhoisconcernedwithoraboutlaw.Thisappliesespeciallytothosewhoareengagedinjuristicorphilosophicalstudyofit,orinthedevelopmentoflegaldoctrineandscholarship.Fortherehastobesomekindofreflectiveequilibriumbetweentheconceptualunderstandingofacategorylike‘law’andmethodologicallyrespectableempiricalaccountsofthemultifarioussortsofactivitiesthatpeopleundertakeinwaysthatpurporttobeorientedtowardslaw.42Sometheorists’assumptionsaboutthecharacterandvalue-orientationoflawmightturnouttofitbadlywithasubstantialpartofthemostconvincingempiricalaccounts.Thiswouldnotamounttorefutationoftheconceptualaccountinquestion,butitwouldrendermorepersuasivethecaseforanaccountthatgaveabetterfit.Thepresenttheoryoflawasinstitutionalnormativeorderseemstofitbetterthanmostrivalswithempiricalunderstandingsoflegalactivity,whilealsoaccountingforthewaylawisacategoryofhumanpracticallife,revealedinthevalueorientationswehavebeendiscussing.Ifso,thisisindeedapointinfavourofthetheory.

Forthosewhoremainuneasyabouttheargumentthatlawasaconceptualcategorycannotsimplybeequatedwithwhatlawyersdo,letusreviewanotheranalogy,concerninghealthandhealthprofessionals.‘Health’isveryobviouslyavalue,instantiatedbyallthoseorganismsthatareingoodshapeasthekindoforganismtheyare.Mentalandphysicalhealthareofgreatconcerntohumanbeings,andtheorganizationofhealthservices,whetherinthepublicortheprivatesectoroftheeconomy,orinsomemixbetweenthese,aremattersofperennialconcernandcontroversy.Theregulationandlicensingofvarioussortsofpractitionersisamatterofconcern,andallcontemporarystateshaveestablishedpublicinstitutionsandlawsthatdealwiththis,inwhatpurportstobethepublicinterest.Wecouldconstructatheorythatmightbecalled‘medicalrealism’,whichwouldsaythatmedicineisnomorethantheaggregateofthepracticesofthosewhopractisemedicineandrelatedhealthprofessions,beingpubliclycertifiedascompetenttodoso.Therewouldseemtobeacertainblunttruthinthis.Medicineiswhatdoctorsdoinfact,andnothingmorepretentious.43


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Butwhatifitturnsoutthatsomethingsdoctorsdoactuallyharmpatients?Whataboutsocalled‘iatrogenic’diseases?WhenIwasyoung,medicalpeopleadvisedustostayawayfromswimmingpoolsinwarmweather,becausepoliowasapparentlyawater-bornedisease—wasthatmedicallycorrect,becausedoctorsthensaiditwas?Irecallalsoatimewhendoctorsstilladvisedwomenthatsmokingcigaretteswasbeneficialasawayofcontrollingnervousdisorders.ItisstillthecasethathospitalsmakesomepeoplesickthroughMRSAinfectionwhileattemptingtocurethemofsomethingelse.

(p.301) Themoralofthisstoryisthatmedicineisaboutthepromotionofhealthandthepreventionofdisease,butthathumansarecapableofmistakesinpursuingtheseobjectives.Epidemiologicalandotherempiricalstudiesaboutthewaythehealthprofessionsworkareofenormousimportanceandcancontributeinallsortsofwaystocritiqueofandreforminmedicalpractice.Buttheydonotdisplacethevalueconcepts‘health’and‘disease’fromtheircentralplaceinaconceptualaccountofmedicine.Thesamegoesforlaw,mutatismutandis.Again,though,thefactthat‘health’isaninterpretativeconceptwouldnotjustifyourconcludingthatthestudyofmedicineshouldseektopresentitalwaysinthebestlightpossible.Wehavetobecandidaboutfailureaswellassuccess.Thosewhodevelopedandthosewhoprescribedthedrugthalidomidedidsowiththebestofintentionsandmotivestowardthereductionofpainandthediminutionofdiscomfortintheearlymonthsofpregnancy.Butthiswasadisasterthatblightedmanylives.Thewell-intentioned(butalsoprofit-oriented)pursuitofhealthinthiscasecauseddeformity,damagedchildren,andbroughtgriefandsufferingtoparents.Asprescribedtopregnantwomen,thalidomidewasbadmedicine,ineverypossiblesenseofthatphrase.Buttheconceptmedicineappliestothiscasealso,aswellastothebrilliantachievementsofthosewhodevelopedpenicillin,orpioneeredkidneytransplantation,orinvitrofertilization.

Ofcourse,fromthepointofviewofthepractitioner,onewithatruevocationtothehealingarts,theideaofmedicineasorientedtowhateveristrulythehealthofhumanbeings,physicalandmental,isamotivatingidea.Theefforttounderstandsomeformofcancer,orschizophrenia,ordepression,tofinditscausesanditspotentialcures,andmeantimetoalleviateaswellaspossiblewhatcannotyetbecured,hastheaimofbringingaboutthebestcurrentlyachievablehealthforthispatientorthoseafflictedpersons.Interpretativeconceptsareindeedinthiswayintrinsictomotivationwithinacertainpractice.Thisexplainswhyintheirmoredetacheddescriptiveusestheyremainneverthelessvalue-orientedinthedescriptionstheyenableustogive.

Itdoesnotunderminetheprojectofdetacheddescription,andindeeditisinthedetachedanddescriptivemodethatlegalscienceandlegaltheorydoandshouldproceed.Theobjectivityofgoodscholarshipisdifferentfromtheimpartialitycoupledwithcommitmenttojusticeofgoodadjudication.Thatis,scholarlyobjectivitycontrastswith,butfullytakesaccountof,themotivatingcommitmentthatisengagedwhenwestepoverfromlegalscienceorlegaltheoryintosuchrolesasthatofadvocate,judge,law-reformerorlegislator.44Thisisnot(p.302) aclaimtohavefoundsome‘Archimedean’pointoutside,perhaps‘above’,thepracticalactivityfromwhichonelooksdownontheactivity


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andseesthatitrepresentsnothingreal.45Rather,asLuhmannpointsout,itinvolvesakindofself-observationofthelegalsystemfromwithinit,butanobservationthatisnotaimeddirectlyatthesolutionofparticularcurrentpracticalproblemsarisingwithinit.46

16.7FacileEclecticism?Animportantpartofthemessageofpart3ofthisbookconcernedtheinterplaybetweenlaw,politics,andeconomicsaselementswithinthetotalityofcontemporarysociallife.Thecivilityofcivillifeisexpressedin,anddependson,thisinterplay.Luhmann'ssystem-theoryaffordsagrand-scalesociologicalaccountofthis,portrayinglaw,politics,andeconomics(alongwithothers)asmajorsub-systemsofthewholesocialsystem.Eachisdistinguishedbyitsownholisticself-conception,andeachreceivesinputsfromtheothersonlythroughinterpretingtheminthecodingappropriatetothereceivingsystem.Thisisasocialworldofimperfectmutualunderstandinginwhicheachsystemisconstantlyadjustingtoinputsfromotherswhichareinturnlikewiseinperpetualself-adjustment.

Theinstitutionaltheoryoflawpresentedinthisbookisnotderivedfromsociologicalsystem-theory,norareanyofitsmainthesesentailedbysystem-theory.Nevertheless,thetwoapproachesarestrikinglymutuallycompatible,notleast(asjustnoted)inrelationtotherolesystem-theoryassignstointernalself-observationwithinasystem.Torepeatapointmadeintheintroductorychapter:

Lawinvolvesbothfront-lineactivitiesoflawmaking,judging,advocacy,counselling,drafting,anddoing,andsecond-lineactivitiesofobservingtheseactivitiesfromwithinthepracticetakenasawhole.Theactorofthesecondline,thestudentorscholaroflaw,concernedwithjurisprudentialordoctrinalexpositionofit,hasacertaindetachmentbycontrastwithfront-lineactors.Ontheotherhand,thissecond-lineactorhasalsoarelativelyhighdegreeofengagementbycontrastwithpurelyexternalobservers.Theselatter(forexample)takethewholecorpusoflegalactivity,includingtheoutputoflegalscholarsandlegaltheorists,asasubjectmatterforstudyfromthestandpointofsociologicaloranthropologicalinquiryorofeconomicsorpoliticalscience.47

Itfollowsthatthereisadifferencebetweenlawandpolitics(orlawandeconomics)aswellasanimportantmeasureofoverlapbetweenthem.Noimportantlegal(p.303)questionlackspoliticalimplications,andviceversa.Nobodycouldhaveawell-consideredphilosophyoflawwhichdidnotmeshwithanequallywell-consideredpositioninpoliticalphilosophy.Butthiswouldnotmeanthateithercollapsesintotheother.ToacceptLuhmann'slineonthisisnecessarilytorejectthatofDworkin,whopresentsanessentiallyunitaryviewoflegalandpoliticalphilosophy.

Equally,however,oneneednotgothewholewaywithLuhmann,forwhomindividualhumanbeingsentersociologyas‘psychicsystems’,interactingwiththeothersurroundingsystems.Suchaviewistotallycontradictoryoftheinsistenceonmoralautonomyaroundwhichtheaccountofthedistinctivenessofmoralityandlawwasbuiltinchapters14and15.Thedebtsowedinthesechaptersaretothe‘discoursetheory’ofRobertAlexy,andinturntoJürgenHabermas,andbeyondthem,toKant.Itisa


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notoriousfactthatLuhmannandHabermasweremutualadversariesintheintellectualrealm.

Itiseasythereforetoforeseeatthispointcriticslevellingatthepresentworkaccusationsoffacileeclecticism,ormethodologicalsyncretism.Theymaywellsaythisisjustaninstanceofajuristflittinginalight-mindedwayfromincompatibletheorytoincompatibletheory,selectingattractive-seemingportionsandlumpingthemtogetherinblithedisregardoftheirdeepincompatibility.Suchcriticismwould,however,beill-founded.Tobeover-impressedwithsuchaccusationswouldinvolveretreatingintothekindoftheoreticalisolationismcastigatedbyRogerCotterrell.Thefundamentalpremisesoftheargumentfrommoralautonomycomefirst,asfarasIamconcerned.Humansocietiesaresocietiesofpersonswithacapacitytorealizemoralautonomyintheirlives.Thiscanoccurinconditionsofcivilsociety(perhapsinothersaswell,butcertainlyincivilsociety),wherecivilinteractionofpersonsispossible.Civilsocietyrequiressomeformoflaw,andthelegalorderofaconstitutionalstate,orlaw-state,iscertainlyakeyelementinsecuringcivility.Butotherkeyelementsareeconomicrelationsandpolitics.Toacceptsystem-theoryforthelightitshedsontheseinteractingelementsdoesnotrequireonetoabandoncriticaljudgmentinrespectofsomelessconvincingpartsofthetheory.ThesamegoesforotherbodiesofthoughtonwhichIhavedrawninthisbookanditscompanionvolumes.

16.8FinalConclusionsWhatthisbookhasestablishedaboutlawandlegalknowledgecanbesummarizedasfollows:

1Normativeorderispossible,becausehumansarenorm-users.Theycanandeverywheredoco-ordinatetheiractivitiesbyreferencetosharedorcommonstandards,evenwithoutmakingtheseexplicitandwithoutformalizingtheminanyway.Thisverycapabilityforco-ordinationinturnmakespossibleformalization,orinstitutionalization,ofnorm-establishing,norm-applying,and(p.304) norm-enforcingagencies.Constitutionalstatesareaveryspectacularexampleofthis.Butalwaysinthefinalanalysistheformalrestsoninformal,customaryfoundations.2Institutionalnormativeordermakespossibletheexplicitenactmentoflegislatedrulesandthearticulatedevelopmentofbackgroundprinciplesthroughadjudicationandthroughdevelopmentoflegalscience.Lawasinstitutionalnormativeorderthuscomestobeacomplexandsystematicwhole.Withinit,personsaredefinedandcanoccupyavarietyofever-changinglegalpositionsandrelations.Toknowoftheseistohaveknowledgeofinstitutionalfacts.Thisdependsoninterpretingfactsandeventsthatexistorhaveoccurred,orthatwillormayoccur,inthelightofinstitutionalornon-institutionalnormsandtheirbackgroundvalues.Suchknowledgeispotentiallymotivating,thoughinmanycaseswheresuchaninterpretationcouldbeadvancednooneactuallyadvancesortakesaccountofit.3Theinstitutionalcharacteroflawisintelligibleonlyonanassumptionconcerning


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theintrinsicendsoftheenterpriseofgovernanceunderlaw:thesearetherealizationofjusticeandthecommongood,accordingtosomereasonableconceptionofthese.4Thesystematicityoflawisbestobservedbyconsideringthesubdivisionofthewholebodyoflegalmaterialintosuchcategoriesaspubliclaw(withthecontemporarysatelliteofhumanrightslaw),criminallaw,andprivatelaw,orfurthersubdivisionsofthese.Tomakethesefullycomprehensible,onehastoconsiderthedifferingbutcomplementaryvaluesimplicitintheselegaldomains:orderlygovernmentanddistributivejustice;civilpeaceandretributivejustice;privatelifeandmarketeconomy,underpinnedbyremedialmeasuresofcorrectivejustice.5Institutionalizationoflawentailsthatstatelawhasapositive(‘posited’)character.Accordingly,lawstandsinfundamentalcontrastwithautonomousmorality,thoughthehumancapacityforconceivingandpursuingtheimperativesofanautonomousmoralcodemaywellrequirethecontextofcivilitythatstatelawcanbringabout.Thedistinctivenessoflawfrommoralitybynomeansentailsthatthelawitselforitsintelligentstudycanbevalue-free.Indeed,asoundtheoryoflawcanandshouldaffirmthatessentialtoexistenceofanyinstitutionalnormasalawmustbesomeminimalsatisfactionofbasicrequirementsofjustice.ThisitselfisinthecontemporaryworldinstitutionalizedthroughHumanRightsConventions,Charters,andthelike.

16.9CodaAttheveryend,itisnecessaryyetagaintoconfrontafearthathasbeenperennialamonglegalthinkers.Thismaybeprovokedafreshbytheadmissionthatreferencetovaluemustenterintoanyexpositioneitherofthegeneralcharacteroflaw(p.305) orofsomebodyoflawactuallyinforcesomewhere—forexample,contractlawinFrance,oradministrativelawinNorway,orEuropeanCommunitylawaboutcompetition.

Thefearisthatsuchreferencetovaluedepriveslegaltheoryandlegalscholarship(legaldoctrine,legaldogmatics,legalscience,academiclaw)ofanypretensiontoscientificcharacter.Werethistrue,lawschools,sofarastheyareanythingmorethantradeschoolsteachingtheskillsandtricksofasometimesquestionablekindofjob,wouldbepurveyorsofideology,notdisseminatorsofknowledgeandlearning.Wereittrue,jurisprudencewouldbecome,orbeseenaswhatithasbeenallalong,anexerciseinlegitimationoftheactualstateanditsmodeofgovernment.Wereittrue,lawprofessorswouldbemereapologistsfortheestablishedorderofthings,interpretingthatinthemostattractivepossiblelight.Thosewhocouldnotinconsciencetakeonthisrolecouldhavenoroleotherthantobeiconoclastswithintheacademy,trashingreceiveddoctrinesandpresentingalternativeversionsthatsystematicallyturnontheirheadsthevaluesandvalue-ladenaccountslaidforthbytheorthodox.Suchworkwouldadmittedlynotbescientific,butitwouldbenomoreunscientificthantheorthodoxaccountsoflawthatotherwiseprevail.Sure,itmaybeideology—butitishonestandopenideology,notalegitimatingideologymasqueradingassomekindofobjectivelegalscience.48


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Theanswertothisreiteratesthepointthathumanartefactsandcontrivances,includinganyrulesbywhichpeopletrytolive,orgetotherstolive,havetobeunderstoodfunctionally.Whatistheirpoint,whatisthefinalcausetowhichtheyareoriented?Theyperformwellorill,areingoodshapeorbad,totheextentthattheycanbeseentoworktowardstheseessentialendswithaminimumofregrettableside-effects.Itisundoubtedlycontroversialwhatfunctionsshouldbeascribedtolawingeneralortoparticularlawsoranyotherhumanproduction.Failuretoconfrontandaccountopenlyforvaluesinvolved,andtodefendone'sownproposalsastowhattherelevantvaluesare,mayconferonworkaboutlawanapparentlygreaterobjectivitythanifaproperopen-nesswerepractised.Butitisthisconcealmentofvalue-orientation,notitsopenavowal,thatisideologicalinasinistersense.Honestinterpretationthatisopenaboutthevaluesitpresupposesandthatisasalerttosystem-failuresassystem-successesjudgedagainstthosevaluesisthebestobjectivitythatisavailabletothehumansciences,jurisprudenceincluded.(p.306)

Notes:

(1)LawQuarterlyReview70(1954)37–58;reprintedinHLAHart,EssaysinJurisprudenceandPhilosophy(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1983)21–48;‘thoughtheoryistobewelcomed,thegrowthoftheoryonthebackofdefinitionisnot’(at25).

(2)Hart,ConceptofLaw,12–15.WilliamTwiningsharesthisview,andshowsthatKarlLlewellynwasaheadofHart'sgameinthisrespect.SeeWTwining,GlobalisationandLegalTheory(London:Butterworths,2000)79–80.

(3)SeeRNMoles,DefinitionandRuleinLegalTheory:areassessmentofHLAHartandthepositivisttradition(Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1987).Inadifferenttradition,RobertAlexyconcludeswitha(summative)definitioninhisTheArgumentfromInjustice(transSPaulsonandBLitschewskiPaulson)(NewYork,NY:OxfordUniversityPress,2002)127–130.

(4)TheconceptofnormativeorderisalsousedbyHansKelsen(towhomindeedIoweit)—see,eg,hisGeneralTheoryofNorms(transMHartney)(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1991)214–215,asoneamongverymanyinstances.

(5)Thereisafterallsuchathingas‘virtuousstipulation’,asarguedforbyAndrewHalpinin‘Concepts,Terms,andfieldsofEnquiry’LegalTheory4(1998)187at195–8.CfRichardRobinson,Definition(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1964).Robinsondrawsattentiontoonekindof‘realdefinition’thathethinksisbetterdescribedas‘analysis’(171–180)Later,headdsthatthismayleadonintosynthesisandthenanattemptatimprovementofconcepts,saying‘Liketheanalysis…ofconcepts,theimprovementofconceptsisoftenaverydifficultandgropingoperation…Everyimprovementofaconceptcarriesalongwithitastipulativeredefinitionofthewordexpressingtheconcept’(p187).The‘explanatorydefinition’advancedhereisputforwardinthatspirit.BrianBix'saccountof‘the(various)purposesofconceptualdefinitions’seemsalsocompatiblewithorperhapsevenfavourabletowardsthepresentapproach:seeBBix,Jurisprudence:TheoryandContext


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(London:Sweet&Maxwell,4thedn,2006)19–25.

(6)Isthisthenan‘essentialist’claimascharacterizedanddeprecatedbyBrianTamanaha,GeneralJurisprudence135–145?Itisnotsointhesenseofdiscoveringasingleessenceinwhateverisconventionallycalledlaw.Butitdoesdependonaviewaboutthevalueswhichitisimportanttorealizethroughtheinstitutionalizationofnormativeorderinthecontextofthestateandotherpartlystate-likeformsoforganization.Itisoftheessenceoflaw,Iclaim,thatitshould,notthatiteverywheredoes,realizethesevalues.Thisisamatterof‘focalmeaning’asdiscussedat16.6below.

(7)CfVovFranceECHRno53924/00,§§41,62–64,70,84.AsamatterofEuropeanhumanrightslaw,thereisnoavailableremedyinsuchacase,accordingtotheGrandChamberoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights—ch5above,atn10.

(8)RDworkin,‘Hart'sPostscriptandtheCharacterofPoliticalPhilosophy’OxfordJournalofLegalStudies24(2004)1–37at3–5,19–22.

(9)Halpinhasalsoarguedin‘TheMethodologyofJurisprudence:ThirtyYearsoffthePoint’(CanadianJournalofLawandJurisprudence19(2006)67–105at91–2)thatlegaltheoristshavebeenmistakeninseparatingthetheoreticalandthepracticalquestionsinthisway,andconcentratingtoomucheffortontheformer:‘Whataretheappropriaterolesforlegaltheory?Primarily,toclarifythemeanswherebythelawexpressesandattainstheresolutionofcontroversy.Fromwhichfollowstheroleofilluminatingwithinthecontinuingpracticeoflawthepotentialdirectionswhichthatresolutionmighttake…’.Thislattertaskiscertainlyanurgentone,andIhavecontributedtoitinRhetoricandtheRuleofLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2005),butitseemstometopresupposethekindoftheoryattemptedinthepresentbook,nottomakeitredundant.

(10)ThisisDworkin'stermforthekindofconversation-stoppingdefinitionalmoveconsideredinthepresentparagraph.SeeLaw'sEmpireat45:‘Peopleareitsprey[thepreyofthe‘semanticsting’]whoholdacertainpictureofwhatdisagreementislikeandwhenitispossible.Theythinkwecanarguesensiblywithoneanotherif,butonlyif,weallacceptandfollowthesamecriteriafordecidingwhenourclaimsaresound.’Myself,Ithinkitisofvaluetodiscusssuchcriteriaandexplainreasonsforadoptingthem;notthatpre-existingagreementonthemisnecessary,northatconversationwiththosewhorejectthemispointless.

(11)RRobinson,Definition(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1964)35–58.

(12)Hencethepresentapproachrejectsthekindof‘conventionalism’proposedbyTamanahainGeneralJurisprudence166–170.

(13)DHume,ATreatiseofHumanNature(edLASelby-Bigge,revisedPHNidditch)(Oxford:ClarendonPress,2ndedn,1978)469–470(BookIII,PartI,s1,lastthreeparas).

(14)TReid,EssaysontheActivePowersoftheHumanMind(withintroductionbyB


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Brody)(CambridgeMassandLondon:MITPress,1969)at470–471(EssayV,ch7).RespondingtoHume'sdemandthat‘oughtandoughtnotbeexplained’,Reidsays,‘ToamanthatunderstandsEnglish,therearesurelynowordsthatrequireexplanationless.Arenotallmentaughtfromtheirearlyyears,thattheyoughtnottolie,norsteal,norswearfalsely?’

(15)CfreferencesinNMacCormick,QuestioningSovereignty1.SeealsoKelsen,HauptroblemederStaatsrechtslehre(Tübingen:JCMohr,1911)441.

(16)HKelsen,GeneralTheoryofNorms(transMHartney)(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1991)1–3.

(17)HLAHart,EssaysonBentham(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1982)253–255.

(18)EWicks,TheEvolutionofaConstitution:EightKeyMomentsinBritishConstitutionalHistory(Oxford:HartPublishing,2006).

(19)Kelsen,PureTheory225–226;forasharplydifferent,andpreferableview,seeJBjarup,‘SocialAction:theFoundationofCustomaryLaw’inPØrebech,FBosselman,JBjarupetal,TheRoleofCustomaryLawinSustainableDevelopment(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005)89–157,especiallyat135–151.

(20)WTwining,‘ComparativeLawandLegalTheory:theCountryandWesternTradition’inIEdge(ed),ComparativeLawinGlobalPerspective(Ardsley,NY:TransnationalPublishersInc,2000)21–76.

(21)Onpluralism,cfTwining,GlobalisationandLegalTheory224–233;Tamanaha,GeneralJurisprudenceofLawandSociety192–200.

(22)RDworkin,‘Hart'sPostscriptandtheCharacterofPoliticalPhilosophy’OxfordJournalofLegalStudies24(2004)1–37,at9–12;forariposte,seeAHalpin,‘TheMethodologyofJurisprudence:ThirtyYearsoffthePoint’CanadianJournalofLawandJurisprudence19(2006)67–105at76–77.

(23)CfJDickson,EvaluationandLegalTheory(Oxford:HartPublishing,2001).

(24)CfRAlexy,ATheoryofConstitutionalRights(transJRivers)(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002)6–10onthe‘analytical,empirical,andnormative’elementsoflegaldoctrineaccordingtohisconceptionofit.

(25)OWeinbergerinNMacCormickandOWeinberger,AnInstitutionalTheoryofLaw(Dordrecht:DReidel&Co,1986)at32–38onnormsas‘thoughtobjects’.

(26)KPopper,ObjectiveKnowledge(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1973)ch4;cfOtaWeinberger,‘FactsandFact-Descriptions’inNMacCormickandWeinberger,AnInstitutionalTheoryofLawch4.SeealsoPMorton,AnInstitutionalTheoryofLaw(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1998)3,12,58.


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(27)Dworkintreats‘interpretivefacts’asacategoryopposedtothatof‘institutionalfacts’,inhis‘OnGapsintheLaw’inPAmselekandNMacCormick(eds),ControversiesaboutLaw'sOntology(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,1991)84–90at85.Forreasonsexplainedinthepresentwork,thisisincorrect.

(28)James,ViscountStair,InstitutionsoftheLawofScotland(DMWalker(ed),fromthesecondeditionof1693)(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,1981)I.i.18(p91).

(29)SeetherecentdecisionbyJudgeJohnEJones,IIIinKitzmillervDoverAreaSchoolDistrict(2005)WL578974(MDPa2005),doubtingthescientificstandingofintelligentdesign.

(30)JFinnis,NaturalLawandNaturalRights(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1980)12–18,citingMWeber,TheMethodologyoftheSocialSciences(transandedEShilsandHAFinch)(NewYork,NY:GlencoeFreePress,1964)58,76–82;alsoJFreund,TheSociologyofMaxWeber(transMIlford)(London:AllenLane,PenguinPress,1968)51–61.BLeiterin‘TheEndofEmpire:DworkinandJurisprudenceinthe21stCentury’RutgersLawJournal35(2005)165–81ascribestoFinnisthe‘primaryintellectualforce’behinddebateonjuristicmethodology.

(31)SeeRDworkin,Law'sEmpire(Cambridge,Ma:HarvardUniversityPress,1986)48–68on‘interpretiveconcepts’.CfStephenPerry,‘InterpretationandMethodologyinLegalTheory’,inAMarmor(ed),LawandInterpretation:EssaysinLegalPhilosophy(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995)137–154.

(32)RDworkin,‘Hart'sPostscriptandtheCharacterofPoliticalPhilosophy’OxfordJournalofLegalStudies24(2004)1–37at35.

(33)SeePMSHacker,‘Hart'sPhilosophyofLaw’,inHackerandJRaz(eds),Law,Morality,andSociety:EssaysinHonourofHLAHart(Oxford:ClarendonPress1977)1–25at12–18on‘HermeneuticsandtheConceptofSocialObligation’,andcompareNMacCormick,HLAHart(London,EdwardArnold,1981).Hacker'swas,Ithink,thefirstuseoftheideaof‘hermeneutics’inEnglish-languagejurisprudence.

(34)CompareJDickson,EvaluationandLegalTheory(Oxford:Hart,2001),suggestingthatatheoristhastoconsiderlawonthebasisofanevaluationofwhatmakesitimportanttoparticipants,butneednother-orhimselfbecommittedtothosevaluesthatmotivateparticipantsinordertosucceedinpursuingthetheoreticalenterprise.

(35)AVDiceymadeafamous,butintheendunsuccessful,attackondroitadministratifinhisIntroductiontotheStudyoftheLawoftheConstitution(edECSWade)(London:Macmillan,10thedn,1964)ch12,328–405.

(36)Halpinarguesin‘TheMethodologyofJurisprudence:ThirtyYearsoffthePoint’(CanadianJournalofLawandJurisprudence19(2006)67–105at87–88)thatthereisa‘question-beggingdifficultyinherentintheefforttoseekageneraldefinitionoflawforallmunicipallegalsystems’.Ifanexplanatorydefinitioninthepresentsenseistobeofany


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value,itmusthelpustowardunderstandingwhatitisthatlaw-stateshaveincommonevendespitetheirmanifolddifferences.Ifnotallstatesturnouttobelaw-statesthismaybeevenmoreilluminating,sinceitisapropositionconfirmedbycommonsense.

(37)SeeLaw'sEmpire52–56onconstructiveinterpretation.

(38)Foracritiqueofover-extensiveclaimsabout‘constructiveinterpretation’,seeWTwining,LawinContext:EnlargingaDiscipline(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1997)174–177;TwiningandDMiers,HowtoDoThingswithRules(London:Butterworth,4thedn,1999)377–379;Twining,TheGreatJuristicBazaar(Aldershot:Ashgate/Dartmouth,2002)34–37,472–473.

(39)Thiscanevenextendoverintosatiricalnovelsthathighlighthowthelawcurrentinsomejurisdictionisgoingwrong.APHerbert'ssatireHolyDeadlock(London:Methuen,1934)expressedacriticalinterpretationofdivorcelawandpracticeasitoperatedinEnglandinthe1930s,andwascertainlyinfluentialincontributingtothedevelopmentofapoliticalclimateinwhichdivorcelawreformbecamepossible.

(40)RCotterrell,ThePoliticsofJurisprudence:aCriticalIntroductiontoLegalPhilosophy(London:Butterworth,1989).

(41)SeeTReid,EssaysontheActivePowersoftheHumanMind(withintroductionbyBBrody)(Cambridge,MassandLondon:MITPress,1969)at443(EssayV,ch6),ontheimpossiblyself-defeatingcharacterofdeceitfulness:‘Withoutfidelityandtrust,therecanbenohumansociety’.

(42)CfCotterrell,Law'sCommunityat222–234;Tamanaha,GeneralJurisprudenceofLawandSocietyat77–107.

(43)CfOliverWendellHolmes,Jr:‘Thepropheciesofwhatthecourtswilldoinfact,andnothingmorepretentious,arewhatImeanbythelaw’(‘ThePathoftheLaw’inCollectedLegalPapers(London:Constable&Co,1920)167–202at173).

(44)Dickson,inEvaluationandLegalTheory(Oxford:HartPublishing,2001)makesacaseforthescholar'stakingarelativelydetachedstance,whileremainingengagedwithvalue-concerns.Foradefenceofasomewhatmoreengagedandprescriptivestance,seeFSchauer,‘TheSocialConstructionoftheConceptofLaw:AReplytoJulieDickson’OxfordJournalofLegalStudies25(2005)493–501.Foranexcellentgeneral,butcritical,surveyofrecentmethodologicaldebates,seeAHalpin,‘TheMethodologyofJurisprudence:ThirtyYearsoffthePoint’CanadianJournalofLawandJurisprudence19(2006)67–105.

(45)Dworkinhascriticisedthe‘Archimedean’methodologyofHartandothersintheirclaimtobepursuingatheoryofknowledgeextraneoustotheknowledgeitpurportstoexplain.See‘Hart'sPostscript’OxfordJournalofLegalStudies24(2004)1–37.

(46)ThemethodologyheredefendeddoesnotpurporttobeArchimedeaninthissense,


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onthegroundsexplainedbyLuhmann,LawasaSocialSystem(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004)58–59,305–307.

(47)Seepp5–6above.

(48)JBalkin,CulturalSoftware:ATheoryofIdeology(NewHaven,Conn:YaleUniversityPress,2003);cfWLucy‘WhatisWrongwithIdeology?’OxfordJournalofLegalStudies20(2000)283–300,reviewingDKennedy,ACritiqueofAdjudication:findesiècle(Cambridge,MaandLondon:HarvardUniversityPress,1997).

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Laws and Values Reflections on the Method