Lawson - Technology, Technological Determinism and the Transformational Model of Social Activity

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Technology, Technological Determinism and the Transformational

Model of Technical Activity.

Clive LawsonRough Draft, 16th July 2004

Abstract:

Technology remains a relatively under-theorised category within the critical

realist literature. This is surprising not only because of its central importance

to a wide range of disciplines, but also because it seems to be a category about

which critical realism has much to say. One aspect of technology that has

proved to be especially problematic for commentators to accommodate is that

technologys constitution is as much a part of the social as well as the natural

domains. This has caused problems to the extent that accounts of technology

implicitly reduce one domain to another or only manage to distinguish onefrom the other in an unsustainable way (typically, those emphasising thesocial constitution of technology tend to treat the natural world as

constructed in much the same manner as the social world, and those

stressing the importance of the material/natural component in technology tend

to treat the social world overly mechanistically). This paper draws upon the

critical naturalism of critical realism and the transformational model of social

activity in particular to develop a conception of technology that avoids these

problems. It then draws out some of the implications of this account. In

particular, some attempt is made to re-cast claims made by some so-calledtechnological determinists, such as Heidegger and Habermas, who on closer

inspection seem to be posing important questions that simply cannot beaddressed without the kind of systematic (ontological) elaboration of the

social and natural domains that I am suggesting.

1. Introduction

We all experience the role technology plays in social change on a daily basis.

Whether cleaning our home, purchasing an air ticket over the internet, paying for

shopping at a supermarket or borrowing a book from the library, we all experience a

constant prodding to our normal and routine ways of doing things that can be

attributed to the introduction of some new technology or other. But do such

experiences provide evidence to support the thesis of technological determinism? One

of the few sources of agreement in the recent technology literature, is that the answer

to this question must be no, i.e., technological determinism must be wrong. However,

I want to suggest that this agreement actually obscures a problem with the treatment


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of technology. Namely, I want to suggest that this rejection of technological

determinism has meant that certain questions posed by so-called technological

determinists remain untheorised or even unaddressed. Indeed I shall also argue that

these questions are difficult to deal with in any sustainable way within the framework

suggested by many of technological determinisms critics, at least those most rooted

in social constructivism. Implicitly, of course, I am suggesting that these questions

asked by so-called technological determinists are important ones. And indeed I

believe their importance explains why so many writers on technology are continually

drawn to the thesis of technological determinism, accounting for the often noted fact

that "as moths to the flame we [theorists of technology] find ourselves continually

attracted to technological determinisms alluring but dangerous glow" (Smith, 1996).

I also want to argue that the issues at stake here are fundamentally ontological

and that it is in this regard that critical realism has much to contribute to the study of

technology at present. Although, surprisingly, little attention has been given by

critical realists to technological issues, it would seem that the social ontology

developed within critical realist accounts has much to offer a basic conception of

technology and, consequently, the particular problems I address here. More

specifically the (transformational) conception of social activity, which of course is

particularly well suited to the avoidance of both determinism and voluntarism with

regard to social phenomena can very fruitfully be applied to an account of technical

activity. Furthermore, I shall argue that fundamental to an account of technology is a

conception of its dual constitution in the social and natural domains. However, it is

rare for technological commentators, especially recently, to attempt to elaborate an

account of technology in terms of the differences between these domains. My

intention here is to do just this by drawing upon the critical or qualified naturalism


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of the term technological determinism (Bimber, 1996). The nomological is that which

takes the 'determinism' in technological determinism most seriously: "technological

determinism can be seen as the view that, in the light of the state of technological

development and laws of nature, there is only one possible future course for social

change" (1996, p. 83). There is no scope for human desires or choices.

Now, although this definition accords most closely with the philosophers (or

common sense?) meaning of the term, Bimber argues that it is actually almost

impossible to find any examples of technological determinism if such a definition is

strictly adhered to. The most likely candidates (perhaps unsurprisingly?) emanate

from the economics domain. The most familiar of these is Marxs famous statement

that "the hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill society with

the industrial capitalist" (Marx, 1971, p. 109). However, it is very difficult to attribute

anything like a hard or nomological form of technological determinism once a wider

reading of Marx is undertaken (especially see Dickson, 1974; Rosenberg, 1976;

Harvey, 1999, pp. 98-136). One sense in which Marx might be understood as

encouraging such an interpretation is in his insistence that history or sequence

matters, and indeed this can sound unduly mechanistic, and has been interpreted by

later Marxists in an unduly mechanistic way (an obvious example is Heilbroner,

1967). But the crucial point that Marx, and indeed Heilbronner, are making is that

some kinds of technology could not happen without others and some kinds of

technology could not happen without others and that some kinds of social

organisation could not happen without certain technological developments. This idea

of the importance of sequence recurs throughout accounts that have been held up as

examples of technological determinism. Perhaps the most sustained of these is that

provided by Clarence Ayers, and which has had such a clear effect on the American


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Institutionalists. On par with Marxs handmill statement is Ayres contention that

given the shipbuilding and navigation skills in existence in 1492, America was

bound to be discovered in a decade or two (Ayres, 1952) often read as betraying

the worst kind of determinism. However, on closer reading, as with Marx, the point

that emerges is that some technological development may be a necessary condition for

some other technological development (or indeed social development). But

nomological technological determinism requires that it is also a sufficient condition.

And it is doubtful whether such a position can be found in any of the above

contributors work.1

Bimbers second use of the term, i.e. unintended consequences technological

determinism, is one that emphasises the process whereby human ideas, values, etc.,

become manifest in some particular technology so giving a fixity or concretisation to

these ideas which is then hard to change. Perhaps the classic statement of such a

position is that made by Langdon Winner (1977; 1980). And as his account explicitly

brings out, although there is a concern with explaining the fact that technology

appears to be out of our control, the point is not that everything is strictly determined

or that choice is precluded. Rather, the point is that choices about the design and

building of technology have implications that require some living with. The call,

from Winner at least, is for greater democratic involvement at an earlierstage in the

development of some technology, not that it is not possible. This general idea is also

to be found in Marx with specific emphasis on the way that social relations become

1 Perhaps there is a case to made for that nomological technological determinism is alive and well inthe writings of mainstream economists or in the more mathematical technological trajectories literature

of neo-Schumpeterians of those such as Dosi . However, in theseaccounts, the adoption of closed-system methods generally imposes a determinism throughout the

social world (see - Lawson, T. 2004; T. Lawson, 1997). But there is nothing in these accounts thatsuggests that there is anything specific about technology that generates determinism of any sort, andthus does not really seem relevant here.


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concretised in particular technologies which then act to maintain or reproduce those

social relations (MacKenzie, 1984)

However, neither the nomological nor the unintended consequences uses of

the term are, Bimber argues, the most familiar face of technological determinism

within the technology literature. Rather, in what he dubs the normative version of

technological determinism, technology appears to us as autonomous because the

norms by which it is advanced are "removed from political and ethical discourse and

goals of efficiency or productivity become surrogates for value-based debate over

methods, alternatives, means and ends" (Bimber, 1996, p. 82). Here technological

development is an essentially human enterprise in which people who create and use

technology are driven by certain goals that rely unduly on norms of efficiency and

productivity. Thus other (ethical, moral) criteria are excluded, producing a process

that operates independently of larger political processes and contexts. The end point

is one in which society adopts the technologist's standards of judgement. Thus there

is a technological domain, which includes elements of society generally, which acts as

constraint and causal force on other aspects of society.

The main examples this time appear to be from the philosophy of technology.

Bimber singles out the contribution of Habermas (see especially; Habermas 1970}.

And although Habermas actually writes very little on technology, his position does

clearly involve the more general features that Bimber has in mind, although at this

level of generality it is perhaps as relevant to Mumfords megatechnics (1967) and

Elluls technique (1964). Habermas is attempting to ground what he sees as the

negative or dystopian character of modernity in very general terms. Central to

Habermass contribution, of course, is a Weberian differentiation of society into the

spheres of work (which is success oriented, purposive action concerned with


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controlling the world) and interaction (communication between subjects in pursuit of

common understanding in the lifeworld). Modernity is characterised by the

colonisation of the system of objectifying (delinguifying) behaviour of the former on

the latter lifeworld. Thus the problem of modernity amounts to the inappropriate

extension of one domain to another.1

Although Bimber fails to mention it, perhaps the most developed position of

this sort is provided by the work of Heidegger. For Heidegger, we are engaged in a

transformation of the entire world (and ourselves) into 'mere raw materials' or

'standing reserves' (1977) - objects to be controlled. But a place is given in

Heideggers account of a process of instrumentalisation in which methodical planning

comes to dominate, destroying the integrity of everything. An collection of functions

replaces a world of things treated with respect for their own sake. Heidegger's

examples of the Greek jeweller making a chalice and a modern dam builder

destroying the local environment show the difference Heidegger has in mind between

(the older crafts-based activity of) bringing things together in harmony and the 'de-

worlding' of modern technology. The central point is that technology itself is not

neutral. Everything is sucked up into the technological process and reduced to the

status of a resource that has to be optimised in some way. Especially worrying is the

idea that, in so doing, people grow to see themselves in the same way. Increasingly,

sight is lost of what is being sacrificed in the mobilisation of human and other

resources for goals that remain ultimately obscure.

Although quite different in many respects, the concern of both Heidegger and

Habermas is the same i.e. with the reduction of meaning and value of humans in the

lifeworld. Human involvement is reduced to a minimum and the values of possession

and control tend to dominate social life. Central is the idea that using technology


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makes us become something else. The use of technology creates a new lifeworld,

which separates, de-worlds, isolates and impoverishes both the natural world and our

selves.2

2.2 The constructivist critique3

It is fair to say that, more recently at least, criticisms of technological determinism are

most often made by, or with the help of arguments made by, social constructivists.

There are though several dimensions to the constructivist rejection of technological

determinism. There is an explicit rejection of the idea that technical change can be

seen as a fixed, or on some monotonic 'trajectory'. Technological change is genuinely

contingent and not reducible to some inner technological logic. The relation

between science and technology (science is the independent, non political source of

technological ideas) is questioned, as is the idea that technological change leads to

(determines) social change and not vice versa. Instead, emphasis is placed, usually by

drawing attention to a series of case studies, upon the contingent nature of technical

change and on how technology is shaped, especially by different social groups in the

process of settling a range of technological/ social controversies and disagreements

(MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985).

However, as Winner famously argues, this emphasis on the social

dimension of technology comes at a cost (Winner, 1991). In particular, what he terms

autonomous characteristics of technology are lost. To see why this might be, we

2 If not for limitations of space, I would also here address the more recent, and more social, re-

workings of Heideggers work , such as that found in the work of Albert Borgmann (1984).3 The main roots of social constructivist accounts of technology appear to lie in the sociology ofscientific knowledge (for a good review see Bloor, 1976; Shapin, 1982). The term socialconstructivism is most often used in a narrow sense to refer to the social construction of technology

(SCOT) approach outlined by Pinch and Bijker (1987) or more recently by Bijker (1995) and related

approaches (e.g. Woolgar 1991}. However, I shall also include here the social shaping approaches(MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985; Wajcman, 1991) and the actor-network approach of Latour (1987) and


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need to consider the particular manner in which the social is brought in to the

technological and in particular the role played by the ideas of symmetries.4 Again the

main idea is taken from the sociology of scientific knowledge literature (Bloor, 1976):

that it is best to remain agnostic about the truth, falsity, rationality, etc., of competing

claims in settling scientific controversies. Translated to the technological realm this

means that the researcher should remain impartial with regards to the actual properties

of the technology involved in determining which technologies become settled upon

(Pinch & Bijker, 1987). The researcher must, in other words, treat as possibly true or

false all claims made about the nature of technology such claims must be treated

symmetrically (explaining them by reference to similar factors), since there is no

independent way of evaluating the knowledge claims of scientists, technologists, etc.

As in the sociology of scientific knowledge literature, two ideas underlie these

arguments. First, the real world plays no role in settling controversies (in settling

the form that technology takes) and, second, that the researcher has no independent

access to the world- so that there is no way of evaluating competing claims. Thus

claims about the relative efficiency or successfulness of different technologies or

technical progress (or how some technology comes to be accepted) are to be avoided

(see also Staudenmaier, 1995; Pels, 1996).

Secondly, given the emphasis upon the nature of technology itself in having

much bearing upon its own acceptance or emergence, existing technology is

understood to exist or is analysed in terms of the stabilisation of different

controversies and disputes. Once stabilisation is achieved, controversy is removed

and the properties of this stabilisation (how consensus is achieved) determines how

Callon (1987).These approaches are roughly in agreement (to varying degrees) over the following

points.4 Various accounts put this aspect as central stage (Collins, 1985; Lynch, 1992) some even present thefield as a series of extensions of the symmetry principle (Woolgar, 1988)


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that technology functions. The focus, as with the SSK literature, is upon how

closure is achieved. Crucial to the idea of closure, is the idea that technology is not

interpreted or understood in any fixed way. These different interpretations of some

technology are not only of its social characteristics or relative functionality, but of its

technical content of how it works. Thus facts about technology are simply the

(different) interpretations of different social groups (Bijker, 1995). It is thus a

rhetorical process of settling dispute via negotiation and social action that is

understood in the term closure. Technology is thus socially shaped and socially

constructed.

But, as such, and this is Winners point, the ability to distinguish technology

from any other social phenomenon is lost. Thus is would seem to be possible to

explain the one feature of technology, noted at the outset, that motivates most so

called determinist accounts how is it the case that technology continually prods or

provokes all manner of social changes. Moreover, it also seems to generate certain

tensions in the accounts of some constructivists themselves. For example, Latour

seems unwilling to distinguish natural from social phenomena, even though he needs

some such account to sustain the idea that technology explains the differences noted

in spatial extensions of human and other societies (Latour & Strum 1987).

Constructivists are clearly correct to argue, against nomological determinist

accounts that contingency matters. However, little is said about the normative form

noted by Bimber and others. Unseating the privileged position of science in

technologys development, whilst surely right, actually distracts from the very factors

that Habermas, Heidegger and others are drawing attention to. The use of technology

may bring with it values of possession and control that dominate social life and drain

it of meaning, are questions about which the constructivist must remain silent. At root


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here seems to be a failure to distinguish two quite different issues the contingency

and irreducibly social nature of technology.5 In arguing effectively that the latter calls

for the former, perhaps the most plausible position (central to normative determinism)

that contingency is consistent with a conception of technology in which it is not

simply reduced to a social phenomenon, is missed.

Taken together these problems have led to a tendency for various questions,

which so called determinist accounts have raised, to be ignored or lost. For example,

how do we account for the extent to which technology appears to be out of control?

How do we make sense of the appearance of stages of development? How do we

account for the constraining effect technology has on social organisation? What do

we mean when we talk of technology concretising or fixing values or ideas? Why

should the technological domain impinge, if it does, on other domains? And how are

all these questions addressed whilst maintaining the irreducibly social character and

essential contingency, insisted upon by constructivist accounts? I shall argue that

these questions are best addressed by establishing a conception of technology that

draws upon recent developments in social ontology. Specifically, I want to argue that

technology is best conceptualised in terms of a transformational model similar to that

developed within critical realist accounts of social ontology.

3 A Transformational model of technical activity

The basic features of this model have been presented in different ways, notably as a

corrective to existing voluntaristic or reificatory accounts of social structure or as a

transcendental argument from the existence of generalised features of experience of

5 I am certainly not arguing that it is only social constructivists who make this mistake. Indeed,

although I do not have space to pursue this here, I would argue that many explicit reactions totechnological determinism have involved reduction of technology to a purely social phenomenon Foran example of such a reaction within Institutionalist thought (see Brinkman, 1997)


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the social world, such as routinised practices.6 Either way, the main point is that

social structure only exists in and through the activity of human agents, even though it

is not reducible to such activity. Put another way, against individualistic or

voluntaristic accounts of social structure, structure pre-exists and is a necessary

condition for all intentional agency, whilst, against reificatory accounts, structure only

exists in virtue of the activity it governs. Thus if social structure always pre-exists

actual behaviour this does not mean that individuals create structure in any sense but

that it is actively reproduced or transformed. Similarly, if it is something that only

exists in virtue of human activity, there is no sense in which it is outside of or external

to human activity. However, neither are structure and agency simply moments in the

same process they are different kinds of thing. And it is this transformational nature

of the connection between the two (interestingly, for my purposes, often conveyed by

the Aristotelian metaphor of the sculpting artist fashioning a product out of the

material and with the tools available) that lies at the heart of the TMSA. The resulting

emphasis, then, is upon transformation.

Fig 1 The Transformational Model of Social Activity

Social structures

Socialisation, enablement

Constraint.

Reproduction/

Transformation

Human agency

Society, conceived of as the sum of the relations between agents is the ever

present condition and continually reproduced outcome of social activity. Society acts

as both an enabling and constraining influence on behaviour as well as, more

6 For the a statement of the former see Bhaskar 1989, and Archer, et al. 1998; and for a statement of the


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constitutively, as a socialising force, thus impacting on how individuals react to the

structural constraints and enablements they face. But as structure is only ever

reproduced or transformed through human action, where such structure endures, its

continuity as much as its change is a significant object of analysis. As such, social

change is inherently non-deterministic. To capture this aspect of structure, following

Giddens, the term duality of structure is often used. Similarly, it should be clear that

although action, where it does, reproduces certain structural forms, this will typically

not be the intention of this activity. Thus, my speaking English is not intended to

reproduce the grammar of the language, although it does generally do so. Following

Bhaskar, the duality of practice is used to capture this dual aspect of action.

One more aspect of this account needs to be drawn out before we can return to

a discussion of technology. Specifically, the TMSA can also be seen as an attempt to

elaborate how the social and natural worlds differ, and specially as part of a qualified

or critical naturalism (PON). In short, drawing un a conception of the natural world

as governed by tranfactually operating generative mechanisms

(Harr, 1970; Harr R. & Secord, 1972; Harr R. & Madden, 1975), the social can

be viewed in the same way (thus providing the basis for a naturalism of some kind),

the main differences depending on the differences in the kinds of mechanisms and

powers that can be discovered (retroduced). For present purposes, the important

differences lie in the relatively greater differentiability or isolatability of natural

structures, and the possibility of closing off the operation of some mechanisms to

observe the operation of others. Given the nature of the social world, as captured in

the TMSA, such differentiability and closedness will be rarely if ever the case. Such

differences have been more formalised in terms of a series of limits naturalism. A

latter see T. Lawson 1997 ).


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major point of the TMSA is that social structures only exist in virtue of the activity

they constrain or enable. Thus social structures depend, for their existence on the

activities of agents and the conception agents have of such structures. As such social

structures will not tend to endure across time and space in the same way that natural

mechanisms do. Such differences (or ontological limits to naturalism) can be

summarised as the relatively greater activity-concept-time-space dependence of social

structures (see PON 1989 37-54, 174-179). The major epistemological limit is that

whereas the differentiability of natural mechanisms means that the natural world may

well be characterised very usefully in terms of closed systems, this is unlikely to be

the case for much of the social world.

This much should, for those familiar with critical realism at least, be familiar

if not uncontentious. But how is any of this of relevance to a conception of

technology? The central link, I want to suggest, comes when we focus upon that

human activity that engages with technology in one way or another. The TMSA

above is an attempt to draw out the main features of human agents relationship with

social structure through the medium of social activity. The focus is on the plane of

social relations. However, such activity can be viewed under another aspect as

technical activity. Human activity of course is essentially the same: people act,

always intentionally, in conditions not of their own choosing but transforming the

materials to hand. But here a distinction can be made between technical objects, that

act as the condition and consequence of technical activity and the technical subjects,

those human agents engaged in technical activity. These can be combined in a similar

way to that above to provide what is effectively a transformational model oftechnical

activity (TMTA). Here the technical subject and object are, similarly, not reducible to

or derivable from each other, they are different kinds of things, even though both are,


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in some sense, the condition and consequence of each other. However, important

differences are apparent once the manner in which both act as condition and

consequence in the TMSA and TMTA are focused upon. Consider Figure 2:

Figure 2 - the Transformational Model of Technical Activity

(devices/artefacts) Technical Object

Socialisation,

enablement

Constraint

.

Reproduction/

Transformation

(action/technique) Technical Subject

Here the nature of the existing technological objects impose severe constraints

on the kind of activity that can be pursued. Such objects both enable and constrain

different kinds of activities. Thus distance is achieved between this and voluntaristic

accounts that tend to see a special (abstract) place for both science and the lonely,

inspired inventor, in the 'creation' of new technology. Instead, a condition for

invention or developments in technology is the state of technology itself. This accords

with the observations of those such as Heilbronner and Ayres, that there are stages in

development (e.g. it is unlikely that the light bulb would be developed before

electricity and that similar patents are often filed more or less simultaneously in

different places). Furthermore, not only do the existing form of technical objects

constrain or enable kinds of action but affect the very nature of the agent. Again

consistent with the institutionalist literature, conditions not only constrain but

socialise. Thus as, say, Veblen would argue, mass production brings with it different

(socially acquired) capabilities and dispositions than craft work or agriculture.

Similarly, the action of technical subjects conditions the development of

technical objects. As with the TMSA, the emphasis is upon reproduction and

transformation (this time of the technical object). In large part though, these come

about through two relatively distinct kinds of action: developing or using technology.


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The former is the most obvious sense of technical activity. Existing artefacts or

devices are transformed into different objects. This is typically what we mean by

invention or innovation. However, a crucial difference with the TMSA needs to be

registered here. Technical activity does not change the laws of physics or, more

generally, the material content of technical objects. It is solely the form of such

objects that is, where it is, transformed. Thus it is the form that is irreducibly social.

Clearly, new materials are brought into use in the development of some object. But, as

with the sculpting artist, it is form that the human agent brings to the materials.

However, unlike society which would cease to exist without its reproduction and

transformation through human activities, the objects of technical action would not

disappear without such action. However, the question to ask, then, is would these

objects still be technology in any sense if humans disappeared? A knife has a

measurable sharpness, but this quality is only sharp or a hazard or of any importance

at all in relation to human beings. Thus a stone or a tree trunk can be used by people,

and in and through use, become technical objects. Thus technology as such requires

both a relation to people and a transformed 'form'.

The main point to make about technical objects, then, is that they have

material content but social form.7 The content of such objects is as unchangeable to

us as is gravity. The sphere of natural relations, which constitute the object's content,

is something we harness or position ourselves with respect to. But there are two

distinct senses in which technical objects have social form. First, this harnessing or

positioning involves re-forming the object, thus different materials are combined in

different ways, various characteristics of the natural world (or existing technology)

are isolated and recombined in different contexts. This re-forming reflects (and of

7 I am grateful to T. Lawson for this formulation (see T. Lawson 1997 ,p 327n )


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course embodies) human desires, purposes and values as well as, especially, given the

nature of technical action, of know-how. The resulting technological objects are then,

a kind of concretisation, objectification or repository of these ideas and knowledge..

about ways of doing things However, there is a second sense in which technical

objects have a social form which is more 'ongoing', which is of most relevance in

considering the reproduction rather than the transformation involved in technical

action. Specifically, I mean here the moment in which the social-relational character

of an object is reproduced through its use by people, typically as a means to some

other end. Thus when I use a machine in my place of work or a mobile phone on at

train, I am reproducing (although usually without intending it) some or other set of

social relations as I do so. As noted above, existing technological forms as well as the

relations in which they stand to human beings are reproduced as technology is used.

The latter though not the former is only reproduced to this extent.

It should be remembered, of course that the technical activity does not take

place in a vacuum. Thus there is also the need, in practice, effectively, to combine the

TMSA with the TMTA. Thus the material conditions of some action involve both

technical and social relations. The main point to make is that both the current state of

technical objects and social structures, both act simultaneously as condition and

consequence of human action and thus mutually condition each other. Alternatively

put, both the TMSA and the TMTA are continually in play. Thus just as the forms of

social relations that emerge are always embedded with existing networks of technical

objects, so the reproduction and transformation of different technical objects always

takes place, and must be embodied within a network of existing social relations. This

point is returned to below. For now, it is enough to point out that not only are existing

ideas or know-how reflected or concretised in the form of technical objects but so to


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are the nature of existing social relations. Moreover, it becomes impossible to

understand the nature of society without some understanding of the (non-

deterministic) role played by the current state of technology

4. Implications of the TMTA

I believe the implications of conceptualising technology and technological activity in

the above terms to be both far reaching and particularly useful. However, given

space, I shall address myself here to only a few of the issues raised in the discussion

of technological determinism provided above. These fall briefly into two categories -

the implications of a transformational conception and the implications of the dual

nature of technical objects.

The emphasis on a transformational conception of technical action, focuses

attention upon conditions and consequences of action rather than creation out of

nothing. This much is in line with those such as Ayres who emphasise that invention

does not result from the whims of detached genius inventors, but typically involves

a re-combination, in situ, of existing technical objects. Thus is sensitises the enquirer

to the importance of historical, or path dependent, context. But a conception of stages

or sequence is accommodated in a way that does not exclude the essentially social

nature of such a process. Indeed it would seem to amply accommodate positions such

as that of Winner in which the (social) consequences of action become the technical

conditions for future action. Most importantly, this accommodation of the main

insights of all these theorists is done with out at all encouraging the label of

technological determinism. Thus, just as the TMSA has clarified a relation between

structure and agency that steers a course between determinism and voluntarism, the

TMTA does performs the same task in the technological realm.


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It would also seem that the TMTA as set out above, provides a useful

framework for comparing different conceptions of exactly what technology is. For

some, technology comes close to being a way of doing things (e.g. Elluls

technique) or are things which embody knowledge of ways of doing things.


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First, this account provides a much more complex grounding of the positions

such as Marx, Winner etc, for whom technology concretises the social in some way.

Ideas of endurability, fixity etc. seem plausible but are notoriously difficult to pin

down and are always open to counterexample. However, locating the concreteness of

technical objects in the relatively greater concept-activity-time-space independence of

the natural world seems would seem to avoid such problems in a sustainable way.

However, a more contentious set of implications follow from a focus on the

kinds of technical activity noted above. Returning to the TMSA, the main types of

activity distinguished were those which transform or reproduce social structure.

Loosely translated to the technical domain, we focus rather on activities of invention

or use. However, it is clear, on reflection, that these activities are actually quite

different. It is perhaps best to conceive technical action as involving two distinct

moments. The moment of invention will typically deal with the detection of natural

mechanisms, which given their relative differentiability, will typically involve the

pursuit of isolation or de-contextualisations of the natural world. This is essentially

Heideggers main insight. Once isolation has occurred, recombination of different

mechanisms and existing technical objects often seems to provide a spur for much

technological innovation (Lawson, 2000). However, a second moment to technical

activity, mostly concerned with the ongoing use of objects, will be involved in re-

contextualising or re-embedding these objects within particular contexts. This second

moment will tend to involve very different skills, attitudes, activities, etc to the

isolating moment. A feel for fit, place, contingency etc. is required in the process of

re-embedding which is of a different nature to that most useful at the isolating stage.

Put another way, the isolating stage involves an ability to deal with or negotiate


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predominantly closed systems, whereas the secondary moment involves the ability to

deal with open systems.

Now of course, I am talking of abilities to deal with open and closed systems

as personal character traits or competences. And there is no a priori reason to think

that those who are comfortable or capable with one should be so with the other.

Indeed, recent accounts of autism, in which particular inabilities to deal with open

systems would seem to underlie some very stereotypically autistic behaviour (such as

being unable to deal with contingency, social (as opposed to fixed or binary) rules,

inability to maintain empathic social relations, etc.) suggests that differences in

abilities are great. Thus given technologys dual constitution, I am suggesting that the

technological domain is a point of overlap or even battleground for the competing

mindsets, values, etc attached to open and closed system ways of thinking about the

world. Such a scenario would seem to provide a solid foundation for Bimbers

normative technological determinists. The invasion of the lifeworld by the

technological can better be understood in terms of the mistaken application of ideas,

values, methods, concerns of most directly relevance to closed systems to situations

that are predominantly open. However, without a conception of these different

moments of technical activity, and without some kind of sustained ontological

elaboration of the social and natural domains, it is not clear that these concerns can

even be posed in a sustainable way.

4. Conclusions

A series of important problems posed by so-called technological determinists simply

cannot be addressed by critics wedded to a social constructivism which ultimately

reduces technology to the social, thus making it impossible to consider the possible


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nature of any autonomous qualities it may have. This paper, by drawing on the

social ontology of critical realism, has attempted to provide a framework in which the

insights both of so-called technological determinists and their constructivist critics can

be accommodated without so reducing technology to just another social phenomenon

or committing the error of nomological determinism. Some of the more obvious

characteristics of technology (its endurability, concreteness, quick diffusion etc.),

seem to be unproblematically grounded by conceiving of technology in terms of its

social form and material content, given the critical realist account of the differences

between the social and natural domains. Lastly, the normative concerns of various

philosophers of technology have been re-cast in terms of the different moments of

technical activity suggested by the TMTA i.e. of isolation and re-embedding.

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Lawson - Technology, Technological Determinism and the Transformational Model of Social Activity