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Laying transoceanic cables on Africa’s shores: a Neo-gramscian study

Derbe, S.T.

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Citation for published version (APA):Derbe, S. T. (2010). Laying transoceanic cables on Africa’s shores: a Neo-gramscian study.

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

135

Chapter Six: Information Society within a

Restructured Africa

This chapter examines the relationship between African

and global capitalist firms and think tanks in shaping

Africa‘s development ideology.

The first section assesses the African Information

Society Initiative (AISI), which was prepared under the

auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

(UNECA). The AISI was a blueprint for national policies

designed to bridge the digital divide. Various NGOs, local and

foreign and governmental actors and international

organisations were active participants in the process of

designing AISI. It is argued that the AISI represents a

conscious agency of reproduction of the global ideational and

material structure in Africa.

Currently, the New Partnership for Africa‘s Development

(NEPAD) is in charge of the information society policy of

Africa. The second sub-section, therefore, investigates NEPAD

using the Neo-Gramscian concepts of hegemony and

counterhegemony.

Africa’s Information Society Initiative

The majority of digital divide initiatives are designed,

undertaken and supported by the international development

practitioners, such as the Canadian IDRC (International

Development Research Centre), the Dutch IICD(International

Institution for Communication and Development), and the UK


136

DFID (Department for International Development), ITU, USAID

(United States Agency for International Development)47 .

Africa was represented by South Africa in the G-7

ministerial meeting of 1995 in which the agenda for global

information society was set by the US. In the same year, a

conference entitled ―African Regional Symposium on Telematics

for Development‖ was organised by the UNECA, UNESCO, ITU and

IDRC. The participants from Africa included ICT consumer

organisations, ISPs and regulators, whereas external

participants included IT specialists and representatives of

bilateral, regional and international organisations. This

conference reviewed existing initiatives in Africa. It was

then agreed that there is a need to devise national strategies

and policies ―emphasizing market-oriented approaches and

opportunities for partnership between user groups,

telecommunications operators and public authorities‖

(http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Padis/telematics.html).

One of the participants of the conference summed up the

agenda for policy reform as follows:

The real challenge is not technical or financial, but organizational

and political. While there are no technological barriers to rapid

expansion of Internet service in Africa, there are many in the sphere

of obsolete regulatory frameworks that result in constricting

barriers to information access and knowledge expansion.

(http://www.unitednationonline.org/eca_resources/Major_ECA_Websites/p

adis/telemat/africa03.htm).

Therefore, the conference participants decided to lobby

the Organisation of African Union and the G15 Heads of State

meetings to address the issue of information society in

47 According to Zongo (2001), ―there are so many international

development agencies in ICT related projects and activities towards Africa

that it may not be possible to go through a full list of them in [a] short

overview paper‖ (p.20).

http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Padis/telematics.html

http://www.unitednationonline.org/eca_resources/Major_ECA_Websites/padis/telemat/africa03.htm

http://www.unitednationonline.org/eca_resources/Major_ECA_Websites/padis/telemat/africa03.htm


137

Africa. It was also underlined that more stakeholders have to

be involved to shape the information society policy of Africa.

(http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Padis/telmatcs_comunik.html)

The telematics conference was a watershed event because

it marked the beginning of the information society policy in

Africa. It was followed by the UNECA Conference of Ministers

responsible for social development and planning in 1995, which

passed a resolution, entitled ―Building Africa‘s Information

Highway‖. A High-Level Working Group was appointed to draft an

umbrella policy that will streamline the various Internet

initiatives in Africa in a definite direction

(http://www.uneca.org/aisi/).

The High-Level Working Group, composed of 11 ICT experts,

came up with ―African Information Society Initiative (AISI):

An Action Framework to Build Africa's Information and

Communication Infrastructure" in 1996. The premise of the

framework was that information technologies are tools that

enable low capital investment and efficient exploitation of

Africa‘s vast information resources. The objective of the

framework is to guide African leaders to take advantage of

this technological revolution by opening up their market to

global ICT providers. Hence, mirroring the information

society agenda set forth earlier by various global

organisations, the AISI recommended:

inclusion of the private sector and NGOs in

the national policy making process,

strong protection for intellectual property,

free flow of information within African

countries and to/from the rest of the world,

http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Padis/telmatcs_comunik.html

http://www.uneca.org/aisi/


138

liberalisation of national

telecommunications and public broadcasting

services, and

creation of enabling environment for

investment through policy and legislation.

The AISI was endorsed by the Summit of Heads of States of

the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at the 64th Ordinary

Session of the Council of Ministers meeting held in Yaoundé,

Cameroon in July 1996. It was subsequently approved by

influential international organisations such as the G8

(http://www.uneca.org/aisi/).

The ECA took up the task of coordinating and guiding the

implementation of the AISI based on this blueprint. The E-

readiness reports prepared by the ECA provided an update on

the investment realities in African countries. It also made

investment scans to indicate the business opportunities

available in Africa (See Scan-ICT at

http://www.uneca.org/aisi/). The ECA also coordinated the

preparation of a common African position at the WSIS. In

general, it played a central role in formulating Africa‘s

position with respect to the ICAIS and other global

information society issues.

In 2002, African leaders introduced another high profile

development blueprint, NEPAD. Hence, NEPAD‘s e-commission for

Africa took over the assignment ―to federate all the ICT

initiatives of the continent and mobilise resources for

funding of the major African projects‖

(http://www.uneca.org/aisi/ Bamako2002/.



http://www.uneca.org/aisi/%20Bamako2002/


139

NEPAD, African Development and E-strategies

The first sub-section deals with the origin of NEPAD, its

vision and strategies. The second sub-section assesses

political response to NEPAD from regional and international

political actors. The third sub-section provides an

interpretation of the role and function of NEPAD from a Neo-

Gramscian perspective.

Genesis of NEPAD

A number of political and economic programmes have been

proposed to end the cycle of poverty and conflict in Africa.

The Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, Africa‘s Priority Programme

for Economic Recovery of 1986, the African Alternative

Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-

Economic Recovery and Transformation of 1989 are only a few of

these policy proposals. NEPAD is yet another such initiative

that aims to address the continent‘s economic, political and

social problems (Adedeji, 2002).

The NEPAD initiative was derived from two recovery plans

for Africa drawn up by Presidents Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal

and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. The first, called the Omega

Plan for Africa, stressed that the major causes of disparity

in productivity and living standards between developed and

developing countries emanate from the difference in their

respective level of infrastructure. Hence, if the gaps in

physical infrastructure, education, health and agriculture are

bridged, Africa will have the capacity to participate in

global production and trade. The practical problem that needs

to be addressed is, therefore, securing finance for

infrastructure construction. The Omega plan insisted that


140

Africa should not rely on foreign aid or debt to finance its

infrastructure projects. Instead, the resources should be

drawn from creation of special drawing rights for Africa,

borrowing from African national treasuries, foreign direct

investment, etc (http:// www.nepad.org.ng /PDF/About% 20Nepad

/planOmega.pdf).

The Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme

(MAP) was the plan contributed by Thabo Mbeki of South Africa.

The MAP was more far-reaching and comprehensive, and it has

been almost entirely incorporated into the final NEPAD

document. NEPAD attributes the impoverishment of the continent

to its colonial legacy, especially to the exploitation of raw

materials for the production of value added products in the

West. Subversion of traditional values, institutions and

structures for imperial ends, and the heritage of a ―weak

capitalist class and weak...accumulation process‖ are the

major features of this legacy. The poor rate of accumulation

in the post-colonial period coupled with a dysfunctional and

corrupt leadership is the single most important obstacle to

Africa‘s economic recovery (OAU, 2001).

NEPAD declared its ―vision and firm conviction" to be the

eradication of poverty in Africa and abolition of the

development chasm between the continent and the international

community. The specific goals to be attained in the medium

term include achievement of an economic growth of 7% per annum

in the next 15 years and attainment of the UN Millennium

Development Goals. The latter include reduction of the

proportion of people living under extreme poverty , infant and

maternal mortality, and increasing student enrolment,

provision of basic health services, etc (Para.1).

http://www.nepad.org.ng/PDF/About%20Nepad/planOmega.pdf

http://www.nepad.org.ng/PDF/About%20Nepad/planOmega.pdf


141

The strategy for economic growth advocated by NEPAD

focuses on increasing and diversifying African exports and

enhancing its competitiveness. The marginalisation of Africa

from the world market is considered the manifestation of its

poverty.

While globalisation has increased the cost of Africa‘s ability to

compete, we hold that the advantages of an effectively managed

integration present the best prospects for future economic prosperity

and poverty reduction (Para.28).

The mobility of capital across the globe enables governments and

private entrepreneurs to secure financial resources from global

markets. To sum up, the globalization process offers Africa greater

opportunity for real injection of private funding and risk taking,

creation of new markets and harnessing of increased economic capacity

(Paras. 29-32).

However, according to NEPAD, there are still two major

obstacles to end the marginalisation of Africa. Firstly, the

developed countries have taken advantage of the marginalised

sections of the world due to the absence of fair and just

rules to regulate global integration of economies. NEPAD

insisted, however, that the call for a fair global rule of

business is not only a moral but also an economic imperative.

In the words of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi,

A small minority of the world creates much of current wealth. That

wealth cannot continue to grow indefinitely so long as it continues

to be based on a narrow circle. The base of the wealth creation has

to be expanded to include the rest of the world for it to be

sustained. In the absence of such an expansive process, it is only a

matter of time before the economies of the developed world stagnate

with all the dire consequences of such a phenomenon…Africa‘s

development is thus a necessary means of preventing ultimate

stagnation in the developed world.

...NEPAD is thus based on the recognition of the fact that Africa‘s

development is vital to the realization of the direct material

interest not only of Africans but also of the rest of the world

(Quoted in Abraham, 2003, pp.19-20).

The other obstacle is the failure by African governments

to introduce good governance. NEPAD, thus, vouched to create a

market friendly environment in Africa through its peace,


142

security, democracy and political governance initiatives. The

African leaders behind NEPAD have assured their partners that

―the numbers of democratically elected leaders are on the

increase‖ in the continent and, hence, the positive outcome of

this latest initiative is guaranteed (para.42). However,

market assessment reports released by Western economic

institutes in the same year NEPAD came to existence seemed to

negate this assurance. For example, according to the Report of

the Economic Freedom of the World in 2003, except for six

African countries (Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia,

Mauritius and Tanzania), the rest have unacceptable legal

structures and weak protection of property rights. Similarly,

the corruption index places most of African countries among

the worst offenders. Only fourteen countries have managed to

put in place enough discipline on their fiscal regime through

spending cuts, reduction of stabilisation funds, and

accelerated privatisation (cited in Loots, 2003).

The African Peer Review Mechanism was created to lock in

the political commitment of each African country. This is a

voluntary mechanism by which member states undertake periodic

review of the policies and practices of one another and exert

peer pressure on the laggards. The review aims to ultimately

ensure that the political and economic processes in the

African countries conform to best practice guidelines

stipulated by their ―development partners‖. By 2008, 29

African states had already gone through the Peer Review

Mechanism (http://www.nepad.org/aprm/; Loots, 2003, p.4).

NEPAD requested foreign financial aid ―to bridge

existing gaps between Africa and the developed countries so as

to improve the continent‘s international competitiveness and

enable it to participate in the globalisation process‖

(Para.95). A large capital inflow, 64 billion USD every year,

http://www.nepad.org/aprm/


143

was sought by NEPAD to carry out its plans and programmes. The

partners for development are, thus, expected to provide debt

cancellation, aid and other financing mechanisms in the short

run. However, NEPAD relies on expected private capital flows

to harness the wealth of Africa and achieve its objectives

(Para.144).

The role of ICTs in the integration of Africa into the

global economy is given a special focus in the NEPAD strategy.

The current economic revolution has, in part, been made possible by

advances in information and communications technology (ICT), which

have reduced the cost of and increased the speed of communications

across the globe, abolishing pre-existing barriers of time and space,

and affecting all areas of social and economic life. It has made

possible the integration of national systems of production and

finance, and is reflected in an exponential growth in the scale of

cross-border flows of goods, services and capital (Para.29).

The benefits expected from utilisation of ICTs range from

enhancing opportunities for global trade, investment and

finance to creation of a common regional market and even an

African Union (Paras.104-108). The small size of African

markets is singled out as the major obstacle to attract

foreign direct investment. Thus, by rolling out regional

Internet connectivity, NEPAD aims to link these markets the

global economy.

The e-Africa commission of NEPAD was established early in

2001 with funding from donors such as the World Bank, the

African Development Bank, UK, Japanese, Swiss development

agencies as well as the governments of South Africa and Egypt.

This organ is responsible for ICT initiatives. The commission,

operating in alliance with regional organisations such as

Southern Africa Development Cooperation (SADC), shapes policy

and regulatory framework to facilitate telecommunications

reform and e-readiness. The fibre optic cable project

discussed in the previous chapter, thus, was one of the tasks


144

the Commission set out to accomplish. The plan was to

coordinate all the fibre optic cables into a ring so that

every African country will be connected to the information

superhighway (http://www.eafricacommission.org/).

Foreign and local engagement with NEPAD

The NEPAD development blueprint has received favourable

response from donors and Western governments. More

importantly, the G8 encouraged all partnership agreements to

be undertaken via the organs created under NEPAD (Abraham,

2003).

In contrast, NEPAD has been a subject of serious

criticism by a number of African scholars, civil society

groups and social movements (Bond, 2005a). The first criticism

relates to the elite driven, top-down process of its

inception. NEPAD was initiated by the heads of states of

Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria and Senegal and later submitted

to the G8 for an approval. Questions as to the source and

scope of its authority have not been answered yet (Tandon,

2002, p.10; Maxwell & Christiansen, 2002; Adedeji, 2002;

Matthews, 2004; Mbaku, 2004).

According to Chabal (2002), the very nature of post-

colonial politics in Africa militates against any democratic

process. Neo-patrimonialism and clientilism still define

African politics. Despite the presence of a modern

institutional facade, power is still exercised through

informal patron-client relationship between the ruling elites

and their support base. Chabal cites the civil service system

as an example of just another link for the patrimonial chain

between patrons and clients. Similarly, elections do not have

http://www.eafricacommission.org/


145

the role of establishing accountability but factional

mobilisation, since the principles of legitimacy are still

traditional. Hence, without fundamentally changing the neo-

patrimonial politics of Africa, it is impossible to have

initiatives like NEPAD through a participatory process.

The second theme of criticism is NEPAD‘s development

paradigm, which is understood to be neo-liberalism. Some

scholars have pointed out that NEPAD‘s reliance on foreign aid

leads to a reproduction of colonial/dependency relationships

(Adedeji, 2002). Others have contended that, as experiences of

other countries such as Argentina indicate, foreign direct

investment (FDI) is a risky means to build Africa‘s economy

(Tandon, 2002, p.21). Tandon, thus, recommends that African

governments open their doors to FDI selectively, and not as a

matter of general policy. In particular, the provision of

social services such as electricity, education, health, etc

must not be put in the investment basket. The obligation to

provide basic needs of the people must be placed outside the

vagaries of the market and squarely shouldered by African

governments.

The cooperation paradigm, or partnership, is also

criticised for perpetuating the inequality between donors and

recipients (Maxwell & Christiansen, 2002; Matthews, 2004).

According to Adedeji (2002), the subtle semantic and

conceptual shift from ―cooperation‖ or ―compact‖ to

―partnership‖ since the end of the cold war has culminated

NEPAD. This shift reflects the change in the character of

international relations since the Yaoundé I cooperation

agreement between the then European Economic Community and

Africa in the 1960s. Each successive agreement has reduced the

autonomy of recipients over aid resources by introducing

stringent conditionality. Adedeji argued that with the


146

introduction of ―partnership‖, the liberal international

principle of interdependence is no more in the service of

Africa. Consequently, it would be naive to expect the

partnership advocated by NEPAD to signify anything other than

submission of Africa to a neo-liberal discipline.

Finally, academics and civil society groups have

articulated alternative visions for Africa. Adedeji advocated

a revival of the principles which guided the liberation

struggle in Africa, namely: self-reliance, self-sustainment,

the democratisation of the development process, and a fair and

just distribution of the fruit of economic progress. Self-

reliance, which is the core element of this vision, emphasises

import substitution and internal articulation of the economy

(Adedeji, 2002, p.7).

Similarly, the Council for the Development of Social

Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and Third World Network

evaluated NEPAD in their meeting in Accra, Ghana in 2002. The

common position was that current African economic problems

emanate from the international economic order with its

division of labour reinforcing ―domestic weaknesses deriving

from socio-economic and political structures‖. Thus, the

policy measures that are urgently required for the recovery of

Africa were pointed out as follows:

stabilisation of commodity prices,

reform of the international financial

system, the World Bank and the IMF,

an end to IMF/World Bank Structural

Adjustment Programmes,

fundamental changes to the existing

agreements of the WTO regime, as well as

reversal of the attempts to expand the scope


147

of this regime to new areas including

investment, competition and government

procurement, and

debt cancellation.

Likewise, a number of radical African social movements,

trade unions, youth and women organisations, and religious,

academic, etc groups, convened in Durban, South Africa in 2002

to denounce NEPAD. The Civil Society Indaba of South Africa,

for instance, specifically addressed each segment of NEPAD‘s

neo-liberal policies including private ownership of

infrastructure, commercial agriculture, debt rescheduling,

etc. They concluded that all these measures are detrimental to

food security, employment, and environmental protection in

Africa. The African Civil Society Declaration that came out of

this meeting articulated an alternative vision for Africa

based on the principles of Human Rights, Self-Reliance, Pan-

Africanism, and a ―developmental participatory state‖

(Bond,2005a,pp.32-35).

Unlike the civil society groups that have been promoting

the neo-liberal principles enshrined in NEPAD, the radical

civil society elements opposed to it remain hardly visible.

The first problem faced by radical civil society groups is

lack of resources to disseminate information, or to carry out

advocacy and lobbying activities. For instance, about 650

activists attended the 2004 Africa Social Forum, which met in

Lusaka, Zambia. Most of the delegates were from neighbouring

countries such as Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia. Members from

other parts of the continent were unable to participate due to

material constraints. Besides, organisations, which were

putting up resistance against their governments on issues of

privatisation and environmental degradation, were prevented

from attending this conference (Bond, 2005b).


148

In Africa, as elsewhere, there are divisions among civil

society actors as to the stance to be taken against the state

and international financial institutions. Some civil society

actors prefer a critical engagement with both, while others

call for mass action and civil disobedience. This divergence

in commitment is usually presented as a lack of unity leading

to the inability to design an all-Africa social forum.

However, such evaluation of civil society actors seems to be

based on an erroneous theoretical presupposition that civil

society represents a homogenous and autonomous entity. Rather,

the African Civil Society Declaration points the way towards a

resistance bloc that not only opposes the neoliberal path of

NEPAD but also offers an alternative vision.

Framing NEPAD

While there is no dearth of criticism of NEPAD, there are

relatively few attempts to explain why it came about in the

first place. Adedeji (2002, p.11) characterised the

partnership logic of NEPAD as ―a childlike naivety among

African leaders and policy makers‖ in expecting a relationship

with donors based on equality. Tandon (2002, p.25), on the

other hand, commented that the ―road to hell is often paved

with good intentions‖. For these authors, NEPAD arises from a

noble concern to end the spiral of poverty and conflict that

is plaguing Africa. It is only the means that it chose which

is inappropriate to the reality of the continent. According to

these scholars, NEPAD should simply adopt a ―strategy of self-

reliance‖48.

48 Both Adedeji and Tandon emphasised the distinction between

insertion into the global accumulation system as advocated by NEPAD and

controlled integration into the global economy. The suggested path is an


149

Tsheola (2002), on the other hand, associated the birth

of NEPAD to the role of South Africa in mediating

globalisation in the continent. He traced the shift to neo-

liberalism in South Africa to the Growth, Employment and

Redistribution (GEAR) policy of 1996. GEAR was committed to

relaxation of exchange controls, reduction of tariff on

imports and privatisation of public assets. These policy

changes affirmed the primary role of capital in the post-

Apartheid recovery of South Africa49.

auto-centred integration in which African countries do not merely adjust to

the system but shape and influence it to their own advantage. Amin stressed

the political goals of integration as follows:

Here we have to look at the challenge of regionalism in another way:

that the bourgeoisie-at the global level or the compradors at various

levels in Africa and elsewhere-look at the problem of regionalism in terms

of common markets and we should be very critical of this view. It is

presented as follows: that if even the Europeans with strong national

economies need to unite by building a common market, we should do the same.

In fact, they have different problems and they have to go beyond a common

market even from the European left point of view (1997, p.8).

49 The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) stated that

the wage of blue collar workers went down by 7% and number of jobs by

171,000 only a year after the introduction of this new policy. At the same

time, the reduction of public expenditure and the push for a slim state has

eclipsed the redistributive goals of the post-Apartheid recovery programme

(Vavi, 1997).

Tsheola also observed that despite the sound macroeconomic

fundamentals set down by GEAR, foreign investment did not materialise. In

fact, there was more capital flight from the country, aided by the

relaxation of foreign exchange control prescribed by the new policy. The

result of this capital outflow was the state expenditure deficit leading to

labour strikes and stoppage. In short, GEAR ensured foreign interests at

the expense of domestic ones.


150

South Africa‘s geographical association with Africa,

which is deemed a zone of danger for free enterprise, was

identified as the cause for the lack of FDI. Therefore, GEAR

was later transposed to NEPAD through the active leadership of

Thabo Mbeki. According to Tsheola, in spite of the rhetoric of

―African recovery‖, NEPAD is but a means to attract more FDI

to South Africa itself.

South African economic think tanks and experts have

indeed positively evaluated the NEPAD initiative as a vehicle

for national economic objectives. The President of the

Economic Society of South Africa spelt out the strategic

advantages of corporate expansion of South Africa into the

rest of the continent (Loots, 2005). Firstly, the

profitability of investment in Africa is, on average, higher

than in other regions of the world. Secondly, the perception

of foreign investors about the continent follows a blanket

approach, which tends to lump all of Africa as a single

destination. South Africa and China are becoming major

investors in the continent partly because they do not share

this perception. Therefore, the adoption of ―good policies

within a stable institutional framework‖ such as NEPAD is an

indispensable prerequisite to attract FDI to Africa50.

Akinboade and Lalthapersad-Pillay (2005,) provided a

detailed account of the ―possible pay-offs‖ of the NEPAD

policy framework for South African economic interest.

Accordingly, African countries need the expertise, investment

50 Loots (2003) also extensively analysed the function and role of

the African Peer Review Mechanism in providing such stable institutional

framework. Applying concepts from the New Institutional Economics (NIE),

she outlined the role of institutions such as the Peer Review Mechanism in

reducing uncertainty, promoting efficiency and, therefore, facilitating

good economic performance.


151

and concrete business opportunities offered by South Africa

―to kick start their development process‖. Economic contact

with South Africa ―provides an opportunity to procure

internationally traded goods and services at reasonable cost

from an African country‖ (pp.5-6).

More importantly, South Africa offers one of the largest

and most deregulated financial industries with sophisticated

banking and insurance markets. The South African stock

exchange market is an important source of equity financing.

Moreover, South African enterprises have the expertise and the

capacity to construct and maintain transport,

telecommunications and energy infrastructure in other African

countries.

Similarly, what South Africa can get from the rest of

Africa is stated as follows:

During the apartheid years cultural, political and economic sanctions

were imposed against South Africa. As South Africa embraced

democracy, these sanctions were lifted. This opened up the

possibility of corporate expansion of dominant South African firms

into the rest of Africa as a means of maintaining economic viability

and acquiring more competitive strength in a globalizing world. Also

expanding into other parts of Africa could minimize the impact of

policy changes that are introduced under democracy on South African

business interests, and should facilitate the closer integration with

Africa of an otherwise previously isolated country(p. 256).

Amin (2006), on the other hand, situated the NEPAD

initiative and the role of African actors within a broader

critique of global capitalist developments. His major

proposition is that various models of worldwide capital

accumulation rest on social alliances in the centre and

periphery. Accordingly, the colonial, post-colonial and the

current ―globalization‖ phases have depended on different

types of comprador classes in Africa.


152

The social blocs in Africa that engaged in the liberation

struggle and then in the NIEO were ―national populist‖ pitted

against the imperial ambitions of transnational capital. The

hegemonic ideas that cemented this bloc included economic

modernisation through industrialisation, internal articulation

of the economy, and creation of internal demand for growth.

According to Amin, these were the foundation for the economic

and social transformation of the third world from the 1950s up

to the 1970s51.

However, the dominance of neo-liberal blocs in the North

and the material limitations in the South later brought about

the reconfiguration of comprador classes in Africa. The debt

burden and the discontinuation of the growth and

industrialisation policies finally eroded national populism.

It could be asked why the governments of the countries of the South

have subscribed to all of these commandments drafted in the

imperialist centres. The response, in general terms, is that we

should look to the social hegemonic blocs mentioned above that make

possible the reproduction of asymmetric globalization. There is a new

comprador class in the countries of the periphery that actually

derives its existence from the new model of globalized liberalism.

This comprador class participates in the new government arrangements

that followed the erosion of the national populist models inspired by

Bandung (Amin, 2006, p.4).

Taylor (2002) has also applied the insights of Neo-

Gramscian theory for his argument that NEPAD has been the

instrument of externally-oriented fraction of capital within

51 Amin distinguished a national populist bloc from a national

socialist one. The former could be useful in combating colonial and neo-

colonial impositions from abroad. Besides, it could play a role in defining

an autonomous development path for Africa. Ultimately, however, the

emergence of a national socialist bloc is a necessary condition to delink

from a capitalist world system. De-linkage is not synonymous with autarchy.

It refers to what Amin calls auto-centred integration with the

international economy.


153

key African states, mainly: South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria.

These are confronted by inward-looking fractions who rallied

around a nationalist project of de-linkage from the world

capitalist system. However, the new global structure has

provided favourable opportunities for the externally oriented

fraction to prevail in such regional initiatives as NEPAD.

These explanations have some merits when analysed on the

basis of the facts and analysis presented in the previous

chapters of this dissertation. The framing of NEPAD as a mere

extension of South Africa‘s national interest into the rest of

the continent appears to be the most extensively documented

and evidenced of all the different arguments. Lesufi (2004,)

emphasised this argument by pointing out that the presentation

of NEPAD as a collective instrument of African leaders

conceals ―the inequalities among the African states and thus

the real possibilities of reproducing relations of domination

and exploitation among them‖ (pp.813-814). Bond (2006) also

underlined the thesis that South Africa is deploying its

―comparative advantage‖ in the industrial sector in order to

play a semi-imperialist role over other African countries.

Such analysis overemphasises the role of national

interest and disregards the integral role played by

transnational alliance of interests52. The agency of other

actors in Africa in charting out a neo-liberal path of

development is, therefore, underestimated.

52 The Sunday Times, reporting on the July 2003 African Union meeting

in Maputo, stated that Mbeki was viewed by other African leaders as ―too

powerful, and they privately accuse him of wanting to impose his will on

others. In the corridors they call him the George Bush of Africa, leading

the most powerful nation in the neighbourhood and using his financial and

military muscle to further his own agenda‖ (Cited in Bond, 2006, p.112).


154

It may be instructive to note the evolution of the Open

Access Policy initiative as the key policy instrument to

integrate Africa into the global economy. This initiative was,

from the start, incubated by Internet service providers in

Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria in particular, and in other African

countries, in general, through their continental ISP

association. The Halfway Proposition and Open Access policy

for Africa were the contributions of this association or its

members. These were only later actively supported and even

funded by the South African political and corporate

elite53.However, the advocacy and policy proposals had already

influenced donors and international financial organisations

well before the involvement of the South African government.

Taylor‘s assessment of NEPAD seems to be closer to the

factual evidence offered in the previous chapters of this

dissertation. However, his dichotomy of the present political

actors into external oriented and inward looking ones is not

fully tenable. It may be appropriate to characterise the

difference between the proponents of NEPAD and some civil

society actors and academics who espoused import substitution

and self-reliance .Otherwise, the Open Access versus

Consortium dispute as well as the resistance by African

governments to privatisation and liberalisation of national

telcos did not display any inward looking political or policy

stance. NEPAD‘s emphasis on African ownership of the fibre

optic cable is, thus, specific to proprietary rights over the

assets such as fibre optic cables and landing stations. It

does not aim to reorient the patterns of trade and investment

between Africa and foreign capital.

53 The South African government contributed 3 million Rand to NEPAD

e-Africa commission to supplement its budget for one year (Jensen, 2007,

p.20).


155

South Africa is indeed the major economic force in Africa

but not the only one. Egypt and Nigeria seek bigger markets

for further accumulation. Egypt is one of those African

countries with indigenous Pan-African operators with a stake

in the global and regional information society policy. MSI and

Orascom, Sudanese and Egyptian private telcos respectively,

have more than fourteen licences in other African countries in

2000 (Gebreab, 2002, p. 9). These corporations have also been

well represented by their state bureaucrats in the NEPAD

blueprint. Egypt, it is to be recalled, was one of the

countries that financed the e-Africa Commission.

South Africa, Senegal and Nigeria, have a relatively

visible preponderance of elites that are part of an emerging

transnational bloc comprised of executives and affiliates of

global corporations, consumerist elites, state bureaucrats as

well as politicians and professionals promoting neo-liberal

policies. The considerable political and discursive power

mobilised to shape African information society by NGOs, ISP

associations, new ICT enterprises is a manifestation of a

transnational class alliance. Likewise, the dispute around the

Open Access versus Consortium models is a conflict between

class fractions, rather than between national interests. ISPs,

mobile providers, ICT entrepreneurs, NGOs, etc, irrespective

of national origin, were supportive of a liberalised

infrastructure provision whereas incumbent telcos were in

favour of a monopoly provision.

Neo-Gramscian studies seem to have neglected the

probability of such class alliance in African social

formations. According to Cox, no dominant class has been able

to establish hegemony in the peripheral regions nor is the

economy developed as in the hegemonic core. In other words, in


156

the peripheral regions, the state is Hobbesian, where civil

society is undeveloped, and the ruling class is the state

class. Therefore, elites in these regions are not able to

articulate hegemonic ideas that have a social basis and

internal logic. Thus, political change in such circumstances

amounts to superimposition of global capital accumulation over

the old internal power structure (Van der Pijl, 1998).Major

ideological and political shifts in Africa ranging from the

promotion of the New International Economic Order of the 1970s

to the democratisation movement of the 1980s were, thus,

summarily explained as a passive revolution. The ruling class

in Africa is ―too weak to establish hegemony in the sense of

an ideological bond between itself and the masses‖

(Abrahamsen, 1997, p.149).

However, the political processes discussed in this

dissertation suggest that hegemonic politics has also its

place in Africa, albeit to a limited extent. Likewise, NEPAD‘s

neo-liberal agenda was opposed by a coalition of radical civil

society actors at regional platforms. Such opposition is a

prototype of a counterhegemonic exercise against the moral and

political legitimacy of the NEPAD programme. Civil society

groups have been able to forward ideas reflective of African

reality and antagonistic to the hegemony of neo-liberalism.

Hence, there are some empirical indications that a blanket

characterisation of African regional and national politics as

a mere ―transition or conveyor belt‖ of external changes may

be unwarranted54. Rather, concepts such as passive revolution

and hegemony are ideal types whose application in practical

contexts may reveal nuances and variations.

54 Though Amin has noted that national populists had a hegemony in

the 1950s and 1960s, he does not ascribe such hegemony to the new

―comprador classes‖ active in NEPAD.


157

In South Africa, GEAR has generally been regarded as a

broad social contract, including civil society, political

parties, and grassroots movements, both radical and moderate,

under the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC).

As a hegemonic exercise, GEAR attempts to establish its

legitimacy by invoking black empowerment in the post-Apartheid

period (Adler & Webster, 1995; Bond & Mayekiso, 1996). Such

empowerment generally took the form of ownership and control

of state enterprises by black entrepreneurs. For example, a

black middle class group owned equity in Telkom (Engdahl &

Hauki, 2001, Horowtiz & Curry, 2007).

However, this idea of black empowerment has also been

contested. Labour representatives such as the Congress of

South African Trade Union (COSATU) have asserted that creation

of black or African bourgeoisie merely introduces a class

conflict between (black) capital and (black) labour. Thus,

empowerment is progressive only when it is people centred and

addresses such issues as poverty, urban renewal and gender

balance (Labour Resource and Research Institute, 2001).

A political contestation of comparable degree also took

place in Senegal, as described in the previous chapter, where

telecommunications reforms accompanied the restructuring of

the state. The employees of the monopoly telco retained their

privilege by becoming shareholders in the new private company.

Nevertheless, a consensus was reached after a complex state-

civil society engagement in which traditional authority

figures (marabouts) were also involved along with the urban


158

middle class55. Certainly, the political forces pitted against

each other had little ideological difference than in South

Africa. Even then, this kind of compromise politics occurred

to a lesser degree in countries like Ghana where privatisation

and liberalisation were carried out after demobilisation of

opposition groups (Noll &Shirley, 2001, p.47).

At the other end of the spectrum are countries like

Ethiopia and Algeria, whose leaders have been the

spokespersons of NEPAD to the outside world. Here the state is

a ―tyranny of cousins‖ and politics is synonymous with armed

struggle or urban riots. In Algeria, telecommunication reform

was carried out in disregard of opposition by labour unions

and political parties (Um, 2004). In Ethiopia,

telecommunication reforms have been muted until the recent

push by international organisations to kick-start the

country‘s accession to the WTO Agreement. These are, indeed,

good examples of passive revolution where a new form of

capitalist accumulation is introduced without altering the

existing social divisions whether based on tradition,

ethnicity, or class. Telecommunication reforms or introduction

of information society policies in such social formations are

means to access foreign debt or aid that will ensure the

continuity of the existing system.

55 These are leaders of Muslim Brotherhoods in Senegal with strong

following. They have been able to influence the votes of their followers

and negotiate with political candidates for the presidency (Azam et al.,

2002).

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